IR 05000483/2015001

IR 05000483/2015001; on 01/01/2015 - 03/21/2015; Callaway Plant, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Maintenance Effectiveness

ML15112A527
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	04/24/2015
From:	O'Keefe N NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E
To:	Diya F Union Electric Co
References
IR 2015001
Download: ML15112A527 (27)

Text

April 24, 2015

SUBJECT:

CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2015001

Dear Mr. Diya,

On March 21, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Callaway Plant. On April 1, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. D. Neterer, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Callaway Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Callaway Plant.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Neil OKeefe, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Number: 50-483 License Number: NPF-30

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000483/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IV==

Docket:

05000483 License:

NPF-30 Report:

05000483/2015001 Licensee:

Union Electric Company Facility:

Callaway Plant Location:

Junction Highway CC and Highway O Steedman, MO Dates:

January 1 through March 21, 2015 Inspectors:

T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector M. Langelier, P.E., Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Project Engineer Approved By:

N. OKeefe Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

- 2 -

SUMMARY

IR 05000483/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 03/21/2015; Callaway Plant, Integrated Resident and

Regional Report; Maintenance Effectiveness.

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 21, 2015, by the resident inspectors at the Callaway Plant and one inspector from the NRCs Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to conduct post-maintenance testing after maintenance on safety-related equipment prior to declaring the system operable in accordance with Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002,

Equipment Status Control, Revision 76. Specifically, the train A component cooling water system was declared operable before performing post-maintenance testing on the train A safety injection pump lube oil cooler cooling water outlet relief valve after this valve was replaced. Additionally, when the post-maintenance test was later performed, it failed to meet acceptance criteria. Despite the failure, the licensee did not enter the condition into their corrective action program nor write a new job to address the test failure in accordance with Procedure APA-ZZ-00322, Appendix E, Post Maintenance Test Program. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201501853 and performed a second post-maintenance test, which was completed satisfactorily.

The licensees failure to verify that all post-maintenance testing had been completed prior to declaring the system operable was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is similar to example 5.b in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, on October 29, 2014, the train A component cooling water system was declared operable and returned to service for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> without completion of post-maintenance testing.

When the post-maintenance testing was performed, it failed to meet the acceptance criteria due to system leakage at the flanged connection. No further actions were taken when the leakage was identified resulting in the train A component cooling water system having a known unevaluated degraded condition adversely affecting the reliability of the system between October 29, 2014, and March 19, 2015. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect system design, did not result in a loss of system function, did not represent a loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specifications allowed outage time, and did not cause the loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance. Specifically, the component cooling water leakage could be made up from a safety-related source without loss of function.

This finding has a work management cross-cutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not appropriately implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Specifically, omitting the correct equipment out of service log entry from the post-maintenance test work task led to operations returning the equipment to service prior to it being tested [H.5]. (Section 1R12)

PLANT STATUS

Callaway began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 31, 2015, the plant experienced an unplanned power reduction to 57 percent. This was caused by a malfunction in the main turbine control system. On February 1, 2014, the licensee further reduced power to 46 percent to support troubleshooting. Callaway identified and corrected the condition and returned the plant to 100 percent power on February 5, 2015. Callaway operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:

• January 13, 2015, train A centrifugal charging pump

• January 27, 2015, train B component cooling water system

• March 3, 2015, train A safety injection

• March 17, 2015, train B emergency diesel generator

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on five plant areas important to safety:

• January 13, 2015, train B emergency core cooling system room, Area A-4

• January 29, 2015, auxiliary feedwater, Areas A-13, A-14, and A-15

• February 28, 2015, control room (including the secondary alarm station),

Areas C-27, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-31 and C-32

• March 3, 2015, train A emergency core cooling system room, Area A-2

• March 17, 2015, train B emergency diesel generator room, Area D-2 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted five quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11)

==

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On February 2, 2015, the inspectors observed as-found simulator training for an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On February 28, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity and risk due to main turbine trip system testing.

