ML033560466

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Undated Fire Protection Baseline Inspection, Report 50-400/2002-011
ML033560466
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/28/2003
From: Hagar B, Payne D
Division of Reactor Safety I, Progress Energy Co
To:
References
71111.05, FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-011
Download: ML033560466 (40)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000400/2002011

Text

FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION

SHEARON HARRIS

INPUT FOR INSPECTION REPORT NO.: 50-400/2002-011

INSPECTORS:

Charlie Payne

Team Leader - Fire Protection

Engineering Branch 1, DRS

Bob Hagar

Resident Inspector, Harris

INSPECTION DATES:

Week 1 of onsite inspection - October 21 - 25, 2002.

Week 2 of onsite inspection - November 4 - 8, 2002

Week 3 of onsite inspection - December 16-20, 2002

Type of Inspection: TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION: Fire

Protection Features and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability

A.

INSPECTION REPORT INPUT

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems

1R05

FIRE PROTECTION (71111.05)

.04

Operational Implementation of SSD Capability

The guidelines established by BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.b, uSafe Shutdown

Capability," paragraph (1), required that SSCs important to safe shutdown be provided

with fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of

systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of

fire damage. Options for providing this level of fire protection were delineated in BTP

CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.b, 'Safe Shutdown Capability," paragraph (2). Where the

protection of systems whose function was required for hot shutdown did not satisfy BTP

CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.b, paragraph (2), an alternative or dedicated shutdown

capability and its associated circuits, was required to be provided that was independent

of the cables, systems, and components in the area. For such areas, BTP CMEB 9.5-1,

Section C.5.c, "Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability," paragraph (3),

specifically required the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to be physically and

electrically independent of the specific fire areas and capable of accommodating

post-fire conditions where offsite power was available and where offsite power was not

available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.f, "Ventilation," required that

products of combustion and the means by which they will be removed from each fire

area be established to ensure that smoke and corrosive gases will not affect SSD areas.

a.

Inspection Scope

XD

For fires in fire areas 1-A-BAL, Fire Zones 1-A-4-CHLR and 1-A-4-COM-E, 1-A-EPA,

1-A-BATB, and 1-A-ACP, the team walked down the manual actions described in

procedure AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, to verify that:

The procedures used for SSD were available to the appropriate staff.

The procedures used for SSD were consistent with the SSA methodology and

assumptions.

The procedures were written so that operator actions could be correctly performed

within the times assumed in the SSA.

The training program for operators included SSD capability for a fire event.

Personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot shutdown condition from

the MCR could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire brigade.

Operators had sufficient access to the equipment to perform the required actions.

For each of these manual actions, the team reviewed fire-protection-related licensing-

basis documents, to verify that these actions were described in those documents.

The team also reviewed:

operator and fire brigade staffing, to verify that shift staffing would be adequate to

complete the required manual actions, and

selected fire fighting pre-plan procedures and heating ventilation and air conditioning

(HVAC) systems, to verify that access to remote shutdown equipment and operator

manual actions would not be inhibited by smoke migration from one area to adjacent

plant areas used to accomplish SSD.

In addition, the team reviewed operator training lesson plans and job performance

measures (JPMs) and discussed the training with operators, to verify that SSD activities

had been appropriately included in the training program.

b.

Findings

(1) RELIANCE ON MANUAL ACTIONS

Introduction

An unresolved item was identified for excessive reliance on manual actions to establish

and maintain SSD in case of a fire, instead of physically protecting cables from fire

damage. (no approved deviations)

Description

Analysis

Enforcement

.

(2) INADEQUATE SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

Introduction: A Green non-cited violation of TS 6.8.1 with two examples was identified

for failure to establish an adequate written procedure covering fire protection program

implementation, in that the licensee's procedure for safe shutdown following a fire

describes manual actions that cannot reasonably be completed by some NLOs.

Description: The team identified several actions required by AOP-036 that could not

reasonably be completed by all SSD NLOs. Those actions and the challenges

associated with those actions are described below.

For a fire in Fire Area 1 -A-ACP, AOP-36 steps 2.c and 14.a required the NLO to remove

fuses from transfer panel 1 B. Completing these steps would include overcoming the

following challenges:

The subject transfer panel was physically located approximately 20 feet from the

ACP room door. With a fire in the ACP room, the area around the transfer panel

could become uninhabitable before the NLO could complete these steps, because

some smoke from the fire could enter the transfer panel area from around the door

while the door is closed, and because smoke would certainly enter the transfer panel

area when the door is opened by the fire brigade to attack the fire.

To physically reach the subject fuses, the NLO would necessarily place his or her

entire body inside a cabinet with a central access area that is approximately 15

inches wide. The licensee had not ensured that all NLOs were physically capable of

entering that cabinet.

Because the subject fuses were located on a panel approximately seven feet above

floor level, to physically reach the subject fuses, all but the tallest NLOs would

necessarily use a narrow, custom-made wooden step-stool to step up to the shield.

The team noted that the location of the step-stool was not controlled.

Because the subject fuses were also located behind a plexiglass fuse cover that was

held in place by small screws, to physically reach the subject fuses, the NLO would

necessarily raise his or her hands above the level of his or her head, and use a

metal screwdriver to remove the fuse cover. The licensee had not ensured that all

NLOs were physically capable of completing this activity. Furthermore, because this

activity involves manipulating a metal screwdriver inside an energized electrical

cabinet, the team considered this activity to involve a personnel safety hazard.

To identify the correct fuses to be pulled, the NLO must first identify the cabinet in

which the fuses are located, and then identify the fuses themselves, within that

cabinet. The team observed that the subject cabinet was physically adjacent to 4

identical cabinets, that these cabinets were not labeled on the side from which the

NLO would enter, and that the instructions in AOP-036 did not identify the subject

cabinet. Furthermore, the team observed that the labels which uniquely identify the

subject fuses within the cabinet were partially obscured by cables which had been

landed on adjacent terminal blocks.

For a fire in Fire Area 1 -A-BATB (Battery Room B,) AOP-036 steps 1.a through 1.d

provided guidance for responding to spurious opening of the RHR containment recirc

sump suction valves. Opening both train A (1SI-300 and 1SI-310) or both train B (1SI-

301 and 1 SI-31 1) sump suction valves would result in the RWST draining down to the

sumps through normally open RWST to RHR supply valves 1 S1-322 (train A) or 1 SI-323

(train B). The team determined that during a fire in Battery Room B, only train B cables

would be affected. Therefore, train B containment recirc sump suction valves would be

the valves of concern. The train A valves would be unaffected and remain closed.

Step 1.a directed the operator to shut and de-energize both RWST to RHR supply

valves (to A and B RHR Pumps, respectively) to immediately stop the RWST drain

down. The team noted that because only train B would be the affected, only supply

valve 1 SI-323 would need to be shut to halt the drain down. Because the train A sump

suction valves would still be shut, shutting 1 Sl-322 would isolate all water suction

sources to the A RHR Pump.

Step 1.b provided guidance to refill the RWST with the A RHR Pump from the

containment emergency sump. None of the actions listed in step 1.b direct opening the

sump isolation valves. Because the A RHR Pump has no suction flow path, the RWST

would not be refilled using this step. The pump recirc line would prevent pump damage

provided prompt operator action to diagnose the improper system response.

Similarly, for a fire in Fire Area 1-A-EPA, the team found the above procedure

deficiencies were repeated but for the opposite train of RHR (train A cables are exposed

in this fire area). The team also noted that the licensee had identified valves 1Sl-322

and 1 SI-300 as contaminated and had wrapped these valves in yellow polyethylene

plastic for contamination control. However, there was no anti-contamination clothing,

step-off pad or portable radiation monitor pre-staged at this location to allow the SSD

NLO to quickly manipulate either valve in emergency conditions. Additionally, the local

valve position indication for each valve was covered by the yellow polyethylene plastic

which would have precluded an NLO from visually verifying valve position from outside

the contamination control area.

Because of these challenges, the team considered that not all NLOs could reasonably

be expected to successfully complete the manual actions described in these steps.

LATER: inadequate corrective action for the previous White finding on the ACP room Thermo-

Lag wall?

LATER: other examples?

Analysis This violation was more than minor because it affected the objectives of the

Mitigating Systems cornerstone, in that this violation could affect the availability of

systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The safety

significance of this violation was very low, because the fire initiation frequency in the

corresponding area is very low, and because failure to remove the subject fuses would

potentially disable only the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump; all other mitigation

capabilities would not be affected.

Enforcement TS 6.8.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established,

implemented, and maintained covering fire protection program implementation. By

reference, FSAR section 9.5.1 incorporates into the FSAR, the licensee's Safe

Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire (calculation E-5525). In E-5525, Revision 6, Section

VL.B describes the methodology through which manual actions were identified, and

Attachment D lists the manual actions that may need to be taken if safe shutdown

components are damaged as a result of a fire. Those manual actions are incorporated

into AOP-036.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish an adequate written procedure

covering fire protection program implementation, in that in Attachment 1 of procedure

AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, steps 2.c and 4 of the Safe Shutdown

Manual Operations for fire area 1-A-ACP describe manual actions which cannot

reasonably be completed by some NLOs. Because this failure to implement an

adequate procedure is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the

CAP (AR 80214), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VL.A

of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-400/02-1 1-XX

(3) INADEQUATE PROCEDURE (inadequate staffing)

Introduction A Green non-cited violation of TS 6.8.1 was identified for failure to

establish an adequate written procedure covering fire protection program

implementation, in that the licensee's procedure for safe shutdown following a fire

describes more manual actions than can reasonably be completed by normal onsite

staff.

Description: The team found that for each fire area inspected, AOP-036 required

operators to complete a relatively large number of manual actions outside the main

control room. The team determined that the normal shift operating crew included four

non-licensed operators (NLOs). Three NLOs were assigned to the fire brigade and one

NLO was assigned to support safe shutdown manual actions (SSD NLO). The table

below shows, for each fire area reviewed during this inspection, the number of manual

actions required by AOP-036 to be completed outside the main control room to achieve

hot standby conditions.

Number of manual actions

Fire Area / Zone

In AOP-036

In other procedures*

Generic Steps for

10

Many. Depends on

All Fire Areas

decisions made by the

operating crew.

1-A-BAL-B

29

LATER

1 -A-BATB

14

LATER

1-A-EPA

14

LATER

Number of manual actions

Fire Area / Zone

In AOP-036

In other procedures*

1-A-ACP

27

18

  • Numbers in this column show how many manual actions were

described in procedures that were called out by AOP-036.

The specific local manual operator actions evaluated by the team for each of these fire

areas are listed in Attachment 1.

The team found that while most of the manual actions in these areas involved one-time

actions (like opening a breaker), others could require the NLO to monitor plant

conditions and make system adjustments over an extended period of time. The manual

actions which could require dedicated NLO attention, and thus possibly detract from the

successful and timely performance of subsequent required local manual operator

actions, include the following:

In Section 3.0 of AOP-036, Step 13.b(3) requires the NLO to establish continuous

communications with the MCR, locally shut 1 CS-228 to isolate the normal charging

flow control valve (FCV) and then to locally control charging flow by throttling the

bypass valve, 1 CS-227. Both valves are in close proximity and located in the

scalloped area of the 248-ft level in the reactor auxiliary building (RAB). This area is

located in the radiation-controlled area (RCA) and radiation levels at these valves

are elevated but within 10 CFR 20 limits. A sound powered phone with a long

extension cord is located in the area to allow the NLO to wait in low dose areas

between valve manipulations if the NLO's radio is not functional. However, local

manual operator actions subsequent to this step could be adversely impacted (e.g.,

Section 3.0, Step 14.b for locally responding to a failed open steam generator

PORV).

In Attachment I of AOP-036, Step 13.c for fire area 1-A-ACP requires the NLO to

locally operate a PORV on the C steam generator, to obtain and maintain the

desired RCS temperature. Because the unit will likely not be at steady state when

this action is undertaken, and because a fire in this area may complicate operator

efforts to stabilize the plant, the NLO who undertakes this action may be required to

monitor RCS temperature and make appropriate adjustments to the PORV position

almost continuously and for some time, until the plant is reasonably stable.

In Attachment 1 of AOP-036, Step 14.b for fire area 1-A-ACP requires the NLO to

throttle 1AF-149 to maintain level in the C steam generator. For the same reasons

as described above, the NLO who undertakes this action may be required to

continue to monitor steam-generator level and make appropriate adjustments to the

position of 1AF-149 almost continuously and for some time, until the plant is

reasonably stable.

The team found that some of the required manual actions would be completed inside

the RCA, while others would be completed outside the RCA. The team also observed

that completing the manual actions in AOP-036, in the order in which they are described

in that procedure, would require the SSD NLO to enter and exit the RCA several times.

The team noted that:

some manual actions involved valves identified as potentially contaminated or

located in contamination areas,

radioactive radon gas can become associated with anyone who passes through the

RCA,

hand or foot contamination as well as radon gas can cause a portal monitor to

alarm, and

anyone who is in a portal monitor when it alarms must wait at the exit point for health

physics (HP) technicians to complete a detailed survey to determine the true cause

of the alarm, before proceeding.

The team noted that the licensee had no emergency dosimeters or rapid ingress/egress

procedures in place for use during plant emergency situations. The team therefore

considered that every time the SSD NLO exited the RCA, that NLO may experience a

portal-monitor alarm, and may therefore be forced to wait for HP technicians to arrive at

the exit and complete a detailed survey before proceeding.

The team considered that the manual actions in AOP-036 could not reasonably be

completed by the available staff, because:

the SSD NLO may be required to complete as many as 39 manual actions,

several manual actions require dedicated operator attention,

some of the manual actions could require a considerable amount of time to

complete,

completing some manual actions could be delayed by RCA portal-monitor alarms,

and

only one NLO would have been available to complete all safe-shutdown manual

actions.

The team therefore considered that procedure to be inadequate.

Analysis: This violation was more than minor because it affected the objectives of the

Mitigating Systems cornerstone, in that this violation could affect the availability of

systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The safety

significance of this violation was very low, because the fire initiation frequency in the

corresponding area is very low.

Enforcement TS 6.8.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established,

implemented, and maintained covering fire protection program implementation. By

reference, FSAR section 9.5.1 incorporates into the FSAR, the licensee's Safe

Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire (calculation E-5525). In E-5525, Revision 6, Section

VI.B describes the methodology through which manual actions were identified, and

Attachment D lists the manual actions that may need to be taken if safe shutdown

components are damaged as a result of a fire. Those manual actions are incorporated

into AOP-036.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish a written procedure covering fire

protection program implementation, in that in Attachment 1 of procedure AOP-036, Safe

Shutdown Following a Fire, the Safe Shutdown Manual Operations for fire area 1 -A-ACP

describe too many manual actions for the available staff to complete. Because this

failure to implement an adequate procedure is of very low safety significance and has

been entered into the CAP (AR 80215), this violation is being treated as an NCV,

consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-400/02-11 -XX

.07.

Emergency Lighting

The guidelines established by BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.g, "Lighting and

Communication," paragraph (1), required that fixed self-contained lighting consisting of

fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual eight hour minimum battery power

supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for

  • access and egress routes to and from all fire areas.

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the design and operation of, and examined the manufacturer's

information for the direct current (DC) emergency lighting system self-contained, battery

powered units (ELUs) as described in UFSAR Sections 9.5.1.2.2.e and 9.5.3. During

plant walk downs of selected areas where operators performed local manual actions

defined in the post-fire SSD procedure, the team inspected area emergency lighting

units (ELUs) for operability and checked the aiming of lamp heads to determine if

adequate illumination was available to correctly and safely perform the actions required

by the procedures. The team inspected emergency lighting features along access and

egress pathways used during SSD activities for adequacy and personnel safety. The

locations and identification numbers on the ELUs were compared to design drawings to

confirm the as-built configuration. The team also checked if these battery power

supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity. In addition, the team reviewed

licensee periodic maintenance tests to verify that the ELUs were being maintained in an

operable manner.

b.

Findings

Introduction A violation was identified for failure to provide fixed, self-contained lighting

with individual eight-hour-minimum battery power supplies in areas that must be

manned for safe shutdown.

Description In the areas in which the team walked down safe shutdown manual actions,

the team identified that the local manual operator actions listed in Attachment 2 would

not be illuminated by fixed, self-contained lighting with individual eight-hour-minimum

battery power supplies.

The team determined that the licensee had not requested exemptions from the

requirement to provide such lighting.

Analysis The team determined that this violation was more than minor because it

affected the objectives of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, in that this violation could

affect the availability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable

consequences.

The team noted that the fire initiation frequency in the ACP room was LATER. The

team reviewed site lighting drawings, and found that the manual actions listed in

Attachment 3 were in the vicinity of flourescent lighting that would be powered from a

diesel generator during a SSD scenario.

The team considered the risk significance of this violation to be very low, because the

fire initiation frequency in this area is low, and because NLOs routinely carry flashlights

that could be used to illuminate the areas in which the actions must be completed.

Enforcement FSAR section 9.5.1 states that Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1 is

used in the design of the fire protection program for safety-related systems and

equipment and for other plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely affect

safety-related systems. BTP 9.5-1, Section C.5.g, uLighting and Communication,"

paragraph (1), required that fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or

sealed-beam units with individual eight-hour-minimum battery power supplies should be

provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for access and egress

routes to and from all fire areas.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide fixed self-contained lighting

consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual eight-hour-minimum

battery power supplies in the vicinity of the components associated with the following

manual actions identified above. Because this failure to provide the subject lighting is of

very low safety significance and has been entered into the CAP (AR 79047), this

violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC

Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-400/02-1 1-XX

List of Inspection Documents Reviewed

PROCEDURES

AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, Rev. 21

AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, Rev. 2

EOP-EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 10

EOP-Guide-1, Path 1 Guide, Rev. 14

MST-10277, Electrical Power Feed Switchover for RHR Inlet Isolation Valve 1 RH-1 (1 RH-

V502SB-1)

OP-i 10, Section 8.3, Venting the SI Accumulators, Rev. 18

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURES (JPMs) AND LESSON PLANS

LOCAL MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION STEPS

REVIEWED FOR ACHIEVING HOT STANDBY

Summary of Number of Local Manual Action Steps to be Performed Outside of the Control

Room to Achieve and Maintain Hot Standby

Number of Manual Action Ste

Fire Area / Zone

Generic Steps

Area Specific

Total Steps

in AOP-36 for

Steps in AOP-036

by Fire

All Fire Areas

and Other

Area/Zone

Procedures

Referenced by

AOP-36

1 -A-BAL-B

10

29

39

1-A-BATB

10

14

24

1 -A-EPA

10

14

24

1-A-ACP

10

45

55

Listing of AOP-036 Manual Action Steps Reviewed for Safe Shutdown Following a Fire

Section 3.0 Actions (Generic Steps for All Fire Areas/Zones):

Step 12.c RNO

MONITOR AFW pump suction pressure indicators as an alternative to

CST level indication: (Refer to Attachment 4, AFW Suction Pressure vs.

CST level)

I

Step 13.b(3)

Locally PERFORM the following (248' RAB):

(a) SHUT 1CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

(b) THROTTLE 1CS-227, Normal Charging FCV Bypass, as necessary to

control charging flow.

Step 13.c RNO

ESTABLISH flow through the Hi Head Si Line, as follows:

(1) .(MCR

action)

(2) .(MCR

action)

(3) OPEN ONE of the following breakers:

1B31 -SB 4C, 1SI-3 BIT Outlet

.

1A31-SA 4C, 1SI-4 BIT Outlet

(4) WHEN directed by MCR, THEN locally THROTTLE the de-energized

valve to maintain PRZ level:

Attachment 2

2

1 S-3, BIT Outlet Isolation

1SI-4, BIT Outlet Isolation

Stepl 4.b

UNLOCK and SHUT the affected manual block valve(s): (Steam Tunnel

Platform El. 280)

1 MS-59, SG A PORV Manual Block

1MS-61, SG B PORV Manual Block

1 MS-63, SG C PORV Manual Block

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions For Fire Area: 1-A-BATB:

Step 1

IF RHR suction valves spuriously open resulting in RWST drain down,

THEN PERFORM the following recommended actions, as required:

Step 1.a

ISOLATE the Containment Recirc Sumps from the RWST, as follows:

(1) SHUT the following valves:

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-6E (RAB 286)

Step 1.b

REFILL the RWST with A RHR Pump, as follows:

(1) SHUT 1SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol Vlv.

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Vlv

(3) USE the RHR Pump as needed.

Step 1.d

WHEN RHR Pumps are no longer required to fill the RWST,

THEN:

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol VIv

(2) OPEN 1SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol Vlv.

Step 2

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve opening:

Attachment 2

3

Step 2.a

VERIFY the following valves are SHUT:

  • 1 SI-311, CV Sump 1 B To RHR Pmp 1 B-SB Downstrm Iso Vlv

(RAB 286)

Step 2.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-301 at breaker 1 B21 -SB-11 B (RAB 286)
  • 1 SI-311 at breaker 1 B21 -SB-7A (RAB 286)

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions For Fire Area: 1-A-EPA:

Step 7

IF RHR suction valves spuriously open resulting in RWST drain down,

THEN PERFORM the following recommended actions, as required:

Step 7.a

ISOLATE the Containment Recirc Sumps from the RWST, as follows:

(1) SHUT the following valves:

1 SI-322, RWST To RHR Pump A-SA (RAB 286)

. 1 SI-323, RWST To RHR Pump B-SB (RAB 286)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31-SB-6E (RAB 286)

Step 7.b

REFILL the RWST with B RHR Pump, as follows:

(1) SHUT 1SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Cross-over Isol Vlv.

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol VIv

(3) USE the RHR Pump as needed.

Step 7.c

IF charging is required in the interim,

THEN USE the Boric Acid Tanks.

Step 7.d

WHEN RHR Pumps are no longer required to fill the RWST,

THEN:

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Vlv

(2) OPEN 1 SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Cross-over Isol Vlv.

Attachment 2

4

Step 8

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve opening:

Step 8.a

VERIFY the following valves are SHUT:

. 1SI-300, CV Sump 1A To RHR Pmp 1A-SA CIV (RAB 286)

. 1SI-310, CV Sump 1A To RHR Pmp 1A-SA Downstrm Iso Vlv

(RAB 286)

Step 8.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

. 1SI-300 at breaker 1A21-SA-7C (RAB 286)

  • 1 SI-310 at breaker 1 A21 -SA-9B (RAB 286)

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions for Fire Area 1-A-BAL:

Step 1

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve operations:

Step 1.a

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN

. 1CS-214, Charging/SI Pumps Miniflow Isol (RAB 236 near Boric Acid

Pumps)

. 1CS-1 69, CSIP Suction Header Xconn (RAB 247 above CSIPs)

.1 CS-218, CSIP Discharge Header Xconn (RAB 247 above CSIPs)

. 1CC-252, CCW From RCP Thermal Barrier FCV (RAB 236 Scalloped

Area)

Step 1.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

. 1CS-214 at breaker 1A35-SA-4C (RAB 261)

. 1CS-169 at breaker 1A35-SA-4B (RAB 261)

1 CS-218 at breaker 1 B35-SB-14D (RAB 261)

1 CC-252 at breaker 1 E12-6B (RAB 261)

Step 5

CAUTION

. The following step will inhibit all automatic and manual safeguards functions

since a fire in this area could cause spurious actuations as well as disable

controls for resetting Si.

  • Removal of Output Relay Power Fuses from both trains of SSPS will

generate a Reactor Trip signal. The Reactor should be shut down prior to

performing the following step.

Attachment 2

5

OBTAIN SSPS Key 96

AND DEFEAT both trains of SSPS by removing the listed fuses in the front

of the listed SSPS Output Cabinets:

  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62

Step 20

IF the following valves cannot be shut due to fire damage to their control

cables,

  • 1 CS-1 65, VCT Outlet/Dilution FCV (1 -LCV-1 15C)

THEN:

Step 20.a

STOP ALL CSIPs.

Step 20.b

SHUT EITHER of the following valves:

  • 1CS-1 68, C CSIP Suction X-conn with A CSIP

Step 20.c

SHUT EITHER of the following valves:

  • 1CS-1 69, C CSIP Suction X-conn with B CSIP

Step 20.d

VERIFY SHUT.1CS-214, Charging/SI Pumps Miniflow Isol.

Step 21

IF BOTH of the following occur due to fire damage to their control cables:

  • 1 SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, spuriously SHUTS

THEN ALIGN flow to the cooling tower, as follows:

Step 21.a

VERIFY OPEN 1 SW-275, ESW Return Header A to NSW.

Step 21.b

WHEN time permits,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE 1 SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, at

breaker 1A35-SA-9C (RAB 261).

(2) OPEN 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

(3) WHEN 1SW-270 is open,

THEN SHUT 1 SW-276, ESW to NSW Discharge Hdr.

Attachment 2

6

Step 22

IF BOTH 1SW-270 AND 1SW-276 shut,

THEN CROSS-CONNECT ESW Discharge Headers as follows:

Step 22.a

VERIFY OPEN 1SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

Step 22.b

VERIFY OPEN 1 SW-275, ESW Return Header A to NSW.

Step 22.c

VERIFY OPEN 1SW-271, ESW Header B Return to Aux Reservoir.

Step 22.d

WHEN time permits,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE 1 SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, at

breaker 1A35-SA-9C (RAB 261).

(2) OPEN 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

(3) WHEN 1 SW-270 has been opened,

THEN SHUT 1SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions for Fire Area 1-A-ACP:

Step lb

SECURE Rod Drive MG sets using OP-1 04, Rod Control System

OP-1 04

Step Number

Description

7.3.2.02

Place GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL

switch 1A to TRIP

7.3.2.03

Place MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL switch 1A

to TRIP

7.3.2.04

Open Reactor Trip Breakers, if not already open.

7.3.2.05

Place GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL

switch 1 B to TRIP

Place MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL switch 1 B

to TRIP

Step 2

If BOTH MDAFW pumps are disabled, THEN:

Attachment 2

7

Step 2c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker)...

... and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by removing

fuses 1A-i1/1 976 and 1A-12/1976

Step 2d

De-energize 1 MS-70 by opening disconnect switch on DP-1 A2-SA-2B.

Step 2f

IF TDAFW Pump is NOT operating properly, THEN locally...

