ML11298A080

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Follow-up Letter to 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, Notification
ML11298A080
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/20/2011
From: Krich R
Tennessee Valley Authority
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML11298A080 (2)


Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 R. M. Krich Vice President, Nuclear Licensing October 20, 2011 10 CFR 50.9(b)

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 2 and 3 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-52 and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-260 and 50-296

Subject:

Follow-up Letter to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information," Notification On September 21, 2011, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) determined that information previously provided to the NRC in response to an inspection was inaccurate. As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b), a notification was made within two working days to the NRC Region II office via a telephone call between R. M. Krich, TVA Vice President, Nuclear Licensing and Victor McCree, NRC Region II Administrator. As requested during that telephone call, TVA is providing this follow-up letter to that notification.

By letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded to NRC inspector follow-up item 50-260, 296/95-19-01 regarding the reduced scope of motor-operated valves in the NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," program for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 2 and 3. This letter stated in part that "... Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode....

As a result of the current root cause analysis that is being conducted to address the issues associated with the failure of valve FCV-74-66 in BFN, Unit 1, TVA discovered that this statement was inaccurate. Specifically, the revision of the Emergency Operating Instruction Program Manual, Appendix 17A, that was in place in January 1997 included a step to verify that the FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 valve was closed as part of performing the steps to place the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling mode.

printed on recycled paper O

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 20, 2011 Accordingly, TVA determined that this condition was reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(b) on September 21, 2011, and the notification was made to the NRC Region II office within two working days, on September 22, 2011. The corrective actions for this condition are being implemented as part of the corrective actions being taken as identified in the root cause analysis.

Should you have any questions, please contact Thomas Hess at (423) 751-3487.

Respectfully, R. M. Krich cc:

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant