ML17228A992

Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Incore Detectors to (TS 3/4.3.3.2) to Updated FSAR & Revising Lhr Surveillance 4.2.1.4 & Special Test Exceptions Surveillance 4.10.2.2,4.10.4.2 & 4.10.5.2

ML17228A992
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	01/20/1995
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17228A991	List: ML17228A992
References
NUDOCS 9501310198
Download: ML17228A992 (36)

Text

St'. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments Relocation of LCO for Incore Detectors to t e U date Fina Safet Anal sis Re ort ATTACHMENT 3 ST.

LUCIE UNIT 1 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES Page IV Page 3/4 2-2 Page 3/4 3-25 Page 3/4 3-26 Page 3/4,10-2 Page 3/4 10-5 Page B 3/4 2-1 Page B 3/4 3-2 950i3i0198 950i20 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P

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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS SECTION 3 4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2. 1 LINEAR HEAT RATE............................

3/4.2.2 DELETED PAGE 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-6 3/4.2.3 3/4.2.4 3/4.2.5 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR FT.

l AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T...................

q DNB PARAHETERS..................-..-.

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3/4 2-9 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-13 3 4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3. 1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION................. 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION............

3/4 3-9 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.......................... 3/4 3-21 Radiation Monitoring.

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'THIS CRr,um I'KVIOOSI.V RGQQE'4tf.P By 'FPI L+r. L-9II-IOI (S/Xllgy)

'Q IS CHA46t QCVu>V5LY R~6s~BP ey PPL Lw. L 99-Jf8 (lo/x7I'B) Accident Monitoring Instrumentation..

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eIrsen4 Meteorological Instrumentation..;..................

3/4 3-30 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation....................

3/4 3-33 e4ec4on-kns4wmerkatkn.....................

Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation...........

3/4 3-50 3 4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION...... 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES SHUTDOWN.

3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES OPERATING..........................

3/4 4-3 ST.

LUCIE UNIT 1 IV

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i POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Continued C.

Verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2, where 100 percent of maximum allowable power represents the maximum THERMAL POWER allowed by the following expression:

MxN where:

2.

M is the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination.

N is the maximum allowable fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER as determined by the F

curve of Figure 3.2-3.

T 4.2.1.4 Incore Detector Monitorin S stem

- The incore detector monitor-ing system may be used for monitoring the core power distribution by verifying that the incore detector Local Power Density alarms:

a

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b.

Are adjusted to satis'fy the requirements of the core power distribution map which shall be updated at least once per 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1.

C Have their alarm setpoint adjusted to less than or equal to the limits shown on Figure 3.2-l.ghee-4he-AA4ew+o props-hH-:&y~ehtde~~>8 setting of thes rms:

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nal uncertainty factor of 1.07, An en i ee ng uncertainty factor o

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NIf the m system becomes inoperable, reduce power to M x N within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and moni tor linear heat rate in accordance with Specification 4.2.1. 3, ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

P 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 27.

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NSTRUMENTATI ON IN RE DETECTORS LIMIT G CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.2 e incore detection system shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

At ast 75K of all incore detector locations, and b.

A mini m of two quadrant symmetric incore detector ocations per core qua rant.

An OPERABLE incore tector location shall consist of a uel assembly contain-ing a fixed detector tring with a minimum of three OP ABLE rhodium detectors.

APPLICABILITY:

When the incore detection system is used for:

a.

Recalibration of t excore axial flux ffset detection s'stem, b.

Monitoring the AZIMUT L

POWER TILT, c.

Calibration of the power evel n

tron flux channels, or d.

Monitoring the linear heat ACTION:

>th the incore detection system noperabl do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or alibration nctions.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.

are not applica le.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.2 The incore d tection system shall be demonstr ted OPERABLE:

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By performance of a CHANNEL CHECK wit tf 6

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er-ea44er when quired for:

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hcalibration of the excore axial flux offset de ction

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NSiRUMENTATION SURV LANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued b.

3.

Monitoring the AZIMUTHALPOWER TILT, or 4.

Calibration of the Power Level Neutron Flux annels.

At leas once per 18 months by performance of CHANNEL CALI-BRATION o eration which exempts the neutron d tectors but in-cludes all lectronic components.

The neut n detectors shall be calibrat d prior to installation in th reactor core.

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M T LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 'a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a aaaaaaaaaa 3.10.2 The group height, insertion.and power distribution limits of Specifications

3. l. 1.4, 3. 1.3. 1, 3.1.3-2, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a.

The THERMAL POWER is restricted to the test power plateau which shall not exceed 85X of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

The limits of Specification 3.2.1 are maintained and deter-mined as specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

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2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications

3. 1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification 3.2.1, or b.

Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

4. 10.2. 1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4

3. 1.3. 1, 3. 1.3.5,

3. 1.3.6, 3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

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4.10.2.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2.1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore Detect Mo itor S

te ursuant to the requirements of pec cat n

during PHYSICS TESTS above 5X of RATED THERMAL POWER n which the requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4,

3. 1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended.

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LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 10-2 Amnndmnnt Nn. ~IO9+<+

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS CENTER CEA MISALIGNMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.5 The requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient and power coefficient provided:

'a ~

b.

Only the center CEA (CEA 81) is misaligned, and The limits of Specification 3.2.1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification 4.10.5.2 below.

APPLICABILITY:

MOOES 1

and 2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.6 are suspended, either:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification 3.2.1, or b.

Be in HOT STANOBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.10.5.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications. 3.1.3.1 and/or 3.1.3.6 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

4.10.5.:2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2.1 by monitoring it continuously with the,.

ete tor o i o in S stem pursuant to the requirements of Specification during PHYSICS TESTS above 5X, of RATED THERMAL POWER in which t e requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1 and/or 3.1.3.6 are suspended.

CAcg ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 10-5

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3/4,2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a

LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200'F..

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Excore Detector Monitoring System and the Incore Detector Monitoring System, provides adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and is capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits.

The Excore Detector Monitoring System performs this function by continuously monitoring the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX with the OPERABLE quadrant symmetric excore neutron flux detectors and verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2.

In conjunction with the use of the excore monitoring system and in establishing the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX limits, the following assump-tions are made:

1) the CEA insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are satisfied,

2) the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT restrictions of Specifica-tion 3.2.4 are satisfied, and 3) the TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR does not exceed the limits of Specification 3.2.3.

The Incore Detector Monitoring System continuously provides a direct measure of the peaking factors and the alarms which have been established for the individual incore detector segments ensure that the peak linear heat rates will be maintained within the al lowable limits of Figure 3.2-1.

The setpoints for these alarms include allowances, set in the conse vative directions, for 1) a measurement-calculational uncertainty facto

2) an engineering uncertainty factor

, 3) a THERMAL POWE measurement uncertainty facto~

M'EL.C-F 3/4.2.3 and 3/4.2.4 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR -

F AND r

AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T The limitations on F, and T

are provided to ensure that the assump-r q

tions used in the analysis for establishing the Linear Heat Rate and Local Power Density-High LCOs and LSSS setpoints and ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

8 3/4 2-1 Amendment No. )7j,g,(r),ljf, 1d gl 9.

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INSTRUMENTATION BASES RADIATIONl t10NITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) by the individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient infor-mation is available on.selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

This capability is consistent with the mcommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980.

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'DfLEYEP ERABILITY of the complement of equipment ensures that the me awned from use of this system accuratel e spatial neutron flux

'on of the 3/4.3.3.3 OPERABIL TY of the seismi u

lclent ayabi ity is av ilable to promptly determine e magnit de of a eismic event nd evalu e the re ponse of hose featu es impor nt to s

ety.

T is capab lity is r quired t permit mparison o

the mea red res nse to hat sed in mls cAAOE Itsgu6~ 5v 3 4.3.3. 4 tlETEOROLOG ICAL INSTRUMENTATION fthm.m. t.-qq-ioi (g/zs(q~)

The OPCRABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radio-active materials.to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs,"

February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFP. 50.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No.

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St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments Relocation of LCO for Incore Detectors to t e U

ated Final Safet Anal sis Re ort ATTACHMENT 4 ST.

LUCIE UNIT 2 MMRKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES Page V

Page 3/4 2-2 Page 3/4 3-30 Page 3/4 3-31 Page 3/4 10-2 Page 3/4 10-4 Page 3/4 10-5 Page B 3/4 2-1 Page B 3/4 3-2

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS SECTION 3 4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS PAGE 3/4.2.1 3/4.2.2 3/4.2.3 3/4.2.4 3/4.2.5 LINEAR HEAT RATE.................................

TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR F..............

TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR F o ~

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AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT.......

DNB PARAMETERS........................-..........-....

3/4 2-1 3/4 2-7 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-13 3/4 2-14 3 4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.................................

3/4 3-1'1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION.................... 3/4 3-1 3/4.3. 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.................. 3/4 3-24

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METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION........................ 3/4 3-35 3/4 3-38 3/4 3-41 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION.......................

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION..........

PR~EVEC'RO~STMMENTATK..............

LOOSE-PART DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION........

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EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.............. 3/4 3-53 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION.........................

3/4 3-60 3 4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION.

HOT STANDBY........................................-..

HOT SHUTDOWN........

COLD SHUTDOWN (LOOPS FILLED)..................

COLD SHUTDOWN (LOOPS NOT FILLED)..............

3/4 4-1 3/4 4-2 3/4 4-3 3/4 4-5 3/4 4-6 ST.

LUCIE UNIT 2 Amendment No.

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PGWER 'DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued C.

Verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2, where 100K of maximum allowable power represents the maximum THERMAL POWER allowed by the following expression:

MxN where 1.

M is the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination.

2.

N is the maximum allowable fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER as determined by the F curve of Figure 3.2-3.

4.2. 1.4 Incore Detector Monitorin S stem

- The incore detector monitoring system may be used for monstorsng the core power distribution by verifying that the incore detector Local Power Density alarms:

~ a.

Are adjusted to satisfy the requirements of the core power

'distribution map which shall be updated at least once per 3l days of accumulated operation in MODE l.

b.

Have their alarm setpoint adjusted to less than or equal to the limits shown on Figure 3.2-l.ghee-@he-fo44e~g-4a pe%;~y-iwcMded-H~Q setting of these alarms:

1-.

A meas em nt-calculational uncertainty f r of 1.062, An engineering uncerta-'

fa of 1.03, A linear heat rat cer inty fa of 1.01 due to axial

,u densif on a hermal expansio d

RMAL POWER measurement uncertainty factor of 1.

If incore system becomes inoperable, reduce power to M x N within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and monitor linear heat rate in accordance with Specification 4.2.1.3.

ST.

LUCIE " UNIT 2 3/4 2"2 Amendment No. P7

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IASRUIMENTATION SURVEILLANCE IREHENTS Continued) 3.

Monitoring the THAL POMER

.L-, or 4.

Calibration of the Powe Le Neutron Flux Channels.

b.

At least once p~e~18 months by performance a

CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations i<h exempts the neutron detectors includes all electr rric components.

The neutron detectors shall alibrated r to installation in the reactor core.

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4. 10. 2 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT GROUP HEIGHT INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

~ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 70.2 The moderator temperature coefficient, group height, insertion and power distribution limits of Specifications

3. 1. 1.4,

3. 1. 3. 1, 3. 1. 3. 5,

3. 1. 3. 6, 3. 2. 2, 3. 2. 3 and 3. 2. 4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a.

b.

The THERMAL POWER is restricted to the test power plateau which shall not exceed 85K of RATED THERMAL POWER, and The limits of Specification

3. 2. 1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification 4. 10.2.2 below.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3 ~ 2.2, 3.2.3 and 3'.4 are suspended, either:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification 3.2. 1, or b.

Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 10.2.

1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications

3. l. 1.4,

3. 1.3. 1,

3. 1. 3. 5, 3. l. 3. 6,

3. 2. 2,

3. 2. 3, or

3. 2. 4 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

4. 10.2.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2.

1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore Detector Monitoring System pursuant to the requirements of Specificatio 4.2. 1.4 during PHYSICS TESTS above 5X of RATED THERMAL POWER in w ic e

requirements of Specifications

3. 1. 1. 4, 3. 1. 3. 1, 3. 1. 3. 5, 3. 1. 3. 6,

3. 2. 2,

3. 2. 3, or 3. 2. 4 are suspended.