...VERIFY OPEN TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve

...VERIFY OPEN 1MS-70, Main Steam B to Aux FW Turbine

Step 2g

IF MCB CST level indication is NOT available,

THEN locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure using Attachment 4.

Step 4

REMOVE the fuse for 1 BD-30 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

REMOVE the fuse for 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

Step 6

OPEN the power supply breaker for 1 CS-235 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-1 OA

Step 7

ISOLATE AND VENT IA to 1 CH-279

Step 7a

SHUT "1 IA-871 -11"

Step 7b

OPEN air filter drain petcocks on Instrument Air Filter

Step 7c

CHECK 1 CH-279, AH-12 1 ASA valve OPEN

Step 8

OPEN the power supply breaker for 1 CS-1 71 at breaker 1 B35-SB-4D

Step 9

Locally VERIFY OPEN 1CS-1 71, B CSIP Suction X-Conn valve

Locally VERIFY OPEN 1CS-235, Charging Line Isolation valve

Step 10

Locally verify shut 1 BD-30, SG 1 B Blowdown Isolation valve

Locally verify shut 1 BD-49, SG 1 C Blowdown Isolation valve

Step 13

IF SG C PORV cycles erroneously, THEN:

Step 13c

IF SG C PORV manuaVautomatic station does not function properly,

THEN locally OPERATE SG C PORV using OP-126 for desired cooldown

rate.

OP-126

Step Number

Description

8.2.1.2.01

Obtain pliers, flashlight, head set, extension cord

Attachment 2

8

8.2.1.2.02

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker PP-1A312-SA-

3

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker PP-1 B312-SB-

3

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker IDP-1A-SIII-1 1

8.2.1.2.03

Remove the cover from the side of the PORV

8.2.1.2.04

Establish communications with the Control Room

8.2.1.2.07

To throttle open the PORV,

8.2.1 .2.07a

Rotate Solenoid B manual override approximately 3/4 turn

in the clockwise direction

8.2.1.2.07b

As directed by the Control Room, slowly rotate Solenoid A

manual override approximately 3/4 turn in the clockwise

direction

8.2.1.2.07c

When the PORV is at its desired position, place Solenoid A

manual override back to its original position

8.2.1.2.08

To partially shut the PORV,

8.2.1.2.08a

Check Solenoid A manual override in the fully

counterclockwise position.

8.2.1 .2.08b

As directed by the Control Room slowly rotate Solenoid B

manual override to its original position by rotating it

approximately 3/4 turn in the counterclockwise direction,

until the PORV starts to shut.

8.2.1.2.08c

When the PORV is at the desired position, rotate Solenoid

B manual override approximately 3/4 turn in the clockwise

direction.

Step 14

IF FCV-2071C, Aux FW C Regulator 1AF-131, spuriously CLOSES, THEN

Step 1 4a

REMOVE fuse 1 A-5/1952 at Transfer Panel 1 B

Step 14b

THROTTLE 1AF-149, Stm Turb Aux FW C Isolation, to maintain SG C level

E

AOP-36 Attachment 2 Actions For SSD 1 Equipment Powered by SSD 2:

Step 2

IF control power is lost to 1 CS-231, Charging Flow controller,

Attachment 2

9

THEN PERFORM the following locally:

Step 2.a

SHUT 1CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

Step 2.b

MAINTAIN 25% to 60% PRZ level (charging flow) using 1CS-227, Normal

Charging FCV Bypass.

I

I AOP-36 Attachment 3 Actions For SSD 2 Equipment Powered by SSD 1:

This attachment was reviewed but contained no hot standby local manual

operator actions.

Attachment 2

10

LOCAL MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION STEPS

REVIEWED FOR ACHIEVING COLD SHUTDOWN

AOP-036

(Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, Rev. 21)

Attachment 1, SSD Emergency Manual Operations: Fire Area: 1-A-EPA

Step 4.b

WHEN manpower is available,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-246, Si Accumulator A Discharge, at breaker 1A21 -SA-5C

Attachment 2, SSD 1 Equipment Powered by SSD 2:

Step 6

IF 1 RH-30, RHR Heat Xchg A Out Flow Cont, OR 1 RH-20, RHR Hx Xchg

A Byp Flow Cont, cannot be controlled due to loss of control power,

THEN:

Step 6.a

ISOLATE 1 RH-20 air supply, 1 IA-1 28-12, to cause it to fail closed.

Step 6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

  • .....(MCR action)
  • Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 2

11

Attachment 2

MANUAL ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN AOP-036

WITHOUT REQUIRED LIGHTING

Section 3.0, for All Fire Areas

Step #

Description

13.a(7)

Open 1 CS-526, BA Tk Supply to CSIP Isol. VIv.

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-ACP

Step #

Description

1.b

Secure Rod Drive MG sets using OP-104, Rod Control System

2.c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker) and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by

removing 2 fuses

2.d

De-energize 1MS-70 by opening disconnect switch on DP-1A2-SA-2B.

2.f

Locally verify open TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve and 1 MS-70,

Main Steam B to Aux FW Turbine

2.g

Locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure

4

Remove the fuses for 1 BD-30 SA and 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

6

Open the power supply breaker for 1 CS-235 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-1 OA

9

Locally verify open 1 CS-235

14.a

Remove fuse 1 A-5/1952 at Transfer Panel 1 B

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BATB

Step #

Description

1.b(1)

Shut 1SI-327, Low Head Si Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. Vlv.

1.d(2)

Open 1 SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. Vlv.

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-EPA

Attachment 2

12

Step #

Description

7.b(1)

Shut 1SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. VWv.

7.d(2)

Open 1 S3-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. VWv.

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BAL SSA Area 1-A-BAL-B

Step #

Description

21 .b(2)

Open 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

22.c

Verify open 1 SW-271, ESW Header B Return to Aux. Reservoir.

22.d(2)

Open 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261). (Same as step 21 .b(2) above but for

different plant conditions.)

Attachment 2

13

Attachment 3

MANUAL ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN AOP-036

WITH DIESEL-POWERED FLOURESCENT LIGHTING

Section 3.0, for All Fire Areas

Step #

Description

1 2.c

Monitor AFW pump suction pressure indicators as an alternative to CST

RNO

level indication: (Refer to Attachment 4, AFW Suction Pressure vs. CST

level)

13.b(3)

(a) Shut 1CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

(b) Throttle 1 CS-227, Normal Charging FCV Bypass, as necessary to

control charging flow.

