IR 05000387/2019003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000387/2019003 and 05000388/2019003 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200028/2019001

ML19316B473
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	11/12/2019
From:	Jon Greives Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Berryman B Susquehanna
Greives J
References
EA-19-082 IR 2019001, IR 2019003, ISFSI IR 2019001
Download: ML19316B473 (18)

Text

November 12, 2019

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2019003 AND 05000388/2019003 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200028/2019001

Dear Mr. Berryman:

On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Kevin Cimorelli and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Susquehanna. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000387, 05000388,

and 07200028 License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000387, 05000388, and 07200028

License Numbers:

NPF-14 and NPF-22

Report Numbers:

05000387/2019003, 05000388/2019003, and 07200028/2019001

I-2019-001-0073

Licensee:

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC

Facility:

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Berwick, PA

Inspection Dates:

July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019

Inspectors:

E. Andrews, Health Physicist

B. DeBoer, Health Physicist

M. McLaughlin, Senior Enforcement Specialist

L. Micewski, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Rossi, Resident Inspector

K. Warner, Health Physicist

Approved By:

Jonathan E. Greives, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 4

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,

Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115

List of Findings and Violations

Unit 2 'D' Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Exceeded Individual Valve Leakage Limit Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable NCV 05000388/2019003-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 A Severity Level IV NCV of Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 was self-revealed when the outboard 'D' main steam isolation valve (MSIV) exceeded the allowed leakage rate for an individual MSIV of </= 100 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh). Specifically, during local leak rate testing in March 2019, the outboard 'D' MSIV leakage was measured at 101.3 scfh.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000388/2019-001-01 LER 2019-001-01 for Susquehanna, Unit 2, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage 71153 Closed LER 05000388/2019-001-00 LER 2019-001-00 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage.

71153 Closed LER 05000388/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for Susquehanna, Unit 2, Valid Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System due to a Trip of Reactor Protection System Bus 2B 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 6, 2019, operators reduced power to approximately 62 percent for a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to full power on September 8, 2019. On September 9, 2019, power was reduced to approximately 61 percent following a trip of the 1C reactor main feed pump. Operators restored power to 100 percent on September 10, 2019. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 27, 2019, operators reduced power to approximately 69 percent for a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on September 28, 2019, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on August 13, 2019.

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit Common, 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) while 'D' EDG running on July 15, 2019

(2) Unit Common, 'E' EDG while substituted for 'A' EDG during maintenance activities on

'A' and 'D' EDGs on July 30, 2019

(3) Unit Common, control room emergency outside air supply system division 2 during division 1 surveillance test on August 27, 2019

(4) Unit Common, division 1 residual heat removal service water during division 2 flow surveillance on September 17, 2019

(5) Unit 2, automatic depressurization system (ADS) and support systems during high pressure coolant isolation (HPCI) flow surveillance on September 19, 2019

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Units 1, 2, and Common, 'B' emergency service water (ESW) during 'A' ESW surveillance test and flow adjustments on August 22, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection

Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2, division 2 lower cable spreading room (fire zones 0-25A, 0-25E) on July 12, 2019

(2) Unit 2, division 1 and 2 125VDC battery rooms (fire zones 0-28C,D,E) on July 17, 2019

(3) Unit 2, reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator set area (fire zones 2-5A, 2-5H) elevation 761' on July 31, 2019

(4) Unit 2, remote shutdown panel and general area (fire zones 2-2A,C) elevation 670' on August 27, 2019

(5) Unit 1, equipment area (fire zone 1-3C) on September 5, 2019

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a planned downpower to 65 percent for a rod sequence exchange and scram time testing on September 6, 2019.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator re-qualification training during a simulator scenario which included an anticipated transient without scram with subsequent loss of high pressure injection on August 12, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Unit 2, uninterruptable power supply maintenance 120V alternating current (AC)instrument power on July 29, 2019

(2) Local leak rate testing program and maintenance actions for main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) on August 20, 2019

(3) Motor Control Center 0B136 May 30, 2019 and August 3, 2019 events and follow up on September 9, 2019

Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activities:

(1) Commercial-grade dedication for differential voltage control relays on September 24, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 2, 'B' RPS K1B repair after failure on July 2, 2019

(2) Units 1 and 2, yellow risk during reactor pressure vessel level functional testing on July 24, 2019

(3) Unit 2, yellow risk during calibration of drywell pressure channels for ADS permissive on July 24, 2019

(4) Unit 1, yellow risk during drywell ADS permissive test on July 25, 2019

(5) Unit Common, 'B', 'C', and 'E' EDGs protected while 'A' and 'D' EDGs were inoperable for maintenance on July 30, 2019

(6) Unit 1, RPS division 1 logic for 'A' and 'C' MSIV isolation following intermittent spurious trips of 'B' MSIV isolation logic on August 16, 2019

(7) Unit Common, 'B' control structure chiller, heating ventilation and air condition, and control room emergency outside air system during 'A' control structure outage window on September 26, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, safety-related breaker 1B22023 found out of specification on June 11, 2019

(2) Unit Common, 'E' EDG voltage imbalance due to loose connection on July 15, 2019

(3) Unit Common, 'A' Loop ESW flow is low with 'C' and 'D' pumps in service on July 23, 2019

(4) Unit Common, loss of power to 0B136 on August 5, 2019

(5) Unit 2, 'D' MSIV leakage exceeded technical specification (TS) limits on August 20, 2019

(6) Unit Common, 'C' ESW failed to meet acceptance criteria on August 28, 2019

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Units 1 and 2, engineering change (EC) 2074859 RHR room pre-isolation temperature alarms, on August 21, 2019

(2) EC 2157226 south gate house wall security upgrades on September 4, 2019

(3) Unit Common, EC 2182692 delete loop 'B' ESW guard pipe drain on September 26, 2019

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance tests:

(1) Unit Common, weld repair to instrument line connection on 'D' ESW pump discharge pipe on July 2, 2019

(2) Unit 2, 'B' RPS K1B repair after failure on July 2, 2019

(3) Unit Common, 'A' EDG 5 year overhaul on July 22, 2019

(4) Unit Common, 'D' EDG jacket water leak repair on July 30, 2019

(5) Unit 1, division 1 RHR planned maintenance on August 5, 2019

(6) Unit Common, 'C' ESW failed to meet acceptance criteria on August 28, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit Common, 'D' EDG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run on July 15, 2019

(2) Unit 2, quarterly calibration of drywell pressure channels PS-E11-2N010 A&C [ADS permissive, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) exhaust vacuum breaker isolation]

on July 24, 2019

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, RCIC monthly surveillance on August 1, 2019

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, drywell sump level instrument functional test on July 10, 2019

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) FLEX pumper truck monthly surveillance on August 7, 2019

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the emergency director, dose assessment personnel, and communicators emergency preparedness implementation during a training exercise on September 4, 2019. The scenario involved a simulated anticipated transient without scram resulting in fuel damage.

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the operators in the control room simulator, the emergency director, dose assessment personnel, and communicators emergency preparedness implementation during a full scale exercise on July 9, 2019. The exercise scenario involved a main generator trip due to grid disturbance, and anticipated transient without scram, and a steam leak in the HPCI turbine room.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018-July 30, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) EDG fuel oil quality

===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000388/2019-01-00, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage (ADAMS Accession No. ML19143A070). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.

(2) LER 05000388/2019-01-01, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage (ADAMS Accession No. ML19192A010). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.

(3) LER 05000388/2019-002-00, Valid Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System due to a Trip of Reactor Protection System Bus 2B (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A257). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements was identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loading of dry storage cask (DSC)-108 on September 9 to 12, 2019.

Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities;

Fuel selection and fuel loading

Heavy load movement of Transfer cask (TC) and loaded DSC

Drying and Backfill evolutions

Closure welding and non-destructive weld evaluations

Transport and alignment evolutions

Radiological field surveys

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Susquehanna Unit 1 TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Less than or equal to 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from Any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation, states, in part, that except for individuals qualified in radiation protection (RP) procedures, or individuals escorted by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures, entry into such areas shall be made only after dose rates in the area have been evaluated and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Contrary to the above, on April 13, 2018, two contract workers, who were neither qualified in RP procedures nor escorted by personnel qualified in RP procedures, entered the Susquehanna Unit 1 drywell, a high radiation area, without a radiological briefing and were, therefore, not knowledgeable of the dose rates in the area.

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors determined that the entry by two contract workers into the drywell, a posted high radiation area, without a briefing on the radiological conditions was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Susquehannas ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the programs and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone in IMC 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection from exposure to radiation. The finding was evaluated to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process.

Specifically, for Step 1, the inspectors determined that the finding is not related to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) because it does not involve unplanned dose that resulted from a deficiency in ALARA planning, work control, or exposure control.

For a no response to Step 1, the significance determination process (SDP) next proceeds to Step 5: Identify if the inspection finding involved an overexposure. The inspectors considered that the workers who entered the drywell without a RP briefing received no alarms on their electronic dosimeters for either excessive dose rate or accumulated dose and, therefore, determined that this finding did not involve an overexposure.

For a no response to Step 5, the SDP next proceeds to Step 11: Consider if the performance deficiency constituted a substantial potential for overexposure. The inspectors considered that the workers were performing stationary firewatch duty, and, as such, were not wandering around the drywell and accessing excessive dose rate areas. The inspectors also reviewed the dosimetry information documented in the licensees condition report for this issue, which notes that, for Worker 1, the highest dose rate encountered was 26.4 mrem/hr and the dose received was 8.0 mrem for the entry. For Worker 2, the highest dose rate encountered was 21.7 mrem/hr and the dose received was 7.5 mrem. The inspectors determined that the radiological conditions the workers experienced did not present a substantial potential for overexposure.

For a no response to Step 11, the SDP next proceeds to Step 14: Does the finding involve a situation where the licensees ability to assess dose was compromised? The inspectors considered that the investigation record supports that the workers were wearing the appropriate dosimetry and were logged on the appropriate Radiation Work Permit.

Consequently, the region determined that this issue did not involve a situation where the licensees ability to assess dose was compromised.

For a no response to Step 14, the SDP concludes that the finding is Green.

Corrective Action References: CR-2018-05932 Unit 2 'D' Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Exceeded Individual Valve Leakage Limit Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000388/2019003-01 Open/Closed

Not Applicable 71153 A Severity Level IV NCV of Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 was self-revealed when the outboard 'D' main steam isolation valve (MSIV) exceeded the allowed leakage rate for an individual MSIV of </= 100 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh). Specifically, during local leak rate testing in March 2019, the outboard 'D' MSIV leakage was measured at 101.3 scfh.

Description:

During local leak rate testing (LLRT) conducted during the Unit 2 refueling outage, combined as-found leakage through the inboard MSIV (HV241F022D) and outboard MSIV (HV241F028D) in the 'D' main steam line was 117.39 scfh, which exceeded the LLRT program troubleshooting limit. Subsequent troubleshooting measured the leakage through HV241F028D as 101.3 scfh, which exceeded the TS 3.6.1.3 limit of 100 scfh for individual valve leakage.

As-found inspection identified degradation of the in-body stellite seating surface and inconsistency in the pilot poppet seating profile. Consultation with the original manufacturer concluded that it is most likely that the degraded seat condition was due to a latent material or fabrication process deficiency that became apparent over the past 34 years that the valve has been in service.

The inspectors reviewed previous test results and did not identify any trend that was indicative of valve degradation. Inspectors also reviewed the maintenance practices for the MSIVs and determined they incorporated industry standards and operating experience available at the time.

Corrective Actions: A seating surface repair on HV241F028D was performed during the refueling outage and as-left leak rate testing measured leakage below the TS 3.6.1.3 limit.

Corrective Action References: CR-2019-04137, CR-2019-05324

Performance Assessment:

The NRC determined this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore is not a performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

The Reactor Oversight Process' SDP does not specifically consider a violation without a finding in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which does not have an associated performance deficiency using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Severity: The NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 2.2.1 states, in part, that whenever possible, the NRC uses risk information in assessing the safety significance of violations. The inspectors considered risk insights from IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings,"

and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions."

The inspectors determined that the issue did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment since the containment isolation logic would have closed both MSIVs and the inboard MSIV leak rate was within the TS requirements.

Therefore, had there been a performance deficiency, the issue could be screened to Green.

The inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance and concluded that the violation would be best characterized as Severity Level IV.

Violation: TS 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves," limiting condition for operation (LCO) requires each primary containment isolation valve to be operable. Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 states, in part, "failure to meet a surveillance shall be failure to meet the LCO." Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires, in part, that the leakage through each MSIV is less than or equal to 100 scfh.