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LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 XO-2

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.4 CENTER CEA MISALIGNMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.4 The requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient, moderator temperature coefficient and power coefficient provided:

a.

Only the center CEA (CEA Pl) is misaligned, and b.

The limits of Specification 3.2.

1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification

4. 10.4.2 below.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1

and 2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.6 are suspended, either:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification

3. 2. 1, or b.

Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 10.4.

1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications

3. 1.3.

1 and/or'.

1.3.6 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

4. 10.4.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2.

1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore Detector Monitoring System pursuant to the requirements of Specification during PHYSICS TESTS above 5X of RATED THERMAL POWER in which the requirements of Specifications

3. l. 3. 1 and/or 3.1.3. 6 are suspended.

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.5 CEA INSERTION DURING ITC MTC AND POWER COEFFICIENT MEASUREMENTS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. l.0.5 The requirements of Specifications

3. 1.3. 1 and 3. 1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient, moderator temperature coefficient, and power coefficient provided the limits of Specification 3.2. 1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification

4. 10.5. 2 below.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the requirements. of Specifications

3. 1.3. 1 and 3. 1.3.6 are suspended, either:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification 3.2. 1, or b.

Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 10.5. 1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications

3. 1.3. 1 and 3. 1.3.6 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

4. 10.5.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2. 1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore De ector Monitoring System pursuant to the requirements of Specificatio during PHYSICS TESTS above SX of RATED THERMAL POWER in which the requirements o

Specifications

3. l. 3. 1 and 3. l. 3. 6 are suspended.

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BASES 3 4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200'F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Excore Detector Monitoring System and the Incore Detector Monitoring System, provides adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits.

The Excore Detector Monitoring System performs this function by continuously monitoring the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX with the OPERABLE quadrant syometric excore neutron flux detectors and verifying that the-AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2.

In conjunction with the use of the excore monitoring system and in establishing the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX limits, the following assumptions are made:

(1) the CEA insertion limits of Specifications 3.'l.3.5 and 3.1.3e6 are satisfied, (2) the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT restrictions of Soecification 3.2.4 are satisfied.

and (3) the TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR does not exceed the limits of Soecification 3.2.2.

The Incore Detector Monitoring System continuously provides a direct measure of the peaking factors and the alarms which have been established for the individual incore detector segments ensure that. the peak linear heat rates will be maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-1.

The setpoints for these alarms include allowances, set in the conservative directions, for (1) a measurement-calculational'ncertainty factor

, (2) an engineering uncer'tainty'factor (3) an allowanc for axial fuel densificatio and thermai expansion, and (A) a THERMAL OW R measu ament uncertainty factor 5)ELF-CS 3/4.2.2, 3 4.2.3 and 3 4.2.4 TOTAL PLANAR AND INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - Fand Fr AND AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T The limitations on F and T are provided to ensure that the assumptions xy used in the analysis for establishing the Linear Heat Rate and Local Power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid during operation at the various allowable CEA group insertion limits.

The limitations o'n F

and T

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are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the analysis establishing the DNB Margin L'CO, the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure LSSS setpoints'remain valid during operation at the various allowable CEA group insertion limits.

If Fx

, F or T exceed their basic limitations, operation may continue under the additional restrictions imposed by the ACTION statements since these additional restrictions provide adequate provisions to assure that the ST.

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" rNS7RUMENTATION BASES individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident..

This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Fnvirons Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980.

3/4. 3. 3. 2 QQRE ETE ABILITY o complement of equipment ensures that this system accuratel casu rom use of a sal neutron ribution of the 3/4. 3. 3. 3 ttM ERABI ITY of th seisms nst pabi ity is a ailable to promptly etermine the magnit Ue of a eismic even nd ev luate t e response of those eatures i portant to safety.

This apab lity is equired t permit c mparison f the meas red res nse t tha used-in the d sign basis for the f cility t determine if plant shutdg n is equ red pur uant to Ap endix A o 10 CFR P rt 100.

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METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of'the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown.

The remote shutdown system instrumentation, control circuits, and transfer switches are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor.

This capability is'consistent with General Design. Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

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