Information Notice 2012-18, Failure to Properly Augment Emergency Response Organizations
| ML12178A010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/26/2012 |
| From: | Camper L, Laura Dudes, Mcginty T NRC/FSME/DWMEP/DURLD, Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking |
| To: | |
| Garmon-Candelaria, David 301-415-3512 | |
| References | |
| IN-12-018 | |
| Download: ML12178A010 (5) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
OFFICE OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATERIALS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001
October 26, 2012
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2012-18:
FAILURE TO PROPERLY AUGMENT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor, including
decommissioning power reactors, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel.
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit or combined license under
10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.
PURPOSE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to notify
addresses of instances of licensees not properly staffing emergency response organizations
(EROs). The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions
contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
From 2009 through 2011, a number of events occurred in which licensee EROs were not
adequately staffed when required. On two occasions - at different sites - the ERO was
augmented in a time that exceeded the licensee emergency plan requirements. On a third
occasion, at a third site, the ERO was not activated because the licensee failed to declare an
emergency action level (EAL) as required.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (Brunswick) - Delay in Augmentation of On-Shift Emergency
Response Staff during Alert
On June 6, 2010, Brunswick declared an Alert, in accordance with EAL guidelines, in response
to a discharge of Halon gas into the basement of the emergency diesel generator building. After
the Alert declaration, the control room site emergency coordinator directed the secondary alarm
station operator to activate the Brunswick emergency notification system. However, the
secondary alarm station operator was unable to activate the emergency notification system
because of administrative and computer access problems and an interruption by an incoming phone call. After the control room site emergency coordinator was notified of the failure to
activate the emergency notification system, the individual initiated a manual ERO group page.
This second attempt to activate the ERO was not initiated correctly because of operator error.
The ERO notification issue finally was remedied by the emergency preparedness supervisor.
As a result of these communications issues, the Brunswick ERO received confusing
notifications of ERO activation (i.e., three inaccurate manual pages, one accurate text message, and several notices from the emergency notification system advising of the Alert declaration).
Delays in proper ERO notification cascaded into delays in the actual staffing of the Brunswick
ERO facilities to the extent that the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support
Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility were not staffed in the time required by
the site emergency plan.
The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was inadequate augmentation drill
frequency, coupled with an inadequate strategy for staffing emergency facilities. Corrective
actions included an increase in the frequency of ERO augmentation drills, shifting to an
All-Call/All-Come ERO response philosophy, and implementing an improved automated
notification system. This event is described in NRC Inspection Report 05000325/2010007 and
05000324/2010007, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML102930092) and Final Significance Determination of White Finding and Notice
of Violation, EA-10-192 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103560553).
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 - Failure to Staff the TSC and OSC within the Required
Time Limit
On November 7, 2010, the licensee at Indian Point Unit 2 declared an Alert, in accordance with
EAL guidelines, in response to two explosions in the Unit 2 transformer yard. After the Alert
declaration, the operations crew activated the automatic notification system directing the ERO
to staff the site emergency response facilities. The Indian Point Emergency Plan requires the
TSC and OSC to be staffed and operational within 60 minutes of an Alert declaration. However, the licensee exceeded the 60-minute requirement when they declared the TSC and OSC
operational 79 minutes and 86 minutes, respectively, after the Alert declaration.
The licensee identified two factors that contributed to the delay: (1) members of the ERO
questioned the validity of the ERO beeper indications, or they believed that other ERO members
would respond to the call-in, and (2) problems occurred with the beeper and phone systems
where some ERO responders indicated that the system recording stated there was no
emergency, while other personnel received a beep but were unable to call in.
While reviewing this event, NRC inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the area of
human performance associated with the work practices attribute of defining and effectively
communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance. This event is described in NRC
Inspection Report 05000247/2010-005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110420231).
