ML040050085
| ML040050085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/2002 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML040050085 (54) | |
Text
Final Exercise Report Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority Exercise Dates:
October 2,2002 Report Date:
December 30,2002 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1 11.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................
2 I11.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW....................................................................................................
4 A.
EPZ Descnption.......................................................................................................
4 B.
Exercise Participants................................................................................................
4 C.
Exercise Timeline....................................................................................................
5 IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND FSSULTS....................................................................
7 A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.
Table 2................................................
7 R.
Status of Jurtsdicr~ons Evaluated.............................................................................
9 1.
STATE OF TENNESSEE..........................................................................
11 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center..............................................
11 1.2 Dose Assessment...........................................................................
12 1.3 Field Coordination Center..............................................................
13 1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center.......................................
14 1. 5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams...........................................
14 1.6 Central Emergency Control Center................................................
15 1.7 Joint Infomiation Center................................................................
15 2.
RISK JURISDICTIONS............................................................................
16 2.1 BRADLEY COUNTY...................................................................
16 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center...........................................
16 2.1.2 Reception and Conyegate Care.........................................
16 2.1.3 Traffic Controi Points........................................................
17 2.2 H.AM ILTON COUNTY.................................................................
18 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center...........................................
18 2.2.2 Reception and Congregate Care.........................................
18 2.2.3 Protective Action for Schools............................................
19 2.2.4 Traffic Control Points........................................................
1~
1
2.3 RHEA COUNTY...........................................................................
20 Reception and Congregate Care.........................................
20 2.4 MEIGS COUNTY..........................................................................
20 Reception and Congregate Care.........................................
20 2.5 SEQUATCHIE COUNTY.............................................................
21 2.3.1 2.4.1 2.5.1 Reception and Congregate Care.........................................
21 3.
SIJMMARY OF AREAS REQCIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION.......... 23 3.1 2002 ARCAs..................................................................................
23 3.1.1 58-02-I.c.1-A-01 SEOC.....................................................
23 2000 PRIOR ARCA - RESOLVED...............................................
25 3.2.1 58-00-09-A-01 SEOC........................................................
25 3.2.
3.3 1998 PRIOR ARCA... RES0LVE.D.............................................
2 5 3.3.1 58-98-18-A-03 Scquatchie County EWD..........................
25 List of Appendices APPEhDIX 1.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................
27 APPENDIX 2.
EXERCISE EVALUATORS...................................................................
29 MPENDIX 3.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMEN......................................................
31 APPENDIX 4. EXERCISE SCENARIO..........................................................................
32 APPENDIX 5.
MEDICAL DRILL...................................................................................
33 List of Tables Table 1 -
Exercise Tinrelinc....................................................................................................
6 Table 2 -
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation................................................................
8 11
I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
On October 2,2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, conducted a full participation plume pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radioiogicsl emergency response plans (WRP) and procedures. This report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise This was the 13th Federally evaluated offsite preparedness exercise conducted for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted in June 1980, and the previous biennial exercise was conducted on October 4, 2000.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals, including volunteers, who participated in this exercise. The State of Tennessee, Risk Counties ofBradley and Hamilton and Host Counties of Meigs, Rhea and Sequatchie participated in the exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an assiped responsibility for others. Others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emcrgenc.y services to their communities.
Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise. The IJ. S. Army Corps ofEngineers and the U. S. Coast Guard pmticipated in their normal support roles at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).
State and local organizations, except where noted, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. No Deficiencies were found during this exercise. However, one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) concerning the activation of the siren system and the broadcast of the emergency alert system (EAS) message prior to notifying Hamilton County was identified during of this exercise. The correction of an ARCA, concerning coordination with Bradley C.ounty identified during the 2000 cxercise and a 1998 ARCA for reception and congregate care in Sequatchie County were both dcnionstratcd during the exercise..
I
- 11.
INTRODUCTION On Decetnber 7, 1939, the President directed FEMA to assunie the lead responsibility for offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code ofFederal Regulations (CFK) Parts 350, 351 and 352. 'These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Thee Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMAs initial and continued approval of State and local government's radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No.176, September 14, 1993).
Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with rcsponsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
Department of Commerce Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environmental Protection Agency Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Department of the Interior, and Food and Drug Administration Department of Transportation Department of Agriculture Representativcs of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
2
Formal submission of the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Response Plan (MJRERP) for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA Region IV by the State of Tennessee was made in May of 1980. Formal approval of the MJREW was granted on August 7, 1980, under 44 CFR 350. Ajoint REP exercise was conducted on October 2,2002, by FEblA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency prcparedriess organizations in implementing their MJREW and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Sequoyah Kuclear Power Plant.
The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are from the evaluations of the Federal Evaluator tcaam, with final detemiinations made by the ChiefEvahator, FEMA Region IV RAC Chairperson and approved by the Regional Director.
The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
hmEGI-O654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Pians and Preparedness in Support of Nuciear Power Plants, November 1980; FEMA-Radiological Emergcncy Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodoiogy, April 25, 2002.
Section 111, entitled Exercise Overview presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a description of the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities evaluated and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV, entitled Exercise Evaluation and Results presents summarized information on the denronstration of applicable exercise criterion at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains:
(1) descriptions of all ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions and the State and local governments response, and (2) descriptions of ARC.4s assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs efforts to resolve them.
3
111.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section arc data and hasic information relevant to the October 2,2002 exercise to test the offsite emcrgeticy response capabilities in the area surrounding the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
A.
EPZ Description The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), is located on the Tennessee River near the town of Soddy-Daisy in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Portions of Bradley and Hamilton Counties lie within the 10-mile EPZ. The major highways are Interstate 75 and Tennessee Highways 27 and 58. Land use is a mix of residential, business and abg-icicultural.
All or portions of the following counties lie within the 50-mile EPZ: Bledsoe, Bradley, Coi'fee, Cumberland, Franklin, Grundy, Hamilton, Loudon, Mchlinn, Marion, Meigs, Monroe, Polk, Rhea, Rome, Sequatchic, Van Buren, Warren, and White. There are approximately 89,000 persons within the IO-mile EPZ.
R.
Exercise Participants The foilowing State agencies. organizations, and units of government participated in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on October 2.
2002.
STATE OF TENNESSEE Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Department of Envirotlnlent and Consenlation Division of Radiological Health Division of Water Pollution Control Department of Solid Waste Management Bureau of State Parks Department of Safety Department of Transportation Department of Agriculture Public Service Conimission Division of Forestry Department of Human Services Department of h4ental Health Department of Military Department of General Services Wildlife Resource Agency Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 4
RISK JURISDICTIONS Bradley County Hamilton County HOST JURISDICTION Meigs Rhea Sequatchie PFUVATEIVOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS AT&T American Red Cross (ARC)
Bell South WSKZ Radio, Chattanooga C.
Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Squoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercisc on October 2, 2002.
5
Table 1 Exercise Tirneline DATE AND SITE: October 2,2002 - Sequoyah Nuclear Bower Plant Level for Event
IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the result3 and findings of the evaiuation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 2,2002 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ around the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of Exercise Evaluation Methodology Notice, dated April 25,2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation -Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2 on the following page presents the status of all exercise criteria which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdiction? and functional entities. Exercise criteria are iisted by number and the demonstration status of those criteria is indicated by the use ofthe following letters:
M Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assesscd and no unresolved ARCAS from prior exercises)
D Deficiency assessed A
ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercisc(s)
N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7
Table 2.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: October 2,2002 - Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction based, issues only format. Presented below are the definitions of terms used in this subsection relative to criterion demonstration status.
Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or PlRCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARGAS assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise critcria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recomniended corrcctive actions.
Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next hieilliial exercise.
Not Demonstrated - Listing ofthe exercise criteria, which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs-Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs ~ Unresolved - Descriptions ofARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennkti cxcrcise. The foilowing are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which may he discussed in this report.
A Deficiency is defined in FEMA REP Program Manual as "...an obsenwl or identified inadequacy of org'anizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
An ARCA is defined in FEMA REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."
9
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEhlA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
0 Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
0 Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
Evaluation Area Criterion - A number, letter and number corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Program Manual.
Issue Classification Identifier - (D =Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
0 0
0
- 1.
STATE OF TENNESSEE 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The SEOC is located in a National Guard facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The use of commercial telephones for support coordination allowed for rapid assessment and deployment of requested assets and kept personnei apprised of situations within the affected area. Briefings were succinct, informative and updated the staff with plant conditions and external factors affecting communication as the exercise progressed. A team concept was apparent as the staff worked well together in decision-making and displayed their commitment to the citizens of Tennessee. Dissemination of infomiation to Hamilton and Bradley Counties and the Sequoyah Xuclear Power Plant took place periodically with the Director and his staff. However, the Operations Office did not inform Hamilton County of the activation ofthe prompt notification system until after its activation.
- a.
MET: Criteria 1.a.l., 1.h. 1., 1.d. 1., 1.e. 1., 2.a. 1., 2.b. 1., 2.b.2., 3.a. I. j 3.b. I ; 1 5.a. 1.
and 5.b. 1.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AFtEAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
I S U ~
NO.: 58-02-1.c.l-A-01 Condition: During the initial activation of the prompt notification system, the SEOC did not infomi Hamilton County until after the sirens were activated and the EAS message was transmitted.
Possible Cause: The plan states in Annex B.I.B.2.h: the warning of the general pubIic is the responsibility of local governments in coordination with the SEOC... and the Hamilton County Implenicnting Procedures state: The Director of the SEOC will coordinate the issuanc.e of evacuation orders with the Director of the Hamilton County Emergency Operation Center (HCEOC) prior to notification to the public. The activation of the sirens and the broadcast of an EAS message are accomplished at the SEQC. Spccific instructions to coordinatc with the counties prior to activation of the public alert and notification system are not provided for the decision-makers.
Reference:
NUREG 0654, E.1 and E. 5 Annex B.l.B.2.b, MJRERP Effect: Not knowing when the public is notified of the emergency situation, could stress the emergency response organization by either overwhelming the 91 1 center or by not having sufficient staff available to deal with increased public inquiries at the County.
11
1.2 Recommendation
Review and revise procedurcs to ensure that coordination with the counties takes place before any notification of the public.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: In Annex A, Appendix 7 to the 2003 version of the Sequoyah and Watts Bar plans, an instruction to notify risk counties of alert and notification system activation times will be inserted in the SEOC Directors checklist. All personnel tasked with SEOC Director duties will be briefed on the subject finding and receive supplemental training on the revised checklists. All corrective actions will be complete with the publication ofthe January 1,2003 MJRERPs.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS
~ RESOLVED:
Issue No: 58-00-09-A-01
==
Description:==
The Tennessce MJRERI states: Since a radiological release may have multi-jurisdictional implications, the State will activate this emergency plan and control the response to the emergency at all levels. (Basic Plan,Section V.A.2.b, page BP-4). The plan also states the primary responsibility of responding to an emergency affecting the health and safety of residents of Bradley County rests with local government. The County Executive made the decision to order an evacuation of all residents in Bradley County within the 10-mile EPZ, which exceeded the decision of the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). The TEMA Director of Operations, when presentcd with this information failed to properly coordinate with the County. He did not assure that the additional evacuation area requested by the Bradley County was effectively communicated to the public, or, if the State had not concurred, taken the necessary steps to inform the county.
Corrective Action: During the 2002 Sequoyah exercise, the decision-making process was performed smoothly and accurately. This resolves the 2000 ARCA.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE
- f.
Dose Assessment The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRII) Radiation Control Officer (RCO) interacted with the SEOC Director in formulating protective action recommendations (PAR). The Tennessee DRH dose assessment staff demonstrated their ability to produce dose projections using the Radiological Assessment System for Consequences Analysis (RASCAL) 2.2 computer progam. The DRH RCO and the TVA Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM) in the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) effectively communicated regarding radioactive material releases and shared all
appropriate information. lhe two TVA representatives in the SEOC were knowiedgeable and provided information on plant conditions to the Tennessee DRH KCO. The ability to calculate and coordinate dose projections was professionally denionstrated by the staff.
- a.
~~ET:Criterial.a.I.,l.c.I.,
l.d.l.,2.a.I.,2.b.l.,2.b.2.and3.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NOhX C
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NOM!
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Field Coordination Center The Field Coordination Center (FCC) serves as backup to the SEOC and provides a location for representatives from all State Agencies to coordinate State response activities in the local area. Each representative made contact with hisiher counterpart in the SEOC and was kept well informed of the activities of their respective organizations. Frequent briefings were held in the FCC allowing each organization an opportunity to inform the FCC team of the activities, concerns and needs resulting in an overall coordinated response. Problems encountered, such as the actual loss of the commercial telephone system and the simulated loss of offsite power, were quic.kly overcome by the use of backup systems. Overall, the FCC staff was well managed, informed and ready to assume the State lead response role if needed.
- a.
ILIET:CriteriaI.a.l., l.b.l., l.c.l., 1.d.l.andl.e.l.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NOPE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 13
,,,... ~:.~.~.~.~.~.~~.~.;:;:~~:,:~~-
~
1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center The DRH was pre-positioned at the Radiological Monitoring Control Center JRMCC) in the Air National Guard facility. Lovell Field, Chattanooga, TN. The DRIf staff successfully demonstrated the ability to direct radiological field monitoring teams (FMT),
exchange field team data with the TVA field team coordinator, arid promptly forward such data to the SEOC in Nashville. Seven FMTs, five state and two TVA, were efficiently directed from the RMCC. All personnel were knowledgeable and performed their duties in a professional manner.
- a.
MET:CritenaI.a.I.,i.b.l.,I.c.l., I.d.l.,l.e.l.,2.a.l..2.b.1..2.b.2.,3.a.l.,
3h.l.,4.a.1.,4.b.2.and4.a.3.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NOhT 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Tennessee deployed five FMTs for the exercise, four were evaluated and one was deployed for training purposes. All evaluated teams established and maintained conimunicatioiis with the RMCC throughout the exercise. The teams were equipped with appropriate instrumentation that had been calibrated within the requirements of the plan.
The teams, managed by the RMCC, located and defined the extent of the plume and used Global Positioning Systems for the first time. This allowed thc precise location of each team relative to the reactor site and substantially contributed to the ease of finding pre-determined monitoring locations in thc field. Proper procedures for emergency worker exposure control were used.
- a.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE MET: Criteria I.d.i., l c l., 3.a.l., 3.b.l.) 4.a.1., 4.a.2. and 4.a.3.
C.
AREAS REQUIFUNC CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR hRCAs -RESOLVED: NONE 14
.........................ii i......
..,.,.,..... ~.......,........... w--
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.6 Central Emergency Control Center The CECC is an excellent facility for effectively managing and conducting emergency operations. Communication, coordination and the flow of technical information between and among the utility operator and the State officials, both at CECC and the SEOC, were outstanding. The State officials dispatched to the CECC were knowledgeable, well trained, and carried out their responsibilities in a professional and efficient manner. All of the exercise criteria, ;is specified in the negotiated Extent-of-Play Agreement, were succ.cssfiilly demonstrated.
- a.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: N O W MET: Criteria I.a. 1., 1.b. I., I.c.1.) 1.d. 1., l.e.l., 3.a. 1. and 5.a. 1.
C.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE P.
PFUOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 Joint Information Center The Joint Infornration Center (JIC) is located in the TVA Headquarters complex in downtown Chattanooga. This excellent faciiity provided working space for the JIC staff from the State, Bradley and Hamilton Counties and TVA. The JIC staff worked well together, providing accuratc and timely information to the media. A total of four media briefings were conducted. Mock Media participation was chsllenging to the spokespersons, but handled very well. The briefings were supplemented by nine State and County news releases. Public hquiry/Rumor Control was staffed by nine individuals who responded to 63 calls during the exercise.
- a.
MET:Criterial.b.l., l.d.l., l.e.l.and5.b.l.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEhlONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PFUQR ARCAs -RESOLVED: SONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE
- 2.
RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 BRADLEY COUNTY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC IS co-located with the 91 1 center and is weil equipped to handle emergency operations. The Emergency Management Director provided direction and control while receiving excellent support from a seasoned EOC staff. Elected oficials including the County Executive and the County Manager were present and participated throughout the exercise. Volunteer agencies included radio amateur civil emergency services (RACES).
the American Red Cross (ARC) and members of the Tennessee Civil Air Patrol who flew over the area and provided real time photos to the EOC staff. Visual aids included maps and a large display of the EOCs computerized activity log that was maintained throughout the exercise. The EOC staff were knowledgeable and pro-active during the exercise.
- a.
MET:Criterial.a.l., l.b.l., 1.c.l. l.d.l., l.e.1.,2.~.1.,3.b.l.,3.~.1.,3.c.2..3.d.I.
and 5.b. 1.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PNOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Reception and Congregate Care Personnel at the Ocoee Middle School mass care shelter successfully demonstrated the capability to provide services, accommodations, and appropriate monitoring and decontamination for evacuees. The ARC Shelter Manager and the Bradley County Radiological Officer provided a walk-through of the facility. Communications capabilities, shelter supplies, stations for various services, and staffing were described or observed. Monitoring demonstrations were performed in accordance with procedures. In addition, the workers displayed a thorough knowledge of radiological exposure control, including procedures for ingestion of potassiuni iodide (KI). Bradley County Health 16
Department personnel provided a walk-through of decontamination procedures. The staff was professional and displayed a positive attitude in the conduct ofactivities.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.d.l., 3.a.l. 6.a.l. and6.c.i.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NOhT
- e.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS -UNRESOLVED: NONE;:
2.1.3 Traffic Control Points The Bradley County Sheriffs Department is responsible for establishing traffic control points (TCP). Establishment of TCPs was simulated by making appropriate telephone calls. The Lieutenant and his deputies identified the location of the TCPs, when they would be established, the equipment that would be available for use, and the communications equipment that would be employed. Both deputies were very knouriedgeable about radiological exposure control, including the procedures for ingestion of KE. The Lieutenant and deputies were professional and knowiedgeable of their responsibilities.
- a.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE MET: Criteria 1.d.l.. 3.a.I., 3.b.l., 3.d.i. and 3.d.2.
C.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIFUNC CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 17
2.2 HAMILTON COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC is co-located with the 91 1 center. A well trained staff accomplished their tasks promptlyand planned the actions to take ifthe situation worsened. The Director of Operations and the Emergency Management Director effectively managed emergency operations. They notified EOC staff immediately of changes in plant conditions and protective actions received from the SEOC. Briefings included discussion from the staff on their activities.
- a.
R;IET:CriteriaI.a.l.,I.b.l.,I.c.l.,I.d.l.,l.e.l.,2.3.1.,2.c.l.,3.a.1.,3.b.I.,3.c.l.,
3.c.2. and 3.d.2.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRIKG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: N O M
- f.
PRIOR hRCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.2 Reception and Congregate Care Hamilton County demonstrated reception and congregate care at East Ridge and Orchard Knob Middle Schools on September 26,2002. The staffrepresented the health department, responsible for monitoring, and the ARC, responsible for mass care operations. All staff were knowledgeable of their duties and performed them well. They monitored the evacuees in accordance with their procedures and walked through the decontamination process. The shelter managers discussed mass care operations including staffing of the facility, obtaining additional supplies and opening additional shelters if needed.
- a.
MET: Criteria3.a.l.. 6.a.l. and 6.c.l.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACIION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNIRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.3 Protective Action for Schools On May 14-I5,2002, nine schools demonstrated relocation procedures in accordance with plans and procedures. The evaluation was conducted through interviews with the school principals and selected staff. Principals of Soddy, Ganns, John Allen, Falling Water and North Hamilton County Elementary, Hunter Road, Loftis and Soddy-Daisy Middle and Soddy-Daisy High schools were very knowledgeable of their pians and procedures for relocating students to paired schools. Schools are equipped with Tone Alert Radios located in the principal's office. Principals are assigned pagers. buses are equipped with two-way radios and teachers are equipped with walkie-talkies, which allows for communication between school officials, bus drivers, arid the emergency mairagement office. Teachers are assigned buses to ride to maintain accountability of their students.
- a.
MET: Criteria 3.a.l. and 3.c.2.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.4 Traffic Control Points Personnel from Public Works and the Sheriff's Department demonstrated the ability to establish TCPs. Plans and procedures identiflr TCPs to be maimed or to be controlled by barricades. The Shenff s Department personnel demonstrated an excellent knowledge of their responsibilities. During exercise play, impediments to evacuation were identified and resolved. The EOC simulated using Traffic Assistance Teams (TAT) to clear impediments. The teams have wreckers to move vehicles. and are equipped to provide fuel and oil, and have the ability to make minor repairs to vehicles to keep traffic flowing All personnel interviewcd were knowledgeable of dosimetry and radiological exposure control procedures.
- a.
MET: Criteria3.a.1..3.d.l. and3.d.2.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE E.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE.
19
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3 RHEA COUNTY 2.3.1 Reception and Congregate Care On September 25,2002, County personnel successfully demonstrated reception and congregate care activities at Rhea Central Elementary School. Two einergcncy wzorkers from the Rhea County Fire Department Emergency Medical Service (EMS) conducted monitoring demonstrations. Monitors performed operational checks on equipment and took a background reading prior to mcnitonng. Emergency worker kits were complete including dosimeters, Themiohminescent Dosimeters (TLD) and exposure control instructions. A walk through of the decontamination process was conducted. The shelter manager was knowledgeable and described the placement of agencies and services. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) discussed their roles of processing evacuees into the shelter. Security was provided by the Sheriff s office and communication was available.
- a.
MET: Criteria3.a.l.,6.a.1. and6.c.l.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECT~~E ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRlOK ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4 MEIGS COUNTY 2.4.1 Reception and Congregate Care On August 15, 2002, personnel successfully demonstrated reception and congregate care activities at Meigs County High School. Two emergency workers from Meigs County Fire and Rescue EMS conducted monitoring demonstrations. Monitors performed pre-operational checks on equipment and took a background reading prior to monitoring. A walk tllrough of the decontamination process was conducted. The shelter managcr had an 20
excellent knowledge of operations and had a diagram depicting station layout and responsibilities of participating agencies. Department of Hcalth and Human Services described their duties at the shelter. The facility is spacious and able to accommodate 560 personnel. The RACES persoirnel denionstrated their remote capabilities using a laptop computer and cross band radio provided comniunications.
- a.
MET: Criteria3.a.l..6.a.I.and6.c.I.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: XOXE 2.5 SEQUATCHIE COUNTY 2.5J Reception and Congregate Care On September 10, 2002, personnel successfully demonstrated reception and congegate care activities at Sequatchie County High School. Two emergency workers from the Sequatchie County Fire Department and the Health Department conducted monitoring demonstrations. Monitors performed pre-operational checks of equipment and took background readings prior to monitoring. Emergency worker kits were complete to include dosimeters, TLDs and exposure control instructions. A detailed discussion and demonstration of the revised decontamination plan monitoring and decontamination for both contaminated and clean areas for evacuees was conducted. The shelter manager was extremely knowledgeable and had a diagram-depicting placement of organizational layout and responsibilities. DIIHS discussed their services at the shelter. The Sheriffs office provided security and comniunications was available. This evaluation corrects an ARCA identified during the 1998 exercise.
- a.
MET: Criteria 3.a.l.. 623.1. and 6.c.l.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING C0RRE:CTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NOhT
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED:
21
Issue No.: 58-98-18-A-03
==
Description:==
Personnel from the Sequatchie County Fire Department performed the initial monitoring of the evacuees. The monitor did not appropriately follow County procedures for radiological monitoring (Sequatchie County Implementing Procedures, Sequatchie County Health Department, Revision 4, July 1998, pg. EE-16, Section VIE.H.) He did not cover the probe or wear gloves while monitoring.
He also did not check the feet, front and back of the evacuees. He moved the probe too rapidly over the area he surveyed.
The set-up ofthe decontamination area for evacuees requires both contaminated and clean evacuees to traverse a narrow entry hall that makes the separation of clean and contaminated evacuees very difficult, and may cause decontaminated evacuees to step into contaminated area.
Corrective Action Demoestrated: Personnel from the Sequatchie County Fire Department and the Health Department successfiilly demonstrated evacuee monitoring procedures. The set up of the decontamination area was proper and in accordance with their procedures.
- f.
FFUOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NOhE 22
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIOX 3.1 2002 ARCAs 3.1.1 58-02-1.c.l-A41 Condition: During the initial activation of SEOC the prompt notification system the SEOC did not inform Handton County until after the sirens were activated and the EAS message was transmitted.
Possible Cause: The plan states in Annex B.LE.2.b: the warning ofthe general public is the responsibility of local governments in coordination with the SEOC... and the Hamilton County Implementing Procedures state: The Director of the SEOC will coordinate the issuance of evaciiation orders with the Director of the Hamilton County Enicrgency Operation Center (HCEOC) prior to notification to the public. The activation of the sirens and the broadcast of an EAS message are accomplished at the SEOC. Specific instructions to coordinate with the counties prior to activation of the public alert and notification system are not provided for the decision-makers.
Reference:
hTREG 0654, E. I and E.5 and Annex B.LB.2.b. MJRERP.
Effect: Not knowing when the public is notified of the emergency situation, could stress the emergency response organization by either overwhelming the 91 1 center or by not having sufficient staff available to deal with increased public inquiries at the County.
Recommendation: Review and revise procedures to ensure that coordination with the counties takes place before any notification of the public.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: In.hex A.
Appendix 7 to the 2003 versions of the Sequoyah and Watts Bar plans, the following addition will be inserted in the SEOC Directors checklist. All personnel tasked with SEOC Director duties will he briefed on the subject finding and receive 23
supplemental training on the revised checklists. All corrective actions will be complete with publication of the January 1,2(K)3 MJRERPs.
24
3.2. 2000 PRIOR ARCA - RESOLVED 3.2.1 58-00-09-A41
==
Description:==
The Tennessee MJRERP states:
SEOC Since a radiological release may have multi-jurisdictioiial implications, the State will activate this emergency plan and control thc response to the emergency at all levels. (Basic Plan,Section V.A.2.b, page BP-4). The plan also states the primary responsibility of responding to an emergency affecting the health and safety of residents of Bradley County rests with iocal govcmient. The County Executive made the decision to order an evacuation of all residents in Bradley County within the 10-mile EPZ, which exceeded the decision of the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). The TEMA Director of Operation$: when presented with this information failed to properly coordinate with the County. He did not assure that the additional evacuation area requested by the Bradley County was effectively communicated to the public, or, if the State had not conc.urred, taken the necessary steps to inform the county.
Corrective.4ctions: During the 2002 Sequoyah exercise, the decision-making process was perfomled smoothly and accurately. The plan has been changed to include new working on authorities for decisions.
This resolves the 2000 ARCA.
3.3 1998 PRIOR ARCA - WSQLVED 3.3.1 58-98-18-A-03
==
Description:==
Personnel from the Scquatchie Sequatchic COW@
County Fire Department performed the initial EWD monitoring of the evacuees. The monitor did not appropriately follow County procedures for radiological monitoring (Sequatchie County Implementing Procedures, Scquatchie County Health Department, Revision 4, July 1998, pg. EE-16,Section VIII.H.) He did not cover the probe or wear gloves while monitoring. He also did not check the feet, front and back of the evacuees. He moved the probe too rapidly over the area he surveyed.
25
The set-up of the decontamination area for evacuees requires both contaminated and clean evacuees to traverse a narrow entry hall that makes the separation of clean and contaminated evacuees very difficult, and may cause decontaminated evacuees to step into contaminated area.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Personnel from the Sequatchie County Fire Department and the Health Department successfully demonstrated evacuee monitoring procedures. The set up of the decontamination area was proper and in accordance with their procedures.
26
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this rtport.
ARC ARCA CECC CFR DHHS DRK E M EEM EMA EMS F,OC EPZ FCC FEMA FMT HCEOC GE GPS ICF JIC KI MJREKP NRC NLXEG-0654 American Red Cross Area Requiring Corrective Action Central Emergency Control Center Code of Federal Regulations Department of Health and Human Services Division of Radiological Health Emergency Alert System Exercise Evaluation Methodology Emergency Management Agency Emergency Medical Services Emergency Operations Center Emergency Planning Zone Ficld Coordination Center Federal Emergency Managernenl Agcncy Field Monitoring Team Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center General Emergency Global Position System ICF Consulting, Inc Joint Information Center Potassium Iodide Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Response Plan Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654IFEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteriujiw Preprution and Evaluution of Rniliological Emergency Response Plans and Prepredness in Support of,Vucleur Power Plunts. Novenzber lYS0 27
QRO PAD PAR PI0 PNS RAC RACES RCO REP RERP RMC RMCC SAE SEOC SOP SQN TAT TCP TEMA TLD TVA Offsite Response Organization Protective Action Decision Protective Action Recommendation Public Information Officer Prompt Notification System Regional Assistance Committee Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service Radiation Control Officer Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Radiological Monitoring Coordinator Radiological Monitoring Control Center Site Area Emergency State Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Traffic Assistance Team Traffic Control Point Tennessee Emergency hlanagement Agency Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Tennessee Valley Authority 28
APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a Iist of the personnel who evaluated the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on October 2,2002. The organization represented hy each evaluator is indicated beiow.
FEMA ICF
- ICF Consulting Incorporated NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission USCG
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- United States Coast Guard Thomas E. Reynolds Co-RAC Chairman EVALUA'FION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief Evaluator Eddie Hickman FEMA ST.4TE OF TENNESSEE SEQC Eddie Hickman John Grijak Central Emergency Control Center Fonvard Coordinating Center Robert Black RMCC Bernie Hannah Robert Trojanowski Dose Assessment Eddie Fuente FMT #1 Keith Earnshaw FMT #2 Jan Radder FMT #3 James Willison FMI#4 Brad McRee Joint Information Center David Moffet Joshua Moore FEMA FEMA NRC ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF 29
B U D L E Y COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Traffic Control Points Congregate Care (Ocoee Middle Schooi)
HANIILTON COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Traffic Control Points RIIEA COUNTY Reception and Congregate Care MEIGS COUNTY Reception and Congegate Care SEQLATCHIE COUNTY Reception and Congregate Care Joseph Canoles Alvin Hall Wayne Wagner Alvin Hall Lawrence Robertson Tom Scheel Wendy Swygert Wendy Swygert Eddie Hiclanan Eddie Hickman Eddie Hickman FEMA ICF ICF ICF FEMA LJSCG ICF ICF FEMA FEMA FEMA 30
APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERION AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria scheduled for demonstration in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on October 2, 2002 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region W.
A.
Exercise Criterion Attached are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.
E.
Extent-of-Play Agreement The Extent-of-Play Agreement on the following pages was submitted by Tennessee and was approved by FEMA Region lV.
31
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENPEff MILITARY DEFARTMENT OF TEWESSEE 3041 SoUCO DRIVE P 0 BOX 41502 NASHV!LLE. TENNESSEE 37204-1x2 (615) 741-0001 2002 SEQUQYAII NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE STATE OF TENRESSEE IO-MILE PLUhlE EXPOSURE PATII\\VAY GOALS, CRITERIA, AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY A full participation exercise will be conducted during the wcek of September 30, ?W2 for the purpose of demonstrating an integrated radiological emergency response capability for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN). The exercise will be a one-day event, lasting approximately eight hours, encompassing response capabilities and requirements of the State, local governments. and TVA in the 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway.
The State of Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Authority have prepared goals addressing respective obligations.
Both reflect the necessary interactions between the State and local governments as well as the utility as set forth in the Ivlulri-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. l h e six evaluation area coupled with specific criteria to accomplish the following goals have been written in accordance with the FEMA Federal Register Notice, Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Escrcise Evaluation Methodology.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISE GOALS:
State and local government goals for this exercise are:
- 1.
Test as well as evaluate the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Multi-jurisdictianal Radiologic.ai Einergency Response Plan concurrently with local government implementing procedures Demonstrate and assess the continued viability of the integrated radiological emergency response effort through state and local government offsite perscnnel iniplementing response actions in accordance with established guidance Ensure the safety of the general public through the issuance of protective action recommcndations. as appropriate.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Ensure capability inadequacies are noted and corrected as well as pertinent recommendations for improvement implemented.
Evaluation Area 1 - Emergency Operations Management 1.a.
Mobilization Criterion 1 a i : Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC will demonstrate the capability to receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Notification to adjacent states will be demonstrated at the SEOC in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Sequoyah MJRERP. Facilities will be considered operational at START EX with assigned personnel to the SEOC, FCC, RMCC (to inciude Field monitoring teams), and Risk County (Bradley and Haniilton) EOCs pre-positioned and in-place no later than 7:OO AM Central:8:00 AM Eastern time.
The JIC personnel, Stateilocal and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no iater than 8:30 AM Eastern. A11 assigned personnel will remain on duty until END EX. The SEOC and Risk County EMA Birectoristaffs will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
1.b.
Facilities Criterion I.b. I : Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC, RhzCC, JIC, and Risk County EOCs (Bradley and Hamilton) will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures and remain fully operational during the course of the exercise. All facilities will be evaluated to estahlish a baseline for future exercise.
I.c.
Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.I:
Key personnel with leadership roles for the OR0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC Director will assume primary responsibility for direction and control while working in concert with the Directors: FCC, JIC, Bradley County EOC, and Hamilton County EOC.
- ARCA Issue No.: 71-01-03-A-0
(\\\\'BNOl)
==
Description:==
At 1055, the State activated sirens and the EAS to inform the public of the decision to evacuate the near plant area (AI. B1, Cl, and 51) and all of quadrants C and D. Simultaneously, the Protective Action Decision (PAD) was communicated to the McMinn, Meigs and Rhea County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to implement their actions to support the evacuation. The counties SQN '02 Page 2 8/14/2002
did not have enough time to implement protective actions before the public began to evacuate.
Providing information to the counties before evacuation decisions are broadcast to the public will ensure iniplementing actions prior to the start of an evacuation.
Follow-up to ensure counties have acted on the decisions is essential.
- ARCA Issue No.: 58-00-09-A-01 (SQNOI)
==
Description:==
The Tennessee h?ulti-iurisdictionaI Radiological Emergency Response Plan states: "Since a radiological release may have multi-jurisdictional implication, the State will activate this emergency plan and control the response to the emergency at all levels:'
(Basic Plan,Section V.4.2.B.), Bradley County did not follow this plan. The County Executive made the decision to order an evacuation of all residents in Bradley County within the EPZ, which exceeded the decision of TEMA. Although, TEMA representatives later stated that they would suppofl and assist the County with actions in excess of the State decision, the County did not assure that the additional evacuation area was effectively communicated to the State and that appropriate actions at the State were taken to inform the public.
1.d.
Communications Equipment Criterion i.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications [inks are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Functionality of a primary and one ( I ) backup communications system will be demonstrated at SART EX by all facilities. The communications network between the DRlI field teams and M4CC and the FMCC and SEOCKECC will be evaluated at the IWCC.
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.] : Equipment, maps. displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),
and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC, RMCC, JIC, and Risk County EOCs (Bradley and Hamilton) will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures, considered operational at START EX, and remain fully operational during the course of the exercise.
1.e.
SQN '02 Page 3 8/14/2002
Evaluation Area 2 - Protective Action Decision Making 2.a.
Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 23.1:
OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system.
including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The decision making process will be scenario driven and denionstrated by appropriate staff through observations by and discussions with evaluators in the SEOC.
Radiological assessnient and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:
Criterion 2.b. 1 : Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information and plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and OR0 dose projections. as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
2.6.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the SEQC, RMCC. and CECC. Personnel (URH) at the SEOC in concert with TVA counterparts in the CECG wiil perform dose assessment. Radiological data for the field teams will be inscrted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC. Projections will be based on piant data provided by ~TVA and field radiation measurements.
Criterion 2.b.2:
A decision-making process invoiving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the genera! public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if OK0 policy).
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff personnel in the SEOC. Prior to implementation, decisions will be coordinated with the Risk County EOC Directors to ensure understanding/consunence.
Protection Action decisions for Protection to Special Populations:
Criterion 2.c.. 1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff; i.e.,
D M, EMS, TEMA, etc., in the State Emergency Operations Center will be scenario driven and based on projected exposure. Decisions will be coordinated through affected county EOCs for concurrence and implementation. Lists of the 2.c.
SBN '82 Page 4 811 4/2002
special needs as well as the resources necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors. When requested, the lists will be provided to the evaluator. Organizational procedures for executing protective actions will be discussed with evaluators. Contact with the Public School System must be actual.
2.d.
Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway:
Criterion 2.d. 1 :
Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OK0 planning criteria.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY -Not applicable for the exercise.
Radiological Assessnient and Decision-Making Concerning relocation, Reentry, and Return:
2.e.
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and Criteria in the QROs plan and/or procedures.
EXrENT OF PLAY -Not applicable for the exercise.
Evaluation Area 3 -Protective Action Implementation 3.a.
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:
Criterion 3 a. I : The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance w1ith the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Emergency workers with assignments in the IO-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued Emergency Worker Dosimetry Kits. The kits contain: a Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD). a direct-reading pocket dosimeter with a range capable of measuring radiation exposure of 0-20 R, a course (14 tablets) of Potassium Iodide (KI), and a Daily Exposure Record card. Four (4) emergency workers in each of the Risk County EOCs (Bradley and Hamilton) will be availabie to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain threshoids are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeded.
3.b.
Implementation of KI Decision:
Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions 3re available should a dccision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration SQN '02
of K1 for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration hy appropriate staff in the State Emergency Operations Center will be: scenario driven and based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC and, after consultation with DRH, will make ali dccisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the local EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated however, procedural discussions between the Chief Medical Officer and other appropriate staff in the SEOC and the evaluators will be conducted.
Implementation of Protective.4ctions for Special Populations:
Criterion 3.c. 1 :
Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.
EXTENI-OF-PLAY - Denronstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC and Risk County EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected exposure.
Decisions will he coordinated through affected county EOCs for concurrence and implementation. (See Sub-paragraph 2.c.l j lmplementation of protective actions will be simulated however, procedural discussions between appropriate staff in the Statei'Risk County EOCs and the evaluators will he conducted. Some eontact with transportation providers should be actual.
Criterion 3. ~ 2 :
actions for schools.
3.c.
OROs!school officials decide upon and implement protective EXTENT-OF-PIAY - County school superintendents and transportation supervisors or designees wiil be available at respective EOCs for interviews by evaluators.
In order to reduce the number of events to be demonstrated on exercise day, out-of-sequence interviews with nine (9) Hamilton County schools/principals were conducted for the purpose of ascertaining staffknov ledge of relocation plans and procedures:
I ENDANGERED I LOCATQN I DATE 1
SCHOOL Soddy Elementary I 9042 Career h n e School Ooltewah. 'I" 37163 SQN '02 Page 6 81\\4/2002
3.d.
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control:
Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffc and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnei.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated however, two (2) Emergency Workers tasked with performing such duties will be inten~iewed at each of the Risk County EOCs. This activity will be in sequence with the scenario; Le., at the point when a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs wili be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field.
Interviews will cover such points as:
roles and responsibilities, personak dosimetry, turn-back values, and KI procedures.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation arc Identified and Resolved, EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of impediments, if any, w4l be scenario driven. Regardless. law enforcement personnel at the State and Risk County EOCs will be available for out-of-scenario sequence discussion and interview.
Impiementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions:
Criterion 3.e.I: The OR0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingstion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures. strategies, and pre-printed instructional materia1 are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions:
3.e.
- 3. f.
SQN '02 Page 7 8/14/2002
Criterion 3.f. 1 : Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise Evaluation Area 4 - Field Measurement and Analysis
- 43.
Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:
Criterion 4.a.l: The field teanis are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Field teams will utilize appropriate instrumentation and guideline as established in DRH Standard Operating Procedures.
Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - (See Sub-paragraph 4.a.l.).411 field teams will be under the direction of the RMCC.
In addition to the four (4) field teams being evaluated, additionai teams may also be participating for training purposes.
Criterion 4.a.j: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.
Teams must move to an appropriate iow background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or proceduresj amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Four (4) field-monitoring tennis will be evaluated.
E.ach field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum saniplc volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bag,ged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data \\vi11 be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and will be transnritted by the teams to the RMCC over the normal communications network (portable hand-held radios). Cellular telephones will be used as a back-up communication system.
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling:
Criterion 4.h.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk. water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessnients and protective action decision-making.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise.
4.b.
SQN '02 Page 8 8/14/2002
4.c.
Laboratory Operations:
Criterion 4.b.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analysis to Support protective action decisions.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise.
Evaluation Area 5 -Emergency Notification and Public information 5.a.
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System:
Criterion 5.a. 1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initiation instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the dements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.1V.D and NUREG-0654, E.56.7): ( 1 ) identification of the State or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message; (2) identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant; (3) reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and (4) a closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will be activated simultaneously with the initial activation (SILENT TEST) of the Sequoyah (PNS) sirens with the broadcast of a test message (EAS blessage # I ).
After the initial activation of the PNS sirens and broadcast of the special test message, subsequent PNS siren activations and EAS message broadcasts will be simulated.
NOTE: Should there be a difference between the State and TVA System Status Monitors (SSMs) or if siren failure!§ i s h e indicated, backup route alerting for the affected coverage areas will be simulated.
In any case, two (2) Emergency Workers \\vho would be involved in such activity will be dispatched (in sequence with scenario events) to the Bradley and Hamilton County EOCs. These EWs will be available for interviews to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation.
NOTE:
activatiods of the Prompt Notification System (PNS) sirens will be ____
simulated.
Criterion 5.a.2: Removed.
In order to avoid alarming the residents in the 10-Mile EPZ, live EXTENT-OF-PLAY -Not applicable for the exercise Criterion 5.a.3:
Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency SQN '02 Page 9 8/14/2002
situation. Hackup alert and notification of the public is coniplcted within 45 minutes following the detection hy the OR0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
EXfENT-OF-PLAY -Not applicahle for this exercise Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media:
Criterion 5.b. 1 : OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Public Information Officers in the SEOC and J16 will work in concert as the scenario dictates. Emergency Instructions!information will originate from the SEOC prior to JIC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JIC while emergency instructions will continue to he disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS.
Both entities will continually exchange information to ensure a one voice response to the puhlicimedia is maintained. After the initial activation of the EAS and broadcast of the special test message, subsequent contact with the EAS control station and the broadcast of emergency instruction messages will he simulated, 5.h.
Evaluation Area 6 - S~ppot-t Operations/Facilitics:
6.a.
Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees:
Criterion 6.a. 1 : The reception centerieniergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, arid registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - See Sub-paragraph 6s..
NO7E:There are no Reception Centers per se in the SQN MJRERP. According to the definitions in FEMA REP 14, the Relocation CenterKongregate Care Center activities are combined and designated as Mass Care Shelters.
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment:
Criterion 6.b.l:
The facility has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for the exercise.
Demonstration was accomplished during Sequoyah 2000 at the Ooltewah Middle School, Hamiiton County, and Bradley County High School, Bradley County.
6.h.
SQN 02 Page 10 a i m 0 0 2
6.c.
Temporary Care of Evacuees:
Criterion 6 c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities wiil demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Congregate care will be demonstrated, out of scenario sequence, at the following six (6) locations. Each shelter will he staffed with trained personnel, and at least six (6) monitoring demonstrations will be accomplished at each shelter. A walk-through of decontamination procedures will be conducted for the evd!UatoKS. Schools may be in session; demonstrations of monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering activities should be held to a minimum in order to lessen disruption of regular school activities. Hov.ever, the staff will be available for interview by evaluators.
Meigs County High School DATE I
SHELTER 105 Able Avenue, Decatur. TN 37322 August 15, 2002 Cleveland, TN 373 i I 1005 Delaware Avenue, Rhea Central Elementary School Dayton. TN 37321 September 26, 2002 East Ridge, TN 374 I2 500 No.Highland Park Ave., I September 26, 2002
- ARCA Issue No.: 58-98-18-A-03
==
Description:==
Personnel from the Sequatchie County Fire Department performed the initial monitoring of the evacuees. The monitor did not appropriately follow County procedures for radiological monitoring (Sequatchie county Implementing Procedures, Sequatchie County Health Department, Revision 4. July 1998, pp. EE-
- 16. Section VII1.H.). We did not cover the probe or wear gloves while monitoring.
He also did not check the feet. front, and back of the evacuees. The probe was moved too rapidly over the area that he surveyed (SQNOO)
The set-up of the decontamination area for evacuees requires both contaminated and clean evacuees to traverse a narrow entryway that would be difficult to prevent decontaminated evacuees from stepping in contaminated areas.6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:
f
- d SBN '02' Page 11 6/14/2002'
6.d.
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:
Criterion 6.d. I : The faci1iiy:ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration at the following locations was accom-plished out of scenario sequence:
FACILITY LOCATION DATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY (EOP):
Refers to the degree actions taken by State arid local response organizations during exercise events will conform to those actions to be taken under the Sequoyah MJRERP. In instances lvhere actions are to he simulated, it is so noted in the EOP.
ACCRQNYMS:
ARCA DWH EhliZ EMS END EX EOC EOP EPZ FCC JIC MJRERP OES OR0 m4cc SEOC START EX Areas Requiring Corrective Action Division of Radiological Health Emergency Management Agency Emergency Medical Services End Exercise Emergency Operations Center Extent of play Emergency Planning Zone Field Coordination Center Joint Information Center Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan Office of Emergency Services Off-site Response Organization Radiological Monitoring Control Center State Emergency Operations Center Start Exercise SBN '02 Page 12 8/14/2002
APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the siniulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on October 2,2002.
This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Tennessee and approved by FEMA Region IV.
32
SEQUOYA~I NIJCLEAR P L m r (SQNI 2002 mcmm GRADED EXERC:SE SCENARIO NARRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL.
Rev. date: 7/18/02 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
UNIT-I:
100% power for the last 120 days. The core is at BOL. The Boron concentration is 978 ppm and burnup is 5085 mm.
1A-W SI Pump is O.Q.S. for repairs. LCO 3.5.2 has been entered.
Known leak of. 1 gallodday at the Seal Tabie. An inspection of this leak will occur this shift.
1-XX-55-6C socket for FCV-63-98 bas failed. MEG is planning to rqair it.
UNIT-2:
As is.
COMMON:
- An uncontrolled release of water from Chickamauga Dam began several hours ago when a barge entering the lock broke free from its tug and struck the downstream gates resulting in a breach of the lock. The tug struck the upstream gate which can not be closed completely. At the star4 ofthe exercise the river level is at 693.5 feet and decreasing. Repairs are under way which will Sop the release of water and are expected to be completed witbin two hours.
EVENTS: Note: Times are in scenario elapsed time(hr:min). While the Scenario has certain EALr listed which the SED is expected to make deslardtion of the emergency classifications(ALERT, SAE. GE),
it is possible that the SED may declare an emergency classification based on judgmcnt or some other set of Ems which the Scenario did not expect. If any of these situations arise the Controllers must be ready to cvaluate the accuracy and timeliness of these unexpected emergency dececlarations.
At five minutes p 0 O : O S ) into the exercise, personnel enter the lower airlock of U-l containment. Shortly aRer this the River level reaches 692.8 feet.
By twenty minutes (T=00:20) into the exercise a NOW2 should be declared based on EAL~..SU(RIV~~
level is < 673 feet as reported by River Bpera~ons).
At about thirty minutes(T=00:30) into the exercise, a plug for a steam generator (SG) tube comes out and makes its way thxough the lower core plate. Loose parts monitor alarms cccur during this tnp to the lower head. Shortly the thimble tube leak increases. The workers present tly to exit the containment but one of them falls off the Seal Table platform breaking a leg and beconies contaminated from the hot water and steam leaking from the tube. The other workers manage to get the injured person and themselves into the airlwk and close the inner door to the Containment. "he medical emergency and leak are reported within five minutes. While the Reactor Coolant Pumps are running this SG tube plug is constantly damagmg the debris screen at the bottom of a particular fuel assembly. Shortly, this debris screen is punctured and the plug begins to impact some fuel rods resulting not only in clad failures but the plug also pulverizes numerous fuek pellets over time. This produces coolant activites compamble to fuel meit situations.
At about forty minutes(T-00:40) into the exercise, Operations Scrams the reactor and initiate a SI. When the reactor Scrams two control rods(N9 and Ni I) do not insert completely and 1B-B Si pump motor trips on start up. An ALERT should be declared based on EAL. 1.2.2P(Non isolatable RCS leak excceding one charging pump in the normai alignment). When containment pressure reaches 2.81 PSIG the Reactor Coolant Pumps should be locked out by Operations but may be started again latsx to assist with the cool down.
At about one hour twenty five mninutes(T=01:25) into the exercise enough radioactitity has entered containment to cause the lower compartment Accident Moiiitars 1-RM-90-273 and 274 to reach about 30 MI.
EAL 1.1.S(Valid reading greater than 29 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 274) is reached. A SAE should be declared based on loss or potential loss of two banirrs(RCS and Fuel clad).
At about one hour forty five minutes(T-01:45) into the exercise, the 1U Air return fan in U-I coutainment trips.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 2002 NRC/FEMA GRADED EXERSISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE CONF5ENTlAL Rev. date: 7/18/02 At about two hours twenty minUtes~=02:20) into the exercise, when containment pressure has again reached about 2.2 psig the Containment fails at the lower access personnel hatch. A GE should be declared based on EAL. 1. I.S(Valid reading greater than 29 whr on 1-RE-90-273 and 274), EAL 1.2.2P Won isolatable RCS leak exceeding one charging pump in the normal alignment). and EAL 1.3.2L(Rapid unexplained pressure decrease following initial increase).
The exercise will terminate at about six hours(T=06:00) into the exercise or when off site environmental monitoring objectives have been demonstrated.
The importance of scmario events:
IA-A SI Pump is 0.0,s. for repairs Known leak of.I gallordday at the Seal Table 1-XX-55-W socket for FCV-63-98 has failed.
River Level at 673.5 feet and decreasing 1E3-B SI pump motor trips on stari up A SG tube ping comes out and damages fuel.
Two Control Rods do not insept completely.
1-RM-90-273 and 274 reach 30 R/hr.
1B air return fan trips.
Containment fails.
Provides an additional OSC task. Also as the Scenario progresses allows m opportunity for the TSC/OSC to prioritize tasks. Also needs to be out for the Simulator lo simulate the location of the thimble rube leak.
Provides a reason for entering the cont&inment and when the leak increases it becomes &e initiating went for the ALERT declaration and also for the Medical emergency.
mais is to support simulation of the thimble tube leak using an existing leak location. Also as the Scenario progresses allows an oppormnity for the TSC/OSC to prioritize tasks.
When River levei reaches < 673 feet the NOUE conditions are met Provides an additional OSC task. Alsa as the SC~MK~O progresses allows an opportunity for the TSUOSC to prioritize tasks. Also needs to be out for the Simulator to sunulate the location of the thimble tube leak.
Provides reason for fuel damage.
Complicates cool down Sombined with the thimble tube leak, allows for loss of the RCS and Fuel Clad kanier resulting in the S A E declaration Allows containment pressure lo increase abwe 2 psig again Combine with loss ofthe previous two barriers results in a GE declaration.
SQN 2002 GRADED EXERCISE
~MERGENCYPREFdaREDNESS SCENARIO TlMELlNE REV. DATE 07-7 8-02 08:OOEDT) 00:30 01:oo 01 :30 02:oo 0230 03:OO 0330 04:OO 04:30 05:00 OS30 06:00 0630 0o:oo I
- 1..-
I-i I
I I
I I
e I
l I
I 3
T= LQ. ~ A - A SI Pump is O.O.S. for repairs
~
I I
1 I
- - I T= 02:20:Containment $iis. A release to!lhe enviranmeii? begins.
I I
I
General Notes:
Locations in the actual operating areas of the plant will be used for training purposes in certain events. Please be I aware of the operating areas that are sensitive to radio communications and other effects that may effect the units.
Mock-ups will be utilized for certain events associated with the exercise. Controllers will manage events associated with the mock-ups to ensure that team members are made aware of the locations and conditions of the mock-ups.
ICs data will be generated and supplied from the simulator. ICs will be limited in its ability to perform as it currently exists hut we are capable of producing plant parameters necessary for the exercise.
The training simulator will be utilized during the exercise to simulate the Unit 1 Control Room. For this reason, cornilmunications will be conducted as follows:
srvl 421 0 FAX(Sirnu1ator) 4235 us, RO, BOP 4397,4398 Simulation and Personnel Safety No action will actually be taken that may alter the operation of the site. Valves, pumps. switches, and other equipment will be physically located but verbal descriptions will be given instead of actual operations which may impact site operation. Actions which WILL NOT impact the site operations. like protective clothing and supplies, will be performed unless otherwise instructed by the controllers.
Personnel WILL NOT enter High Radiation or Contamination Areas Full actions are expected and allowed on mock-ups
- 1.
Accountability
- 2.
Security
- 3.
Environmental Monitoring
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
NRC Notification Simulation Specifics:
Assembly - Will be performed Site Evacuation ~ Simulate Roadblocks - Simulate Environs Vans - Full participation for SQN, WBN van - Full participation.
Screening Van - Full participation Courier - Full participation Make first call to inform NRC of the exercise Ask NRC if further follow-up is desired All other contacts are based on NRC wishes Notify NRC of termination of the exercise Post-Accident Sampling PASF ~ Simulate Offsite Support......
Central Emergency Control Center will fully participate.
Joint Information Center will fully participate, State Emergency Operations Center will fully participate.
Risk Counties Emergency Operations Centers will fully participate State Field CQordinatiOR Center will fully participate.
State Radiological Monitoring Control Center will fully participate.
State Field Teams will fully participate.
Other TVA Off Site Supporl - Contact BWT DO NOT ACTIVATE.
ERDS Activation - Simulate
- 7.
I I I S ~ ~ M C ~ ~ Q I I S and Rules for Plant Players Even though controliers may refer to "Elapsed" or "Scenario" time, all players are to use only clock time (local time) in actions. logs, etc.
B. Conduct of an Exercise There are seven categories of persons during an exercise...
- 1. Controller -- runs the exercise. evaluates when won't interfere with conducting the exercise Controllers conduct an exercise by providing information to players. A controller must accompany players on any task given. If a controller is not standing by. players should locate the lead controller for the area and notify him of her of their need for a controller.
- 2. Evaluator -- evaluates the actions of the controllers and players May not interact, assist. or interfere with actions of players.
- 3. Visitor (or Observer) -- observes for own information, performs no evaluations May not interact, assist. or interIere with actions of players
- 4. Player -- any person who participates in the exercise and actions are being graded Must ensure a controller is available before performing tasks for proper exercise conduct.
- 5. Drill Exempt -- excluded from the exercise to perform routine duties May not interact, assist, or interfere with actions of players. Does not have to react to drill events.
- 8. Mentor - any person who is participating in the exercise to work along side of a player and provide training or specific guidance and instruction. This person will not be knowledgeable of the exercise material.
- 7. Coach - any person who is participating in the exercise to observe and offer assistance requested by the player. This penon will not be knowledgeable of the exercise material.
as Demonstrate your knowledge of the emergency plan, emergency operations and procedures. Utilize Status boards, log books. etc. as much as possible to document and record your actions. instructions, and reports to your co-workers. The controllers use these logs to credit you with actions and failure to maintain good legs may result in not being credited with actions you did perform.
Play out all actions as much as possible as if this were a real emergency. Unless authorized by a controller, you SHOULD NOTsirnulate actions. It is to our advantage to perform as many of our actual tasks under simulated accident conditions to identify problems and improve our actions. Plant and personnel safety, however, always take precedent over exercise activities.
If authorized to simulate an action. tell the controller how and when you would actually perform each step.
Clearly identify all actions you would perform so that the controller may credit you with prior actions.
Remember. you are entering plant areas with actual day-to-day restrictions. A drill or exercise DOES NOT suspend plant procedures. NO ONE, not even controllers or evaluators, are exempt from normal station radiological, safety. or operating procedures. Report any hazardous conditions or situations immediately to the controller.
You must play as if the simulated radiological conditions provided by the controllers were real. You will be required to wear the appropriate protective equipment and follow proper practices including A U R A practices.
Since controllers would not actually exist in a real emergency, controllers will not be wearing equivalent radiological protective clothing. Do not allow this to confuse you or make you act unwisely.
IN ALL CASES: Do not enter high radiation areas. confamination areas, or airborne contarnination areas in the plant. The benefit of experience DOES NOTjustify the additional dose arid potential for contamination.
D. Communications Speak out, identifying your key actions and decisions to the controliers and evaluators. Remember to always say the words "This is a drill" at the start and conclusion of all your communications to other people about drill events or information. This is especially important with radio communications where members of the public may hear your conversations and could become alarmed.
Always use the Phonetic Alphabet and 3-Way Communications Controller Messaoes If you are ever in doubt about a message, ask the controller for clarification. Controllers will always repeat or clarify a message. The controller will not, however, prompt or coach you, but will tell you only what you would perceive with you own senses.
Controller Intervention If a controller intervenes with your actions, it is for a good reason. Obey the controller's directions at all times. The controller will afso periodically issue messages or instructions designed to initiate, clarify. or terminate an activity. You MUST accept these messages immediately and respond accordingly.
If a situation arises where you disagree with the information that a controller provides, you may ask to have the information verified by the lead controller for that area. Once verified, however. you must aci on the information wilhout further delay. We cannot allow a technical disagreement to derail the exercise so, please continue with the information you have and the issue will be addressed after the exercise.
E. Post-Exercise Critique At the end of the exercise. the players will be expected to evaluate their own performance. This is a very important activity as it demonstrates our ability to be self-critical and our desire to improve our own programs without the need for outside organizations. The intent of these critiques. both the players and controllers, is to improve TVAs response to an actual emergency.
Keep a list of items you feel will improve the emergency plan and procedures. Provide this during the post-exercise critique and give your notes to your lead controller afterthe player critique and he or she will ensure that they are considered.
APPENDIX 5 MEDICAL DRILL June 18,2002 Memorial HosDital of Chattanoopa. Chattanooga, Tennessee On June 18,2002, a medical services drill was conducted to evaluate the response of Memorial Hospital, Chattanooga, Tennessee.
The medical dnll was initialed at 0915, when Memorial Hospital Emergency Medical Service (EMS) responded to an accident involving a conhminatcd individuai, who was suffering from a large contusion on his forehead with lacerations to the right leg and ann. The EMS unit examined the patient while obtaining basic infomation regarding the accident and reassuring the patient that he would be fine. The patient was placed on a draped backboard, cocooned and carried to the ambulance.
The ambulance was properly insulated. Communication betwecn EMS personnel and Memorial Hospital was demonstrated while in route to the hospital. The hospital was prepared to receive the patient. A security line was established around the receiving area and security personnel maintained control. The receiving area outside the radiation emergency ama and radiation treatment area tloors had protective covering. The monitoring was satisfactory. Contamination control and decontaniination procedures were good. Staff was knowledgeable and worked well as a team. Emergency room (ER) staff wore direct-reading dosimetry and permanent-record dosimetry.
Patient monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control procedures followed by EK staff were good. The fact that ER staffrnenibcrs would contact Oak Ridge for assistance on contamination, if required, is commendable. Appropriate medical samples were taken from the patient's wound and other ingestion areas. An x-ray of the patient injury was done. The hospital staff demonstrated the capability to respond to an injured and contaminated patient.
- a.
MET: CRITERIA 3.a.l. and 6.d.l.
- h.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 33