13.c

(3) Open one of the following breakers:

RNO

13.c

When directed by MCR, then locally throttle the de-energized valve to

RNO

maintain PRZ level:

  • 1SI-3, BIT Outlet Isolation
  • 1S1-4, BIT Outlet Isolation

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-ACP

Step #

Description

1.b

Secure rod drive MG sets using OP-104

2.c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker) and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by

removing 2 fuses

2.f

Locally verify open TDAFW pump trip and throttle valve & 1 MS-70

2.g

Locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure

4

Remove the fuses for 1 BD-30 SA and 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BATB

Step #

Description

Attachment 2

14

1.a(2)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

1.b(2)

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 Sl-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. Viv

1.d(1)

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 Sl-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv

Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-EPA

Step #

Descrigtion

4.b(1)

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

7.a(2)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-6E (RAB 286)

7.b(2)

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. Vlv

7.d(l)

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. VIv

AOP-36 Attachment I (, for Fire Area 1-A-BAL, SSA Area 1-A-BAL-B

Steo #

Description

1.a

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN

. 1CS-214, Charging/SI Pumps Miniflow Isol. (RAB 236 near Boric Acid

Pumps)

Attachment 2

15

5

OBTAIN SSPS Key 96 AND DEFEAT both trains of SSPS by removing

the listed fuses in the front of the listed SSPS Output Cabinets:

. Train A, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses

  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62

. Train B, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses

. Train B, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62

16.b(1)

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

22.a

VERIFY OPEN 1SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

22.d(3)

WHEN 1SW-270 has been opened,

THEN SHUT 1SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

Attachment 2, Safe Shutdown 1 Equipment Powered by Safe Shutdown 2

Step #

Description

2

IF control power is lost to 1 CS-231, Charging Flow controller,

THEN PERFORM the following locally:

a. SHUT 1 CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

b. MAINTAIN 25% to 60% PRZ level (charging flow) using 1 CS-227, Normal

Charging FCV Bypass.

6.a

ISOLATE 1 RH-20 air supply, 1 IA-1 28-12, to cause it to fail closed.

6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

. Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 3, Safe Shutdown 2 Equipment Powered by Safe Shutdown 1

Step #

Description

4.b

(1) OPEN feeder breaker 1A21-SA-5C, Accum lA-SA Disch Iso (RAB

286).

(2) OPEN feeder breaker 1 A21 -SA-3D, Accum 1 C-SA Disch Iso (RAB 286).

Attachment 2

16

6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

. Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 2

LOCAL MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION STEPS

REVIEWED FOR ACHIEVING HOT STANDBY

Summary of Number of Local Manual Action Steps to be Performed Outside of the Control

Room to Achieve and Maintain Hot Standby

l_______

_ Number of Manual Action Steps

Fire Area / Zone

Generic Steps

Area Specific

Total Steps

in AOP-36 for

Steps in AOP-036

by Fire

All Fire Areas

and Other

Area/Zone

Procedures

Referenced by

AOP-36

1-A-BAL-B

10

29

39

1 -A-BATB

10

14

24

1-A-EPA

10

14

24

1-A-ACP

10

45

55

Listing of AOP-036 Manual Action Steps Reviewed for Safe Shutdown Following a Fire

AOP-36 Section 3.0 Actions (Generic Steps for All Fire Areas/Zones):

Step 12.c RNO

MONITOR AFW pump suction pressure indicators as an alternative to

CST level indication: (Refer to Attachment 4, AFW Suction Pressure vs.

CST level)

Step 13.b(3)

Locally PERFORM the following (248' RAB):

(a) SHUT ICS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

(b) THROTTLE 1 CS-227, Normal Charging FCV Bypass, as necessary to

control charging flow.

Step 13.c RNO

ESTABLISH flow through the Hi Head Si Line, as follows:

(1).....(MCR action)

(2).....(MCR action)

(3) OPEN ONE of the following breakers:

1B31-SB 4C, 1Sl-3 BIT Outlet

1A31-SA 4C, 1Sl-4 BIT Outlet

(4) WHEN directed by MCR, THEN locally THROTTLE the de-energized

valve to maintain PRZ level:

Attachment 2

2

1 S-3, BIT Outlet Isolation

1SI-4, BIT Outlet Isolation

Stepl4.b

UNLOCK and SHUT the affected manual block valve(s): (Steam Tunnel

Platform El. 280)

1 MS-59, SG A PORV Manual Block

1 MS-61, SG B PORV Manual Block

1 MS-63, SG C PORV Manual Block

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions For Fire Area 1-A-BATB:

Step 1

IF RHR suction valves spuriously open resulting in RWST drain down,

THEN PERFORM the following recommended actions, as required:

Step 1.a

ISOLATE the Containment Recirc Sumps from the RWST, as follows:

(1) SHUT the following valves:

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-322 at breaker 1 A31 -SA-6E (RAB 286)
  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31-SB-6E (RAB 286)

Step 1.b

REFILL the RWST with A RHR Pump, as follows:

(1) SHUT 1 SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol Vlv.

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 S1-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 S1-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Vlv

(3) USE the RHR Pump as needed.

Step 1.d

WHEN RHR Pumps are no longer required to fill the RWST,

THEN:

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head Si Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 Sl-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Vlv

(2) OPEN 1 SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol Vlv.

Step 2

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve opening:

Attachment 2

3 .

Step 2.a

VERIFY the following valves are SHUT:

  • 1 SI-311, CV Sump 1 B To RHR Pmp 1 B-SB Downstrm Iso VIv

(RAB 286)

Step 2.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-301 at breaker 1 B21-SB-11 B (RAB 286)

1 SI-311 at breaker 1 B21 -SB-7A (RAB 286)

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions For Fire Area 1-A-EPA:

Step 7

IF RHR suction valves spuriously open resulting in RWST drain down,

THEN PERFORM the following recommended actions, as required:

Step 7.a

ISOLATE the Containment Recirc Sumps from the RWST, as follows:

(1) SHUT the following valves:

1 SI-323, RWST To RHR Pump B-SB (RAB 286)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-6E (RAB 286)

Step 7.b

REFILL the RWST with B RHR Pump, as follows:

(1) SHUT 1 SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Cross-over Isol Vlv.

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head Si Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Vlv

(3) USE the RHR Pump as needed.

Step 7.c

IF charging is required in the interim,

THEN USE the Boric Acid Tanks.

Step 7.d

WHEN RHR Pumps are no longer required to fill the RWST,

THEN:

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head Si Recirc to RWST Root Isol Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol Viv

(2) OPEN 1 SI-326, Low Head Si Train A to Hot Leg Cross-over Isol VIv.

Attachment 2

4

Step 8

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve opening:

Step 8.a

VERIFY the following valves are SHUT:

(RAB 286)

Step 8.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions for Fire Area 1-A-BAL:

Step 1

PERFORM the following to prevent spurious valve operations:

Step l.a

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN

Pumps)

  • 1 CC-252, CCW From RCP Thermal Barrier FCV (RAB 236 Scalloped

Area)

Step 1.b

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 CS-169 at breaker 1 A35-SA-4B (RAB 261)
  • 1 CS-218 at breaker 1 B35-SB-14D (RAB 261)
  • 1 CC-252 at breaker 1 E12-6B (RAB 261)

Step 5

CAUTION

. The following step will inhibit all automatic and manual safeguards functions

since a fire in this area could cause spurious actuations as well as disable

controls for resetting SI.

  • Removal of Output Relay Power Fuses from both trains of SSPS will

generate a Reactor Trip signal. The Reactor should be shut down prior to

performing the following step.

Attachment 2

5

OBTAIN SSPS Key 96

AND DEFEAT both trains of SSPS by removing the listed fuses in the front

of the listed SSPS Output Cabinets:

  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62

Step 20

IF the following valves cannot be shut due to fire damage to their control

cables,

  • 1 CS-1 65, VCT Outlet/Dilution FCV (1 -LCV-115C)
  • 1 CS-1 66, VCT Outlet (1 -LCV-115E)

THEN:

Step 20.a

STOP ALL CSIPs.

Step 20.b

SHUT EITHER of the following valves:

  • 1 CS-170, A CSIP Suction X-conn
  • 1CS-1 68, C CSIP Suction X-conn with A CSIP

Step 20.c

SHUT EITHER of the following valves:

  • 1CS-1 69, C CSIP Suction X-conn with B CSIP

Step 20.d

VERIFY SHUT 1CS-214, Charging/SI Pumps Miniflow Isol.

Step 21

IF BOTH of the following occur due to fire damage to their control cables:

  • 1 SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, spuriously SHUTS
  • 1 SW-276, ESW to NSW Discharge HDR, spuriously OPENS

THEN ALIGN flow to the cooling tower, as follows:

Step 21.a

VERIFY OPEN 1 SW-275, ESW Return Header A to NSW.

Step 21.b

WHEN time permits,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE 1 SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, at

breaker 1A35-SA-9C (RAB 261).

(2) OPEN 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

(3) WHEN 1SW-270 is open,

THEN SHUT 1SW-276, ESW to NSW Discharge Hdr.

Attachment 2

6

Step 22

IF BOTH 1 SW-270 AND 1 SW-276 shut,

THEN CROSS-CONNECT ESW Discharge Headers as follows:

Step 22.a

VERIFY OPEN lSW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

Step 22.b

VERIFY OPEN 1 SW-275, ESW Return Header A to NSW.

Step 22.c

VERIFY OPEN 1SW-271, ESW Header B Return to Aux Reservoir.

Step 22.d

WHEN time permits,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE 1SW-270, ESW Header A Return to Aux Reservoir, at

breaker 1A35-SA-9C (RAB 261).

(2) OPEN 1SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

(3) WHEN 1 SW-270 has been opened,

THEN SHUT 1 SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions for Fire Area 1-A-ACP:

Step lb

SECURE Rod Drive MG sets using OP-104, Rod Control System

OP-1 04

Step Number

Description

7.3.2.02

Place GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL

switch 1A to TRIP

7.3.2.03

Place MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL switch 1A

to TRIP

7.3.2.04

Open Reactor Trip Breakers, if not already open.

7.3.2.05

Place GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL

switch 1 B to TRIP

Place MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL switch 1 B

to TRIP

Step 2

If BOTH MDAFW pumps are disabled, THEN:

Attachment 2

7

Step 2c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker)...

... and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by removing

fuses lA-1 1/1 976 and 1A-12/1976

Step 2d

De-energize 1 MS-70 by opening disconnect switch on DP-1A2-SA-2B.

Step 2f

IF TDAFW Pump is NOT operating properly, THEN locally...

...VERIFY OPEN TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve

...VERIFY OPEN 1 MS-70, Main Steam B to Aux FW Turbine

Step 2g

IF MCB CST level indication is NOT available,

THEN locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure using Attachment 4.

Step 4

REMOVE the fuse for 1 BD-30 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

REMOVE the fuse for 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

Step 6

OPEN the power supply breaker for 1 CS-235 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-1 OA

Step 7

ISOLATE AND VENT IA to 1CH-279

Step 7a

SHUT m1 IA-871 -l1 "

Step 7b

OPEN air filter drain petcocks on Instrument Air Filter

Step 7c

CHECK 1CH-279, AH-12 1ASA valve OPEN

Step 8

OPEN the power supply breaker for 1 CS-171 at breaker 1 B35-SB-4D

Step 9

Locally VERIFY OPEN 1 CS-171, B CSIP Suction X-Conn valve

Locally VERIFY OPEN 1CS-235, Charging Line Isolation valve

Step 10

Locally verify shut 1 BD-30, SG 1 B Blowdown Isolation valve

Locally verify shut 1 BD-49, SG 1 C Blowdown Isolation valve

Step 13

IF SG C PORV cycles erroneously, THEN:

Step 13c

IF SG C PORV manuaVautomatic station does not function properly,

THEN locally OPERATE SG C PORV using OP-126 for desired cooldown

rate.

OP-126

Step Number

Description

8.2.1.2.01

Obtain pliers, flashlight, head set, extension cord

Attachment 2

8

8.2.1.2.02

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker PP-iA312-SA-

3

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker PP-1 B312-SB-

3

Open Servo Valve Solenoid feeder breaker IDP-1A-SIll-1 1

8.2.1.2.03

Remove the cover from the side of the PORV

8.2.1.2.04

Establish communications with the Control Room

8.2.1.2.07

To throttle open the PORV,

8.2.1.2.07a

Rotate Solenoid B manual override approximately 3/4 turn

in the clockwise direction

8.2.1.2.07b

As directed by the Control Room, slowly rotate Solenoid A

manual override approximately 3/4 turn in the clockwise

direction

8.2.1.2.07c

When the PORV is at its desired position, place Solenoid A

manual override back to its original position

8.2.1.2.08

To partially shut the PORV,

8.2.1.2.08a

Check Solenoid A manual override in the fully

counterclockwise position.

8.2.1.2.08b

As directed by the Control Room slowly rotate Solenoid B

manual override to its original position by rotating it

approximately 3/4 turn in the counterclockwise direction,

until the PORV starts to shut.

8.2.1.2.08c

When the PORV is at the desired position, rotate Solenoid

B manual override approximately 3/4 turn in the clockwise

direction.

Step 14

IF FCV-2071C, Aux FW C Regulator 1AF-131, spuriously CLOSES, THEN

Step 14a

REMOVE fuse 1 A-5/1952 at Transfer Panel 1 B

Step 14b

THROTTLE 1AF-149, Stm Turb Aux FW C Isolation, to maintain SG C level

AOP-36 Attachment 2 Actions For SSD I Equipment Powered by SSD 2:

Step 2

IF control power is lost to 1 CS-231, Charging Flow controller,

THEN PERFORM the following locally:

Attachment 2

9

Step 2.a

SHUT 1 CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

Step 2.b

MAINTAIN 25% to 60% PRZ level (charging flow) using 1CS-227, Normal

Charging FCV Bypass.

AOP-36 Attachment 3 Actions For SSD 2 Equipment Powered by SSD 1:

This attachment was reviewed but contained no hot standby local manual

operator actions.

LOCAL MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION STEPS

REVIEWED FOR ACHIEVING COLD SHUTDOWN

AOP-36 Attachment 1 (Area Specific) Actions for Fire Area 1-A-EPA:

Step 4.b

WHEN manpower is available,

THEN:

(1) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

Attachment 2, SSD 1 Equipment Powered by SSD 2:

Step 6

IF 1 RH-30, RHR Heat Xchg A Out Flow Cont, OR 1 RH-20, RHR Hx Xchg

A Byp Flow Cont, cannot be controlled due to loss of control power,

THEN:

Step 6.a

ISOLATE 1 RH-20 air supply, 1 IA-1 28-12, to cause it to fail closed.

Step 6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

  • ..... (MCR action)
  • Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 2

MANUAL ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN AOP-036

WITHOUT REQUIRED EMERGENCY LIGHTING

AOP-36, Section 3.0, for All Fire Areas

Step #

Description

13.a(7)

Open 1CS-526, BA Tk Supply to CSIP Isol. Vlv.

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-ACP

Step#

Description

1.b

Secure Rod Drive MG sets using OP-104, Rod Control System

2.c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker) and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by

removing 2 fuses

2.d

De-energize 1 MS-70 by opening disconnect switch on DP-1A2-SA-2B.

2.f

Locally verify open TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve and 1 MS-70,

Main Steam B to Aux FW Turbine

2.g

Locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure

4

Remove the fuses for 1 BD-30 SA and 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-19A

6

Open the power supply breaker for 1 CS-235 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-1 OA

9

Locally verify open 1CS-235

14.a

Remove fuse 1 A-5/1952 at Transfer Panel 1 B

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BATB

Ste#0

l Description

1.b(1)

Shut 1SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. Vlv.

1.d(2)

Open 1SI-327, Low Head SI Train B to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. VIv.

I

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-EPA

Step #

Description

7.b(i)

Shut 1SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. Viv.

7.d(2)

Open 1 SI-326, Low Head SI Train A to Hot Leg Crossover Isol. Vlv.

Attachment 3

2

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BAL SSA Area 1-A-BAL-B

Step #

Description

21.b(2)

Open 1 SW-270 locally (RAB 261).

22.c

Verify open 1 SW-271, ESW Header B Return to Aux. Reservoir.

22.d(2)

Open 1SW-270 locally (RAB 261). (Same as step 21.b(2) above but for

different plant conditions.)

MANUAL ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN AOP-036

WITHOUT REQUIRED BATTERY-BACKED EMERGENCY LIGHTING

BUT WITH DIESEL-POWERED FLOURESCENT LIGHTING

AOP-36, Section 3.0, for All Fire Areas

Step #

Descrintion

12.c

Monitor AFW pump suction pressure indicators as an alternative to CST

RNO

level indication: (Refer to Attachment 4, AFW Suction Pressure vs. CST

level)

13.b(3)

(a) Shut 1CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

(b) Throttle 1 CS-227, Normal Charging FCV Bypass, as necessary to

control charging flow.

13.c

(3) Open one of the following breakers:

RNO

  • 1 B31 -SB-4C,1SI-3 BIT Outlet

13.c

When directed by MCR, then locally throttle the de-energized valve to

RNO

maintain PRZ level:

  • 1SI-3, BIT Outlet Isolation
  • 1SI-4, BIT Outlet Isolation

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-ACP

Step #

Description

1.b

Secure rod drive MG sets using OP-104

2.c

Obtain a transfer panel key 33, 34, 35, 36, 99 or 106 (MCR or ACP key

locker) and de-energize the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve by

removing 2 fuses

Attachment 3

3

2.f

Locally verify open TDAFW pump trip and throttle valve & 1 MS-70

2.g

Locally monitor AFW pump suction pressure

4

Remove the fuses for 1 BD-30 SA and 1 BD-49 SA at panel ARP-1 9A

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BATB

Step #

Description

1.a(2)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

1.b(2)

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 S1-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. Vlv

1.d(1)

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. Vlv

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-EPA

Step #

Description

4.b(1)

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

7.a(2)

(2) DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

  • 1 SI-323 at breaker 1 B31 -SB-6E (RAB 286)

7.b(2)

(2) OPEN the following valves to align RHR HX outlet flow to the RWST:

  • 1 SI-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 SI-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. Vlv

7.d(1)

(1) SHUT the following valves to isolate RHR HX outlet flow from the

RWST:

  • 1 Sl-448, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Root Isol. Vlv
  • 1 Sl-331, Low Head SI Recirc to RWST Isol. VIv

Attachment 3

4

AOP-36, Attachment 1, for Fire Area 1-A-BAL-B

Step #

Description

1.a

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN

Pumps)

  • lCS-1 69, CSIP Suction Header Xconn (RAB 247 above CSIPs)

5

OBTAIN SSPS Key 96 AND DEFEAT both trains of SSPS by removing

the listed fuses in the front of the listed SSPS Output Cabinets:

  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train A, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 1, Output Relay Power fuses
  • Train B, Output Cabinet No. 2, fuses 61 and 62

16.b(l)

DE-ENERGIZE the following valves:

22.a

VERIFY OPEN 1SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

22.d(3)

WHEN 1SW-270 has been opened,

THEN SHUT 1 SW-274, ESW Return Header B to NSW.

AOP-36, Attachment 2, Safe Shutdown 1 Equipment Powered by Safe Shutdown 2

Step #

Description

2

IF control power is lost to 1CS-231, Charging Flow controller,

THEN PERFORM the following locally:

a. SHUT 1CS-228, Normal Charging FCV Inlet Isolation Valve.

b. MAINTAIN 25% to 60% PRZ level (charging flow) using 1 CS-227, Normal

Charging FCV Bypass.

6.a

ISOLATE 1 RH-20 air supply, 1 IA-1 28-12, to cause it to fail closed.

6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

  • Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 3

5

AOP-36, Attachment 3, Safe Shutdown 2 Equipment Powered by Safe Shutdown I

Step #

Description

4.b

(1) OPEN feeder breaker 1A21-SA-5C, Accum 1A-SA Disch Iso (RAB

286).

(2) OPEN feeder breaker 1 A21 -SA-3D, Accum 1 C-SA Disch iso (RAB 286).

6.d

VERIFY RHR is cooling the RCS by trending temperature using ONE of

the following methods:

. Local temperature indication TI-5551A (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet)

Attachment 3

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