ML092850023

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1 (Functional Units 7 and 8), Action 6#:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 4, Leak in Letdown HX, after the TS declaration is complete. The bistables need not be tripped to continue the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 12 of 43

~

Event

Description:

Res Loop 1 T HOT RTD Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1 (Functional Units 7 and 8), Action 6#:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 4, Leak in Letdown HX, after the TS declaration is complete. The bistables need not be tripped to continue the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...- Scenario #

1 Event #

_4.:....-____ Page 13 of _4_3---"

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-644-1-3 CC LOOP A RM-L2A HI RAD; XCP-644-1-4 CC LOOP A RM-L2A TRBL; XCP-643-3-6 CC SRG TK VENT 7096 CLSD HI RAD RO Responds to alarm(s).

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Radioactive in-leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

I PW-7096, CC SURGE TK VLV, closes.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the Automatic Action has occurred.

Verify the alarm is valid by observing RM-L2A and RlR-5 for increasing radiation.

Notify Health Physics and request a radiological survey.

Notify Chemistry and request a sample of the Component Cooling System.

Monitor Component Cooling System flows, temperatures and annunciators for any indications of equipment failure.

Booth Operator: Approximately two minutes after Health Physics and Chemistry are dispatched, report that high activity exists in CCW system CREW Determines leak is in Letdown HX based on CCW indications, PCV-145 response and VCT level.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

1 Event #

_4..:...-____ Page 13 of _4;.;;.,3---"

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-644-1-3 CC LOOP A RM-L2A HI RAD; XCP-644-1-4 CC LOOP A RM-L2A TRBL; XCP-643-3-6 CC SRG TK VENT 7096 CLSD HI RAD RO Responds to alarm(s).

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Radioactive in-leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

I PW-7096, CC SURGE TK VLV, closes.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the Automatic Action has occurred.

Verify the alarm is valid by observing RM-L2A and RlR-5 for increasing radiation.

Notify Health Physics and request a radiological survey.

Notify Chemistry and request a sample of the Component Cooling System.

Monitor Component Cooling System flows, temperatures and annunciators for any indications of equipment failure.

Booth Operator: Approximately two minutes after Health Physics and Chemistry are dispatched, report that high activity exists in CCW system CREW Determines leak is in Letdown HX based on CCW indications, PCV-145 response and VCT level.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

1 Event #

_4.;.....-____ Page 14 of _4..;.,;3;""'--1 Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Isolate the source of in-leakage when confirmed by sample analysis or a radiological survey.

If leakage is from a Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier, verify adequate seal injection flow and close the associated following valve for the affected pump: (N/A)

If leakage is from the Letdown Heat Exchanger, perform the following:

Place Excess Letdown in service per SOP-1 02.

RO SOP-102, Section C - Establishing Excess Letdown Verifies Initial Conditions:

RCS heatup is in progress or increased Letdown is required.

Component Cooling Water is in operation per SOP-118.

Procedure Note 2.0:

Due to the heat loss generated not being an input to the calorimetric thermal power calculation, Core Power should be maintained at less than or equal to 2898 MWt prior to and during Excess Letdown operations.

RO Ensure HCV-137, XS LTON HX, is closed.

Procedure Note 2.2:

Excess Letdown should normally be directed to the VCT. If required, Excess Letdown may be aligned to the RCDT.

RO Place PVM-8143, XS L TON TO VCT OR RCOT to one of the following as desired: (PEER...J)

VCT (preferred).

RCOT (alternate).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

...;...._ Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 14 of 43

~--------

--~~

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Isolate the source of in-leakage when confirmed by sample analysis or a radiological survey.

If leakage is from a Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier, verify adequate seal injection flow and close the associated following valve for the affected pump: (N/A)

If leakage is from the Letdown Heat Exchanger, perform the following:

Place Excess Letdown in service per SOP-1 02.

RO SOP-102, Section C - Establishing Excess Letdown Verifies Initial Conditions:

RCS heatup is in progress or increased Letdown is required.

Component Cooling Water is in operation per SOP-118.

Procedure Note 2.0:

Due to the heat loss generated not being an input to the calorimetric thermal power calculation, Core Power should be maintained at less than or equal to 2898 MWt prior to and during Excess Letdown operations.

RO Ensure HCV-137, XS LTON HX, is closed.

Procedure Note 2.2:

Excess Letdown should normally be directed to the VCT. If required, Excess Letdown may be aligned to the RCDT.

RO Place PVM-8143, XS L TON TO VCT OR RCOT to one of the following as desired: (PEER...J)

VCT (preferred).

RCOT (alternate).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

.-;...- Scenario #

1 Event #

_4~ ____ Page 15 of _4;..;,.3---1 Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO If required, reset Phase A Isolation by depressing the following:

(N/A)

MVT-81 00, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

MVT-8112, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

RO Ensure MVG-9583, FROM XS L TON HX, is open.

RO Open PVT-8153, XS LTON ISOL.

RO Open PVT-8154, XS LTON ISOL.

Procedure Note 2.8:

When sending Excess Letdown to the RCDT, RCDT level and pump operation should be monitored locally at XPN0007, WASTE PROCESSING/BORON RECYCLE CONT PNL (AB-412).

RO Establish Excess Letdown flow as follows:

Slowly throttle open HCV-137, XS L TON HX.

Monitor TI-139, XS LETDOWN HX OUT TEMP of, to maintain less than 165°F.

Monitor the following to ensure flow between 0.2 gpm and 5.0 gpm:

FR-154A, RCP SL LKOFF HI RANGE.

FR-154B, RCP SL LKOFF LO RANGE.

RO Returns to ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3 to complete steps

Close PVT-8149A(B)(C), LTON ORIFICE A(B)(C) ISOL.

Close LCV-460, L TON LINE ISOL.

Close LCV-459, L TON LINE ISOL.

Close PVT-8152, LTON LINE ISOL.

Close PCV-145, LO PRESS LTON.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

.-;..._ Scenario #

1 Event #

_4..;.... ____ Page 15 of _4~3--1 Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position J Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO If required, reset Phase A Isolation by depressing the following:

(N/A)

MVT-81 00, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

MVT-8112, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

RO Ensure MVG-9583, FROM XS L TON HX, is open.

RO Open PVT-8153, XS LTON ISOL.

RO Open PVT-8154, XS LTON ISOL.

Procedure Note 2.8:

When sending Excess Letdown to the RCDT, RCDT level and pump operation should be monitored locally at XPN0007, WASTE PROCESSING/BORON RECYCLE CONT PNL (AB-412).

RO Establish Excess Letdown flow as follows:

Slowly throttle open HCV-137, XS L TON HX.

Monitor TI-139, XS LETDOWN HX OUT TEMP of, to maintain less than 165°F.

Monitor the following to ensure flow between 0.2 gpm and 5.0 gpm:

FR-154A, RCP SL LKOFF HI RANGE.

FR-154B, RCP SL LKOFF LO RANGE.

RO Returns to ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3 to complete steps

Close PVT-8149A(B)(C), LTON ORIFICE A(B)(C) ISOL.

Close LCV-460, L TON LINE ISOL.

Close LCV-459, L TON LINE ISOL.

Close PVT-8152, LTON LINE ISOL.

Close PCV-145, LO PRESS LTON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

_4~ ____ Page 16 of

_4..;.;3~-I Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position J

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Close FCV-122, CHG FLOW.

Adjust HCV-186, INJ FLOW, to maintain 6-13 gpm per pump.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 5, Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature, after HCV-186 has been adjusted or seal injection flow is evaluated as satisfactory.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

4 Page 16 of 43

~-------

~

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Close FCV-122, CHG FLOW.

Adjust HCV-186, INJ FLOW, to maintain 6-13 gpm per pump.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 5, Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature, after HCV-186 has been adjusted or seal injection flow is evaluated as satisfactory.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--.;...- Scenario #

1 Event #

....,;5::...-____ Page 17 of _4_3---f Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature TIme I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-633-6-3, UNIT AUX XFMR XTF-2 TRBL BOP Responds to alarm.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-633-6-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Transformer N2 pressure high: 8.5 psig

Transformer N2 pressure low: -1.5 psig Empty N2 cylinder: 200 psig

Winding temperature high: 117°C

High oil temperature: 90°C Low oil level.

Loss of voltage.

Mechanical relief: 10 psig

Sudden pressure: 5.5 psi/sec

Combustible limit: 1 %

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate.

Booth Operator:

Wait approximately 3 minutes then (as AO) report winding temperature at 120*C and rising slowly with all fans running.

If contacted as Maintenance or System Engineer, wait 3 minutes then report that the temperature appears to be valid but no reason is apparent.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ----

Scenario #

1 Event #

_5;...-. ____ Page 17 of _4..;.;3;;"'-'-f Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature TIme I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-633-6-3, UNIT AUX XFMR XTF-2 TRBL BOP Responds to alarm.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-633-6-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Transformer N2 pressure high: 8.5 psig

Transformer N2 pressure low: -1.5 psig Empty N2 cylinder: 200 psig

Winding temperature high: 117°C

High oil temperature: 90°C Low oil level.

Loss of voltage.

Mechanical relief: 10 psig

Sudden pressure: 5.5 psi/sec

Combustible limit: 1 %

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate.

Booth Operator:

Wait approximately 3 minutes then (as AO) report winding temperature at 120*C and rising slowly with all fans running.

If contacted as Maintenance or System Engineer, wait 3 minutes then report that the temperature appears to be valid but no reason is apparent.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

1 Event #

_5~ ____ Page 18 of _4;.;;.,.3--1 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

If the alarm is caused by a sudden pressure, the 86T2-1, UNIT AUX DIFF LOCK-OUT RELAY, will actuate.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If a trip occurs, refer to UNIT AUX DIFF LCKOUT 86T2-1 (XCP-639 3-2).

Dispatch an Operator to XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, to determine the cause of the alarm.

Notify the System Controller.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If necessary, transfer loads to the Emergency Auxiliary Transformers per SOP-304.

When the cause has been corrected, verify XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, auxiliaries are returned to normal operation per SOP-303.

Contact Substation Maintenance for further assistance, if necessary.

CRS Directs BOP to transfer loads to Emergency Auxiliary Transformers per SOP-304.

BOP Verifies Initial Conditions:

The AUTO-MAN XFER Switch for each Balance of Plant bus is in AUTO.

XTF0031 and XTF0032, EMERGENCY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER #1 and #2 are in service per SOP-302.

Conditions exist which require removal of normal feed for the buses.

XTF0001, MAIN TRANSFORMER and XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER are in service per SOP-302.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 18 of 43

~-------

--~

Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

If the alarm is caused by a sudden pressure, the 86T2-1, UNIT AUX DIFF LOCK-OUT RELAY, will actuate.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If a trip occurs, refer to UNIT AUX DIFF LCKOUT 86T2-1 (XCP-639 3-2).

Dispatch an Operator to XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, to determine the cause of the alarm.

Notify the System Controller.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If necessary, transfer loads to the Emergency Auxiliary Transformers per SOP-304.

When the cause has been corrected, verify XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, auxiliaries are returned to normal operation per SOP-303.

Contact Substation Maintenance for further assistance, if necessary.

CRS Directs BOP to transfer loads to Emergency Auxiliary Transformers per SOP-304.

BOP Verifies Initial Conditions:

The AUTO-MAN XFER Switch for each Balance of Plant bus is in AUTO.

XTF0031 and XTF0032, EMERGENCY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER #1 and #2 are in service per SOP-302.

Conditions exist which require removal of normal feed for the buses.

XTF0001, MAIN TRANSFORMER and XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER are in service per SOP-302.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

~-

...;5~ ____ Page 19 of _4;.,;.3--1 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.1 through 2.3:

When BUS 1A, 1B, or 1C is aligned to its alternate feed, automatic transfer to its normal feed is not available.

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1A to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1AAUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1A ALT FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1A NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1A potential lights remain energized Place BUS 1A AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1 B to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1 B AL T FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1 B NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1 B potential lights remain energized.

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

Notify the System Controller of the applicable bus voltage limits from Enclosure B.

CREW Lower 216.9 Higher 239.6 If required, adjust the 115KV and/or 230KV alarm setpoints per CREW Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB for the current lineup.

Complete attachment but do not change setpoints Evaluator Note: Ask follow-up question - What are the new setpoints and how are the alarm setpoints adjusted?

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

~-

_5~ ____ Page 19 of _4;..;.3--1 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Aj)plicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.1 through 2.3:

When BUS 1A, 1B, or 1C is aligned to its alternate feed, automatic transfer to its normal feed is not available.

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1A to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1AAUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1A ALT FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1A NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1A potential lights remain energized Place BUS 1A AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1 B to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1 B AL T FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1 B NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1 B potential lights remain energized.

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

Notify the System Controller of the applicable bus voltage limits from Enclosure B.

CREW Lower 216.9 Higher 239.6 If required, adjust the 115KV and/or 230KV alarm setpoints per CREW Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB for the current lineup.

Complete attachment but do not change setpoints Evaluator Note: Ask follow-up question - What are the new setpoints and how are the alarm setpoints adjusted?

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_

Scenario #

Event #

_5~ ____ Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Manually transfer BUS 1C to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1 C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1 C AL T FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1 C NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1 C potential lights remain energized.

Place BUS 1 C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

Lead Evaluator cue Event 6, Controlling PZR Level Channel fails LO, after all buses have been transferred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

Event #

....;5:;;..-. ____ Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Manually transfer BUS 1C to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1 C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1 C AL T FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Open BUS 1 C NORM FEED breaker. (PEER..J)

Verify BUS 1 C potential lights remain energized.

Place BUS 1 C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER..J)

Lead Evaluator cue Event 6, Controlling PZR Level Channel fails LO, after all buses have been transferred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

_1.:...-_ Scenario #

1 Event #

_6~ ____ Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-614 5-1, CHG LINE FLO HIILO XCP-616 1-3, BLCK HTRS ISOL L TON PZR LCS LO XCP-616 1-5, PZR LCS OEV HI/LO XCP-616 3-1, PZR HTR CNTRL OR BU GRP 1/2 TRIP XCP-6164-6 SCR OUTPT LOSS RO Responds to multiple alarms.

CREW Recognizes entry conditions for AOP-401.6, PZR LEVEL CONTROL AND PROTECTION CHANNEL FAILURE.

RO Performs Immediate actions of AOP-401.6

Place PZR LEVEL CNTRL Switch to the position with two operable channels.

CRS Enters AOP-401.6 and verifies immediate action performance.

RO Select an operable channel on PZR LEVEL RCDR.

RO Control the PZR Heaters as necessary to maintain PZR pressure:

CNTRL GRP Heaters.

au GRP 1 Heaters.

au GRP 2 Heaters.

Evaluator's Note:

If RCS pressure drops below 2206 psig, the crew is required to enter TS 3.2.5, ONBR Parameters (Actions below at end of event)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_6~ ____ Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-614 5-1, CHG LINE FLO HIILO XCP-616 1-3, BLCK HTRS ISOL L TON PZR LCS LO XCP-616 1-5, PZR LCS OEV HI/LO XCP-616 3-1, PZR HTR CNTRL OR BU GRP 1/2 TRIP XCP-6164-6 SCR OUTPT LOSS RO Responds to multiple alarms.

CREW Recognizes entry conditions for AOP-401.6, PZR LEVEL CONTROL AND PROTECTION CHANNEL FAILURE.

RO Performs Immediate actions of AOP-401.6

Place PZR LEVEL CNTRL Switch to the position with two operable channels.

CRS Enters AOP-401.6 and verifies immediate action performance.

RO Select an operable channel on PZR LEVEL RCDR.

RO Control the PZR Heaters as necessary to maintain PZR pressure:

CNTRL GRP Heaters.

au GRP 1 Heaters.

au GRP 2 Heaters.

Evaluator's Note:

If RCS pressure drops below 2206 psig, the crew is required to enter TS 3.2.5, ONBR Parameters (Actions below at end of event)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 22 of 43

~--------

--~

Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

Several steps will be contrary to the pre-event alignment for the Letdown HX leak with letdown isolated and charging minimized. The eRS should make decisions to maintain the pre-event conditions.

RO Verify Letdown is in service. (NO)

RO Check if PZR LVL MASTER CONTROLLER is responding appropriately: (N/A)

RO Place FCV-122, CHG FLOW, in AUTO. REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

Booth Operator/Evaluator's Note:

The bistables do NOT need to be tripped to continue the scenario.

CRS Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -- Scenario #

1 Event #

_6~ ____ Page 22 of _4;.;;,3---1 Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

Several steps will be contrary to the pre-event alignment for the Letdown HX leak with letdown isolated and charging minimized. The eRS should make decisions to maintain the pre-event conditions.

RO Verify Letdown is in service. (NO)

RO Check if PZR LVL MASTER CONTROLLER is responding appropriately: (N/A)

RO Place FCV-122, CHG FLOW, in AUTO. REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

Booth Operator/Evaluator's Note:

The bistables do NOT need to be tripped to continue the scenario.

CRS Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_6 ______ Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 11-Action 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1. 1.

CRS IF RCS Pressure dropped below 2206 psig, enters TS 3.2.5 action With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RA TED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Lead Evaluator cue Event 7, Inadvertent Reactor Trip, Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_6.;;.-.____ Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

PZR Level Channel L T -459 fails low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 11-Action 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1. 1.

CRS IF RCS Pressure dropped below 2206 psig, enters TS 3.2.5 action With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RA TED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Lead Evaluator cue Event 7, Inadvertent Reactor Trip,

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;,,:,'..;;.8'~&;.;..;9~ __ Page ~

of

_4..;.;3~-I Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

FIRST OUT ANNUNCIATOR - MAN RX TRIP CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip. (Notes 1 RTB opened)

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VL Vs are closed.

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;,,:,'..;;.8'~&;.;..;9~ __ Page ~

of

_4..;.;3~-I Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

FIRST OUT ANNUNCIATOR - MAN RX TRIP CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip. (Notes 1 RTB opened)

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VL Vs are closed.

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_

Scenario #

1 Event #

_7"':"..;.8~, &_9 ___ Page ~

of _4;,;;;.3---.1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-61 07, 1-1. (NO)

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

Evaluator Note: Minimum communication required is parameter value and trend RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

Steam line differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRI P RECOVERY.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_

Scenario #

1 Event #

_7"':"..;.8~, &_9 ___ Page ~

of _4;,;;;.3---.1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-61 07, 1-1. (NO)

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

Evaluator Note: Minimum communication required is parameter value and trend RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

Steam line differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRI P RECOVERY.

Appendix D Op Test No.: ----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7-.,.... 8.,

&~9.;....-__ Page ~

of _4.-3 __ -11 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution:

If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Check FW status:

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 OF. (YES)

BOP Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321 (3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MD EFW Pumps are running.

Verify the TD EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;,,:,'.;;;.8':..;:&;;.,;9~ __ Page ~

of _4.;,,;3=---I Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution:

If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Check FW status:

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 OF. (YES)

BOP Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321 (3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MD EFW Pumps are running.

Verify the TD EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

Appendix D Op Test No.: ----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

Event #

....;7~,..;;;.8,:...;&....;9~ __ Page ~

of _4.;,;;3:"'--1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 oF. (YES)

Procedure Note - Step 4:

If a transition is made to AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI, the steps of EOP-1.1 which do NOT conflict with AOP-112.2 should be completed as time allows.

IF EOP-1.0 was entered from AOP-112.2, THEN RETURN TO CRS AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI, Step 7.

Booth Operator's Note:

Insert PZR Steam Space Break after all control rods are verified inserted.

RO Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

RO Reports rapidly lowering RCS Pressure/AUTO SI.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

...;..._ Scenario #

Event #

....;7~,.;,;;.8'1..:&;;.;9~ __ Page ~

of

_4....;3~-t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 oF. (YES)

Procedure Note - Step 4:

If a transition is made to AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI, the steps of EOP-1.1 which do NOT conflict with AOP-112.2 should be completed as time allows.

IF EOP-1.0 was entered from AOP-112.2, THEN RETURN TO CRS AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI, Step 7.

Booth Operator's Note:

Insert PZR Steam Space Break after all control rods are verified inserted.

RO Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

RO Reports rapidly lowering RCS Pressure/AUTO SI.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--.;...._ Scenario #

Event #

_7:..1.'..;;;.8'1..,;;&;;..;9~ __ Page ~

of _4....;3_~

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-50S, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note:

Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERI FICA TION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide. There is a critical task to close at least one Phase" A" Isolation Valve in two lines that have not properly isolated.

RB Instrument Air RCP Seal Water Return BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3,81 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Reports failure of RHR Pump "A" Evaluator Note:

CRS may direct NROATC to start RHR Pump "B".

Booth Operator's Note:

If dispatched wait 2-3 minutes and then report RHR Pump "A" breaker tripped on overcurrent.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

Event #

_7;.,j,'..;;.8:....;'

&;.;...9~ __ Page ~

of

_4.;.;3;...-.~

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-50S, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note:

Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERI FICA TION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide. There is a critical task to close at least one Phase" A" Isolation Valve in two lines that have not properly isolated.

RB Instrument Air RCP Seal Water Return BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3,81 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Reports failure of RHR Pump "A" Evaluator Note:

CRS may direct NROATC to start RHR Pump "B".

Booth Operator's Note:

If dispatched wait 2-3 minutes and then report RHR Pump "A" breaker tripped on overcurrent.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7

.....,_8....

, &_9 ___ Page ~

of _4_3--'-1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF.

With no RCP running, RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (NO)

IF RCS temperature is LESS THAN 557 OF AND decreasing, BOP THEN stabilize temperature by performing the following as required:

Close IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR Perform one of the following:

IF Narrow Range SG level is LESS THAN 26% [40%] in all SGs, THEN reduce EFW flow as necessary to stop cooldown, while maintaining total EFW flow GREATER THAN 450 gpm. OR WHEN Narrow Range SG level is GREATER THAN 26% [40%] in at least one SG, THEN control EFW flow as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature at 55TF.

COMMENCE A IT ACHMENT 6, STEAM VALVE ISOLATION, while continuing with this procedure.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN close:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7

.....,_8....

, &_9 ___ Page ~

of _4_3--'-1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF.

With no RCP running, RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (NO)

IF RCS temperature is LESS THAN 557 OF AND decreasing, BOP THEN stabilize temperature by performing the following as required:

Close IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR Perform one of the following:

IF Narrow Range SG level is LESS THAN 26% [40%] in all SGs, THEN reduce EFW flow as necessary to stop cooldown, while maintaining total EFW flow GREATER THAN 450 gpm. OR WHEN Narrow Range SG level is GREATER THAN 26% [40%] in at least one SG, THEN control EFW flow as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature at 55TF.

COMMENCE A IT ACHMENT 6, STEAM VALVE ISOLATION, while continuing with this procedure.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN close:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;.,j",..;;.8,:..;;&;;..;9;;..-. __ Page ~

of _4.;.;;;.3---f Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Procedure Note:

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped:

CRITICAL Stop all RCP's before the transition to EOP-2.0.

TASK #1 BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED:

No SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

(YES)

No SG is completely depressurized. (YES)

CREW Verify Secondary radiation levels indicate SG tubes are NOT RUPTURED: (YES to a")

RM-G19A (B) (C) STMLN HI RNG GAMMA

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

RO Check if the RCS is INTACT: (NO to any or a")

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;,.:.,..;.8..,;, &;....9~__ Page ~

of _4-.3--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Procedure Note:

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped:

CRITICAL Stop all RCP's before the transition to EOP-2.0.

TASK #1 BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED:

No SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

(YES)

No SG is completely depressurized. (YES)

CREW Verify Secondary radiation levels indicate SG tubes are NOT RUPTURED: (YES to a")

RM-G19A (B) (C) STMLN HI RNG GAMMA

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

RO Check if the RCS is INTACT: (NO to any or a")

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7.;...:,_8.,:..' &-....9___ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;""--1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RB radiation levels are normal on:

RM-G7, CONTAINMENT HI RNG GAMMA

RM-G18, CNTMNT HI RNG GAMMA

RB Sump levels are normal.

RB pressure is LESS THAN 1.5 psig.

The following annunciators are NOT lit:

XCP-606 2-2 (RBCU 1A12A DRN FLO HI)

XCP-607 2-2 (RBCU 1 B/2B DRN FLO HI)

CRS Transitions to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

800th Operator's Note:

Trip RHR Pump "8" as the reading of the first step is in progress. If dispatched to investigate, report the breaker tripped and very hot motor with a smell of burned electrical insulation in the area of the pump.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running).

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED No SG decreasing in an uncontrolled manner (YES)

No SG completely depressurized (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7.;...:,_8.,:..' &-....9___ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;""--1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RB radiation levels are normal on:

RM-G7, CONTAINMENT HI RNG GAMMA

RM-G18, CNTMNT HI RNG GAMMA

RB Sump levels are normal.

RB pressure is LESS THAN 1.5 psig.

The following annunciators are NOT lit:

XCP-606 2-2 (RBCU 1A12A DRN FLO HI)

XCP-607 2-2 (RBCU 1 B/2B DRN FLO HI)

CRS Transitions to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

800th Operator's Note:

Trip RHR Pump "8" as the reading of the first step is in progress. If dispatched to investigate, report the breaker tripped and very hot motor with a smell of burned electrical insulation in the area of the pump.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running).

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED No SG decreasing in an uncontrolled manner (YES)

No SG completely depressurized (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

~-

_7;..:.'.;;.8,:..;;&;;..;9;...-. __ Page ~

of _4.;.,;.3---1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Check Intact SG levels

NR level in intact SGs >26% [40%]

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Check if Secondary radiation levels are normal: (YES to all)

Check radiation levels normal on:

RM-G19A(B)(C), STMLN HI RNG GAMMA.

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS' ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR' BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW' DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

Place SVX-9398A(B)(C), SG A(B)(C) SMPL ISOL, in AUTO.

Notify Chemistry to sample all SG secondary sides, and screen samples for abnormal activity using a frisker.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to the PZR PORV Block Valves:

MVG-8000A, B, C (YES)

Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

~-

_7;..:.'.;;.8,:..;;&;;..;9;...-. __ Page ~

of _4.;.,;.3---1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Check Intact SG levels

NR level in intact SGs >26% [40%]

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Check if Secondary radiation levels are normal: (YES to all)

Check radiation levels normal on:

RM-G19A(B)(C), STMLN HI RNG GAMMA.

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS' ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR' BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW' DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

Place SVX-9398A(B)(C), SG A(B)(C) SMPL ISOL, in AUTO.

Notify Chemistry to sample all SG secondary sides, and screen samples for abnormal activity using a frisker.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to the PZR PORV Block Valves:

MVG-8000A, B, C (YES)

Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7 8,..... &_9 ____ Page ~

of _4,;.;3--'-f Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "N Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPL Y TO RB.

RO Check if SI flow should be reduced:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP OF, is GREATER THAN 30 oF. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 11.

RO Check if RB Spray should be stopped:

Check if any RB Spray Pumps are running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 12. Observe the CAUTION prior to Step 12.

Evaluator Note:

Closely monitor SRO decision at the following steps. SRO should NOT loop back to procedure step 1.

RO Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped: (None running)

RO Check if RCS pressure is stable or decreasing. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7 8,..... &_9 ____ Page ~

of _4,;.;3--'-f Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "N Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPL Y TO RB.

RO Check if SI flow should be reduced:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP OF, is GREATER THAN 30 oF. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 11.

RO Check if RB Spray should be stopped:

Check if any RB Spray Pumps are running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 12. Observe the CAUTION prior to Step 12.

Evaluator Note:

Closely monitor SRO decision at the following steps. SRO should NOT loop back to procedure step 1.

RO Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped: (None running)

RO Check if RCS pressure is stable or decreasing. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

_7...:. *..;.8.:...;&..;.9~ __ Page ~

of _4..;.,;3;;....-..."

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Check if pressure in all SGs is stable or increasing. (YES)

BOP Check if DGs should be stopped:

Verify both ESF buses are energized by offsite power.

(YES)

Stop any unloaded DG. REFER TO SOP-306.

RO Verify equipment is available for Cold Leg Recirculation:

Verify power is available for at least one RHR Pump: (NO -

both breakers are tripped)

Lead Evaluator may terminate this scenario at his discretion after entry to EOP-2.4 when all critical tasks are addressed.

CRS GO TO EOP-2.4, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.

Procedure Caution:

If Emergency Coolant Recirculation capability is restored, further recovery action should continue by RETURNING TO the Procedure and Step in effect, since further actions of this procedure are unnecessary.

If the suction source is lost to any SI OR RB Spray Pump, the AFFECTED pump should be stopped to prevent pump damage.

Procedure Note:

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

_7...:. *..;.8.:...;&..;.9~ __ Page ~

of _4..;.,;3;;....-..."

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Check if pressure in all SGs is stable or increasing. (YES)

BOP Check if DGs should be stopped:

Verify both ESF buses are energized by offsite power.

(YES)

Stop any unloaded DG. REFER TO SOP-306.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

RO Verify equipment is available for Cold Leg Recirculation:

Verify power is available for at least one RHR Pump: (NO -

both breakers are tripped)

Lead Evaluator may terminate this scenario at his discretion after entry to EOP-2.4 when all critical tasks are addressed.

CRS GO TO EOP-2.4, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.

Procedure Caution:

If Emergency Coolant Recirculation capability is restored, further recovery action should continue by RETURNING TO the Procedure and Step in effect, since further actions of this procedure are unnecessary.

If the suction source is lost to any SI OR RB Spray Pump, the AFFECTED pump should be stopped to prevent pump damage.

Procedure Note:

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

~-

Event #

_7;.l,'..;;;.8,l..;' &::.;9:::..-__ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;"'-'-1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note - Step 1:

RHR Sump blockage is indicated by decreased and unstable pump amps, discharge pressure, OR discharge flow.

CRS IF both RHR Pumps are secured due to cavitation, THEN GO TO EOP-2.6, RHR SUMP BLOCKAGE, Step 1. (NO)

CRS Try to restore at least one train of Emergency Coolant Recirculation:

Notify TSC personnel of conditions and indications.

Booth Operator's Note:

If contacted, report that the TSC is still manning. You will call back when it is activated.

Procedure Caution - Step 2.b:

Equipment may be in abnormally high radiation areas.

Appropriate radiological precautions must be taken to minimize personnel exposure.

RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset both LATCHED SI RHR SUMP VLV TRAIN A(B)

Switches.

BOP Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

RO Verify RWST level is GREATER THAN 6%. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

~-

Event #

_7;.l,'..;;;.8,l..;' &::.;9:::..-__ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;"'-'-1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note - Step 1:

RHR Sump blockage is indicated by decreased and unstable pump amps, discharge pressure, OR discharge flow.

CRS IF both RHR Pumps are secured due to cavitation, THEN GO TO EOP-2.6, RHR SUMP BLOCKAGE, Step 1. (NO)

CRS Try to restore at least one train of Emergency Coolant Recirculation:

Notify TSC personnel of conditions and indications.

Booth Operator's Note:

If contacted, report that the TSC is still manning. You will call back when it is activated.

Procedure Caution - Step 2.b:

Equipment may be in abnormally high radiation areas.

Appropriate radiological precautions must be taken to minimize personnel exposure.

RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset both LATCHED SI RHR SUMP VLV TRAIN A(B)

Switches.

BOP Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

RO Verify RWST level is GREATER THAN 6%. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

...;7;..l.,.;;,;8,..,;;&;;..;9;;...-. __ Page ~

of _4-.,3---t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check if RB Spray should be aligned for recirculation:

Verify at least one RB Spray Pump is running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

Evaluator's Note:

The RWST Makeup Initiation steps follow. It is likely that the scenario will be terminated before the makeup terminates. All steps (except field operations) are performed by the RO.

RO Add makeup to the RWST:

REFER TO SOP-106, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM.

Place RX COOL SYS MU to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT to MAN.

(Peer..J)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

...;7;..l.,.;;,;8,..,;;&;;..;9;;...-. __ Page ~

of _4-.,3---t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check if RB Spray should be aligned for recirculation:

Verify at least one RB Spray Pump is running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

Evaluator's Note:

The RWST Makeup Initiation steps follow. It is likely that the scenario will be terminated before the makeup terminates. All steps (except field operations) are performed by the RO.

RO Add makeup to the RWST:

REFER TO SOP-106, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM.

Place RX COOL SYS MU to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT to MAN.

(Peer..J)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

_1~_ Scenario #

1 Event #

....;7;..:.,.;,;8,~&;..;9:...-. __ Page ~

of _4;.;;.,3--t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.3:

Boric Acid flow rate should be set slightly higher than required mixture rate to ensure Boric Acid flow terminates first and lines are flushed with Reactor Makeup Water.

Adjust FCV-113 A & B, BA FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, batch integrator for desired quantity. (peer...J)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, Batch Integrator for desired quantity. (Peer...J)

Booth Operator's Note:

Determine REMOTE functions for the following step during validation.

CREW Open the following (AB-436):

XVD08432-CS, RWST & RHT BA INLET HDR ISOL VALVE.

XVD08434-CS, RWST BORIC ACID INLET HEADER ISOL VALVE.

Procedure Note 2.8:

Normally open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is locked closed in Mode 6 in compliance with Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.9.1.3.

If required, unlock and open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE (AB-412). (N/A)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

_1~_ Scenario #

1 Event #

....;7;..:.,.;,;8,~&;..;9:...-. __ Page ~

of _4;.;;.,3--t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.3:

Boric Acid flow rate should be set slightly higher than required mixture rate to ensure Boric Acid flow terminates first and lines are flushed with Reactor Makeup Water.

Adjust FCV-113 A & B, BA FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, batch integrator for desired quantity. (peer...J)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, Batch Integrator for desired quantity. (Peer...J)

Booth Operator's Note:

Determine REMOTE functions for the following step during validation.

CREW Open the following (AB-436):

XVD08432-CS, RWST & RHT BA INLET HDR ISOL VALVE.

XVD08434-CS, RWST BORIC ACID INLET HEADER ISOL VALVE.

Procedure Note 2.8:

Normally open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is locked closed in Mode 6 in compliance with Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.9.1.3.

If required, unlock and open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE (AB-412). (N/A)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

Event #

_7;..:,...;;8.:." &,;;,;",.;;,9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;,;3;""'-1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is open and it is desired to only transfer boric acid to the RWST, place FCV-168B, MU WTR TO BLENDER, in CLOSE.

Place RX COOL SYS MU to START.

If desired, place FCV-113, A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Verify the following:

Desired flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

Desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

RWST level increases.

BOP Check Intact SG levels:

NR level in intact SGs >26% [40%] (YES)

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level Procedure Note - Step 5:

Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.

CRITICAL Initiate RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown:

TASK #3 CRS Initiate an RCS cooldown prior to taking any action to reduce SI flow.

Maintain the cooldown rate in the RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100 "F/hr.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

Event #

_7;..:,...;;8.:." &,;;,;",.;;,9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;,;3;""'-1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is open and it is desired to only transfer boric acid to the RWST, place FCV-168B, MU WTR TO BLENDER, in CLOSE.

Place RX COOL SYS MU to START.

If desired, place FCV-113, A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Verify the following:

Desired flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

Desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

RWST level increases.

BOP Check Intact SG levels:

NR level in intact SGs >26% [40%] (YES)

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level Procedure Note - Step 5:

Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.

CRITICAL Initiate RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown:

TASK #3 CRS Initiate an RCS cooldown prior to taking any action to reduce SI flow.

Maintain the cooldown rate in the RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100 "F/hr.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;..:....;.8:...;. &;;..9;....-__ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;""--1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK.

Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Close the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C), for any FAULTED or RUPTURED SGs.

BOP Dump steam from each intact SG to the condenser.

Verify permissive C-9 light is bright on XCP-6114-1-3.

(YES)

Evaluator's Note:

The crew could elect to leave the MSIVs closed and initiate the cooldown on the Steam line Power Reliefs.

BOP Perform the following:

Verify the MS Isolation Valves PVM-2801A, B, C are open for the intact SGs.

BOP Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and closed.

BOP Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

BOP Adjust the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller to obtain the desired cooldown rate.

RO Check if SI System is in service.

Any Charging Pump is running with flow indicated on FI-940(943), CHG LOOP A(B) CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

(YES)

Any RHR Pump is running in the SI Mode. (NO)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

1 Event #

_7;..:....;.8:...;. &;;..9;....-__ Page ~

of _4.;.,;3;""--1 Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK.

Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Close the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C), for any FAULTED or RUPTURED SGs.

BOP Dump steam from each intact SG to the condenser.

Verify permissive C-9 light is bright on XCP-6114-1-3.

(YES)

Evaluator's Note:

The crew could elect to leave the MSIVs closed and initiate the cooldown on the Steam line Power Reliefs.

BOP Perform the following:

Verify the MS Isolation Valves PVM-2801A, B, C are open for the intact SGs.

BOP Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and closed.

BOP Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

BOP Adjust the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller to obtain the desired cooldown rate.

RO Check if SI System is in service.

Any Charging Pump is running with flow indicated on FI-940(943), CHG LOOP A(B) CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

(YES)

Any RHR Pump is running in the SI Mode. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

_7.;..,l *...;;8;.:....;;.;&..;;;9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;.;3;""'--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Establish one train of SI flow to conserve RWST inventory:

Ensure only one Charging Pump running. Stops one Charging Pump.

Verify RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

IF RHR is NOT the suction source for the Charging Pumps, THEN stop both RHR Pumps. (Neither running)

CRS GO TO Step 17.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario when Step 17 (Verify no backflow from the RWST - - - -) is started.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

Event #

_7.;..,l *...;;8;.:....;;.;&..;;;9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;.;3;""'--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1). RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Establish one train of SI flow to conserve RWST inventory:

Ensure only one Charging Pump running. Stops one Charging Pump.

Verify RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

IF RHR is NOT the suction source for the Charging Pumps, THEN stop both RHR Pumps. (Neither running)

CRS GO TO Step 17.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario when Step 17 (Verify no backflow from the RWST - - - -) is started.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

--=--

_7:..1.'..;;.8:..;' &;.;.;9~ __ Page ~

of

_4..;.;3~-I Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

MDEFW Pump "A" and RHR Pump "A" will not be running.

There will be no flow from RHR Pump "8" (until it trips) because RCS pressure will remain above the shutoff head.

There is a critical task for isolating two Phase" A" lines.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C)

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFWflow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321 (3331 )(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

--=--

_7:..1.'..;;.8:..;' &;.;.;9~ __ Page ~

of

_4..;.;3~-I Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

MDEFW Pump "A" and RHR Pump "A" will not be running.

There will be no flow from RHR Pump "8" (until it trips) because RCS pressure will remain above the shutoff head.

There is a critical task for isolating two Phase" A" lines.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C)

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFWflow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321 (3331 )(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

~-

1 Event #

_7;,,:,'..;;.8':..;&;;..;9~ __ Page ~

of _4..;.,;3;;"'--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

80th RHR Pumps are running. (NO - "A" is failed and "8" may trip before Attachment 3 is completed) 80P Ensure two R8CU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the R8CUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP 8 DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(8)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

~-

1 Event #

_7;,,:,'..;;.8':..;&;;..;9~ __ Page ~

of _4..;.,;3;;"'--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

80th RHR Pumps are running. (NO - "A" is failed and "8" may trip before Attachment 3 is completed) 80P Ensure two R8CU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the R8CUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP 8 DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(8)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...._ Scenario #

1 Event #

_7""",....

8.....

, &_9 _____ Page ~

of _4_3_-1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

BOP Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO A IT ACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

CRITICAL Closes at least one valve in each of the following pairs:

TASK #2 8100 ANDIOR 8112, RCP Seal Water Return Isolations

2662A ANDIOR 2662B, RB Instrument Air Isolations BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

Verify RHR flow on: (No pumps running).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...._ Scenario #

1 Event #

_7""",....

8.....

, &_9 _____ Page ~

of _4_3_-1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

BOP Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO A IT ACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

CRITICAL Closes at least one valve in each of the following pairs:

TASK #2 8100 ANDIOR 8112, RCP Seal Water Return Isolations

2662A ANDIOR 2662B, RB Instrument Air Isolations BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

Verify RHR flow on: (No pumps running).

Appendix D Scenario Outline FINAL Form ES-D-1 Facility:

VC SUMMER Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

2009 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:

IC-10, 100% Power, MOL (IC-232 for 2009)

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle.

64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning and Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statement for TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Maintain 100% power.

Critical Task:

1.

Initiate manual reactor trip prior to exiting step 1 of EOP-1.0.

2.

Isolate affected SG before NR level reaches 100%.

3.

Trip all RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

PMPFW013B C-BOP Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure.

R-RO Power Reduction.

2 NIS003D I-RO PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO.

TS - CRS 3

EH001 C-BOP EHC Pump Trip EH002 Standby EHC Pump AUTO start failure.

ANN EH009 EHC PP A MOTOR OVERLOAD 4

RCS002B C-RO SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI.

TS -CRS 5

FWM023A C-BOP SG "A" Feedwater Control Valve (FCV-478) fails to respond in AUTO during power reduction (verify malfunction value matches "value" on far right column of DIRECTOR window.

6 EPS004C M-ALL Loss of Service Bus 1 C.

7 PCS009AB C-RO AUTO Reactor Trip Failure PCS009BB 8

RCS002B M-ALL SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip.

VLVRC005P PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI.

VLVRC013P 9

MSS006B C-BOP SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close.

Terminate at the transition to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

(N)ormal, (R )eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline FINAL Form ES-D-1 Facility:

VC SUMMER Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

2009 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:

IC-10, 100% Power, MOL (IC-232 for 2009)

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle.

64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning and Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statement for TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Maintain 100% power.

Critical Task:

1.

Initiate manual reactor trip prior to exiting step 1 of EOP-1.0.

2.

Isolate affected SG before NR level reaches 100%.

3.

Trip all RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

PMPFW013B C-BOP Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure.

R-RO Power Reduction.

2 NIS003D I-RO PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO.

TS - CRS 3

EH001 C-BOP EHC Pump Trip EH002 Standby EHC Pump AUTO start failure.

ANN EH009 EHC PP A MOTOR OVERLOAD 4

RCS002B C-RO SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI.

TS -CRS 5

FWM023A C-BOP SG "A" Feedwater Control Valve (FCV-478) fails to respond in AUTO during power reduction (verify malfunction value matches "value" on far right column of DIRECTOR window.

6 EPS004C M-ALL Loss of Service Bus 1 C.

7 PCS009AB C-RO AUTO Reactor Trip Failure PCS009BB 8

RCS002B M-ALL SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip.

VLVRC005P PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI.

VLVRC013P 9

MSS006B C-BOP SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close.

Terminate at the transition to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

(N)ormal, (R )eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

2 Event #

--.;.. ____ Page 6

of _4..;.;2;;""--1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-625-1-3, FWPB AlB/C/o OVRLD Computer High Temperature alanns Feedwater Booster Pump" A" amps rising Evaluatorl Booth Operator Note:

The crew has pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions. Initiate Event 1, Feedwater Booster Pump Trip, approximately 30-60 seconds after the crew assumes the watch.

Report "74" relay flag for amber light (when requested)

Report "51" relay if pump trips (when requested)

(IF DIRECTED to open wannup valve 1639, set LOA-FWM021=100%)

BOP Responds to alarm XCP-625-1-3, FWBP AlB/C/O OVRLO.

CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-625-1-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Pump or pump motor malfunction.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Feedwater Booster Pump trips.

Procedure Note:

This alarm has reflash capabilities.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

2 Event #

Page 6

of 42

~--------

~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-625-1-3, FWPB AlB/C/o OVRLD Computer High Temperature alanns Feedwater Booster Pump" A" amps rising Evaluatorl Booth Operator Note:

The crew has pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions. Initiate Event 1, Feedwater Booster Pump Trip, approximately 30-60 seconds after the crew assumes the watch.

Report "74" relay flag for amber light (when requested)

Report "51" relay if pump trips (when requested)

(IF DIRECTED to open wannup valve 1639, set LOA-FWM021=100%)

BOP Responds to alarm XCP-625-1-3, FWBP AlB/C/O OVRLO.

CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-625-1-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Pump or pump motor malfunction.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Feedwater Booster Pump trips.

Procedure Note:

This alarm has reflash capabilities.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

...;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

.-.;.. ____ Page 7

of _4_2_-1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If the number of Feedwater Booster Pumps in operation is less than the number of Feedwater Pumps in operation, immediately trip the Reactor and enter EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION. (NO-3/3)

If three Feedwater Booster Pumps and three Feedwater Pumps are in operation, reduce Reactor power to 95% per GOP-4C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION. (YES)

Crew Determines the need to manually trip Feedwater Booster Pump A.

BOP If available, start a standby Feedwater Booster Pump per SOP-210, FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

BOP Ensure Deaerator wide range level is maintained greater than 4' as indicated on LI-3135, DEAER STOR TK WR LVL FEET.

CRS Enters GOP-4C.

CRS Verifies Initial Conditions:

The plant is in Mode 1. (YES)

Conditions exist that do not require a Reactor Trip but do require the Reactor to be in Mode 2 in less time than would be allowed by performing a normal shutdown. (NO, but the ARP has directed use of GOP-4C)

Note 3.1 through 3.10 If time allows, load reductions should be discussed with the Load Dispatcher.

Thermal Power changes of greater than 15% in any one hour require completion of Attachment III.H. of GTP-702.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

...;..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

Page 7

of 42

~~~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If the number of Feedwater Booster Pumps in operation is less than the number of Feedwater Pumps in operation, immediately trip the Reactor and enter EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION. (NO-3/3)

If three Feedwater Booster Pumps and three Feedwater Pumps are in operation, reduce Reactor power to 95% per GOP-4C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION. (YES)

Crew Determines the need to manually trip Feedwater Booster Pump A.

BOP If available, start a standby Feedwater Booster Pump per SOP-210, FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

BOP Ensure Deaerator wide range level is maintained greater than 4' as indicated on LI-3135, DEAER STOR TK WR LVL FEET.

CRS Enters GOP-4C.

CRS Verifies Initial Conditions:

The plant is in Mode 1. (YES)

Conditions exist that do not require a Reactor Trip but do require the Reactor to be in Mode 2 in less time than would be allowed by performing a normal shutdown. (NO, but the ARP has directed use of GOP-4C)

Note 3.1 through 3.10 If time allows, load reductions should be discussed with the Load Dispatcher.

Thermal Power changes of greater than 15% in any one hour require completion of Attachment III.H. of GTP-702.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 8

of 42

~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Informs Load Dispatcher.

Commence rapid Plant Shutdown as follows:

RO Energize all Pressurizer Heaters.

Procedure Note 3.1.b Setting FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT to 8.3 will yield 33 gpm Boration flow rate.

Maintain the following with rod motion or boron concentration changes:

Tavg within 10°F and trending to Tref.

L11 within limits.

Control Rods above the rod insertion limit.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may initiate a boration before or after the power reduction. Boration steps are not in GOP-4C but are included for evaluator use following the load reduction steps.

BOP Reduce load by either of the following methods:

By use of the DEC LOAD RATE circuit as follows:

De-energize LOAD LIMIT circuit.

Energize DEC LOAD RATE circuit.

Select desired rate on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN, up to 5% per minute.

Decrease LOAD SET to the load desired.

By use of the load limiter as follows:

Ensure LOAD LMT light is lit.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ----

Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 8

of 42

~--------

~~~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Informs Load Dispatcher.

Commence rapid Plant Shutdown as follows:

RO Energize all Pressurizer Heaters.

Procedure Note 3.1.b Setting FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT to 8.3 will yield 33 gpm Boration flow rate.

Maintain the following with rod motion or boron concentration changes:

Tavg within 10°F and trending to Tref.

L11 within limits.

Control Rods above the rod insertion limit.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may initiate a boration before or after the power reduction. Boration steps are not in GOP-4C but are included for evaluator use following the load reduction steps.

BOP Reduce load by either of the following methods:

By use of the DEC LOAD RATE circuit as follows:

De-energize LOAD LIMIT circuit.

Energize DEC LOAD RATE circuit.

Select desired rate on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN, up to 5% per minute.

Decrease LOAD SET to the load desired.

By use of the load limiter as follows:

Ensure LOAD LMT light is lit.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

--.;,.. ____ Page 9

of _4_2---1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Tum the LOAD LMT SET potentiometer counterclockwise, up to a nominal 5% per minute, until the desired load is reached.

BORATION STEPS (SOP-10S,Section IV.D - All steps performed by the RO)

Evaluator Note:

The RO could elect to borate in accordance with SOP-10S,Section IV.D - BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATION VALVE. A copy of that procedure page is attached at the end of this scenario guide.

Procedure Note 2.0 Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Ensure at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to BOR.

(Peer..J)

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, Batch Integrator to the desired volume (Peer..J)

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to START.

Procedure Note 2.S Step 2.S may be omitted when borating less than 10 gallons.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

Page 9

of 42

~--------

-=~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Tum the LOAD LMT SET potentiometer counterclockwise, up to a nominal 5% per minute, until the desired load is reached.

BORATION STEPS (SOP-10S,Section IV.D - All steps performed by the RO)

Evaluator Note:

The RO could elect to borate in accordance with SOP-10S,Section IV.D - BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATION VALVE. A copy of that procedure page is attached at the end of this scenario guide.

Procedure Note 2.0 Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Ensure at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to BOR.

(Peer..J)

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, Batch Integrator to the desired volume (Peer..J)

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to START.

Procedure Note 2.S Step 2.S may be omitted when borating less than 10 gallons.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -----

Scenario #

2 Event #

-.;.. ____ Page 10 of _4.;.;;:.2--1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Procedure Note 2.7 The AUTO setpoint dial for FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW, controller may be adjusted slowly to obtain the desired flow rate.

Verify the desired Boric Acid flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

Evaluator Note:

RO will borate approximately 50 gallons When the preset volume of boric acid has been reached, perform the following:

Place FCV-113A&B, BA flow controller in MAN.

Verify boration stops.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Procedure Note 2.10

If plant conditions require repeated borations, Step 2.10 may be omitted.

The volume in the piping between the blender and the VCT outlet is approximately 3.8 gallons.

Alternate Dilute 4 to 6 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to flush the line downstream of the blender by performing the following:

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL. (Peer~)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow rate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

-.;.. ____ Page 10 of _4_2---1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Procedure Note 2.7 The AUTO setpoint dial for FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW, controller may be adjusted slowly to obtain the desired flow rate.

Verify the desired Boric Acid flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

Evaluator Note:

RO will borate approximately 50 gallons When the preset volume of boric acid has been reached, perform the following:

Place FCV-113A&B, BA flow controller in MAN.

Verify boration stops.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Procedure Note 2.10

If plant conditions require repeated borations, Step 2.10 may be omitted.

The volume in the piping between the blender and the VCT outlet is approximately 3.8 gallons.

Alternate Dilute 4 to 6 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to flush the line downstream of the blender by performing the following:

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL. (Peer~)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow rate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

2 Event #

~

____ Page 11 of _4;;;;.2---l1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer..J)

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

Verify alternate dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer..J)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

In MAN, adjust FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW OUTPUT, to the required position which will ensure proper Boric Acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Adjust FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT, to the desired position to ensure proper boric acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the in-service Boric Acid Tank.

If necessary, start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the Boric Acid Tank on recirculation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -----

Scenario #

2 Event #

-.;..____ Page 11 of _4;.;;;.2---l1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "An bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer..J)

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

Verify alternate dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer..J)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

In MAN, adjust FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW OUTPUT, to the required position which will ensure proper Boric Acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Adjust FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT, to the desired position to ensure proper boric acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the in-service Boric Acid Tank.

If necessary, start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the Boric Acid Tank on recirculation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

....;..-- Scenario #

2 Event #

....;.. _____ Page 12 of _4.;.;2;""--1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2 (PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO) when power is stabilized at (or below) the required value and the reactivity control evaluation is complete.

J I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

2 Event #

--=-_____ Page 12 of 42

---I Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" bearing failure, Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2 (PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO) when power is stabilized at (or below) the required value and the reactivity control evaluation is complete.

I I

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2~ ____ Page 13 of _4;,;;.2---11 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV RO Responds to alarm XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV, and/or rod motion.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew will likely go directly to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE CHANNEL FAILURE, rather than to implement the ARP.

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-620-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Dropped Rod.

Quadrant Power Tilt.

Power Range channel in test.

Power Range channel failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Observe Power Range meters NI-41 B, NI-42B, NI-43B, and NI-44B.

Verify proper Control Rod positions.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If a rod dropped, refer to AOP-403.6, DROPPED CONTROL ROD. (NO)

Determine if a quadrant power tilt exists by: (NO)

Display TFMMI on the IPCS.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2 _______ Page 13 of _4=2---1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV RO Responds to alarm XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV, and/or rod motion.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew will likely go directly to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE CHANNEL FAILURE, rather than to implement the ARP.

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-620-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Dropped Rod.

Quadrant Power Tilt.

Power Range channel in test.

Power Range channel failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Observe Power Range meters NI-41 B, NI-42B, NI-43B, and NI-44B.

Verify proper Control Rod positions.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If a rod dropped, refer to AOP-403.6, DROPPED CONTROL ROD. (NO)

Determine if a quadrant power tilt exists by: (NO)

Display TFMMI on the IPCS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2~ ____ Page 14 of _4;.;;;.2---11 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If the IPCS is not available, perform STP-108.001, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.

If a Power Range channel is in test, place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to the channel being tested.

If an instrument failure is suspected, refer to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE FAILURE.

CRS Enters AOP-401.1 0 RO Performs immediate actions

Verify normal indication on Power Range Channel N-44.

(NO)

IF Power Range Channel N-44 has failed, THEN place the ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch in MAN.

Stabilize any plant transients in progress.

CREW Maintain stable plant conditions.

CREW Verify no testing is in progress on the operable Power Range channels.

Evaluator Note:

Prompt the CRS to direct the NROATC to perform the actions below on the NI panels Place ROD STOP BYPASS Switch (on the MISCELLANEOUS RO CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL) for the failed Power Range channel in BYPASS.

BOP Verify the appropriate Rod Stop Bypass status light is bright:

For N-44, B2 OP ROD STOP BYP (XCP-6111 4-4).

BOP Adjust Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 1.0 of of Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

...;2~ ____ Page 14 of _4=2---11 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If the IPCS is not available, perform STP-108.001, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.

If a Power Range channel is in test, place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to the channel being tested.

If an instrument failure is suspected, refer to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE FAILURE.

CRS Enters AOP-401.1 0 RO Performs immediate actions

Verify normal indication on Power Range Channel N-44.

(NO)

IF Power Range Channel N-44 has failed, THEN place the ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch in MAN.

Stabilize any plant transients in progress.

CREW Maintain stable plant conditions.

CREW Verify no testing is in progress on the operable Power Range channels.

Evaluator Note:

Prompt the CRS to direct the NROATC to perform the actions below on the NI panels Place ROD STOP BYPASS Switch (on the MISCELLANEOUS RO CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL) for the failed Power Range channel in BYPASS.

BOP Verify the appropriate Rod Stop Bypass status light is bright:

For N-44, B2 OP ROD STOP BYP (XCP-6111 4-4).

BOP Adjust Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 1.0 of of Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

...,;2;;...-____ Page 15 of _4.;.;;;.2--1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notify the I&C Department to record detector currents and CRS status lights on POWER RANGE A and POWER RANGE B drawers.

Procedure Caution - Step 9 The empty fuse holders should NOT be reinstalled as this will allow a sma" amount of current flow through the blown fuse indicator.

Evaluator Note:

The following are expected alarms when the fuses are pulled in the next step:

XCP-620-1-1, PR HI SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-2, PR LO SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-2-1, PR DET VOL T LOSS

XCP-620-2-2, PR FLUX HI RATE SINGLE CHAN ALERT RO Deenergize the failed Power Range channel:

Remove the CONTROL POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE A drawer.

Remove the INSTR POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE B drawer.

Evaluator Note:

The following alarms will clear during the next step:

XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT RO Align the Power Range channel comparator circuits:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2 ______ Page 15 of _4=2---1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notify the I&C Department to record detector currents and CRS status lights on POWER RANGE A and POWER RANGE B drawers.

Procedure Caution - Step 9 The empty fuse holders should NOT be reinstalled as this will allow a sma" amount of current flow through the blown fuse indicator.

Evaluator Note:

The following are expected alarms when the fuses are pulled in the next step:

XCP-620-1-1, PR HI SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-2, PR LO SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-2-1, PR DET VOL T LOSS

XCP-620-2-2, PR FLUX HI RATE SINGLE CHAN ALERT RO Deenergize the failed Power Range channel:

Remove the CONTROL POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE A drawer.

Remove the INSTR POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE B drawer.

Evaluator Note:

The following alarms will clear during the next step:

XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT RO Align the Power Range channel comparator circuits:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--.;...._ Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2:=..-____ Page 16 of _4_2--1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time J

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place the following switches to the failed Power Range channel position:

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch (on the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer).

UPPER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

LOWER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

RO Ensure NR-45 is selected to the appropriate operable channels.

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 75%. (NO)

Initiate GTP-702, Attachment IV.F. (AFD MonitOring)

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 50%. (NO)

Initiate GTP-702, Attachment IV.D. (QPTR Monitoring)

CRS Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel.

REFER TO Attachment 1.

0 NC-44P 0

NC-44R 0

NC-44U(+)

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.-;....- Scenario #

2 Event #

...;;2 _______ Page 16 of _4;.;;.2--1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place the following switches to the failed Power Range channel position:

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch (on the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer).

UPPER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

LOWER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

RO Ensure NR-45 is selected to the appropriate operable channels.

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 75%. (NO)

Initiate GTP-702, Attachment IV.F. (AFD MonitOring)

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 50%. (NO)

Initiate GTP-702, Attachment IV.D. (QPTR Monitoring)

CRS Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel.

REFER TO Attachment 1.

0 NC-44P 0

NC-44R 0

NC-44U(+)

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

-.;....- Scenario #

2 Event #

,..;2;;.... ____ Page 17 of _4;.;;.2---1 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1., Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 3.

Determines ACTION #2 applies: (3.0.4 provisions N/A)

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3. 1. 1.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RA TED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RA TED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the Power Range channel failure.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3 (EHC Pump triplStandby EHC Pump AUTO start failure) after the TS declaration and the channel is bypassed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

-.;....- Scenario #

2 Event #

....;2;;..... ____ Page 17 of _4=2---;

Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1., Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 3.

Determines ACTION #2 applies: (3.0.4 provisions N/A)

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERA TlON may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3. 1. 1.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RA TED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RA TED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the Power Range channel failure.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3 (EHC Pump triplStandby EHC Pump AUTO start failure) after the TS declaration and the channel is bypassed.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.:

--.;....- Scenario #

2 Event #

_3;;...-____ Page 18 of _4;.;;;,2--11 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When dispatched to investigate pump failure, report no leaks or apparent reason.

Indications Available:

XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLD XCP-631-1-2, EHC FLUID PRESS LO BOP Responds to alarm XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLO BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-631-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Excessive flow due to an internal leak within the servo valves.

Excessive flow due to an external leak.

Mechanical binding of the pump or motor.

Breaker XSW1C1 060, EHC FLUID PUMP A XPTOO03-PP1-EH, racked out.

Evaluator's Note:

The BOP may start the standby pump before the automatic start setpoint is reached since no EHC Pump is running.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The pump may trip if the condition is not corrected.

If the pump trips, the standby pump starts at 1300 psig.

BOP If EHC PUMP A is still running, verify high amps. (NO. Pump tripped)

BOP Start EHC PUMP B and observe motor amps.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

...,;3;....-____ Page 18 of _4=2--11 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When dispatched to investigate pump failure, report no leaks or apparent reason.

Indications Available:

XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLD XCP-631-1-2, EHC FLUID PRESS LO BOP Responds to alarm XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLO BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-631-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Excessive flow due to an internal leak within the servo valves.

Excessive flow due to an external leak.

Mechanical binding of the pump or motor.

Breaker XSW1C1 060, EHC FLUID PUMP A XPTOO03-PP1-EH, racked out.

Evaluator's Note:

The BOP may start the standby pump before the automatic start setpoint is reached since no EHC Pump is running.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The pump may trip if the condition is not corrected.

If the pump trips, the standby pump starts at 1300 psig.

BOP If EHC PUMP A is still running, verify high amps. (NO. Pump tripped)

BOP Start EHC PUMP B and observe motor amps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

2 Event #

_3~ ____ Page 19 of _4.;.;;2;""'-1 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If EHC PUMP A is still running with higher amps than EHC BOP PUMP B, secure EHC PUMP A and continue to monitor EHC PUMP B. (EHC Pump A already tripped)

CREW Dispatch an operator to check for EHC System leaks.

If EHC PUMP B is drawing high amps with EHC PUMP A BOP tripped, attempt to restart EHC PUMP A and run both pumps until an external leak is located or a low level in the EHC fluid tank alarm is received. (NO)

If EHC PUMP B overload annunciator is received after starting, BOP commence a Turbine Runback at 5% per minute per GOP-4C.

(N/A)

Evaluator's Note:

This step should be completed in its entirety prior to exiting to another procedure.

Booth operator's Note:

Unit 5 reports no obvious EHC leak.

BOP Upon receipt of a low level alarm in the EHC fluid tank, perform the following: (N/A)

If Reactor power is greater than 50% (P-9), perform the following:

Trip the Reactor and implement EOP-1.0, Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Actuation.

Trip the Main Turbine.

Place the EHC Pumps in PULL TO LK NON-A.

CRS Contacts Work Control and/or Maintenance for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

When actions for EHC failure are completed, initiate event 4 (5G "B" 5GTL Not Requiring 51)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