Contrary to the above, there is firm evidence that the leakage through the outboard 'D' MSIV exceeded the Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 leakage limit sometime during the operating cycle between April 2017 and March 2019 without either isolating the affected flow path by closing and deactivating the inboard MSIV or placing Unit 2 in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or in cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The disposition of this violation closes LERs 05000388-2019-001-00 and 05000388-2019-001-

01.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On September 12, 2019, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection results to Derek Jones, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

On October 17, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Kevin Cimorelli and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

60855.1

Engineering

Evaluations

2.212 Evaluation Spent Fuel Storage Project 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation

Revision 9

Procedures

ME-0RF-023

Dry Fuel Storage - 61BT(H) Dry Shielded Canister

Revision 42

NDE-PT-001

Color Contrast Liquid Penetrant Examination

Revision 7

71111.05Q Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-11377

Housekeeping Inspection with NRC

09/05/2019

Fire Plans

FP-113-112

Equipment Area (I-202, I-204, I-205) Fire Zones 1-3C-

N,S,W, Elevation 683'-0"

Revision 5

FP-213-243

Remote Shutdown Panel Area (II-109) Fire Zones 2-2A, 2-

2C

Revision 8

FP-213-254

RPS MG Set Room (II-511)

Revision 8

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

ACT-01-CR-

2019-02998

Receipt Inspection for GE Differential Control Relays, RIR

254348, CID 1007989, PO 21026614

03/06/2019

CR-2016-12680

Unit 2 Scram due to loss of 2B246 and 2D666

05/13/2016

CR-2018-07886

NRC question with respect to results of failure analysis

performed on 2B246102 starter

05/15/2018

CR-2018-08459

Receipt Inspection Discrepancies for GE Control Relays

05/24/2018

CR-2019-04137

Outboard 'D' MSIV HV241F028D Exceeded as Found Tech

Spec Leakage Limit of 100scfh (47,187sccm)

03/28/2019

CR-2019-04551

Breakers failed during testing panel 2y226 under WO 211051

04/03/2019

CR-2019-06358

2D240 output breaker trip

05/06/2019

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

AR-2019-11800

Add procedural guidance for MRFF CDE revisions

09/17/2019

Miscellaneous

Maintenance Rule Basis Document-System 17

2/12/2019

21026614

SSES Receipt Inspection Report

05/24/2018

ON-YPNL-201

Loss of Instrument Bus

Revision 99

Procedures

LS-120

Issue Identification and Screening Process

Revision 11

71111.13

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-08581

Received AR-103 alarm LPRM Upscale from LPRM 32-09B

on APRM 1

06/27/2019

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2019-08606

Loss of 2B RPS

06/27/2019

CR-2019-08633

Loss 2B RPS bus

06/27/2019

CR-2019-08646

Panel 2C611 Trip Channel B1 light and Rod Group Indicator

lights for Groups 3 and 4 are extinguished

06/27/2019

CR-2019-08844

Control room alarms will not clear

07/02/2019

CR-2019-08849

Unit 2 Entered EO-200-104 when AR-201-001 RWCU Pre-

isolation HI Temp/Hi Diff was received

07/02/2019

CR-2019-10260

U1 CR received AR-111-01 window E01 (MSIV logic B/D iso

initiated with the 'B' MSIV logic light out

08/08/2019

CR-2019-10421

Unexpected MSIV logic B/D initiated alarm (AR-111-E01) as

a result of 1C611-K7B De-energizing

08/13/2019

Drawings

M1-C72-4

Unit 2 Elementary Diagram Reactor Protection System M-G

Set Control

Revision 9

Procedures

SI-183-321

Quarterly Calibration of Drywell Pressure Channels PS-E11-

1N010A,B,C,D (ADS Permissive, RCIC Exhaust Vacuum

Breaker Isolation)

