ML042330367
| ML042330367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/2004 |
| From: | Olshan L NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2 |
| To: | Ross-Lee M NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2 |
| Olshan L N, NRR/DLPM, 415-1419 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML042330367 (14) | |
Text
August 20, 2004 CANCELED MEMORANDUM TO: Mary Jane Ross-Lee, Acting Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management FROM:
Leonard N. Olshan, Project Manager, Section 1 /RA MRoss-Lee for/
Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management, NRR
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DATE & TIME:
Wednesday, August 25, 2004 8:00 a.m. - 3:45 p.m.
LOCATION:
Oconee Nuclear Station - World of Energy Downstairs Meeting Room 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina PURPOSE:
To present the NRC staff and licensee perspective on the licensees June 7, 2002, risk-informed amendment request (ADAMS ML021710770) that would revise the Oconee licensing basis for tornado mitigation.
Supplemental information was provided by the licensee on January 29, 2003 (ADAMS ML030380340) and June 18, 2003 (ADAMS ML031820616).
CATEGORY 1:
- This is a Category 1 Meeting. The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have one or more opportunities to communicate with the NRC after the business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned.
MEETING CONTACTS:
L. N. Olshan, NRR Robert E. Martin, NRR 301-415-1419 301-415-1439 lno@nrc.gov rem@nrc.gov
- Commission's Policy Statement on Enhancing Public Participation in NRC Meetings,"
(67 FR 36920), May 28, 2002 CANCELED
M. Ross-Lee CANCELED PARTICIPANTS:
Participants from the NRC include members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region II (RII)
NRC DUKE ENERGY E. Hackett J. Yerokun R. Gambrell J. Hannon C. Doutt S. Newman D. Harrison L. Olshan G. Davenport M. Ross-Lee C. Liang D. Brewer J. Tatum L. Kanipe Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Attachments: 1. Agenda
- 2. NRC Evaluation of Dukes Risk-Informed Request to Revise the Oconee Licensing Basis for Tornado Mitigation cc w/att: See next page CANCELED
ML042330367 NRC-001 OFFICE PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA (A)
PDII-1/SC (A)
NAME MRoss-Lee for LOlshan CHawes for DClarke MRoss-Lee DATE 8/20/04 8/20/04 8/20/04
CANCELED MEETING WITH DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION TO DISCUSS TORNADO MITIGATION JULY 21, 2004 Measure for Success for the Meeting
Achieve a common understanding with respect to the current licensing basis for tornado mitigation at Oconee
Achieve a common understanding on how to move forward on this specific licensing action AGENDA 8:00 a.m. - 8:15 a.m.
Opening remarks 8:15 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
Discuss the items in Attachment 2 11:30 a.m.- 12:30 p.m.
Lunch 12:30 p.m.- 3:30 p.m.
Continue discussion of the items in Attachment 2 3:30 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.
Closing remarks 3:45 p.m.
Adjourn CANCELED
EVALUATION OF DUKES RISK-INFORMED REQUEST TO REVISE THE OCONEE LICENSING BASIS FOR TORNADO MITIGATION I.
Current Licensing-Basis Criteria Vulnerabilities Recognized and Accepted by the NRC II.
Proposed Changes Other Embedded/Implied Changes III.
Evaluation Findings Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) as Assured Means of Steam Generator (SG) Makeup Elimination of the High Pressure Injection/Spent Fuel Pool (HPI/SFP) Primary Makeup Flow Path Other Related Issues IV.
Conclusions I.
Current Licensing-Basis Criteria for Tornado Mitigation
Essential Structures, Systems and Components and Electric Emergency Power Sources, Have Been Designed, Fabricated, and Erected to Performance Standards That Will Enable the Facility to Withstand, Without Loss of Capability to Protect the Public, the Additional Forces That Might Be Imposed by Natural Phenomena. The Designs Are Based upon the Most Severe of the Natural Phenomena Recorded for the Vicinity of the Site, with Appropriate Margin to Account for Uncertainties in the Historical Data.
Safety Will Not Be Impaired by the Sharing of Systems Between the Oconee Units.
A Tornado Is Not Allowed to Cause a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, and the Ability to Safely Shutdown All Three Units Is Provided.
Failure of Structures and Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads Will Not Compromise the Ability to Safely Shutdown All Three Units.
Others Established by the Post-Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements (e.g. Reliability, Long-term Cooling)
I.
Current Licensing-Basis Criteria for Tornado Mitigation - Continued Vulnerabilities Recognized and Accepted by the NRC
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System of the Affected Unit
Keowee Hydro Units
Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities, Including:
Upper Surge Tank and Piping in the East and West Penetration Rooms for EFW of the Affected Unit.
Piping in the East and West Penetration Rooms for the Station Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) System.
A Small Portion of Piping in the West Penetration Room for the SSF ASW System.
II.
Proposed Risk-Informed Changes
Credit the SSF ASW System as the Assured Means of Providing SG Makeup (Harden West Penetration and Cask Decontamination Room Walls)
Remove Credit from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
Suction Flow Path for HPI Primary Makeup Other Embedded/Implied Changes
Long-term Cooling Is Eliminated as a Consideration for Tornado Mitigation by Deleting the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Discussion of the 37-day SG Makeup Capability Provided by the Station ASW System
The Capability of Station ASW to Provide SG Makeup for All Three Units as Currently Described in the UFSAR Is Relaxed to Only Credit Makeup Capability for a Single Unit Other Embedded/Implied Changes - Continued
Provides for Implicit Acceptance of New Tornado Vulnerabilities That Have Been Identified (Cumulative Increase in Core Damage Frequency on the Order of 8E(-6)/RY)
Collective Tornado Effects That Fail the Borated Water Storage Tank and the West Penetration Room of a Particular Unit Coupled with the Failure of Electrical Connections Between the Standby and Main Feeder Buses for Multiple Units; +2.8E(-6)
Potential Loss of the 4160 Vac Standby Bus Feeders; +2.5E(-6)
Turbine Driven EFW Pump Cooling for All Units; +1E(-6) Atmospheric Dump Valves (Required for Use of Station ASW); +9E(-7)
Limitations Associated with Use of the HPI/SFP Flow Path; +6E(-7)
Vulnerabilities Associated with the Battery Chargers of Multiple Units; +6E(-7)
Qualification of Pressurizer Safety Valves to Function as Assumed SG Tube Differential Temperature Considerations Unit 3 North Control Room Wall Cask Decontamination Room Walls III.
Evaluation Findings SSF ASW as the Assured Means of SG Makeup
Risk Assessment Did Not Compare the Existing Licensing-Basis Capability to the Proposed Capability 3E(-5) 1E(-5)
Decreasing Increasing CDF CDF
Technical Specification (TS) Requirements for the SSF That are Commensurate with the Proposed Change Need to be Addressed (e.g., Existing 45-day AOT, SSF Diesel Fuel Oil Inventory)
Defense-In-Depth Must be Addressed Redundancy, Independence, and Diversity Defenses Against Potential Common-cause Failures Intent of the Licensing-Basis Criteria (e.g., Reliability, Long-term Cooling Considerations)
III.
Evaluation Findings - Continued Elimination of the HPD/SFP Flow Path for RCS Makeup
The Capability of the SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup System (29 gpm per Unit) to Provide Sufficient Primary Makeup for Tornado Mitigation Must be Adequately Demonstrated Worst-case Primary Makeup Requirements Must be Adequately Addressed (e.g., TS Limitations on Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate; Shrinkage Considerations Based on Limiting Cooldown Scenarios; Inventory Losses; Margin for Uncertainties)
SSF Considerations Relative to TS Requirements, Long-term Cooling, Reliability, and Mission Time Must be Adequately Addressed Other Related Issues
Tornado Impact on Unprotected Main Stream Lines
Tornado Impact on Unprotected Piping in the East and West Penetration Rooms
Consequences of Tornado Mitigation Strategy on SG Tube Stresses
Use and Qualification of the Pressurizer Safety Valves
The Existing Primary Makeup Capability as Described in the UFSAR Was Not Reviewed by the NRC; How it Satisfies the Licensing-Basis Criteria Must be Demonstrated IV.
CONCLUSIONS
The Proposed Changes to Credit the SSF as the Assured Means of SG Makeup and to Credit the SSF for Primary Makeup Following a Tornado Need Additional Justification
Consistency with the Existing Licensing Basis Relative to the Capability to Safely Shut Down All Three Units Following a Tornado Needs Additional Explanation
McGuire Nuclear Station Catawba Nuclear Station Oconee Nuclear Station cc:
Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Mail Code - PB05E P.O. Box 1244 Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1244 County Manager of Mecklenburg County 720 East Fourth Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Mr. C. Jeffrey Thomas, Manager Regulatory Compliance McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Anne Cottingham, Esquire Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20005 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Mr. Peter R. Harden, IV, Vice President Customer Relations and Sales Westinghouse Electric Company 6000 Fairview Road, 12th Floor Charlotte, North Carolina 28210 Dr. John M. Barry Mecklenburg County Department of Environmental Protection 700 N. Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection NC Dept. of Env., Health, & Nat. Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Ms. Karen E. Long, Asst. Attorney General NC Department of Justice P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. R. L. Gill, Jr., Manager Nuclear Regulatory Issues and Industry Affairs Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street - Mail Stop EC05P Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 NCEM REP Program Manager 4713 Mail Service Center Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4713 Mr. T. Richard Puryear Owners Group (NCEMC)
Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 4800 Concord Road York, South Carolina 29745 Mr. Lee Keller, Manager Regulatory Compliance Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 4800 Concord Road York, South Carolina 29745 North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1 1427 Meadowwood Boulevard P.O. Box 29513 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0513
McGuire Nuclear Station Catawba Nuclear Station Oconee Nuclear Station cc:
County Manager of York County York County Courthouse York, South Carolina 29745 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 121 Village Drive Greer, South Carolina 29651 Saluda River Electric P.O. Box 929 Laurens, South Carolina 29360 Henry Porter, Assistant Director - DWM Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Dept. of Health & Env. Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201-1708 NC Electric Membership Corporation P.O. Box 27306 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4830 Concord Road York, South Carolina 29745 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7812B Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Mr. Michael A. Schoppman Framatome ANP 1911 North Ft. Myer Drive Suite 705 Rosslyn, Virginia 22209 Mr. B. G. Davenport, Manager Regulatory Compliance Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Energy Corporation 7800 Rochester Highway - MS ONO3RC Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Mr. Dhiaa Jamil Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 4800 Concord Road York, South Carolina 29745 Mr. G. R. Peterson, Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Mr. Ronald A. Jones, Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Ms. Mary Olson Director of the Southeast Office Nuclear Information and Resource Service 729 Haywood Road, 1-A P.O. Box 7586 Asheville, North Carolina 28802 Henry Barron Group Vice President, Nuclear Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer P.O. Box 1006-EC07H Charlotte, NC 28201-1006