ML033381069
| ML033381069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2003 |
| From: | Troy Pruett Plant Support Branch Region IV |
| To: | Ridenoure R Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| Download: ML033381069 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I V 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005 December 3,2003 I?. T. Ridenoure Division Manager - Nuclear Operations Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
SUBJECT:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED DURING THE NOVEMBER 18,2003, EXERCISE
Dear Mr. Ridenoure:
Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) Region Vlls letter to the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, dated November 25, 2003. This letter discusses two deficiencies identified during evaluation of the November 18, 2003, emergency preparedness exercise of state and local response plans for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.
Both of the deficiencies were assessed against the Washington County Emergency Operations Center. FEMA defines a deficiency as, an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. The first deficiency related to the effectiveness of direction and control provided by the Emergency Management Director at the Washington County Emergency Operations Center. The second deficiency related to decision-making and communication of protective action decisions for special population groups in Washington County.
The purpose of this letter is to communicate FEMAs official notification of the deficiency in accordance with the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding. No response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is required.
b The NRC encourages Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station to work with the appropriate off-site governmental agencies to ensure a timely resolution of this issue. The NRC will continue to monitor the status of this issue. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the NRC and FEMA Region VI will assess the progress made towards resolution of this issue by approximately February 2, 2004, and will decide at that time if additional measures are necessary.
If this issue is not resolved by March 25, 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency may withdraw the finding of reasonable assurance according to the requirements of 44 CFR 350.13(a). At that time the NRC would take appropriate action according to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(~)(2) and 50.54(~)(3).
Omaha Public Power District If you have any further questions, please contact Ryan E. Lantz at (817) 860-8158, or Paul J.
Elkmann at (817) 276-6539.
Sincerely fi4k fioyW. Pruett, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40 Attachment :
FEMA Region VI1 Letter to Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, dated November 25,2003 cc w/attachment:
John B. Herman, Manager Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Richard P. Clemens, Division Manager Nuclear Assessments Fort Calhoun Station P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 David J. Bannister, Manager - Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-1-1 Plant P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 James R. Curtiss Winston & Strawn 1400 L. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 466 Blair, NE 68008
Omaha Public Power District Sue Semerena, Section Administrator Nebraska Health and Human Services System Division of Public Health Assurance Consumer Services Section 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5007 Daniel K. McGhee Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health 401 SW 7th Street, Suite D Des Moines, IA 50309 Technical Services Branch Chief FEMA Region VI1 2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 900 Kansas City, Missouri 641 08-2670
N 0. 0 4 9 P.214 2323 Gw"d Boulevard, Suite 900 Vovember 25,2003 A1 Bern&, Assistant Director Nebraska Emergency Managewent Agenoy 1300 Military Road
'Lin~oln, 68508-1090 The purpose of this let$er is to offisrslly isform yow office of the two Deficiencies identified during %e November 18,2003, fidl-scale/relocation, re-entry, and return exercise of the state and local radiological emergency response plans for the Fort W~OLUI Nuclear Station. These issues were disoussed at the post exmise participants briefii cm November 20,2003. The Deficiencies were assessed against the Washington County Emergency Operatiom Center.
Washeton Countv EmereenwODerations Centor CEOQ I, Criterion Icl, activities associated with direction and control, was not adequately d-n-ted, resulting in a Deficiency. The following specif5c concern was identified; Duectiop aod oontrol was never fully established wil&it~ the Wasbingtan County EOC. The Bmergm Management Directcxr never fully assumed his leadership end coordination role within the EOC t&uc@xe.
The BOC st;lff worked independently without cowdbating their activities or Worming ofher staff of their actions. Regular briefings by all EOC M, by fqnc#id area, did not occur una evstuators indicated to the Emergency Maaagement hector (at approximstely 10:lS am,) that this &ouId be &ne in order to effectively coordinate activities and itmp-e that no necessary actions were missed. Bvep after reccivhg this advice frorn the evaluators, this process was n e w fully engaged and information exchanged wilbin the EOC about aotivitiee was incomplete. Examples of problems related to this direction and control failure include:
Accmae information conambg protective actions for echools was never provided to the public. The Blair and Fort W o u n Schools were nosed at the Alert (7: 15 a.m,) in accosdance with an automatic procedure that is implemented by the Sheriffs Office dispatch cmm, when asked what action was t8km for the schoo~s, the Emergency Management Director was hi#idy qncert.ain about this. After consultation with the State Liaison wd others, the Emergency Management Director stated tlut the schools would use their n d
evacuation procedures, Later in tJx exermw, h%gomti~%t was x ~ u l a ~ e d hat the schools had been notified mid closed p r i ~ ~
lo thek nom1 start tlmc and that buses enroute to school would have been turned around. However, no message went out to the public to www.fmna.gov
N0.049 P. d/4 address school closures and to nojify pgren$ that their children were being return@ home. No informsrtion was provided to the ptiblic!concemg schools or dayoare facilities until an Emergency Public Information @PI) message WaE reletwed fo~~owing the (3erkerd l3nergency (IO: 14 4,m.). vlnt mesaage inconectly indioated that the 'phoo)s bad been relocated to Frernont High School, ~bg-was a p a t deal of uncert@inty about the W\\on ta$ren for the sohmls and the 4tatys of the school children, It is poasible that school children couldlhave been
- W e d to their homes withopt pare~p$
supervision. This could have posed a slriow kea4 to their health and safety dwing the svacuntian of sub areas I, 2, and 3.
