ML17312A770
| ML17312A770 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1996 |
| From: | Bateman W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312A772 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9605220138 | |
| Download: ML17312A770 (30) | |
Text
~
gP,R RE00
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 S
C COM C
T NO.
ST 50-528 N
C G
G S
ON N
0.
ENT T P
I G
C S
Amendment No.
107 License No. NPF-41 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of. Water and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated May 15,
- 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in.10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 2.
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 is.hereby amended to read as follows:
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The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
- 107, and the Environmental'rotection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance. with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION F~'ihlliam H. Batemao, Director Project Directorate, IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
Hay 15; 1996
iJ 0
'I
C NS N
PF-41 CK T NO.
TN 0-5 8 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number.
and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to,maintain document completeness.
~S~RT 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2
<Q ik
S VEILLA CE R
UIREM NTS Continued A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that, the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,
- screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural. distress or corrosion.
2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
Verifying that a minimum total of 464 cubic feet of solid granular anhydrous trisodium phosphate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.055 2 0.001 lb of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 1.0 i 0.05 gallons of 77 i 9 'F borated water from the RMT, the. pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on,(SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal', the containment sump isolation valves
- open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation flow line isolation valves and combined SI mini-flow valve close, and the LPSI pumps stop.
Conducting an inspection of all ECCS piping outside of containment, which is in contact-with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA conditions, and verifying that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than 1 gpm when pressurized to at least 40 psig.
f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
2.
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 165 psid.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 87-,107
I+I l~
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4. 5. 1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Safety Injection System (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below.the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety injection tanks will adequately perform thei~
function in the event of a LOCA in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A minimum of 25X narrow range corresponding to 1790 cubic feet and, a maximum of 75K narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated.water are used in the safety analysis as the volume in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 28K narrow range corresponding to 1802 cubic feet and 72K narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a maximum pressure of 632 psig are used in the safety analysis.
To allow for instrument accuracy 600 psig minimum and 625 psig maximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm minimum and 4400 ppm maximum are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower limit of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit assumed in the; safety analysis prior to the time when draining of the SIT is necessary.
The SIT isolation valves are not single failure proof; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be removed from these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during a Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs 'by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves is removed while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumpti'on of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to be operable so that, given a single failure, all four SITs may still be vented during post-LOCA long-term cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT depressurization capability which ensures the timely establishment of shutdown cooling entry conditions as assumed by the safety analysis for small break LOCAs.
The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be. immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE,where this capabil,ity is not required.
For MODES 3 and 4 operation with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia the Technical Specifications require a minimum of 57X wide.range corresponding PALO VERDE - UNIT I B 3/4 5-1
'AMENDMENT NO. 28
AS S
F C
- 3IKS (Continued) to 1361 cubic feet; and a -maximum of 75X 'narrow range. corresponding
-to 1927 cubic feet 'of bor~ited erat'er peter, tank,.when three~ safety injection tanks'r'e
'perable,and a minimum of 36X wid'e range coirr6spbnding to 908"cubic feet, a'nd'a
'aximum of 75X narrow range, corresponding to 1927 cubic feet 'per tank, when four safety injection; tanks. are operable at a mihimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum-pre'ssure of 625 psig.
To allow for instrument inaccuracy, 60X wide range instrument corresponding to,1415 cubic feet, and '72X narrow 'range instrument correspondiag to 1914 cubic feet, wh'en three safety injection tanks are operable, and 39X edde range-instrument'orresponding to 962 cubic felt, and 72X narrow range instrument. corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, when fo'ur SITs are operable, a'e specifiIad in the Tec'hnical Specifications.
To allow,for instrument inaccuracy 2!54 psig, is specified in 'the Technical Specificathons.
The instrumeritation,vs..
volume correlattidn foH the 'SITs is as folldwd:-
~ttg
<a~rgw ~..., )(gage 962 ft:,
<OX
,39X 1415 ft:,
<OX 60X
'1802 ft:
28X'8X 1914 ft'2X 83X 4
4:.~~CCS SUIBS'fST~M!i
.The OPERABILITY of'wo separate ahd indePenHent FCGS subsystems with th@.
indicated,-RCS pressure grIeater than or equal to '1837 psia, or with the indicated RCS cold leg temperature: greater than or equal to 485 degrees F
ensures that su'fficient 'emergehcy cI)re cooling capability will be availhble in the event of a L'OCA assuming the lo. s, of one subsystem
.through any single failure: consideration.
Tlpiese indicated valUesj ihcl'udge allowances for uncertainties.
EithIer subsystem operating in conjunction with t;he safety injection tanks is capable o'f supplying: sufficient.core cooling to limit.
the'eak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for,all postulated break sizes r'anging from the double-, ended break, of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In-addition, each ECCS subsystem pr'ov'ides long-term core coolin'g
'apability in the recir~ulation mo'de during the accid~nt recovery period.
The, Node 3 safety analysis c'redits one'ISI'ump'to'rov'ide negati<ze
'eactivity insertion.to protect the core and RCS following a steam line'Heak when RCS cold leg temperature
'ls 485 degrees F or greater..
Requiring tiNo operable ECCS subsystems in the situation will ensure one HPSI pump. is available ass'umingi. s'ing1e,failure o'f the other HPSI pump.
Mith the RCS cold'eg temperature, below 485 degrees F,,
one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable.
without single failure consideratit~n on the basis,'of'he stable reactivity'.'condition of the -reactor and the limited core coolin'g requirements.
The anhydrous, trisodiuk phosphate (TSP) stored in. dissolving baskets located in the, containment basement is provided to minimize. the possibilit'y of
'orrosion cracking of certain metal components during.operation of the ECCS fol.lowing a LOCA.-
Tlie TSP. provides.this protect',ion.by dissolv'in'g in the sump wate'r and, causing its final 'pH to be raised! to grea'ter than.o0 equal to '7.0.
The surveillance requirements provided td ebs'u're OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assump'tions~
used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem.
OPERABILITY is mhiAtaine'd.
Surveillance.require-ments for throttle.,valve position stops and flow balance testing provide PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4-5-2 Amendment No. 4CI6,107
gals R<0u~
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++*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-'0001 0
U S
C CK 0.
0-UC G
G UN 0
ENT 0
C IT NG IC NS Amendment No. 99 License No. NPF-51 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and
- Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated May 15, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission',s regulations.set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commiss'ion's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and.security or to the health and'afety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 is hereby amended to read as follows:
ii ll
(2)
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix 'A, as.revised through'Amendment No.. 99; and the. Environmental 'Protection Plan contained in Appendix B,. are. hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except. where otherwise stated in. specific license conditions.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance..
FOR THE NUCLEAR,REGULATORY COHNISSION gv William H.. Bateman,, Director Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of'ssuance:
Hay 15',
1996.
ii ll
0-5 9 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications.with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2
~NS RT 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2
Qi 0
1
.EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued g.
By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or aechanfcal position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
1.
Nthfn 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completfon.of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.
2.
At least once per 18 months.
~LYSI 5 Valve 'Number Hot Le In ection Valve Number l.
SIB-UV 615, SIA-HV 306 1.
SIC-HV 321 2.
SIB-UV 625, SIB-HV 307 2.
SIO-HV 331 3.
SIA-UV 635 4.
SIA-UV 645 By performing a:flow. balance test, during shutdown, following, completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:
HPSI S stem - Sin le Pum The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 816 gpm.
LPSI S stem,- Sin le Pum 1.
Injection Loop 1, total flow equal to 4800 + 200 gpm 2.
Injecti'on Legs 1A and 1B when tested individually, with the other. leg isolated, shall be within 200 gpm of each other.
3.
Injection Loop 2, total flow equal to 4800 a 200 gpm 4.
Injection Legs 2A and 2B when tested individually, with the other leg isolated, shall be within 200 gpa of each other.
Sfaultaneous Hot Le and Cold Le In ection - 'Sin 1'e P
4 1.
The hot leg flowrate fs greate~
than or equal to 525 gpm; 2.
The sua of the cold leg flowrates fs g~eater than or equal to 525 gpm; and 3.
The total pump flowrate does not exceed 1200 gpm.
PALO VEROE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 AMENOMENT NO.
29
iJ!!5 $XQX%
R AN
~M'E"' lf '
'm"< "J-A visual inspection of the c6ntailmeht sump and verifying that the, subsystem suction inlets are not restricted.by debri.
and that the sump components,(trash
- racks, screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural distress'r'orrosion; 2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
4.
Verifying that a minimum total bf. 464 cubic feet of solid granu'lar anhydrous trisodium'ph'osphate (TSP) is contained within f
- the, TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a, representIative'ample of 0.055 i 0.,001 lb of TSP from a TSP storage basket is subeeItged, without agitation, in 1.0 2 0.05 gallons df 77 k 9 F borated water fram the RMT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater
'than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.I least once per 18 months, during.shutdown, by:
Verifying that-each automatic valve "in the flow path actuates to it. correct position on (SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pump.. start automaticallyI upon receipt of a safety injecttio6 artuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pres. sure safety, injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal,
'thP containment,.
sump 'isolation valves open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculati'on flow line isolation valves and combined SI mini-flqw valve close, and tlhe LPSI pumps stop.
Conducting an inspection of. all ECCS piping outside of contain-ment, which is in contact with recirculation sump invento~ry~
during LOCA conditions, and verifying that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than 1 gpm when pressurized to at 1I,east 40 psig,.
By verifying that each of the, following pumps develops the indiclteld differential pressure at or greater than their respective miniInuk allowable recirculation flow when te. ted pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
l.
2.
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
Low pressure safety, injection pUmp gr'eater than or equal to 165 psid.
PALO VERDE UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 813-,39, 99
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS BASES 3/4.5. 1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Safety Injection System (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety injection tanks will adequately perform their function in the event of a LOCA in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A minimum of 25K narrow range corresponding to 1790 cubic feet and a
maximum of 75K narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety analysis as the volume in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 28X narrow range corresponding to 1802 cubic feet and 72K narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a maximum pressure of 632 psig,are used in the safety analysis.
To allow for instrument accuracy 600 psig minimum and 625 psig maximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm minimum and 4400 ppm maximum are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower limit of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit assumed in the safety analysis prior to the'ime when draining of the SIT is necessary The SIT isolation valves are not single failure pro'of; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be removed from these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during a Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves is removed while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumption of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to be operable so that, given a single failure, al.l four SITs may still be vented during post-LOCA long-term cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT depressurization capability which ensures the timely establishment of shutdown cool.ing entry conditions as assumed by the safety analysis for small break LOCAs.
The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened,, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE where this capability is not required.
For MODES 3 and 4 operation with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-1
AS S
~I~~mwxca.
~F Jgg$
(Continued) the Technical Specifications require a minimum of 57X wide range corres'por'>di'ng
'o 1361 cubic feet and a maximum of 75X narrow range corresponding to 1~927 cubic feet of borated water per tank, when three safety injection tanksl a0e operable and a minimum of 3i5X wide range corresponding to 908 cubic felt And a'aximum of 75X narrow 'range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet per tank, when four safety injection tanks are operable at, a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig.
To allow for'instrument inaccuracy, 60X >ride range instrument corresponding to 1415 cubic feet, and 72X narrow rang6 instrument corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, when three safety injection tanks
~
are operable, and 39X wide ir'ange instrument corresponding to 962 cubic
'feet,'nd 72X narrow range instru~iient corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, when four SITs are operable, are specified in the Technical Speci.f'ications.
To alldw for instrument inaccuracy 254 psig i. specified in t'e Technical
'Specificat'ious.'he instrumentation vs,. volume correlation for the SITs is as follows:
~i~e g~~ow ~Ra e
I~ie ~~
962 ft
<OX
'39X 1415 ~ft
<OX
.60X
,'1802 ft 28X 78X 1914 ft 72X 83X
~>WMKIMBLMEI'-
The OPERABILITY oF two separate-and independeht ECCS subsystems with the indicated RCS pressure greater than or equal to 1837, psia, or with'he
~
indicated RCS cold leg temperature greater than or equal to 485 degrees F
ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capabi'lity will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
These indicated value.. include allowances for uncertainties.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within aicceptable 1limits for al I postulated brdak sizes ranging from-the doub1le-ended break of the largest, RCS cold 1'eg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides "long-ter'm core coolinig
'apability
'in the recirculation mode d'uring'he
'accident recovery period.
The Node 3 safety analysis credits: one HPSI pump to provide negative reactivity insertion to protect the core and RCS~ following a steam line break when RCScold leg temperature is=48I5 degrees F or glreater.
Requiring tI<o operable ECCS subsystems in the situation w'ill ensure one HPSI pump is available assuming single failure oIF the other HPSI pump.
kith the RCS cold leg temper'ature beloW 485'e'grees',',
one OPERABLS kCC0 subsystem is acceptable. without single failuie cbnsideratiI>n on.the basis
'of,'he stable reactivity condition of >the reactor" and the limited core coolin'g requirements.
- The anhydrous trisodium phosphate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provhdejd 4o minimize the possibilit'y df
'orrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.
The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in thA s'urn) water and causing its final pH to be raised td gireater than or.equal to 7.0.
PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 B '3/4 5-2 Amendment No. ~8,99
gP,R RE00 (4
Po 0O 0
+~
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++*<<+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&0001 OFC G
T 0
U 0.
T G
S Amendment No. 79 License No. NPF-74 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison
- Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Mater.
and
- Power, and Southern California Publ,ic Power Authority dated Hay 15, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of,this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Oper'ating License No. NPF-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:
i~
ll
(2)
S ec 'ti ns d
onmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 79, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8, are hereby incorporated into this license.
APS shall. operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection
- Plan, except. where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3'.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance..
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
~
~
~
William H. Bateman, Director Project Directorate IV-2
'Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear.Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes. to the Technical Specifications Date of. Issuance:
Hay 15, 1996
0 a
NG C
T 0
0 Replace the.following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain, document completeness.
fKH9K 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 JEKBI 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 '5-2
i)
~
H G
SURVEILLANG NG YS HS HENTS Continued A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,
- screens, etc.)
show no evidence of.structural distress or corrosion.
2.
3.
e.
At 2.
3.
4.
Verifying that,a minimum total of 464 cubic feet of solid granular anhydrous trisodi'um phosphate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.055
- k. 0.001 lb of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 1.0 f 0.05 gallons of 77 i 9 F borated water from the RMT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised'o greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:.
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on (SIAS and RAS) test signal(s).
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the containment sump isolation valves
- open, the HPSI, 'LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation -flow line isolation, valves and combined SI mini-flow valve close, and the LPSI pumps stop.
Conducting an'nspection of all ECCS piping outside of contain-ment, which is in contact with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA conditions, and verifying that the total measured leakage from piping and components is less than I gpm when pressurized to at least 40 psig.
f.
By verifying that each of the followi'ng pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
2.
Low pressure safety injection'ump greater than or equal to.
165 psid.,
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 Amendment No.79
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS EEt!~ f Et!!
g-By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
l.
Mithin.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve strokin'g
'peration or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are.required to be OPERABLE.
2.
At 'least onci per ].8 iwonths.
'LPSI S
s'Sem Valve Number l.
SIB-UV 6]L5, 2-.
SIB-UV. 625, 3.
SIA-UY 635 4.
SIA-UV 645 Hot iLe Ih ection Valv,e um e, SIA-NV 306 1..5/C-,IHV ',32k SIB"IHV 307 2.
'SD-tlV '331 h.
By performing a flow balance test,'urihg shutdown,- following colmpletic)n of modifications to theECCS subsyrstiems tlhat alter the subsystem flow characteristics and veri fying the fol'lowing.flow r'atis:
~HPSI S stem - SinsLle Pump The sum of the injection line flow ratek,
'exc!luding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equa"l to 816 gpm.
~LPSI 3 stem.-- Sin~le Pump 2.
Inject'ion Loop 13 totait flow i.qu'al to 4800 + 200 gpm Inject'ion Legs lA aind 1B when'te'stid individually, with the other leg isolatedl, shalll 'be'ithin 200 gpm of each
. other.
3.
Injection Loop 2, total flow e.qual 'to 4800 a 200 gpm 4.
Injection Legs 2A and 2B whin'tested ind'ividually, with th' other leg isolated, shall be v'iithini 200 gpm of each other.'imultaneous.Hot Leg a,nd Cold Leg I~nectioh -'i~nle
~Pum 1.
The hot leg flowrate is greater tha'n ar Wqu'al 'o 525 gptti; 2.
The sum'of the cold leg flowrates is greater than or.equal'd 525 gpm; and 3.
The total pump flowrate does not exceed 1200 gpm.
PALO YEROE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6 AMENOMENT NO.
19
3/4.5 EMERGENCY,CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABIL'ITY of each of the Safety Injection System (SIS) safety injection tanks ensures that a'sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the RCS provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank,volume,'boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the safety injection tanks will adequately perform their function in the event of a LOCA in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
A minimum of 25K narrow range corresponding to 1790 cubic feet and a maximum of 75K narrow range corresponding to 1927 cubic feet of borated water are used in the safety analysis as the volume in the SITs.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 28K narrow range corresponding to 1802 cubic feet and 72K narrow range corresponding to 1914 cubic feet, are specified in the Technical Specification.
A minimum of 593 psig and a maximum pressure of 632 psig are used in the safety analysis.
To allow for instrument accuracy, 600 psig minimum and 625 psig maximum are specified in the Technical Specification.
A boron concentration of 2000 ppm minimum and 4400 ppm maximum are used in the safety analysis.
The Technical Specification lower limit of 2300 ppm in the SIT assures that the backleakage from RCS will not dilute the SITs below the 2000 ppm limit assumed in the safety analysis prior to the time when dr ain-ing of the SIT is necessary.
The SIT isolation valves are not single failure proof; therefore, whenever the valves are open power shall be removed from these valves and the switch keylocked open.
These precautions ensure that the SITs are available during a Limiting Fault.
The SIT nitrogen vent valves are not single failure proof against depressurizing the SITs by spurious opening.
Therefore, power to the valves, is removed.while they are closed to ensure the safety analysis assumption of four pressurized SITs.
All of the SIT nitrogen vent valves are required to be operable so that, given a single failure,.all four SITs may still be vented during post-LOCA long-term cooling.
Venting the SITs provides for SIT depressurization capability which ensures the timely establishment of shutdown cooling entry conditions as assumed by the safety analysis for small break LOCAs.
The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE where this capability is not required.
For MODES 3 and 4 operation, with pressurizer pressure less than 1837 psia the Technical Specifications require a minimum of 57X wide range corresponding PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-1
ih KlHKMGfBRMKQ IAHKR ( '"~4 '.'.~)
to 1361.cubic feet and a maximI>m of 75X narrow range corresponding.;to 1927 cubic. feet of'borated water peir tanl(,
when t:hHee'sa'fety inject'ion'anks.'ar' operable and a.minimum of 36X wide range corresp6nding to 908 ",cubic feet and !a
'aximum',of 75X narrow range con esponding-tb 1927, c'ubic feet per tank, when four safety injection t'anlks, are operable at a mit>im'um pressure of 235 psig and a maximum 'pressure. of 625 ps,ig.
To allow. for, instrulm.nt inaccuracy,.
60X wide.
range instrument corresporiding to 1415 cubid Feet,
'arid 72X narrow 'range instrument correspondirig to 1914 cubic feet',. w'hen three safety injectiori tanks
're operabl'e, and 39X betide range instrume'nt corresponding to. 962 cubic feet,
'nd
'72X narrow range instruojenIt corresponding
,'to.1914.cubic feet, when four-SITs are operableare specified
.in the Technica1I,Specifications.
To allow for instrument.inaccuracy 254 psig is specified in the Technical Spe'cifications; The instrumentation vs.
volume correlakidn for~.the SITs is as 'follows:
~ie Q~iwl~
g~ie~~e
'962 ft:
<OX 59X 1415 ft:
<OX 60X' 1802 ft:
.28X
'PBX 1914't'2X 83X
's..
~<
m.'i The OPERABILITY of two separate and'inIIependent E'CC0 -s'ubsystems with the indicated RCS pressure greater than or equal to 1837'si'a, or"with the
.indicated'CS cold leg. temperature greater than or equal to 485: degre'es F
.ensures
.that sufficient emergency,: core coolingcapability. will be available in the event of' LOCA assuming the'.'toss of, one. subsyst;em through any -single failure consideratioIn.
These,iindicated values irIcldde,a11owances for.
uncertainties.
Either subsystem operating in.conjunctioh with the, safet'y
'njec'tion tanks is capable of ! upplying sufficient core cooling. to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits 'for all postulated break sizes ranging'from.the double-ended break of the laIIgest RCS cold 'leg pipe
'downward.
In additiiin, each ECCS subsystem provides long-.term core cool'ing capability in: the recirculatior> mode during the accident recovery period'.
The Mode 3 safety analysis credits one HPSI pump to priovide negativ'e
'eactivity insertion to protect'he core and RCS 'folio'wing
'a steam. l.ine br'6ak when RCS,cold leg temperature is 485:degrees F or-greater..'equiring two operable
'ECCS subsystems in the situation will'n'sure one 'HPSI pump is available assuming s'ingle failure.of'.the other HPSI pump.,
With the RCS co'old leg'temperature below 485 'degre'e's'F, one OPERABLE~
ECtCS'ubsystem is acceptable wiithout. single failure consideration on the basis; of'he stable reactivity conditiorii oF the reactor and:the l.imi,ted'ore cooling requirements.
The, anhydrous trisodium phosphate (TSP) stored
-.in dissolving baskets located.in the containment basement is provided to.minimize the possibil'ity of corrosio'n cracking of certain Inetal components during opera'tion of the ECCS following a LOCA.
The
'TSP p'rovides this protectioh by dissolving in the.skimp.
water and-causing its final lpH to be raised: to greater than or equal to 7..CI.
The surveillance requirements -provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each
.component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions~used
'in the safety aha)ys4s are met and that subsystem'OPERABILITY is mNintained. 'urveillance requt'rd-mehts for throttle valve positio'n stops and flow bal'ance testing provide'ALO
'VERDE UNIT 3 B:..3/4 5-2" Amendment No. %R,79