In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including Procedure ODP-ZZ-00001, Operations Department - Code of Conduct, and other operations department policies.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components:

• January 31, 2015, turbine control system

• March 13, 2015, safety injection system maintenance

The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause structure, system, and component failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the structures, systems, and components. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12. The safety injection system sample was performed as a vertical slice sample.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to conduct post-maintenance testing after maintenance on safety-related equipment prior to declaring the system operable in accordance with Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control. Specifically, the train A component cooling water system was declared operable prior to performing post-maintenance testing on the train A safety injection pump lube oil cooler cooling water outlet relief valve after this valve was replaced.

Description.

During Refueling Outage 20 the train A safety injection pump lube oil cooler discharge relief valve (EMV0189) was replaced on the component cooling water system as part of the preventive maintenance program. As part of the work package, a post-maintenance test, specifically an in-service leak test, was to be performed to ensure that the flange connections for the relief valve did not leak. On October 29, 2014, at 4:43 p.m., the train A component cooling water system was placed in service and declared operable. The post-maintenance test for the replacement of the relief valve had not been started until 11:03 p.m. Licensee Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002, step 4.5.3, required that prior to declaring a component operable and closing the EOSL entry, ENSURE all work documents (including post maintenance testing) are complete.

During the performance of the post-maintenance test, a small amount of leakage was observed on the lower relief valve flange and the post-maintenance test was declared unsatisfactory due to failing to meet its acceptance criteria. The failed post-maintenance test was noted in the work package notes and the work package was subsequently closed on November 4, 2014. This action was contrary to Procedure APA-ZZ-00322, Appendix E, Post Maintenance Test Program, which requires entering the condition into their corrective action program and creating a new job to address the failure. The licensee did not take any further actions due to the failed post-maintenance test until the inspectors identified the concern. A second post-maintenance test was completed satisfactorily on March 19, 2015.

As the maintenance to replace the relief valve affected two systems (train A safety injection system and train A component cooling water system), two equipment out of service log entries were associated with the replacement task in the work package.

However, the task for the post-maintenance test only included the train A safety injection system equipment out of service log entry. Inspectors concluded that this led to the licensee declaring the train A component cooling water system operable and returning it to service prior to the post-maintenance testing being completed.

Analysis.

The licensees failure to verify that all post-maintenance testing had been completed prior to declaring the component cooling water system operable was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is similar to example 5.b in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).

Specifically, on October 29, 2014, the train A component cooling water system was declared operable and returned to service for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> without completion of post-maintenance testing. When the post-maintenance testing was performed, it failed to meet acceptance criteria due to system leakage at the flanged connection. No further actions were taken when the leakage was identified resulting in the train A component cooling water system having a known unevaluated degraded condition adversely affecting the reliability of the system between October 29, 2014, and March 19, 2015.

Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect system design, did not result in a loss of system function, did not represent a loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specifications allowed outage time, and did not cause the loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance.

Specifically, the component cooling water leakage could be made up from a safety-related source without loss of function. This finding has a work management cross-cutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not appropriately implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Specifically, omitting the correct equipment out of service log entry from the post-maintenance test work task led to operations returning equipment to service prior to it being tested [H.5].

Enforcement.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with procedures.

Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control, step 4.5.3 states, in part, that prior to declaring a component operable and closing the EOSL entry, ENSURE all work documents (including post maintenance testing) are complete. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with procedures resulting in a safety related system being in service with an unevaluated degraded condition from October 29, 2014, to March 19, 2015. Specifically, the licensee returned the train A component cooling water system to service and declared it operable prior to performing post-maintenance testing. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201501853, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000483/2015001-01, Failure to Perform Post-maintenance Testing on Safety-related Equipment Prior to Declaring it Operable.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

• January 13, 2015, train B centrifugal charging pump out of service for motor testing

• March 4, 2015, train B safety injection pump out of service for motor testing

• March 13, 2015, clean and inspect supply breaker for the essential service water to train B component cooling water heat exchanger isolation valve The inspectors verified that these risk assessment were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.

The inspectors also observed portions of two emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems, or to impact barrier integrity:

• January 20, 2015, unplanned reactor coolant system leakage

• January 30, 2015, turbine control system failure

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and components.

