Information Notice 1984-09, Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)
12 IN 84-09, Rev.
1
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
D.C.
20555
March 7, 1984
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO.
84-09, REVISION
1:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC
INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION
SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50,
APPENDIX R)
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL)
or
construction permit (CP).
Purpose
This Information Notice is a revision to IE Information Notice No. 84-09 issued
on February 13, 1984.
Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page
which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of
The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative
text and in the margin to highlight the change.
Licensees should add the
replacement page 2.
No specific action or response is required as a result of
this replacement.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
- Edward L Jordan, Director
Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and
Eangdeeringg Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts:
L. E. Whitney, IE
(301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR
(301) 492-7072 Attachments:
1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Requi.,ements,
Replacement page 2
2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
8402090024 640307 PDR I&E
NOTICEB4-09 PDR
Attachment 1
IN 84-09, Rev.
1 March
1984 I11. Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown
At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were
Separated by a partial horizontal pyrocrete barrier suspended from the overhead.
At the same facility, two auxiliary feedwater pumps were located adjacent to
each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side
with fire-retardant material.
The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section
III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of
a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.
No alternative means of feedwater supply
was designated.
At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located
within the same cabinet.
At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation
valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity
without a fire rated barrier.
Appendix R,Section III.G.1, requires that fire protection features shall be
provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.
These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from either
the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage.
Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented
outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
remains free of fire damage.
The alternatives are:
1.
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated
circuits by a three-hour fire barrier.
2.
Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated
circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automratic fire
suppression systems installed in the area.
3.
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated
circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles
and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed
in the area.
4.
Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent
of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in
the area contining-this-aernative-or-dedic ted-shutdown-cepabity7 under consideration.
R1 It should be noted *that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide
additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and
cableswithin non-inerted containments.
Attachment 2
IN 84-09, Rev.
I
March 7, 1984
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
84-18
84-17
84-16
84-15
84-14
84-13
Stress Corrosion Cracking in
Pressurized Water Reactcr
Sysetms
Problems with Liquid Nitrogen
Cooling Components Below the
Nil Ductility Temperature
Failure of Automatic
Sprinkler System Valves to
Operate
Reporting of Radiological
Releases
Highlights of Recent Trans- port Regulatory Revisions by
DOT and NRC
Potential Deficiency in
Motor-Operated Valve Control
Circuits and Annunciation
Failure of Soft Seat Valve
Seals
Training Program Deficienc- ies
Motor-Operated Valve Torque
Switches Set Below the
manufacturer's Recommended
Value
Lessons Learned from NRC
Inspections of Fire Pro- tection Safe Shutdown
Systems (10
CFR 50,
Appendix R)
3/7/84
3/5/84
3/2/84
3/2/84
3/2/84
2/28/84
2/27/84
2/24/84
2/21/84
02/13/84
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All NRC licensees
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
84-12
84-11
84-10
84-09 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit