ML15260A260
| ML15260A260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1991 |
| From: | Gibson A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hampton J DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9201140050 | |
| Download: ML15260A260 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1991028
Text
December 20, 1991
Docket No. 50-269
License No. DPR-38
Duke Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. J. W. Hampton
Vice President
Ocone Site
P. 0. Box 1439
Seneca, SC 29679
Gent emen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-269/91-32)
This refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on
December 18, 1991. .This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Oconee
facility. The issues discussed at this conference were related to three apparent
violations covering failure to follow procedures/ inadequate procedures, failure
to maintain safety-related system out-of-service/ testing status, and failure to
implement effective corrective actions. -These apparent violations are associated
with the September 7, 1991,
reactor coolant system heat-up event and the
September 19-20, 1991,. over-pressurization of the low pressure injection system
event.
These events are described in the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)
Inspection Report No.
50-269/91-28, dated October 30,
1991.
NRC Inspection
Report
No. .50-269/91-32,
dated
December .6, 1991,
describes the follow-up
inspection to the AIT and the apparent violations. A list of attendees and a
copy of your handout are enclosed.
We are continuing our review of these issues
to determine the appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance.with Section .2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title
10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be
placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
(ORIGINAL SIGNED BY C. JULIAN FOR)
Albert F. Gibson, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosures:
1. List of Attendees
2. Handout
cc w/encls:
See page 2)
9201140050 911220
PDR ADOCR 05000269
G
Duke Power Company
2
December 20, 1991
(cc w/encls cont'd)
A. V. Carr, Esq.
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242-0001
County Super isor of Oconee County
Walhalla, SC 29621
Robert B. Borsum
Babcock and Wilcox Company
Nuclear Power Generation Division
Suite 525, 1700 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852
J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Winston and Strawn
1400 L Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20005
Office of Intergovernmental Relations
116 West Jones Street,
Raleigh, NC 27603
Heyward G. Shealy, Chief
Bureau of Radiological Health
South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, SC 29201
Manager, LIS
NUS Corporation
2650 McCormick Drive
Clearwater, FL 34619-1035
R. L. Gill
Nuclear Production Department
Duke Power Company
P. 0. Box 1007
Charlotte, NC 28201-1007
Karen E. Long
Assistant Attorney General
N. C. Department of Justice
P. 0. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602
(cc w/encl cont'd - See page 3)
Duke Power Company
3
December 20, 1991
(cc w/enc1 co nt'd)
M. E. Patrick
Compliance
Duke Power Company
P. 0. Box 1439
Seneca, SC
2'9679
bcc w/encl.
L. Wines, NRR
W. Miller, RIIl
G. A. Belisle, RH
A
Herdt, RII
o,.-Document Control Desk
NRC Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 2, Box 610
Seneca, SC
29678
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ENCLOSURE 1
LIST OF ATTENDEES
Duke Power Company
J. W. Hampton, Oconee Nuclear Station, Vice President
H. Barron, Oconee Nuclear Station, Station Manager
J. Davis, Oconee Nuclear Station, Manager of Safety Assurance
M. Patrick, Oconee Nuclear Station, Compliance Manager
G. Ridgeway, Oconee Nuclear Station, Shift Operations Manager
R. Sweigart, Oconee Nuclear Station, Superintendent of Operations
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RH
R. Baldwin, Reactor Engineer, Operator Licensing, DRS, RII
G. Belisle, Chief, Section 3A, Division of Reactor Projects, RH
W. Cline, Chief, RP/EP Branch, DRSS, RH
R. Crlenjak, Chief, Operational Programs Section, DRS, RH
A. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RH
A. Herdt, Chief, Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects, RII
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector, RH
G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, RIT
J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RI.I
R. Laufer, Enforcement Specialist, OE
E. Merschoff, Director (Acting), Division of Reactor Projects, RH
W. Miller, Jr., Project Engineer, DRP, RII
S. Ninh, Project Engineer, DRP, RII
T. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS, RH
L. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Rh
W. Sartor, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS, RH
B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Specialist, EICS, RH
L. Wiens, Senior Project Manager, NRR
ENCLOSURE 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
