ML050540149

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Corrected Page 7 to License DPR-28 and Page 97 to Technical Specifications for Vermont Yankee
ML050540149
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/2005
From: Richard Ennis
NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1
To: Kansler M
Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
Download: ML050540149 (2)


Text

c. A verification or coding system for emergency messages between Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. and the state police headquarters of the respective states and the Commonwealth.

14.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. shall furnish advance notification to MDPH, or to another Commonwealth agency designated by MDPH, of the time, method and proposed route through the Commonwealth of any shipments of nuclear fuel and wastes to and from the Vermont Yankee facility which will utilize railways or roadways in the Commonwealth.

F. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the SER dated January 13, 1978, and supplemental SERS, dated 9112179, 2/20/80, 4/15/80, 7/3/80, 10/24/80, 11/10/81, 1/13/83, 7/24/84, 3/25186, 12/1/86, 12/8/89, 11/29/90, 8/30195, 3123/97, 6/9197, 8/12/97, 3/6/98, 3/31/98, 9/2/98, and 2/24/99, subject to the following provisions:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

G. Security Plan Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans', which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: 'Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 0," submitted by letter dated October 18, 2004.

The Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan are Appendices to the Security Plan.

Amendment No. 107, 168, 206, 208 Revised by letter dated Oebaber 28, 2004 Revised by letter dated February 18, 2005

VYNPS BASES:

3.4 & 4.4 REACTOR STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM A. Normal Operation The design objective of the Reactor Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) is to provide the capability of bringing the reactor from full power to a cold, xenon-free shutdown assuming that none of the withdrawn control rods can be inserted. To meet this objective, the Standby Liquid Control System is designed to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of 800 ppm of natural boron in the reactor core in less than 138 minutes. An 800 ppm natural boron concentration in the reactor core is required to bring the reactor from full power to a subcritical condition. An additional margin (25t of boron) is added for possible imperfect mixing of the chemical solution in the reactor water. A minimum quantity of 3850 gallons of solution having a 10.1t natural sodium pentaborate concentration is required to meet this shutdown requirement.

The time requirement (138 minutes) for insertion of the boron solution was selected to override the rate of reactivity insertion due to cooldown of the reactor following the xenon poison peak. For a required minimum pumping rate of 35 gallons per minute, the maximum net storage volume of the boron solution is established as 4830 gallons.

In addition to its original design basis, the Standby Liquid Control System also satisfies the requirements of 10CFR50.62(c)(4) on anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) by using enriched boron.-

The ATWS rule adds hot shutdown and neutron absorber (i.e., boron-10) injection rate requirements that exceed the original Standby Liquid Control System design basis. However, changes to the Standby Liquid Control System as a result of the ATWS rule have not invalidated the original design basis.

With the reactor mode switch in the "Run" or "Startup/Hot Standby" position, shutdown capability is required.

With the mode switch in "Shutdown," control rods are not able to be withdrawn since a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate controls to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical. With the mode switch in "Refuel,"

only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies. Determination of adequate shutdown margin by Specification 3.3.A ensures that the reactor will not become critical.

Therefore, the Standby Liquid Control System is not required to be operable when.only a single control rod can be withdrawn.

Pump operability testing (by recirculating demineralized water to the test tank)in accordance with Specification 4.6.E is adequate to detect if failures have occurred. Flow, relief valve, circuitry, and trigger assembly testing at the prescribed intervals assures a high reliability of system operation capability. The maximum SLCS pump discharge pressure during the limiting ATWS event is 1320 psig. This value is based on a peak reactor vessel lower plenum pressure of 1290 psia that occurs during the limiting ATWS event at the time of SLCS initiation, i.e., 120 seconds into the event. There is adequate margin to prevent

-the SLCS relief valve from lifting. With a nominal SLCS relief valve setpoint of 1400 psig, there is a margin of 80 psi between the peak SLCS pump discharge pressure and the relief valve nominal setpoint.

Recirculation of the borated solution is done during each operating cycle to ensure one suction line from the boron tank is clear. In addition, at least once during each operating cycle, one of the standby liquid control loops will be initiated to verify that a flow path from a pump to the reactor vessel is available by pumping demineralized water into the reactor vessel.

Revised by letter dated February 18, 2005 Amendment No. a2, --14, a-2, Al&, BV* ea 38; 219 97