Revision 22

Work Orders

269171

Replace K1B Contactor in 2Y201. Investigate and repair

Loss of 2B RPS

07/02/2019

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-07825

E diesel voltage unbalance alarm when attempting to synch

to 2c bus

06/06/2019

CR-2019-09554

'A' LOOP ESW flow is low with 'C' and 'D' ESW pps i/s

07/22/2019

71111.18

Corrective Action

Documents

AR-2018-11971

Revise CL-05A-0012 due to deletion of valve 011018

08/15/2018

CR-2016-15310

Challenge for Control Room Operators to meet the intent of

NSIR/DPR-ISG in one specific instance

06/17/2016

CR-2018-08892

Valve 011018 ESW Loop 'B' Guard Pipe Drain Valve

completely rusted off

06/04/2018

Engineering

Changes

2182692

Delete the Loop B ESW Guard Pipe Drain and Repair

Penetration X-56-1-40

Revision 0

Miscellaneous

2157226

South Gate House Wall Security Upgrades

Revision 1

EC 2074859

Decrease RHR Room Pre Isolation Temperature Alarms per

CR-2016-15310 to 110 Degree F

06/30/2017

Procedures

AR-109-001

RHR and Core Spray Div 1 1C601

Revision 36

71111.19

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-09796

Jacket Water Leak from 'D' EDG

07/27/2019

CR-2019-09875

As found CR on failed DG hose replaced by PCWO 2275539 07/30/2019

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2019-08854

NRC Senior resident questioned status of welding machine

used to perform weld on ESW

07/02/2019

CR-2019-08858

The welding machine used to perform PCWO 2270038 was

not tested/calibrated prior to work

07/02/2019

Procedures

OP-024-001

Jacket Water System Operation

Revision 91

Work Orders

WO2270038

'D' ESW Pump Discharge Pipe and RV-PI-0110AD has

minor leak at weld

07/01/2019

71111.22

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-09346

Minor Lube Oil Seepage on D DG 2L Fuel Oil Injector Pump

Pedestal

07/16/2019

CR-2019-09386

Changes in D DG Voltage and Vars During Beginning of 24

Hour Surveillance Run

07/16/2019

CR-2019-10031

Steam from Lagging around RCIC Turbine

08/01/2019

Procedures

MI-AD-043

Maintenance Standards

Revision 53

SI-169-202

Monthly Functional Test of Drywell Floor Drain Sump Level

Channels LIT-1612A&B (Analog LOOP)

Revision 19

SI-283-321A

Quarterly Calibration of Drywell Pressure Channels PS-E11-

2N010A&C (ADS Permissive, RCIC Exhaust Vacuum

Breaker Isolation)

Revision 0

SI-283-321B

Quarterly Calibration of Drywell Pressure Channels PS-E11-

2N010B&D (ADS Permissive, RCIC Exhaust Vacuum

Breaker Isolation)

Revision 0

SO-024-D01

Diesel Generator D Integrated Surveillance Test

Revision 1

SO-250-002

Quarterly RCIC Flow Verification

Revision 55

Work Orders

267739

71114.06

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-09143

Radio in TSC used to communicate with field monitoring

teams was not working

07/10/2019

CR-2019-09240

Dose Assessment Objectives deemed not met during 7/9/19

Blue Team ERO drill

07/11/2019

CR-2019-09250

Incorrect Engineering Assessment on EP-PS-001-61 form

during the 7/9/19 E-Plan drill

07/11/2019

71152

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2019-07537

PA-015 FP in E DG Bay has packing leak dripping roughly 1

drop every 2 minutes

05/31/2019

CR-2019-07541

Housekeeping issue in Unit 1 Reactor Building Elevation

719' Identified by the NRC Resident

05/31/2019

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2019-09369

NRC Resident notified WCC of OOS App. R Lighting

07/16/2019

CR-2019-09586

NRC walkdown Unit 1 Reactor Building items identified

07/22/2019

CR-2019-09587

NRC walkdown Unit 1 Reactor Building items identified

07/22/2019

CR-2019-09588

NRC walkdown Unit 1 Reactor Building items identified

07/22/2019

CR-2019-09838

NRC identified issue

07/29/2019

CR-2019-10738

NRC Question regarding the 'D' Emergency Diesel

Generator Missile Shield panels having a small gap

08/20/2019

CR-2019-10976

One input to Average Drywell temperature computer point

MAT01 was found invalid

08/27/2019

CR-2019-10997

NRC notified WCC of housekeeping issues in both the

Control Structure and U2 RB

08/27/2019

CR-2019-11598

U1 Fukushima Fuel Pool Level Indication Timestamp Needs

Updated

09/11/2019

CR-2019-11655

Housekeeping Deficiency Identified by NRC

09/12/2019

CR-2019-11663

Floor panel found dislodged in U2 URR by NRC resident

09/13/2019

CR-2019-11923

NRC notification of housekeeping issues and an equipment

issue

09/19/2019

CR-2019-12303

NRC resident questioned how 0P504C motor term box was

being restrained

09/30/2019

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-08606

Loss of 2B RPS

07/26/2019

Work Orders

PCWO 2269171

Investigate and repair loss of 2B RPS