ML040090433

Draft IR 05000335-03-002 and IR 05000389-03-002 on 03-10-28/03, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Violations Noted

ML040090433
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/22/2003
From:	Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB
To:	Stall J Florida Power & Light Co
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-03-002
Download: ML040090433 (51)

See also: IR 05000335/2003002

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:May XX, 2003 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. A. Stall, Senior Vice President Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 50-335/03-02 AND 50-389/03-02 Dear Mr. Stall: On March 28, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Units I and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on March 28, 2003, with Mr. D. Jemigan and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This reoort documents afin di concernin silicon "oil filled tratnsf oB Swthaear Room'which'had n6t'b&6n.c'onsidered or iiduafe'in' the iic~nsee's firet naards jWjs Additionalv.there Was'a findina con'cemin f hc ditino-ofimanual operator-acti'o6nutsidte'e .. incontroI'rr iiili6u ohfmsial*--rotetioo f caesbl andequi 1eint re iedlon't afe Iudown n a fire -AIiht Prior NRC aDrovai: for areas eslant'ed as "0CFR50 Dnendix R. Section II l.G.2 Th6 s'efiedin vo1ti6n f, ENRC ra uifernt tsThee' fidin' s collectivelv'have' Dotenitiail safety ~ici~ge~rta evlWS Hi~i~i owever':a A '.'.'.'. T: j. j.t 'mt;j9 -',h, 1I x9Ah9rMs re sen;7-lt an safetv sianhicance deteminabion as'not b'effdon'leted. T s ftndir d i7 a immediate safetvyconcem in; addition. the oept'do um ents oe' NRC-ienified findiofv lo -safetv .sifhfficance'(Green).-'which deteinied oinvol vioiation of NRC L r~auirernents. Hoa wee.-be6aiseofthe velowsaetyvnican'e 'ad eus'e It w 'enitered into vour corective ctiof roaram.,the NRC is'treati a thisa'-a onscited iviblation NCV) consistent with Sectio6n ;VI.A' 'of th6 NRC Enfor'ement Policv.' Additionallv'itwo iiice's'ee identified violationswhichiweredetermined to'be 6fVe Iow afTtV'sghifi6ice isteflnthis rerort.IfYou'contest any NCV-in this report.'voU should Drovidea resonse vithiri:3odaysof the date of thisinsnection oort.urith the basis foiur denial.t the Nuclear Relat6torv Commission A Docume ntControlDesk. Washingtfi DC 20555-000: with conies to the Rieio'n'al AdministratRoiReion:iin:th6e 'DiretO icte!of-i E'nforcement'.Unfted State'sNulear Regulatorv Commission, jWashington, DC 20555 0001 ;'ad the NRC Resident lnsptorat St. Lucie' Nuclear 'Plant. ; - '

FP&L 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at htto://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely, Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16 Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-335, 389/03-02 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc wlencl: (See page 3)

FP&L 3 cc: Senior Resident Inspector St. Lucie Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 6090 Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Craig Fugate, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 M. S. Ross, Attorney Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. Douglas Anderson County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 Mr. William A. Passetti, Chief Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1741 Mr. Donald E. Jernigan, Site Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Mr. Don Mothena Manager, Nuclear Plant Support Services Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. Rajiv S. Kundalkar Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. J. Kammel Radiological Emergency Planning Administrator Department of Public Safety 6000 SE. Tower Drive Stuart, Florida 34997 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Steve Hale St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000 Mr. Alan P. Nelson Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708 APN@NEI.ORG David Lewis Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Mr. Stan Smilan 5866 Bay Hill Cir. Lake Worth, FL 33463 Mr. Alan P. Nelson .. .. Nuclear Energy Institute . Mr. R. E. Rose Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Mr. G. Madden Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957

i l J, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos: License Nos: Report No: Licensee: Facility: Location: Dates: Inspectors: 50-335, 50-389 DPR-67, NPF-16 50-335/03-02, 50-389/03-02 Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 March 10-28, 2003 R. Deem, Consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory P. Fillion, Reactor Inspector F. Jape, Senior Project Inspector M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector) S. Walker, Reactor Inspector G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000335/2003-002, 0500038912003-002; Florida Power and Light Company; 03/10 - 28/2003; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection. The report covered a two-week period of inspection by regional inspectors and a consultant. Three Green non-cited violations (NCVs) and one unresolved item with potential safety significance greater than Green were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, 'Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Initiating Events TBD. The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.48 and the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (PSL) Unit 2 Operating License Condition (OLC) 2.C.(20), Fire Protection. The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) failed to consider and evaluate the combustibility of 380 gallons of transformer silicone dielectric insulating fluid in each of six transformers (installed in three Unit 2 fire areas) as contributors to fire loading and effects on safe shut down (SSD) capability, as required by Fire Protection Program (FPP) commitments. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the objective of the initiating events cornerstone to limit the likelihood of those events that could upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions relied upon for SSD during a fire. The six previously unidentified silicone oil-filled transformers represented an increase in the ignition frequency of the associated fire areas/zones. This finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination. Also, when assessed with other findings identified in this report, the significance could be greaterthan very low significance. (Section 1R05.02) X Comerstone: Mitigating Systems . TBD. A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, was identified for failure to ensure that one train of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions would be free of fire damage. Electrical cables for Train B 480 volt (V) vital load centers 2B2 and 2B5, and Train A 480V vital load center 2A5 were located in fire area C (B switchgear room) with no adequate spatial separation or fire barriers. These load centers powered 480V motor control centers (MCCs) 2B5, 2B6, and 2A6, which powered the boric acid gravity feed valves V-2508 and V-2509, volume control tank outlet valve V-2501, and boric acid makeup pumps 2A and 2B, respectively. The valves and pumps were redundant components relied on for SSD during a fire in the B switchgear room.

2 Green. Lack of spacial separation or barriers to protect cables against fire damage in containment could result in spurious opening of the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV). A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that, spurious opening of the PORV during post-fire safe shutdown would adversely affect systems intended to maintain hot shutdown. The finding is of very low safety significance because the initiating event likelihood was relatively low, manual fire suppression capability remained unaffected and all mitigating systems except for the PORV and block valve were unaffected. (Section 40A5) B. Licensee-identified Violations

TBD. Many local manual operator actions were used in lieu of the required physical protection of cables for equipment relied on for SSD during a fire, without obtaining prior NRC approval for these deviations from the approved fire protection program. This condition applied to numerous fire areas, including the areas selected for this inspection. This reliance on large numbers of local manual actions, in place of the required physical protection of cables, could potentially result in an increased risk of loss of equipment that was relied upon for SSD from a fire. (Section 1 R05.XXXX)) A violation of PSL Unit 2 (OLC) 2.C.(20) and the Fire Protection Program was identified. However, this finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination. The finding is greater than minor because it could potentially result in an increased risk of loss of equipment that was relied upon for SSD from a fire. (Section I R05.XXXXX) Other violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the team. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4A07.

REPORT DETAILS 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity 1R05 FIRE PROTECTION 01. Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown a. Inspection Scope The team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program against applicable requirements, including Operating License Condition (OLC) 2.C.20, Fire Protection; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix R; 10 CFR 50.48; Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants; related NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs); the St. Lucie Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); and plant Technical Specifications (TS). The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. The team reviewed the licensee's Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) and performed in-plant walk downs to choose three risk-significant fire areas for detailed inspection and review. The three fire areas selected were:

, Unit 2 Fire Area B - Cable.Spreading Room (Fire Zone 52). A fire in this area would involve alternate shutdown from outside the main control room (MCR).

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Unit 2 Fire Area C - Train B Switchgear Room (Fire Zone.34) and Electrical Equipment Supply Fan Room (Fire Zone 48). Fire Area C and the essential equipment and cables within were evaluated by the licensee with respect to the protection and separation criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, to assure that the ability to safely shut down the plant was not adversely effected by a single fire event. Safe shut down of Unit 2 from the MCR using Train A equipment was credited for'a fire in this area.

- Unit 2 Fire Area I - Fire Zone 51 West (Cable Loft), Fire Zone 21 (Personnel Rooms), Fire Zone 32 (PASS and Radiation Monitoring Room), Fire Zone 331 (Instrument Repair Shop), and Fire Zone 23 (Train B Electrical Penetration Room). Fire Area I and the essential equipment and cables within were evaluated by the licensee with respect to the protection and separation criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section III.G.2 to assure that the ability to safely shut down the plant was not effected by a single'fire event. Safe shutdown from the MCR using Train A equipment was credited for a fire in this area.. . The team reviewed the licensee's fire protection program documented in the St. Lucie UFSAR (Appendix 9.5A, Fire Protection Program Report); safe shutdown analysis

2 (SSA); fire hazards analysis (FHA); SSD essential equipment list; and system flow diagrams to identify the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The objective of this evaluation was to assure the safe shutdown equipment and post-fire safe shutdown analytical approach were consistent and satisfied the Appendix R reactor performance criteria for safe shutdown. For each of the selected fire areas, the team focused on the fire protection features, and on the systems and equipment necessary for the licensee to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in those fire areas. Systems and/or components selected for review included the pressurizer PORVs; boric acid makeup pumps and gravity feed valves V-2508, V-2509; auxiliary feedwater (AFW); charging pumps and volume control tank discharge valve V-2501; shutdown cooling; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC); atmospheric dump valves (ADVs); component cooling water. This review also included verifying that manual valves operated during post fire safe shutdown were included in the licensee's maintenance program. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability a. InsDection Scone For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the frequency of fires or the potential for fires, the combustible fire load characteristics and potential fire severity, the separation of systems necessary to achieve SSD, and the separation of electrical components and circuits located within the same fire area to ensure that at least one train of redundant safe shutdown systems was free of fire damage. The team also inspected the fire protection features to confirm they were installed in accordance with the codes of record to satisfy the applicable separation and design requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, and Appendix A of BTP ASB 9.5-1. The team reviewed the following documents which establish the controls and practices to prevent fires and to control combustible fire loads and ignition sources to verify that the objectives established by the NRC-approved fire protection program (FPP) were satisfied:

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Appendix 9.5A, Fire Protection Program Report

Plant St. Lucie (PSL) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)

Administrative Procedure 1800022, Fire Protection Plan

Administrative. Procedure 0010434, Plant Fire Protection Guidelines

-* Electrical Maintenance Procedure 52.01, Periodic Maintenance of 4160 Volt Switchgear

3. The team toured the selected plant fire areas to observe whether the licensee had properly evaluated in-situ compartment fire loads and limited transient fire hazards in a manner consistent with the fire'prevention and combustible hazards control procedures. In addition, the team reviewed fire protection inspection reports, and corrective' action program condition reports (CRs) resulting' from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and equipment overheating incidents for the years 2001-2002 to assess the effectiveness of the fire prevention program and to identify any maintenance or material condition problems related to fire incidents. The team reviewed the fire brigade response procedures, training procedures, and drill program procedures. The team reviewed Fire Brigade Initial Training and Fire Brigade Continuing Training course materials to verify appropriate training was being' conducted for the station firefighting personnel. In addition, the team evaluated fire brigade drill 'training records for the operating shifts from August 2001- February 2003. The reviews were performed to determine whether fire brigade drills had been conducted in high fire risk plant areas and whether fire brigade personnel qualifications, drill response, and performance met the requirements of the licensee's approved fire protection program. -The team walked down the fire brigade staging and dress-out areas in the turbine buildings and fire brigade house to assess the condition of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The team examined the fire brigade's personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs), portable'communications equipment, and various other fire brigade equipment to determine accessibility, material condition and operational readiness of equipment. Also, the availability of supplemental fire brigade SCBA breathing air tanks, and the capability for refill, was evaluated. Additionally, the team observed whether emergency exit lighting was provided for personnel evacuation'pathways to the outside exits as identified in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards. This review also included an examination of backup emergency lighting availability on pathways to and within the dress-out and staging areas to support fire brigade operations during a fire-induced power failure. The fire brigade self-contained breathing apparatuses were examined arid assessed for adequacy.' Team members walked down the selected fire areas to compare the associated fire fighting pre-fire strategies and drawings with'as-built plant conditions. This was done to verify that fire fighting pre-fire strategies and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions'described in the UFSAR Fire Protection Program Report. Also, the team perforrned a review of drawings and engineering calculations for fire suppression caused flooding associated with'the floor and' equipment drain systems for the Train B Switchgear Room`, Electrical Equipment Supply Fan Room, and Train B Electrical Penetration Ro6m. .The review focused on ensuring that those actions required for SSD would not be inhibited by fire suppression activities or leakage from fire suppression systems. '

4 The team reviewed design control procedures to verify that plant changes were adequately reviewed for the potential impact on the fire protection program, SSD equipment, and procedures as required by PSL Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(20). Additionally, the team performed an independent technical review of the licensee's plant change documentation completed in support of 2002 temporary modification, TSA 2-02-006-3, that placed two exhaust fans on a fire damper opening between the cable spreading room and the Train B switchgear room. This TSA was evaluated in order to verify that modifications to the plant were performed consistent

• with plant design control procedures.

b. Findings Inadequate Fire Hazards Analysis Introduction: The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) associated with failure to meet the fire protection program plan requirements. The team found that six silicone oil filled transformers installed in three Unit 2 fire zones [Fire Zone 37, Train A Switchgear Room; Fire Zone 34, Train B Switchgear Room; and Fire Zone 47, Turbine Building Switchgear Room] were not evaluated in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) as contributors to fire loading and effects on SSD capability as required by fire protection program commitments. DescriDtion: At PSL, the indoor medium voltage power transformers installed in Unit 1 were of the dry type. However, six of the indoor medium voltage power transformers in Unit 2 were cooled and insulated by a silicone-type fluid. The licensee provided the team with information from the transformer vendor which indicated that the transformer insulating fluid was Dow Coming (DC) 561, a dimethyl silicone insulating fluid. The team performed an independent technical review of the licensee's engineering calculations and maintenance documentation, transformer vendor technical information manual, insulating fluid manufacturer information, Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and Factory Mutual (FM) listing agencies' documentation, and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards. The DC 561 technical manual described the DC 561 fluid as a silicone liquid that will burn, but was less flammable than paraffin-type insulating oils. The technical manual also stated that the DC 561 fluid had a flash point of 324 C, a total heat release rate (HRR) of 140 kw/m2 (per ASTM E 1354-90), and a fire point of 357 OC. In their Fire Hazard Analysis the licensee evaluated the adequacy of their fire area/zone and electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS) enclosure barrier features based on the combustible hazard content and overall fire loading (analyzed fire duration) present within the associated area/zone. Based on the above, the team concluded that the transformer insulating fluid was a in-situ combustible liquid not accounted for nor evaluated in the PSL FHA. Additionallyj the team noted that the licensee had conducted an UFSAR Combustible Loading Update evaluation in 1997. This evaluation was documented in PSL-ENG-SEMS-97-070, but failed to identify that the transformers in fire zone 37 contained combustible silicone insulating fluid. Also a PSL Triennial Fire

5 Protection Audit (documented in QA audit Report QSL-FP-01-07) conducted in 2001, reviewed the FHA but did not identify any fire loading discrepancies. The team determined that the previously unidentified six silicone oil-filled transformers represented an in an increase in the ignition frequency of the associated fire areas/zones. Also, the additional in-situ combustible fire load and fire severity represented by the combustible transformer insulating fluid increased the likelihood of a sustained fire event from a catastrophic failure of an effected transformer that may upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during SSD operations. The -T-E Unit Substation Transformers Instruction Manual recommended that the dielectric insulating fluid be sampled annually and the dielectric strength of the fluid be tested to ensure that it is at 26 KV or better. The licensee determined that except for four tests conducted during the period 1990-1992, there were no records of the transformers' fluid being sampled and tested. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR 2003-0978 and will followed up by the PSL Resident inspector staff. Analysis: The team determined that this finding was associated with the "protection against extemal factors" attribute and affected the objective of the initiating events, cornerstone to limit the likelihod of t'se' events that could upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions relied upon'for SSD from a fire, and is therefore' greater than minor. The previously unidentified six silicone oil-filled transformers in Unit 2 represented an in an increase in the ignition frequency of the associated fire' areas/zones. The finding was considered to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve the impairment or degradation of NRC approved fire protection features and the overall SSD capabilities for the areas were evaluated by the licensee's SSA as ade'quate to ensure SSD capability. However, when assessed in combination with other findings identified in this report, the significance could be greater than very low significance. Enforcement: 10 CFR 50.48 states, in part,'"Each operating nuclear power plant must have a fire protection program that satisfies Criterion-3 of Appendix A to this part." PSL Unit 2 Operating License NPF-16, Conditiori2.C.'(4)'specifies, in part, that the licensee implement andmaintain-in-effect-alt prvisions of the approved.FPP as described in the FSARibr the facility and as approved by the NRC letter dated July171984, and subsequent supplements. The 'approved FPP is maintained and documented in the PSL UFSAR, Appendix 9.5A, Fire Protection Program Report. The UFSAR, Fire Protection Program Report, states, in part, that the PSL Fire Protection Program described in the report implements the philosophy of defense-in- depth protection against fire hazards and effects of fire on safe shutdown equipment. The PSL fire protection program is guided by plant fire hazard analyses and by credible fire postulations. It further stated that the Fire Hazard Analyses performed for St. Lucie Unit 2 considered potential fire hazards and their possible effect on safe shutdown capability. -

6 PSL administrative fire protection procedure, 1800022, Section 8.3 states that the FHA for Unit 2 are individual studies of each plant's designs, potential fire hazards in the plant, potential of those threats occurring and the effect of postulated fires on safe shutdown capability. Further, Section 8.7.1.A of this procedure states that in-situ combustible features are evaluated in the fire hazards analysis as contributors to fire loading in the respective fire zones. Contrary to the above, the FHA for fire zones 34, 37 or 47 was not adequate and did not meet FPP commitments. Specifically, 380 gallons of in-situ combustible transformer silicone dielectric insulating fluid in each of six transformers located in Unit 2 was not considered nor evaluated in the FHA as contributors to fire loading and possible effects on SSD capability. This condition was contrary to the requirements of the PSL FPP as outlined in UFSAR, Section 9.5A, and therefore did not meet the requirements as set forth in 10 CFR 50.48 and PSL OLC 2.C.(20). Because the failure to evaluate in-situ combustible transformer silicone dielectric insulating fluid as a contributor to fire loading in the FHA is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as CR 2003-0637, this violation is being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This item is identified as NCV 50-389/03-02-OX, Failure to Evaluate In-situ Combustible Transformer Dielectric Insulating fluid as a Contributor to Fire Loading in the FHA. .03 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed how systems would be used to achieve inventory control, reactor coolant pump seal protection, core heat removal and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure control during and following a postulated fire in the fire areas selected for review. Portions of the licensee's Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Report which outlined equipment and components in the chosen fire areas, power sources, and their respective cable functions and system flow diagrams were reviewed. Control circuit schematics were analyzed to identify and evaluate cables important to safe shutdown. The team traced the routing of cables through fire areas selected for review by using cable schedule, and conduit and tray drawings. The team walked down these fire areas to compare the actual plant configuration to the layout indicated on the drawings. The team evaluated the above information to determine if the requirements for protection of control and power cables were met. The licensee's circuit breaker and fuse coordination study was reviewed for adequate electrical scheme protection of equipment necessary for safe shutdown. The following equipment and components were reviewed during the inspection:

V1474 and V1475, Pressurizer PORVs

V1476 and V1477, Pressurizer Isolation Block Valves

MV-09-03 and MV-09-04, Feedwater Bypass Valves

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2HVE-13B, Control Room Booster Fan

V2501, VCT Discharge Outlet Valve

MV-07 -04, Containment Spray Isolation Valve

LP-208, Lighting Panel 208

LP-209, Lighting Panel 209

HCV-3625, Safety Injection Block Valve

V3444, Shutdown Cooling Block Valve

PI-1107/1108, Pressurizer Pressure for Hot Shutdown Panel

LI-1 104/1105, Pressurizer Level for Hot Shutdown Panel

LI-9113 / 9123, Steam Generator Level for Hot Shutdown Panel

.. SIAS Logic

MCC 2A5/2A6 and relative feeds, 480 Volt Motor Control Center

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MCC 2B5/2B6 and relative feeds, 480 Volt Motor Control Center

Load Center 2A5 480 Volt Switchgear b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 04. Alternative Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability a. Insgection Scope The cable spreading room, which was one of two alternate shutdown (ASD) fire areas listed in the St. Lucie SSA for Unit 2, was selected for detailed inspection of post-fire SSD capability. Emphasis was placed on verification that hot and cold shutdown from outside the control room could be' implemented; and that transfer of control from the main control rodm to the hot shutdown control panel (HSCP) and other equipment isolation locations could be accomplished within the performance goals stated in Appendix R Section 1ll.L.3. Electrical diagrams of power, control, and instrumentation cables required for ASD were analyzed for fire induced faults that could 'defeat operation from the MCR or the HSCP. The team reviewed the electrical isolation and protective fusing in the transfer circuits of components (e.g., motor operat6d valves) required for post-fire SSD'at the HSCP to verify that the SSD components were physically and electrically separated from the fire area. The team also examined the electrical circuits for a sampling of components operable at the HSCP to ensure that afire in the B Switchgear Room'would not adversely affect safe shutdown capability from the MCR. The team verified that adequate isolation capability of equipment used for safe shutdown implementation was in place, accessible, and that the hot shutdown control 'panel was capable of controlling tnpea aceiidta tesudw rcessibeltheprfomacagal 6fApedi all the required equipment necessary bring the unit to a safe shutdown condition. The team also verified that the shutdown' process ffiet the performance goals f Appendix R Section Ill.L.3 and guidance in generic letter (GL) 86-10, by comparing it to the thermal hydraulic time line analysis' provided by the lienfef.'i

8 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 05. Operational Implementation of Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability a. Inspection Scooe The team reviewed off normal operating procedures 2-ONP-100.02, Control Room Inaccessibility, Rev.13B, the licensee's procedure for alternate safe shutdown, and 2- ONP-100.01, Response to Fire, Rev.9, the licensee's operating procedure for post-fire safe shutdown from the MCR. The review focused on ensuring that all required functions for post-fire safe shutdown and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The review also examined the consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and other procedure driven activities associated with post-fire safe shutdown (ie. fire fighting activities). b. Findings The team noted that the licensee had identified that manual operator actions outside the MCR were credited and used in lieu of physical protection of cables and equipment relied on for SSD during a fire. The use of manual operator actions outside the MCR for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 areas (Fire Area C and Fire Area I for this inspection) without prior NRC approval. This was a deviation from the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee identified this issue in CR 03-0153 prior to this inspection. This finding is More Than Minor. This finding will be Unresolved pending completion of the SDP to determine the risk associated with using the manual operator actions in lieu physical protection. (NOTE: The NRC and the Nuclear industry are working to resolve this issue on a generic basis). 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, specifies the need to identify equipment to achieve and maintain safe shutdown functions, and the protection requirements for that equipment. It also states that one train of safe shutdown equipment should remain free of fire damage for non-alternate shutdown (ll.G.2) designated fire areas. Two of the three fire areas inspected were so designated. In these areas, manual operator actions outside the MCR were being used- and credited in the SSA to achieve safe siihtd6wn. Determination of the licensing basis and required NRC exemption to use manual operations in lieu of protection for one shutdown train was addressed by another inspection team member. The inspection team was also concerned whether all potential spurious operations were properly accounted for in the shutdown procedures. Subsequent review of the licensee's procedures for these areas did demonstrate that manual actions required to mitigate spurious signals on both units were properly dispositioned. 06. Communications a. Inspection Scope

9 The inspection team verified whether communication requirements were properly evaluated in the licensee's SSA and properly integrated into the Appendix R safe shutdown procedures. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 7. Emergency Lighting a. Inspection Scope Section I.J of 10CFR50 Appendix R requires eight hour emergency lighting coverage in any area where manual operator actions are required during post-fire safe shutdown operations, including the ingress and egress routes. The inspection team verified that emergency lighting requirements were evaluated in the licensee's SSA and properly integrated into the Appendix R safe shutdown procedures. b. Issues and Findincs No outstanding issues or non-compliances were found in this area of the inspection. c. Conclusions The inspection team found that the emergency lighting throughout the unit provided sufficient illumination to adequately implement safe shutdown. 8 Cold Shutdown Repairs a. Inspection Scope A n---------A'y-repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown must be accomplished in 72 hours. All equipment required to implement those repairs must be available onsite. b. Issues and Findings The licensee's SSA states that no repairs were necessary to achieve cold shutdown. In reviewing the shutdown procedure for the mB" switchgear room, the inspection team noted that fuses were being replaced to energize the pressurizer low range pressure indicators. Replacement of fuses is considered a repair. Although performing this action is allowed under Appendix R and there were no timing or other technical issues associated with performing this repair, having to pbrform it was in disagreement with the licensing basis documentation. ,

.

c. Conclusions -

10 The licensee was appraised of this situation, and agreed to remove this inconsistency from the documentation. List of Documents and Drawings Reviewed during Inspection 2998-B-048, Safe Shutdown Analysis Fire Area report". 2998-B-049, Essential Equipment List", Rev.6, dated 02/14/02. Procedure 2-ONP-100.02, "Control Room Inaccessibility", Rev.13B, dated 10/29/02. Procedure 2-ONP-100.01, "Response to Fire", Rev.9, dated 12/28/01. PSL-1 FJM-91-001, "PSL-1 RAB Electrical Equipment Rooms HVAC Computer model Data Inputs and Outputs", Rev.1, dated 10/5/92. St. Lucie, Unit 2 Flow Diagrams: 2998-G-078, SH 121A,121B,122, "Chemical and Volume Control System," Rev. 16. 2998-G-879, SH 1&2, HVAC Flow and Control Diagrams," dated 10/20/89. 2998-G-079, SH 1, 2 & 7, "Main Steam System," Rev. 20. 2998-G-080, SH 2A & 2B, "Feedwater and Condensate System," Rev. 25. 2998-G-082, SH 1 & 2, "Circulating and Intake Cooling Water System," Rev. 37. 2998-G-083, SH 1 & 2, "Component Cooling Water System," Rev. 28. 2998-G-078, SH 107, 108, 109, 110, "Reactor Coolant System," Rev. 1. 2998-G-078, SH 130A, 130B, 131, 132, "Safety Injection System," Rev. 12. 2998-G-088, SH 1, "Containment Spray and Refueling Water System," Rev. 35. I i

1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel D. Albritton, Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor P. Bames, Fire Protection Engineering Supervisor R. De La Esprella, Site Quality Manager B. Dunn, Site Engineering Manager K. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer J. Hoffman, Design Engineering Manager D. Jernigan, Site Vice President G. Madden, Licensing Manager R. Maier, Protection Services Manager R. McDaniel, Fire Protection Supervisor T. Patterson, Operations Manager R. Rose, Plant General Manager V. Rubano, Engineering Special Projects Manager S. Short, Electrical Engineering Supervisor NRC Personnel C. Ogle, Branch Chief R. Rodriguez, Nuclear Safety Intern (Trainee) T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector

2 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

3 ATTACHMENT 2 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AMP Aging Management Program AMR Aging Management Review ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CASS Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel CCW Component Cooling Water CR Condition Report CST Condensate Storage Tank EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EQ Environmental Qualification Program FAC Flow Accelerated Corrosion FPL Florida Power and Light Company GALL Generic Aging Lessons Learned report ICW Intake Cooling Water System ILRT Integrate Leak Rate Test ISI Inservice Inspection LR License Renewal LRA License Renewal Application LRAMR License Renewal Aging Management Review report LRBD License Renewal Basis Document NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OE Operating Experience PM Preventive Maintenance PMAI Plant Management Action Item RAB Reactor Auxiliary Building RAI Request for Additional Information RCS Reactor Coolant System RV Reactor Vessel RVH Reactor Vessel Head RVI Reactor Vessel Intemals SSC Systems, Structures, and Components SSMP Systems and Structures Monitoring Program TCW . Turbine Cooling Water UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

4 INPUT~EOST4UCEJNP - RPT03-02 PaMI:~ilkf dat6di nbecauseo h vrj wa: trie~6:hvoli7~ilt~~,~d Aevwee ntre and- NRC is freati ~~ ~ U.6Kis ikdl S t C~ ~, 6~c'd-me-Add~l itioalyja: lisee6 identifiddvoat' j~nSeto Q NA, -A"RiNDING ~ ~ct6~r Iiiti;Fi dl S1If-Re6Miek FiA i ~ee~& L~ckof sdciaIe raino

t rot ect c_;;a.`blesga i s tfi re ~~ result ipjns~qpni~ ng]qLhpessurb ze pwer A fbncite ~Itobf~rl O CFR 5.ADed R'1~. ~dhiidTi cohrttnaeven bieiv-.eq 6dnt idliablb. MAW si~~lfre Unoorsii~ capabat remaie anfetdn mitiaig se xeto~ePR d1olt6dofitfie,'VG oI2Afe~ infcn&Wiiii dtf~ ~hheseh e_bn`'-n't dt the' fi~~d'sk iiiftive action: [)rogram::Th6volto n 40gA3 EetFol1oWUR ihU~rf~a~d Sarationrsusih7: g ae p~nb~,it.Iesr

--- --- ) 5Wi' M&;h : ,23 W~&&id~Tifidsevewn 7caser fe'i~~i~ij~ owutdb&j' 66iiWnWa

vI~'VS652

dlid 34 81 ~c'~ pi6il ~n~~~bfrd~d ableocable'hotcrc t4Telcaio6nof JiQ rabiit ,Was "a' 6UIIbox (bb`23'li h th~ti~d~*ia~se ~ ~xisted ~f~A -ndupd ca6ble ir~clvcnnetst~,RS tbiilfibhtnt ratedforRC W-orsoeaic resse lhe'Ri, ii~~~~ ,Dre55rerslif valv ~~at~d~alvein see Mqithy6524hnd V348 V34-bidfeco ~ :oflow.1bLVth~cables forV3545 66uIld :!a'y. ee dmg iific~~~i~~W of the)o b-4. P&ldhreO6i.Aij ndi F heihde rs drets.i~ ~rim~Th '~"~ ~ 1i~t~f ~fh~1~ftia h evet cc-n atftt pooutsidcoontainent. iTh canciie. esaur6sett idafc~ ouinDitntrt6 mer66o esofiaitie~tiiniIand ,t wi__`___ cnniqes~os~f1bdjfaNR PT11edurein cableR tray at o~j115.vt1 1

• , I:24:pd:P

03 T10 and PTzi1O8~ incbduits2501s:eVatnd.09 The-cor*lui*f'%.-.. tifob ~1 htaPti even~T10W~6t ~~~~~~m~dbe; NW6td cu64Wd

6 com~uterinDutsF inDut to calculabons and indications0 of Dressuatvi loctions Nitn 6et'revlewed the conseaudences and:Farifiain'fisr'~nsfiiaet hi holow so'reviewed: WswhidK Pressurizer trntations: remain unaffectdthe fireh i dribatio fadbthe t d iCt [^wr~~~,S v:'-- a~ttlt

, *>,,>t'. '-< > ' ' v.^~ I- - s >* ~

> r 4 w@>< -, i0;t t 2 jt concluded that tne ffectd iwould not lead to nor to cnanae n, core 'damaaed freauerim-Thi fiftdirid ii therefore of verv ow. -safet s 4i anifi ~"~s- c o rr e i v e a c t i o n n d iub 2 5 0 1 8 Y ind 2 3 0 9 1 A wr e `;r otect ra2ian2 h eat stwentv.feet2eith4dfsid of th24t rayV plntoic PC:M99104.:SuDier)1-mnt1.Rem11cesee eports thefact that bothfchannels f oressunzer pressure instruments seified in the' bost-fireshuitdown procedure could lav been affectd bv onefirerebrdsbnt6a violation f 10 CFR 50'. ADendi'xRl-Sectiors !lI,*,xG 2A.Hefer~to 40A7. of;Ws -report for enforcement aspe Pressurnzer. Ievel ihstrientabion affecte"d by tray-conduit interactiou con Uts in. containmentmeant tiatair, whichicould start inthe cable2 rav due to cable selnitincouldresultdamaae all Dress zerleinstrumenitatl t IOODS ;L 1iOXaidLT-1105 are in travL2213:and:LT~l.1lOY'afnd LTllae c _ndui- 23320D Land 23090 .1 1OX &Y were'soecified ih6 ih drocure. It was determined tth failure mode fore 6h'rt circuit between'thd twisted Dair or oDencircuit. caused bv fiaexosureo lee evelfails ioW.eLvel failin1 w.iiiateseveralltauoihatic a me`ofWhic'h, to cause evetorise' and some of. to.falli -The de-nerakation of Pressurzer etrthe sitatinadreultsin fllino l1vel. ikledd to a'reac tor ti w~hiafetv 'ihietinor low Pressuzerk Pressure'. Wli'n~the safetv inlection sm'starti the level w'risb Since'te& oerator cannot see he may not turnoff tIe sfetu iniectionDumibkSGSoit folow's that thedressurizerwll osolidTie M ost-fresaf shUtdownD dUeidiren e h thudOwn ovrrieddue o concgreems a noutns~riosentkn'af~her for'rndiAvel and oncomitiato'res'su're'se woued be. reievedjWvrihe sftv pendix val ere nTot btain'thesk sionifica nof the fire pin he ucan'flus'r felse ration wheeth'rare no i.wonion sioee tfor'stuk hoe clevalvemas elvae t esuldr'i idi le thlo.fin awas.oe'vergvl

fet

si nfcan '(Green),46N te sme,-reasons meifio'd~in~ neci4A0 5 14 i OA d 1 s wit~riosuso~enigf P OR~s.N~'licenseerdod tefha oth chanii o P f ! .z.:s Lwf' bn..t naF'.St:Xo P

1

ifit-hk ' Q 'ib G DressureeG levelintuents"66-ecffid inUth botfr htow rcdrt ldhave fiea r e~ ft erts'dia vib fotn hefJ6,60d %~~~~, 2 c t h A7-otis repotfo enfor e nt asp c Pressunznlve cntuetbnafetdb odi o dut g Rintera 6;nainia c'ab1esj_ r redundantfchanis of. Dresiudzer evel M sI mn:i,.ma the'seDaration' rea'uiremenhts. of Aj56endix R were ,no~ht",e. h.lcto fteitrcin is , ,nt annu us, areavatn a ie atioh'v ere thbf,er r no: innition soureotrha e cables~th isevsi . nt ot 'cnsi ered rdbeta low oae 4m:eer

7 d~ibl-adii~ ffe-'c any:comersto'n6.~ The'lic6ee torrected !heb-ti ~NRC'senf6teriidnt:Pbiib 4~~~~mtijeie' d-D-tsr 'nrb;meanit tha;it the ~eDar in ~~~~~~~~wr~t ere,orthlPR if one ~~~~~e~~ch~fd ~~thfe 4 ob) ecessaio~tfunA'tioh. !5bt~eit~.wii.orduce Dressure:, ut te..abve are id itinisource b6h
thr~h- ttubcabsth elm6I1"t ig'nbt~~osided the ~~~~~~ i' A66eh ~di t:-ret-ire ii~h ~i~f~i~ontainment in th~ ~ ~ wbll t1i~l~ nnlnoabove fte 45;on sleorratn n a D~urni~ blb'hfe23-foTh rain AL~~d t22 h d s C223 ""Tr'iri A)'tid 02224f(Trtin BPCM t~~~thfe~-,tft c o h ou rtbh~d~a&~ ~a~Iia~nt shied i~t~lled uer , v16ithroof Tis i a1ualIai&t!9Ubdbt

8 reudn cals@- h iesereDortd inithe'LER that the~ radiant heatshields bel6o' he a tlevation were. not instalIed.:The.missing radint heat shields 4ifoot elevabon- or onbsftrveTre ecpucusi6n of this evaluation was'thatthe roble~mn, w~s Ko~v. Iowsaftys fcane So the doi factor oinsidered wereF

Fr ngj! ,bilty for ~a firi~cntainient ws not !mpairedl A eloband i Oni~vth toD tra neach roub contains DowercabIs(48Ovolt) c rs&Rcicent eherav.casable of elf initibn'of IEEE 383 flame tested'cablo oDeratUoflTheset travs-are solid metallic. bottom and cover tve'tras Whis constructnntinrentiv limits th6e spread of intemal-i -fire,a rovishield limitin the radiant heatenegvs The'tafier cable trav mini LresDatial. eDaratiofof 1feetvertica ad7 fet horeontalifrom the otentialiv burnihao 6blelF6;.'-Th- t&r66t'Iravs have solid metallic bottoms~t-l: R iant enerv.flownd between source daet is blocked to a xreat'extnf bv- inte rveini HVAC ducts ,iare , DiDes', tanl&- and bUildin hnst"ePHotgaslay ia ftor. i the,;part of containment drider cnsieratio yhetarae ables would be nstrumrhnttion cables;and vanous scenaios inovn; ^ 'dnrelition~rto othr thi '6Sectoiiwe'r'e'w tbb '"'tt'y AYer similar cofiuraion inthe Unit 1. otain nt wa analyzed by-the llcens~e and reviewd t by thie NRCji reat dta iL and found to. be anacceptable confiuration from~the~fire.Drotecton~view~ointn>..The*Unit dv4 had a- safet facor, of at' least two.which' Pvidmrin to accounht f'geomety.and'66r unknown differences' betwfeten the wo.'nits nan~ exc tion, to. 10 CFR' 50. e!dix R-. Secti6n ,il l G. 2 rebresents~a. icensed identifi dat Refer toMSectionAAO7; of this report'_r. ef6rome' aspects .2 ~(Closed) LER 50.-335/00.;4 P L-ze rLevinstrume ttin'ondui' ,Separaion 64 ifsidel~pend ix1R signBases

9 &ati66 r~a a iahl shielbti~e'eiu ~'~aw ?Andi6nuar po,~wnt ',.t afores tr '.'

- -rblesef , fidd ld~r I elintrftensio rI NC . d .. a e o .ressunzer ey n iftisk- fifc and irauire6itsjfr thislissuej~ouldb~jdaenia tbthid m h.rActi tes Ele~i R SctonlffiiiNid o

,7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

______b~~4Dbn~cU~i2~f In tcih'nteap ffD6ectionn3RC,.. nsbioh,,Re~rt5O~335. 8/MBdti-Jiit 31~~2b00Y the inspectsidentified induced able :tcable'shit ifeUitel;~issT i &6a4sl deift edt ou'dh'tiVleW:of~h ceii~siin W>,HWver' t1he ~l~'defd

• id'hWdhat

le'bal',hdtd R~lai6'o'~nuoeriqf~h6,ORVWas',notcreidible~I s~n beel

iictii6-ite'bd~sttifitIVI

M rebtdta- ~~~ its ~~~~~~~block vlewere-aray ear. e~containrh~rit"Wiala'find'in bestainmentin.bectors &1cetise fiatonwa iril'iri throub s'~tinarm ~~ER'ODO1~ w itib'e abI h"-Vrfld eL ;re '6icense6 i 8tifed n m e ~ n Uio ~~br ~~~~~ ~~sinRefe -irr t ct nfimedth ifidthi~n;w's ~m-.d~mh~~hbih.'~iwO,,ltt~M I'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' ~ei~dii ~eaufren~nt~lt-as consdered ater~thah minor because It &6Iid__ ~~ ~ of stems and b~~~~~~Mrlj~~ife4t

10 s in t'sensethat svste deslanted fo'r DoSt-fire shutdownwould vffde'dbV'an 6D6en PRORV durih1O~~a tades9fW ~ i~tbn the, conerone o arie ; int~it ~hdes6: that a'sDUfo:slv.oDen PORV re~reentsa brect~o the CS Ddss~r b~udarjwhich is one ofthe'bamersxsn that the findin,;awasob~en.owv'safety ni~nfic~nce (Green)',;SDecificall tte wrksheet. for stuck open relief vaIw Ited.R-kev factor leq'ddIa; this_ cori'clusionwa's th'at thetntiatingevent likeih6od as relat velv ow: W-It was le1sW tha'n the' likdliho . stuckoen PORV-due tdtnon-fire nducedcause -R Manual 11::A O'i.\\-i'- ff-.., ^4g?I!t9!3riH. ' i'4*^-fi4op,~-s-;thb xi suDDressionof fires i thecontainment was inthe normal state beca'usethe Dlant had fire deteceorsla fire 0lan and therqewee no aut ic vave's.i Rth'e wateriource that o~ud'-ff&' di dae fotfee bl'ockY 21 e, a cwas imanlyd, ue'to the factth'at'tta r,¢S i ti a a tRe.-l h !d ?.' .~f'e W' r, J. ' a -h ' S-it*v, 44~'+ - I I c , aloutsidecontairfetnt] associtddb0'fhere~a~ o 1OF~5~A~ii ~~ ~~~~i---A,; , , ' 4 - -r S -, over'low.saf sinito the CAP,,,(CRO 0386) Yd:ieF "raie'has anm fci r idt r e N consistent with Section VSA of the NRCEnforcement Policv.eThe>ride a titleof t hi NOV CVe: NV 50-335M89 -i2 i. > t - S'ction Ill t2, or~fotctioof~tl' P CabheI'. - pnp d i*he liceiisfe and ~ of f thW NCfeifred oli6fr hu bii'~ euires

r r~~Z

1

N lieseeiant're caetinto NRC' reaueoerais 'w u e, thle rbonadue ti o wn o h in'e.____-_N__ on . fe followingfirepro ectionmans _____ _ _Fe '63t7:6bd gerfdundifttriinsbl oria t6&ro ,energys, !iedk ontra ts. si tr fire [1: ,Shqtdown. coolin aves,3652,andV3481on Uni

11 2.?ir iiesuer,,rsur~ntrmentbon PT-i 07 and P-.1108,o nit2f ~~~~~ i~~~~~~~~~~~~i LISTOF TEMS~_PNED OE ADDISeSED E!~ EN bbe~~~~~~~~~nie:6edo"dA.j t Pesu rer Iventrmetaio:~i,,;*0 Cntanmn P' _________ L~ER ui~ i a ~edxRH.L rei 02335100004 ~~~R u s i qsas'o4A&~Ent F6IIvn a~Seionii4AOn d42 'Pr.. 299B:GA24~~O~hCJ~~iit2 ~Reacetoetebtorsa Emernc ih 1 . _ _ D84.-Wi W-,.,, _w t_ bEsig-iBs Documtlb bn0t.335,f389/0unzer-02t0i sure Y cSucti&1 .23 oir>.P etyinjeto FRU Sion G o3 q~qp

12 FA P, 9;;;awi 071.206. Reactor Operator Lesson. Pressurzer Preissureand Level Control Rev;,12 NR S fn1wtaI~ Safet E6;alt tE R KSE foj,+Uni~414 ffioug UTOFCRONYMi CA ~correctve actionrrarmz CF Code fFeea, ~ alain IEEE Iristitu~te'otf Electvicaljand Electronics Engineers LElc even re LOCA lossof coolantacciden NC, ,non-citd Violabon_ _ _ N~~~~iw U.S.-; NuclearL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eaulatorel Commlsslon~~~~~~~~~~~U.S;,.NUpda, i NCM issionneormdliato POR V rower operated relief valve RCS c

13 Ji6NBSNEINPECJLQJ StLSucie' P.OWETATION INPUT FORINSPECTION REPORT NO.' 50-33589/2003-02 NSTECTOR:.,, e r.tProiectManaaer ~~EClONKTW e~n'eiofote inpion March 1 200'1, irY~e f,lnspction:"'oRENNIA'IFlRE -kTC~O5ASLN ZNSECgO !i ~ ire Protection Features and PostFire"Saf&",SS'utdowr"Ca 4i [NSPECTION:REPOR. NPJT . I .'-Z S t ,r E tiin c.ve ntsi~Miti~atin9?y s Fire Profectio'n'of.SSD Caoabilit9 . - - ,

npin Scopen, he riIrew.was' to yerifthatthebbilctive's.stablished bvthe 'NRC-'iroved sFPwre ,attsfiediheteam ,seecte tfie areas and revieed the licensee s du l heteamalsoreviwd the 'bb~q'arte'diumryeort Zswell ast .te p-a~tfie 3meraencv/incidentireports resultinatfrom 'fire.- snokes rk.?-arcina;.and eruisment zerheabrn iciaents th.eer-2C00--2001&? :This& reviewa 6 cndued to as'ess e effectveness of t fi~re Dventin proarainn6dt6O"identif.'anVmainVte'nan'e'o'r ntenalVcrdition b atea;tofireincidents:.' Additionalv'th Iteam reviewed deskin control orocedures to vrifvitiati itda chaiaes weredetauatelv revewe dfor~thu s' - l he teamexamined wether, bac'u ,emrencv liahtina was ,xrovided fr 'acces oathwavs to and within the ;fire .briade;stacln'qand 'dress-out areas in suDort of.fire' ah apowrfallre' occurdurina',ttifire"emerencvi-, he team trovided rseoa n nel revacuation nnlathWays tothe 6.eutide exitsa ideftifiedin' the t' s i sAt _ C tto onditio-tigdes'r be'd,.inithe'U.F A -..................... . . ,tkhb'e'- aiffii-rv~t e i' w-e'dth idn a 'ber tde'eamiened th'e: ma'atu r's'data hetsfr.the.direct curre'nt:(DC) em ergerncyli'hting system ,seifcohtaind 'batie

14 Doweredn..-The te6m~ ce6cked if these battery'

-edwer

suDplies were rated, With, at dsh &tctest aid maintenance droced resaid recordsto determine if adeauate t ixvt pro per I t "6g-f "'eA; ' ki. T iof a firetat the siteF ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ fi'~LWh~h-~4v~ito The tea r~iiewd the irebiade-restons6'biiocdur` firp, ripda rqntin 6nd Droaram drlrocedures Fire eraininq andodrill records w ere.ale6e'w&edfveifth at the ire de er s o; nn el' aIfi 9riqa e drill rsr~os.imad bnHgaepeae me,requremebnt-f e' lcnse'ssaproeFPP Desi DrodedUr6vere-reviewed atoneqnthat reviewed for th otential,!ract, e,,i pas Teuteamby reied aLicene o. l1nitinsadt. Identificatiofhteotion of rlaedw ins r veacton r .cor e ~~~~ and ~~~~~ir ~ an.1ftgu S _ _

• ~~~~~~~~~~~eqidmftsh

im e ve realso eed s ca 'an reie fre of thdo6wn e tire t-,,rni~orrnta esolvethe s The!:t, mZ Kr~ieveed ,thicvewnse ,~blicabilitV. &valuations an fcorrrtiv seleted indutrv, ex~o~d~ene issues relatedto'fire Protectiona oexeenence r ~e'6i Weretreviewed toaveriwf tHt te and were _k r~e listed List of D tsS.R'e' ei4'd Stfo L. ___r 6'm Fir"nali ___ nDCUsMnTSREanpe wer idenf_ !Lk!TKREDORCUMENTSREVEWED Audit'Rep'orts . ......... 1..,. . - S.L r-F:nnua- F-re Protec-tion Fu-i;- - o -alr Aud i QSL-FP-06-67,: ,Anual Fire, Protection Funtional Area Audit

15 SLI*M.7011-:0 TeAnnal Fi9re PtofecfiopnutioaICAudit l ~~arnb~Rev 11 _ ________ ' . hi A ct . .. 1M-001 8F:MIi P Maintenance i M___ t a

• -

- -- ,, - ~-OSP151 i Fi~Pr~t~ti~h'stemQuarerl Aianmet V&ifiaoni( y ~~ ~ystem Trl~~~~'eibi6VFloW;Te't -01 5Zi ~ irui Bea raieeir .~SEN 21 C0 W ~tijR 6 ursu bR 02-209S N Aoic A eerl Chne a3 -~6t a~~ .s - .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,ondlloneprts,,peratn, qwp c ce

16 FIRE PROTECTION. BASELINE INSPECTIONS STLUCIE .CFOR INREPORT NO.: 50,389/0 02 INSPECTOR:. c Lead INSPECTION DATES: Weibf'0isitK 2 ,'0 00 _______ 24ofonpetio 24.2003 r;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---- -- t -7U~~ of-e nspectibn.TRENNlAL FIRESPROTECTION BASIENSPECTIONWFire ,PottoneaturesndP~-Fir, hutdoCa% bi__ IP CN'RtORt'lNP0T REACTORSAFE M __ Cornerstones: Initang Eventsj, MitigatingSym l03 P~os-t-Fire-Safe Sudown Circuit Anailvsis InspectionScopoe reviewed howsvstems.wul beudtoachiveinv ibi r~e~ci@>o'oant pturnD.s,e a brotecion/-cor hereriovafidantdddtrdobia sVst -nRCS"De cossure ntrol OSa freaindti e fi areas~selecte~d'fort rf~eview., 'Protth liese.;Do dix:R.SafdSut w AnlsisRe-v hich outlifidd cluipmen ja9o n e n s in e. h o'-s e'n GMr areas: :pow er ources.and ti reseci V cable fJnctofnsan dsvtee'flmow didqramiswere.refvied.et-rcin6Ic u

tschfiatids'sWdre

C naiedd toiddbtm an4d&ivluate?'alesTihoftjods he teamtraced the rouit ng cables tnrouah fir' areas selected for reviewubv sin cablesch and ompondntsereJ infdrmationltdeterin i th bf,(6tb a'i-'"o'wer-bems""e're"it.~; , li66nri-see'sciit breakeir arnid f coo~nV 1 t474 is reviewed fira Reliteflo eaui~meriit'hec~s~arV,-owingrequipment as V147d.R1SuV e V1475- Prssurizer R

3. V 476, Pressurzer Isoiaton Block Valve 4. V1477, Pressurizer Ioatlon Block Valve

17 V09-03,Feedwater Bvbass"Y alve . tV-09-04'",,Feedwater iBvrassoValve ? CHVE-13,>Cntrol'R66,BoseFafi 1/2 J5l:5CTDisc ra&Outlt;Valve__ AV- O71 'Otontainment S ISoatioVave

105 P' 208.liqhtinq`R1andl 208'

I J ~ $ rl>20 9w41ti 6 hi n4 q..rfe 20 9 12I CI'V,;~32.J36SafW'-SriiintiBgc-,V 44 Shutdown fiCoolina ':Block yae 15 l1J°V415 Pesrze.,ee fo ot Shutdown anel 6 14 13/.1 Sem5eeatree HShrtov ShtdPai nb 8. t/1C:G 2A5i2A6and relati 6ds48O Volt Mdttr, Cotro r qgV CC YGC B5 /2B6 and Telative f6eds:^48O0o'-Votor C&fitori6'; r Z~~~~~. , - " . wninainis AltemanutrowrnoCapability ' , e kSectncal.`dia ramsiorSfDt oh;Doerntrl.-n ere hstrientatih cale qUt l-o su~nrt:AD~werewaabllvzdtofirlfidQedfaIts';that co'uld.defeato~eration rr the.Maih ,Cbiiteol"Rom(tR oth6,;H&t Shtdown :Panel .(HSP) .. h eam reviewedthe fe aalect e §t Is th.ane erlectvtr ciruits t ^ .' -- Inr~ $-Ii£ S.>>v3it;l r. t..- 1

47t'.r

• q~ls.'su,.

tusi '4 ~ g~sV H r, '.,C. . 'F > _-. . Dfcomrnonents le-a.,. ,motor-oteratd valves)'reauired oi otfre4se~h bhIfin"fiyHSat eslure tha anf"electhel amidtin Doensoerbleat t thata _ . f--- .f-om- . mberW,~hie'MCRi~tyl o desey~etsfg -- ,n- --. '-

18 2998ZGl4-1tReactorAbili 1iildinqE 9150& bnduitei vs.Lavo'0'4R &K 298,1IR laV 1 n;l-9:50.Conduit LavouE6. 5S4te 6 4' .,Reactor Awdiar NBti iri El~ 9$50, Cdduit Lavu s. 2998 B, 3 2 . . 2998; .- 1 Reactor A Bditib1 Elerc endArea cdi. ilayoutjR2e,9 2998-4- CabjlQ,>E,1'u0CraistKoeyRv 29981/2 IV4 RatAiiel: a Biid El!j 4,3'O Crui59t;rav&` GohdRi: s6 Y 2998-1' 92 R5At.(5di Bonduit dag &Grd'dn&9ht- Rewkl 7 299&G 34 1'~Riacf6r~~i&&:LI ini P&WA.950WCon'dbit V6tr,,vs~.& G-,,RudiV.hji-,1 2968 G1 078eid&to AuxiliarvBu! 1hid 9'0 MiCn'suSetios'R1/2. 2998 O"~0i',, G~bh',Vlt'rrancien Rlani&h*x6riiQ

~

2998-~ G 27ACfbidri' da dind~ Exl&&-4.0.on'uiDiararis~&vt~dif- 2998 -B 32 eilif stoolataonf EVA 9 47Cohd$ 1180s: Rv'1 2998 - 3274 teda i Reiefaoati v v;i -47 2.s'r1 2998Ž1276,:Ra LP-lpliWiCanry,i 92C-65sI~2O~e 2998:-327.tPfJdristeri'bMaih -idrA 474 shj' 2.ad RV i210 M~~~~~ re s .U n r R 6, I s 61 6 t i,,,.oh">- Va I rjve, VC 1 4a .~§N,- 1: 8.7tR e. ^r 2998B:32L6~ft~r#.otEA4 tdh6fi-,P4i.Ai O7

fi39]~;'ev13 2998-B-F. iJ i14eD i3449 d'F'o 28B325Y BLPilwCMatr~sbtO26-0t'RV 6 s~,,20."e.,, 2998'B327.Pi~sf~Th" Gii elitef- 2a ~:Vl45. h.,'8.; d;` ~~~~~~~ s- s-d;rlzi r' e It 'i.. '.V-'.j:'. -e ifl t-' V- a' e-r Vd 47 ' -~ h- 6 2 ',t R 299&B427ppen iU 1e0ip es, te-iuts,7OR R ev', 2998-B-32' MeasunreeCann F21z1:P22 5:T229:9222R'h 50 Re:11 C641 31 7241 2",522~trd P'61'ssah-iihrneRetNesltedh{5n'Darms1tRv.3 L-1:~ ~ ~~~~~Reoe7ess nerconhdction&64r4j&i Cal Agpend Si*d~r Uns~nituip~nt.is irbuiSJ ev.,0

19 W FSL .J. E 0 O eiUc7 2 2A4&'>2B iED GEl ectricalLods,' ReV7, M'AICERITcit cta .d-;*, ciI/M~cS9,t,1aui 79 9 OBD)-ES F2.1Enint ernnq.iSt - Norkdrds l+Job.'Task -{!j4,it~~~~~as-C S s t gt w r , ,- ~~25Y 4Rr't tm~38H of -'4CAbI;S2l 7OC.teveiidatedi 0n-taeI29I950 - -2Ll;6 C

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^t~ 4 ~~Jaibrati6&dtetd! /7/03 N.O:{31 061301 .2 B44A~SI.G~2 Levl fo6pCaliration- dated 8//071i O.!31 817341 O h dated 4/24/02 N. !3i1222101 .b 'DAisar 221 2taibratated 9 No."32017351 G-- <v U'(-e nsnwz 3^ i-> g^rhg^*i OTT1321 L+Avei'( 1 S 1O7L 108ii 1)Caibration t 0 s (L104 O/1 00682601 ,___________ z .A I .1 .bat, d b-6ic&dl .m 2eh-i6 lSbed&ifca dn /4.3.3.5.2 UJFS AiSpeti n S

20 a ~F RE PROTEC ASENP'TIF nTLUCIE.POERSTATiON FNPUTFOR FNPTIO N ~iff REOT N: 035:8I2"~O NSETr: VV(igeiir ______jj_____ ~~ rot e ~ ~ 'CaponSyser~is ~ LNSPECTJOREO~NP U .IR RTCTO.e.SEIE lPEC1 rrtc'on ~sIbtu'ra 380-ieSf.htdwnGpa,~lt

?!ntix'eof, the

t repi vents-P ,y, S Ilicote oiIldtfan !fo luadie i~~iiicreas~~1i~the i~~iitibcj eac rea eresendAuatb one Pisiconsiers'andtevluafte- t TBD Manstyl.o380ca p al os tri ansfo s'were eeinnOlaftiiuire Dhvsia.tr DorsteIon of r.n b for fitrelied on f oiS durs1n dit! enetsnbtj r by=;( sFrm ido itme____ a tcitedo itC heatn.Wer.'<ie lnSecti' reLtiOe6f initrgtn]paeoe a eter-thaceiof becau Id oblwbv~ofthelniiabq eent cdrerson tolmetth reeihoi o s eent t-a tn~a~lnceasein;ffe. icniti'on freaiue-ncv f the6ascite fire'6reaszons-..The~fin'din vias!consdj6Nit hve verv. ow~sa eesiqnificancet{Green) b-eca-use it di;nt7vle jffibmIirmein" ordpaaino RC rDoe ierrotection etrsadtePvrl ensure."bfii SS:cpbiiy8 rt TBD . Mav loca manul- o~ratdr.'actlo'ns were use~d JI, Dlace-ofbi'rau wlthut btalinaNRC D~rvalfon these deviations .from ithe amroved; fire Drbfiictian: roam--Thiscondit-abble to al areas~thait were:fInsbecttd.>>,.This rllancije on lre numbero'f lical mfian'ual ct!on in' plaeofeeq Ired

7- I. I 21 hv ~ ~ ~ ~ t3T1~LIidap n or. SD6t~h ' C(etio n "ARS x.~ rs iIf1~ id,,',H W AI~e~~~ dnc;s u rs~ e endna ofpf getJola Ination; ~ ~ deftWa 'm Inorbicauseit~ l o t~ n ti a M 10 6r e u I i n 1 i~ s p me___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JEACTOR?.SAFj ? R05 R PR T C I nsA ctoce f e n 4t~ ~ T s eDUira r d d e s q n r e iu- - J a n tu c l M D P,6 PU n Jn _ _ .,b _ d r.lfi a~6% tF rvi i i6r'dtu~c;c t i , ~ ~sm k~~~s arks rcinS

22 uetfidibdrhatitidj in i& Wfi te ears, 1-O2 ~~~tve covne fire, prevention an~a n t'i~t y, ainAnc~Emtjacrdto Th& tda Ieie~ ti idrnaarsoseiad r , re u~~o ir' ~rei aniwd for~th'est Odbt6§;reiahn p'ersonnfel idi~ jte evlaed Me&,n adBdi tf~~~iiii~~~~ 7reoort- f rebd A6. Itfi6WAiiJ F ~ OO ~~ ~~~ &Fq~o'etdrinilsth~rf~criebcadiI hdb

id.tdn

hd"M~th rem nt-dd es ~fIie~t~fi ~Ike~d~~{thefjr Iidfitiddfl Eut areasj thetnbf uilds"ani~,i1d~~i Tdhe team examinedth 'f th eauiDmeny'~and.v'arious. othd'-,.fire&briad . conditini h'or theiona'i"~abeli s iio-P"al,iei~eam' obs~erved wthrmeenextliahiln wa s roiefr eronhel eVacuation'DathWavs'to the oit~ie; dxi'M6' dentified i',the.aoalFr an lexamination: bf ~kdb mr apparatues' wer examindan oesvi6 fi;-bbit6atd~iip &w§,o veri~thaj~fi~&inira' pireestratedi es a daiswerei"onsisi tih-W thfiefire__ qram Po etea a 'i i iiof'rawins~ an Thiat ii.sfbfir r§dhcause6d-fod associated wiortfiana pqip"me't-dri6f-stems fort eiTrainTB" SWitchgeajr, Ro~;Eet~lEuoe ivtis6r$ik6 for~h-fire'suPpreson-l MSy. desiva nto'~roc6eurslntcaesWe ado~telv,'hVieW'L4dfdr the"potehtiWl frnb~io.tefr 5otci~iDom~S i~~t~i'd ~saui~b S ~i'2 drii ieieCnii ~~~~~~~~~~~t M -P, B!r

23 bet~~~~~iiv6~~~~~~n the T~~~~~6ii, t anr6n6aipp'T$Is --oir ificmnf~~h lcni bas'*TatdiSKdr oer2vtatmo2 te ir~~~diri '§di ~;L~h~e d .va6iat'is proc t'- ti~cotain~ e An ~Vi1CFR 2 :O-rTffJdin oiifih (OLC) 2.C(2O.h-ri~- f, od rain A S , tc Wtch _&,R 6rZA'i3u 'rir 3re',of tha; rv~vpez~ H, 6 ix .t ~ '~ .i's~i~Vd mtv'a ?sia cturbefthflDo edoth U.D -C),a6 !jidiThUtetihd frmedd~ 66giEe(IEEE) ~Istlndrehies":~doc~hrnnsrvee aelse nhAtci I ___-1isam as7oi a nb s . e eae I~ctnca1acewa~.fre~bamefysternL(RFBS)~eb d enosrarfler.ffatiiresaedj ransformer nspa~ - UFSAR- bTSU ddiid~' ev ubinl 97 hseauto bom6 in PSQ:E -ES9-70t'ft jIdd toldehfif that th"67t~sores to~ained bop11stible 'silidon ilatinda ~fuidi§A-s--PLTI'iiI Er .#ttI oh' ' -Nid dbb e n e" a i;QAIiRb SF~1OY~~utdi~b

24 earn 6i ~ ~ ~ idFiitifte SI slccn tr ~~~'e ~Itd bVlh'e-,c&.brhU~tiblbj~f ludi~t~ii~i~df ii~~ l* TLE U~it~S6~s ~T~f6 ~In ~structi&,maiWt rco I~d~~ f1 ttrih diectric ingulatinq-ifluid be'samol16d h6iU'61l~hd theedellutd~sb? stdt. ihur'htt i~at 26' KV6fbettef.,;T. excehniie. pUi-fJ~ fou stets, 'o d rbro.199O1~,1992.there~ fwe____ -and t"sted>Tfi suewas te e~ ~ he orc ~~alvsis~~~~Th~~. i~~~iii~~~d~~t~rmined'i hat tfifi' fi~dh ~a~c~e wt t'~t aaains extenal fators:attnbuteb"and affecte6d thie obiec0t',ve6f,"he intitlevents 'hald'q~cr"W~dvan .ieonre~ieopfjraecftha c~erel 6'teSithdid nf6t.n~iblv- the: [neiosaietifi e'adtinofN aorydi vto reb retT Athr firns "ha'vev§bi siig~Th&'flih--Wn -cbsded t;a i~i~lemen'~ndifiaitain~n efect all do ifi UFSAotedhlo SSD 6D- bbi thser~eaa~~be an L r 6rt., fi~~~~~~ -: -~ aveItonfurhersatmthat i~i~'th CdtFrS 6' Ha~~hI\\se oefo 66df& t-t,6' ~~~ fi~~~~~~~~.h Yd~~~~~~~~~~~~ and ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~

l-

canOierfnlic-ieNF1;Codiih2', i igs ioni)roc mil":'.: 80002 66tion 81.3,s a es:

'U"'nitc zareirf Mddbl'studi6§-6f'

n't' sz" d 6 s i "goes'%" 6 t e fi t 1 a I -fi r

25 zlatJotetia 'o ,tose treas ,ccurrina and theb,,ffect of ioostulated-Tiesoisf WA "d 6 i~~~iattastt Pr> 4 c . 8^0fi ,%,cckie s ..-E'*. Iadipe'niveseAtivereon sl neet OiR isr.sbesfipa 3 nsformer Ra nih __ i3iconedi9_ef n I U fluid i tranS ocated .nEridtZ1asinot on~sidy ey~va~uad asdst FHAeiof 1d f effects an tifficac6-a66aolh~i't6~enise n did nonttmeeteithe rreauiremen t P.ta p Yt~~~in Q85 u V if ma e d o . ans i s et'S ecausen.theCfalr5't e.Sutn.-siC c2obsil tasomeŽiionlil triabnur.t, FrcoannthRoeFHadiai-hrEAi ovr o ~ me3.' - 'C mimni;.. _&a J -. t .io r- sNC 91 aniica~ce.ad,,as~e~e eter zno~te orrctie~cto raa'-. s(R203063 05 &. i. FIIii- I ns~etionS&*riel

• e team serif led that~adeut commnication svstemi

i eumntiefld~6 16n ,oodiateth sutdwr<.f,thelnt and irebriae duies, nldalhstenaii PA)lo. andLoundowred nh~ohe sstems was avaiable consistent with 3sseswhetherthevwere~soe-vlae~r th iese SA~oetdf and intearated into-the ost-fireluSSDrPedures.tf:iThe

eamwaled

.dow setios6o hiost-fIrSSD vr&66du res-and - hcedjffiaeuate . zrcesst he'eam als .rv~eea he Pe ic testinfi- of th ifte flireilarmanP

vtms.ma ntenanree checidistskOd

hasudDowere~hn~rut 'And amblifie!rs; alntenancelsrveil lance' test i ramfor the com munIcat~ions systems ;wassuf ficient 'Z>-4* 1 r' - _ , -i-. !r -~ya -2r P /,

• .

g~np~oer ation a .ti efens

iiird>- V ss 06 .:. LI . Q~fdins~f sgnicance""' ei etfi6&,t EW~~ .. .:.:...a Es R c . ,io ~, .r-.................. ,, -

26 Segnt i ibhldF5Lbid Rtreiires -ioti-'a'u'd Oberat~~~~~~r ~ ~ nnerirapoc Iii~tia requirementsh' nevaluatedin'teliensees'. Suaend' '.r6T t1'Tsdtir: thefADbendix R-safe shutdownrocedures sdescdn~d i UFSAR ApDendix 5 SieiioV J.D~r, tunna lant walktd dtddswher6oteratorso ocalmanal atonderled njth Dot-fie SD:'brocedures§.- the~teamqinsciectedae determine fadeauate iluminaton *as available to correctlv and Derfom the rea onaccessand earess oathwavs'used durifi;SSDactivities'for'a and6.e:sonel safetve~ -.The team'checke'difTtheELUs' battervdoOwer suDplies wererated wth at least'an'8hour caditv.t I addition'the team-reviewedthe manufa i tiorio 'nhdffi'e'lis-es-e-e"'s,"license'e';Denrodic r'Mantea'c'tss o'en ELUs'Were peroiy g 6 fd.'maintatinedin S Inspectionbcor e rheteam:w.alked down the seect ed fre-zoneslareas to aluate the adequacvoft re resistance of, barner. e cltIqs rea fls. fitdr"a.moers.andcabierotectito'ns team randovtiic1 .sev fire bamoer svsturinianc eA _~~~~~~~~~- a in frearre e (ERFBS) nciosu'resto ensurethaat frate tearisd the matria con' and 6~icon~fritib6f the selecd fira, &d !d and a reViewedconstruction .details'and suD~ortincaiirexendu'ra'nc6test' ,>Re~~~~d" lef'f'fr^--r e- >^w;atu'rb;S;'+r-l;2-t;-t e9g;: .t.s<a!i.>d: t -t-cva* n nstalled coma t Denetai ~B coirtio tote esad

.ef cofqraos. Tetearn alsb' coniared* the:'Denetration se'l'ad~ ERES atings with jThedtea~revlewed licensina 'curentati neern o 86'.1 0filre;,b'arierfe'tu r'endFlAcde devationsverfvthattheire nsatHiiiomt'deian r qcirerents and license commitmnents.f lr~dditinih6:tem' e

• .

-t

d w s i . h: r- - II i ueiewed~survli[anceiana maintenance Drocedure for selected fire' t vifythe ffbies br eing ade'qute

27 ind..'. 3 f a team ~revjew nwere ntie' S Ieeotior~dnvrii o re;DUnieo r Va ains.- e evaluated w ton .schareati water deliernod uDDIizses. control ircuir ecnical entssb loss 6f fide :waterasuOvtthebiantt dietrio'1y.motienim rebers ',alkddbM'eiteme"Drotection water UDDV svsteW6YrdaiD 17gaffii1evlated6whethetd bmo~frelremoeto waeSelvn~d'sp X-< i,-+r--;g2-mcv-6f: ';i RC nfdr W i-; is t 4_;ti Win4rs8;t ;;1z2 g .l itv!Y,** d'Ninstalled ire jN F-ares p: h&2DanefnAoe Ins'cow ~le'd bzeIrtn d fn-e--e c failur fdetect-rica in g zt k i tb j I n'i r _+:-t ut, ded'.+8wife..areaglfKr4<l* st cv<-$ uz4f t ,,thi . Gp<4f; e rt

^Si

J udlior cotroa:cfi uts nd useun dwdbl os~ffevatni',nd~let~h,-ln dduoreasllonsvstebmsinstaled to r tv:e Dlaement -andrDiv svfe V natenal-tbstcucion:tionsThr 'O eabi`tvaonsn and e na t 3no0,abtlt6h>uress ytstem ns or-eacgceareaw apb es eleam eviewed the dead bi & inFe'Teti'n a UD ~ ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ J 6d I and ,fife ,'_-;h,,s<,..;,gr- ts`; e sseioilo u ato vdnNi n evlations t i ' to -wth the rlicensee i Nmd f -i, 6 - 7- . .itl~sfr'N P e.eitgoh

SUPPLEMEN AL-INFORMATION N O O IE5~ NSQC~A seersonni In _'. V..!Bamedt7 o n EnRlneennq " '~~~~~~~~-

. STOFATEM "OP L EA O ehe ~50389IO3- 2O) Dieltnc. Inuatn Iluitua~CouteTn sftjji l j~t s { -t 9 <pje .t~- r $ I b t Vs:. .;_' WN ';' It <, 1 1< S~tv j a,<

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lt/l i$ St3' , r J: i- , - o' ~,t " . 4 D~ieectric ns~latlnq~lui,.,as'-a~sontnutortg~,,oLr,,,o 66din ATTACHMENT

iS T OF. I D O C U-M: E-VIEW- ",W. D , , KIS4QF .OCUMETSi EVIEWED. . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h1 .'t .

iRv-:Fg:jvlPro cvion ..... rbe'durb "s: Native. tic du. e~r001 0434' .P.,anVFijfProtection G.uideline7 Wdmnlpii~it~tiocrei 80OO0ir&Pl tbn!Jar RRe25 ,nca~~~~~~~~~~~~ 'ii _3i' ciioneral:Malntecesl~u =e atcuatioi and iEva6iaLioris SL-.FR.ER5009-O4iIDispsbsiti6ii6T6tinf2 ;Froe etiojd'WtemS oncbsn'e;'Rbv.-ia blatior~~~~b.Stti arrie I_ a r.in(Stind Bt-, T i '-CabI6TrayF FiSto 'Rddei;' ' - Jaa1lBt6Rde-t.ethofiareas r i e uion';2~d 'e~rmia-,. i2$2k0 vaiton to`dbtrt iln ntiIc ne1riaI:Mana hersrciisffUjt - A5- d2B5nd 2B2; dateciac;X2,0.3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ ..i i98BB9.gi~actoyABuia di PjynbinWdD#~aiaseelan iE43Rl0 2999W733 ;:F'irdcte 99 85'Re ac6tAroAiii ibfVoBUidridRobiand uoi Stie'du!" 3V8 998 2-882EACEdUtein't'SchIe'~d'!end Detais'Rev: ' 2' ALV:&'319'ALHFire D ~~~ Wat~~~~~~~~r~~~ PR~~~~ 6 '14 ATTACHMENT

}*lidable,;Codsa'ltnrs: IEEEStadai OOSan i ar r16 . El"""" 6T - A w -(:> S S . - - K- a.; n--, ro-,, -s *d- *.- ..- y -' -.1-- - ...-- ,j .-.- - 4FP A;13 thIisallationbirinkler SVsters,-1973,Edition_ _ JF PA>P4\\' 'Standard, .torhe~lnstallation oSaaiead oe Sses>93 dto SF.P.A-20St on a tallatidrbf Centnfuaal. Fire PumDs;,^72 Ediionj NFPA72A Staidartion: Local.ProtectiveSionaIrina;Svstems 1 972 Editio iadifin'tstennj 973Editio ' .FPaegOStandardPn Fi'evon'isWoinarid .93Ettil______ NUREGL.1552;--S Superet1,.ire ae.eetaonSel nNulaPoe.Fats-dt ,- ;'Januar.V.J9u9 GSHA"sandrd 29,CFRi 1 91 6 cS HeauthtStioardsn ,"'ort§ ;Audits ahnd:'S'elf-Asesme ReWeWed] 'pOSL '(S

S'e;07aifi

ther -*D ounents ,PI EEELSub~iitfa1.o S iI /nt 1-ad2S Odtd eeb15

• ini-t1~

i ea 6s+Eam>B.'-P 3; o4- Ui6,65it!:-.Xe..M JFSAR v~~p~endiA P9ant Fire ProtebtioPobam~ noGire eV 7 Wd6Gr'-fIv7-e . 0572,'Fre 17ron i eletnal aitennc Proedr 52.O1i,: eodic'Maintennceof1 4.6O;,oit Swstchqear b003 F i4r trSwit'chaear' Roo4Xy F irAR'a A: 2 efire;'Sttatio

etir~ad-Ro Fire AreaBReV'.23_ r- .SV~-,-,, N&A-, Oki 3n - .'re-fire, Strateav Nor2. a- Pwnefr. oo Room B! reAee3 Pr6e r -A ej -61th-0 I ~~~~~W_ Se AUNT. (Mv~~~~~~~~F "

• v~reriteqyrs

or,25,,,,P ersRe~onnelR4omto re-est~f:3)liRtlirtah h PieareeaAoer esfi~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~t __Ut~~~~~~tM 6 of __ 49 'rWsit~tataos57- B5udin FrF/moe Dae QCded"2i 'eftttf b asco.;-tfo ~Flodda.,Power.anhd 'Li'a'ht. ontesbiddtbf U; ,uallfaloes-r Pulfrman' ndusines' Interri'~al Exansion C-De r,`AssbhmblY` adAbfifl 1 6,A^x . eoaitne.TReDrt.sFlkR408ie 7- Eponsgmer Lrjdujt baettomnssoi~p~~ RcllAert;nvensvs'BI S EiCA~bMANUA1;SNNDOR INRMATIO6N h ng 56,16l, d:' e ti@^t -<>+ e>.s> r, .- Wa7 ATTACHMENT

~oi'mCrni;561 Smnicbn ran ierFiid'Te'chiaMualA O;453-971997 'ag Sheemdl95'Pendntd' es. rinl Sprinkrbr'atioj _ ~~~~~r ciahe!Model L-2055E:: d1 us l Of a~ctflndFirG FiOSTtIi200n .~ ~ -. v .R .ea R REPORTS'.-AUDITS. AND SELFASSESSMENTSREVIEWED,- -R98-405fEvalaVei6Dev:tioFrom ffiNFPA1.I3 p 975de_ _ -Ra98s As- 'eiuitsaidirw Hose;No2I6 in;tB>it R~~~~~d'i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Sat~ __________________ .PSL

-- , ; 1 ATTACHMENT

-- ENGINEERING BRANCH I FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION DEBRIEF Inspection of: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Report Number: 50-335,389/03-02 Inspection Dates: March 10-14 and 24-28, 2003 (onsite inspection) Type of Inspection: TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION: Fire Protection Features and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability Inspectors: M. Thomas, Lead/Operations Inspector; G. Wiseman, Fire Protection Inspector; S. Walker, Electrical Inspector; P. Fillion, Electrical Inspector (Open Items Followup); F. Jape, Operations Inspector (Training); R. Deem, Contractor (Mechanical Systems/Operations); Accompanying Personnel: R. Rodriguez, Nuclear Reactor Safety Intern, will be in training and support the open items followup/Electrical areas. Inspection Scope: This inspection was conducted in accordance with revised Inspection Procedure 71111.05, Fire Protection, dated 03/23/01, and the NRC Reactor Oversight Process. The inspection team focused their review on the separation of the systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown and fire protection features of these plant areas. The team used IPEEE data, with assistance from the RII Senior Risk Analyst, to identify risk significant plant areas and components among those with the highest CDFs and CCDPs. The fire areas/fire zones chosen for review during this inspection are: 3. Unit 2 Fire Area B - Cable Spreading Room (Fire Zone 52). A fire in this area could result in evacuation of the Unit 2 main control room (MCR) and the plant could be brought to cold shutdown from a remote location even with the loss of all unprotected equipment and cables in Fire Zone 52. Use of Train "A" equipment is credited for a fire in this area. 2. Unit 2 Fire Area C - Dual elevation fire area encompassing Fire Zone 34 (Train "B" Switchgear Room) and Fire Zone 48 (Electrical Equipment Supply Fan Room). Fire Area C and the essential equipment and cables within, have been evaluated with respect to the protection and separation criteria of Appendix R, Section III.G.2 to assure that the ability to safely shut down the plant is not adversely effected by a single fire event. Safe shut down of Unit 2 from the MCR using Train "A" equipment is credited for a fire in this area. 3. Unit 2 Fire Area I - consists of Fire Zone 51 West (Cable Loft), Fire Zone 21 (Personnel Rooms), Fire Zone 32 (PASS and Radiation Monitoring Room), Fire Zone 331 (Instrument Repair Shop), and Fire Zone 23 (Train "B" Electrical Penetration Room). Fire Area I and the essential equipment and cables within, have been evaluated with respect to the protection and separation criteria of Appendix R Section Il.G.2 to assure that the ability to safely shut down the plant is not effected by a single fire event. ATTACHMENT

Safe shut down of Unit 2 from the MCR using Train "A" equipment is credited for a fire in this area. INSPECTION RESULTS: Two Findings were identified. Finding No. I Silicone oil filled transformers in Unit 2 fire areas'were not evaluated in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) as required by the Fire Protection Program commitments. The affected fire areas were Fire Area A (Fire Zone 37, A SWGR Rm); Fire Area C (Fire Zone 34, B SWGR Rm); and Fire Area QQ (Fire Zone 47, Turbine Bldg SWGR Rm). This finding is More Than Minor. The 380 gallons of transformer silicone dielectric cooling fluid In each transformer was not evaluated In the FHA as contributors to fire loading and effects on SSD In FZ 34, 37 or 47. Note: This finding affects: 1. Existing fire protection licensing bases (deviations to Appendix R granted by the NRC) 2. Current engineering evaluations allowed under GL 86-10 for fire protection barriers or systems not submitted to the NRC (CR 02-0396, Derated Thermo-Lag fire barrier wall partition separating the CSR and B Switchgear Room) 3. IPEEE Risk Analysis for Fire Events (the transformers were likely not accounted for in ISDS and could affect total CDF for the fire areas. 4. The maintenance and surveillance programs for transformer related fluid sampling and condition evaluations. (Note: Will be followed up by Resident inspectors).. The licensee initiated CRs 03-0637 and 03-0978 to address this finding Missed Opportunities For Identification: In 1997 the licensee conducted an UFSAR Combustible Loading Update evaluation documented in PSL-ENG-SEMS-97-070 but failed to identify that the transformers in fire zone A37 contained combustible silicone fluid.

PSL Triennal FP Audit in 2001 documented in QA audit ReportQSL-FP-01-07 reviewed the FHA but did not identify any fire loading discrepancies. Finding No. 2 Use of Manual Operator actions outside the MCR for IIl.G.2 areas (Fire Area C and Fire Area I) without prior NRC approval. 'Many manual operator actions were used in lieu of physical .protection of cables and equipment relied on for SSD during a fire. This was a deviation ATTACHMENT

- - from the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee identified this issue in CR 03- 0153 prior to this inspection. This finding is More Than Minor. This finding will be Unresolved pending completion of the SDP to determine the risk associated with using the manual operator actions in lieu physical protection. (NOTE: The NRC and the Nuclear industry are working to resolve this issue on a generic basis). In addition to the two findings, eight condition reports (CRs) were written as a result of this inspection. The CRs were evaluated against and determined to meet the NRC criteria for minor issues and will not be discussed in the report details. CR 03-0847 CR 03-0888 CR 03-0942 CR 03-0964 CR 03-0965 CR 03-0966 CR 03-0986 CR 03-1010 Hot shutdown repairs using tools to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire Update UFSAR to delineate that Deviation C6 previously approved by the NRC for fire areas A & C is no longer required Discrepancies between the safe shutdown analysis (SSA), essential equipment list (EEL), and the breaker/fuse coordination study Rubatex insulation installed on instrument lines in the U2 intake (fire area R- R) is not considered in the FHA Combustible fire load for Ul and U2 intake fire areas same in the field but different values listed each unit's FHA Temp Mod (installation of fans between cable spreading room and B SWGR room) did not sufficiently evaluate potential impact on fire protection Discrepancies between SSA and EEL. Determined that EEL was in error Cold shutdown repairs identified in licensee procedures, but UFSAR states that no credit is taken for post-fire repair of cold shutdown equipment Open Items Reviewed: Three open items assigned to EB1 were reviewed for closure. URI 50-335,389/99-08-03, PORV Cabling May Not Be Protected From Hot Shorts Inside Containment (Closed- Green NCV) LER 50-335,389/00-001, Outside Design Bases Appendix R Hi-Lo Pressure Interface and Separation Issues LER 50-335/00-004, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Conduit Separation Outside Appendix R Design Bases ATTACHMENT

LESSONS LEARNED: Successes:

Followed up on three open items

Nuclear Safety Intem (Reinaldo Rodriguez) involvement and support on open items

Experience/knowledge of Fire Protection Inspector

Resident inspector followup of licensee's sampling of transformer oil Challenges:

Better coordination by team leader with licensee for open item followup

Completing SDP for the open items

Effect of fire on instrumentation needs to be reviewed in more depth and detail ATTACHMENT }}