Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML070820573
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/24/2006
From:	Shortell T; Constellation Energy Group
To:	Caruso J; Operations Branch I
	Sykes, Marvin D.
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Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline FWO2C Form ES-D-1 C(TS SRO)

Malf. No.

Event I Type*

RP20B I(TS SRO) rN RROSC C(ALL)

R (RO)

Override R (SRO I RO)

M(ALL) 1 RP26B C(ALL) 1 RR87 Event Description Feedwater Booster Pump 13 auto trips. The pump is a HPCl component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days.

~

Transfer pressure control from MPR to EPR per N1-OP-31, F.3.0.

Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale.

Transmitter supplies input to RPS, Core Spray and Containment Spray Systems. SRO Tech Spec Entry into LCO 3.6.2 is required.

Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator Slot temperatures rise. Removal of the pump from service is required, which also requires a power reduction. Actions are taken for the Recirc Pump Trip per SOP-I.3 Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 1 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners:

Operators Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 d

9 10

( N)ormal, Steam Seal Regulator Failure. Power reduction reveals a pre-existing failure in the Steam Seal Regulator and results in degraded steam seal header pressure and increased condenser air in-leakage. Regulator Bypass must be manually opened to restore seal pressure.

Recirc Master Controller fails low resulting in Restricted Zone entry.

Entry into SOP-I.5. Flow drops to 21 Mlbm/hr and power is 45-50%

on APRMs. Cram Rods must be inserted to exit the restricted zone. Power must be reduced to about 30% power to exit region.

Loss of Condenser Vacuum due to Steam Seal Regulator Bypass Valve Failure. Enter SOP-25.1. A turbine trip is required when condenser backpressure exceeds 5 inches with generator load

< I 90 MWe. Reactor scrams either manually or automatically.

~

~~

~______

~

Steam Leak in Drywell 20% ramp time 1O:OO minutes. After the scram and initial actions are complete, the steam leak develops.

Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig and EOP entry is required.

Drywell parameters will reach values that require use of Containment Spray.

Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476C fails downscale.

With the "A" transmitter previously failed the high drywell pressure RPS scram signal, Core Spray and Containment Spray automatic initiation signals are prevented. Crew must take manual actions to initiate these functions.

RPV level instrument reference legs flash. Crew is required to perform RPV Flooding. Event is classified as SAE 2.1.2 (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal 1 of8

Facilitv: Nine Mile Point I Scenario No.: NRC-01 TARG ET Q U A NT I TAT1 V E ATT R I B UTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)

1. Total malfunctions (5-8)

Events 4,5,6,8,9,10 Events 9 and 10

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

ACTUAL ATTR I B UTES 6

2

3. Abnormal events (2-4)

4. Major transients (1 -2)

5. EOPs enteredirequiring substantive Event 6 SOP-I.5 and Event 7 SOP-25.1 Event 7 Loss of Vacuum actions (1 -2)

Containment Event 6 EOP-2 RPV; EOP-4 Pri 2

1 2

CT-1.O Flood to Main Steam Lines CT-2.0 Containment Spray

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

Event 9 EOP-7 RPV Flooding Op-Test No.: NRC 1

Total Malfunction Count:

Major not included in this count.

Didnt count Event 1 and 3, because these only require SRO tech spec use.

Abnormal Events Count:

Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are considered separately.

SRO TS Events Event 1 and 3 are SRO Tech Spec evaluation events.

10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal 2 o f 8

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 34 RPV FLOODING PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VALIDATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/18/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIG U RAT1 ON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level:

90%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 90% reactor power, with the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) in service. The crew will shift pressure control to the Electronic Pressure regulator (EPR) per normal operating procedures. Shortly after assuming the shift, Feedwater Booster Pump 13 automatically trips and the standby booster pump automatically starts. The pump is a HPCl component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days. While shifting regulators, one of the four drywell pressure transmitters fails downscale, preventing that channel from actuating protective functions. The transmitter inputs to RPS, Core Spray, Containment Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS). Tech Spec 3.6.2 entry is required.

Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator experiences an overheating condition and generator slot temperature rises. The crew will reduce power and remove Recirc Pump 13 from service. As turbine load is reduced, a pre-existing failure in the Turbine Steam Seal regulating system is revealed. The turbine seals are normally self-sealing at high power levels. The component failure is only evident as load is reduced from the Recirc Pump trip. Seal header pressure drops below normal values. The crew restores seal header pressure by manually opening the steam seal bypass valve.

A failure of the Recirc Master Flow Controller results in an unplanned power change, as Recirc Flow is reduced to minimum. Plant parameters are such that the Restricted Zone of the Power/Flow Map is entered. The crew implements N1-SOP-1.5 and must exit the Restricted Zone by inserting cram rods. The transient is complicated by a failure of the Turbine Steam Seal Regulator Bypass valve which causes a degraded condenser vacuum, due to loss of steam seals. Vacuum lowers and now results in a required turbine trip due to low load ( 4 9 0 MWe) and high backpressure (>5 inches). The crew trips the turbine, but the reactor remains at power, since power is now within turbine bypass valve capability. The crew is expected to NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

manually initiate a scram, due to the degrading conditions. If the crew does not initiate a manual scram, a spurious automatic scram will occur.

Several minutes after the reactor is scrammed, a steam leak inside the drywell develops along with a failure of an additional drywell pressure transmitter. The transmitter failure results in loss of function for actions occurring on high drywell pressure. These functions include loss of automatic scram, automatic start of Core Spray and Containment Spray systems and ADS.

Following the scram, all RPV water level indicators will become erratic as reference legs flash, due to the elevated drywell temperature. The crew will be required to flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per N1-EOP-7, RPV Flooding. The crew will also control Primary Containment parameters by implementing N1 -EOP-4, Primary Containment.

Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-1.5, N1-SOP-25.1, N1-EOP-2, NI-EOP-4, N1 -EOP-7 EAL Classification:

SAE 2.1.2 RPV Flooding is required.

Termination Criteria:

RPV Flooding conditions are met. Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-236 for NRC Exam. IC-20 or equivalent. Ensure EPR has been removed from service and control established on MPR per N1-OP-31. Reactor power is 90%.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scenl.bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scenl.bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scenl.bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. None D. Support Documentation

1. None E. Miscellaneous

1. None

2. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES

a. See bat file n06scenl.bat NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

I I.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I:

shift.

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the 0

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0

Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 90%

0 Loadline = >loo%

0 MPR is in service.

0 All requirements are met for operation without the EPR.

PART I I I :

RemarkslPlan ned Evolutions :

0 Transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31 F.3.0.

0 EPR power has been on for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months .

PART IV:

To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened?

Other Options?

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

Ill.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O Given the plant with RPV water level unknown due to reference leg flashing, the crew will flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per EOP-7 and establish RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.

Given the plant with a Loss of Coolant Accident, automatic system failures and conditions requiring Drywell Spray, the crew will initiate drywell sprays and secure drywell sprays before DWP becomes negative.

CT-2.0

6. Performance Objectives:

PO-1.O Given a trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 13 the SRO will declare the HPCl component inoperable and enter Tech Spec 3.1.8.

Given the plant at power with the MPR in service the crew will transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31.

Given downscale failure of a Drywell Pressure transmitter the SRO will declare the instrument inoperable and take the actions required by Tech Spec 3.6.2.

Given the plant at power and a rising Recirc Pump Motor Generator slot temperature the crew will remove the pump from service.

Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system, the crew will respond per procedures and stabilize condenser vacuum to preclude a turbine trip.

Given the plant at power and a Recirc master flow controller failure resulting in Restricted Zone entry, the crew will enter and execute N1-SOP-1.5 to exit the Restricted Zone.

Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system resulting in low turbine load (<I90 MWe) and high condenser backpressure (>5 inches), the crew will trip the turbine as required by N1-SOP-25.1.

PO-2.0 PO-3.0 PO-4.0 PO-5.0 PO-6.0 PO-7.0 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PO-8.0 Given indication of RPV water level reference leg flashing, the crew will recognize water level is unknown and execute EOP-7 RPV Flooding and flood to the Main Steam Lines.

Given the plant with LOCA conditions, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig.

PO-1 0.0 Given the plant with LOCA conditions and Containment Sprays is service, the crew will secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 psig PO-I I

.O Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

PO-9.0 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT1 FWBP13 Trip CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed activate malfunction by activating TRG 1 :

FWOZC FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 13 FWBP 13 trip and FWBP 12 starts.

H3-3-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P 13 TRIP OL SUCTION alarms The following annunciators alarm, but clear after the transient:

H3-1-7 REACTOR FW PUMP I ? TRIP NRC Scenario 1 Crew 1 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

SRO KI Directs performance of transferring control to EPR.

BOP Report alarm and respond per H3-3-6 0

SRO Confirm alarm on computer (E076 RX FW BOOST PMP 13 TRIP)

Confirm start of standby pump FWBP 13 control switch should be placed in PTL.

Dispatch operators to shift Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection from FWBP13 to FWBP 12.

Acknowledges report.

Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR AC-1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OVERLOAD SUCTION HI-LEVEL H3-2-7 REACTOR FW PUMP 12 TRIP OVERLOAD SUCTION HI-LEVEL H3-3-7 REACTOR FW SHAFT P 13 DlSCH PRESS SUCTION NOTE: Event 3 should be entered while Event 2 is in progress. There are no audible alarms associated with the transmitter failure.

EVENT 2 Transfer Control to EPR Note: All actions to place the EPR in service will be conducted from E Console.

EPR setpoint is lowered from I010 psig to about 920 psig before the servo begins to move in the upscale direction.

As the EPR setpoint meter moves in the upscale direction, the EPR will assume control NRC Scenario 1 specification b. Determines redundant component i nope ra bi I i ty and 15 days to restore.

7 Initiates surveillance requirement 4.1.8 c for redundant component opera b i I i t y verification.

7 Notifies WEC I Notifies Ops Management 7 Performs crew briehpdate.

3op Verify EPR power is on for minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Verify EPR setpoint 101 0 psig or EPR Control Light off, as directed by SRO.

Record Reactor Pressure Slowly lower EPR setpoint in move and wait manner while monitoring servo position.

WHEN EPR Servo position starts to move upscale THEN raise EPR setpoint until servo stops moving upscale to demonstrate control of EPR servo.

Lower EPR setpoint again in move and wait manner UNTIL September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS when the servo indication is about the same as the MPR servo setting.

Adjusting the EPR setpoint to re-establish pressure will change the magnitude of the difference between the MPR and EPR se tp oin t.

The MPR setpoint may require adjustment to establish the required difference in servo NRC Scenario 1 EPR servo begins to move slowly upscale.

WHEN EPR servo position approaches MPR servo positon, observe the following responses:

0 Steam Pressure EPR Control light lit A2-4-4 TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS REG IN CONTROL clears Assure EPR has taken control by slowly lowering EPR setpoint in move-and-wait manner until reactor pressure lowers by 1 or 2 psig.

Verify EPR performance as follows:

Slowly raise MPR setpoint UNTIL MPR control light goes off.

Raise MPR setpoint to obtain MPR servo position 8% to 14%

lower than EPR Servo position (MPR setpoint is 4-6 psi above EPR setpoint).

Adjust EPR setpoint to return reactor pressure to pre-transfer setting recorder in step F.3.2 Adjust MPR setpoint as necessary to obtain MPR servo position 8% to September 2006

INS I KUC I OK ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS position.

ROLE PLAY:

If dispatched to verify proper paddle gap, wait one minute, then report paddle gap is 0.20 inches.

NOTE: There are no alarms associated with the transmitter failure (downscale). At the Lead Examiners discretion a role play as RB operator may be used. Report the downscale condition and gross failure, while on RB rounds.

EVENT 3 Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by activating TRG 2:

RP20B RPS 11 DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED LOW ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL I 1 TROUBLE red light illuminates. Red light is located on upper left side of F Panel.

ROLE PLAY:

WHEN dispatched to RPS Cabinets, report NRC Scenario 1

-1 1-12% lower than EPR servo position. 0.1 5 to 0.25 MPR paddle gap.

Report s EPR in service to SRO.

CREW Identifies and reports ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL 11 TROUBLE red light illuminated.

Dispatches operator to Reactor Building 281 to check RPS cabinets 7 May refer to drawing C-I 8014-C sheet 1 and table to determine functions of affected instrument.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S Drywell Pressure transmitter 201.2-476A is downscale with gross failure lit. All other DW pressure transmitters are reading correctly for current DW pressure.

NOTE:

Tech Specs 3.6.2.a, b, d, e, f and I all apply.

3.6.2.a Scram Note ( 0 ) With one channel required by Table 3.6.2.a inoperable in one or more parameters, place the inoperable channel and/or that trip system in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.6.2.b Note (f) also requires tripping channel within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , since channel is common with RPS.

3.6.2.d Note (f) requires placing channel in tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or take the action required by Specification 3.6.2.a for that parameter. This requires tripping the channel in I 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . 3.6.2.e Note (c) also applies the same way.

3.6.2.1 is 7 day LCO for CREVS. 3.4.5 must also be entered for CREVS system.

EVENT 4 RECIRC PUMP MOTOR GENERATOR SLOT TEMPERATURE RISES WITH STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILED CLOSED PO-3.0 and 4.0 When plant conditions have stabilized, ACTIVATE malfunctions using TRG3:

NRC Scenario 1 SRO Declares DW P transmitter inoperable.

Enter Tech Spec 3.6.2 for instruments that initiate scram, primary coolant or containment isolation, core spray initiation, containment spray initiation and ADS initiation.

Determines transmitter must be placed in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Notifies the WEC.

Notifies Ops Management.

Conducts crew briefhpdate.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RROSC, Recirculation MG Set # I 3 Generator Overheating (1 00% over 10 min.)

MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILS LOW After about 3 minutes Annunciator F2 (2-3), REACT REClRC MG SET 13 alarms ROLE PLAY:

As A 0 sent to the MG set, report that ventilation system is operating properly and the motor end of #I3 RRMG set is extremely hot to the touch.

Note: Emergency Power Reduction actions are contained in N1 -SOP-I. 1. These actions are also identified in N1-OP-43B NRC Scenario 1 3OP iesponds to annunciator F2-(2-3) 1 Observes Process Computer point A094 and B331, RRMG 13 GEN SLOT TEMP in high alarm.

1 Dispatches A 0 to verify proper ventilation and inspect 13 RRMG.

3 Inform SRO of high temperature on 13 RRMG.

7 May also reference N1-OP-40, F. 1.O for additional response.

rhese actions for Nl-OP-I F.4.0 Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Area Ventilation Verify proper positioning of TB Truck Bay doors Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Set Area Coolers Verify RRP parameters are within limits Verify total recirculation flow is even balanced between operating RRPs IF generator slot temperatures continue to rise and approach 1 20°C, THEN reduce loading on affected RRMG by lowering power per N 1 -0P-43B (Emergency Power Reduction section), as directed by SRO.

September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note:

The SRO should direct one of the following actions to reduce the load on 13 RRMG:

Emergency Power Reduction, using NI-SOP-I. I or NI-OP-43B 13 RRP Shutdown, using Nl-OP-I, Section H. 1.0.

Trip of 13 RRP Expected result is that 13 RRMG and RRP will be shutdown due to inability to clear the high temperature condition on RRMG 13.

ROLE PLAY:

As A 0 sent to the MG set, after the power reduction report that the RRMG appears to be getting hotter, even though the load has been reduced.

The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, so a failure of the regulator is not apparent until load is reduced. Steam Seal header pressure drops below normal. Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-NRC Scenario 1 Direct Emergency Power Reduction per N 1 -SOP-I.I OR Direct RO to remove RRMG 13 from service Checks T.S. 3.1.7 for 4 loop operation,.98 APLHGR applies.

Verifies 4 loop thermal limits Verifies P/F Map updated When Recirc Pump 13 Discharge Valve is re-opened, declares APRMs inop, due to reverse flow.

(Only applicable if pump was tripped and APRMs are declared inop, while discharge valve is open).

Notifies Operations Management Notifies Chemistry Notifies Reactor Analyst Provides Reactivity Brief per GAP-OPS-05.

RO ci If directed, reduces power per NI-SOP-1.I, using all Recirc Master Flow Controller.

If directed to shutdown 13 RRP per N1-OP-I H.l.O performs the September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS LOW alarms.

When RRP 13 pump is removed from service delete the Malfunction for REACT RECIRC MG SET 13 GENERATOR OVERHEATING.

It will slowly cool down and the alarm will clear.

NRC Scenario 1 following:

0 0

0 Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL in BAL and null out Deviation Meter (top meter)

Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to MAN Verify open REACTOR R PUMP 13 BYPASS VALVE.

Slowly reduce recirculation Pump 13 flow to 6 to 8x1 O6 Ib/hr Close REACTOR R PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.

WHEN Discharge Valve is closed, place REACTOR RP MOTOR 13 MG SET switch to STOP.

Hold in OPEN position for 2 to 3 seconds REACTOR R PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.

Align system for 4 Loop operation per section H.

If directed to trip RRMG set:

Trip 13 RRMG set Monitor P/F map (4 loop) lnop APRMs due to reverse flow in idle loop.

Take N1-SOP-1.3.

September 2006

I RUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Scenario events will proceed prior to completing the 30 minute warmup period for the discharge valve.

rhese action are from SOP-1.3 10 If directed, executes SOP-I.3 IF Recirc Pump trip results in less than three operating loops THEN SCRAM the reactor per SOP-I (Not Expected)

Verify proximity to resticted zone using PowerlFlow Map (Four Loop)

Notify SRO that APRMs are inoperable.

Close RECIRC PUMP 4 4 4 DISCHARGE VALVE.

IF RECIRC PUMP /

17 DISCHARGE VALVE is closed, THEN hold open for 2-3 seconds RECIRC PUMP 14 DISCHARGE VALVE.

Notify SRO that APRMs are operable.

During valve stem warmup, restore F Panel controls to normal as follows:

Green flag RECIRC PUMP.Id SB switch.

l ?

Place RECIRC PUMP SPEED CONTROL AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to MAN.

WHEN 30 minute warmup period NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 5 Steam Seal Regulator Failure Event is automatically initiated during the power reduction. BOP actions are taken concurrently with actions taken by RO for RRP 13 high slot temperature and the power reduction.

Malfunction initiated with Event 4 using TRG 3:

MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILS LOW The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, so a failure of the regulator is not apparent until load is reduced. Steam Seal header pressure drops below normal. Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW alarms.

When STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS is throttled open, Steam Seal Header pressure will rise.