I I
The Sheriffs Office personnel oondwt@ back-up route alerting for areab affecfed by a siren ovtqge (sirens 41 and 42) fofollowbg the Site A(ea Ekpageacy at 859 4,m. A controller message &out tbe siren failure at 8143 a.m. led to muoh jnformation about the actual myone else within the E N.
this action asd was not Office personnel about by the Sheriffs Office on this ima. However, of rout0 alerting vas not communicated to Director never directed his staff to initiate wag also coRfusim mong Shenff s I
0 Thc $beriff% Office lies outside ~e 10 q o public mile EPZ and the this a&m until it information or were unaware of The Rnwgency In addition, emluaWrs asked them to provide EOC briefings; A fdum to establish direction and control resulted in misoommuunicalion within the Wa6bhgtw Camp ROC and betweeq the Boc and &e State on imP0rfa;nt ismes concerning public safe@ and public iafoytion. Communication mcl coordination ia general was insuffioieat to insure that all necessary PctiVities p x e wcoplpbh& verified, and crommunicated to qffected parties in a timely manner. ("R&0654, A.X.fl., Z.& b.)
Remedial Actibns Required: A mdirll exerr:
OpeT'ations Center. "his should o a r 8-t to @e Emergency Management Wcctnr receiving training in floc direction and wntrol. In addition, the dedi~,a@d btliqo md fax machine ghoyld be rpovd to a location within the EOC to eliminate the Brnerghcy Mapagmnent Director &om ha-to leave the EOC fieqymtly.
'Won Zcl, activities associated with protc tive aotion deoiskm-dg for spwial population groups,
m t be condycted by zhe Waahiagton Coynty Emgmcy c
b was not adewtelv demonstrated, resulting 9 a Deficiency, The folloying specific concern was identified:
I I
N0.049 P. M ~
hospital. There is no evidence that either of tbese protective action decisions w made for the special populations or that these facilities were ever notified (either actually or simulated) aboqt my protective actions to take, The p l m and procedures for m&hg clecisions regwding the protection of special populations and facilities were not followed. There was a lack of effective communication within the EOC and between the EOC and the state of Nebraska's fhailities. The ineffdve comwicstion an4 coordination of the county's aotioa resulted in critical actiom pot being accomplished. As the resul# of the failwe fo make and ooslmunicate deoisiow concerning special facilities, t&ese populations were not adequately protected and the health and safety of these person6 wqs aonylromised, (NUREGO654, J.9., lO.cd.e,g.)
Remedial Actions Reqwed: A remedial exercise must be conducted by the Wwhbgtot) County Emagency Operatiom Centm. All EOC staff should mview plans and procedures and additional W n g must be provided concerning the plans md pmcedqres for the prot@on of special popuIatiQns. The Emergency Management Coordinator needs to ensure that plans and procodwa ~ I V followed and must closely monitor staff activities within the ROC! to ensw that critical a&ons are r$ccornplisM, In addition, careful logging of BOC activities and regular comunicaticw, both internally and e e
y we required to eflectively coordinate activities and provide quality conh-01.
In accordance with 44 CFtR 350,9(d) md the F W
Wologicsl ;Bnergencu Preparedness &mise Pvxmual
@l3&GREP-14)), September 1991, we have thomqgldy reviewed aud diswsed these issuss with PEMA H e w e n, the U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Comtnission, qnd sppr.6pTjat.e FEMA Region VII Regional Assistance Committee members. J?EMA-RRP-14), psge C.16-I, defhea a Dcficienoy as "..ANI observed or identified inadequacy of organizational perforrmuce h QI exercise fbat could cayse a finding that offsite emergency p5.epaednw is not adequate to provide reasonable qssuraaoe that appropriate protective measurea can be taken in tbe went of a radiological emergency b prott?ct tbe Wth and safety of the publio living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant." Because of tke pom~al impact of a Defi&qcy on the public health and safely, they are requued to be COW Witbin 120 days after the exercise h u g h appropriate remedid actions, inclubg remedid exercises, drills, plan changes or ~ther actions.
Please provide a response to tbe proposed remedial aotiw lW above by DecembeJ 5.2003. My Radiological Emergency Preparedness Mis adable ts provide assistzu~ce in achieving resolution IO this issue. Should you have any quefitions, please contact Mr. Joe Sohulte at (816) 283-7016.
Sincerely,
?
Richard Hainje Regional Director