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) - Failure to Declare Alert and to Implement
the Emergency Classification and Action Level
On June 25, 2009, an explosion and fire occurred in voltage monitoring equipment on a
345 kilovolt electrical bus. Shift management personnel did not recognize the event as having
satisfied any emergency criteria. The next day, the oncoming control room Shift Manager, in
consultation with the Emergency Preparedness Manager, determined the event met the conditions for an Alert, in accordance with EAL guidelines. At this point, the NRC, State, and
local officials were notified of the missed EAL declaration and the proper classification status.
The licensee attributed the failure to declare an Alert to personnel not adequately describing the
event as an explosion. A recent change to the site procedure added catastrophic failure of
energized equipment to the definition of an explosion. However, this procedure change was
not properly managed, resulting in site personnel not receiving adequate training to identify
catastrophic electrical faults as explosions. Therefore, site personnel made reports of an
electrical fault and did not report the explosion to the control room. This event is described in
NRC Inspection Report 05000346/2009503 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093620814); Final
Significance Determination for a White Finding Notification of Follow-Up Assessment, and
Notice of Violation, EA-09-283 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100560592); and the Response to
the Notice of Violation (ADAMS Accession No. ML100910164).
BACKGROUND
Part 50.54(q) of 10 CFR, Conditions of licenses, requires licensees to follow and maintain the
effectiveness of prescribed emergency plans. The requirements for emergency plans are
codified in 10 CFR Part 50.47, Emergency Plans, and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50,
Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities. Additionally, NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, amplifies the requirements set
forth in the regulations. Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Nuclear Power Reactors, endorses NUREG-0654 as an acceptable method for applicants and
licensees to comply with the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).
DISCUSSION
Part 50.47(b)(2) of 10 CFR, requires that timely augmentation of on-shift emergency response
capabilities be available. An in-depth review of the events described in this IN revealed
inadequate training as a contributing cause to the untimely augmentation of emergency
response capabilities. In general, training for emergency responders should be sufficient to
ensure designated individuals are competent in executing their assigned emergency response
duties. The events described in this IN illustrate potential deficiencies that licensees should
take measures to avoid. Although there is no explicit NRC requirement to do so, licensees may
consider reviewing the circumstances of these events within their emergency response training
programs and preemptively implementing applicable corrective actions described in the
documents referenced above.
CONTACT
S
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response (NSIR) manager.
/RA/
/RA/
Timothy J. McGinty, Director
Larry W. Camper, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Division of Waste Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
and Environmental Protection
Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs
/RA by JLuehman for/
Laura A. Dudes, Director
Division of Construction Inspection
and Operational Programs
Office of New Reactors
Technical Contacts: Eric Schrader, NSIR
(301) 415-5627 E-mail: eric.schrader@nrc.gov
David Garmon, NRR
(301) 415-3512
E-mail: david.garmon@nrc.gov
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library.
ML12178A010 *via e-mail
TAC ME8295 OFFICE
NRR/DIRS/I
OEB*
Tech Editor*
NSIR/DPR/
DDEP/IRIB*
NRR/DIRS/IOE
B:BC
NSIR/DPR/DD
EP/IRIB:BC*
FSME/DWM
EP/RDB:BC*
NRR/DORL:D*
NAME
DGarmon
JDougherty
ESchrader
HChernoff
RKahler
BWatson
MEvans (SCoffin
for)
DATE
08/28/12
06/29/12
09/19/12
08/28/12
09/18/12
07/31/12
09/18/12 OFFICE NRR/DIRS:D NSIR/DPR/DD
EP:DD*
NRR/DPR/
PGCB:PM*
NRR/DPR/
PGCB:LA
NRR/DPR/PGC
B:BC
NRO/DCIP:D
FSME/
DWMEP:D
NRR/DPR:D
NAME
HNieh
MThaggard
ARussell
CHawes
DPelton
LDudes
(JLuehman
for)
LCamper
TMcGinty
DATE
09/10/12
09/19/12
09/19/12
09/19/12
09/27/12
10/11/12
10/25/12
10/26/12