NRC Scenario 1 has elapsed for discharge valve, THEN Close Recirc Pump 14 discharge valve. (Not expected) 3op 3 Report and respond to annunciator A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW rhese actions are from A2-2-5 3 Confirm alarm comp point 1 Maintain Steam Seal Reg pressure 2-5 psig Verify open STEAM SEAL REG BLOCK 11 Verify open STEAM SEAL REG BLOCK 13 Verify closed STEAM SEAL UNLOAD Thottle open STEAM SEAL REG BY -PASS.

Report header pressure restored to September 2006

I N~TRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ROLE PLAY: If required direct crew as Ops management, with reactor engineering concurrence, to reduce power below 80%.

Provide RMR, if needed. This must be done prior to inserting next malfunction. If started from too high a power level, a high level trip may occur due to FWLC and FWP valve response times.

EVENT 6 MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS LOW PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunctions by activating TRG 4:

RR27 MASTER RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS-LOW Recirc flow signal rapidly reduces to minimum, Recirc flow, reactor power and generator MWe begin to lower. Reactor power will lower to about 50% and core flow will be about 21 Mlbm/hr. Entry into the Power/F/ow map "Restricted Zone" occurs. An RPV HIGH WA TER LEVEL alarm may occur due to the rapid power change and response of the Feed wa te r System.

NRC Scenario 1 normal value.

SRO Direct entry into SOP-I.5 for unplanned reactor power change.

May direct FWLC placed in manual, due to transient rising level.

Directs exit from Restricted Zone by Cram Rod Insertion September 2006

INS 1 RUCTOK AC 1 IONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE:

The REClRC MASTER controller is failed low, therefore flow cannot be raised to exit the restricted zone. Cram rod insertion is required to exit the restricted zone. Based on the Power/Flow Map, power must be reduced from about 50% to about 30% with flow at 21 Mlbm/hr to exit.

Reactor power lowers as cram rods are inserted. If generator MWe e190 MWe and B499 computer point indicates backpressure is

>5 hg, a turbine trip is required, per SOP-25.1 As power lowers Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW alarms again. Steam seal pressure must be manually adjusted as power lowers.

3Q rhese actions are from SOP-1.5 Continuously monitor LPRMs and APRMs for thermal hydraulic instabilities (NONE expected).

IF RESRICTED ZONE is entered, THEN...Exit by performing one of the following:

IF Recirc Pumps are operating AND plant conditions permit, THEN Raise RECIRC MASTER controller to raise recirc flow.

(CANNOT BE PERFORMED).

Lower reactor power by inserting cram rods to 00.

WHEN directed by SRO, inserts obtains reactivity book and inserts cram rods to 00.

Inform Reactor Engineering Supervisor.

BOP If necessary, adjusts STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS to maintain 2 to 5 psig NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S Event 7 STEAM SEAL BYPASS FAILURE DEGRADES CON DENSER VACUUM.

PO-6.0 WHEN power is about 30% to 35%, activate overrides to fail STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS valve closed using TRG 5:

ior 2s5di171 (5 0) on ior 2s5dil72 (5 0) off STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS closes and Steam Seal header pressure drops to 0 psig.

Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LO W alarms. Condenser vacuum begins to lower. WHEN vacuum lowers to 24 inches, annunciator A 1-3-4 CONDENSER VACUUM BELOW 24HG alarms. Per NI-SOP-25. I, If generator MWe 190 M We and B499 computer point indicates backpressure is >5 hg, a turbine trip is required, per SOP-25. I NOTE:

Lowering power in this case will actually make NRC Scenario 1 BOP 0

0 0

0 7

Recognize and report alarm Report STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS is closed and cannot be opened.

Report condenser vacuum lowering.

Executes SOP-25.1 for loss of vacuum.

Recognize requirement to trip the turbine and enter N1-SOP-31.I Trips the turbine Verifies turbine is tripped and bypass valves are controlling reactor pressure.

Verifies generator tripped Reports FW shifted to HPCl mode due to turbine trip.

As required, lower power per SOP-1. I to stabilize vacuum.

September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS condenser vacuum worse because lowering power makes the steam seal loss more severe. Increased air in-leakage past seals will occur the more power is lowered.

F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press Low is expected to alarm during power reduction to exit the Restricted Zone.

NOTE:

Vacuum Trip 1. Trips turbine at 22.1 Vacuum Trip 2. Closes BPV at I O Other actions that may be directed are removing 13 FWP from service and starting a second motor driven feed pump. After the HPCl initiation, resetting HPCl may be directed. The scenario will proceed prior to any of these actions being performed.

Due to degraded condition, the crew may initiate a manual scram after tripping the turbine. If a manual scram is directed, the steam leak will occur after 4:OO minute time delay and MS to shutdown.

IF a manual scram IS NOT initiated by the NRC Scenario 1 Verify proper operation of the following:

Circ Water SJAE Off Gas System Condensate System Turbine Gland Seal System System Leaks If appropriate, place standby SJAE in service (NOT expected)

F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press in alarm (Yes/No) Should Be YES IF YES....Verify power below 45%

BEFORE Condenser Vacuum reaches 22.1 Hgv TRIP the turbine and enter SOP-31. I concurrently.

BEFORE Condenser Vacuum reaches 10 Hgv SCRAM the reactor and enter SOP-I concurrently.

If directed, manually scram the reactor and enters SOP-I September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT~ONS~

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS crew after tripping the turbine CONSOLE OPERATOR initiates an automatic scram by activating malfunction using TRG 8:

RP03 REACTOR SCRAM NRC Scenario 1 SRO 3 Directs a manual scram based on degraded plant OR IF automatic scram occurs directs scram actions to be implemented.

SRO 0 Repeats back Scram Report 0 Enters EOP-2 RPV Control on on RPV water level < 53inches These actions from EOP-2 Directs entry into SOP-1 (SCRAM)

IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Expected to occur later, when reference legs flash)

Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):

Condenstate/F W CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)

September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE When the reactor is scrammed and the Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN, malfunctions are activating by TRG 6 and TRG 7:

The steam leak will not become apparent until about four minutes after the scram.

RP26B RPS 1 I DW PT 201.2-476C FAILED LOW MS04 STEAM LINE RUPTURE INSIDE PRIMARY CONTAIMENT 20% 1O:OO MINUTE RAMP AFTER 4:OO minute time delay... ms04 (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO NRC Scenario 1 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)

EC ERV Others (Not expected)

May direct closing MSlVs prior to automatic closure on lowering vacuum RO When directed, initiates a manual scram by pacing Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN or using Manual Scram pushbuttons and implements SOP-I Reactor Scram.

Provides Scram Report Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 Mlbmlhr Perform SOP-I Scram Verification steps Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.

Observe power decreasing September 2006

W R U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Failure to give 29-01 a close signal, will cause FWP13 FCV to swing and results in pressure and flow swings when NR level instruments begin to swing after reference legs flash. This is because FWP 13 FCV receives its setpoint setdown control signals, even with MA controller in MANUAL.

Place IRMs on Range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.

Maintain RPV pressure in the directed band, below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from E 0 P-2):

Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers 0 ERVs 0 Others (Not expected) 3op 2 Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.

1 Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.

0 IF 13 FWP is running and level is recovering :

Verify at least one motor FWP running.

7 Terminate 13FWP injection:

Place 13 FWP Valve Controller in MAN and dial to 0 output.

Verify >53 inches.

Disengage clutch.

Give 29-01 BV close signal.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Placing a FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO set at 65 to 70 inches, will cause FWP pressure and flow swings when NR level instruments begin to swing after reference legs flash.

Event 8 Steam Leak inside Drywell. DWP Transmitter 201.2-4766 failed downscale.

After 4 minutes, malfunction MS04 begins to ramp.

Steam leakage into the drywell begins with temperature and pressure rise. The D WP downscale transmitter failure results in failure of one RPS Channel ( I I ) to trip when DWP exceeds 3.2 psig. Other automatic system responses are failure of Core Spray System to start on High DWP. The Containment Spray System auto start is also affected by the transmitter failures.

7 Control Motor FWP Injection:

Verify >53 inches and rising Verify 11 and 12 FWP valve controllers in MAN and dial to 0 output.

At E Panel, reset HPCl 11 and 12 using pushbuttons.

Place one FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO set at 65 to 70 inches.

Verify level stable and secure 2"d FWP, if running.

If required, close running FWP discharge BV.

3 If directed, closes MSlVs CREW Recognize and report rising DWP NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

?

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTIONS FOR HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE N1 -EOP-4 Primary Containment Control.

Executes all legs concurrently. Major actions and legs executed during EOP-4.

PO-I 0.0 and PO-I 1.O Drywell and Torus pressure and temperature rise due to steam leakage.

Torus pressure exceeds 13 psig.

NRC Scenario 1 SRO May direct manual containment isolation to be initiated.

Enters EOP-4 on high DWP above 3.5 psig Containment Spray Initiated? (Step 1 NO)

Directs lockout of all Containment Spray Pumps (Step 2)

Executes PCP Leg If Cont Sprays are running, THEN stop sprays when DWP drops below 3.5 psig. (PCP-1 Override)

Action is expected to occur after spray is initiated).

Maintain PC pressure below 3.5 psig (EOP 1 Att IO) (PCP-2)

If Torus Pressure exceeds 13 psig, THEN Go to 17 (which is PCP-3)...(PCP-2, Expected)

Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit Fig K? (PCP-3 YES)

Directs All Recirc Pumps tripped.

Directs all drywell cooling fans tripped.

Operate Cont Spray (EOP 1 Att

17)

Keep trying to lower PC pressure below 3.5 psig. (PCP-5)

If cannot stay Inside PSP Fig L September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 6 NRC Scenario 1 curve, THEN Go to 18 (which is PCP-8) (Perform a Blowdown per EOP-8 Not expected).

ihese actions are expected by SRO vhen reference leg flashing occurs 1 Determines and announces RPV water level is unknown 1 WHEN RPV reference leg flashing occurs and water level can no longer be determined, Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 RPV Flooding (from L-2 and L-4)

Ro ixecutes TT Leg 3 Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att 16) (TT-2)

BOP If directed, starts Torus Cooling per 6 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 285°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-45 1 12 or 121 : 80-40 and 80-45 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 122; 80-40 1 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 1 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 1 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

111; 80-16 112; 80-36 121;80-15 122; 80-35 7 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-40 112; 80-44 121;80-41 122; 80-45 11 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

CI Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PO-I 0.0 BOP Actions for cont 7 inment spray per EOP-1 When Containment Spray is initiated, Drywell pressure lowers below 3.5 psig.

CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN Drywell temperature drops below 200°F and the crew is injecting to establish flooding pressure, THEN delete malfunctions RR99A and RR87:

This stops the erratic indication on all level meters.

PO-I 1.o Drywell pressure lowers with Containment Spray in operation until D WP drops to 3.5 psis per N 1 -0P-I 4.

11 Report status to SRO.

BOP When directed, trips all Recirc Pumps.

When directed, trips drywell cooling fans.

Verify started Containment Spray Pump 111 or 122.

Verify started at least one of the other three Containment Spray Pumps.

IF 80-1 18 is open for Torus Cooling, THEN Open Containment Spray Discharge IV for Containment Spray Loop in Torus Cooling Mode.

Close 80-1 18 Verify open 80-40 and 80-45 IF EDG loading permits, THEN start Containment Spray Raw Water Pump for associated loop.

BOP o Reports DWP below 3.5 psig Stops Containment Spray by placing all Containment Spray NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS CT-3.0 When Drywell temperature exceeds 240 OF, reference leg flashing occurs and RPV water level can no longer be determined.

Event 8 RPV Level Instrument Reference Leg Flashing PO-9.0 IF conditional event triggers fail to activate RR99Aand RR87..... THEN manually activate both malfunctions using TRG 9 and I O.

When Drywell Air Temperature PCTDWAIR exceeds 240°F trigger 9 and 10 activate malf u n ctions:

RR99A ERRATIC LEVEL INDICATION, ALL METERS AND RECORDERS RR87 FUEL ZONE LEVEL INSTRUMENT FLASHING Reference leg flashing occurs. Fuel Zone digital display indications begin flashing. All water level indications become erratic.

NOTE: The following actions may lead to fluctuating FWP flow and pressure as NR level Pumps in Pull To Lock.

1 Stops Containment Spray before DWP becomes negative.

CREW 7 Recognize and report erratic level indication and fuel zone indications of flashing SRO These actions are expectec b

when reference leg flashing occurs Determines and announces RPV water level is unknown 0 Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 RPV Flooding (from L-2 and L-4)

These actions are directed from EOP-7 RPV Flooding 0 Are all rods inserted to at least position 04? (Step 1 YES)

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

c2 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS indications swing:

Placing FWP Bypass Controller to AUTO.

Leaving any FWP MA CONTROL in AUTO (with HPCl fuses pulled) will result in valve swings as sensed level swing.

Failure to close FWP 13 Blocking Valve will result in swings from FWP13. Setpoint Setdown will still control FWP 13 valve, even with controller in manual.

CT-2.0 Detail E Systems are:

Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (EOPI Att 5)

Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)

Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12)

Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) 0 0

0 0

0 IF RPV water level can be determined....RETURN TO RPV CONTROL (Step 12 Not expected)

Torus water level? (Step 13 Above 8 feet)

Directs Open 3 ERVs (Step 14) and OK to exceed 100°F/hr coo Id own Can 3 ERVs be opened? (Step 15 YES)

Directs Close MSlVs and EC Steam Isolation Valves (Step 16)

Control injection to establish and maintain 3 ERVs open AND RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure using (Step 17):

CondensatelFW, OK to bypass high level trips CRD Core Spray, Bypass IV Interlocks 0 Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E)

If you cannot restore and maintain NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR If dispatched to pull HPCl Fuses, activate remote using TRG 20:

FW24 PULL HPCl FUSES, PULL, 3:OO min delay.

After the 3:OO minute time delay, remote becomes active. As operator dispatched, REPORT HPCl fuses are pulled.

CT-2.0 RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open...THEN FLOOD THE DRYWELL, exit all EOPs and enter all SAPS (Step 17) 3 Record time of RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open (Stepl8).

J WAIT for RPV water level instruments to be available AND DWT at 319 ft <212 AND Flooding conditions met for at least 101 minutes (Step 19)...to proceed.

NOT expected to proceed past this JVAlT block in the scenario RO cl If directed, initiates manual containment isolation at E Console.

If directed, injects with CondensatelFW system.

If directed, pulls HPCl fuses.

If directed, starts second CRD Pump.

If directed establish injection with Core Spray systems.

Starts Core Spray Pumps Install Core Spray Jumpers NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS T E RM I NATION C RITE RIA RPV Flooding conditions are met.

Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.

EVENT 9 SRO Classification PO-I 1.o I

Throttles open injection valves Using any injection systems directed, establishes injection to maintain 3 ERVs open and RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.

SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.1.2, RPV Flooding is required.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events Unit 2 Loss of Steam Seals March 2006 B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED

n06scenl t e s t.batch scenario 1 f i l e created 7/11/06 A UPDATED 7/20 TO ADD RROID MALFUNCTION, NEEDED AN ADDITIONAL EVENT.

A UPDATED 7/21 CHANGED R R O l D TO RROgC BECAUSE I T I S A BETTER EVALUATION EVENT.

A UPDATED 8/9 Added FWOZC, NEEDED A SECOND SRO TS AND T H I S I S HPCI COMPONENT.

A UPDATED 8/21 Based on t e s t run w i t h OpS, on 8/18/06.

A UPDATED 9/18 Based on v a l i d a t i o n run w i t h Ops. Sequence issues.

A t h i s can be used t o i l l u s t r a t e how t h e more common types o f simulator events can be entered A e n t e r " b a t n06scenl.bat" i n command l i n e t o open, w i t h i n t h e IC t o be used f o r scenari 0.

as needed A (1 0 ) means manual t r i g g e r 1 w i t h 0 delay (Boolean)

A (3 10) 1 means manual t r i g g e r 3 w i t h 10 sec delay and VALUE i s 1 delay (Integer)

A (1 0) 50 1:OO means manual t r i g g e r 1 w i t h 0 delay (Variable-Anolag) trigger-delay-value-ramp-time-in1 t i a l v a l u e A (0 0) means manual t r i g g e r 0 w i t h 0 delay value 1 (Annunciator as I n t e g e r 1 c r y w o l f 2 i s o f f i m f as malfunction)

Areset t o I C 236 IC-20 w i t h MPR i n s e r v i c e per ~ 1 - O P - 3 1 Power a t 90%

A r s t 236 AEvents a r e sequenced so t h a t p l a n t i s a t reduced power when r r 2 7 i s i n i t a i t e d. T h i s prevents h i g h water l e v e l t r i p s Adue t o t h e r a p i d drop i n r e c i r c f l o w.

i m f fwO2c (1 0)

AEVENT 2 Transfer Pressure c o n t r o l TO EPR N1-OP-31 i r n f rp20b (2 0) b a s i c syntax i s i m f m a l f ( t r i g g e r delay) value ramp time i n i t i a l v a l u e AEVENT 1 FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP T R I P 1 3 AEVENT 3 DRYWELL H I G H PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F A I L LOW 201.2-476A AEVENT 4 RECIRC PUMP 1 3 MG SLOT TEMPERATURES R I S E.

/\\EVENT 5 STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILURE CAUSES DEGRADING SEAL HEADER PRESSURE Ams05 i s on a t r i g g e r 3 o n l y t o prevent i t s ' unexpected a c t u a t i o n e a r l i e r than intended.

i m f r r 0 9 c (3 0) 100 1O:OO i m f ms05 (3 0)

AEVENT 6 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS LOW CAUSES RESTRICTED ZONE ENTRY i r n f r r 2 7 (4 0 )

AEVENT 7 STEAM SEAL BYPASS FAILS CLOSED i o r 2s5di171 ( 5 0 ) on i o r 2s5di172 ( 5 0 ) o f f AEVENT 8 STEAM LEAK I N DRYWELL

/ \\ I n i t i a t e d upon manual scram, mode switch t o shutdown AAssign c o n d i t i o n o f Event T r i g g e r 6 and 7 t r u e when Mode s w i t c h i s placed i n t r g s e t 6 "zdrpstdn== 1" t r g s e t 7 "zdrpstdn== 1" AEVENT 9 DRYWELL H I G H PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F A I L LOW 201.2-476C SHUTDOWN AAssign an i t e m t o be i n t i a t e d when c o n d i t i o n o f t r i g g e r 5 and 6 becomes t r u e t r g 6 " i m f rp26b (6 0)"

t r g 7 " i m f ms04 (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO" A I f crew does n o t scram a f t e r t r i p p i n g t u r b i n e, i n s e r t spurious scram Page 1

n06scenl A I f crew scrams manually a f t e r t r i p p i n g t u r b i n e, t h i s i s n o t necessary.

i m f rp03 (8 0 )

i r f fw24 (20 3:OO) p u l l APULL H P C I FUSES FU8/FU9 A h h h h h A A A A A h h A A C O N D I T I O N A L EVENT

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A AThese Event t r i q q e r s do not show on IS summary w i t h scenario loaded u n t i l they become TRUE Acheck Extreme ACE t r i m e r (Distol icon) t o v e r i f y t h e condtion shows UD i n t h e event a c t i o n column to-ensure t r i g g e r loaded Aonly one event can be placed on a t r i g g e r f o r proper f u n c t i o n o f t r g A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A AEVENT 10 RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENT REFERENCE LEG FLASHING AAssign c o n d i t i o n o f Event Trigger 8 t r u e when Drywell A i r temperature exceeds 240 F t r g s e t 9 "pctdwai r >240" t r g 9 " i m f rr99a (9 0)"

AAssign c o n d i t i o n of Event Trigger 9 t r u e when Drywe11 A i r temperature exceeds 240 F t rgser 10 "pctdwai r >240" t r g 10 " i m f r r 8 7 (10 0)"

Aend of setup Page 2

Initial 1.o (C2) 2.0 2.1 ATTACHMENT 17: AUTO or MANUAL INITIATION of CONT SPRAY Sheet 1 of4 PURPOSE To confirm proper alignment of Containment Spray System after Automatic OR Manual initiation for App J Water Seal.

To provide alternate Torus Cooling through Cont Spray, spray mode, when normal lineup can NOT be established due to Cont Spray operation in accordance with EOP(s)/SAP(s).

PROCEDURE When directed by EOP's to spray the Containment for Pressure or Temperature Control, then secure Containment Sprays when Drywell Pressure drops below 3.5 psig.

OR When directed by EOP's/SAP's to spray the Containment for Combustible Gas Control (EOP-4.2, SAP-2) or Primary Containment Flooding (SAP-I), Then secure Containment Sprays before Drywell pressure reaches 0 psig.

2.1.I 2.1.2 2.1.3 IF 80-1 18 is open for Torus Cooling, Verify started, Containment Spray Pump 11 1 or 122.............................................................

Verify started, at least one of the other three Containment Spray Pumps.............................

THEN 1.

Open Containment Spray Discharge IV for the Containment Spray Loop@) in Torus Cooling mode.........................................................

2.

Close 80-1 18,..............................................................................................

3.

Verify open 80-40 and 80-45.......................................................................

4.

IF EDG Loading permits.

THEN Start RAW Water pumps associated with running Containment Spray Pumps......................................................................................

2.1.4 IF 80-40 fails closed, THEN Open 80-44.............................................................................................................

NIA, 80-40 did not fail closed.................................................................................................

Page 49 N 1 -EOP-l Rev 06

Initial ATTACHMENT 17(Cont) 2.1.7 IF Torus Cooling is required AND Emergency Diesel Generator loading permitted THEN Start All available Containment Spray Raw water Pumps..........................................

(-)

NIA, Torus cooling not required......................................................................................

Sheet 2 of 4 2.1.5 IF 80-45 fails closed, w

THEN Open 80-41..............................................................................................................

NIA, 80-45 did not fail closed.................................................................................................

2.1.6 IF 80-1 18 has failed open, AND Diesel loading permits, THEN Start all available Containment Spray pumps...........................................................

2.2 To supply Containment Spray Sparger from Raw Water perform the following:

0 Loop 1 I (RAW WATER PUMP 121) refer to Step 2.3..............................................

0 Loop 12, (RAW WATER PUMP 112), refer to Step 2.4.............................................

IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND is no longer required to lower containment pressure AND Directed by the SM or CRS THEN Return system to normal standby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, Draining Containment Spray RAW Water Heat Exchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected Containment Spray Loop selected...........................

2.4 Supply Raw Water to Containment Spray Loop I1 as follows:

2.4.1 Place CONT SPRAY RAW WTR 121 INTERTIE control switch to CNT SPR 11 1 position:

a.

Verify closed 93-26, DIS VLV 11 1............................................................................

b.

Verify open 93-73, CNT SPR 121.............................................................................

Page 50 Nl -EOP-l Rev 06

Initial ATTACHMENT 17(Cont)

Sheet 3 of 4 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.4.5 2.4.6 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.4.5 Unlock and close 93-13, BV-121 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screenhouse)..................................................................................................

Throttle open 93-13, 4-6 turns...............................................................................................

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121.....................................................

WHILE maintaining CSRW Pump 121 motor amps less than 76 amps, throttle 93-13 as necessary to maximize flow rate............................................................................................

IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND is no longer required to lower containment pressure AND Directed by the SM or CRS THEN 1. Shutdown SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121.....................................................

2. Open 93-13, BV-121 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screenhouse)....................................................................................................

3. Return system to normal standby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, Draining Containment Spray RAW Water Heat Exchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected Containment Spray Loop selected...........................

Supplv raw water to Containment Sprav Loop 12 as follows:

Place CONT SPRAY RAW WTR 112 INTERTIE control switch to CNT SPR 122 position:

a.

Verify closed 93-28, DIS VLV 122.............................................................................

b.

Verify open 93-72, CNT SPR 122.............................................................................

Unlock and close 93-1 6, BV-112 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (Screen house).................................................................................................

Throttle open 93-1 6, 4-6 turns...............................................................................................

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 112.....................................................

WHILE maintaining CSRW Pump 112 motor amps less than 76 amps, throttle 93-16 as necessary to maximize flow rate.......................................................................................

Page 51 N 1 -EOP-l Rev 06

ATTACHMENT 17(Cont)

Initial Sheet 4 of 4 2.4.6 IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND Is no longer required to lower containment pressure AND Directed by the SM or CRS THEN 1, Shutdown SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 112.....................................................

2. Open 93-16, BV-112 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screen house).....................................................................................................

3. Return system to normal standby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, Draining Containment Spray RAW Water Heat Exchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected Containment Spray Loop selected...........................

Page 52 N1 -EOP-1 Rev 06

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description Crew performs N1 -ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valve Operability Test for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2.

~

Steam IV 39-08R fails to fully close during testing. Valve must be declared inoperable and isolated per Tech Spec 3.2.7. EC Loop 12 now remains inop and unavailable when the steam line is isolated (TS 3.1.3.b, 7 day)

ERVl I 1 inadvertently opens. The crew enters SOP-I.4. An emergency power reduction to 85% is performed. The ERV will close after the fuses are pulled. Tech Spec 3.1.5 must be entered because the valve is now inoperable. TS 3.2.9 may also require entry.

Recirc Flow Master Controller fails as-is, preventing the power reduction by normal methods. The crew will operate individual Recirc Flow controls at F panel or insert cram rods to complete the emergency power reduction.

~~

~

ECO9B AD05 RR28 CTOIA ECOGA C (BOP)

Containment Spray Pump 11 1 trips, after control rods are fully inserted. Pump is initially running in the Torus Cooling mode. Since Torus temperature is still high due to heat added during the event, the system must be realigned to start an alternate Containment Spray Pump.

Event is classified as SAE 2.2.2

~

~~

C (TS SRO)

C (BOP)

EC 11 tube leak (50% with 5 minute ramp time). EC 11 isolation is required. Both EC loops are now inoperable. Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e now applies and an orderly shutdown is required.

MS12 TU02 RD33 RP09 MSOI M (ALL)

C (ALL)

Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 2 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners:

Operators Initial Conditions: IC20 100% Reactor Power Turnover: Complete NI-ST-Q4 Section 8.2.39-13R, 39-14R,05-04R, and 05-12 testing is done. Test Steam IVs39-10R and 39-08R. LP Pump 12 is out of service since 0600 today. TS LCO 3.1.2 Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 A steam leak develops in the turbine building condenser area with severity at 15%. Turbine Vibration rises following the load reduction. The crew will initiate a manual scram due to degraded plant conditions or when turbine bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils.

ATWS. Following the scram control rods will not fully insert and power will remain within turbine bypass valve capability, at about 30%. The MSIVs will close on high temperature and heat will be rejected to the torus.

Control Rod Drive Pump 12 trips during the scram transient.

RD35B I c(Ro) I Starting CRD Pump 11 is necessary for driving control rods.

10/21 I2006 6:39:44 AM 3 of 8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

TARG ET Q U AN TI TAT1 VE ATT R I B UTES (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d)

-1. Total malfunctions (5-8)

Events 3,4,5,7,8,9

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

Event 8 CRD Pump Trip Event 9 Containment Sprav Pump Trip

3. Abnormal events (2-4)

Event 3 SOP-I.4 Event 5 EC Tube Leak

4. Major transients (1 -2)

Event 6 Turbine High Vibration and Steam Leak into the Turbine building

5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive EOP-4 Primary Containment

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive EOP-3 Failure To Scram actions (1 -2) actions (0-2)

7. Critical tasks (2-3)

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CT-1.O Maintain below HCTL CT-2.0 Terminate and prevent RPV injection during ATWS.

CT-3.0 Restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

ACTUAL ATTRl BUT E S 6

2 2

1 1

1 3

10/21 /ZOO6 6:39:44 AM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal 4 of 8 Total Malfunction Count:

Major is not included in this count.

Abnormal Events Count:

Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are considered separately.

SRO TS Events Event 2,3 and 5 are SRO Tech Spec evaluation events.

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 PREPARER FAILURE TO SCRAM G. Bobka DATE 7/18/06 VAL1 DATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/18/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE Ay+/h+

0 PERATl ON S MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON F I G U RAT1 0 N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level:

loo%, above the 100% Rod Line The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions and Containment Spray Pump 122 removed from service for maintenance. The crew will perform N1 -ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, on the Emergency Condenser (EC) Loop 12 Isolation Valves (IVs) per Section 8.2. This test consists of stoke time tests for EC Steam Isolation Valves. A valve failure will result in entry into Tech Specs for the failed coolant and containment isolation valve When the surveillance on the EC Loop 12 IVs is addressed, the crew will respond to an inadvertent opening of an ERV. The crew will perform an emergency power reduction to about 85%. A failure of the Master Recirc Flow Controller will require the crew to either take manual control of the pump MA stations or insert the cram rods to complete the power reduction. The ERV will be closed when the crew pulls the control power fuses. The SRO must also assess the Tech Spec impact of the inoperable ERV.

ECI 1 vent radiation monitor alarms and the crew determines that a tube leak exists, based on confirmed alarms and rising shell water level. The crew will isolate ECI 1 to stop the release.

The SRO reviews Tech Specs and determines with ECI 1 inoperable Tech Spec 3.1.3.b applies. However, with a confirmed EC Tube Leak a plant shutdown is required. Additionally both EC are now inoperable and unavailable for pressure control.

Following the power reduction, turbine vibration will rise and steam leak in the turbine building develops. These reach a severity level that requires a turbine trip and a reactor scram.

When the crew inserts a reactor scram, many control rods fail to insert and power remains at 30-45% power. Because of the steam leak into the turbine building, the main condenser will NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

only be available as a heat sink for a short period of time after the scram before the MSlVs are closed, on high steam tunnel temperature. The crew will terminate and prevent injection to lower reactor water level and suppress reactor power. When the main condenser is lost as a heat sink, the crew will maintain reactor pressure using the ERVs and will place torus cooling in service. Because of the rising torus water temperature the crew will inject Liquid Poison (LP).

The SRO will direct the actions of EOP-3 and EOP-4 including alternate control rod insertion per EOP-3.1. The crew will be able to insert control rods, after starting a CRD pump, using the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) and manual reactor scrams will be successful in inserting the control rods. The SRO will be required to reduce the pressure control band to remain within the heat capacity temperature limit. The loss of both Emergency Condensers adds additional heat to the torus due to more frequent operation of the ERVs to control reactor pressure. After all rods are inserted, the Containment Spray Pump operating in Torus Cooling mode trips. The system must be realigned and an alternate pump started to continue Torus Cooling.

Major Procedures:

EAL Classification:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.2.2 Termination Criteria: All control rods inserted, EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and crew directed to restore reactor water level restored to 53-95 inches.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

~ ~-

SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent LP Pump 12 and Containment Spray 122 are out of service.

6. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

See bat file n06scen2.bat

2. Remotes:

3. Overrides:

a. None

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. Liquid Poison Pump 12 (reference tag taped near keylock switch)

2. Containment Spray Pump 122 (red clearance applied to pump cs, in PTL)

D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2. Initial complete so that 39-10R is next valve to be tested.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Update Divisional Status Board (LP 12 and Cnt Sp 122)

2. Protected Equipment

a. Containment Spray Pumps 11 1 112

b. Core Spray Pumps 11 1 112

c. EDGl02 d. EVENT TRI GG ERSlCOM POS ITES

a. trgset 9 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

II.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I:

shift.

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the 0

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0

Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 100%

0 Loadline = 103%

0 122 Containment Spray Pump 00s for repair. TS 3.3.7.b (day 1 of 15 day LCO).

0 Complete N1 -ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2, starting at 8.2.5 for 39-IOR.

Liquid Poison Pump 12 is out of service for motor repairs. TS 3.1.2.b (day 1 of 7 day LCO).

PART 111:

RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:

Maintenance continues to work on Containment Smav Pumo # I 12 PART IV:

To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)

Shift Crew Composition (SMICRS)

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I Scenario ID#

4STRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened?

What we did?

Why? (Goals)

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006 Other 0 pt ions?

Ill.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching 1 1 O'F, the crew will utilize Boron injection, Torus cooling, control rod insertion and RPV pressure control to preclude violation of the HCTL in accordance with EOP-3.

CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 jnches, terminate and prevent all injection except Boron and CRD in accordance with EOP-1, Att. 24.

CT-3.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram w' d h power above 6% AND RPV level above -84 inches AND ERVs open AND torus water temperature above 1 IOOF, the crew will terminate and prevent injection and restore injection to restore and maintain water level above -109 inches, when allowed by EOP-3.

CT-4.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with control rods NOT inserted to at least position 04 and the reactor will not stay shutdown without boron, the crew will insert all control rods to at least position 04 per EOP-3.1, Alternate Control Rod Insertion.

B. Performance Objectives:

PO-I.O Given a quarterly surveillance for Reactor Coolant Isolation Valves, the crew will recognize the failure of a valve to operate correctly in accordance withN 1 -ST-Q4.

Given a valid EC vent radiation monitor alarm, the crew will respond in accordance with the ARPs, N1-OP-I 3.

PO-2.0 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PO-3.0 PO-4.0 PO-5.0 PO-6.0 PO-7.0 PO-8.0 PO-9.0 Given the plant with a stuck open ERV, the crew will implement SOP-I.4 and close the ERV before torus temperature reaches 1 10°F.

Given the plant requiring an emergency power reduction and the master flow controller failed as-is, the crew will perform the power reduction by operating individual pump MA stations in manual in accordance with N1 -SOP-I.4 Given the plant with indications of an Emergency Condenser Tube Leak, the crew will isolate the affected Emergency Condenser in accordance with ARP and normal operating procedures.

Given the plant with a steam leak in the Turbine Building the crew will initiate a manual scram in accordance with N1-SOP-1.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation the crew will insert control rods using the RMCS and repetitive scrams in accordance with N1-EOP-3 and N1-EOP-3.1.

Given an ATWS condition accompanied by a loss of the Main Condenser, the crew will recognize the challenge to HCTL and Inject liquid poison in accordance with N1-OP-12 Given the plant with elevated torus water temperature AND a trip of the operating Containment Spray Pump, the crew will start an alternate pump in torus cooling per EOP-4 and EOP-1 Attachment

16.

PO-I 0.0 Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

PO-I 1.O Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required action sln otif ication s.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event I Perform Surveillance Surveillance test continues PO-I.o Per Nl-ST-Q4, 4.4.e, the valve must be declared inoperable immediately. No retest is allowed.

Perform the test, starting at step 8.2.5 Annunciators F1-3-2 RPS CH 11 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION and F4-3-7 RPS CH 12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION are expected to actuate when EC valves 39-?OR and 39-08R are stroked closed.

Test 39-10R Crew 0

Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

Direct BOP to complete Nl-ST-Q4, Section 8.2.

Acknowledge 39-08R has dual indication when performing close to open stroke test and contact FIN Team or maintenance.

Determine isolation valve is inoperable and enter tech Spec 3.2.7 and requirement to isolate the penetration using 39-1 OR Determine TS 3.1.3.b remains effective, since EC Loop 12 will be isolated.

BOP 0 Obtain SRO permission to continue N1 -ST-Q4, Section 8.2.

Cycle 39-10R, EC STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 121, AND:

Record open to close stroke time NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I T R U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 P E RAT0 R ACT IONS Independent verification may be obtained later, due to crew resources.

Test 39-08R3, step 8.2.6 EVENT 2 39-08R valve Fails to Fully Close PO-I I.o Preset malfunction ECO9B When 39-08R is cycled in the closed direction, the red light remains on. The valve must be declared inoperable and no retesting is a 110 wed.

Role Play: If sent to determine condition of 39-08R, report valve appears to be about half open.39-08R is identified as a coolant system isolation valve in NIP-DES-04 List of Controlled Lists, Attachment 6 Nine Mile Point Unit I Reactor Coolant System Isolation 0

0 0

for 39-10R. (224.3 and 532.8 sec).

[ 538 sec for TS]. (221.5 and 535.8 sec for LST}

Record close to open stroke time for 39-10R. (225.4 and 534.3 sec).

(222.4 and 537.4 sec for LST}

Obtains Independent verification in valve open position.

Record open to close stroke time for 39-08R. (217.0 and 523.0 sec).

[ 538 sec for TS]. (215.0 and 525.0 sec for LST}

Recognize dual indication for 39-08R and valve appears to have not fully closed.

Stops the test to notify SRO of failed component.

May dispatch operator to determine condition of valve locally.

If directed, closes39-10R to isolate the line to comply with Tech Specs.

SRO Acknowledges report of 39-08R failure to indicate full closed.

Recognize EC Loop 12 must now remain inoperable (3.1.3.b)

Recognize valve is a "Reactor NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Valves. These are also Primary Containment Isolation Valves, per the attachment table Note

9.

Tech Spec 3.2.7 and per specification b, in the event that any isolation valve becomes inoperable the system shall be considered operable provided at least one valve in each line having an inoperable valve is in the mode corresponding to the isolated condition.

Event 3 E R V I I I opens PO-3.0 Event 4 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS AS-IS During Emergency Power Reduction PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the lead evaluator activate malfunction using TRG 3 AD05 ERVI 11 INADVERTENTLY OPENS RR28 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS AS-IS Coolant System Isolation Valve.

Enter Tech Spec 3.2.7 specification b. A valve in the line must be closed to comply with b. If not closed, then specification c requires a normal orderly shutdown initiated within one hour.

Directs line isolated by closing 39-1 OR or initiates a normal orderly shutdown.

May direct EC removed from service per N1-OP-13 H.17.2 Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.4, since these valves are identified as PC Isolation Valves, in NIP-DES-04 note.

Tech Spec 3.3.4 requires that one valve in the line be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SRO Directs entry into SOP-I.4 IF average torus temperature approaches 1 1 OOF, THEN prior to reaching 1 10°F, directs a reactor NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS Electromatic Relief Valve ERV111 opens.

ERVI 1 I red pilot and red ERV1 11 accoustic monitor light are lit. Blue continuity light extinguishes. Generator MWe lowers as MHC regulating system responds to the drop in RPV pressure.

F2-4-1 MAIN STM LINE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE OPEN F1-4-8 STEAM LINE DETECTION SYS FLOW OFF NORM When lowering power with the Master Recirc Flow Controller, no change in core flow or reactor power occurs because the controller is failed %s-is. Power can be reduced by either taking control of the pump individual MA stations at F Panel or by inserting cram rods.

scram Directs emergency power reduction to approximately 85%

per SOP-I.I Declares ERV inoperable and enters TS 3.1 5. Specification a states that all six solenoid actuated pressure relief valves shall be operable. Specification b states that if a is not met be 110 psig or less within ten hours.

IF ERV fuses are pulled at JB Panel 11 and 12 on RB 237 then Tech Spec 3.2.9 should be referenced. The pressure relief function is lost for the effected valve. The spec is still met with the other five ERVs able to perform the pressure relief function.

If Torus water temperature exceeds 85OF, enters EOP-4 0 Directs Containment Spray locked out 0 Directs Torus Cooling placed in service EOP-1 Attachment 16.

NRC Scenario 2

-1 1-September 2006

$d I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ROLE PLAYS:

When dispatched to Aux Control Room as NAO, report ERVI 1 I acoustic monitoring indicates flow through ERVI 11.

As NAO in Aux Control Room if asked to report status of ERV AFTER FUSES ARE PULLED, report ERV is closed based on Acoustic Monitoring.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:

If dispatched and directed to pull ERV fuses on RB237 activate REMOTE using TRG 4:

ADO1 ERV 111 FUSES, Pull 2:OO minute time delay.

After time delay and remote is active, report fuses pulled for ERVI 11 in the reactor building.

rhese actions are from SOP-1.4 10 7 Monitors Reactor power, level, pressure and torus water temperature II When directed, performs emergency power reduction per SOP1. I c3 Reports failure of MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER to reduce flow Takes manual control of Recirc Pumps at F Panel to individually lower Recirc Flow, if directed.

Inserts cram rods. if directed.

BOP Recognize and report ERV open Enter and execute SOP-1.4 IF average torus temperature approaches 1 1 OOF, THEN prior to reaching 11 OOF, scrams the reactor, as directed by SRO Determines which ERV is open Informs SRO of required emergency power reduction Perform one or all of the following to attempt to close the stuck open ERV:

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS If directed to reset the Acoustic monitor channels in the Aux Control Room activate REMOTE using TRG 5:

AD07 ACOUSTIC MONITOR ALM RESET Report acoustic monitor reset, when appropriate.

When fuses are pulled the ERV closes. Fuses are located inside F Panel. Electrical Safety PPE is needed to enter panel and pull the fuses. F15 6A POS F30 6A NEG are the correct fuses for ERVI 11. Pulling these fuses will close the ERV, When fuses are pulled, the normal control room light indication is lost. When the ERV closes, generator MWe rises. The ERV position is confirmed to be closed from the Aux Control Room using Acoustic Monitoring.

NOTE:

These actions are directed and performed concurrently with above actions to close the ERV, per the SOP.

0 0

0 IF Depress ADS Timer Reset push buttons.

Cycle control switch for ERV 111.

Pull control power fuses in F Panel for ERVI 11 (Detail 1.4-1)

Dispatch an operator to JB Panel 11 and 12 on RB 237 to pull appropriate control power fuses at local cabinet (Detail 1.4-2).

ERV closes THEN reset the Accoustic Monitor.

IF ERV remains open THEN scram per SOP-I (Not expected to scram)

When ERV closes, report condition to SRO.

Dispatches operator to Aux Control Room Panel 1 S49 to perform the following:

Check for Red Hi-Alarm light lit.

Compare meter reading for alarming channel to other channels.

Select channel to audio monitor.

Monitor and maintain Torus water NRC Scenario 2

-1 3-September 2006

m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS temperature as follows:

Initiate Torus Cooling per (this procedure).

Record Torus water temperature every five minutes per N 1 -ST-V5 BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing pump switches in PTL 0 If directed, starts Torus Cooling per 6 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 285°F 0 Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 0 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 0 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

0 111;80-16 0 112; 80-36 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS Event 5 EC 11 Tube Leak PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction by activating TRG 6:

NRC Scenario 2 121;80-15 122; 80-35 7 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-40 112; 80-44 0 121;80-41 0 122; 80-45 11 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV 7 Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

I Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N1-OP-14.

Report status to SRO.

SRO Acknowledge report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.

September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak 111 (50%; ramp 5:OO minutes)

K1-1-2, MER COND VENT I 1 RAD M 0 N I TOR, a la rms.

EMERG COND RMON 11 1 and EMERG COND RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels rising.

NOTE: If ECI I is not isolated based on confirmed radiation levels and rising shell water level, then MER COND I 11-1 12 LEVEL HIGH-LOW, will alarm on high level in approximately five (5) minutes.

ROLE PLAYS:

If asked as Chemistry to perform sampling and/or EC Effluent Dose Assessment, acknowledge the request.

If informed of the EC tube leak, acknowledge the report.

IF asked as RP to evaluate dose rates on 340 el RB, acknowledge the report.

Direct actions of K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR.

Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).

Direct EC I 1 be isolated.

Assess EPIP-EPP-01, Attachment 1, EAL Matrix and determine the effluent monitoring threshold has NOT been reached by referencing Category 5.1.I, 5.1.2, and Table 3.

(May evaluate later, due to crew resource limitations).

Determine that with ECI 1 isolated (inoperable) Tech Spec 3.1.3.b applies.

With EC 12 already isolated, then Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e applies. A normal orderly shutdown must be initiated within one hour.

Request Chemistry to perform sampling AND EC Effluent Dose Assessment IF an EC tube leak is confirmed perform shutdown actions in accordance N1-OP-13 H.lO.O Brief crew on event impact.

Notifies Ops Management of required plant shutdown.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACiIUNS-PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S BOP Recognize/report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.

Recognize/report rising water level in ECI 1.

Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).

Acknowledge direction to perform actions of K1-1-2.

These actions are from K1-1-2 Confirm computer points E478 and E 480 in alarm Recognize/report EMERG COND RMON 11 1 and EMERG COND RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels rising.

Inform SRO to assess effluent dose.

With SRO concurrence, isolate ECI 1, as follows Close 39-07RI EC STM 0 Close 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 11 1 ISOLATION VALVE 112 Close 39-05, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 Close 39-11R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 11 1 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: WHEN the next event is initiated (Turbine Building Steam Leak), the crew is likely to direct a manual scram due to degraded plant conditions. IF the crew does not manually scram, the high turbine vibration conditions will result in procedure required trip of turbine and scram.

Event 6 Steam Leakage Into the Turbine Building and Turbine Vibration Rises PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction by activating TRG 7:

MS12 Steam line Rupture In TB Condenser Area (15% 4:OO minute ramp time)

TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing

5 and #6 (75% 8:OO minute ramp time).

Close 39-12R7 EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 112 Close 05-01 R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 11 I Close 05-1 I, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112 Reference N1-OP-13, H.lO.O IF an EC lube Leak is confirmed, THEN initiate normal shutdown in accordance with N1-OP-43C.

SRO Acknowledges reports and directs action for steam leak.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

rmSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS Steam leakage into Turbine Building causes LOCAL PANEL NO1 FIRE alarm to actuate.

MAIN FIRE PANEL 2-1 TURB BLDG 261 H1-4-8 AREA RADIATION MONITORS (E495 TB261 CP AREA) alarms.

L1-3-3 CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR (F329 TB NGAIR) alarms.

IF the reactor is no tripped and vibration continues to rise, then:

A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.

Computer points 6444 (BRG #5) and 6445 (BRG #6) in alarm ROLE PLAYS:

If asked as maintenance or WEC to investigate, acknowledge the request.

If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.

EVENT 7 FAILURE TO SCRAM PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

Verify TRG 8 actuates the following If warranted, acknowledge report vibration is rising; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.

Direct Turbine Building local area evacuation per EPP-5.

Direct a reactor scram and entry into SOP-1, Reactor Scram. Due to steam leak or turbine vibration.

Direct a turbine trip and entry into SOP-31.I, Turbine Trip, if vibration reaches 12 mils.

RO When directed, initiates a manual scram and implements SOP-1 Reactor Scram.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S malfunction AFTER 3:OO minute delay, when Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN:

MSOI STEAM LINE RUPTURE OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (8 3:OO) 2 1 :00 (2% with 1 :00 ramp, 3 minutes after MS to SD)

Other malfunctions activated NOW by Mode Switch:

Verify TRG 9, RD35B CRD Pump 12 trip after 1 :00 minute delay.

When the reactor is scrammed a// rods DO NOT fully insert due to hydraulic lock of the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). Power remains about 30%-45%, but is within Bypass Valve (BPV) capability (of 45%). Pressure is controlled by the BPVs, until the MSlVs eventually close due to high steam tunnel temperature from the steam leak.

Provides Scram Report Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 Mlbm/hr Perform SOP-I Scram Verification steps Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.

Report ALL RODS ARE NOT FULL IN If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.

Verify turbine and generator tripped.

Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from EOP-2):

Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers 0 ERVs Others (Not expected)

BOP Respond to Fire alarms and radiation alarms At Fire Panel, closes Turbine NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

IN> I KUL I UK HL I IUI\\S/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS SRO ACTIONS WITH FAILURE TO SCRAM Building Roof Vents.

If directed, evacuates the Turbine Building.

Recognize/report vibration is rising; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.

3 Acknowledge report control rods failed to insert (ATWS).

3 Enter EOP-2, RPV Control on power above 6% and scram required. THEN exit and go to EOP-3, Failure to Scram because all rods are not inserted to at least

04.

Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control when torus temp reaches 85°F These are EOP-2, RPV CONTROL actions Answer all rods in to at least 04 NO.

Answer will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO.

SRO These are EOP-3, FAILURE TO NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When RPV injection is terminated and prevented, RPV water level lowers and approaches -4 I inches. As level lowers, reactor power lowers and may drop below the APRM downscale setting of 6%.

SCRAM actions Direct Bypass ADS Direct prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.

'hese are EOP-3 Level Actions Direct verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg.

Direct MSlV jumpers installed per EOP-1, Attachment 2.

With reactor power >6% and RPV level above -41 inches, go to B.

Directs terminate and prevent injection using EOP-1, Attachment

24.

Directs level lowered to at least

-41 inches When level drops below -41 inches directs level band -84 to -41 inches.

IF torus temperature is above 1 IOOF, let level continue to drop until reactor power <6%

RPV level reaches -84 inches all ERVs remain closed with DWP below 3.5 psig.

Direct level band between -1 09 inches and the level it was lowered NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PERATO R ACT1 ON S CT-I.O Injecting Liquid poison after torus temperature reaches 1 IO OF is still required. This contributes to staying below HCTL.

to using Cond/FW and CRD.

Determine WAIT UNTIL 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank) 3 all rods inserted to 04 OR reactor will stay shutdown without boron.

Proceed to WAIT block L-11 and WAITS until 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).

THEN direct level restored to +53 inches to +95 inches.

These are EOP-3 Power Actions Directs Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Directs initiation of ARI.

Directs verify trip of RRPs.

Directs execution of EOP-3.1 Direct LP injection. (Expected to occur before torus temperature reaches 1 10°F).

Record LP tank level:

approximately 1460Gallons.

Direct verification RWCU isolates.

May answer is main condenser available YES but MSlVs are closed due to MSL high temperature. Must answer NO in step Q-13.

These are EOP-3 Pressure actions NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ECs are NOT available for pressure control due to component malfunctions.

CT-I.O SRO is expected to readjust RPVpressure band as often as needed to stay below HCTL.

These EOP-4 actions may have already been directed, if EOP-4 was entered due to earlier scenario events (ERV opening).

BOP Terminate and prevent injection level Direct pressure band below 1080 psig using ERVs. (800 to 1000 Psig)

IF torus temperature cannot be maintained below HCTL, THEN maintain RPV pressure below the limit. (OK to exceed 100OFlhr cooldown rate). (Step P-3 override) (CT)

SRO These EOP-4, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL actions Direct lockout of all containment spray pumps TORUS TEMP Direct torus cooling per EOP-1, 6, to maintain torus temp below 85°F.

Monitor HCTL (FIG M) and reduce reactor pressure band as necessary to stay in GOOD region.

When informed of Containment Spray Pump trip, directs an alternate loop to be placed in service per EOP-1 Attachment 16.

BOP NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S control actions per EOP-1 Attachment 24.

CT-2.0 Expected operator response is to close FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 11 and 12 to stop injection, until HPCl fuses are removed.

VALVE CONTROL stations are placed in MAN and dialed to zero so that they remain closed when the HPCl fuses are pulled.

HPCI fuses are pulled to establish manual injection using the Feedwater Pump discharge level control valves.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

WHEN directed to Pull HPCl Fuses, activate triggerTRG 25 irf fw24 (25) pull Nhen directed terminate and wevent injection using EOP-1, Utachment 24.

Perform one of the following:

Place FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 11 and FEED W ATE R I S OLAT I 0 N VALVE 12 to CLOSE.

Place FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and FEEDWATER PUMP 12 control switches in PTL.

Select MAN on FW 11 VALVE CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

Select MAN on FW 12 VALVE CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

Select MAN on FW 13 VALVE CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

Direct A 0 to pull FU-8 and FU-9 (HPCI fuses) in Panel IS34.

Verify closed FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE.

Verify FEEDWATER 11 BYPASS VALVE in MAN and at zero.

Verify FEEDWATER 12 BYPASS NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

n\\l STRU C T O R C T I o N SI PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS CT-3.0 CT-1.O When re-injecting per EOP-I Attachment 24, THROTTLE INJECTION, BOP injects as follows VALVE in MAN and at zero.

Inform SRO when level reaches target level (-41 inches corrected) as directed by SRO.

IF terminating and preventing injection with torus temperature above 1 IOOF, THEN inform SRO when power ~ 6 % RPV level reaches TAF (-84 inches).

When directed establish injection and maintain level between -109 inches and level it was lowered to using CondlFW.

Controls pressure in assigned bands, as directed by SRO to stay below HCTL BOP Perform one of the following:

o REOPEN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 1 I and FEE DWATE R I SOLATIO N VALVE 12 if closed to terminate injection.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

~-

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 8 CRD Pump 12 Trip CRD Pump 12 trips resulting in loss of a high pressure injection source and pressure source for control rod insertion. CRD Pump I I must be manually started either as an injection source or to provide drive pressure while implementing EOP-3. I, Alternate Control Rod Insertion.

When directed, RO enters M Panel to install -

RO RESTART FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and/or FEEDWATER PUMP 12 by placing its control switch in START if placed in PTL to terminate injection.

Adjust FW 11 VALVE CONTROL and/or FW 12 VALVE CONTROL by rotating knob to establish injection and maintain desired level band.

Monitor and report if 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).

Monitor and report if all rods inserted to 04.

When directed to restore level to

+53 inches to +95 inches using Cond/FW.

When loss of CRD pump 12 is recognized, start CRD pump 11.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EOP jumpers identified in EOP-3.

7 When directed prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.

fOP-I Attachment 4, Prevent Core Spray Injection Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1 NIA and 1 N1 B):

Jumper 17: 40-01, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS Jumper 18: 40-1 1, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV111 BYPASS Jumper 19: 40-06, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE1 1 BYPASS Jumper 24: 40-09, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS Jumper 25: 40-10, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS Jumper 26: 40-05, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE12 BYPASS Verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg.

If directed install MSlV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 2.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

9 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP ACTIONS FAILURE TO SCRAM Inject per LIQUID POISON INJECTION (OP-12 H.1.O) PO-8.0 System I 1 is started and injects boron to the core. If not already isolated, RWCU isolates.

EOP-1 Attachment 2, MSlV Lo-Lo Isolation Bypass Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

0 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1 NIA and 1 N1 B):

Jumper 1 : MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 11K19A Jumper 2: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 11 K20A Jumper 8: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 12K19A 0 Jumper 9: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 12K20A BOP When directed inject liquid poison.

Place keylock switch to SYS 11.

Confirm RED LIGHT ON and GREEN LIGHT OFF for pump started.

LIQUID POISON EXPL VALVE 11 CONTINUITY light OFF.

LIQUID POISON EXPL VALVE 12 CONTINUITY light OFF.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO actions for Alternate Control Rod Insertion, EOP-3.1.

Section 3 and 4 are implemented to manually drive control rods and by repeated manual scrams.

Verify LIQUID POISON HDR PR value is greater than reactor pressure.

Verify CU RETURN ISOLATION VALVE 1 (INSIDE) 33-01 closed.

Verify CU SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 11 (INSIDE) 33-02 closed Verify CU SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 12 (OUTSIDE) 33-04 closed.

Report boron injecting to SRO.

RO 3 Verify at least one CRD pump is running. If not previously performed, recognize CRD Pump 12 tripped and starts CRD Pump

11.

Reactor Mode Switch to REFUEL.

Both SECTION 3 and SECTION 4 require the following actions Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE at F Panel.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When scram channels are reset, CHI 1 and CHI2 white pilot solenoid group lights are on.

The SDV begins draining.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

WHEN the scram is reset, delete ALL RD33 malfunctions:

RD33A, RD33B, RD33C, RD33D, RD33E Install RPS SCRAM LOGIC RELAY BYPASS JUMPERS, by performing the following:

Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

Defeat RPS logic relays by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1 NIA and 1 N1 B):

Jumper 5: BYPASS RELAY 11 K7 TO RELAY 11 K51 B Jumper 6: BYPASS RELAY 11 K8 TO RELAY 11 K52B Jumper 12: BYPASS RELAY 12K7 TO RELAY llK51B Jumper 13: BYPASS RELAY 12K8 TO RELAY 12K52B Reset the scram by depressing Ch 11 and Ch 12 RESET buttons.

Bypass the RWM.

Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

c<

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When the SDV is drained and another manual scram is inserted, ALL RODS WILL FULLY INS E R T.

CT-4.0 of core (use LPRM indications).

MANUAL SCRAMS (Section 4)

Direct A 0 to verify open 44-167 (CRD-12), Charging Water Header Blocking valve (RB El 237 west hall).

WHEN.... SDV drained (following clear):

o F1-1-8, RPS CH 11 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH o F3-1-4, CONT ROD DRIVE SCRAM DUMP VOLUME WTR LVL HIGH o F4-1-1, RPS CH 12 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH AND....Either Reactor Pressure or CRD Charging Water Pressure

>450 psig.

THEN.... man ual ly scram by depressing the Ch 11 and Ch 12 scram buttons.

IF.... control rods move inward, THEN.... reset scram and repeat steps.

Provides a Scram report. Report all rods fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IF a different pump is started for torus cooling, trip THAT pump using the appropriate CTOI B,C or D malfunction CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When all rods are fully inserted, activate malfunction using TRG 1 1 :

CTOIA CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TRIP 111 Containment Spray Pump I I I trips resulting in a loss of torus cooling. An alternate pump should be started, since torus temperature is still significantly above 85 OF (EOP-4 condition).

Entering EOP-1 Attachment 16 and re-performing steps for another loop will correctly align the system in the torus cooling mode.

After all rods are fully inserted, exits EOP-3 and enter EOP-2 BOP Report Containment Spray Pump tripped Starts an alternate containment spray pump in torus cooling per EOP-1 Attachment 16 Realigns Loop BVs for selected Pump Closes Containment Spray IV to prevent spraying drywell Starts alternate Containment Spray Pump Reports torus cooling in service.

SRO If all rods in then:

Direct stopping LP injection.

Exit EOP-3 and Enter EOP-2 0 Direct restoring level to +53 inches to +95 inches using Cond/FW and CRD.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 ON S T E RM I NATION C RITE RIA Control Rods Inserted RPV water level being restored to normal band 53 to 95 inches.

EVENT 10 SRO SRO Classify event as SITE AREA EM E RGENCY per 2.2.2.)

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

' Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario 0 u tline Form ES-D-1 Event TY Pe*

R N (BOP)

I TS (RO SRO)

Event Description Raise RPV Pressure from 845 psig to 918 psig with EPR in service.

At about 900 psig RPV Pressure, place 2nd RWCU Pump in service IRM 11 INOP trip. Requires bypassing, consulting Tech Specs and resetting RPS Channel 11 trip.

Service Water Pump 11 trips resulting in rising RBCLC and TBCLC temperatures. Service Water Pump 12 is manually started.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 NM13A CW02A RM1 U RD02R3 03 1 RR54 EC02 EC08A EC08B RP05B RP28 HV03A HV03B FWO3A FWO3B I TS (SRO)

REACTOR BUILDING VENT RAD MONITOR fails inoperable.

Requires TS 3.6.2.j entry. Input into RB Emergency Ventilation System automatic initiation. Trip channel within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

C (RO)

I (BOP)

M (ALL)

~

Control Rod Drifts out. The rod is fully inserted and the HCU is valved out per Annunciator Response Procedure F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT.

RPV Narrow range water level transmitter failed upscale. RPV level slowly lowers requiring FW LCV placed in manual and level restored manually. N1-SOP-16.2 is entered.

Emergency Condenser Steam Leak into Reactor Building with Failure to Isolate. Requires a manual scram. More than one Reactor Building General Area temperature eventually exceeds 135"F, requiring an RPV Blowdown, later in the scenario.

10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal C(R0) 5 o f 8 RPS Fails to trip but manual initiation of ARI pushbutton results in complete rod insertion.

C (ALL)

C (BOP)

SRO RB Ventilation failure. Manual action is required to trip and isolate normal ventilation and start RBEVS, if Reactor Building radiation levels are above 5 mr/hr. If below this value operation of normal ventilation can continue per EOP-5.

Loss of Feedwater Pumps following control rod insertion. This complicates post blowdown level control. Injecting with Feedwater Booster Pumps or Core Spray is necessary to maintain RPV Water Level.

Classify Site Area Emergency 3.4.1 and 4.4.1

Facilitv: Nine Mile Point I Scenario No.: NRC-03 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)

1. Total malfunctions (5-8)

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

Events 3,4,6,7,9,10,11 Event 9 RPS failure Event I O RB Ventilation failure and Event 11 Loss of FW ACTUAL ATT RI B UTES 7

3

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 I

Event 6 Rod Drift Event 7 FWLC

4. Major transients (1 -2)

Event 8 EC Steam Leak with Isolation Failure actions (1 -2)

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive EOP-2 RPV and EOP-5 Sec Cont 1

2 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive EOP-3 Failure To Scram; EOP-8 RPV actions (0-2)

Blowdown

7. Critical tasks (2-3)

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CT-1.O Initiate scram before blowdown CT-2.0 Insert rods using ARI CT-3.0 Blowdown when 2 areas above 135 CT-4.0 Restore and maintain level above TAF with Alternate Injection Svstems 4

Op-Test No.: NRC 2 and 3 AND 4 and 5 events can be run simultaneously, to improve efficiency.

Total Malfunction Count:

Major not included in this count.

Abnormal Events Count:

Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are considered separately.

SRO TS Events Event 3 and 5 are SRO Tech Spec evaluation events.

10/23/2006 1 1 : I 0:02 AM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal 6 of 8

?

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 38 LOW POWER WITH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT EOP ENTRYAND RPV BLOWDOWN REQUIRED PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VALIDATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/19/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING 0 PE RAT1 ONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE

<72;%-

DATE /o/a,k&u c;

/

CON F I G U RAT1 0 N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level:

2% Power. RPV Pressure is 845 psig with Bypass valve open.

The scenario begins at about 2% reactor power, during plant startup. RPV pressure is 845 psig. The crew will continue the startup raising pressure to 91 8 psig and establishing pressure control on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR). As pressure is raised to about 900 psig, the second Reactor Water Cleanup Pump is started per normal operating procedures. IRM 11 failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip of RPS Channel 11. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.

Service Water Pump 11 trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service. Control Rod 30-31 will drift out. The rod is fully inserted and isolated. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. The startup can now continues by pulling control rods. Reactor Building radiation monitor 11 inop condition occurs. Tech Spec entry into 3.6.2.j is required because the monitor is part of RB Emergency Ventilation initiation instrumentation.

RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC) fails upscale. With the level transmitter failed high, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-16.1, Feedwater Failures. When level is stabilized the crew will maintain manual level control.

The major transient begins when an Emergency Condenser steam leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the leak will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed.

When the manual scram is initiated RPS Channel 12 fails to trip. The crew enters EOP-3 Failure To Scram and takes initial actions to mitigate the event. When the crew manually NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

'ihitiates ARI, all control r The crew transitions back to EOP-2 RPV Control. After the transition back into EOP-2, the operating Feedwater Pumps trip, complicating post scram level control. When Reactor Building general area temperatures exceed 135°F in more than one area, an RPV Blowdown using EOP-8 is required. Reactor Building Ventilation system malfunctions requires manual action to mitigate steam leak into the building which could lead to a release.

Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-18.1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-5, N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification:

SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, EC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment SAE 4.1.I Primary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB general area temperatures >135"F in two or more areas, N1-EOP-5 Termination Criteria:

RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF with all rods fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-226 or equivalent. Reactor Power 2% RPV Pressure 845 psig Initial IC006 was at 500 psig. Shifted RWCU to High Pressure PCV and raised pressure to 845 psig by raising MHC pressure setpoint. Pulled some control during the pressure increase to raise power, but probably didnt have to.

Currently, pulling rods is at RWM Group 15. This should allow the crew to increase pressure by only using MPR pressure set. Pulling control rods is not required to accomplish scenario objectives.

Ensure IRM 17 bypassed and half scram is reset.

Shift one IRM/APRM recorder to FAST in each RPS Channel B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scen3.bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. IRM 17 failed and is bypassed D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of N1-OP-43A. Section 1.O and E.2.0 are complete. E.3.0 is in progress and signed off complete including E.3.20. The next step is E.3.21, for starting the second RWCU pump at 900 psig. The 900 psig Drywell Inspection is NOT required.

2. Working copy of N1-OP-31 with sign-offs indicating step E.4.11 is in prog r e s.

E. Miscellaneous

1. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSlTES

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

II.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I:

shift.

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the 0

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 2%

0 Loadline = NA 0

RPV Pressure is 845 psig with a bypass valve partially open. MPR in control.

0 N1-OP-43A in progress at step E.3.21 0

Drywell Inspection at 900 psig is complete.

0 N1-OP-31 in Droaress at ster, E.4.11 0

IRM 17 is failed upscale and is bypassed. Tech Spec LCO is being complied with.

PART 111:

RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:

0 Raise RPV pressure to 900 psig and start the second RWCU Pump.

0 Raise RPV pressure to 918 psig and place EPR in service.

0 Continue startur, and comdete section E.3.0

~~~

~~

~

PART IV:

To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM)

Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened?

What we did?

Why? (Goals)

Other Options?

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

111.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O CT-2.0 CT-3.0 CT-4.0 Given an unisolable RWCU leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-2 RPV Control and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.

Given a condition requiring scram and failure of an RPS Channel to trip, the crew will manually initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) per N1-EOP-3 to shutdown the reactor.

Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.

Given a loss of Feedwater Pumps following a scram, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches using Alternate Injection Systems per EOP-2.

B. Performance Objectives:

PO-1.o PO-2.0 PO-3.0 PO-4.0 PO-5.0 Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will raise pressure to 91 8 psig per N 1 -0P-43A.

Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will place the second RWCU pump in service per normal operating procedures.

Given the plant during startup conditions, the crew will establish pressure control on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR).

Given the plant during startup conditions and an IRM failure, the crew will bypass the failed channel and reset the tripped RPS channel. The SRO enters Tech Specs.

Given the plant during startup conditions and a Service Water Pump trip, the crew will start the standby pump per station procedures.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

PO-6.0 PO-7.0 PO-8.0 PO-9.0 PO-10.0 PO-I 1.o PO-1 2.0 PO-1 3.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and an inop condition on Reactor Building Rad Monitor 11, the SRO will enter Tech Specs.

Given the plant during startup conditions and a drifting control rod, the crew will fully insert and valve out the affected HCU per ARP F3-2-6 and N1-OP-5.

Given a failed RPV level instrument resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per N1 -SOP-I 6.1 Feedwater Failures Given a RWCU leak and general area temperatures approaching 135OF, the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-5 and EOP-2.

Given a RWCU leak and general area temperatures in two areas

---cc exceeding 135"F, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per NI-EOP-8.

Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RB Vent monitor reading above 5 mr/hr, the crew will isolate RB Ventilation and start RBEVS per N1-EOP-5.

Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RE3 Vent monitor reading below 5 mr/hr, the crew will recognize that an isolation should have occurred. With readings below 5 mrlhr, operation of normal ventilation is allowed per N1 -EOP-5.

Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 Raise RPV Pressure From 845 psig to 918 psig and place EPR in service.

PO-1.o NOTE:

The SRO may direct the RWCU pump start prior to raising pressure to 900 psig. The procedure step states When the reactor pressure reaches 900 psig, verify the second cleanup pump in service..... This would allow the condition where both pumps are in service when pressure reaches 900 psig.

As MPR setpoint is raised Bypass Valves (BPVs) throttle closed then reopen as RPV pressure rises from 845 psig to the new MPR setpoint. As the MPR is adjusted Annunciator AI-4-6 TURBINE BY-PASS VALVES OPEN clears and alarms, as the BPV close when setpoint is raised and re-open as pressure rises to the new setpoint.

NRC Scenario 3 Crew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down panels, and tests annunciators.

SRO Conducts Shift Briefing Directs startup continued per NI-OP-43A E.3.21 Functions as Reactivity SRO.

May direct control rod withdrawal to raise power. (Not expected)

When RPV pressure is approaching 900 psig, directs the second RWCU Pump placed in service per N 1 -0P-3.

After Cleanup Pump 12 is in service, directs pressure raised to 918 psig.

RO Manually adjusts MPR setpoint by bumping MECHANICAL PRESSURE REG switch to RAISE Continue to raise RPV pressure to about 900 psig.

Allows BPV to regulate pressure at 900 psig while starting second RWCU Pump.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS Annunciator F3-1-1 APRM 15-18 may also intermittently alarm as some APRM downscale conditions clear and alarm.

Reactor coolant temperature also rises from 525°F (large E window display on K Panel).

The crew monitor heat-up rate.

As RPV pressure rises above 850 psig, Annunciator F1-4-7 (F4-4-2) RPS CH 1 1 (12)

REACTOR PRESS LOW clears.

EVENT 2 Place znd RWCU PUMP In Service.

PO-2.0 NOTE: At the Examiners discretion, EVENT 3 can be initiated while EVENT 2 is in progress, if desired.

RPV pressure is stabilized at 900 psig by throttling of BPVs. When pressure reaches 900 psig, the crew places the second RWCU Pump (Pump 12) in service per N1-OP-3 Section E. 7.0.

II If directed, commences pulling control rods to establish BPV position or power increase.

3op M o n i to r N 0 N - R E G EN E RAT I V E HX outlet temperature (F359) AND REGENERATIVE HX inlet temperature (F363) UNTIL system parameters stabilize AND ensure temperatures do not exceed 120°F.

IF NON-REGENERATIVE HX outlet temperature (F359) OR REGENERATIVE HX inlet temperature (F363) approach or exceed 12OoF, THEN lower Cleanup system flow using RMC-33-1 51, CLEANUP SYS FLOW.

Verify adequate thermal margin exists to core thermal power limits.

(Not a concern for this power I eve1 ).

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS R WCU System Flow is indicated on dual pen chart recorder P/FR-35-150. Flow is the RED PEN and reads out in 0-400 X IO3 Ibm/hr.

System Fldw in gpm can be determined using FC I69 and adjusting the thumbwheel to null the meter on the controller tape setting.

As system flow is lowered, CLEANUP SYSTEM PRESSURE PI-35-131A pressure rises. If flow is reduced too rapidly high pressure system isolation may occur at 130 psig.

NRC Scenario 3 Perform the following to start CLEANUP PUMP 12:

Verify closed 33-1 6, CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE.

Adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, using RMC-33-151 to establish cleanup system flow between 180 X I O3 and 220 X I

O3 I bm/hr (360-440 gpm).

Verify open 33-1 58, CLEANUP PUMP RECIRC VALVE 12.

Verify cleanup system pressure as indicated on PI-35-131A is being maintained 80 to 100 psig.

Start Cleanup Pump 12 Slowly jogs open 33-1 6, CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE while maintaining approximately 80 to 100 psig system pressure.

Maintain pump discharge pressure less than 1400 psig by opening 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151.

WHEN 33-36 CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE is fully open adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151 September 2006

~~

~

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in service the crew will continue raising RPV Pressure to 918 psig, if not previously done.

EVENT 3 IRM 11 INOP TRIP.

PO-4.0. This event can be initiated at any point up until 9 18 psis is reached, in the scenario as determined by the NRC Lead Examiner. It may be done simultaneously with the RWCU pump start or prior to the pump start.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 1 :

NM13A IRM 11 FAILURE-INOP NRC Scenario 3

-1 1-to maintain desired system flow 250 X I O 3 and 380 X I O 3 Ibm/hr (500 to 760 gpm).

Continue at 7.6 (of procedure)

Verify cleanup system computer point inputs to core thermal power calculations are in scan and updating. May contact STA or Reactor Engineer to verify points in scan.

Adjust thumbwheel on FC 169 to indicate current system flow rate in gpm.

Report CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in service.

SRO Acknowledges report Consults Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g and determines minimum September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PERATO R ACT1 0 NS IRM I I INOP TRIP is generated. RPS CHANNEL I I trips and four white scram pilot solenoid lights and one red backup scram light extinguish on f Panel. At E Console for IRM I I, the white DOWNSCALE/INOP light is lit.

IRM I I reading on chart is downscale.

The Rod Block Monitor panel on E Console blue SRM 11&12 IRM 11,12,13&14 APRM 11,12,13&14 lights are lit.

The following Annunciators actuate:

FI-I-IRPS CH I 1 REACTNEUTRON MONITOR f 1-2-1 RPS CH I 1 AUTO REACTOR TRIP F14-1 RPS CH I 1 REFUEL INST TRIP F2-3-6 IRM 11-14 F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK At backpanel, IRM 1 I Drawer white DOWNSCALE and INOP lights are lit and the meter is downscale.

number of channels are still operable for each trip system.

7 Directs IRM 11 bypassed 3 Directs RPS CH 11 reset I Notifies WEC 11 Notifies Ops management 7 Conducts Crew Brief/Update RO Reports alarms to SRO These actions are from F1-1-1 Confirms RPS Channel 11 tripped.

Confirms alarm using available indications.

Confirm other channels of neutron monitoring are normal.

Consult Tech Specs (Notifies SRO)

WHEN the cause of the alarm is corrected, reset RPS Channel 11.

These additional actions are from F I 1 Determine which sensor in RPS Channel 11 caused trip.

(Determines IRM 11 inop condition).

Confirms RPS Channel 12 sensors normal based on plant conditions.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO determines and directs IRM I I is to be bypassed per N1-OP-38 H. 1.0 SRM-IRM AUXILIARIES drawer is a separate drawer from the IRM channel drawers with status lights, located in same vicinity.

(Determines RPS 12 sensors normal).

Theses applicable actions are from F2-3-6 Confirm alarm on computer printout. (BI 93 is expected).

Observe E Console to determine condition: Observes DOWNSCALE OR INOP light is on. The UPSCALE lights are off.

IF instrument is malfunctioning, THEN refer to N1-OP-38B Consult Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g (Notifies SRO).

These actions are in OP-38B H.1.O for Bypassing IRM at E Console Confirm requirements of Tech Specs will be met after IRM is bypassed. (Action completed by SRO).

Place IRM BYPASS switch in BYPASS (IRM 11) position.

Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on panel E.

Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on IRM auxiliaries drawer (back panels).

Confirm computer printout IRM 11 BYPASS YES NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO determines and directs RPS Channel I 1 to be reset.

When the trip is reset, the RPS Channel 11 four white pilot lights and one red light illuminate and asso cia te d annunciators clear.

EVENT 4 Service Water Pump 11 trips PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 2:

CWO2A SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 1 I SERVICE WTR PUMP I I trips.

The following annunciators actuate:

H1-1-2 SERVICE WTR PUMP 11 TRIP OVERLOAD HI-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS/SERV W PUMP HDR PRESS HI-4-1 R. BUlLDlNG COOLING WTR PRESS-TEMP MAKEUP FLOW When Service Water Pump 12 is started, header pressures and system temperatures 7 Report IRM 11 bypassed to SRO These actions are required to reset RPS Channel 11 trip RO Depress REACTOR TRIP RESET pushbutton on E Console Observe RPS Channel 11 four white pilot lights illuminate Report RPS Channel 11 trip is reset.

SRO Acknowledges report Directs starting Service Water Pump 12 Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew BriefIUpdate BOP Reports alarms Reports Service Water Pump 11 tripped These actions are from H I 2 Confirm alarm on computer printout.

Start Service Water Pump 12.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS return to normal values.

EVENT 5 RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 3:

RMIU RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP L1-4-3 RB VENT RAD MONITOR OFF NORMAL alarms.

NRC Scenario 3 (Pump starts)

IF Service Water Pump 12 will NOT start, THEN enter N1-SOP-18.1. (NA; Pump 12 starts)

Place Service Water Pump 11 control switch to STOP. May be delayed until after the WEC is contacted.

Also refers to HI-4-2, but actions in either ARP are effective in mitigating the pump trip.

BOP Reports alarm.

Observes back panel reading of instrument.

Reports downscale indication to SRO.

Notifies RP.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Channel 12 can still automatically start RBEVS, if 5 mr/hr setpoint is reached.

EVENT 6 Control Rod Drifts Out PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 4:

RD02R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD FAILURE DRIFT OUT 0 WHEN rod is inserted and valved out, then delete this malfunction.

0 WHEN directed to reset drift alarm in Aux Control Room; activate REMOTE using TRG 5:

RD07 RESET ROD DRIFT ALARM Control Rod 30-31 drifts outward.

The following annunciator actuates:

F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT SRO 0 Acknowledges status reports Enters TS 3.6.2.j. Determines channel must be tripped within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or the action required in 3.6.2.a must be taken.

Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew Brief/Update SRO Acknowledges report Directs control rod inserted per ARP Notifies Reactor Engineering Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew BrieflUpdate These actions are from F3-2-6 RO Confirm rod is drifting by observing F Panel RPlS indication AND/OR the process computer. Identifies NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When drifting rod is selected and driven in, the rod will insert to notch 00.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

While isolating HCU, in order to simulate depressurizing the accumulator BEFORE contacting control room, activate malfunction using TRG 12:

RD03R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD ACCUM Failure Annunciator F3-2-5 alarms When HCU is isolated and the malfunction is deleted, the rod will remain at notch position 00 (full in).

ROLE PLAYS:

After isolating and depressurizing the HCU, THEN as operator dispatched report HCU is isolated, with cooling water maintained.

After activating REMOTE RD07, THEN as operator dispatched report rod drift alarm has been reset.

When the Rod Drift Alarm is reset in the Aux Control Room Annunciator F3-2-6 CONTROL rod 30-31 is drifting out.

If more than one rod is drifting, then manually scram and enter NI-SOP-I. (NA; only one rod drifting).

Selects drifting rod 30-31 and inserts to notch 00 using EMERGENCY ROD IN.

For OUTWARD Drifting rod:

Apply continuous insert signal using EMERGENCY ROD IN to maintain rod full in.

Valve out affected HCU 30-31 per N1-OP-5 H HCU Isolation.

(Dispatches Operator/Directs task to be performed in Reactor Building).

WHEN HCU is isolated, release EMERGENCY ROD IN switch.

WHEN rod drift condition is corrected, THEN depress control rod drift reset push button Aux Control Room Cab IS20.

Contact Reactor Engineering.

Initiate OD-7, Option 2 to update control rod position scan.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S ROD DRIFT clears.

EVENT 6 RPV Level Transmitter Failed HIGH PO-8.0 This event has the potential to lead to an automatic reactor scram. If this occurs, then activate TRG 7 to initiate the EC steam leak.

The scenario can proceed under these conditions.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 6:

RR54 RPV LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LOCAL FW CONTROL FAILS HIGH F2-3-3 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW alarms GEMAC level transmitter REACTOR LEVEL COL I 1 (ID59A) fails upscale. Dual pen RX VESSEL LEVEL - TOTAL FW FLOW recorder ID14 on F Panel, level indication pegs high. It will remain high until level column 12 is selected, at which point, the recorder input is from Column 12.

FWLC input from a failed water level instruments results in slowly lowering RPV SRO 11 Acknowledge status reports Direct entry into N1 -SOP-I 6.1 Feedwater Failures Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew Brief/Update NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS waterlevel, as FWP I 1 BYPASS VALVE closes in response to the sensed high level condition.

Yanlvay water level instruments Ll36-09 and 36-10 and GEMAC Col 12 level transmitter ID59B all start to slowly lower.

NOTE:

Annunciator response action will mitigate the transient. The crew will be expected to also enter SOP-I 6. I Feedwater Failures. These actions are also effective in mitigating the transient.

As FWP 11 valve is re-opened, actual RPV water level will begin to rise, as observed on other instruments.

These actions are from F2-3-3 BOP 0

0 0

Confirm vessel level by monitoring level indications.

Observe steam flow/ feed flow mismatch.

Take manual control of mis-operating system that are feeding or draining the vessel.

0 Depresses MAN pushbutton for FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.

Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.

Determine cause AND return level to normal. (Cause is failed COL 11 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S NOTE:

It is NOT required for the crew to transition to OP-16 to transfer the level column to 12. FW may remain in MAN for the remainder of the scenario.

NRC Scenario 3 instrument).

These actions are from SOP-16.1 BOP IF RPV level is lowering THEN Reduce reactor power per SOP-1.I as necessary to maintain level.

(Not expected to reduce power)

Problem with FWLC, FW Pumps OR FW heating? FWLC FCV Lockup? NO FWLC Malfunction? YES Using available FCVs take manual control of FWLC at MA stations placing controllers in Manual AND attempt to control RPV level.

o. Depresses MAN pushbutton for FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.

Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.

Can level be maintained > 53 inches? YES Restore level to 65 to 83 inches.

IF feed/ steam flow OR narrow range level instrument is malfunctioning THEN Shift Reactor Pressure/ level Columns or FW modes per N 1 -0P-I 6 Section F and return FWLC to auto.

September 2006

s, QI I~STRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS EVENT 8 EC Steam leak into Secondary PO-9.0, 10.0, 11.0, 12.0 Containment with Isolation Failure Console Operator: Refer to Attachment for reporting Reactor Building general area temperatures. Blowdown when evaluators are ready to allow the scenario to continue.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When RPV level is stabilized and directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 7:

EC02 STEAM LEAKAGE OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (4% 5 0 0 minute ramp)

EC08A EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE Ill 100%

EC08B EC LOOP I 1 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112 100%

Emergency Condenser steam leakage into the Secondary Containment begins. The following annunciators actuate:

K1-4-3 MER COOLING SYSTEM 11 STEAM LEAK AREA THIGH (with computer points C190, C189, C187) followed shortly by K1-4-5 MER COOLING SYSTEM 12 STEAM LEAK AREA THIGH (with computer points C 193 and C 194)

NRC Scenario 3 SRO Enters and executes EOP-5 due to

%rea temperature above any alarm setpoint (Detail T) when K1 4-3 alarms.

Activates the Emergency Plan, if required. (Expected later).

IF Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust radiation levels exceed 5 mr/hr THEN Verify RB Ventilation September 2006

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS HI-4-8 AREA RAD MONITORS (EOP)

Area Rad Monitors #I8 (RB 340) and #22 (RB 281) alarm and are above Detail R values.

Also, RB PNG monitor goes into ALERT alarm.

As steam leak rate rises, RPV pressure begins to lower. Turbine Bypass Valves are regulated closed. Pressure and power continue to lower as RPV pressure lowers. Eventually, as RCS coolant temperature begins to rapidly lower, a large power excursion may occur.

PANEL Fire panel Alarms actuate 2-1 1-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCA 7 FIRE 10 2-1 4-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCAL PANEL NO 7 TROUBLE 2-2 1-2 DIESEL FIRE PUMP #I RUNNING 2-2 2-2 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP #I STARTED Fire systems actuate in RB 318 areas.

NRC Scenario 3 isolation and EVS initiation.

7 IF Reactor Building Ventilation isolates AND Exhaust radiation level is below 5 mr/hr THEN Restart RB Ventilation. (SC-2) (Not Expected)

These actions are from T E M P E RAT U RElRAD I AT IO N Leg Directs operation of area unit coolers and RB Ventilation as required. (SC-3)

IF any area temperature or radiation level is above its alarm setpoint (Detail R, T), THEN Go to 27 (which is SC-5).....( SC-3)

(Expected because ARM # I 8 is exceeding and also Detail T values exceeded with K1-4-3 and C189 and C190)

IF a primary system is discharging into the reactor building AND the discharge cannot be isolated THEN Go to 28 (which is SC-9)

(Expected, because based on temperatures, radiation levels and fire alarms, crew is expected to determine the source as a primary system EC steam line)

Directs action to isolate EC 11 (all September 2006

L INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After about a minute LI-3-6 (4-6) EMERG VENT SYS CHANNEL 11 (12) RELAY OPERATE Reactor Building Supply and Exhaust Fans should trip and RB isolation dampers close.

Malfunction HV03A and B prevent the isolation from occurring.

When RPV pressure lowers below 850 psig, a turbine trip signal is generated from actuation of Vacuum Trip 1. The turbine trip results in HPCl actuation.

CT-1.O While WAITING in block SC-I land executing EOP-2 RPV Control, the SRO should determine that RPV Blowdown is anticipated and direct rapidly depressurizing the RPV using ECs and Bypass Valves per override step P-1 of EOP-2.

discharges into affected areas)

(SC-6)

Proceeds to WAIT block SC-7 and WAITS until 2 or more general areas are above Max Safe Values.

Also concurrently executes the actions in 28, since a primary system is discharging into the reactor building.

BEFORE any area temperature, radiation or water levels reaches a Max Safe Value (SC-9) (Detail S)..... Directs a manual scram and ENTER RPV CONTROL EOP-2, while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-IO) (Expected, because the unisolable leak is increasing Sec Containment temperatures and radiation levels).

Proceeds to WAIT block SC-11 and WAITS until 2 or more general areas are above Max Safe Values.

IF anticipating RPV Blowdown, directs use of EC and BPVs to rapidly depressurize. (EOP-2 P-I Override)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT I ON S/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When the second area (RB 298 West) is reported approximately 6 minutes after being dispatched......

Event 9 RPS failure SRO Entry into EOP-2 for scram, including the transition to EOP-3, due to RPS failure.

Control rods should be quickly inserted with manual ARI initiation and transition back to EOP-2 occurs.

Transition from EOP-2 to EOP-3 SRO Entry into EOP-3 NRC Scenario 3 1 WHEN notified that 2 or more general areas are above Max Safe Values....p roceeds to step SC-12 and directs entry to EOP-8, RPV Blowdown while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-12) (Expected) rhese actions are directed when FOP-2 is entered from EOP-5 step sc-I 0 Directs a manual scram from EOP-5 step SC-IO (CT)

Repeats back Scram Report and acknowledge RPS failure to trip.

Enters EOP-2 RPV Control All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2)

NO Will reactor stay shutdown without boron? (Step 3) NO Exits EOP-2 and Enter EOP-3 (Step 4)

These actions are directed when EOP-3 is entered from EOP-2 step 4 SRO IF all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without boron THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS All legs are implemented concurrently but priority may be given to POWER leg first.

CT-2.0 When A RI is manually initiated, control rods will fully insert. EOP-3 will be exited per override step 7 and EOP-2 is entered.

Transition from EOP-3 to EOP-2 NRC Scenario 3 1

1 expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. (Step 1) Expected after manual ARI initiation.

Directs Bypass ADS Directs Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 Attachment 4 (Install Core Spray Jumpers)

(Step2) rhese actions are from POWER

,EG Directs Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN. (Q-I) (Already done)

Directs verify ARI initiation. (Q-2)

Turbine Generator on-line? (Q-3)

NO (May direct based on timing)

Directs EOP-3.1. (Q-7) (May direct based on timing).

WHEN informed of all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without boron THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. From override step 1.

September 2006

~

~-

-~

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Entry into EOP-2 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

IF directed to pull HPCl fuses WAIT three minutes, active REMOTE using TRG IO:

FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU81 FU9 THEN report HPCl fuses are pulled.

When FWP trips, level control strategy should change, since level cannot be maintained above 53 inches.

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are:

Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (EOPI Att 5)

Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)

Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12)

Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13)

RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV (EOP-These actions are directed when EOP-2 is entered from EOP-3, after rod insertion Repeats back Scram Report and acknowledge.

Enters EOP-2 RPV Control All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2)

YES Directs entry into SOP-I (SCRAM)

IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Not expected)

Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):

Condenstate/FW CRD 0 Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)

Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks IF RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above 53 inches THEN directs level maintained above -84 inches TAF. Use Alternate Injection Systems if needed (Detail E) L-3 (CT)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSl PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS 1 Attachment 25)

RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)

Anticipating blowdown on more than one area exceeding Max Safe temperature values is expected.

BOP Actions on EC Steam Leak NRC Scenario 3 0

0 IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated THEN rapidly depressurize the RPV using EC and turbine bypass valves. OK to exceed 1 OO°F/hr cooldown rate. (P-I override)

(Expected to direct use of EC and BPVs to depressurize).

Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)

EC ERV Others (Not expected)

BOP Report annunciators.

Confirm alarm on computer printout.

Enter N1-EOP-5. (Notifies SRO of entry cond it ion).

Verify system isolation.

Attempts to manually close EC Steam IVs.

Reports failure of EC isolation September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Actions when reactor scrammed BOP Actions when EOP-3 is entered valves to close.

7 Dispatches operator RB to take local area temperatures.

7 Reports local area temperature to the SRO.

3op 7 Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.

7 Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.

3op 7 When directed, Bypass ADS using keylock switches at F Panel 1 When directed, manually initiates ARI at F Panel J When directed, Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 (Install Core Spray Jumpers) at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside N Panel)

I 7 40-01 INSIDE CORE SPRAY DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS

I8 40-1 1 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE I V l l l BYPASS

I 9 40-06 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 11 BYPASS

24 40-09 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS

25 40-10 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 9 RPS Failure When scram is initiated RPS Channel 1 I trips but Channel 12 does not. The crew enters transitions to EOP-3. When directed to verify A RI in the POWER leg, the RO actuates manual ARI at F Panel. The scram air header dept-essurizes after the A R1 valves actuate. All control rods fully insert.

CT-2.0 NRC Scenario 3 n #26 40-05 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 12 BYPASS o Throttle Core Spray Inboard IVs (40-01, 40-09,40-IO and 40-1 1 ) as necessary.

10 When directed, initiates a manual scram by pacing Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN or using Manual Scram pushbuttons and implements SOP-I Reactor Scram.

Provides Scram Report, including failure of RPS Channel 12 to trip.

When directed to verify ARI depresses MANUAL ARI pushbutton F Panel.

Reports ARI successful When all rods are full in, provides a znd scram report.

Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 Mlbm/hr Perform SOP-I Scram Verification steps Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.

If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS WHEN ready to provide temperature data to require the RPV Blowdown, reports can be made from those dispatched to monitor temperatures. Reactor Building temperatures continue to rise and when RB 298 West is reported to be 141 OF (more than one general area temperature is reported to be above 135 OF)....EOP is entered.

SRO Actions for EOP-8 NRC Scenario 3 Observe power decreasing Place IRMs on Range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.

Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from EOP-2):

Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers ERVs Others (Not expected)

SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected Are all rods inserted to at least September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 10 RBEVS Fail To Start PO-1 1.o, 12.0 Malfunctions become effective HV03A RBEVS CH 1 I FAIL TO AUTO INITIATE HV03B RBEVS CH 12 FAIL TO AUTO I N IT I AT E When RB Vent Radiation levels exceed 5 mrihr on the operable vent monitor, RB Normal position 04? YES (Step 3)

Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step I O )

Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)

Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet (Step? 3)

Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)

OK to exceed 100°F/hr.

Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig.

(Step 16)

Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.

BOP Determine failure of RB Ventilation to trip and isolate by observing supply and exhaust fans still operating with containment isolation dampers still open.

Report failure to SRO.

Stops the following fans NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Ventilation should trip and both RBEVS trains should start. NOTE: EOP-5 (step SC-2) allows RB Ventilation restarted, if isolated and radiation levels are below 5 rnr/hr.

BOP Actions to Start RBEVS OP-I 0 H.1.O 202-01 RB Supply Fan 11 202-02 RB Supply Fan 12 202-05 RB Exhaust Fan 11 202-06 RB Exhaust fan 12 Close Containment isolation dampers 202-15 RB Supply Isolation Valve 11 202-16 RB Supply Isolation Valve 12 202-32 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve 11 202-31 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve 12 Verify open 202-36 EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV.

Verify closed the following:

0 202-47 EM VENTILATION TIE BV 0 202-74 EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV 0 202-75 EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV Place RBEVS 11 (12) in service:

Place 202-37 (38) to OPEN 0 Verify open 202-37 (38)

Start 202-53 (33) EVS FAN 11 (12)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 11 Loss of Feedwater Pumps CT-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

After rods are inserted by ARI and before RPV Blowdown is directed, activate malfunction using TRG 8:

FW03A FWP TRIP 11 FW03B FWP TRIP 12 CT-4.0 After feedpumps trip, inventory will be lost during the RPV Blowdown. FWBP or Core Spray Pumps can be used to mainfain RPV water level above TA F (-84 inches).

Injecting using FWP 11 or 12 FCV required pulling HPCl fuses to establish control with valves. If using 13 FCV, these fuses are not required to be removed.

BOP Actions for Blowdown NRC Scenario 3 Verify open 202-34 (35)

Confirm proper operation of 202-50 (51) Inlet FCV by lights and flow indication.

Report RBEVS manually started.

BOP 7

Report loss of feedwater pumps Use injection sources as directed If directed, executes EOP-1 5 or 26 to control level using FWBP and FW Level Control Valves 1 1,I2 or 13.

Injects, using systems directed by SRO to restore and maintain level above -84 inches.

BOP If directed, initiate ECs (CT)

When directed open 3 ERVs (CT)

Monitor RPV pressure.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS If Torus water temperature reaches 85 OF All legs are executed concurrently, but major actions are taken to control the rising torus water temperature, after EOP entry.

BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 6 SRO Enters EOP-4 on high torus water temperature, if required Directs Containment Spray lock out Executes Torus Temperature Leg Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att 16) (TT-2)

BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing switches in PTL.

If directed, starts Torus Cooling per 6 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 2 85°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-45 1 12 or 121 ; 80-40 and 80-45 0 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 0 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 13 Verify closed Cont Spray NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

0 111; 80-16 112; 80-36 0 121;80-15 0 122; 80-35 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-40 0 112; 80-44 0 121;80-41 0 122; 80-45 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N 1 -0P-14.

Report status to SRO.

September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TERM I NATION C RI T E RIA RPV Blowdown complete. RPV water level restored and maintained above TAF. All rods fully inserted.

EVENT 12 SRO Classification PO-I 3.0 SRO Classify the event as SAE 3.4.1 and 4.4.1 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

Form ES-D-1

~

M (ALL)

-~

Malf. No.

Mechanical Pressure Regulator Failure Low. The MPR fail low resulting in rapid pressure and power rise. An automatic reactor scram occurs NM19C C

(BOP)

C (ALL)

RRO6A RR07A Overrides Electric Fault on Emergency AC Powerboard PB102. Diesel Generator 102 automatically starts, but does not close in on the bus due to the fault. DG102 must be manually shutdown due to loss of power to the diesel auxiliaries. Downstream 600 VAC Powerboard PBI 6B must be re-energized from an alternate source.

Motor Driven Feedwater Pump 12 trips resulting in a loss of high pressure feed. Additional high pressure injection sources (CRD and Liquid Poison) must be started as directed from EOP.

A small LOCA (approximately 14%) occurs which reduces vessel inventory and level lowers to top of active fuel. Containment Spray system operation is required due to elevated Drywell pressure.

Core Spray Pump 112 trips and Core Spray Pump 122 suction strainer becomes plugged. Injection can be restored using Feedwater Booster Pumps, after depressurizing the RPV.

SRO Classifv event as ALERT 3.1. I TC06 TC08 ED07 FW03B RR29 CSOl B CSOSD Event Description Event R

Return Dower to 100% bv raising Recirc Flow.

Switch CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F per NI-OP-5, Section F.4.1

~

APRM 13 fails upscale resulting in half scram and Tech Spec entry.

Bypassing channel and resetting half scram is required.

Recirc Pump 11 seal leakage requires pump removal from service.

Pump suction valves fails to fully close resulting in partial loop isolation. Tech Spec 3.1.7.e is entered for 4 loop operation.

Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 4 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners:

Operators Initial Conditions IC20 Reduce Power to 95% with RCS Flow.

Turnover: Feedwater Pump 12 is out of service for repairs. Red Clearance applied. HPCl LCO in effect.

Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11

( N)ormal, Electrical Pressure Regulator Failure Oscillations. The EPR is removed from service and the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) is placed in service (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 10/2 1/2006 6:39:44 AM 7 o f 8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)

1. Total malfunctions (5-8)

Events 3.4.5,7,8,9.10 ACTUAL 6

ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunction Count:

Major not included in this count.

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

Event 7,8,9,10

3. Abnormal events (2-4)

Event 4,5

4. Major transients (1-2)

Event 6

5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive actions (1 -2)

EOP-2 RPV and EOP-4 Pri Cont

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

Alternate Level Control of EOP-2

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 10/23/2006 1 :I 9:40 PM NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal 4

2 1

considered separately.

SRO TS Events 2

Abnormal Events Count:

Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are Event 3 and 4 1

8 o f 8 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CT-1.O Initiate Containment Spray CT-2.0 Restore and maintain RPV level above -109 inches 2

NMP STMULATOR-SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. I!

No. of Pages: 38 LOCA WITH DEGRADED CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 10/13/06 VAL I DATED GEN SUPERVISO OPS TRAINING OPE RAT1 ONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE G. Spears, S. Evanchik, G Rabalais DATE 10/17/06 C72TAF DATE &;kd3,AA CON FI G U RAT1 ON CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length:

90 minutes Crew assumes the shift with the plant at 95% power with 11 FWP out of service for repairs.

The crew is directed to restore reactor power to 100% following performance of N1 -ST-W 1, 7 Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test. Following the power reduction the crew is C

directed to swap CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F. After this, 13 APRM will fail upscale, producing a half scram that may be reset. Crew will bypass the failed APRM, reset the half-scram and review Technical Specifications for the failed instrument.

After the Technical Specifications review, a seal leak develops on 11 Reactor Recirculation Pump. Crew will remove that pump from service, attempt to isolate it, and review Technical Specifications.

Reactor pressure will then begin to oscillate. Crew will recognize a failing EPR, place the MPR in control, move the EPR to its high stop, and review Technical Specifications for operation without a backup regulator. When the plant is stable, the MPR will fail, causing a reactor scram. Crew enters EOP-2 on low RPV water level.

After scram actions are complete, Powerboard 102 will develop a fault; EDG 102 will start, but its output breaker will not close. The Crew crossties PB 16B and PB 16A and restore loads.

Shortly afterwards, 12 FWP will trip, leaving only CRD pumps and Liquid Poison pumps for high-pressure injection.

A medium break LOCA begins to develop inside Primary Containment. Crew enters EOP-4 on high drywell pressure. When Core Spray pumps start, one of the operable pumps will trip.

Recognizing its inability to maintain level above TAF with high-pressure injection, the crew aligns alternate injection sources, and enters EOP-8 for blowdown.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

~

One Core Spray Pump is available, but its injection capability is limited by suction strainer clogging. The Condensate System remains available for injection using the Feedwater Booster Pumps through the Feed Pump level control valves, after pressure is reduced by performing an RPV Blowdown. Crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

Major Procedures:

N1-EOP-2, 4, and 8 EAL Classification:

Alert EAL 3.1.I Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown completed, RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising and Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent. Reduce Power to 95%. FWP 11 INOP.

CRD Stabilizing Valves A and B in service.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. Feedwater Pump FWP 11 with red clearance applied to control switch.

2. Feedwater Blocking Valve Closed for FWP 11 and red clearance applied.

D. Support Documentation I. Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, (Page 1, Attachment 1 to GAP-OPS-05) to support performance of power restoration following performance of N1 -ST-w1.

2. N1-OP-43B F.2 through F.6 signed off and performing step 2.7

a. Setup C875 instantaneous MWth in window

b. Depress LPRM Dnsc bypass pushbutton on E panel.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red Clearance for FWP I 1 and blocking valve.

2. Protected Equipment Signs placed on the following with FWP 11 inoperable:

13 Condensate Pump 13 FW Booster Pump 0 12FWP PB12(R122)

Diesel Generator 103 Offsite Breaker R40

3. EVENT TRI GG ERS/COM POSITES

a. See bat file n06scen4,bat NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

II.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT:

U N I

D DATE:

PART I:

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)

PART II:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA)

Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)

RO Log (RO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (RO)

(SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor Power = 95%

Loadline = >lOOo/~

FWP 11 is out of service.

0 Raise reactor power to 100% in accordance with RMR and NI-OP-43B, following performance of N1-ST-W1, Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test by Drevious shift.

0 N1-OP-43B in progress to restore power to loo%, with rod exercising completed.

PART I I I:

RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:

Return Dower to 100%

0 Swap Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.

PART IV:

To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SMICRS)

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I I Scenario ID What Happened?

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What we did?

Why? (Goals)

Other 0 p t ion s?

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

Ill.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O CT-2.0 Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300°F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW NI-EOP-4.

Given degraded RPV injection sources the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches IAW N1 -EOP-2, such that Severe Accident Procedure (SAP) entry is not required.

B. Performance 0 bjectives:

PO-I.O Given the plant at less than rated power the crew will raise power to rated, per N1-OP-43B and the RMR provided.

Given the plant at power, the crew will transfer CRD stabilizing valves in accordance with N1-OP-5.

Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the crew will bypass the instrument and reset the tripped RPS channel in accordance with Nl-ARP-F2 (F2-1-6) and N1-OP-38C.

Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g).

Given the plant at power with a failure of Reactor Recirculation Pump mechanical seals, the crew will remove the pump from service and isolate the loop in accordance with N1-SOP-1.2.

PO-2.0 PO-3.0 PO-4.0 PO-5.0 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PO-6.0 PO-7.0 PO-8.0 PO-9.0 Given the plant at power with 4 loop operation, the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.1.7).

Given the plant at power with a failure of automatic pressure control system (EPR), the crew will place the MPR in service in accordance with N 1 -ARP-A2 (A2-4-4) and N 1 -SOP-31.2.

Given the plant at power with an automatic reactor scram, the crew will implement scram action and enter EOPs in accordance with N1 -SOP-I, EOP-2 and EOP-4.

Given the plant at power with a loss of PB102 the crew will shutdown the affected diesel and reenergize PB16B in accordance with N 1 -ARP-A4 (A4-1-6).

PO-I 0.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing. Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel Walkdown Event 1 Power Restoration to 100%

PO-I.o NOTE: Reactivity briefing, procedure review and RMR review should occur prior to scenario start, in secure briefing room.

3rew J Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

Conducts reactivity brief for power restoration, if not previously performed.

Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, if not previously performed.

Directs RO to restore power to 100% using recirculation flow in accordance with the RMR and NI-OP-43B.

Provides Reactivity SRO monitoring Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains copy RMR form Begins raising Master Recirculation Flow Controller while monitoring APRM and Total Recirculation Flow indications NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 2 CRD Stabilizing Valve Swap PO-2.0 Role Play: As Operator, when requested, report:

BV-44-175 is OPEN BV-44-184 is OPEN After Stabilizing Valve Transfer Switch selected to E and F and requested by Control Room, report:

BV-44-176 is CLOSED NRC Scenario 4 3 Reports to SRO when power restoration is complete.

BOP Monitors individual RRP for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors feed water controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 75)

SRO 0

Direct BOP to swap CRD Stabilizing Valves from A-B to E-F per N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1 BOP Acknowledges direction from SRO.

Performs N 1 -0P-5, Section F.4.1, Switching Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.

Directs NAO to perform valve lineups for transfer.

Places Stabilizing Solenoid Valves October 2006

P&NT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S BV-44-183 is CLOSED Role Play: When requested to confirm exhaust flow report: EXHAUST FLOW 6.0 GPM Event 3 APRM 13 Failure PO-3.0 and PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION When stabilizing valve operation is completed, insert malfunction by activating TRG 1 :

NM19C APRM CHANNEL 13 FAIL UPSCALE APRM 13 Fails Upscale The following annunciators alarm F2-1-6 APRM 11-14 Fl-1-1 RPS CH I I REACT NEUTRON MO NIT0 R F1-2-1 RPS CH 11 REACTOR AUTO TRIP F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report from SRO. Advise that you will provide requested assistance.

The APRM will not be repaired during the scenario.

NOTE: Technical Specification requirements from Tables 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g are satisfied NRC Scenario 4 Transfer Switch to E and F position on Panel F I Directs NAO to confirm stabilizing exhaust line flow between 5.8 and 6.5 gpm.

RO J Recognize/report RPS Channel 11 trip 3 Reports APRM 13 Upscale SRO:

PO-3 Acknowledges report from RO Directs RO/BOP to follow ARPs for failed APRM, Half-SCRAM and ROD BLOCK Contacts WEWManagement and informs them of failed instrument.

Requests assistance in correcting problem.

October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S with only one APRM failed.

PO-4.0 NRC Scenario 4

-1 1-Reviews Technical Specifications for impact of failed instrument.

0 TS 3.6.2.a requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to cause a SCRAM on High Flux 0 TS 3.6.2.g requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to initiate a ROD BLOCK on High Flux Determines that APRM 13 may be bypassed Directs RO to bypass APRM 13 and reset RPS Channel 11 trip.

BOP Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains ARP F2-1-6 and executes 0 Verifies alarm computer points B183 (ROD BLOCK) and DO52 (UPSCALE HlHl FLUX)

Observes LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries Drawer (Panel G) and determines that APRM 13 has an upscale condition If required, bypass APRM per N 1 -0P-38C.

October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 30""

When APRM 13 is bypassed F2-1-6, F3-4-4 and Fl-1-1 should all clear.

The LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries drawer will indicate the HlHl condition until the APRM is bypassed then the BYPASS indicating light will also be illuminated.

NRC Scenario 4 Obtaindreviews ARP F1-1-1 Confirm RPS Channel 11 tripped Confirms other channel readings are normal/

Obtains/reviews ARP F1-2-1 Determines that failed APRM caused trip When cause is corrected (APRM is bypassed), reset RPS Channel 11 Obtains/reviews ARP F3-4-4 Confirms alarm by observing computer point C067 RWM ROD BLOCK Determines caused by failed APRM When directed to verify APRM 13 bypassed, observes APRM 13 bypass light on Panel "G" (LPRM-APRM AUXILIARIES DRAWER)

RO Completes RO actions for ARP F2-1-6 Determines that APRM 13 has UPSCALE/HI-HI condition Monitors other APRM channels to determine that power is October 2006

I NSTRUCTORCTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 NS Following the bypassing of APRM 13 and the reset of the half-scram, all annunciators will be clear.

Bypass APRM Reset RPS Channel 11 Trip NRC Scenario 4 stablehnchanged Verifies proper power to flow ratio on 5-LOOP Operating Curve Bypasses APRM 1 3 per N 1 -0P-38C Places APRM BYPASS joystick on Panel E to APRM 13 position Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on E Panel.

Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on LPRM-APRM auxiliaries drawer (G Panel).

Confirm computer printout APRM BYPASS YES.

After APRM bypassed reset RPS Channel 11 trip Verifies Fl-1-1 clear

~1 Depress SCRAM RESET pushbutton on E Verifies F1-2-1 clear and resets ann u nciato rs Report APRM 13 bypassed and ARP actions completed to SRO October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 RRP I 1 Failure of Both Seals PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by Lead Evaluator or after actions for failed APRM are completed insert malfunctions by activating TRG 2:

RRO6A, RRP 11 Inner HP Seal 75% with 1O:OO minute ramp time RR07A, RRP I 1 Outer LP Seal 25% with 1O:OO minute ramp time ure will rem High pressure seal pres, in essentially unchanged at approximately system pressure at about 1040 psig. Low pressure seal pressure will gradually rise from initial value of about 510 psig. ARP F2-1-1 requires if seal pressure reaches 625 psig, SOP1.2 is to be entered. Initial indications are that only a single seal has failed. Drywell conditions will begin to deteriorate and increased drywell humidity and in-leakage to the DWEDT will be indicated. When Drywell parameters are impacted, the failure is considered catastrophicJJ in SOP-I. 2 and the NRC Scenario 4 BOP Recogtizedreports annunciator F2-1-1 SRO Acknowledges report from BOP Directs execution of ARP Directs entry into SOP-1.2 BOP Reviews/executes ARP F2-1-1 Enters SOP-1.2 for seal failure Confirms alarm computer point A072 RRP 11 SEAL LEAK DET FL Monitors DWEDT and DWFDT level recorders Contacts Engineering for evaluation.

Monitors drywell pressure and temperature Monitors and compares RRP October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ -

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS pump must be tripped and isolated.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

If necessary and directed by the Lead Evaluator, malfunction RR07A severity level can be raised to about 30% to lower seal pressure.

Role Play: As WECIMgmt. when contacted regarding the seal leakage inform the SRO that you will provide what assistance is required.

Seal Pressure indications Determines that HP Seal has failed based on rising pressure of LP Seal Determines that LP Seal failure is occurring due to LP Seal pressure changes in Drywell parameters.

2 When Drywell pressure begins to rise, notifies SRO.

7 Acknowledge report from BOP 7 Inform the WEC/Mgmt. of the leaking RRP seals 7 Determine that the pump should be isolated Review Technical Specifications for impact of seal leakage and removal of pump from service Tech Spec 3.2.5 identifies RCS leakage be limited to e2 GPM/day increase for identified leakage.

This will apply until the RRP is isolated.

t~ Tech Spec 3.1.7.e requires that power be maintained below 90.5%

until the isolated loop has valve motor breakers locked open and RRP Motor circuit breaker removed May direct RRP 11 removed from NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INTTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO may direct the pump removed from service per operating procedures. The most likely sequence is that the pump will remain in service and monitored until conditions inside the Drywell are affected. When Drywell pressure rises and the crew determines that both seals are failed, the pump is tripped and isolated per SOP-I. 2.

NRC Scenario 4 service, per OP.

When informed of rising Drywell pressure, directkoncur with tripping pump per SOP-1.2.

Direct BOP that discharge and suction valves SHOULD NOT be reopened 2 - 3 seconds after closing.

Provide reactivity management oversight for removing the pump from service.

Evaluates EAL 2.1 for RPV Water level, due to changes in containment leakage.

BOP If directed to shutdown the pump, prior to determination that a catastrophic failure has occurred:

Obtainheview copy of N1-OP-I for shutting down and isolating 11 RRP Remove 11 RRP from service Verify 11 RRP M/A station balanced Place 11 RRP M/A control selector switch to MANUAL Reduce speed of pump (RRP Flow) to between 6 - 8 x 1 O6 Ibm/hr Close 11 RRP discharge valve by holding switch in CLOSE position October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RATOR ACT1 0 NS CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

This action is performed no matter which method is used to remove pump from service. When BOP begins closing 11 RRP Suction Valve, ensure that overrides on triggers 16-1 9 activated. This will insert overrides:

OVR-5S61 D13715 POS A OFF (SWITCH)

OVR-5S61 D1380 POS C OFF (SWITCH)

OVR-5DS235L03450 Green light OFF OVR-5DS236L03451 Red light OFF AND MANUALLY change and activate seal leak rate malfunctions to new values RROGA set to 10% with 1:30 min ramp RR07A set to 10% with 1:30 min ramp This will simulate the I I RRP Suction MOV breaker tripping after valve 90% closed. Leak will reduce but not stop.

If tripping RRP per SOP-I.2 Time valve stroke with wall clock, watch or stop watch. Closure time is 2 minutes.

Trip 11 RRP MG Set Isolate 11 RRP 0

0 0

BOP Close 11 RRP Suction Valve by holding switch in CLOSE position Time valve stroke with wall clock, watch or stop watch.

Closure time is 2 minutes.

Recognize/report when suction valve indication is lost.

When DWP rises, trip RRP per SOP-I.2 Place REACTOR RP MOTOR 11 MG SET control switch to STOP.

Close REACTOR PUMP 11 BYPASS VALVE Simultaneously close RRP 1 I NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report from SRO. If requested to determine the problem with 11 RRP Suction Valve, report the breaker has tripped on overload and cannot be reset.

The seal leak will have reduced significantly.

Seal pressures will not lower due to partially open Suction Valve.

ROLE PLAY:

suction and discharge valves Reports loss of red and green light indication for REACTOR R PUMP 11 SUCTION.

RO Monitor total recirculation flow and APRM power levels while 11 RRP being shutdown Monitor 4-Loop Power Operating Curve and verify allowable region 0 Verify power less than 90.5% after 11 RRP is removed from service If directed, reduces power SRO Acknowledge report from BOP Contact WEC/Mgmt and advise of problem with 11 RRP Suction Valve.

Directs that troubleshooting be done due to pump seal leak.

Direct that BOP monitor RRP 11 pressures and drywell leakage and report trends.

Verify and directs power reduction if power not less than 90.5% and that operating point within limits on NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INS I KUC; I VK HC; I IVNW PLANT RESPONSE 0 P E RAT0 R ACT IONS If contacted as Reactor Engineer, report thermal limits are within specifications.

Event 5 EPR Regulator Oscillations PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When actions to isolate 11 RRP have been completed or as directed by Lead Evaluator insert malfunction by activating TRG 3:

TC06 EPR Failure - Oscillates RPV pressure to rise approximately 12 PSlG and power to rise 2-3%. Pressure will peak and level off when MPR is in control then begin to lower again. RO will observe control valve position oscillations as well.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION As WEC/Mgmt. Acknowledge report of failed EPR. Advise SRO that you will provide requested assistance.

(The EPR will not be repaired.)

NRC Scenario 4 4-LOOp Power Operating Curve Notify WEC/Mgmt. that 11 RRP has been shutdown but not isolated.

May contact Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits.

RO 7 Recognize/Report Annunciator A2-4-4, TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESSURE REGULATOR IN CONTROL SRO Acknowledge report by RO Direct execution of ARP A2-4-4 Direct entry into SOP-31.2 for oscillating EPR Notify WEC/Mgmt. of failed EPR October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RATOR ACT1 0 NS Note: This step may be performed by either operator or concurrently. The required controls are located on the desk section of Panel E.

As MPR setpoint is lowered, pressure will steady out, as the MPR takes control.

Pressure is likely to be lower by several psig.

Raises RPV pressure by raising MPR setpoint to return pressure to pre-transient value.

If power is above 90%, there are no thermal limit restrictions with one pressure regulator inoperable.

NRC Scenario 4 BOP Monitor suppressed range pressure record e r/i nd ications (Panel F) and turbine control indications (Panel AI/BI )

These act,ans are in SOP-31.2 EPR in control? YES Pressure oscillating? YES Lower MPR setpoint until MPR is in control Raise EPR Setpoint to 101 0 psig Verify alarm A2 4-4 MPR IN CONTROL Confirm and report RPV pressure steady on MPR.

Does EPR stroke go to zero? YES Pressure under control? YES Restore pressure to pre-transient value. Adjust MPR setpoint Refer to N1-OP-31 section H, operation with one Regulator I nope ra ble.

Exits SOP-31.2 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As Reactor Engineering inform SRO that MCPR limits are satisfied. As WEC/Mgmt acknowledge report of EPR malfunction and present operational status.

Event 6 MPR Fails Low causes automatic Reactor Scram PO-8.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by Lead Evaluator insert malfunction by activating TRG 4:

TC08 MPR Fails Low This failure mode is the loss of pressure signal to MPR. RPV pressure rapidly rises as the MPR closes turbine CVs. Bypass valves have a delayed open due to MPR failure and EPR setpoint ( I 0 10 PSIG) and the resulting pressure rise will cause a reactor scram and SRO Acknowledge report from operator Review Technical Specifications for limitations imposed by operating without backup pressure regulator Directed by TS 3.1.7.c into COLR for MCPR limitations Contacts Reactor Engineering to have RE determine current MCPR based on power level. Advises WEC/Mgmt of failed EPR and plant status.

RO Recognize/report reactor SCRAM Place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Verify reactor SCRAM NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

~

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 ONS ERV actuation.

WHEN Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN, the following events are triggered by time delay, on TRG 5, 6 and 7, respectively:

ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PB102 in 2:30 min FW03B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% in 6:30 min NRC Scenario 4 0

Confirm FW LVL SP SETDN INlT light ON, if level below 52 inches Provide SCRAM report:

Mode switch position RPV pressure (valuehrend)

RPV level (valuehrend), below 53 inches (EOP-2 entry)

Reactor power, APRMs downscale.

Control rod position, as full in.

Acknowledges SCRAM report Enters EOP-2 on low RPV water) level (below 53 inches or high pressure (above 1080 psig).

Direct RO to execute SOP-1 Direct BOP to restore and maintain water level (53 inches to 95 inches) using condensate, feed and CRD Verifies no ERV cycling Direct BOP/RO to maintain pressure (800-1 000 PSIG) using ECs or Turbine Bypass Valves RO Acknowledge SRO direction October 2006

INS I KUC I OK AC I IONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS Execute SOP-I actions Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 x I O 6 Ibm/hr Confirm all rods in Place IRM range switches in Range 9 0 Insert all IRM/SRM detectors Verify Main Turbine and Generator tripped BOP Acknowledge SRO direction Execute SOP-I actions for RPV level control Confirm RPV level recovering Verify 12 FWP pump running Place 13 FWP flow control valve in MAN and dial to 0.

Disengage 13 FWP Give 29-10 (FWP 13 Discharge BV) a CLOSE signal.

Verify 11 and 12 FWP controllers in MAN and dialed to

0.

Reset HPCl at E Panel.

Place 12 FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO and set to 65-70 inches.

If level reaches 85 inches and rising Verify FWPs are OFF NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2:30 min after scram, initial scram and EOP actions should be complete and the plant stabilized. Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG5:

ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PB102 at 2:30 min The following loads will be lost and not re-energized when PB 102 trips:

I1 I and 112 Core Spray Pumps and Core Spray Topping Pumps I I I and 112 Containment Spray and Containment Spray Raw Water Pumps The following significant loads will be lost but Secure CRD pumps, if required.

0 Maximize RWCU reject flow Close FW IVs, if required.

0 Close MSIVs, if required.

Establish RWCU reject flow to condenser 0 Open CLEANUP SELECTOR CONDENSER WASTE to COND.

0 Open reject flow valve using controller RMC-33-165C.

Using Bypass Valve Opening Jack operate Turbine BV as required to maintain pressure in directed band.

Report actions complete to SRO.

RO Recognize/report loss of PB102 Reports EDG 102 started but did not close in on powerboard Recognize fault on PB102 SRO NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S will be re-powered when PB 16B is re-energized:

EDG102 Auxiliaries, RBCLC Pump 13, CRD Pump 11, RPS-UPS 162A/B, SBClGIA/B, ESW Pump 11, MG167 Role Play: As WEC and acknowledge report from SRO. Report that you will have the problem with PB102 investigated. After 10 minutes report that there is a fault on PB102.

Acknowledge report from RO Directs execution of ARP A4-1-6, POWER BD 102 BUS VOLTAGE LOW Notify WEC/Mgmt of PB102 trip RO Acknowledges direction from SRO Executes ARP A4-1-6 Confirm alarm on computer (F138, D199)

Determine that PB102 cannot be reenergized Place normal supply R1012 in pull-to-lock Place EDG control switch in EMERGENCY STOP Verify 12 CRD Pump in service Verify RBCLC pressure 240 PSlG Reset 86-16 (H panel)

Verify OPEN R1043 Make plant announcement that Power Board 16B will be re-energized Close PB16 A-B tie breaker NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

R1042 Contacts WEC to prepare a clearance for R1012 to prevent auto-start of EDGI 02 Informs SRO that actions for ARP are complete TRG 6:

FWO3B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min, following scram.

Next malfunction automatically triggers on Role Play: As WEClMgmt and acknowledge report of 12 FWP trip. Inform SRO that you will dispatch personnel to investigate the problem.

(12 FWP will not be returned to service.)

After I O minutes report that 12 FWP tripped on electrical overload.

When FWP trips, level control strategy should change, since level cannot be maintained above 53 inches.

BOP Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG 7:

RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% at 6:30 min, following scram.

Drywell pressure/temperature begins to rise.

RPVpressure begins to lower, RPV water level begins to lower.

NRC Scenario 4 1 Recognizeheport trip of 12 FWP 7 Report no Feed Pumps available LI If required start CRD Pump 12 for level control.

SRO Acknowledge report from BOP Recognize only CRD/Liquid Poison pumps available for high pressure RPV makeup Evaluate RPV IeveVtrend Notify WEC/Mgmt of problem with 12 FWP. Direct WEC to dispatch operatodmaintenance to investigate.

October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Drywell pressure exceeds 2.0 PSlG Annunciator K2-4-3 alarms RPV Level begins lowering Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig Core Spray Pump 122 starts and stays running. Core Spray pump 1 12 starts but immediately trips. Core Spray Topping Pump 122 also starts. Pumps 1 11 and 121 cannot start because of the loss of PB102.

RO Recognize/report annunciator K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure Hi-Low Confirm alarm computer point Report drywell pressure/temperature rising SRO Acknowledge report from RO Direct execution of ARP K2-4-3 RO/BOP Acknowledge direction from SRO Monitor primary containment parameters Monitor RPV level/pressure BOP Recogn ize/report lowering RPV level Start CRD pumps (if not running)

Recognize/report drywell pressure above3.5 psig. (EOP-4 and EOP-2 Entry Conditions).

Recognize/report that Core Spray Pump 112 is not running (tripped).

Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump are the only available Core Spray Pumps.

Report RPV level below 53 inches and lowering.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO may direct alternate injection sources be lined up (e.g., Fire Water, Liquid Poison pumps to Test Tank, etc.)

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are:

Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (EOPI Att 5)

Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)

Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12)

Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) 0 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV NRC Scenario 4 SRO Acknowledge reports from operators Enter EOP-4 and re-enter EOP-2 on High Drywell Pressure. Re-enter EOP-2 on RPV level Direct Containment Spray Pumps locked out (placed in pu I I-bloc k) 0 Directs monitoring of Torus pressure (for reaching 13 psig)

Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):

Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4) 0 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks (If using for level control)

IF RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above 53 inches THEN directs level maintained above -84 inches TAF.

Use Alternate Injection Systems if needed (Detail E) L-3 0 May direct RPV injection from October 2006

I MSTRU CTO R ACT1 0 N S/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (EOP-1 Attachment 25) o RPV Level Control through 1 I and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)

Anticipating blowdown on more than one area exceeding Max Safe temperature values is expected.

LP tank per EOP-1 Attachment

13.

IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated THEN rapidly depressurize the RPV using EC and turbine bypass valves. OK to exceed 10O0F/hr cooldown rate. (P-I override)

Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5) u EC (Expected)

ERV (Not Expected)

Others (Not expected)

RO 7 Acknowledge direction from SRO Place all Containment Spray Pumps in pull-to-lock Informs SRO when Torus Pressure reaches 13 psig Reports Drywell parameters for verifying Containment Spray Initiation Limit NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I-CTOR ACTIONS1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As level lowers, Drywell and Torus pressure rise. Torus pressure reaches 13 psig requiring Drywell Sprays while level is sill lowering but still above -84 inches. The crew is expected to be initiating Drywell Sprays, while level continues to lower toward TAF.

NRC Scenario 4 SRO These actions are from EOP-4 When notified of Torus pressure reaching 13 psig, continues to execute PCP leg Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit (Fig K)? YES Direct all recirculation pumps verified tripped 13 Direct all drywell cooling fans be trip ped Direct RO to initiate Containment Sprays per EOP-1 Attachment 17 Direct RO secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 PSlG RO:

Acknowledge direction from SRO Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped Observes GREEN RRPMG breaker lights or places RRPMG Control switches to TRIP then neutral Verifies all drywell cooling fans tripped Places DW Cooling Fan control switches to TRIP then neutral October 2006

I N T C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CT-1.O After Drywell Spray is initiated, Drywell and Torus pressure lower. Pressure is not expected to drop below 3.5 psig until after level is being recovered above -84 inches.

As level continues to drop, the SRO determines that level cannot be maintained above -84 inches and proceeds to alternate level control leg at EOP-2 step L-4 EOP-2 Step L-7 Preferred Injection Systems are:

Condenstate/FW (Cant inject due to pressure) 0 CRD (Can inject) 0 Core Spray (One Pump, Cant inject due to pressure)

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are:

Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (EOPI Att 5)

Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)

NRC Scenario 4 7 Initiates Containment Sprays Start Containment Spray pump 122 Start Containment Spray pump 121 Monitor Drywell pressure Report containment spray initiated to SRO Monitors drywell pressure and reports when reduced below 3.5 psig.

SRO Determines RPV water level cannot be maintained above -84 inches.

Directs ADS bypassed.

Directs ECs placed in service.

Maximize injection using Preferred Injection Systems Directs CRD maximized Are 2 or more subsystems lined UP? NO (L-8)

Start lining up Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E)

Directs EOP-1 Attachment 25 to lineup injection from 13 FW October 2006

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) o Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13)

RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 25)

RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)

Available sources (FW and Core Spray) will restore level above TAF. Blowdown should not be delayed.

Blowdown is not required to be initiated before level reaches -109 inches. It's ok to open ERV's even if below -109 inches.

SRO Actions for EOP-8 FCV.

May also direct EOP-1 6 to lineup injection through 11 and 12 FW FCV. (Requires pulling HPCl fuses).

3 WAITS until level drops to -84 inches. (L-I 0) 3 Is any subsystem lined up with a pump running? YES CS 122 pump Before level drops to -109, enter EOP-8, RPV Blowdown and continue here.

SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected Are all rods inserted to at least position 04? YES (Step 3)

Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step IO)

Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)

Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet (Step1 3)

Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)

OK to exceed 10O0F/hr.

0 Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 NS CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

WHEN 3 ERVs are opened, insert malfunction by activating TRG 8:

CS05D, CORE SPRAY PMP 122 SUCT CLOGGING, 100% 0~30 SEC RAMP Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump 122 amps will fluctuate. When RPV pressure drops below 365 psig and injection valves open, no flow is observed from Loop 12.

If the pumps are allowed to run for an extended period of time, an automatic pump trip occurs.

rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig.

(Step 16)

Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.

Return to EOP-2 for maximizing injection.

Acknowledge reports for Core Spray status.

May direct tripping Core Spray 122 due to cavitation.

BOP cl Monitors Core Spray operation for injection.

Reports fluctuating pump amps for Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump 122.

Reports no flow with injection valves open.

If directed, trips pump.

If pumps automatically trip, report conditions to SRO.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

-INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 ON S BOP actions for level restoration, using Feedwater Booster Pumps When 13 FWP BV is opened and the controller is operated, 13 FWP Flow will rise. RPV water level will begin to recover, once injection is established.

Using f WBP injection to the RPV while an Recirc pipe break exists in the Drywell, will result in lowering Hotwell level and rising Torus le vel.

NRC Scenario 4 BOP If directed, performs EOP-1 5 for lining up 13 FW FCV.

When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Place LVL SETPOINT SETDOWN to OVERRIDE at F Panel.

Verify open at least one FEE DW ATE R I SOLATl ON VALVES 11 and 12 Verify open FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE Select manual on 13 FWP VALVE CONTROL MA Turn FCV (knurled knob) clockwise to open valve.

Position as necessary to control flow.

Reports water level rising.

BOP If directed, performs EOP-1 6 for lining up 11 and 12 FW FCV.

When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Verify open at least one FEE DW ATE R I SO LA TI 0 N VALVES 11 and 12 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

If dispatched to pull HPCl fuses trigger remote by activating TRG 12:

FW24 HPCl Fuses, Pull THEN report fuses removed.

Pump flows will rise when FCVs are opened.

CT-2.0 IF NEEDED CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

If contacted to line up Fire water to feedwater header per EOP-1 Attachment 19, trigger remote by activating TRG I O :

FP04, loo%, I O minute delay After 10 minutes, report Firewater is lined UP-NOTE: Use of fire water is not expected, because other injection sources, such as feedwater injection through FWP pump level NRC Scenario 4 Verify open both FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and 12 BLOCKING VALVES.

Select manual on 11 and 12 FWP VALVE CONTROL MA Turn FCV (knurled knob) fully counter-clockwise to close valves.

Dispatch operator to remove HPCl fuses FU-8 and FU-9.

Position as 11 and 12 FCVs necessary to control flow, while maintaining each below 1.5 E6 Ibm/hr.

Inject with Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

Reports water level rising RO:

Acknowledge direction from SRO Contacts WEC/NAO and directs lineup of Fire Water to Feed system October 2006

II_~ --

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS control valves is still available.

When RPV water level is rising, SRO establishes level band above TAF. Level strategy changes to returning level to 53 to 95 inches.

RPV level rises and is expected to be returned to the normal Drywell pressure drops below 3.5 psig RPV water level continues to rise and is restored above -84 inches.

TERMINATING CUE RPV Blowdown completed NRC Scenario 4 jR0 1 When level is rising, Go to EOP-2 step L-I.

1 Directs verification of necessary isolations and auto actions. (L-I) 7 Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches, using Condensate/FW and CRD. (L-3) 3op 7 Restores level to directed band, using Condensate/FW and CRD.

3Q II Reports.:hen Drywell Pressure drops below 3.5 psig II Secures Containment Spray Places control switches for Containment Spray Pumps 121/122 in pull-to-lock Reports Containment Sprays secu red October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0

Event SRO Classification RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig SRO:

Classify the event as an ALERT, EAL 3.1.1 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

z V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events Unit 2 Loss of Steam Seals March 2006 B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

ML070820573

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