These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

The safety injection system sample was performed as a vertical slice sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components:

• January 13, 2015, train A centrifugal charging pump room cooler foreign material inside screen, Callaway Action Request 201500272

• January 14, 2015, train B emergency diesel generator D air start hanger broken, Callaway Action Requests 20150303 and 20150304

• February 24, 2015, train A emergency diesel generator B air start system strut support misaligned, Callaway Action Request 201501195

• February 26, 2015, train A ultimate heat sink cooling tower fan room damper air leak, Callaway Action Request 201501393

• March 3, 2015, train A containment spay suction line air void, Callaway Action Request 201501122 The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded structure, system, or component to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded structure, system, or component.

These activities constitute completion of five operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant structures, systems, or components:

• January 14, 2015, train B centrifugal charging pump technical specification outage, Job 13511172

• February 4, 2015, train B control room emergency ventilation system and control room air conditioning system technical specification outage, Job 14504406

• February 18, 2015, turbine controls corrective maintenance, Job 15000632

• March 4, 2015, train B safety injection pump and valves, Job 13511172

• March 19, 2015, train A essential service water technical specification outage, Job 10502942 The inspectors reviewed licensing-and design-basis documents for the structures, systems, or components and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.

The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected structures, systems, or components.

These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19. The safety injection system sample was performed as a vertical slice sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

• February 23, 2015, train A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump in-service test, Job 14513402

Other surveillance tests:

• January 28, 2015, train A emergency diesel generator slow start and 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> load test, Job 15500103

• February 25, 2015, trains A and B safety injection signal slave relay test, Job 15501364

• February 28, 2015, main turbine trip system tests, Job 15501064

• March 4, 2015, train B safety injection pump/valve test, Job 13511172 The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected structures, systems or components following testing.

These activities constitute completion of five surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22. The safety injection system sample was performed as a vertical slice sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a hostile action based drill dress rehearsal on March 10, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance.

The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, emergency operations facility, and backup technical support center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Mitigating System Performance Index:

Emergency AC Power Systems (MS06) and Cooling Water Systems (MS10)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of first quarter 2014 through fourth quarter 2014 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for emergency ac power systems and the mitigating system performance index for cooling water systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected two issues for an in-depth follow-up:

• On February 9, 2015, the inspectors selected Callaway Action Request 201408897, which was the root cause analysis for an unplanned turbine trip and reactor trip that occurred in December 2014. The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.

• On March 5, 2015, the inspectors selected Callaway Action Request 201501566 which identified that no assessment of the impact of plugging floor drains in the train B residual heat removal heat exchanger room for maintenance was completed prior to the maintenance starting. Licensee management identified the issue during a plant ALARA review committee meeting for this maintenance.

The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors noted that the licensees immediate corrective action to evaluate the drain system for functionality omitted one of the functions of the drain system and that no determination of operability of the safety-related equipment within the room was initially completed. After discussing the issue with the licensee, the inspectors reviewed the new operability evaluation and the revised flooding analysis that demonstrated that no safety-related equipment would be affected by a pipe break. The inspectors also noted that there was minimal procedural guidance for job planners on actions to take when there is the potential to impair floor drains during planned maintenance. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.

These activities constitute completion of two annual follow-up samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 1, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Neterer, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that no proprietary information was reviewed by the inspectors.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Andreason, Consulting Engineer, Mechanical

S. Banker, Senior Director, Executive Projects

F. Bianco, Assistant Operations Manager, Shift

M. Covey, Assistant Operations Manager, Support

B. Cox, Senior Director, Nuclear Operations

F. Diya, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

L. Eitel, Supervising Engineer, Engineering Systems

T. Elwood, Supervising Engineer, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing

M. Hoehn, Supervisor, Engineering Programs

B. Huhmann, Acting Director, Engineering Design

J. Kovar, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing

G. Kremer, Director, Engineering Programs

P. McKenna, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

S. Maglio, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

D. Neterer, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

C. Norman, Consulting Engineer, Mechanical

J. Norman, Consulting Engineer, Balance of Plant

S. Petzel, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

B. Price, Supervisor, Operations

K. Tipton, Supervisor, Engineering Systems

T. Witt, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000483/2015001-01 NCV Failure to Perform Post-maintenance Testing on Safety-related Equipment Prior to Declaring it Operable (Section 1R12)