---.- Scenario #

2 Event #

3 Page 19 of 42

~~~

Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If EHC PUMP A is still running with higher amps than EHC BOP PUMP B, secure EHC PUMP A and continue to monitor EHC PUMP B. (EHC Pump A already tripped)

CREW Dispatch an operator to check for EHC System leaks.

If EHC PUMP B is drawing high amps with EHC PUMP A BOP tripped, attempt to restart EHC PUMP A and run both pumps until an external leak is located or a low level in the EHC fluid tank alarm is received. (NO)

If EHC PUMP B overload annunciator is received after starting, BOP commence a Turbine Runback at 5% per minute per GOP-4C.

(N/A)

Evaluator's Note:

This step should be completed in its entirety prior to exiting to another procedure.

Booth operator's Note:

Unit 5 reports no obvious EHC leak.

BOP Upon receipt of a low level alarm in the EHC fluid tank, perform the following: (N/A)

If Reactor power is greater than 50% (P-9), perform the following:

Trip the Reactor and implement EOP-1.0, Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Actuation.

Trip the Main Turbine.

Place the EHC Pumps in PULL TO LK NON-A.

CRS Contacts Work Control and/or Maintenance for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

When actions for EHC failure are completed, initiate event 4 (5G "B" 5GTL Not Requiring 51)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4~ ____ Page 20 of _4=2---1 Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 800th Operator Instructions:

First entry for this event is the trigger for a 12 GPM tube leak on SG "8"

When directed by the Lead Evaluator, then raise SG "8" Tube leakage to 50 GPM Fail Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 at the existing position (AUTO only) when the power reduction associated with the SGTL begins.

Indications Available:

XCP-642-2-1, MN STM LINE RM-G19 HI RAD CREW Refer to alarm response procedure.

RO/BOP Verify the alarm is valid and identify the Main Steam line affected by observing RM-G19A, B, and C and RlR-S.

CRS Request Health Physics perform radiological surveys around Main Steam Lines.

CRS Direct Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity.

Booth Operator: When requested, report:

XVB0011O-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE, OPEN

XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE, CLOSED CREW Align the condenser exhaust to the Auxiliary Building Charcoal exhaust as follows: (Dispatches AO)

Open XVB0011 O-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

Close XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

BOP Reduce all Steam Generator Blowdown Flows to minimum.

CRS Enters AOP-112.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak Not Requiring SI.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4~ ____ Page 20 of _4=2---1 Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 800th Operator Instructions:

First entry for this event is the trigger for a 12 GPM tube leak on SG "8"

When directed by the Lead Evaluator, then raise SG "8" Tube leakage to 50 GPM Fail Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 at the existing position (AUTO only) when the power reduction associated with the SGTL begins.

Indications Available:

XCP-642-2-1, MN STM LINE RM-G19 HI RAD CREW Refer to alarm response procedure.

RO/BOP Verify the alarm is valid and identify the Main Steam line affected by observing RM-G19A, B, and C and RlR-S.

CRS Request Health Physics perform radiological surveys around Main Steam Lines.

CRS Direct Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity.

Booth Operator: When requested, report:

XVB0011O-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE, OPEN

XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE, CLOSED CREW Align the condenser exhaust to the Auxiliary Building Charcoal exhaust as follows: (Dispatches AO)

Open XVB0011 O-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

Close XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

BOP Reduce all Steam Generator Blowdown Flows to minimum.

CRS Enters AOP-112.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak Not Requiring SI.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 21 of 42

-=~

Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check if PZR level can be maintained:

Open FCV-122, CHG FLOW, as necessary to maintain PZR level.

Verify PZR level is at or trending to program level (YES)

RO Reduce Letdown to one 45 gpm orifice:

Set PCV-145, LO PRESS L TDN, to 70%.

Ensure PVT-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE A ISOL, is open.

Close both PVT-81498(C), LTDN ORIFICE 8(C) ISOL.

Adjust PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, to maintain PI-145, LO PRESS L TDN PRESS PSIG, between 300 psig and 400 psig.

Place PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, in AUTO.

CRS/RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following criteria are met:

Charging maximized with Letdown isolated OR PZR level is approaching 12%, OR PZR pressure is approaching 1870 psig CRS Go to Step 3.

RO Verify VCT level is being maintained between 20% and 40%.

CRS/RO IF Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage has not been determined, THEN perform the following:

Estimate the RCS leak rate refer to IPCS CHGNET

Calculate the RCS leak rate. REFER TO STP-114.002, OPERATIONAL LEAK TEST.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 21 of 42

-=~

Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check if PZR level can be maintained:

Open FCV-122, CHG FLOW, as necessary to maintain PZR level.

Verify PZR level is at or trending to program level (YES)

RO Reduce Letdown to one 45 gpm orifice:

Set PCV-145, LO PRESS L TDN, to 70%.

Ensure PVT-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE A ISOL, is open.

Close both PVT-81498(C), LTDN ORIFICE 8(C) ISOL.

Adjust PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, to maintain PI-145, LO PRESS L TDN PRESS PSIG, between 300 psig and 400 psig.

Place PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, in AUTO.

CRS/RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following criteria are met:

Charging maximized with Letdown isolated OR PZR level is approaching 12%, OR PZR pressure is approaching 1870 psig CRS Go to Step 3.

RO Verify VCT level is being maintained between 20% and 40%.

CRS/RO IF Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage has not been determined, THEN perform the following:

Estimate the RCS leak rate refer to IPCS CHGNET

Calculate the RCS leak rate. REFER TO STP-114.002, OPERATIONAL LEAK TEST.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

.-;....- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4.:..-____ Page 22 of _4_2---11 Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: Direct the booth operator to raise leak rate to 50 gpm following leak rate determination

Comply with the applicable Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 action statement a. (N/A)

Evaluator's Note:

The AOP shutdown requirement is more restrictive than the TS requirement in that it specifies a rate of power reduction.

The CRS should enter the TS action statement (a) but implement the AOP-112.2, Step 5 table requirement for ~

150 GPO.

CRS Determines SGTL exceeds TS 3.4.6.2.c (150 GPO)

Action a:

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or with primary-ta-secondary leakage not within limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Procedure Note - Step 5 Rate of plant shutdown must be evaluated based on magnitude of RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage).

Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage rate, and rate of increase, is represented by the following IPCS Computer points:

UR1019, SIG LEAK RATE FROM RMA9 (in gpd).

UR1019-R, SIG LEAKAGE FROM RMA9-RATE (in gpd/hr).

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: -- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4.:..-____ Page 22 of _4=2--1 Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: Direct the booth operator to raise leak rate to 50 gpm following leak rate determination

Comply with the applicable Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 action statement a. (N/A)

Evaluator's Note:

The AOP shutdown requirement is more restrictive than the TS requirement in that it specifies a rate of power reduction.

The CRS should enter the TS action statement (a) but implement the AOP-112.2, Step 5 table requirement for ~

150 GPO.

CRS Determines SGTL exceeds TS 3.4.6.2.c (150 GPO)

Action a:

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or with primary-ta-secondary leakage not within limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Procedure Note - Step 5 Rate of plant shutdown must be evaluated based on magnitude of RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage).

Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage rate, and rate of increase, is represented by the following IPCS Computer points:

UR1019, SIG LEAK RATE FROM RMA9 (in gpd).

UR1019-R, SIG LEAKAGE FROM RMA9-RATE (in gpd/hr).

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.-;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4~ ____ Page 23 of _4;.;;;.2--1 Event

Description:

SG UB" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage) is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75 gpd (.05 CRS gpm), THEN initiate a plant shutdown per the following table using GOP-4B, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 DESCENDING).

Be in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Booth Operator:

If crew requests that Chemistry provide determination of leak rate, inform them that the isotopic analysis calculator is not functioning at this time and they will be unable to provide a leak rate.

Evaluator's Note:

Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 will fail at the existing position (in AUTO only) when the power reduction begins. Allow the BOP/CREW to deal with that malfunction then the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C).

CREW Based on control panel indications of steam generator leak rate, the CRS will direct a unit shutdown Initiate a Reactor shutdown: REFER TO GOP-5, REACTOR CRS SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3), while continuing with this procedure.

RO Commence RCS boration to commence load reduction BOP Commence load reduction by decreasing Main Turbine load in accordance with GOP-4B Booth operator's Note:

Insert MAL FWM023A Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 will fail at the existing position (in AUTO only) when the power reduction begins.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.-;...- Scenario #

2 Event #

_4~ ____ Page 23 of _4;.;;;.2--1 Event

Description:

SG UB" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage) is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75 gpd (.05 CRS gpm), THEN initiate a plant shutdown per the following table using GOP-4B, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 DESCENDING).

Be in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Booth Operator:

If crew requests that Chemistry provide determination of leak rate, inform them that the isotopic analysis calculator is not functioning at this time and they will be unable to provide a leak rate.

Evaluator's Note:

Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 will fail at the existing position (in AUTO only) when the power reduction begins. Allow the BOP/CREW to deal with that malfunction then the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C).

CREW Based on control panel indications of steam generator leak rate, the CRS will direct a unit shutdown Initiate a Reactor shutdown: REFER TO GOP-5, REACTOR CRS SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3), while continuing with this procedure.

RO Commence RCS boration to commence load reduction BOP Commence load reduction by decreasing Main Turbine load in accordance with GOP-4B Booth operator's Note:

Insert MAL FWM023A Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 will fail at the existing position (in AUTO only) when the power reduction begins.

Appendix D Op Test No.: -----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

..;5~ ____ Page ~

of _4_2_-t SG "A" Feedwater control Valve (FCV-478) Fails to Respond in AUTO During Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-624-1-5, SG A LVL DEV BOP Responds to SG L VL DEV alarms and/or observation of different FCV/SG response.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5.

Evaluator's Note:

The BOP may take MANUAL control of FCV-478 before an alarm setpoint is reached in accordance with management expectations for operator response.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

BOP Reports FCV-478 appears to not be tracking the AUTO signal.

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators LI-474, LI-475, and LI-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT -478, SG A FWF, as required.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C) when SG A level is under control.

Appendix D Op Test No.: -----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

..;5~ ____ Page ~

of _4_2_-t SG "A" Feedwater control Valve (FCV-478) Fails to Respond in AUTO During Power Reduction Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-624-1-5, SG A LVL DEV BOP Responds to SG L VL DEV alarms and/or observation of different FCV/SG response.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5.

Evaluator's Note:

The BOP may take MANUAL control of FCV-478 before an alarm setpoint is reached in accordance with management expectations for operator response.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

BOP Reports FCV-478 appears to not be tracking the AUTO signal.

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators LI-474, LI-475, and LI-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT -478, SG A FWF, as required.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C) when SG A level is under control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--=-_ Scenario #

2 Event #

....;8;;..&;;;..;;.9 ___ Page ~

of

_4..;.;2~-f Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Multiple Alarms; FLOW LO P-8 PERMSV CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip demand signal.

CRITICAL RO Initiates a MANUAL Reactor trip.

TASK #1 Booth Operator:

Coincident with the MANUAL Reactor Trip, ramp the SG "B" SGTL to 600 GPM over 10 minutes.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--=-_ Scenario #

2 Event #

....;8;;..&;;;..;;.9 ___ Page ~

of

_4..;.;2~-f Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Multiple Alarms; FLOW LO P-8 PERMSV CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip demand signal.

CRITICAL RO Initiates a MANUAL Reactor trip.

TASK #1 Booth Operator:

Coincident with the MANUAL Reactor Trip, ramp the SG "B" SGTL to 600 GPM over 10 minutes.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;..&.;;.;..;;..9 ___ Page ~

of

_4..;.;;2~-I PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-61 07 1-1. (NO)

OR Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

OR Steam line differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;..&.;;.;..;;..9 ___ Page ~

of

_4..;.;;2~-I PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-61 07 1-1. (NO)

OR Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

OR Steam line differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY.

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&~9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2--1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution:

If 51 actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Procedure Note:

Main Turbine vibration should be monitored during coastdown.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Evaluator's Note:

The SG "B" SGTR symptoms will become evident during the conduct of EOP-1.1. It is likely that the crew will initiate a MANUAL 51 before an AUTO setpoint is reached. Several EOP-1.1 steps are included in the scenario guide.

The EOP Reference Page action to be monitored in EOP-1.1 is:

51 ACTUATION CRITERIA IF either of the following conditions occurs, THEN actuate 51 and GO TO EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, Step 1:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP of, is LESS THAN 30 of.

OR PZR level can NOT be maintained GREATER THAN 12%.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Check FW status:

RO

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 oF. (YES)

Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498), are closed. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&~9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2--1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution:

If 51 actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Procedure Note:

Main Turbine vibration should be monitored during coastdown.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Evaluator's Note:

The SG "B" SGTR symptoms will become evident during the conduct of EOP-1.1. It is likely that the crew will initiate a MANUAL 51 before an AUTO setpoint is reached. Several EOP-1.1 steps are included in the scenario guide.

The EOP Reference Page action to be monitored in EOP-1.1 is:

51 ACTUATION CRITERIA IF either of the following conditions occurs, THEN actuate 51 and GO TO EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, Step 1:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP of, is LESS THAN 30 of.

OR PZR level can NOT be maintained GREATER THAN 12%.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Check FW status:

RO

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 oF. (YES)

Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498), are closed. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

...;8;..;&;;;..;;..9 ___ Page ~

of

_4.;.;;2~-t PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C), are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321(3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW Pumps are running. (YES)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels. (NOT required)

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 OF. (YES)

Evaluator's Note:

At some point early in EOP-1.1, SGTR symptoms will be evident from lowering PZR level and pressure. The CRS should direct a MANUAL SI when it is clear that the Reference Page SI Initiation criteria will be met When SI is initiated a PZR PORV will fail OPEN and will not close or isolate.

CRS MAY direct a MANUAL SI.

RO Initiates a MANUAL SI if directed.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;..&;;,;..;;;..9 ___ Page ~

of

_4.;.;;2~-t PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C), are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321(3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW Pumps are running. (YES)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels. (NOT required)

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 OF. (YES)

Evaluator's Note:

At some point early in EOP-1.1, SGTR symptoms will be evident from lowering PZR level and pressure. The CRS should direct a MANUAL SI when it is clear that the Reference Page SI Initiation criteria will be met When SI is initiated a PZR PORV will fail OPEN and will not close or isolate.

CRS MAY direct a MANUAL SI.

RO Initiates a MANUAL SI if directed.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8.;;...&..;;.;....;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-50S, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note:

Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide.

Adverse containment values will be reached during the scenario.

BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen. (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8.;;...&..;;.;....;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-50S, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note:

Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide.

Adverse containment values will be reached during the scenario.

BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen. (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (YES)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;..&;;;...;;.9 ___ Page ~

of _4_2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed. (NO PCV-455B OPEN)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

RO Attempts to close PCV-455B and reports it will not close.

RO Attempts to close MVG-8000C and reports it will not close.

Booth Operator:

The crew may direct local closure of the PORV isolation valve. If so, wait 5 minutes and then report that the clamp on ammeter has broken and you are searching for another.

CRS IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

CRS Transitions to EOP-2.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;..&;;;...;;.9 ___ Page ~

of _4_2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed. (NO PCV-455B OPEN)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

RO Attempts to close PCV-455B and reports it will not close.

RO Attempts to close MVG-8000C and reports it will not close.

Booth Operator:

The crew may direct local closure of the PORV isolation valve. If so, wait 5 minutes and then report that the clamp on ammeter has broken and you are searching for another.

CRS IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

CRS Transitions to EOP-2.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8.... &

9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2--1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-2.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

TUBE RUPTURE TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR if any SG has abnormal radiation, THEN start Charging Pumps and operate valves as necessary, and GO TO EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

CRITICAL RO Stops all running RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

TASK #3 Evaluator's Note:

The crew may perform some steps in EOP-2.0 but should transition to EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, on the Reference Page Criteria shortly after entering EOP-2.0.

CRS Transitions to EOP-4.0.

Evaluator's Note:

The only EOP-4.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies is a continuation of the requirement to reduce control room ventilation that started with the implementation of EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8.... &

9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2--1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

The EOP-2.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

TUBE RUPTURE TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR if any SG has abnormal radiation, THEN start Charging Pumps and operate valves as necessary, and GO TO EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

CRITICAL RO Stops all running RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

TASK #3 Evaluator's Note:

The crew may perform some steps in EOP-2.0 but should transition to EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, on the Reference Page Criteria shortly after entering EOP-2.0.

CRS Transitions to EOP-4.0.

Evaluator's Note:

The only EOP-4.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies is a continuation of the requirement to reduce control room ventilation that started with the implementation of EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--:..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&~9 ___ Page ~

of _4;.;;;;,2---1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "8" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running)

Procedure Caution - Step 2 Radiation levels may have increased in steamlines. Proper radiological precautions must be taken when obtaining samples to minimize personnel exposure.

CREW Identify the RUPTURED SG(s):

Narrow Range level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner. (SG "8")

As determined by Chemistry sample analysis for abnormal activity using a frisker.

Procedure Caution - Step 3 At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

CRITICAL 80P Isolate flow from each RUPTURED SG:

TASK #2 Place the Steamline PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in MAN and closed.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) to 8.85 (1150 psig).

Place the Steamline Power Relief 8 Mode Switch(s) in PWR RLF.

Place the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in AUTO.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to 8YP INTLK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--:..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&~9 ___ Page ~

of _4;.;;;;,2---1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "8" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running)

Procedure Caution - Step 2 Radiation levels may have increased in steamlines. Proper radiological precautions must be taken when obtaining samples to minimize personnel exposure.

CREW Identify the RUPTURED SG(s):

Narrow Range level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner. (SG "8")

As determined by Chemistry sample analysis for abnormal activity using a frisker.

Procedure Caution - Step 3 At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

CRITICAL 80P Isolate flow from each RUPTURED SG:

TASK #2 Place the Steamline PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in MAN and closed.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) to 8.85 (1150 psig).

Place the Steamline Power Relief 8 Mode Switch(s) in PWR RLF.

Place the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in AUTO.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to 8YP INTLK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

-.;8;..;&;;;...;;.9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;.;;2;;"'--1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "8" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior

Verify the Steamline PORV (B) closed.

Procedure Caution:

If the TO EFW Pump is the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the TO EFW Pump must be maintained from at least one SG, to maintain a secondary heat sink.

Procedure Note - Step 3.g If the TO EFW Pump is tripped, it should be reset as time permits.

Booth operator:

LOA MSS0032 to open breaker 10A2X 05EH and VLV-MS008P to close MVG 2802A.

BOP IF SG B OR SG C is RUPTURED, THEN perform the following:

CRITICAL

IF at least one MO EFW Pump is running, THEN isolate TASK #2 the TO EFW Pump by placing PVG-2030, STM SPL Y TO BOP TO EFP TRN A(B), to CLOSE prior to performing EOP-4.0, Step 6 - Determine required core exit - - -.

Notify operators to perform Alternative Action Step 3.g while continuing with this procedure.

CRITICAL BOP Close the following for each RUPTURED SG:

TASK #2

SG Blowdown, PVG-503B MS Drain Isolation, PVT -2843B CRITICAL BOP Close the following for each ruptured SG:

TASK #2

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801 B MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869B BOP Reports MS Isolation Valve, PVM-2801 B, will not close CRITICAL BOP Close the following:

TASK #2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

-.;8;..;&;;;...;;.9 ___ Page ~

of _4..;.;;2;;"'--1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "8" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior

Verify the Steamline PORV (B) closed.

Procedure Caution:

If the TO EFW Pump is the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the TO EFW Pump must be maintained from at least one SG, to maintain a secondary heat sink.

Procedure Note - Step 3.g If the TO EFW Pump is tripped, it should be reset as time permits.

Booth operator:

LOA MSS0032 to open breaker 10A2X 05EH and VLV-MS008P to close MVG 2802A.

BOP IF SG B OR SG C is RUPTURED, THEN perform the following:

CRITICAL

IF at least one MO EFW Pump is running, THEN isolate TASK #2 the TO EFW Pump by placing PVG-2030, STM SPL Y TO BOP TO EFP TRN A(B), to CLOSE prior to performing EOP-4.0, Step 6 - Determine required core exit - - -.

Notify operators to perform Alternative Action Step 3.g while continuing with this procedure.

CRITICAL BOP Close the following for each RUPTURED SG:

TASK #2

SG Blowdown, PVG-503B MS Drain Isolation, PVT -2843B CRITICAL BOP Close the following for each ruptured SG:

TASK #2

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801 B MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869B BOP Reports MS Isolation Valve, PVM-2801 B, will not close CRITICAL BOP Close the following:

TASK #2

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

....;8;;...;&::;:..;;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4_2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

All remaining MS Isolation AND MS Isolation Bypass Valves.

PCV-2058, MS TO AUX STM.

MVG-1701, STEAM SEAL FEED VLV.

MVG-2896A, SV-1 BSD.

MVG-2896B, SV-2 BSD.

MVG-2896C, SV-3 BSD.

MVG-2896D, SV-4 BSD.

IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR.

At the Digital Control Station for the MSRs, ensure the following are closed:

MVG-2811.

XVG-2807.

Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and close.

Place the ST DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

Place the following in AUTO and ensure the valves are closed (REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, AL TERNA TE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS, if necessary to locally isolate valves):

PVT-2870, TO MSR A & BORN.

PVT-2875, TO MSR A & BORN.

PVT-2851A, B, C, 0, MS LINES TO TURB DRN.

PVT-2713A, B, C, 0, STM DUMP DRN BYP.

PVT -2838A, B, HDR DRNS.

Direct the Turbine Building Operator to complete ATTACHMENT 1, ALTERNATE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS Use INTACT SG(s) Steamline PORV(s) as needed in subsequent steps to dump steam.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;..&;;;..;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

All remaining MS Isolation AND MS Isolation Bypass Valves.

PCV-2058, MS TO AUX STM.

MVG-1701, STEAM SEAL FEED VLV.

MVG-2896A, SV-1 BSD.

MVG-2896B, SV-2 BSD.

MVG-2896C, SV-3 BSD.

MVG-2896D, SV-4 BSD.

IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR.

At the Digital Control Station for the MSRs, ensure the following are closed:

MVG-2811.

XVG-2807.

Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and close.

Place the ST DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

Place the following in AUTO and ensure the valves are closed (REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, AL TERNA TE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS, if necessary to locally isolate valves):

PVT-2870, TO MSR A & BORN.

PVT-2875, TO MSR A & BORN.

PVT-2851A, B, C, 0, MS LINES TO TURB DRN.

PVT-2713A, B, C, 0, STM DUMP DRN BYP.

PVT -2838A, B, HDR DRNS.

Direct the Turbine Building Operator to complete ATTACHMENT 1, ALTERNATE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS Use INTACT SG(s) Steamline PORV(s) as needed in subsequent steps to dump steam.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;..&=9 ___ Page ~

of _4;.;;;.2---;

PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF any RUPTURED SG can NOT be isolated from at least one CRS INTACT SG, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1. (NfA)

BOP Check level in each RUPTURED SG:

Verify Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG is GREATER THAN 26% [40%].

Stop EFW flow to each RUPTURED SG:

CRITICAL Close FCV-3541, MD EFP TO SG B before indicated TASK #2 level reaches 100%.

Close FCV-3546, TD EFP TO SG B.

Maintain Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG GREATER THAN 40% [50%].

Procedure Caution - Step 5 The major flowpaths from each RUPTURED SG (MSIV and the TD EFW Pump) must be isolated before performing Step 5, to minimize radiological releases and ensure RCS subcooling is maintained.

BOP Verify each RUPTURED SG pressure is GREATER THAN 350 psig. (YES)

CRS Determine the required core exit TC temperature for RCS cooldown from the table below:

Determines as target temperature.

ROfCRS Check if any RCP is running. (NO)

Appendix D Op Test No.: ----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

.....;8;;..&;;;;..;;;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---;

PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF any RUPTURED SG can NOT be isolated from at least one CRS INTACT SG, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1. (NfA)

BOP Check level in each RUPTURED SG:

Verify Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG is GREATER THAN 26% [40%].

Stop EFW flow to each RUPTURED SG:

CRITICAL Close FCV-3541, MD EFP TO SG B before indicated TASK #2 level reaches 100%.

Close FCV-3546, TD EFP TO SG B.

Maintain Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG GREATER THAN 40% [50%].

Procedure Caution - Step 5 The major flowpaths from each RUPTURED SG (MSIV and the TD EFW Pump) must be isolated before performing Step 5, to minimize radiological releases and ensure RCS subcooling is maintained.

BOP Verify each RUPTURED SG pressure is GREATER THAN 350 psig. (YES)

CRS Determine the required core exit TC temperature for RCS cooldown from the table below:

Determines as target temperature.

ROfCRS Check if any RCP is running. (NO)

Appendix D Op Test No.: -----

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;,..&.;;.;.....;,.9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior With no RCP running, RCS cooldown and depressurization may cause RUPTURED loop Tcold to falsely indicate a CRS transition to EOP-16.0, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK, is required. Disregard the RUPTURED loop Tcold indication prior to performing Step 34.

Procedure Note - Step 8 The Rep trip criteria does NOT apply after a controlled cooldown is initiated. Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

BOP Dump steam from each INTACT SG:

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552"F), THEN:

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK.

Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Dump steam from each INTACT SG to the Condenser:

Verify PERMISV C-9 status light is bright on XCP-6114 1-3.

Verify the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C) are open for the INTACT SGs OR

Open MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C),

for only the INTACT SGs Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and closed Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS

Adjust the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller to fully open the Bank 1 Steam Dump Valves Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.-.;..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

....;8;...;&;;;..;;;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4.;.:;.2---1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior With no RCP running, RCS cooldown and depressurization may cause RUPTURED loop Tcold to falsely indicate a CRS transition to EOP-16.0, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK, is required. Disregard the RUPTURED loop Tcold indication prior to performing Step 34.

Procedure Note - Step 8 The Rep trip criteria does NOT apply after a controlled cooldown is initiated. Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

BOP Dump steam from each INTACT SG:

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552"F), THEN:

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK.

Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Dump steam from each INTACT SG to the Condenser:

Verify PERMISV C-9 status light is bright on XCP-6114 1-3.

Verify the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C) are open for the INTACT SGs OR

Open MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C),

for only the INTACT SGs Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and closed Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS

Adjust the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller to fully open the Bank 1 Steam Dump Valves

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Fonn ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

...;8;..&~9 ___ Page ~

of

_4.;,;;2~-I PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

If crew determines that SG PORVs will be used to commence cooldown, steps are listed below.

Dump steam from each INTACT SG using SG PWR RELIEFS BOP in MANUAL: (If crew assumes Steam Dump not available with unaffected MSIVs closed)

BOP Dump steam from each INTACT SG using the Steam line PORVs:

Place the Steamline Power Relief A(C) Mode Switch(s) in PWRRLF.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF A(C) SETPT Controller(s) to open Procedure Note - Step 9 Steps 11 through 18 should be performed as time permits, while the cooldown is in progress.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew will continue in the procedure and return to the cooldown isolation step when the target temperature is reached.

RO Verify core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value determined in Step 6. (NO)

WHEN core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value CREW determined in Step 6, then complete Step 10.

Go to Step 11 BOP Check intact SG levels:

Verify Narrow Range level in intact SGs is greater than 26% [40%].

Appendix D Operator Action Fonn ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--:..._ Scenario #

2 Event #

...;8;;..;&;;...;;.9 ___ Page ~

of _4...;2;"""-1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

If crew determines that SG PORVs will be used to commence cooldown, steps are listed below.

Dump steam from each INTACT SG using SG PWR RELIEFS BOP in MANUAL: (If crew assumes Steam Dump not available with unaffected MSIVs closed)

BOP Dump steam from each INTACT SG using the Steam line PORVs:

Place the Steamline Power Relief A(C) Mode Switch(s) in PWRRLF.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF A(C) SETPT Controller(s) to open Procedure Note - Step 9 Steps 11 through 18 should be performed as time permits, while the cooldown is in progress.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew will continue in the procedure and return to the cooldown isolation step when the target temperature is reached.

RO Verify core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value determined in Step 6. (NO)

WHEN core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value CREW determined in Step 6, then complete Step 10.

Go to Step 11 BOP Check intact SG levels:

Verify Narrow Range level in intact SGs is greater than 26% [40%].

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;..&;;;;..;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Control EFW flow to maintain narrow range level in intact SGs between 40% [50%] and 60%.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Procedure Caution - Step 12.b If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 12.b should be repeated after pressure decreases to LESS THAN 2300 psig, to ensure the PORV recloses.

BOP Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (NO)

IF PZR pressure is LESS THAN 2300 psig, THEN close the PZR PORV.

IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its Block Valve.

IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT:

SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1.

Evaluator Note:

If crew transitions to EOP-4.2 prior to terminating the maximum cooldown rate to target temperature, followup questions should be asked to determine applicant knowledge of the cooldown requirements.

CRS Transitions to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario at the transition to EOP-4.2.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8... &

9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Control EFW flow to maintain narrow range level in intact SGs between 40% [50%] and 60%.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Procedure Caution - Step 12.b If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 12.b should be repeated after pressure decreases to LESS THAN 2300 psig, to ensure the PORV recloses.

BOP Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (NO)

IF PZR pressure is LESS THAN 2300 psig, THEN close the PZR PORV.

IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its Block Valve.

IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT:

SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1.

Evaluator Note:

If crew transitions to EOP-4.2 prior to terminating the maximum cooldown rate to target temperature, followup questions should be asked to determine applicant knowledge of the cooldown requirements.

CRS Transitions to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario at the transition to EOP-4.2.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&;;.;....;;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4.:..:.2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

There will be no RHR flow indicated because RCS pressure will remain above the discharge head of the pumps.

All other equipment should be in the design condition unless pre-emptive actions have been taken based on accident diagnosis.

SOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

SOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(S)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(S)(C).

MVG-2802A(S), MS LOOP S(C) TO TO EFP.

SOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(S)(C).

FW Flow Control Sypass, FCV-3321(3331)(3341).

SG Slowdown, PVG-503A(S)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(S)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;...&;;.;....;;..9 ___ Page ~

of _4.:..:.2---1 PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

There will be no RHR flow indicated because RCS pressure will remain above the discharge head of the pumps.

All other equipment should be in the design condition unless pre-emptive actions have been taken based on accident diagnosis.

SOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

SOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(S)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(S)(C).

MVG-2802A(S), MS LOOP S(C) TO TO EFP.

SOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(S)(C).

FW Flow Control Sypass, FCV-3321(3331)(3341).

SG Slowdown, PVG-503A(S)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(S)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_

Scenario #

2 Event #

....,;8;;.,;&;;;;..;;;,.9 ___ Page ~

of _4.;.;2=---1 Event

Description:

PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated:

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR Steam line flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

...,;8;;".&;;,;",,;;,,9 ___ Page ~

of _4=2---t PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated:

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR Steam line flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8... &;;...;..9 ___ Page +/-1.- of _4=2---t PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

BOP Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO AITACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig.

Verify RHR flow on:

FI-605A, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP A FLOW GPM AND FI-605B, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP B FLOW GPM.

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8:;..&:;..;;..9 ___ Page +/-1.- of _4_2---t PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

BOP Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO AITACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig.

Verify RHR flow on:

FI-605A, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP A FLOW GPM AND FI-605B, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP B FLOW GPM.

Appendix D Op Test No.: --

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8

.... &--.9 ___ Page ~

of _4_2"",--f PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SOP-106,Section IV. D. BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATE VALVE 2.1 Open MVT-81 04, EMERG BORATE.

2.2 Ensure XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), is running.

2.3 Verify greater than 30 gpm flow on FI-110, EMERG BORATE FLOW GPM.

2.4 When boration is no longer required, perform the following:

a. Close MVT-81 04, EMERG BORATE.

b. Verify no flow on FI-110, EMERG BORATE FLOW GPM.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

~-

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #

2 Event #

_8;;...&~9 ___ Page ~

of

_4..;.;2~-f PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SOP-106,Section IV. D. BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATE VALVE 2.1 Open MVT-81 04, EMERG BORATE.

2.2 Ensure XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), is running.

2.3 Verify greater than 30 gpm flow on FI-110, EMERG BORATE FLOW GPM.

2.4 When boration is no longer required, perform the following:

a. Close MVT-81 04, EMERG BORATE.

b. Verify no flow on FI-110, EMERG BORATE FLOW GPM.

Appendix D Scenario Outline FINAL Form ES-D-1 Facility:

VC SUMMER Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

2009 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:

IC-11, 75% Power, MOL (IC-231 for 2009)

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle. 64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning & Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statementfor TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Start Condensate Pump "C" and shutdown Condensate Pump "B" then raise power to 100% at Y2% per minute per GOP-4A. GOP-4A, Step 3.16.e is in effect.

Critical Task:

1.

Energize ESF Bus 1 DB prior to performing EOP-6.0, Step 8.

2.

Start the TDEFW Pump before WR level in any two SGs is less than 15%.

3.

Open MVG-8801 B before reporting the completion of EOP-1.0,.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N - BOP, Shift operating Condensate Pumps.

CRS R-RO Raise power.

2 CVC010B I-RO VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO.

3 ANN DG014 TS-CRS Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm.

4 PRS001B I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails LO.

TS-CRS 5

FWM012 C-BOP Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller fails HI.

6 XMTFW0170 I-BOP MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT -508 Fails LO.

7 EPS001 M-Crew Loss of Off-site Power.

8 EPS006B C-Crew DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 implementation).

9 FWM003B C-BOP MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip.

MSS0017A TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically.

10 RCS006A M -Crew 600 gpm SBLOCA after Bus 1 DB Recovery.

11 VLVSI004P C-RO/BOP MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) fails to OPEN.

Terminate when cooldown is initiated in EOP-2.1.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline FINAL Form ES-D-1 Facility:

VC SUMMER Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

2009 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:

IC-11, 75% Power, MOL (IC-231 for 2009)

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle. 64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning & Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statementfor TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Start Condensate Pump "C" and shutdown Condensate Pump "B" then raise power to 100% at Y2% per minute per GOP-4A. GOP-4A, Step 3.16.e is in effect.

Critical Task:

1.

Energize ESF Bus 1 DB prior to performing EOP-6.0, Step 8.

2.

Start the TDEFW Pump before WR level in any two SGs is less than 15%.

3.

Open MVG-8801 B before reporting the completion of EOP-1.0,.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N - BOP, Shift operating Condensate Pumps.

CRS R-RO Raise power.

2 CVC010B I-RO VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO.

3 ANN DG014 TS-CRS Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm.

4 PRS001B I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails LO.

TS-CRS 5

FWM012 C-BOP Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller fails HI.

6 XMTFW0170 I-BOP MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT -508 Fails LO.

7 EPS001 M-Crew Loss of Off-site Power.

8 EPS006B C-Crew DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 implementation).

9 FWM003B C-BOP MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip.

MSS0017A TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically.

10 RCS006A M -Crew 600 gpm SBLOCA after Bus 1 DB Recovery.

11 VLVSI004P C-RO/BOP MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) fails to OPEN.

Terminate when cooldown is initiated in EOP-2.1.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

3 Event #

_1,;..-. ____ Page 6

of _4;..;;.,6---1 Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When/if contacted, report "C" Condensate Pump ready for start. When/if contacted post-start, report that conditions are normal.

Indications Available:

N/A Evaluator's Note:

The crew assumes the watch with power at 75% and an escalation on hold to facilitate a swap from Condensate Pump "B" to Condensate Pump "C". After the Condensate Pumps are swapped the crew will begin raiSing power to 100%.

BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.B.

BOP Determines INITIAL CONDITIONS (Section 1.0) are met.

Evaluator's Note:

Expected alarms when pump is started:

XCP-6271-3, FW HTR 5,6 LVL HI HI

XCP-625-1-4 (2-4, 3-4), FWP A (B, C) SL WTR TEMP HI The BOP should make an announcement prior to the start of the pump BOP Ensure the discharge valve for the pump to be started is closed:

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

BOP Start one of the following: (PEER,j)

XPP-0042C, CO PUMP C.

BOP Open the associated pump discharge valve: (PEER,j)

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 6

of 46

~~

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time J

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When/if contacted, report "C" Condensate Pump ready for start. When/if contacted post-start, report that conditions are normal.

Indications Available:

N/A Evaluator's Note:

The crew assumes the watch with power at 75% and an escalation on hold to facilitate a swap from Condensate Pump "B" to Condensate Pump "C". After the Condensate Pumps are swapped the crew will begin raiSing power to 100%.

BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.B.

BOP Determines INITIAL CONDITIONS (Section 1.0) are met.

Evaluator's Note:

Expected alarms when pump is started:

XCP-6271-3, FW HTR 5,6 LVL HI HI

XCP-625-1-4 (2-4, 3-4), FWP A (B, C) SL WTR TEMP HI The BOP should make an announcement prior to the start of the pump BOP Ensure the discharge valve for the pump to be started is closed:

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

BOP Start one of the following: (PEER,j)

XPP-0042C, CO PUMP C.

BOP Open the associated pump discharge valve: (PEER,j)

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

_1,;...-____ Page 7

of _4;.;;,6--1 Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Aj>Qlicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.C.

BOP Verifies INITIAL CONDITIONS are met (two pumps running)

BOP Stop one of the following:

XPP-0042B, CO PUMP B.

BOP Verify the associated pump discharge valve closes:

XVB-614B, B DISCH ISOL.

BOP Reports completion of the Condensate Pump swap.

CRS Returns to GOP-4A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 -

ASCENDING).

ALTERNATE DILUTE STEPS (SOP-106, Section E)

Procedure Note:

Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Verify at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL.

(Peer --J)

RO Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 7

of 46

~~

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.C.

BOP Verifies INITIAL CONDITIONS are met (two pumps running)

BOP Stop one of the following:

XPP-0042B, CO PUMP B.

BOP Verify the associated pump discharge valve closes:

XVB-614B, B DISCH ISOL.

BOP Reports completion of the Condensate Pump swap.

CRS Returns to GOP-4A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 -

ASCENDING).

ALTERNATE DILUTE STEPS (SOP-106, Section E)

Procedure Note:

Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Verify at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL.

(Peer --J)

RO Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_

Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 8

of 46

~~

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior rate.

RO Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer -V)

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

RO Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

RO Verify dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer -V)

RO Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

BOP Select 1/2 on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN.

BOP Slowly raise LOAD SET to attain 80% Reactor Power while continuing with this procedure.

BOP At 80% Reactor Power, align Control Valve drain valves as follows:

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open as follows:

Verify Control Valve #4 is closed.

Verify PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ----

Scenario #

3 Event #

_1.;....-. ____ Page 8

of _46;"';"--1 Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior rate.

RO Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer -V)

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

RO Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

RO Verify dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer -V)

RO Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

BOP Select 1/2 on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN.

BOP Slowly raise LOAD SET to attain 80% Reactor Power while continuing with this procedure.

BOP At 80% Reactor Power, align Control Valve drain valves as follows:

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open as follows:

Verify Control Valve #4 is closed.

Verify PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -- Scenario #

3 Event #

Page 9

of 46

~-------

~~

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If both PVG-2898B, DV-4, and Control Valve #4 are closed, open PVG-2898B, DV-4, by opening MVG-2898D, STM LEAD DRN FOR CV-1.

Open MVG-2897, COMB CNTRL VLV BSD.

BOP When Control Valve #4 indicates greater than 5% open, perform the following:

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is CLOSED.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2, VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO (CVC010B), when desired but not during a dilution operation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.-;...- Scenario #