SHUTDOWN EVENT ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 18, 1991
AGENDA
INTRODUCTION
J. W. HAMPTON
EVENT DESCRIPTIONS
H. B. BARRON
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT AND
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
H. B. BARRON
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
J. M. DAVIS
REVIEW OF APPARENT
VIOLATIONS
J. M. DAVIS
SUMMARY
J. W. HAMPTON
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LLP-68
OCONEE
LOV PRESSURE
INJECT ION SYSTE
B
GN1MENT
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT
ROOT CAUSE
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LICENSED
PERSONNEL WERE NOT ADEQUATELY DEFINED,
UNDERSTOOD, AND EXECUTED
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
RE VISED
MANAGEMENT
DIRECTIVES
TO
CLEARLY DEFINE AND DIFFERENTIATE THE
ROLES OF:
OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS
BALANCE OF PLANT OPERATOR(S)
CONTROL ROOM SRO
UNIT SUPERVISOR (SRO)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
ESTABLISHED
OPERATOR
QUALITY
TEAM
To
DEFINE BARRIERS TO QUALITY OPERATION
EXAMI LES:
LIMIT
LICENSED
OPERATORS
AND
CORRESPONDING
WORK
LOAD
IN
THE
CONTROL ROOM AT A GIVEN TIME
ENHANCE SHIFT TURNOVER PRACTICES
MORE FREQUENT PRE-JOB BRIEFINGS
CHANGE ROLE OF SUPPORT STAFF TO QUALITY
COORDINATORS
RATHER
THAN
WORK
COORDINATORS
IMPROVE WORK FLOW/INTERFACE WITH THE
CONTROL ROOM
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
REQUESTED AND RECEIVED INPO ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT PRACTICES AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
PLANS
AREAS OF EMPHASIS:
IMPROVE STRUCTURE OF EXTERNAL WORK
AC IVITIES WITH THE CONTROL ROOM
IMPROVE ON-SHIFT MODIFICATION TRAINING
WITH MORE LIVE AND HANDS ON INSTRUCTION
SOME
IMPROVEMENT
OPPORTUNITIES
IN
ADMINISTRATION OF BLOCK TAGOUTS
NEED BETTER STATION INTEGRATION OF VALVE
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING TESTING
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE
PROCESSES FOR MANAGEMENT
OVERSIGHT
AND ASSESSMENT
FAILED TO DETECT AND
CORRECT A NEGATIVE TREND
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"SAFETY REVIEW SECTION" WILL ENHANCE
PROCESSES
TO
PERIODICALLY
ASSESS
MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
INCREASED TRAINING AND EMPHASIS ON ROOT
CAUSE EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR LESS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DIRECTIVE BEING DEVELOPED TO CLARIFY THE
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT EXPECTATIONS OF
THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR
ROUTINE
ASSESSMENT
OF
SHIFT
WATCH
STANDING
PRACTICES
BY
NON-SHIFT
MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE
SURVEILLANCE
PROCEDURES
NOT
ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS
MONITORING
OF
CRITICAL PARAMETERS DURING SHUTDOWN
OPERATIONS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
PROCEDURE CHANGES TO REQUIRE LOGGING
OF CRITICAL PARAMETERS EVERY 2 HOURS
ENHANCED
USE
OF
PROCESS
COMPUTER
MONITORING AND ALARM CAPABILITIES
REDUCE
"COLD
SHUTDOWN
HIGH
TEMP"
ANUNCIATOR SETPOINT TO 125 DEGREES
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE
LPI SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE DID NOT
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS TRANSITIONS BETWEEN
OPERATING ALIGNMENTS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
REVISING LPI OPERATING
PROCEDURE
TO
ADDRESS CHANGING OPERATING TRAINS
OTHER
"ROUTINE"
EQUIPMENT
MANIPULATIONS BEING REVIEWED TO IDENTIFY
THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT
DEFICIENCY
CO NTROL OVER REMOTE TESTING OF MOTOR
OPERATED VALVES IN SYSTEMS NOT REMOVED
FROM SERVICE NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
CORRECTIVE ACTION
IMPLEMENTING
PROCEDURE
CHANGES
TO
REQUIRE
CONTINUOUS
COMMUNICATIONS
WITH CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL WHILE
CYCLING SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR OPERATED
VALVES
IN SYSTEMS NOT REMOVED FROM
SERVICE
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
HEAT-U P EVENT
CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS WOULD HAVE
ALERTED OPERATORS HAD EVENT CONTINUED
CORE WOULD HAVE REMAINED COVERED FOR
MORE THAN 20 ADDITIONAL HOURS
No FUEL DAMAGE
NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE,
PRESSURIZATION EVENT
NO INDICATION OF LPI COOLER TUBE LEAKAGE
NO SIGNIFICANT RADIATION EXPOSURE TO
PERSONNEL
NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY
REVIEW OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS
FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES/INADEQUATE
PROCEDURES
AGREE
WITH
ALL
EXAMPLES
EXCEPT
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
OF
SHUTDOWN
FUNCTO
CLASSIFICATION NOT INTENDED FORTHIS TYPE
SITUATION
FAILURE TO IDENTIFY SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM
STATUS
COMMAND AND CONTROL AS IDENTIFIED IN
PROCEDURE
CONCERNS
-
INADEQUATE
PROCEDURE
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE
ACTION
ADMIT VIOLATION