ML17312B142
| ML17312B142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1996 |
| From: | Clifford J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312B143 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9612240299 | |
| Download: ML17312B142 (36) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001 R ZONA PU C
CK T NO.
STN 50-528 ALO VERD NUCLEAR G NERAT NG STATION UNIT NO.
1 MENDM NT TO FAC TY OPERATING LIC NS Amendment No. 110 License No. NPF-41 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
{the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Souther n California Public Power Authority dated June 28, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and {ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 2.
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as fo1lows:
96i2240299 96i210 PDR ADQCK 05000528 P
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(2)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
- 110, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of.issuance to be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR'. REGULATORY COMMISSION J
es W..Clif d, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
December 10, 1996
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ATTACHHENT TO LICENSE AHENDHENT NDHENT NO.
110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENS NO.
NPF-41 DOCKET NO.
STN 50-528 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised'ages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
~REMOV 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 '5-3
'INSERT 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3
0 et I.'
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MERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
~ SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,
- screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
Verifying that a minimum total of 524 cubic feet of solid granular anhydrous trisodium phosphate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 3.5 + 0.005 grams of anhydrous TSP (corrected for moisture content) from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 1.0 2 0.005 liter of 2.5 wt% boric acid solution (nominally 4400 ppm boron at 135 2 9'F, the pH of the solution as measured at 77 2 9'F is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on (SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the containment sump isolation valves
- open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation flow line isol'ation valves and combined SI mini-flow valve close, and the LPSI pumps stop.
Conducting an inspection of all ECCS piping outside of containment, which is in contact with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA conditions, and verifying.that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than I gpm when pressurized to at least 40 psig.
f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow.when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
2.
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or. equal to 1761 psid.
Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 165 psid.
PALO VERDE UNIT I 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 87
, HP-, 110
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3/4.5 EMERGENCY COR DOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Safety In)ection System (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volte of borated water will be i~diately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety infection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling aechanisa during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank vol~, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety infection tanks will adequately perfora their function in the event of a LOCA in NDE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A ainiaum of 25X narrow range corresponding to 1790 cubic feet and a aaxiaum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety analysis as the vol~ in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 2BX narrow range corresponding,to 1802 cubic feet and 72X narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a aaxiaua pressure of 632 psig arc used in the safety analysis.
To allow for instrument accuracy 600 psig ainimum and 625 psig aaximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm ainiaoa and 4400 ppm aaximum are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower liait of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit asswed in the safety analysis prior to the tiae when draining of the SIT is necessary.
The SIT isolation valves are not single failure proof; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be reaoved froa these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during a Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves is removed while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumption of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to be operable so that, given a single failure, all four SITs aay still be vented during post-LOCA long-term cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT dcpressurization capability which ensures the tiacly establishaent of shutdown cooling entry conditions as assed by the safety analysis for saall break LOCAs.
The liaits for operation with a safety infection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed ainiaizes the tiae exposure of thc plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety infection tank which any result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be.immediately
- opened, the full capability of one safety in5ection tank is not available and proapt action is required to place the reactor in a NDE where this capability is not required.
For NOES 3 and 4 operation with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia the Technical Specifications require a ainiaua of 57X wide range corresponding PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO. 28
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ~ECCS}
BASES SAF TY NJ CT N TANl(S (Continued) to 1361 cubic feet, and a maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water per tank, when three safety injection tanks are'perable and a minimum of 36X wide range cor'responding to 9Q8 cubic feet 'and a'aximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet per tank, wNen four safety inject.ion tani:s are operable at
'a minimum pressure of 235 psi'g and' maximum pressure. of 625 ps'ig.
Ilo allow for instrument inaccuracy, 6OX wide range instrument corresponding to 1415 cubic feet, and 72X narrow range instrument corresponding,to 1914 cubic feet, when three safety injection tanks are operable, and 39X wide range instrument
'cor'respondiing to 962 cubic fe'et,',
and 72X narrow range instrument corresponding to
$ 914 Cubic feet, when four, SITs are operable, are speci. fied in the Technical Speci,fications.
1'o all,'ow,'for instrument inaccuracy 254 psig is specified in the Technical Specifications The instrumentation vs.
volu~~e correlation for the SITs is as follows:
Volume Narrow R~an e
Mjde~gge 962 ft:,
<OX 39X 1415 ft;',
<09'0X
'802 ft:,
28X 78X
'914 ft'29$
83X 4.5.2 and 3 4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two.separate and indepeindhnt'CCS'ubsystems with'he
'ndicated RCS pressure greater than or equal to 1837 psia, or with the indicated RCS cold leg temperature greater than or equal to 485 degrees F
ensures that suffi,cient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one'uibsyst'em'thlrough any single failure consideration.
These indicated valu'es 'include allowances for uncertainties.
Either subsystem operating in donljunction'ith the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperature.
within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the 'largest IRCS cold leg pipe downward.
.In addition, each ECCS subsystem prdvides'ong-'erm core cooling capability in the reicircu1lation mode during the accident recovery period.
The Mode 3 safety analysis credits one HPSI Pump to provide negative reactivity insertion to protect the core and RCS following a steam line b'reak
'hen RCS cold leg temperature is 485 degrees F or gr'eater'.
'Requiring two operable ECCS subsystems in the situation will ensure one HPSI pump is available assuming single failure of the other HPSI pump.
With the 'RCS co'ld leg temperature below 485 degrees F,
one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable w1ithiout -single failure cohsi'deration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition, of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
Anhydrous TSP is stored. in baskets in cont,ainment that allow the TSP to dissolve into. contaiinment sump water following a large break LOCA.
Once dissolved in the containment sump water', the'SP will increase the water
'pH to greater than or equal to 7.
Maintaining the, pH at greater than or equal to 7
prevents a significant fraction of dissolved'odine, from converting to a volatile form and minimizes the. potential of stress corrosion cracking 'of, austenitic stainless stee'll components in containment following a LOCA.
PALO VERDE UNIT 1
B 3/4 5-2'me,ndment No. +06-,%871'I 0
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
'ASES The surveillance requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance require-ments for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA*.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(I) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
In specification 4.5.2.h, the specified flows include instrumentation uncertainties.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of borated water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
The term "minimum bypass recirculation flow," as used in Specification 4.5.2e.3.
and 4.5.2f., refers to that'flow directed back to the RWT from the ECCS pumps for pump protection.
Testing of the ECCS pumps under the condition of minimum bypass recirculation flow in Specification 4.5.2f. verifies that the performance of the ECCS pumps supports the safety analysis minimum RCS pressure assumption at zero delivery to the RCS.
3 4.5.4 REFUELING WAT R TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water tank (RWT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that (I) sufficient water plus lOX margin is avail-able to permit 20 minutes of engineered safety features pump operation, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.
These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
- The following test conditions, which apply during flow balance tests, ensure that the ECCS subsystems are adequately tested.
The pressurizer pressure is at atmospheric pressure.
The miniflow bypass recirculation lines are aligned for injection.
For LPSI system, (add/subtract) 6.4 gpm (to/from) the 4800 gpm requirement for every foot by which the difference of RWT water level above the RWT RAS setpoint level (exceeds/is less than) the difference of RCS water level above the cold leg centerline.
PALO VERDE - UNIT I B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 47-, 110
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.UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 R ZONA PUBLIC S RV C
COHPANY ET CKE NO STN 50-529 PALO VERDE NUC EAR G
N RATING STATION UNIT NO.
2 AHENDHENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 102 License No.
NPF-51 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Hexico, Los Angeles Department of Mater and
- Power, and South'em California Public Power Authority dated.
June 28,
- 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of. 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set,forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii)'hat such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical. to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 2.
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-51's hereby amended to read as follows:
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3.
{2)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained'n Appendix A, as.revised through Amendment No. iO2, and the Environmental Protection 'Plan contained in Appendix 8, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditi'ons.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ja es M. Cliffo
, Senior Project Manager Project. Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Speci,fications Date oF Issuance:
December i0, f996
4>
4i
ATTACHMENT TO ICENSE AMENDMENT HENDHENT NO. "O2 TO ACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-51 OCK T NO.
STN 50-529 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
RENOVE 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 INSERT 3/4'-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3
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MERG NCY CORE COOLING SYST MS
. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued 2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,
- screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
Verifying that a minimum total of 524 cubic feet of solid granular anhydrous trisodium.phosphate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 3.5 k 0.005 grams of anhydrous TSP (corrected for moisture content) from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 1.0 2 0.005 liter of 2.5 wtX boric acid solution (nominally 4400 ppm boron) at 135 2 9 F, the pH of the solution as measured at 77 2 9 F is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on (SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the containment sump isolation valves
- open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation flow line isolation valves and combined SI mini-flow valve close, and the LPSI pumps stop.
Conducting an inspection of all ECCS piping outside of contain-ment, which is in contact with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA conditions, and verifying that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than 1 gpm when pressurized to at least 40 psig.
f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
2.
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 165 psid.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 39-,39-,99,102
s 4
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I
E RIIEI'i '<<i j Iy verifying the correct pos)Mon of each <<lectrkcal and/or secjhanfcal posit<on stop for the following KCCS throttle valves.".
I-Nthfn 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> folliMngcollat'fon of lech valve stroking operat'ion or Iafntenance on the Valve'en the KCCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.
2.
At least once per XB lengths.
LPSI S stem ve Number 1.
SIB-UV 615, SIA-Nv 306 2.
SIB-UV 625, SIB-NV 307 3.
SIA-UV 635 4.
SIA-UV 645 Hot e I e
t4'on'.
SIC iIIV 521'.
2.
'SIb-iIIV 431'y performing.a flow balance test, duper'fnlg shutdown, following completion of iaocikficatkons to the ECCS subsy'stWs'hat alter the subsystem fliow character'istkcs and verifying the following flow rites:
~HPS1 S stem - S<m~le P~ums The sum of the
$ rgect$ on 14ne flow rates, itxclucllng the highest flow rate, 1is greater than or equal to 816 gpi.
~LPSI S stem - Slegle PmmP 1.
In)ect1'on Loop 1, total flow equal to 4800 + 200 gpm 2.
In)acti'on Legs 7A and 18 when tested 1indfvldually, with the other leg isolated, sha'll be er$ th3in 200 gin of each other.
3.
Ingect1on Loop 2, total flow equal to iN a 2OO gxs 4.
Infect)on Legs 2A and 2B when tested fndivfdwilly,with this other leg Isolated, shall be w)thin Ã4 gpss of each other.'feultaneous Hot ~L'e ~and Co'ld Le In etio Sf~le Puep 4
The Ihot leg flowrate 5s greater than or equal to 525 gpe; 2.
The swi of the cold leg flan'ates 4s greater tdan or equal t6 525 gpa and 3.
The total puap flowrate d'oes not exceed 12OO ~.
PALO VEROE LNIT 2 3/4 5-6 AMENOMENT IK).
29
3/4.5 EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Safety Injection Systea (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient vol~ of borated water will be imediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank vol<ac, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety injection tanks will adequately perform their function in the event of a LOCA in NDE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A ainiaun of 25K narrow range corresponding to 1790 cubic feet and a
maximum of 75K narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety analysis as the vol~ in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 28K narrow range corresponding to 1802 cubic feet and 72K narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a maximum pressure of 632 psig are used in the safety analysis.
To allow for instroaent accuracy 600 psig minimus and 625 psig aaximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm ainiam,and 4400 ppa aaxisum are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower liait of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit assured in the safety analysis prior to the time when draining of the SIT is necessary The SIT isolation valves are not single failure pro'of; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be removed from these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available duriag a
Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves is removed while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumption of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to be operable so that, given a single failure, all four SITs say still be vented during post-LOCA long-tera cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT depressurization capability which ensures the timely establishment of shutdown cooling entry conditions as assed by the safety analysis for saa11 break LOCAs.
The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for.any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring, concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which say result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be iaaediately
- opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prorrpt action is required to place the reactor in a NDE where this capability is not required.
For NDES 3 and 4 operation with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1
!!n!<<<<a j!IMj: Il a BASES T"
(!
.!>>d) the Technical Specif'ications require a minimum of 57X wide range correspionding
'o 1361 cubic feet and a maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water peii tank, wheri three safety injiection tanks are operable and a minimum of 36X wide range corresponding to 908 cubic feet and a
maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic f'ee't per tank, when four safety injection tanks, are operable at a ininimum pressure of'35 pst!g and a maximum pressure of 625 psig.
To allow for instrument inaccuracy, 60X wide
,range instrument corre.sponding to 1415 cubic feet, and 72X narrow range i
instrument corresponding to 1914 cubic feet. when three safety injection tanks are operable, and 39X wide range instrument corresponding tio 962 cubic feet, and 72X narrow range, instrument correslponding to 1914 cutiic feetwhen four SITs are operable, aire specified in the Technical Specifications,.
To alilow for instrument inaccuracy 254 psig is specified in the Technical Specificatiions.
The instrumentation vsa violume correlation f'r the SITs is as follows:
Volume
<arrow IILaaneee
~ide Ran a
962 ft
<OX 39X 1415 ft
<OX 60X 1802 ft 28X 78X 1914 ft 72X 83X
.!'a-!'
The OPERABILITY of two separate and independlent ECCS subsystems with the indicated RCS pressure greater thian or equal to 1837 psia, or with the indicated RCS cold 1eg temperature greater than dr equ'al'to 485 degrees F
ensures that sufficient emergency cI)re cool ing caipability will be available in the event of a LOCA as,suming t'e loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
The. e indlicated values include allowances for uncertainties.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supipl!(ing suff'icient core coo'ling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limitsifor all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-endled break ofe 'largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provide;s long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the artcc'ident recovery period.
The hiode 3 safety analysis credits one HPSI ipump to provide negative reactivity insertion to protect t,he core and RCS fo'ilowing a steam line break when RCS cold leg temperature is 485 degree.s F or greater.
Requ'ir ing twio operable ECCS subsy. tems in the situation will'nsure one HPSI pump is available assuming.'ingle failure of the other HPSI pump.
Mith the RCS cold leg temperature below 485 degrees F,
one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure'onsideration on the basi.s of the stable reactivity condition of Ithe reactor and-the limitedl core cooling requirements.
Anhydrous TSP is stored in baskets in containment that allow the TSP to dissolve into containment; sump water following a large break LOCA.
Once dissolved in the containment sump water, the TSP wi'll increase the water pH to greater than or eiqual to 7.
hfaintaining.the pH at greater than or equal to 7 prevents a significant fraction of dissolved i'odine fr'om',converting to a
volatile form and minimizes the potential of stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components in containment following a LOCA.
PALO VEROE UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-'2 Amendment hlo. 98-,99, 102
~
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I M
RG NCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
The surveillance requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance require-ments for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.*
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(I) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
In specification 4.5.2.h, the specified flows include instrumentation uncertainties.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of borated water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
The term "minimum bypass recirculation flow," as used in Specification 4.5.2e.3.
and 4.5.2f., refers to that flow directed back to the RWT from the ECCS pumps for pump protection.
Testing of the ECCS pumps under the condition of minimum bypass recirculation flow in Specification 4.5.2f. verifies that the performance of the ECCS pumps supports the safety analysis minimum RCS pressure assumption at zero delivery to the RCS.
3 4.5.4 R
FUE ING WATER TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water tank (RWT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that (I) sufficient water plus lOX margin is avail-able to permit 20 minutes of engineered safety features pump operation, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.
These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
- The following test conditions, which apply during flow balance tests, ensure that the ECCS subsystems are adequately tested.
l.
2.
3.
The pressurizer pressure is at atmospheric pressure.
The miniflow bypass recirculation lines are aligned for injection.
For LPSI system, (add/subtract) 6.4 gpm (to/from) the 4800 gpm requirement for every foot by which the difference of RWT water level above the RWT RAS setpoint level (exceeds/is less than) the difference of RCS water level above the cold leg centerline.
PALO VERDE UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 89-,98, 102
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES REFUELING WATER TANK (Continued)
The contained
~aber vol+ac liait includes
<<n alliance for eater not usable because of tank dischai~ line location cir iotlIer physical character isties.
The liaits on contained inter vol~ and boron concentration of the-i'lso ensure a pH value of bebveen 7.0 and 8.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LO(A.,This pH band sin)sizes the evolution of iodine and ainiilzes the effect of chloride and',caustic stress corrosion on aechanica1 systeas and coapionents.
The liait on the NT solution teIeperature ensures.that the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses raisin valid.
PAi< VERDE - UNIT,2 B 3/4 5-i
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISStON WASHINGTON, D.C. 2M55-0001 ARIZONA PUBLIC S RVIC COMPANY ET AL.
CK T 0.
STN 50-530 ALO V RDE NUCLEAR G NERATING STATION UNIT NO.
3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 82 License No. NPF-74 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Hexico, Los Angeles Department of Mater and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated June 28, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 2.
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
NPF,-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:
0 0
3.
(2)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 82, and the Environmental. Protection Plan contained
.in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental. Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGUL'ATORY COMMISSION Ja es W. Cliff d, Senior Project Hanager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
December i0, f996
IL
~
I
~ 'l TTACHMENT TO ICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO.
82 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-74 OCKET NO.
STN 50-530 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
~REHOV 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 INSERT 3/4.5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3
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0 EHERGENCY CORE COOL NG SYSTEHS
. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,
- screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
4.
Verifying that a minimum total of 524 cubic feet of solid granular anhydrous trisodium phosphate,(TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 3.5 2 0.005 grams of anhydrous TSP (corrected for moisture content) from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 1.0 2 0.005 liter of 2.5 wtX boric acid solution (nominally 4400 ppm boron) at 135 2 9'F, the pH of the solution as measured at 77 i 9
F is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on (SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the containment sump isolation valves
- open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation flow line isolation valves and combined SI mini-flow valve close, and the L'PSI pumps stop.
Conducting an inspection of all ECCS piping outside of contain-
- ment, which is in contact with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA conditions, and verifying that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than 1
gpm when pressurized to at least 40 psig.
f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
2.
Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 165 psid.
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 78,82
EMERGENCY CORE COOLIiNG SYSTEMS g-By verifying the correct pos'Jtion Iof each,'electrical and/or mechanical position. stop for the fiollow'fng ECCS throttle valves:
1.
Nthin,4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> -follmlng c~lekion of each valve stroking operatioin or maintenance on tahe~ valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPEfUSLE.
2.
At least, once per
',18 months.
LPSI S steie a ve NLiiEer Hot,Le In 4t)on a e, el SIB-llV 615, SIA"HV 306 1.
'IC-HV 321 2.
SIB-U'V 625SIB-HV 307 2.
'ID-HV'331 3.
SIA-U'V 635 4.
SIA-UiV 645 h.
By performing a flow balance test,'<'iri'ng 'sh<'std'own, following completion of modifications to the ECCS'ubsystems that alter 4he subsystem flow characteristics and verifying'th5 following flow rhte's:
'HPSI 5 stem - Ss~nle Pein~
The sua of the 1in)ection line flow'ate's, 'excluding. the highastt flow rata, is greater than or aqua'1 to 816 gpm.
~LPSI 5 stein - 51ii~nle PNn5 2.
In]iection Loop 1, total flow.equal 'o 4MO + 200 gpm In]iection Legs 1A and XB when tWstlad 'individually, with the. other leg isolated; shall be within 200 gpm of each other..
3.
In]iection Loop 2, total flow <<qual to 4800 a 200 gpm In]iection Legs 2A and 28 when'ested
individually, with thh other leg iso'latede shall be Within '200 'gris of each other.
Simultaneous IHot Le~encl Cold La IIn ec io -'i~nle
~P 1.
The hot leg f',lowrate 'fs greater than ior equal to 525'ee; 2.
The sea of the cold leg flowrates is greater than or equal'o 525 ga; and 3.
The total pump flowrate does inot,-e)cceed 1200 gpm.
PALO-VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6
'MENDMENTi NO.
19
s t
l 3/4. 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS
~ BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Safety Injection System (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volte of borated water will be imediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety injection tanks will adequately.
perform their function in the event of a LOCA in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A minimum of 25K narrow range corresponding to l790 cubic feet and a
maximum of 75K narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety 'analysis as the volume in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 28K narrow range corresponding to 1802 cubic feet and 72K narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a maximum pressure of 632 psig are us~a in the safety analysis.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 600 psig minimum and 625 psig maximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm minimum and 4400 ppm maximm are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower limit of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit assumed in the safety analysis prior to the time when drain-ing of the SIT is necessary.
The SIT isolation valves are not single failure proof; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be removed from these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during a Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves is removed while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumption of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to "be operab1e so that, given a single failure, all four SITs may still be vented during post-LOCA long-term cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT depressurization capability which ensures the timely establishment of shutdown cooling entry conditions as assumed by the safety analysis for small break LOCAs.
The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If, a closed isolation valve cannot be iaeediately
- opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and proapt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE where this.capability is not required.
For MODES 3 and 4 operation with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia the Technical Specifications require a minimum of 57K wide range corresponding PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-1
~>>ll.;<< ~: l BASES
~Wde R n 39X 6GX
'8X 83X Volume Rairrow~FFan e
962 ft:
<OX 1415 ft;-
<OX 1802 ft; 28X 1914 ft'2X The OPERABILITY of'wo separate and independent ECCS subsystems with the indicated RCS pre. sure greater thai or equal'o 1837 psia, or with the indicated RCS cold leg temperat,ure greater than or equal to 485 degrees F
ensures, that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming thee 'loss of one subs'yst'em'through any single failure consideration.
These indicated values iniclude allowances for uncertainties.
Either subsystem operating in cIonjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable.of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures withiin acceptable limits for all postulated brIeak sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the 'largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem prcbvides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
The Node 3 safety analysis credits one HPSI Puttip to provide negative reactivity insertion to protect, the core and RCS following a, steam line break when RCS cold leg temperature is 485 degrees F or greater'.
'Requiring two operable ECCS subsystems
'in the situation williensure one HPSI pump is available assuming single failure of the other HPSI pump.
With the RCS cold leg tempFerature below 485 degrees F,
'ubsystem is accepta'ble without, single failure cohsideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition oiF the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
Anhydrous TSP is stored in baskets in containment that al1low the TSP to dissolve into contai;nment sump-water following a la<'ge break LOCA.
Once dissolved in the containment sump water, the'SP will increase the water pH to greater than or equal to 7.
Maiintaining the pll a't greater than or equal to 7 prevents a significant fraction o)F dissolved'odine from converting to a
'olatile form and minimizes the potential of stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steem compFonents in containment following a LOCA.
SAFETY INJECTION TANKS (Continued) to 1361 cubic feet and a maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water per tank, when tlhr4e safety i'njdction tanks are operable and a minimum of 36X wide range cor'responding to 908 cubic feet and a
maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet per tank, when four safety injection tanks are operable at a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig.
lo allow for 'instrument inaccuracy 60X wide
'ange instrument corresponding to 1415 cubic feet,,
and 72X narrow range instrument corresponding to 1914 cubic feet,,
when three safety injection tanks are operable, and 39X wide range instrument corresponding to 962 cubic feet, and 72X narrow range instrument corresponding 4o 1914 cubic feet, when fdur SITs are operableare specified in the Technical SpFecifications.
To allow for instrument inaccuracy 254 psig is specified in the Technical Specifications.
The instrumentation vs. volume correlatJioA fbr the SITs is as follows:
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 B 3/4 '5-2 Amendment No.
78-,W,,82
HERG NCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
. BASES EB I~I
(
i d)
The surveillance requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance require-ments for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.*
Haintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping, system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump,flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper Flow, split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA, analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
In specification 4.5.2.h, the specified flows include'instrumentation uncertainties.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of borated water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
The term "minimum bypass recirculation flow," as used in Specification 4.5.2e.3.
and 4.5.2f., refers to that flow directed back to the RWT from the ECCS pumps for pump protection.
Testing of the ECCS pumps under the condition of minimum bypass recirculation flow in Specification 4.5.2f. verifies that the performance of the ECCS pumps supports the safety analysis minimum RCS pressure assumption at zero delivery to the RCS.
3 4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water tank (RWT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of bor ated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that (1) sufficient water plus 10X margin is avail-able to permit 20 minutes of engineered safety features pump operation, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.
These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
- The following test conditions, which apply during flow balance tests, ensure that the ECCS subsystems are adequately tested.
1.
2.
3.
The pressurizer pressure is at atmospheric pressure.
The miniflow bypass recirculation lines are aligned for injection.
For LPSI system, (add/subtract) 6.4 gpm (to/from) the 4800 gpm requirement for every foot by which the difference of RWT water level above the RWT RAS setpoint level (exceeds/is less than) the difference of RCS water level above the cold leg centerline.
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 49,82
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES REFUELING MATER TANI( (Continued)
The contained water vo'lace 11iait inclu'ded ah alllowance for water not
'sable because of tank discharge li,ne location or other;physical characteristics.
The.liaits"on contained water vol~ and boron concentration of the Wf also ensure a pH va'lue of between 7.0 and 8.5 for the'solution recir-culated within containaent after a LOCA.
7hiS pH band ainiaizes the.evolution of iodine and einieizes the effect of.chlorid>> and 'caustic 'stress corrosion on aechanical systems and cceponent!.
The limit on the M'olution teayerature ensures that the assueptions used in the LOCA analyses remain valid.
P~LO VERDE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-i