3 Event #

Page 9

of 46

~--------

-=~

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior If both PVG-2898B, DV-4, and Control Valve #4 are closed, open PVG-2898B, DV-4, by opening MVG-2898D, STM LEAD DRN FOR CV-1.

Open MVG-2897, COMB CNTRL VLV BSD.

BOP When Control Valve #4 indicates greater than 5% open, perform the following:

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is CLOSED.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2, VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO (CVC010B), when desired but not during a dilution operation.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 10 of 46

~~

Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger for VCT Level XMTR L T -115 fails LO Indications Available:

XCP-613-3-1, VCT LVL HIILO RO Responds to and reports alarm XCP-613-3-1, VCT L VL H IILO CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-613-3-1 Evaluator's Note:

The RO may immediately recognize the failure of L T -115 and place the RX Cool SYS MU Switch to STOP to terminate the unwarranted automatic makeup.

ARP-613-3-1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Makeup flow in excess of Charging flow.

Makeup system not armed for automatic makeup.

Failure of ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.

Failure of ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.

RO Reports failure of L T -115.

ARP-613-3-1 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Automatic makeup should start at 20% and stop at 40%.

At 70%, LCV-115A, L TON DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to begin diverting letdown to the Recycle Holdup Tank.

At 80%, LCV-115A, L TON DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to full divert.

At 5%, the Charging Pump suction will align to the RWST.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;2~ ____ Page 10 of _4;.;;.6--1 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger for VCT Level XMTR L T -115 fails LO Indications Available:

XCP-613-3-1, VCT LVL HIILO RO Responds to and reports alarm XCP-613-3-1, VCT L VL H IILO CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-613-3-1 Evaluator's Note:

The RO may immediately recognize the failure of L T -115 and place the RX Cool SYS MU Switch to STOP to terminate the unwarranted automatic makeup.

ARP-613-3-1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Makeup flow in excess of Charging flow.

Makeup system not armed for automatic makeup.

Failure of ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.

Failure of ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.

RO Reports failure of L T -115.

ARP-613-3-1 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Automatic makeup should start at 20% and stop at 40%.

At 70%, LCV-115A, L TON DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to begin diverting letdown to the Recycle Holdup Tank.

At 80%, LCV-115A, L TON DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to full divert.

At 5%, the Charging Pump suction will align to the RWST.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

...:....- Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2=--____ Page 11 of _4.;.;,6---1 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Places the RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

ARP-613-3-1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the appropriate automatic action.

Verify VCT level on LI-112A, LEVEL %, if ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

Verify VCT level on LI-115, LEVEL %, if ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

RO Determines LT-112A must be used for VCT level indication.

ARP-613-3-1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS If auto makeup control is lost, refer to SOP-1 06.

If necessary, attempt to makeup to the VCT manually per SOP-106.

If makeup flow is high, reduce makeup flow.

If Charging Pump suction swaps to RWST, 2300 ppm boron may be injected into RCS. Reduce load and trip the turbine, if necessary, to establish control.

RO Acknowledges that use of MANUAL Makeup in accordance with SOP-106 may be required.

CRS Contacts Work control and/or I&C for assistance.

Booth Operator Note: If contacted, remove the failed channel from service but do not repair the channel before the scenario is terminated.

Report that it appears that the D/P Cell needs to be replaced Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

...:....- Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2=--____ Page 11 of _4.;.;,6---1 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Places the RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

ARP-613-3-1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the appropriate automatic action.

Verify VCT level on LI-112A, LEVEL %, if ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

Verify VCT level on LI-115, LEVEL %, if ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

RO Determines LT-112A must be used for VCT level indication.

ARP-613-3-1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS If auto makeup control is lost, refer to SOP-1 06.

If necessary, attempt to makeup to the VCT manually per SOP-106.

If makeup flow is high, reduce makeup flow.

If Charging Pump suction swaps to RWST, 2300 ppm boron may be injected into RCS. Reduce load and trip the turbine, if necessary, to establish control.

RO Acknowledges that use of MANUAL Makeup in accordance with SOP-106 may be required.

CRS Contacts Work control and/or I&C for assistance.

Booth Operator Note: If contacted, remove the failed channel from service but do not repair the channel before the scenario is terminated.

Report that it appears that the D/P Cell needs to be replaced

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

...:..__ Scenario #

3 Event #

.,,;2;;... ____ Page 12 of _4.;,.;6;""'--1 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior and a work plan will be required.

I I

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3, Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm, when desired.

I I

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

...;..-- Scenario #

3 Event #

_2 ______ Page 12 of

_4.;..;6~-I Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior and a work plan will be required.

I I

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3, Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm, when desired.

I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

.....;...- Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 13 of 46

~-------

-=~

Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP TRBL BOP Responds to/reports alarm XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP TRBL BOP Enters ARP-OO 1-XCP-636-6-3 ARP-001-XCP-636-6-3 PROBABLE CAUSE:

High/Low lube oil temperature:

Lube Oil Heater failure.

Lube Oil Filter Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Lube Oil Cooler.

High/Low coolant temperature:

Coolant Heater failure.

Jacket Water Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Jacket Water Cooler.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The diesel will trip at 195°F (coolant high temp.) or 175°F (lube oil high temp.), unless it was started by an Emergency Start signal, in which case PVG-3105A, FS TO DG A, will open to cool the diesel.

BOP Automatic action N/A - DG not running.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to identify the cause of the alarm.

Ensure AUTOMATIC ACTIONS have occurred if the alarm Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

....:...- Scenario #

3 Event #

.....;3~ ____ Page 13 of _4.;,;.6---i Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP TRBL BOP Responds to/reports alarm XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP TRBL BOP Enters ARP-OO 1-XCP-636-6-3 ARP-001-XCP-636-6-3 PROBABLE CAUSE:

High/Low lube oil temperature:

Lube Oil Heater failure.

Lube Oil Filter Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Lube Oil Cooler.

High/Low coolant temperature:

Coolant Heater failure.

Jacket Water Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Jacket Water Cooler.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The diesel will trip at 195°F (coolant high temp.) or 175°F (lube oil high temp.), unless it was started by an Emergency Start signal, in which case PVG-3105A, FS TO DG A, will open to cool the diesel.

BOP Automatic action N/A - DG not running.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to identify the cause of the alarm.

Ensure AUTOMATIC ACTIONS have occurred if the alarm

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--.;...- Scenario #

3 Event #

....;3~ ____ Page 14 of

_4.;.;6~-f Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior is due to High Temp.

Perform Corrective Actions per ARP-004-XCX-5201.

CREW Dispatches AO to DG "A" to investigate.

Booth Operator Note: Wait 3-5 minutes then report: Local alarm ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, LOW LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE, is actuated.

Lube Oil Temperature is 108 OF and the heater will not energize from the switch.

Operator reports that local ARPs are missing at BOTH EDGs.

ARP-OO 1-XCP-636-6-3 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Perform Supplemental Actions per ARP-004-XCX-5201.

When lube oil temperature or jacket water temperature is CRS low, monitor and record the applicable temperature on a generic log once every two hours.

If the diesel generator is inoperable, refer to Tech Spec 3.8.1.

Evaluator's Note:

Per a note in ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, the DG is inoperable when LO temperature is less than 110 OF.

CRS Enters TS 3.B.1.1.b, Action b.

1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A. C. off site sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4. B. 1. 1. 1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per B hours thereafter, and

2. If the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing:

a) determine the OPERABLE EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --

Scenario #

3 Event #

_3~ ____ Page 14 of _4.-6;"'-'-4 Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior is due to High Temp.

Perform Corrective Actions per ARP-004-XCX-5201.

CREW Dispatches AO to DG "A" to investigate.

Booth Operator Note: Wait 3-5 minutes then report: Local alarm ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, LOW LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE, is actuated.

Lube Oil Temperature is 108 OF and the heater will not energize from the switch.

Operator reports that local ARPs are missing at BOTH EDGs.

ARP-OO 1-XCP-636-6-3 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Perform Supplemental Actions per ARP-004-XCX-5201.

When lube oil temperature or jacket water temperature is CRS low, monitor and record the applicable temperature on a generic log once every two hours.

If the diesel generator is inoperable, refer to Tech Spec 3.8.1.

Evaluator's Note:

Per a note in ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, the DG is inoperable when LO temperature is less than 110 OF.

CRS Enters TS 3.B.1.1.b, Action b.

1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A. C. off site sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4. B. 1. 1. 1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per B hours thereafter, and

2. If the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing:

a) determine the OPERABLE EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

_3;;;..-.____ Page 15 of _4

.... 6_.."

Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

b) demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and The CRS should identify a Shutdown LCO due to EDG inoperability with RB Spray Pump out of service.

3.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , verify that required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining EDG as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE and in MODE 1,2, or 3, that the Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump is OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

4. Restore the EDG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , unless the following condition exists:

a) The requirement for restoration of the EDG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months may be extended to 14 days if the Alternate AC (AAC) power source is or will be available within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , as specified in the Bases, and b) If at any time the AAC availability cannot be met, either restore the AAC to available status within the remainder of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in 4.a (not to exceed 14 days from the time the EDG originally became inoperable), or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 4 (PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 fails LOW) after the CRS Evaluator has completed hislher evaluation of the TS entry and/or elects to follow up after the scenario is terminated.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

_3;;;..-.____ Page 15 of _4

.... 6_.."

Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

b) demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and The CRS should identify a Shutdown LCO due to EDG inoperability with RB Spray Pump out of service.

3.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , verify that required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining EDG as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE and in MODE 1,2, or 3, that the Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump is OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

4. Restore the EDG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , unless the following condition exists:

a) The requirement for restoration of the EDG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months may be extended to 14 days if the Alternate AC (AAC) power source is or will be available within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , as specified in the Bases, and b) If at any time the AAC availability cannot be met, either restore the AAC to available status within the remainder of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in 4.a (not to exceed 14 days from the time the EDG originally became inoperable), or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 4 (PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 fails LOW) after the CRS Evaluator has completed hislher evaluation of the TS entry and/or elects to follow up after the scenario is terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...._ Scenario #

3 Event #

_4..;..-.____ Page 16 of _4;.;;,.6--1 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-616-3-6, PZR PCS LO BU HTRS ON RO Responds to alarm.

RO Reports PZR Pressure channel failure.

RO Performs immediate actions of AOP-401.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE.

IMMEDIATE Verify the PZR PORV's are closed (YES)

ACTION STEP 1 IMMEDIATE Compare the PZR control channel indication to the protection ACTION STEP 2 channel indications:

PI-455, PRESS PSIG.

PI-456, PRESS PSIG.

PI-457, PRESS PSIG.

RO Reports PI-444 reading lower than any protection channel.

IMMEDIATE Check if PI-444, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is ACTION RO normal (NO)

STEP 3 Ensure the spray valves are closed:

PCV-44C, PZR SPRAY PCV-44D, PZR SPRAY Control PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL IN MAN Operate the PZR Heaters and Spray Valves in manual to control RCS pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

Within ONE hour, close MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444B ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;...._ Scenario #

3 Event #

_4..;..-.____ Page 16 of _4;.;;,.6--1 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-616-3-6, PZR PCS LO BU HTRS ON RO Responds to alarm.

RO Reports PZR Pressure channel failure.

RO Performs immediate actions of AOP-401.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE.

IMMEDIATE Verify the PZR PORV's are closed (YES)

ACTION STEP 1 IMMEDIATE Compare the PZR control channel indication to the protection ACTION STEP 2 channel indications:

PI-455, PRESS PSIG.

PI-456, PRESS PSIG.

PI-457, PRESS PSIG.

RO Reports PI-444 reading lower than any protection channel.

IMMEDIATE Check if PI-444, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is ACTION RO normal (NO)

STEP 3 Ensure the spray valves are closed:

PCV-44C, PZR SPRAY PCV-44D, PZR SPRAY Control PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL IN MAN Operate the PZR Heaters and Spray Valves in manual to control RCS pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

Within ONE hour, close MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444B ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--.;...- Scenario #

3 Event #

_4.;..-.____ Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters AOP-401.5 Procedure Note:

Throughout this procedure, "AFFECTED" refers to any PZR PORV that has actuated as the result of the instrument failure.

Step 2 Note:

PZR PRESS control channels PI-444 and PI-445 connect to the same reference leg as protection channel PI-457.

CRS Reads immediate actions.

RO Verifies immediate actions.

RO Check if PI-445, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is normal (YES)

RO Ensure ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch is in AUTO.

RO Maintain RCS pressure between 2220 psig and 2250 psig.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Contacts I&C and/or Work Control for assistance.

Evaluator's Note:

While the following TS-related action has already been directed by the AOP, the CRS must still enter TS 3.4.4.a.

CRS Enters TS 3.4.4. a.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Enters AOP-401.5 Procedure Note:

Throughout this procedure, "AFFECTED" refers to any PZR PORV that has actuated as the result of the instrument failure.

Step 2 Note:

PZR PRESS control channels PI-444 and PI-445 connect to the same reference leg as protection channel PI-457.

CRS Reads immediate actions.

RO Verifies immediate actions.

RO Check if PI-445, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is normal (YES)

RO Ensure ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch is in AUTO.

RO Maintain RCS pressure between 2220 psig and 2250 psig.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Contacts I&C and/or Work Control for assistance.

Evaluator's Note:

While the following TS-related action has already been directed by the AOP, the CRS must still enter TS 3.4.4.a.

CRS Enters TS 3.4.4. a.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

3 Event #

_4 _____ Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 5 (Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI) when the TS actions are complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

....;..__ Scenario #

3 Event #

_4";,,,.-____ Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT -444 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 5 (Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI) when the TS actions are complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

....;5~ ____ Page 19 of _46~-f Event

Description:

Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-627-2-1, CNDSR HOTWEll lVl lO XCP-627 3, CO PP DISCH HDR PRESS HI/HI HI BOP Responds to alarm XCP-627-2-1, CNDSR HOTWEll lVl lO, or change in indicated Deaerator flow/Hotwell level BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-627 1 Evaluator's Note:

The ARP will NOT lead the crew directly to the problem.

The problem must be diagnosed by looking at Deaerator Tank and Hotweillevei. While it is unlikely, failure to act in a timely manner will result in a Condensate Pump trip on HI-HI DA Tank level and implementation of AOP-20S.1, CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Hotweillevel control system malfunction.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify flow from the CST to the Condenser Hotwell as indicated on FR-3009.

BOP Verifies flow on FR-3009.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to verify proper operation of the Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~- Scenario #

3 Event #

....;5~ ____ Page 19 of _46~-f Event

Description:

Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

XCP-627-2-1, CNDSR HOTWEll lVl lO XCP-627 3, CO PP DISCH HDR PRESS HI/HI HI BOP Responds to alarm XCP-627-2-1, CNDSR HOTWEll lVl lO, or change in indicated Deaerator flow/Hotwell level BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-627 1 Evaluator's Note:

The ARP will NOT lead the crew directly to the problem.

The problem must be diagnosed by looking at Deaerator Tank and Hotweillevei. While it is unlikely, failure to act in a timely manner will result in a Condensate Pump trip on HI-HI DA Tank level and implementation of AOP-20S.1, CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Hotweillevel control system malfunction.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify flow from the CST to the Condenser Hotwell as indicated on FR-3009.

BOP Verifies flow on FR-3009.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to verify proper operation of the

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;....- Scenario #

3 Event #

_5~ ____ Page 20 of _4;.,;;.6---1 Event

Description:

Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior hotwelilevel control system.

Open XVT00655-CO, COND A HOTWEll EMER MU CO NT VlV BYPASS (TB-412), to bypass IlV03011-CO, COND A HOTWEll EMER MAKE-UP CO NT VlV (TB-412), to regain normal hotwelileveL

Check operation of IlV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VlV (TB-412).

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate problem/check valve lineup.

Booth Operator Note: If dispatched, wait 3 minutes then report that the hotwell level control system appears to be operating properly but level is not recovering. ILV03011-CO, COND A HOTWELL EMER MAKE-UP CONT VLV, is OPEN and ILV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VLV, is SHUT.

BOP Reports IFK-3136, CONDENSATE FLOW TO DEAERATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE, is 100% OPEN BOP Places IFK-3136 in MANUAL and lowers flow to re-establish normal DA Tank and Hotwelileveis.

CRS Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT -508 Fails LO) when secondary-side conditions have stabilized and corrective actions will not be jeopardized by the alarm.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.;....- Scenario #

3 Event #

_5~ ____ Page 20 of _4;.,;;.6---1 Event

Description:

Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior hotwelilevel control system.

Open XVT00655-CO, COND A HOTWEll EMER MU CO NT VlV BYPASS (TB-412), to bypass IlV03011-CO, COND A HOTWEll EMER MAKE-UP CO NT VlV (TB-412), to regain normal hotwelileveL

Check operation of IlV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VlV (TB-412).

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate problem/check valve lineup.

Booth Operator Note: If dispatched, wait 3 minutes then report that the hotwell level control system appears to be operating properly but level is not recovering. ILV03011-CO, COND A HOTWELL EMER MAKE-UP CONT VLV, is OPEN and ILV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VLV, is SHUT.

BOP Reports IFK-3136, CONDENSATE FLOW TO DEAERATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE, is 100% OPEN BOP Places IFK-3136 in MANUAL and lowers flow to re-establish normal DA Tank and Hotwelileveis.

CRS Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT -508 Fails LO) when secondary-side conditions have stabilized and corrective actions will not be jeopardized by the alarm.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--:...._ Scenario #

3 Event #

_6 ______ Page ~

of _4.,.;6 __ -1 Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate the trigger for MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO (180 second ramp)

Indications Available:

XCP-624-1-5; 2-5; 3-5, SG LVL DEV BOP Responds to multiple SG L VL DEV alarms and/or change in feedwater flow.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may first enter an ARP but could go directly to AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION, based on multiple alarms or early diagnosis. The scenario guide is conservatively written as if an ARP will be entered.

At some point prior to or during procedure implementation the BOP should diagnose the problem as a Feedwater Header Pressure instrument (PT -508) failure.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 or 2-5 or 3-5 ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

BOP Determines all SG's are responding in the same manner.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--:...._ Scenario #

3 Event #

_6 ______ Page ~

of _4.,.;6 __ -1 Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate the trigger for MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO (180 second ramp)

Indications Available:

XCP-624-1-5; 2-5; 3-5, SG LVL DEV BOP Responds to multiple SG L VL DEV alarms and/or change in feedwater flow.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may first enter an ARP but could go directly to AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION, based on multiple alarms or early diagnosis. The scenario guide is conservatively written as if an ARP will be entered.

At some point prior to or during procedure implementation the BOP should diagnose the problem as a Feedwater Header Pressure instrument (PT -508) failure.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 or 2-5 or 3-5 ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

BOP Determines all SG's are responding in the same manner.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.:..._ Scenario #

3 Event #

-=.,6 _____ Page ~

of _4.;.;;,.6---1 Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Determines all FCV's are responding the same way.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators LI-474, LI-475, and LI-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT -478, SG A FWF, as required.

Manually control Feedwater Pump speed as follows:

Place the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN.

Adjust the differential pressure between Feedwater Pump discharge header pressure and Main St If FCV-478, A FCV, malfunctioned go to AOP-21 0.1, Feedwater Flow Control Valve Failure.

If a Main Feedwater Pump has tripped or is malfunctioning go to AOP-21 0.3, Feedwater Pump Malfunction.

If an instrument channel failed, go to AOP-401.11, Steam Generator Level Control and Protection Channel Failure.

BOP Places Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN and adjusts to restore SG levels CRS Enters AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION.

BOP Performs Immediate Actions

Verify at least one Feedwater Pump is running (YES)

Check if a Feedwater Pump trip occurred (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 13 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-.:..._ Scenario #

3 Event #

-=.,6 _____ Page ~

of _4.;.;;,.6---1 Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Determines all FCV's are responding the same way.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: