ML040760950
| ML040760950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/2004 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Coutu T Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| 50-305/04-301 | |
| Download: ML040760950 (45) | |
Text
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 (R8, S1)
OPERATING TEST NO. 2004301:
Applicant Type Evolution Type Minimum Number Scenario Number 1
2 3
1 / -
2 / -
1 / -
Normal 1
- / 1
- / 2
- / 1 Instrument /
Component 4
3,6 /
2,4,7 4,5 /
1,3,7 2, 3, 5
/ 2, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 / 5 6 / 6 6 / 6 As RO Reactivity 1
1 2
1 Normal 0
Instrument /
Component 2
3,6 4,5 2, 3, 5 Major 1
5 6
6 SRO-I As SRO Reactivity 0
Normal 1
1 2
1 Instrument /
Component 2
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 6
6 Reactivity 0
Normal 1
1 2
1 SRO-U Instrument /
Component 2
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 6
6 Instructions:
(1)
Enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type.
(2)
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.4.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D.
(3)
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirement.
Author:
_Charles D. Zoia____________________________
NRC Reviewer:
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Facility: _Kewaunee Nuclear Plant_ Scenario No.: ___1____ Op-Test No.: _______
Examiners: _ _______________
Operators: _______________________
Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon. Testing of the turbine governor and stop valves is scheduled for later in the shift.
Turnover: (1) A RHR pump has been OOS for high vibration for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. (2) B motor-driven AFW pump was taken OOS last shift due to a lube oil cooler leak. (3)
B S/G level channel LT-472 is OOS for a recent transmitter failure. Maintenance has been initiated but is not expected to be completed on this shift Even t No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R - RO N - BOP N - SRO Perform a power reduction to 390 MWe per N-O-3 with make-up control in MANUAL.
2 I - BOP I - SRO A S/G level controlling channel, LT-461, fails LOW.
3 I - RO I - SRO Controlling PRZR pressure channel, PT-431, fails HIGH.
4 FW01 C - BOP C - SRO Loss of condenser vacuum (procedure E-AR-09).
5 M - RO M - BOP M - SRO ATWS without manual turbine trip from the control room (procedures E-0 to FR-S.1).
6 C - RO C - SRO Charging pumps trip (auto-inhibit signal) requiring SI pumps to be started (procedure FR-S.1).
7 C - BOP C - SRO A AFW pump fails to auto-start and must be manually started (procedure FR-S.1).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #1 Simulator Shift Turnover:
Per Scenario Outline SIMULATOR SCENARIO SETUP 1.
STEP COUNTERS - ON 2.
INITIALIZE into IC 3.
Communicator Telephone Log - AVAILABLE 4.
Simulator Setup Checklist - COMPLETED 5.
Simulator Book Prep. Checklist - COMPLETED 6.
Simulator Scenario Briefing Sheet - COMPLETED ____________
7.
Simulator Security Checklist - COMPLETED
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #1 Simulator Scenario Guide:
1.
INITIALIZE to a 100% Power IC 2.
PLACE RHR Pump A CS in PULLOUT and PLACE a Hold Card on the switch.
3.
PLACE AFW Pump B CS in PULLOUT and PLACE a Hold Card on the switch.
4.
PLACE an Out of Service sticker on S/G B level indicator LI-472.
5.
PRELOAD/VERIFY active the following simulator codes:
TIME TYPE Description RAMP START VALUE RAMP TIME DELAY TIME VALUE TRIGGER PRELOAD MALF SER0966, Beta Annunciator Driver Override BLOCK PRELOAD ANN 47034-O, SER1670 Source Range Hi Flux @ SD Alarm Blocked BLOCK PRELOAD MALF RHR04B - Failure to Auto Start RHR Pump 1B PRELOAD METER MCA, AO-41052-02, LI-472 0
PRELOAD REMOTE RP191, 472A, Lo/Lo Level Logic TRIP PRELOAD REMOTE RP192, 472B, Hi Level Logic TRIP PRELOAD REMOTE RP193, 472C, Lo Level Logic TRIP PRELOAD ANN 47065-F, SER0812, AMSAC in Test Crywolf PRELOAD LIGHTS MVB, DO047033:401, TLA-16 AMSAC Channel Abnormal ON
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #1 Simulator Scenario Guide (CONTINUED)
TIME TYPE Description RAMP START VALUE RAMP TIME DELAY TIME VALUE TRIGGER EVENT 1 EVENT 2 EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 3 EVENT 3 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 3 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 4 EVENT 4 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #1 Simulator Scenario Guide (CONTINUED):
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon. Testing of the turbine governor and stop valves is scheduled for later in the shift.
TURNOVER:
(1) A RHR pump has been OOS for high vibration for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(2) B motor-driven AFW pump was taken OOS last shift due to a lube oil cooler leak.
(3) B S/G level channel LT-472 is OOS for a recent transmitter failure.
In all cases, maintenance has been initiated but is not expected to be completed on this shift.
EVENT 1 With the plant initially at 100% power, power must be reduced to perform a test of the turbine governor and stop valves. During the power reduction, reactor make-up control does not operate in automatic, therefore manual boration and/or dilution is required (REACTIVITY MANIPULATION).
EVENT 2 Once power is reduced, a failure of S/G A Level Transmitter LT-461 (LOW) occurs. This causes the S/G A Feedwater Flow Control Valve to fully open, requiring Manual control of the valve to stabilize the plant. A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
EVENT 3 After the plant has stabilized and A-MI-87 is completed, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-431 fails high and causes the pressurizer spray valves to fully open and de-energize all heaters.
This will require the operator to swap channels or take manual control of the spray valves. After stabilizing the plant, A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
EVENT 4 After the plant has stabilized and A-MI-87 is completed, air begins to leak into the condenser, causing a loss of condenser vacuum. Actions of E-AR-09, Loss of Condenser Vacuum are initially successful, but the reactor eventually must be manually tripped due to entering the DO NOT OPERATE region of E-AR-09, Figure 1-Operating Regions Based on Condenser Back Pressure.
EVENT 5-7 After the manual reactor trip is determined to be necessary and ordered, the reactor will not manually trip and a transition to FR-S.1 is made. After working through FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0 and then to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The scenario is ended at the discretion of the lead examiner after the transition to ES-0.1 has been made.
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _01_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
With the plant initially at 100% power, power must be reduced to perform a test of the turbine governor and stop valves. During the power reduction, reactor make-up control does not operate in automatic, therefore manual boration and/or dilution is required.
(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Brief crew on performance of N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power. Discuss precautions for commencing down-power.
CRS Implement N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power.
RO Perform reactivity estimate based on planned load decrease.
CRS Direct power reduction to <390MWe BOP Reduce load per N-TB-54, Turbine and Generator Operation:
Review Initial Conditions, Precautions & Limitations
Perform SHUTDOWN per step 4.3 (Preferred Method):
Determine maximum unloading rate (figures 2 & 3)
Adjust controls to clear Valve Position Limiter (VPL)
Reduce setter < EH Panel Plaque value Set loading rate < 5% per minute Depress GO pushbutton WHEN VPL light goes out, push the HOLD pushbutton.
Set setter to desired load
Verify/set desired loading rate to 0.25% per minute (Normal Plant Practice)
Inform Energy Supply and Control of the rate and the amount of the load reduction
Depress the GO pushbutton
Maintain reactive load within the limits of Figure 5, Generator Capacity Curve...
(EVENT 1 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 1 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _01_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
With the plant initially at 100% power, power must be reduced to perform a test of the turbine governor and stop valves. During the power reduction, reactor make-up control does not operate in automatic, therefore manual boration and/or dilution is required.
(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Perform reactivity adjustments:
Rod Control (rod motion at 1.5F difference Tavg to Tref)
AND/OR Boration Concentration Control in MANUAL per A-CVC-35A, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control:
Review Symptoms and Immediate Actions
Determine Rate and magnitude of Boration
Position Reactor Makeup Control Switch to STOP.
Position Makeup Mode Selector to MANUAL per step 4.4.
Borate using CVC-405, Boric Acid Emergency Suction Isolation:
Establish communication between Control Room and Operator at CVC-405.
START BA Transfer Pump in fast.
Locally OPEN CVC-405 to obtain desired flow rate.
Monitor Emrg BA Totalizer.
When the required amount of BA has been added, CLOSE CVC-405.
STOP BA Transfer Pump Dilution (to flush lines) in MANUAL per A-CVC-35A, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control:
Establish communication between Control Room and Operator at MU-1025, Makeup Water to Alt. Suct.
Throttle OPEN MU-1025.
Monitor Emrg BA Totalizer.
WHEN required amount of makeup water has been added, CLOSE MU-1025.
BOP Adjust Heater Drain Pump speed to maintain equal loading on pumps - AS REQUIRED.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (02)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 2 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _02_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
This event is a failure of S/G A Level Transmitter LT-461 (LOW). This causes the S/G A Feedwater Flow Control Valve to fully open, requiring Manual control of the valve to stabilize the plant. A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will trip bistables per A-MI-87 paperwork provided by the CRS and return paperwork to the CRS when the actions are complete)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Identify and report the failure using available indications:
Annunciator 47062-A, S/G A Program Level Deviation
Annunciator 47062-B, S/G A Bypass CV Level Deviation
Annunciator 47064-A, S/G A Level Low Low
Level Indicator LI-461 failed to zero.
BOP Refer to annunciator response procedure, place FW-7A, S/G A Main FW Flow Control Valve to MANUAL, and restore level to 44%.
NOTE: S/G A Level Control must be controlled in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario when using Main FW.
CRS Direct the power decrease to be placed on HOLD.
CRS Implement A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst., to remove LT-461 from service -
B/S tripping must be performed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per A-MI-87.
NOTE: A-FW-05A, Abnormal Feedwater System Operation, may be referenced but requires no additional actions.
CRS Direct actions to remove LT-461 from service:
Direct I&C to perform SP 47-316A to check redundant channel B/S contacts for LT-461 removal from service (NOTE: The Control Room will be informed that SP 47-316A has been completed).
BOP Perform/verify prerequisite lineup of Removal from Service:
Ensure FW-7A is in MANUAL.
Place FW-10A, S/G A Bypass FW Flow Control Valve to MANUAL.
CRS Direct I&C to trip associated bistables for LT-461.
(EVENT 2 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 3 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _02_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
This event is a failure of S/G A Level Transmitter LT-461 (LOW). This causes the S/G A Feedwater Flow Control Valve to fully open, requiring Manual control of the valve to stabilize the plant. A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Complete the verification steps of A-MI-87 after B/S tripping:
Ensure the following annunciator/status lights are ON:
1.
Annunciator 47064-A, S/G A Level Low Low 2.
Annunciator 47064-B, S/G A Level High 3.
Status Light 44907-1101, S/G A Low-Low Level 4.
Status Light 44908-0801, S/G A Hi-Hi Level CRS Review Technical Specifications 3.5.b and 3.5.c:
Table 3.5-2 1.
No. 12 - LO-LO S/G Water Level 2.
Continued operation is acceptable (2 channels per loop required to be OPERABLE)
Table 3.5-3 1.
No. 4.a - MDAFW Pumps - Either S/G LO-LO level 2.
No. 5.a - TDAFW Pumps - Both S/G LO-LO level 3.
Continued operation is acceptable (2 channels per loop required to be OPERABLE)
Table 3.5-4 1.
No. 4.a - HI-HI S/G Level Main Feedwater Isolation 2.
Continued operation is acceptable (2 channels required to be OPERABLE)
CRS Direct I&C to investigate S/G level channel LT-461 failure/status.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (03)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 4 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _03_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-431 fails high and causes the pressurizer spray valves to fully open and de-energize all heaters. This will require the operator to swap channels or take manual control of the spray valves. After stabilizing the plant, A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will trip bistables per A-MI-87 paperwork)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Identify and report the failure using available indications:
Annunciator 47041-C, Pressurizer Pressure 2385
Ann. 47043-C, Pressurizer Control Press Abnormal
Status Light 44907-0307, Pressurizer 2385 psig
Pressurizer Pressure Indicator PI-431 failing high.
RO Refer to annunciator response procedure and place the Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector to position 2-1, to remove the failed instrument.
NOTE: Alternative acceptable actions include placing both Pressurizer Spray Valve Controllers in Manual and shutting them OR placing the Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller in manual and adjusting to control pressure.
CRS Direct the power decrease to be placed on HOLD.
CRS Implement A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst., to remove PT-431 from service -
B/S tripping must be performed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per A-MI-87.
CRS Direct actions to remove PT-431 from service:
Direct I&C to perform SP 47-316C to check redundant channel B/S contacts for PT-431 removal from service (NOTE: The Control Room will be informed that SP 47-316C has been completed).
RO Perform/verify prerequisite lineup of Removal from Service:
Place the Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector to position 2-1 (to place PT-429 as the controlling channel).
Place the Pressurizer Pressure Recorder Input Selector switch to position 1".
CRS Direct I&C to trip associated bistables for PT-431.
(EVENT 3 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 5 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _03_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-431 fails high and causes the pressurizer spray valves to fully open and de-energize all heaters. This will require the operator to swap channels or take manual control of the spray valves. After stabilizing the plant, A-MI-87 is then used to remove the channel from service.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will trip bistables per A-MI-87 paperwork)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Complete the verification steps of A-MI-87 after B/S tripping:
Ensure the following annunciator/status lights are ON:
1.
Annunciator 47041-D, PZR Press SI Channel Alert 2.
Annunciator 47033-C, OT T High 3.
Annunciator 47041-C, Pressurizer Pressure 2385 4.
Annunciator 47042-D, Pressurizer Pressure <1900 5.
Ann. 47041-R, OT T Channel Rnback/Rdstp ALERT 6.
Status Light 44908-0203, Pressurizer 1815 psig 7.
Status Light 44908-0103, Pressurizer > 2000 8.
Status Light 44907-0507, Loop B OT T 9.
Status Light 44907-0207, Pressurizer 1900 psig 10.
Status Light 44907-0307, Pressurizer 2385 psig 11.
Status Light 44904-0202, Loop B Channel 3 OT T CRS Review Technical Specifications 3.5.b and 3.5.c:
Table 3.5-2 1.
No. 5 - Overtemperature T 2.
No. 7 - Low Pressurizer Pressure 3.
No. 8 - High Pressurizer Pressure 4.
Continued operation is acceptable (3 channels for No.
5 & 7 - 2 channels for No. 8 are required OPERABLE)
Table 3.5-3 1.
No. 1.d - Pressurizer Low Pressure 2.
Continued operation is acceptable (2 channels required OPERABLE)
CRS Direct I&C to investigate Pressure Transmitter PT-431 failure/status.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (04)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 6 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _04_
Page _1_ of _3_
Event
Description:
Air begins to leak into the condenser, causing a loss of condenser vacuum. Actions of E-AR-09, Loss of Condenser Vacuum are initially successful, but the reactor eventually must be manually tripped due to entering the DO NOT OPERATE region of E-AR-09, Figure 1-Operating Regions Based on Condenser Back Pressure._________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Identify and report the failure using available indications:
Annunciator 47051-W, Condenser Vacuum Low
Annunciator 47054-I, Cond Drain Tank Level High/Low
Condenser vacuum indicating low.
Generator electrical output indicating low.
CRS Implement procedure E-AR-09, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
CRS Direct announcement Losing Condenser Vacuum via Gai-tronics BOP Verify safe operation of the turbine per Figure 1, Operating Regions Based on Condenser Back Pressure
TRIP the reactor IF EITHER of the following occur:
Turbine operates in the Avoid Operation region for
> 10 minutes OR
Turbine operates in the Do Not Operate region NOTE: These criteria will not initially require a trip, but after vacuum stabilizes briefly, a manual reactor trip will be required due to eventual operation in the DO NOT OPERATE region of Figure 1.
BOP VERIFY the following:
Normal Circulating Water (CW) System operation:
1.
CW Pump(s) RUNNING and Disch. Check Valve(s) -
OPEN.
2.
Condenser inlet water box isolation valves - OPEN.
Gland Steam Supply Pressure (4101002) at 2.5 - 4.0 psig (EVENT 4 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 7 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _04_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
Air begins to leak into the condenser, causing a loss of condenser vacuum. Actions of E-AR-09, Loss of Condenser Vacuum are initially successful, but the reactor eventually must be manually tripped due to entering the DO NOT OPERATE region of E-AR-09, Figure 1-Operating Regions Based on Condenser Back Pressure._________
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will provide the required local actions below)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY/PERFORM the following LOCALLY:
1.
Normal water level in the Condensate Drain Tank.
2.
Steam supply air ejectors (PI-11052) 118-125 psig.
3.
CLOSE AR-35, Condenser Air Inleakage Throttle Valve.
4.
Proper air ejector jet operation:
1.
IF jet(s) are NOT functioning properly, SHIFT to standby jet as follows (2nd Stage air ejector):
1.
ISOLATE Faulty ejector:
1.
CLOSE AR-4A(B)(C), 2nd Stage Ejector Inlet.
2.
Close MS-520A(B)(C), 2nd Stage Ejector Steam Inlet.
2.
PLACE Standby Ejector in service:
1.
OPEN MS-520A(B)(C) 2.
OPEN AR-4A(B)(C)
NOTE: The 2nd Stage air ejector jets will not be functioning properly, and placing the standby jets in service will be partially effective. Ultimately, the reactor will have to be tripped due to operation in the DO NOT OPERATE region of Figure 1.
BOP Identifies reactor trip criteria is imminent and reports to the CRS, recommending a manual reactor trip.
CRS Acknowledges report and orders reactor to be tripped.
CRS Transitions to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENTS (05-07)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 8 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _1_ of _3_
Event
Description:
After a manual reactor trip is determined to be necessary and ordered, the reactor will not manually trip and a transition to FR-S.1 is made. After working through FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0 and then to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Manual trip initiated - the reactor does NOT trip.
BOP Manual trip initiated using 2nd reactor trip pushbutton - the reactor does NOT trip.
(*)Manually inserts control rods.
BOP Attempts to open Bus 33 and 43 supply breakers - THIS ACTION WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL.
CRS With power > 5%, a transition is made to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS from E-0.
BOP PERFORM FR-S.1 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
RE-VERIFY FR-S.1, step 1 Immediate Actions and Contingency Actions previously performed in E-0.
(*)Operator is dispatched to locally open reactor trip breakers and locally position rod drive MG set motor and generator switches to TRIP. THIS IS SUCCESSFUL.
VERIFY Turbine Trip
A Manual Trip will be required and attempted but UNSUCCESSFUL.
(*)Manually run back Turbine AND stop both EH Oil Pumps.
IF Turbine Control Valves cannot be closed, THEN manually initiate Main Steamline Isolation.
A M/D Pump must be Manually started.
Check NR S/G level < 17%
Check T/D AFW Pump running.
(EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 9 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _2_ of _3_
Event
Description:
After a manual reactor trip is determined to be necessary and ordered, the reactor will not manually trip and a transition to FR-S.1 is made. After working through FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0 and then to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP CHECK SI Pumps - ALL STOPPED RO ESTABLISH Charging Flow:
Charging pumps have tripped and WILL NOT start due to an auto-inhibit signal.
IF no charging pump can be started, GO TO Step 7.
RO VERIFY Boration Flow:
CHECK PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 psig
VERIFY charging flow > 40 GPM (NOT MET) 1.
Manually start SI Pumps.
2.
OPEN PRZR PORVs and block valves as necessary to obtain SI flow > 100 gpm CONTINUE Boration to Cold Shutdown Conc. per RD-6.7 NOTE: The Cold Shutdown Boron Concentration should be determined per RD-6.7 and RCS sampling initiated.
BOP VERIFY Containment Vent Isolation:
1.
Cntmt Purge/Vent Supply & Exhaust - CLOSED a.
RBV-1 b.
RBV-2 c.
RBV-3 d.
RBV-4 e.
RBV-5 f.
TAV-12 2.
Post LOCA Hydrogen Valves - CLOSED a.
LOCA-2B b.
LOCA-100B c.
LOCA-201B d.
SA-7003B (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 10 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _3_ of _3_
Event
Description:
After a manual reactor trip is determined to be necessary and ordered, the reactor will not manually trip and a transition to FR-S.1 is made. After working through FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0 and then to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK if the following Trips have occurred:
1.
Reactor - TRIPPED 2.
Turbine - TRIPPED BOP CHECK S/G Levels:
1.
NR Level in at least one S/G > 4%
2.
Control feed flow to maintain NR level between 4% & 50%
BOP Verify all dilution paths ISOLATED:
1.
MU-1022, Reactor M/U Water to Blender - CLOSED.
2.
MU-1025, M/U Water to Alt. Suction - CLOSED.
3.
MU-1024 and CVC-423, Chem. Mixing Tank - CLOSED.
4.
MU-1031A and B, M/U Water to BA Pumps - CLOSED.
BOP CHECK for Reactivity Insertion from Uncontrolled Cooldown:
1.
RCS Temp. - Decreasing in an Uncontrolled Manner OR 2.
Any S/G Press - Decreasing in an Uncontrolled Manner 3.
BOTH ARE NO - Stop any CONTROLLED Cooldown AND GO TO Step 18 BOP 1.
CHECK Core Exit TCs < 1200F 2.
VERIFY Reactor Subcritical 1.
Power Range < 5%
2.
Intermediate Range - Negative SUR CRS Transition back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection CRS Transition to ES-0.1 once E-0 Immediate Actions (steps 1 - 4) are verified and it is determined that SI is NOT required.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, THE SCENARIO MAY BE TERMINATED.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 11 of 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-01_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _1_ of _3_
Event
Description:
Air begins to leak into the condenser, causing a loss of condenser vacuum. Actions of E-AR-09, Loss of Condenser Vacuum are initially successful, but the reactor eventually must be manually tripped due to entering the DO NOT OPERATE region of E-AR-09, Figure 1-Operating Regions Based on Condenser Back Pressure._________
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 9 of
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 (R8, S1)
OPERATING TEST NO. 2004301:
Applicant Type Evolution Type Minimum Number Scenario Number 1
2 3
1 / -
2 / -
1 / -
Normal 1
- / 1
- / 2
- / 1 Instrument /
Component 4
3,6 /
2,4,7 4,5 /
1,3,7 2, 3, 5
/ 2, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 / 5 6 / 6 6 / 6 As RO Reactivity 1
1 2
1 Normal 0
Instrument /
Component 2
3,6 4,5 2, 3, 5 Major 1
5 6
6 SRO-I As SRO Reactivity 0
Normal 1
1 2
1 Instrument /
Component 2
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 6
6 Reactivity 0
Normal 1
1 2
1 SRO-U Instrument /
Component 2
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 Major 1
5 6
6 Instructions:
(1)
Enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type.
(2)
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.4.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D.
(3)
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirement.
Author:
_Charles D. Zoia____________________________
NRC Reviewer:
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Facility: _Kewaunee Nuclear Plant_ Scenario No.: ___3____ Op-Test No.: _______
Examiners: _ ________ Operators: ____________________
Initial Conditions: 80% power, BOL, with a power ascension in progress. The plant tripped 7 days ago due to a trip of the B MFW pump, which was subsequently repaired and returned to service.
Turnover: (1) A RHR pump has been OOS for high vibration for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. (2) B motor-driven AFW pump was taken OOS last shift due to a lube oil cooler leak.
Maintenance has been initiated but is not expected to be completed on this shift Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R - RO N - BOP N - SRO Perform a power increase to 100% power per N-O-3.
2 ED07B I - RO I - BOP I - SRO Loss of instrument bus II -WHITE 3
CV203 I - RO I - SRO VCT level transmitter, LT-141, fails HIGH (DIVERT).
4 CW04A C - BOP C - SRO Trip of running CW pump.
5 SG02B C - RO C - BOP C - SRO B S/G tube leak leading to a reactor trip (HS-17, Humidification Steam fails to isolate).
6 M - RO M - BOP M - SRO B S/G tube leak increases to a SGTR 7
C - BOP C - SRO B S/G PORV fails open due to PS-16113 failing HIGH
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #3 Simulator Shift Turnover:
Per Scenario Outline SIMULATOR SCENARIO SETUP 1.
STEP COUNTERS - ON 2.
INITIALIZE into IC 3.
Communicator Telephone Log - AVAILABLE 4.
Simulator Setup Checklist - COMPLETED 5.
Simulator Book Prep. Checklist - COMPLETED 6.
Simulator Scenario Briefing Sheet - COMPLETED ____________
7.
Simulator Security Checklist - COMPLETED
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #3 Simulator Scenario Guide:
1.
INITIALIZE to a 80% Power IC 2.
PLACE RHR Pump A CS in PULLOUT and PLACE a Hold Card on the switch.
3.
PLACE AFW Pump B CS in PULLOUT and PLACE a Hold Card on the switch.
4.
ENSURE Circulating Water Pump A is running, CW Pump B is OFF.
5.
PRELOAD/VERIFY active the following simulator codes:
TIME TYPE Description RAMP START VALUE RAMP TIME DELAY TIME VALUE TRIGGER PRELOAD MALF SER0966, Beta Annunciator Driver Override BLOCK PRELOAD ANN 47034-O, SER1670 Source Range Hi Flux @ SD Alarm Blocked BLOCK PRELOAD MALF RHR04B - Failure to Auto Start RHR Pump 1B
?PRELOAD ANN 47065-F, SER0812, AMSAC in Test Crywolf
?PRELOAD LIGHTS MVB, DO047033:401, TLA-16 AMSAC Channel Abnormal ON
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #3 Simulator Scenario Guide (CONTINUED)
TIME TYPE Description RAMP START VALUE RAMP TIME DELAY TIME VALUE TRIGGER EVENT 1 EVENT 2 MALF ED07B Loss of instrument bus II -WHITE EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 2 (A-MI-87)
EVENT 3 OVRD CV203 LT-141, VCT Level As FND 100 EVENT 4 MALF CW04A Timed Inst Overcurrent, CW Pump 1A As FND 75 EVENT 4 EVENT 5-7 MALF SG02B 75 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7 EVENT 5-7
Kewaunee Simulator Exam Scenario Rev. 0 Dynamic Simulator Scenario #3 Simulator Scenario Guide (CONTINUED):
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 80% power, BOL, with a power ascension in progress, but currently on hold for turnover. The plant tripped 7 days ago due to a trip of the B MFW pump, which was subsequently repaired and returned to service.
TURNOVER:
(1) A RHR pump has been OOS for high vibration for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(2) B motor-driven AFW pump was taken OOS last shift due to a lube oil cooler leak.
In all cases, maintenance has been initiated but is not expected to be completed on this shift.
EVENT 1 With the plant initially at 80% power, power must be raised to 100% - full power.
(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION).
EVENT 2 Once power is raised, Annunciator 47101-D, Instrument Bus Voltage Low comes in due to a failure of Instrument Bus II breaker BRB-113 tripping on overcurrent. This causes many different alarms and instrument failures. The crew must address these failures and take manual control as appropriate to stabilize the plant. A-MI-87 is then used to remove the affected channels from service.
EVENT 3 After the plant has stabilized and A-MI-87 is completed, VCT Level Transmitter LT-141 fails high and causes letdown to divert to the hold-up tanks. This will require implementation of A-CVC-35C and manual control of LD-27.
EVENT 4 After the plant has stabilized and A-CVC-35C is completed, the running CW Pump (A) trips on overcurrent. This requires the operator to locally align and start CW Pump B per E-CW-04 and investigate to determine the reason for the pump trip. The following conditions for the CW will exist when asked by the crew - the tripped pump motor appears normal, the forebay level is normal and there are no indications of problems with the traveling screens.
EVENT 5-7 After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm. As the actions of A-RM-45 are being performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then Manually trip and SI. After performing the required steps in E-0, the crew transitions to E-3.
While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed. The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _01_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
With the plant initially at 80% power, power must be raised to 100% - full power.
(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS BRIEF crew on performance of N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power. Discuss precautions for increasing reactor CRS IMPLEMENT N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power.
RO PERFORM reactivity estimate based on planned load increase.
CRS DIRECT power increase to full power.
BOP Increase load per N-TB-54, Turbine and Generator Operation:
REVIEW Initial Conditions, Precautions & Limitations
INCREASE load per step 4.1.29:
DETERMINE maximum loading rate (figures 2 & 3)
SET Valve Position Limit to 100%.
SET setter to desired load
VERIFY/SET desired loading rate to 0.25% per minute (Normal Plant Practice)
INFORM Energy Supply and Control of the rate and the amount of the load increase.
DEPRESS the GO pushbutton
MAINTAIN reactive load within the limits of Figure 5, Generator Capacity Curve...
(EVENT 1 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 1 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _01_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
With the plant initially at 80% power, power must be raised to 100% - full power.
(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO PERFORM reactivity adjustments:
Rod Control (rod motion at 1.5F difference Tavg to Tref)
AND/OR Boration Concentration Control per N-CVC-35A, Boron Concentration Control, step 4.1, Automatic Makeup:
REVIEW Precautions, Limitations AND Initial Conditions.
DETERMINE current RCS boron concentration.
POSITION Makeup Mode Selector to AUTO.
POSITION Reactor Makeup Control Switch to START
OBSERVE VCT Level to verify proper operation.
VERIFY proper boron concentration using the following:
CVCS BA & MU Rcdr.
BA Tank level change to BA Totalizer change.
SR count rate.
Change in Tavg.
Control Rod motion.
BOP Adjust Heater Drain Pump speed to maintain equal loading on pumps - AS REQUIRED.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (02)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 2 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _02_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
Once power is raised, a failure of Instrument Bus II occurs due to breaker BRB-113 tripping on overcurrent. This causes several alarms and instrument failures. The crew addresses the failures and takes manual control as appropriate to stabilize the plant.
A-MI-87 is then used to remove the affected channels from service.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will trip bistables per A-MI-87 paperwork provided by the CRS and return paperwork to the CRS when the actions are complete)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO IDENTIFY and REPORT the failure using available indications:
Annunciator 47101-D, Instrument Bus Voltage Low CRS DIRECT the power increase to be placed on HOLD AND TRANSITION to A-EDC-38B.
CREW PERFORM the following per A-EDC-38B, Step 4.4:
VERIFY BRB-113 is ON - NO (CUE: The AO should report about 5 minutes after being called that the main breaker was found to be tripped on overcurrent)
REQUEST Electricians to investigate
REFER to the following procedures for guidance:
Electrical Cross Reference
GMP-245
A-MI-87
CRS IMPLEMENT A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection or Safeguards Inst., to remove failed instruments from service. NOTE: B/S tripping must be performed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
CRS DIRECT actions to remove the failed instruments from service:
PT-946 and PT-949 - Containment Pressure
N42 - Nuclear Power Range
LT-427 - Pressurizer Level
PT-430 - Pressurizer Pressure
FT-412 - RCS Flow
TI-406B - % Full Power Delta Temperature
FT-467 - S/G Feedwater Flow
FT-465 - S/G Steam Flow
LT-473 - S/G Level
PT-469 - S/G Pressure BOP/RO PERFORM/VERIFY lineups for Removal from Service.
CRS DIRECT I&C to trip associated bistables for the failed instruments.
(EVENT 2 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 3 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _02_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
Once power is raised, a failure of Instrument Bus II occurs due to breaker BRB-113 tripping on overcurrent. This causes several alarms and instrument failures. The crew addresses the failures and takes manual control as appropriate to stabilize the plant.
A-MI-87 is then used to remove the affected channels from service.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator will trip bistables per A-MI-87 paperwork provided by the CRS and return paperwork to the CRS when the actions are complete)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Complete the verification steps of A-MI-87 after B/S tripping:
VERIFY the following channels annunciator/status lights are ON per Attachment I of A-MI-87:
1.
PT-946 and PT-949 - Containment Pressure 2.
N42 - Nuclear Power Range 3.
LT-427 - Pressurizer Level 4.
PT-430 - Pressurizer Pressure 5.
FT-412 - RCS Flow 6.
TI-406B - % Full Power Delta Temperature 7.
FT-467 - S/G Feedwater Flow 8.
FT-465 - S/G Steam Flow 9.
LT-473 - S/G Level 10.
PT-469 - S/G Pressure CRS REVIEW Technical Specifications 3.5 for the failed instruments:
1.
PT-946 and PT-949 - Containment Pressure 2.
N42 - Nuclear Power Range 3.
LT-427 - Pressurizer Level 4.
PT-430 - Pressurizer Pressure 5.
FT-412 - RCS Flow 6.
TI-406B - % Full Power Delta Temperature 7.
FT-467 - S/G Feedwater Flow 8.
FT-465 - S/G Steam Flow 9.
LT-473 - S/G Level 10.
PT-469 - S/G Pressure CRS DIRECT I&C to investigate the Instrument Bus II failure/status.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (03)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 4 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _03_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
After the plant has stabilized and A-MI-87 is completed, VCT Level Transmitter LT-141 fails high and causes letdown to divert to the hold-up tanks. This will require implementation of A-CVC-35C and manual control of LD-27 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO IDENTIFY and REPORT the failure using available indications:
Level Indicator LI-141 - Failed HIGH
Annunciator 47043-L, VCT level High/Low - LIT RO REFER to annunciator response procedure and INFORM CRS of required actions (GO TO A-CVC-35C).
CRS IMPLEMENT A-CVC-35C, Abnormal VCT Control.
RO REVIEW Symptoms and Automatic Actions of A-CVC-35C.
RO CHECK at least one operable VCT level channel (CAS):
VCT level channel LI-112 is determined to be operable RO CHECK operable VCT level channel > 5% (CAS):
VCT level channel LI-112 is operable and indicates > 5%.
RO CHECK VCT level channel LI-112 - OPERABLE (YES).
RO CHECK VCT level channel LI-141 - OPERABLE (NO).
POSITION LD-27, VCT/Holdup Tank Divert Valve to VCT
MANUALLY CONTROL VCT level <56% with LD-27.
NOTE: The crew should realize that the automatic swap of Charging Pump suction to the RWST when VCT level is < 5%
will NOT occur with LT-141 failed high.
Manual Makeup as required IF VCT Level < 17%
RO CHECK Actual VCT Level < 28%
Manual Makeup is STOPPED IF Actual VCT Level > 28%
Charging Pump speed adjusted to maintain PRZR level.
(EVENT 3 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 5 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _03_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
After the plant has stabilized and A-MI-87 is completed, VCT Level Transmitter LT-141 fails high and causes letdown to divert to the hold-up tanks. This will require implementation of A-CVC-35C and manual control of LD-27 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK Actual VCT Level < 56%
Manual Makeup is STOPPED IF Actual VCT Level > 56%.
IF Actual VCT Level > 56%, DIVERT to the CVC Holdup Tank with LD-27.
RO CHECK Reactor Make-up Control - OPERATING PROPERLY
Proper Reactor Make-up Control is unaffected by the failure of LT-141.
CRS RETURN to procedure and step in effect (N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power).
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (04)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 6 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _04_
Page _1_ of _2_
Event
Description:
After the plant has stabilized and A-CVC-35C is completed, the running CW Pump (A) trips on overcurrent. This requires the operator to locally align and start CW Pump B and investigate the reason for the pump trip. The following conditions for the CW will exist - the tripped pump motor appears normal, the forebay level is normal and there are no problems with the traveling screens.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator provides any required local actions below)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP IDENTIFY and REPORT the trip of CW Pump A using available indications:
Annunciator 47082-C, Bus 3 Feeder Bkr Trip
Annunciator 47083-C, Bus 3 Feeder Bkr Overload
Annunciator 47033-45, TLA 4160V Stator Temp Hi
White disagreement light on CW Pump A.
RO/BOP REFER to annunciator response procedure and INFORM CRS of required actions (GO TO E-CW-04; N-CW-04 & A-CW-04 are also referred to and may be referenced for additional actions).
CRS IMPLEMENT procedure E-CW-04, Loss of Circulating Water based on current plant conditions.
BOP CHECK Annunciator 47051-M, CW Pumps Low Low Level Trip -
NOT LIT (CAS):
YES - Annunciator 47051-M is NOT LIT BOP VERIFY at least one CW Pump is RUNNING (CAS):
NO CW Pumps are running.
START standby Pump B BOP CHECK number of CW Pumps running - NOT CHANGED (CAS)
The crew has NOT been informed about any liquid discharge at this time. Any discharge would have to be secured due the change in CW flow caused by the pump trip.
BOP CHECK condenser vacuum - NORMAL (CAS):
NO Condenser Vacuum PPCS ALARMS.
Condenser Back Pressure - WITHIN FIGURE 1 LIMITS NOTE: IF a condenser PPCS alarm is received due to timing of procedural actions, a slight reduction of turbine load MAY be required.
(EVENT 4 IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 7 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _04_
Page _2_ of _2_
Event
Description:
After the plant has stabilized and A-CVC-35C is completed, the running CW Pump (A) trips on overcurrent. This requires the operator to locally align and start CW Pump B and investigate the reason for the pump trip. The following conditions for the CW will exist - the tripped pump motor appears normal, the forebay level is normal and there are no problems with the traveling screens.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator provides any required local actions below)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY CW Pump Discharge Valve Position:
1.
RUNNING CW Pump Discharge Check Valve - OPEN.
2.
IDLE CW Pump Discharge Check Valve - CLOSED BOP VERIFY Condenser Waterbox Inlet Valves - OPEN.
CW-2A1 and CW-2A2.
CW-2B1 and CW-2B2.
BOP VERIFY Traveling Screens - CLEAR:
Annunciator 47054-Q, Traveling Water Screen DP High -
NOT LIT.
Locally CHECK Traveling Screens DP < 6 inches H2O.
Locally MONITOR Traveling Screens.
BOP Locally VERIFY Forebay Level - STABLE OR INCREASING:
LI-26829 through LI26832 are STABLE OR INCREASING BOP GO TO Step 12 BOP CHECK Forebay Level - NORMAL:
Forebay Level > 64%
Forebay Level STABLE OR INCREASING CRS RETURN to procedure and step in effect (N-0-03, Plant Operation Greater than 35% Power).
NOTE: N-CW-04 and A-CW-04 are referred to by the Alarm Response Books and may be referenced for additional actions.
These actions include opening SW-143B, Thrust Bearing Cooler Isolation and verifying proper seal water flows and oil levels.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENTS (05-07)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 8 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _1_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed. The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(NOTE: The Simulator Booth Operator provides the required local verification below)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO IDENTIFY and REPORT the S/G B tube leak using available indications:
Annunciator 47011-B, Radiation Indication High
Annunciator 47012-B, Radiation Indication Alert
Annunciator 47033-35, TLA RMS Above Normal
Individual radiation monitor reading on drawer.
RO/BOP REFER to annunciator response procedure and INFORM CRS of required actions (GO TO A-RM-45).
CRS IMPLEMENT A-RM-45, Abnormal Radiation Monitoring System BOP PERFORM A-RM-45 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
VERIFY Monitor R-15/R-19 Automatic Actions occur:
AR-6/CV-31168, Air Ejector Disch Vent, positions to DUCT.
The following valves CLOSE:
BT-2A, S/G A Blowdown Isolation A1 BT-3A, S/G A Blowdown Isolation A2 BT-2B, S/G B Blowdown Isolation B1 BT-3B, S/G B Blowdown Isolation B2 BT-31A, S/G Sample Isolation BT-32A, S/G Sample Isolation BT-31B, S/G Sample Isolation BT-32B, S/G Sample Isolation HS-17-1, Humidification Steam Inlet CV (LOCAL VERIFICATION)
NOTE: HS-17-1 does NOT automatically close and therefore must be CLOSED MANUALLY.
CRS TRANSITION to E-0-14, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
(EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 9 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _2_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed. The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY PRZR Level STABLE or INCREASING:
PRZR Level will be DECREASING due to the leak - the following actions are required CONTINGENCY ACTIONS:
INCREASE Charging flow.
TURN PRZR heaters ON.
VERIFY Reactor Makeup is OPERABLE.
ISOLATE Letdown.
- MANUALLY TRIP AND ACTUATE SI (GO TO E-CRS IMPLEMENT E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO VERIFY Reactor Trip (IMMEDIATE ACTIONS):
Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN.
Rod Position Indicators - ZERO.
Rod Bottom Lights - LIT.
Neutron Flux - DECREASING.
BOP VERIFY turbine trip (IMMEDIATE ACTIONS):
HP Turbine Impulse Pressure PI-485/486 -
TRENDING TO ZERO.
All turbine stop valves - CLOSED.
VERIFY Power to Emergency AC Buses (IMMEDIATE ACTIONS):
Bus 5 - ENERGIZED.
Bus 6 - ENERGIZED.
RO CHECK SI Status (IMMEDIATE ACTIONS):
CHECK if SI is ACTUATED:
Annunciator 47021-A, SI Train A Actuated - LIT OR
Annunciator 47021-B, SI Train B Actuated - LIT
VERIFY both SI Trains - ACTUATED:
BOTH Annunciators 47021-A AND 47021-B - LIT (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 10 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _3_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed. The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Feedwater isolation:
FW-7A & FW-7B Main FW Flow Control Valves CLOSED.
FW-10A & FW-10B Main FW Bypass Flow Control Valves CLOSED.
FW-10A & FW-10B FW to S/G A/B Isol. Valves CLOSED.
Both Feedwater Pumps - OFF.
RO MAKE plant announcement for Safety Injection.
BOP CHECK Main Steamline Isolation:
Isolation is NOT required - GO TO Step 8 AND OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 8.
RO VERIFY Containment Spray is NOT required:
Containment Spray is NOT required - Containment Pressure HAS remained below 23 PSIG.
BOP VERIFY Containment Cooling:
Fan Coil Units - RUNNING.
SW-903A, B, C AND D - OPEN.
RBV-150A, B, C AND D - CLOSED (NOTE: Containment Pressure DOES NOT exceed 4 PSIG at this time).
BOP VERIFY Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation RUNNING:
Annunciator 47052-G, ZONE SV BNDRY DAMPER NOT CLOSED - NOT LIT
Zone SV Fans - RUNNING (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 11 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _4_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed.
The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Service Water Alignment:
VERIFY all SW Pumps - RUNNING.
VERIFY selected SW Header > 82.5 psig.
VERIFY A M/D Pump - RUNNING
Since BOTH M/D pumps are NOT available, the TDAFWP is NOT secured at this time (the TDAFWP is secured when RCS temperature control is checked in step 18 of E-0).
RO VERIFY Containment and Containment Ventilation Isolation:
All CI Active Status Panel Lights - LIT RO VERIFY ESF Equipment RUNNING:
Both SI Pumps - RUNNING.
B RHR pump - RUNNING.
Both CC Pumps - RUNNING (one CC Pump must be STOPPED AND placed in PULLOUT since BOTH are currently running).
SI Active Status Panel Lights - LIT (for operating equipment).
RCS Pressure - < 2200 psig
SI Cold Leg - F925 INDICATES FLOW
RCS Pressure - < 150 psig - NO (GO TO Step 16)
BOP VERIFY Total AFW Flow > 200 gpm (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 12 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _5_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed.
The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK RXCP Seal Cooling:
CC Supply to Thermal Barriers - NORMAL:
CC-600, CC-601A(B), CC-610A(B) AND CC-612A(B) - OPEN
Thermal Barrier Temperatures T614 AND T610 -
NORMAL
RXCP Bearing Temperatures T132 AND T125 -
NORMAL RO CHECK RCS Temperatures:
DECREASING due to SI AND AFW flow.
BOP PERFORM the following due to decreasing RCS Temperature:
STOP dumping steam.
PLACE TDAFWP to PULLOUT.
IF S/G levels > 4%, REDUCE AFW FLOW
MSIVs & MSIV Bypass valves - May be CLOSED IF Cooldown Continues.
RO CHECK PRZR PORVs and Spray Valves CLOSED:
Both PORVs - CLOSED.
Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.
CVC-15, Aux Spray Valve - CLOSED.
RO CHECK if RXCPs should be TRIPPED:
RXCPs should NOT require tripping.
BOP CHECK if S/Gs are Faulted - NO FAULTED S/Gs
GO TO step 22.
CREW CHECK that S/G Tubes are NOT Ruptured: NO
Multiple indications of S/G Tube Rupture ARE available.
GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 13 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _6_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm. As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed. The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS TRANSITIONS to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture RO CHECK if RXCPs should be TRIPPED:
RXCPs should NOT require tripping.
CREW IDENTIFY Ruptured Steam Generator(s):
S/G B should be identified as the ruptured steam generator based on several indications.
- ISOLATE the Ruptured Steam Generator:
VERIFY BT-2B AND BT-3A, S/G B Blowdown Isolation Valves
- CLOSED.
SET Steam Generator B PORV Controller to 1050 PSIG.
WHEN ruptured S/G pressure < 1050 PSIG, THEN VERIFY Steam Generator B PORV is CLOSED - NO
The PORV is failed OPEN due to PS-16113 failing high and must be ISOLATED:
PLACE PORV Controller in MANUAL.
CLOSE PORV.
CLOSE MS-100B, S/G B Supply to T/D AFW Pump.
Locally CLOSE Main Steam Header B Trap 9 inlet and bypass valves:
TD-1-9
TD-3-9
CLOSE S/G B Main Steamline Isolation Valves:
MS-1B, S/G B Main Steamline Isolation Valve
MS-2B, S/G B MSIV Bypass Valve BOP CHECK Ruptured Steam Generator Level:
NR Level > 4%:
IF YES - STOP AFW Flow to Ruptured S/G
IF NO - MAINTAIN AFW Flow to Ruptured S/G until Level > 4%, THEN STOP AFW Flow to Ruptured S/G.
(EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 14 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _7_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed.
The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP CHECK Ruptured Steam Generator Pressure > 200 PSIG.
CREW INITIATE RCS Cooldown:
DETERMINE required CET temperature
S/G B pressure ________ psig.
Required CET Temperature _______ F.
DUMP steam to condenser from intact S/G:
SET Steam Dump to STM PRESS mode.
DUMP Steam at maximum rate.
At 540F, SET Steam Dump to BYPASS INTLK.
CET Temperature < Required Temperature:
IF YES - STOP RCS Cooldown AND MAINTAIN Temperature < Required Temperature.
IF NO - CONTINUE with Step 8 until CET Temperature < Required Temperature, THEN STOP RCS Cooldown AND MAINTAIN Temperature <
Required Temperature.
BOP CHECK A Steam Generator Level > 4%:
IF YES - CONTROL AFW Flow to A S/G to MAINTAIN level between 4% and 50%
IF NO - MAINTAIN Total AFW Flow > 200 gpm UNTIL A Steam Generator Level > 4%.
RO CHECK Pressurizer PORVs and Block Valves:
Both Pressurizer PORVs should be shut AND both block valves open.
(EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 15 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _8_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed.
The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO ISOLATE Letdown - DONE previously.
RO RESET SI - DONE previously.
RO RESET Containment Isolation:
DEPRESS both Containment Isolation pushbuttons.
BOP VERIFY Instrument Air to Containment - ESTABLISHED:
At least one air compressor - RUNNING.
Air header pressure > 60 psig.
Instr. Air to Containment Isolation IA-101 - OPEN.
RO CHECK if RHR Pumps should be STOPPED - NO.
RO ESTABLISH Charging Flow:
2 Charging Pumps should be started AND flow MAXIMIZED.
NOTE: This requires aligning Charging to the RWST.
RO CHECK if RCS Cooldown should be STOPPED:
The crew must WAIT until CET Temperature < Required Temperature. No further steps in E-3 can be performed.
BOP CHECK Ruptured Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
S/G B Pressure should be relatively stable.
NOTE: S/G Pressures that are decreasing due to the cooldown are considered to be stable.
RO CHECK RCS Subcooling > 50F.
(EVENTS 5-7 ARE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 16 of 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2004301 Scenario No.: _04-03_ Event No.: _05-07_
Page _9_ of _9_
Event
Description:
After E-CW-04 is completed, S/G B tubes begin leaking at about 30 gpm.
As the actions of A-RM-45 are performed, the leak increases to a rupture at 300 gpm. The crew must then manually trip and SI. From E-0, the crew transitions to E-3. While in E-3, a PORV fails open on S/G B due to PS-16113 failing high, and SD-2B must be manually closed.
The scenario ends when SI Flow is terminated in E-3.
(*) = CRITICAL TASK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO DEPRESSURIZE RCS to minimize break flow and refill PRZR:
PRZR heaters Manually controlled to MAINTAIN saturated conditions in the PRZR.
BOTH spray valves FULLY OPENED until ONE of the following conditions is met, THEN CLOSE spray valves:
PRZR Level > 74%.
RCS Subcooling < 30F.
RCS Pressure < Ruptured S/G Pressure.
GO TO Step 22.
CREW CHECK if SI Flow Should be Terminated:
RCS Subcooling > 30F.
RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING.
PRZR Level > 5%.
Total Feed Flow > 200 gpm AVAILABLE OR
Narrow Range Level in S/G A > 4%
NOTE:
ALL of the conditions above should be MET :
BOTH SI Pumps - STOPPED.
BOTH SI Pumps - PLACED in AUTO.
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD EXAMINER, THE SCENARIO MAY BE TERMINATED.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 17 of 17