HNP-95-027, Forwards Closure Package for GL 89-10 Program Implementation

Forwards Closure Package for GL 89-10 Program Implementation

ML18011A807
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/28/1995
From:	Robinson W CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-89-10, HNP-95-027, HNP-95-27, NUDOCS 9503080193
Download: ML18011A807 (38)

Text

P RIDRITY 1 ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING REGULATORY INFORMATION DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9503080193 DOC.DATE: 95/02/28 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ROBINSON,W.R.

Carolina Power It'ight Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

DOCKET 05000400 P

SUBJECT:

Forwards closure package for GL 89-10 program implementation.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A064D COPIES RECEXVED LTR ENCL SXZE:

TITLE: Response to Generic Ltr 89-10, '"Safety-elated OV Testing NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.

R Surveill 0

05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS

~F755 CENTER 0'2y NRR/DISP/PI PB NRR/PD1 11-3 RES/DSIR/EIB/B EXTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LE,N AEOD/SPD/RAB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB RES/DSIR NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

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N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!CONTACTTI.IE DOCUMENTCONTROL DESK. ROOK! Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083

) TO ELIWIINATE YOUR NAXIEFROil DISTRIBUTIONLISTS I'OR DOCL:MEN'IS YOU DON"I'L'ED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 13 ENCL 13

1 g

C@CM Carolina Power &Light Company PO Box 165 tt.s V t"5 R"'ile Number: HO-950503 William R. Robinson Vice President Harris Nuclear Plant SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 CLOSURE OF NRC GENERIC LETTER 89-10 Gentlemen:

By letter dated July 15, 1994, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) notified the NRC of the completion of the Generic Letter 89-10 program implementation at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP).

Subsequent to that notification, the NRC staff requested that CP&L provide documentation to assist in NRC closure of the Generic Letter.

On January 16, 1995, CP&L committed to provide plant-specific closure information to the NRC by February 28, 1995

~

The purpose of this letter is to transmit the closure package for SHNPP.

To facilitate NRC staff review, the enclosures to this letter have been prepared using the NRC's "Guidance on Closure of Staff Review of Generic Letter 89-10 Programs," dated July 12, 1994.

Questions regarding this matter may be referred to Mr. R. W. Prunty at (919) 362-2030.

Sincerely, LSR/lsr

Enclosures:

1. Information for Generic Letter 89-10 Closure

2. Tables A through D c:

Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. S. A. Elrod Mr. N. B. Le O erg g O g 95030EtOi93 950228 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P

PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC Tel 919362-2502 Fax 919362.6950

I s

(

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 NRC GENERIC LETTER 89-10 CLOSURE In accordance with NRC "Guidance on Closure of Staff Review of Generic Letter 89-10 Programs,"

dated July 12,

1994, the following information is provided to assist in the closure of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant's (SHNPP)

Generic Letter 89-10 Motor-Operated Valve program.

Since the NRC has inspected and determined that the SHNPP program meets the intent of the NRC's recommendations, appropriate sections from NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13 are referenced where applicable.

A.

The items in this section refer to the number designations provided in the NRC's July 12, 1994 guidance.

04.04 "Select a sample of MOVs for detailed review from the population of MOVs in the generic letter program."

a. Valve number and system label name

b. Safety function description

c. Mfg, type, and size for valve, actuator, and motor for each MOV

d. Control switch thrust vs. calculated minimum and maximum thrust

e. Test status Basis for closure

g. Remaining activities with schedule for completion There are 88 MOVs in the SHNPP GL 89-10 program.

The information requested for the Program MOVs is contained in Tables A, B, C,

and D (attached).

Sub-item "g" of item 04.04 requests schedule completion dates for remaining activities.

While SHNPP has completed the GL 89-10 Program activities, selected MOVs have work activities scheduled during the next Refueling Outage (RFO-6) which are intended to improve their performance characteristics.

Item 04.04 also addresses an issue titled "Mispositioning."

The NRC staff has indicated that a Supplement to GL 89-10 is in preparation to address valve mispositioning for PWRs.

SHNPP will review any future GL supplement for program'applicability and provide an appropriate response as necessary.

CP&L previously presented a

position regarding valve mispositioning in letter Serial:

NLS-91-138 dated June 6,

1991.

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 "Verify that the licensee has performed design-basis reviews of the sampled MOVs consistent with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate."

A design basis review of each GL 89-10 MOV has been completed and documented in individual evaluations in the plant's Document Control location.

The NRC's review of this information is documented in Paragraph 2.1 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13.

"Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding" SHNPP performed evaluations of valves that might be susceptible to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding (PL/TB) during initial plant licensing.

While industry reports on PL/TB have continued to be monitored, the last formal evaluation was dated

November, 1985.

In NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13, the NRC noted that this evaluation was out-of-date in light of recent studies/industry experience.

PL/TB was identified as an NRC Inspector Followup Item, IFI 50-400/93-13-01.

This Item indicated that the NRC would followup on licensee actions to address the potential for PL/TB as part of the GL 89-10 Program.

Following the GL 89-10 Phase II inspection, CP&L personnel attended the special NRC Public Workshop on Gate Valve PL/TB on February 4, 1994.

At this

workshop, the NRC staff stated that PL/TB would be independent of GL 89-10 and that a separate Generic Letter would be issued.

SHNPP will review the proposed Generic Letter on PL/TB issues when issued and provide a response as appropriate.

We will continue to monitor valve performance at SHNPP and at other CPEL facilities with regard to this matter.

"Verify that the licensee has adecpxately sized the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate.

Verify that switch settings are consistent with the expected design conditions for operation of the valve."

Each MOV in the GL 89-10 Program has been verified for

I

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 proper sizing and torque switch settings.

Paragraph 2.2 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13 documents the NRC review of this information.

"Verify that the licensee has demonstrated the design-basis capability of the sampled MOVs and the adequacy of the licensee's program applied to the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate.

Paragraph 2.3 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13 documents the NRC review of sampled MOVs.

Paragraph 2.3 indicates there are 116 MOVs in the program.

Since the inspection, this number has been reduced to 88 based on the criteria provided in Supplements 1

8 6 of GL 89-10 (Supplement 6 was issued subsequent to the Phase II inspection).

Differential pressure tests were performed where practicable.

Therefore 56 of the 77 gate and globe valves and 9 of the 11 butterfly valves were tested under dynamic conditions.

Information on the MOV testing is provided in Table B.

Item 04.07 discusses Supplement 5 of the generic letter regarding "Diagnostic Test Equipment Accuracy".

A percentage for diagnostic equipment accuracy has been factored into the torque switch trip setup range (minimum and maximum values).

SHNPP applies the accuracy term provided by the diagnostic equipment vendor (Liberty Technologies) in the plant procedure for field measurement of thrust using VOTES equipment.

Since the NRC Phase II inspection, the thrust analysis procedure used in the field for diagnostic testing has been revised to include a step in the dynamic test data evaluation portion which compares the dynamic thrust at torque switch trip to the extrapolated thrust needed to close the valve at design dP.

A 10%. margin objective is desirable to allow for various uncertainties;i.e.,

measurement

errors, degradation, etc.

Item 04.07 also discusses the issue of "grouping" to reduce dynamic testing.

SHNPP has not used a grouping strategy to reduce the

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 number of MOVs to be dP tested.

"Verify that the licensee has established a method for periodic verification of adequate capability of the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate."

SHNPP has a program procedure which establishes a

periodic verification frequency for GL 89-10 Program MOVs of every 3 Refuel'ing Outages or 5 years.

The periodic verification will consist of a, static retest.

Static verification will allow thrust and/or torque parameters measured during the initial baseline GL 89-10 Program to be reverified.

Any change in MOV capability can be monitored by comparing the baseline value(s) to the new value(s) obtained in the reverification process.

While there have been issues relating to diagnostic equipment accuracy and torque switch repeatability, there is confidence in the value of the static diagnostic information.

The NRC has provided two examples of acceptable periodic verification:

(1) dynamic diagnostic testing, and (2) static diagnostic testing with margin based on plant-specific dynamic testing.

HNP MOV dynamic test results were fed back into the setup calculations of the applicable MOVs (where appropriate).

The objective in using the test information was to provide conservatism in the MOV evaluations.

For those valves that have a function to close under torque switch control, margins have been added to the setup parameters to account for uncertainty issues (including "Rate of Loading

" where observed).

See Tables B and C.

The dynamic testing involved many variables that would challenge the ability to perform repeatable dynamic test results over outage time periods.

Besides the uncertainties common to static testing such as diagnostic accuracy and torque switch repeatability, the following are examples of additional variables involved in the dynamic testing information:

system pump operation (pipe/valve vibration),

pressure gages/ERFIS (gage reading tolerance,

I

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 indicator vibration),

and diagnostic analysis interpretation.

Due to the variables surrounding dynamic testing, it would be difficult to duplicate the results of a dynamic test in a subsequent time period.

Thus, trending of such results would not be practical.

The objective of performing periodic verification is to be able to show an MOV has the ability to perform its design basis function.

The data from a static test provides important information concerning the ability of the actuator to convert torque to thrust;i.e.,

"stem factor."

Both thrust and torque information are scheduled to be obtained during periodic reverification.

The ability of an MOV to be able to convert torque to thrust is important when evaluating the capability of those MOVs that have to change direction in response to a safety signal for a design basis event at SHNPP.

These MOVs have a special feature incorporated into their circuitry.

Every SHNPP GL Program MOV that has an active safety function has a 96'.

(approximate) open or close torque switch bypass upon receipt of its applicable safety

signal, depending on its required direction of travel.

The MOV's motor thermal overload protection would also be bypassed by the safety signal.

The safety signals that would initiate the 96. torque switch bypass and the motor thermal overload bypass circuitry include the Safety Injection Signal, Containment Spray Actuation Signal, Containment Isolation Signals, and Steam Generator Isolation Signal.

This bypass of the torque switch, and motor thermal overload, will allow "full motor capability" (subject to voltage conditions) regardless of the torque switch setting (see Table D for thrust capability of gate valves that have to close).

These MOVs are essentially controlled by the actuator's limit switch until either the fluid flow stops or the valve disc is fully open, depending on safety function.

An MOV's ability to convert torque to thrust is therefore very important for those gate valves that have to change direction and have the full motor capability available to accomplish their design function. Static reverification can

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 provide indication that this capability remains satisfactory.

"Verify that (1) the licensee has analyzed MOV failures which have occurred and. has an effective corrective action plan to prevent recurrence and (2) the licensee trends failures of MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate."

The NRC review of this information is contained in Paragraph 2.5 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13.

The NRC review of "licensee response to NRC Information Notices, industry technical and maintenance

updates, and 10 CFR Part 21 notices" is documented in Paragraph "k" of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/92-06.

"Verify that the licensee is meeting the program schedule in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1),

as appropriate."

CP&L submitted a letter to the NRC dated July 15,

1994, Serial:

NLS-94-055, documenting the completion of the GL 89-10 Program Implementation.

"Verify quality assurance program implementation in the design control and testing of the sampled MOVs."

Paragraph 2.5 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13 documents the NRC review of an early internal assessment of the SHNPP MOV Program.

In addition, an assessment of the Program was initiated on November 14, 1994 which included personnel from other CP&L organizations familiar with MOVs.

The assessment utilized prior NRC GL 89-10 Program inspection guidance information, the SHNPP Phase I & II reports, industry

issues, the earlier SHNPP MOV Program assessment mentioned in Paragraph 2.5, and the NRC guidance of July 12, 1994.

Additionally, the design guide used at SHNPP for evaluating MOV sizing and switch settings is applicable at CP&L's two other nuclear power plants.

This MOV evaluation methodology was reviewed by the NRC during Phase I

& II inspections and there have also been CP&L internal assessments performed of each of these plant's programs.

The design guide has been revised as needed to reflect changes in MOV technology.

b

ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:

HNP-95-027 Inspector Followup Items and Concerns documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/93-13 were as follows:

Inspection Followup Item (IFI) IFI 50-400/93-13-01 (Paragraph 2.7)

- This item identified the need to follow the actions taken by SHNPP to address the potential for pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves at SHNPP.

As indicated in Item 04.05 above, SHNPP will'eview any forthcoming NRC generic correspondence on this issue and address those issues separately from the GL 89-10 Program.

Concern (Paragraph 2.3)

- The NRC inspectors noted that a

formal procedure did not exist to provide a method for extrapolation of dynamic test data or account for test equipment accuracy (i.e., not factored into the extrapolation method).

The SHNPP procedure which defines the analysis methods for MOV diagnostics has been revised since the NRC Phase II inspection.

This procedure documents the method for evaluating dynamic diagnostic thrust results.

A check has been included in the method of reviewing the margin between the dynamic thrust at Torque Switch Trip and the extrapolated thrust calculated as being needed at design dP.

The minimum desirable margin is 10% which is intended to account for uncertainty issues.

Concern (Paragraph 2.3)

- The NRC inspectors identified instances where evaluations of MOV operability were generic and not based on valve-specific considerations with respect to certain MOV modifications.

The modifications mentioned in the Inspection Report were for GL Program MOVs that additional margin capability was desired for and had been completed in a prior outage.

These modifications were not identified as having operability questions;

rather, there was a concern related to the use of a generic operability evaluation.

However, generic evaluations of MOV performance capability are no longer performed.

In addition, it should be noted that we have implemented a new plant procedure since the Phase II inspection which provides administrative controls for identifying, documenting, evaluating, and correcting adverse conditions at SHNPP.

TABLEA Valve, Operator, and Motor Data for HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves Tag Number Safety Funct.

Mfg.

Type" Mau'I Operator Type Motor Start Tq.

Voltage 1AF 55 1AF-74 1AF-93 1AF-137 1AF-143 1AF.149 1CC-99 1CC-113 1CC-127 1CC-128 1CC-147 1CC-167 1CC 176 1CC.202 1CC-207 1CC-208 1CC-249 1CC-251 1CC-252 1CC-297 1CC-299 1CS-165 1CS-166 1CS-182 1CS-196 1CS.210 1CS-214 1CS.217 1CS-218 1CS-219 1CS-220 1CS.235 1CS-238 1CS.291 1CS-292 1CS-341 1CS-382 1CS-423 1CS-470 1CS-472 1CS-745 1CS-746 1CS.752 1CS-753 AFWhohtionto A SG AFWlsohtionto C

SG AFW Isohtionto 8 SG AFW(solationto A SG AFWlsohtionto 8 SG AFWlsohtionto C

SG A CCW to Nonessential Loop 8 CCW to Nonessenthl Loop 8 CCW to Nonessential Loop A CCW to Nonessenthl Loop RHR Heat Exchanger A Isolation RHRKeatExchanger 8 Isohtion CCW to RC Drakr Tank 6 Excess Letdown HX CCW to RC Drain Tank 6 Excess Letdown HX CCW to RCP Seah & Motor Coohrs CCW to RCP Seah & Motor Coohrs CCW from RCP Thermal Barrhrs CIV CCW from RCP Thermal Barriers CIV RCP Thermal Barriers FCV CCW from RCP Oil Coolers CCW from RCP Oil Coohrs VCT Outlet/Dguthn Control VCT Outlet/D&rtion Control A CSIP Normal Recirculation Isolation 8

CSIP Normal Recirculation holathn C

CSIP Normal Recirculation holation Common CSIP Normal Recircuhtion Isohtion CSIP Discharge Cross4xxxiectlon CSIP Discharge Cross-Connection CSIP Discharge Cross-Connection CSIP Discharge Cross-Connection Normal Charging holation Normal Charging hohtion RWST Supply to CSIPs RWST Supply to CSIPs RCP A Seal injection Isohtion RCP 8

Seal Ic(ection Isolation RCP C

Seal Injection ho(ation RCP Seal Water Return Isolation RCP Seal Water Return Isolation CSIP to RWST (Alternate Min Flow)

CSIP to RWST (Alternate Min.Flow)

CSIP to RWST (Alternate Min.F(ow)

CSIP to RWST (Alternate MinRow)

Chse'osei Qosei Qose'osei Qosei Close'keer Ckee'ose*

Open'pen'oss'ose'lose'lose'ose'ose'lose'ose'hses Qose'~

Close'"

Qose'ose'lose'hse'ose'lose'lose'ose'os

'lose'pen'pen'ose" Qose'4 Close'ose'ose'ose" Op/Cl" Op/CI" Qose" Fish.

Fish.

Fish.

Vekm Velan Vehn Vehn Vehn Velan Vehn Velan Vehn Velan Velan W

W Vehn Vehn Velan W

W W

W W

W W

W W

Vehn Vehn Velan Velan Vehn Vs!an Velan Vehn Vehn Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Globe Globe Globe Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Ghbe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe 18 18 18 18 12 12 6

6 6

6 4

4 4

6 6

4 4

2 2

2 3

4 4

4 4

3 3

8 8

1-1/2 1-1/2 1-1/2 2

2 2

2 2

2 900 900 900 900 900 900 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 1 500 1500 1500 150 150 150 150 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1 500 1500 1500 1500 150 150 1500 1500 1500 1500 1 500 1500 1500 1500 1 500 CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SMB-00 SM8-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SM8-00 9MB-00 SMB-00/H2BC SMB.OO/H28C SMB-00/H28C SM8-00/H28C SM8-00 SMB-00 5MB.OO SM8-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SMB-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SB-OO SMB-00 SMB-000 SMB-000 SM8-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SB-OO SB-OO SB-OO SB-OO SB-OO SB 00 SB-OO SM8-00 SMB-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SMB-00 SMB-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 SMB-00 SM8-00 SMB-00 15 ft-Ib 15 ft-Ib 15 ft-Ib 25 ft.lb 25 ft45 25 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft-lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft-lb 10 ft-gr 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft-lb 10 ft-Ib 25 ft-lb 25 ft.lb 25 ft.lb 10 ft4b 10 ft.lb 10 ft4b 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 15 ft.lb 15 ft-Ib 1 5 ft.lb 1 5 ft-Ib 1 5 ft-Ib 1 5 ft.lb 1 5 ft-Ib 10 f!.Ib 10 ft-Ib 10 ft.lb 10 ft-Ib 10 ftqb 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft-Ib 10 ft.gr 10 ft-Ib 10 ft.lb 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 125 DC 125 DC 125 DC 440 AC 440 AC 440 AC 440 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC Page 1 of 3

TABLEA Valve, Operator, and Motor Data for HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves Tag Number Safety Function Mfg.

Type~

Size Matr'I Operator Type Motor Voltage Stan Tq.

1CT-11 1CT-12 1 CT-26 1CT-50 1CT-71 1CT-88 1CT-102 1CT-105 1ED-94 1ED-95 1MS-70 1MS-72 1RC-113 1RC-115 1RC.117 Containment Spray Chemical Addition Containment Spray Chemical Addition Conte@ment Spray Pump Suction from RWST Containment Spray Pump Discharge Containment Spray Pump Suction from RWST Containment Spray Pump Discharge Contabment Sump to Cont. Spray Pump Contiinrnent Sump to Cont. Spray Pump Contakvnent Sump Pump Discharge Containment Sump Pump Discharge Main Steam to AFW Turbine Main Steam to AFW Turbine PORV Bkick PORV Bock PORV Block Op/CI'r op/a>>

Close" Open'r aose" Open" Open" Open" aose'ose'pen" open" Chse'*

aosei*

Ckee" Yarwy YaNvy A/D A/D A/D A/D A/D A/D A/D A/D W

W W

Globe Ghbe Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate 2

2 12 8

12 8

12 12 1 500 1 500 150 300 150 300 150 150 150 150 900 900 1500 1500 1500 SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS CS CS SS SS SS SM8-00 SMB-00 SMB.OOO SB-OO SMB-000 SB-OO SB-000 SB-000 SMB-000 SM8-000 SM$410 SMB-00 SB.OO 8&40 SB-OO 15 ft.lb 15 ft.lb 5 ft.lb 15 ft.lb 5 ft-lb 15 ftdb 5 ft-Ib 5 ft-Ib 2 ft-Ib 2 ft-Ib 25 ft-h 25 f!.Ib 15 ft.lb 15 ft-Ib 15 ft.lb 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 125 DC 125 DC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 1RH-25 1RH-31 1RH-63 1RH.69 1SI-1 1SI-2 1SI-3 1SI-4 151-52 1SI.86 1SI-107 1SI.300 1SI-301 1SI-310 1SI-311 1SI-322 1SI-323 151-326 1SI-327 1SI-340 1SI-341 1SI-359 1SW-39 1 SW-40 1 SW-270 1SW-271 1 SW-274 1SW-275 1SW-276 RHR to CSIP Suction RHR Pump ReciraAation RHR to CSIP Suction RHR Pump Reciradation BIT Inst Isolaton BIT Irfet Isokrtion BIT Outlet Lsolation BIT Outlet isolation HHSI to RCS Cold Leg HHSI to RCS Hot Leg Alternate HHSI to RCS Hot Leg Containment Sump to RHR Pump Containment Sump to RHR Pump Containment Sump to RHR Pump Containment Sump to RHR Pump RWST to RHR Pump flWST to RHR Pump lHSI to RCS Hot Leg Crossover lHSI to RCS Hot leg Crossover LHSI to RCS Cold Leg LHSI to RCS Cokf Leg LHSI to RCS Hot Lag NSW to ESW Header NSW to ESW Header ESW Header Return to AuxiiyResenioir ESW Header Return to AuuTery Reservoir ESW Return Header to NSW ESW Return Header to NSW ESW to NSW Discharge Header Open'p/Cl" Open'p/CI" Open'pen'pen~

Open~

Op/CPi Op/Clu Op/CPi Open" Open" Open" Open" Close" aoser Close" aose*~

Op/CP Op/CP Op/Clu Close'ose'pens open'lose'ose'lose" W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W Jbry Jbry Jbry Jbry Jbry Jbry Jbry Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Ga'te Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly 3

3 3

3 3

3 3

14 14 14 14 14 14 10 10 10 10 10 30 30 30 30 30 30 36 300 600 300 600 1500 1500 1500 1500 1 500 1500 1 500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 600 600 1500 1500 1 500 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS CS CS CS CS CS CS CS 6MB-00 SM8-000 SMB-00 SMB-000 SMB-000 SM8-000 SB-O SB-0 SMB-000 SMB-000 SMB-000 SB-1 SB-1 SB-1 S8.1 S8-1 S8-1 SMB-1 SMB-1 SB-2 S8-2 58-2 SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC SMB-00/H3BC 25 ft-Ib 10 ft.lb 25 ft.lb 10 ft-Ib 10 ft.lb 10 ft-Ib 15 ft.h 15 ft Ib 10 ft-Ib 10 ft.lb 10 ft.lb 60 ft-Ib 60 ft-Ib 60 ft.tb 60 ft-Ib 60 ft-tb 60 ft-h 40 fth 40 ft-Ib 80 ft-h 80 ft.h 80 ft.h 10 ft-lb 10 ft.lb 10 ft.h 10 ft.h 10 ft-h 10 ft.h 15 ft.h 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC 460 AC Page 2 of 3

TABLEA Valve, Operator, and Motor Data for HNP GL 89-'t0 Program Valves Notes:

(a)

Allgate valves in the HNP GL 89-10 Program are the flexible wedge design.

Allglobe valves are installed flow under the seat.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Valve is normally open and automatically closes upon receipt of a Steam Generator Isolation Signal.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually closed to establish two independent trains (Passive Failure Protection).

Valve is normally closed and is remote manually opened for Sl recirculation.

Valve is normally open and automatically closes upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Phase A ("T" Signal).

Valve is normally open and automatically closes upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Phase B ( P Signal).

Valve is normally open and automatically closes upon receipt of a high flow signal.

Valve is normally open and automatically closes upon receipt of a Safety Injection ("S") Signal.

Valve is normally open and automatically closes in response to a low-lowlevel in the VCT.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens upon receipt of a Safety Injection ("S") Signal.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually closed for long term containment isolation.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually closed as a contingency action if the automatic valve fails to close.

Valve is normally closed, opens on high RCS pressure coincident with S Signal, and recloses at lower pressure setpoint.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens upon receipt of Containment Spray Actuation Signal and automatically recloses on a Spray AdditiveTank Empty Signal.

Valve is normally open and is automatically closed on low-low RWST level provided sump recirculation valve has opened.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens upon receipt of Containment Spray Actuation Signal Valve is normally closed and automatically opened on low-lowRWST level coincident with Containment Spray Pump running.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens on either a Steam Generator 2/3 Low-LowLevel, ATWS, or Bus undervoltage.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually shut to prevent pressurizer blowdown in the event the associated PORV fails open.

It is also remote manually closed during normal operation to isolate a leaking PORV.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens when RHR Pump discharge flowis less than the minimum limitand automatically recloses at the maximum flowlimit.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens upon receipt of a Safety Injection ("S ) Signal.

Valve is normally closed and is remote manually opened and reclosed as required during Sl recirculation to accomplish switchover from RCS cold leg to hot leg and back again.

CSIPs are shut off when valve is cycled closed during the Sl recirculation switchover process.

Valve is normally closed and automatically opens upon receipt of a Safety Injection ("S

) Signal coincident with a 2/4 RWST Low-LowLevel.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually closed during transfer to cold Ieg recirculation.

Valve is normally open and may be remote manually closed in the event of a LOCA outside containment.

Valve is normally open and is remote manually cycled to transfer LHSI between the cold and hot legs.

Valve is normally closed and is remote manually cycled to transfer LHSI between the cold and hot legs.

Abbreviations and Acronyms:

A/D AFW ATWS Bfly BIT CCW CIV CSIP ESW Anchor Darling Valves AuxiliaryFeedwater Anticipated Trip Without Scram Butterfly Valve Boron Injection Tank Component Cooling Water Containment Isolation Valve Charging/Safety Injection Pump Emergency Service Water FCV Fish.

HHSI HX Jbry LHSI LOCA NSW RC Flow Control Valve Fisher Valves High Head Safety Injection Heat Exchanger Jamesbury Valve Low Head Safety Injection Loss of Coolant Accident Normal Service Water Reactor Coolant RCP RHR RWST SG Sl VCT W

Yarwy Reactor Coolant Pump Residual Heat Removal Reactor Water Storage Tank Steam Generators Safety Injection Volume Control Tank Westinghouse EMD Yarway Valve Page 3 of 3

I'

TABLE B Setup of dP Testable HNP GL 89-'t0 Program Valves Tag Number Valve Type

-Valve Factor-Calc.

Test Test ikP

% Design Basis Valves Which Have a Safety Function to Close

Thrust Additions>>

ROL>>

Stem COF

-Packing Load-Diag.

TSR Cafe./Test Cele.

Test Calo.

Test" Minimum Cafe.

Thrust Maximum Cele.

Field Setup PSA Group>>

Notes 1AF-55 1AF-74 1AF.93 1AF-137 1AF-143 1AF-149 1CC.99 1CC 113 1CC-127 1CC-128 1CC-176 1CC-202 1CC-207 1CC-208 1CC-297 1CC-299 1CS-182 1CS.196 1CS-210 1CS-214 1CS-217 1CS-218 1CS-219 1CS.220 1CS-235 1CS-238 1CS-382 1CS-423 1CS-745 1CS-746 1CS-752 1CS-753 1RH-31 1RH.69 1SI-326 1SI-327 1SI-340 1SI-341 1SI-359 1SW-274 1SW-275 1SW-276 Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Bfly Bfly Bfly Bfly Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gbbe Gbbe Gbbe Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gbbe Ghbe Gbbe Gbbe Gbbe Gbbe Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Bfly Bfly Bfly 0.73 0.64 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.59 0.40 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.24 0.613 0.613 0.613 0.613 1.1 1.1 0.86 0.86 0.97 1.0 0.67 0.67 0.76 0.69 0.607 0.64 0.96 N/A N/A N/A 0.73 0.64 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.38 0.59 0.30 0.57 0.55 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.24 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.07 0.76 0.69 0.27 0.64 0.96 N/A N/A NIA 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,299 1,299 1,299 134 134 134 134 132 132 132 132 132 132 2,838 2,838 2,751 2,799 142 142 142 142 2,799 2,799 0

0 2,773 2.773 2,773 2,773 147 147 172 172 149 149 149 147 147 147

> 100

> 100

> 100 41 71 50 79 79 78 74 65 65 68 63 59 63 96 96 98 97

>100

>100

> 100

>100 98 98 96 96 97 98 87 85 85 90 91 91 69 60 50 10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

NIA N/A N/A N/A 10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

'I0.3%

10.3%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

10%

NfA N/A NIA 5%

5%

10%

5%

5%

5%

N/A N/A N/A N/A 5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

NIA 10%

10%

10%

10%

N/A N/A 5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

10%

10%

10%

10%

5%

5%

5%

N/A N/A N/A

~2,525/-2,525 0/+430

-2,812/-2,812

~681/-681

-1,484/-1,484

-3,200/-3,200 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0/+246

~500/.385 0/+ 21 10%/<<

0/+ 787 0/+43

~500/.299

-1,614/-1,614

~211/-211 N/A

-1,000/-810

-1,000/-872

~2,000/.1,760

-3,000/-2,602 N/A N/A

-1,000/-732

-1,000/-74 0/+139

-1,528/-1,492

~616/.603 0/'

323/-123 0/-53

~2,219/-2,185

~2,105/-2,104 OI+ 1,095

~1,029/-1,003

-4,702/-4,693 N/A N/A N/A 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 N/A NIA N/A 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.07 0.22 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10

~ <<\\ ~

0.28 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.12 N/A N/A N/A 1,500 1,500 500 1,500 1,500 1,500 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,500 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,015 2,369 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 2,000 1,500 1,550 1,703 1,500 1,500 1,409 1,405 1,147 1,500 1,500 1,500 2,000 2,500 5,500 2.500 2,500 NIA NIA N/A 90 933 202 433 339 782 N/A N/A N/A NIA 1011 70 260 385 255 186 1,015 2,369 708 108 333 118 1,340 1,625 50 703 274 597 409 1,405 647 641 474 103 629 509 3,516 749 409 N/A N/A N/A 18,103 14,104 15,474 12,434 15,645 17,201 NIA N/A N/A N/A 3,680 4,356 3,658 4,851 3,775 3,695 10,288 11,266 9,358 8,914 4,085 4,085 5,685 6,085 10,657 7,665 6,023 6,023 9,291 10,800 10,500 10,653 3,000 2,677 13,800 13,500 12,150 10,000 16,300 N/A N/A N/A 19,896 19,896 19,233 19,896 19,896 19,896 N/A N/A N/A N/A 16,865 16,865 16,865 16,865 16,865 16,865 14,558 14,558 14,558 14,940 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 12,600 12,600 14,558 14,558 14,558 14,558 14,558 14,558 7,200 7,200 40,500 40,500 63,000 63,000 63,000 N/A N/A N/A 19,527 18,827 15,551 15,220 13,016<<

16,867'/A N/A N/A N/A 7,317 5,402 7,187 5,788 6,593 4,333 10,691 11,474 9,707 11,462 12,637 15,550 15,785 12,764 11,275 9,727 9,924 9,198 11,166 10,879 11,805 10,653 4,552 5,3'I 4 14,362 22,399 43,126 38,049 54,596 N/A NIA N/A 19 19 19 19

'12 a 19 12 a 19 1 ala 1 a 18 1 a is 1 a 18 Sensor Reversal 13

'2a10, 13

'2 a 10, 13

<<14

<<14

~3

~4 1 a15 1 a 16 1 a 17 Page

j. of 3

TABLE B Setup of dP Testable HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves

~

~

Valves Which Have a Safety Function tD Open Design Test hP Tag Vahre

-Valve Factor-Basis

% Design Stem COF

-packing Load-

Torqve pSA Number Type Cele.

Test hpt>>

Basis Cele.

Tes&

Cafe.

Teste Needed'"

Avail!>>

Groups Notes 1CC.147 Gate 1CC.1 67 Gate 1CS-746 Globe 1CS-752 Globe 1MS-70 Gate 1MS-72 Gate 1RH.25 Gate 1%&31 Gate 1RH.63 Gate 1RH.69 Gate 1SI-1 Gate 1SI-2 Gate 1SI.3 Gate 1SI-4 Gate 1SI.52 Gate 1SI.86 Gate 1SI.107 Gate 1SI.340 Gate ISlat Gate 1 64359 Gate 1SW-270 Bfly 1SW-271 Bfly 0.30 0.20 132 0.30 0.19 132 N/A'/A~

0>>

N/A N/A~

0~

0.40 1,242 0.40 1,242 0.52 134 059 147 0.52 134 0.59 0.32 147 0.35 0.31 2,832 0.35 0.29 2,832 0.592 0.39 2,908 0.592 0.32 2,908 0.35 0.07 2,832 0.35 0.14 2,843 0.40 0.32 2,836 0.76 0.76 149 0.98 0.98 149 1.0 1.0 149 N/A N/A 144 N/A N/A 144 85 89 87 87 88 94 95 92 92 94 95'5'0 91 91 77 78 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 N/A N/A 0.07 1,000 0.13 1,000 0.18 1,500 0.27 1,500 0.10 2,500 0.11 2,500 0.07 2,500 0.11 1,500 0.04 1,500 0.10 1,500 0.14 1,500 0.18 1,500 0.19 1,500 0.14 1,500 0.06 2.500 0.21 1,500 0.20 1,500 0.18 5,500 0.13 2,500 0.13 2,500 N/A N/A N/A N/A 273 71 128 1

1055 102 129 1

754 27 181 3

437 32 205 3

194 244 3

194 244 3

1,152 59 115 3

286 29 70 3

429 59 120 3

217 29 70 3

1,291 67.5 79 1

1,246 67.5 80 1

784 153 291 1

829 132 286 1

2,124 83.5 98 1

589 69 100 1

1,153 81 97 1

5,361 301 924 3

1,104 259 948 3

205 263 939 3

N/A 114 162 1

N/A 155 159 1

5'fhw under the seat globe valve (dP assists valve opening) fhw under the seat ghbe valve (dP assists valve opening) e6

~ 7

~4 e4

~4 8,11 9,11

'9, 11 20 20 20 1

1 (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

Simple addition method (Diagnostics + Torque Switch Repeatability + Rate-of-Loading) in lieu of Square Root Sum of Squares Method. The values noted in the thrust additions colum is the thrust margins added to the calculated value of closing thrust to determine the minimum setup thrust A negative sign indicates a reduction in thrust at dynamic torque switch trip when compared to thrust at static torque switch trip, a positive sign indicates an increase.

Both positive and negative Rate-of-Loading value are shown in the column, only reductions in thrust at torque switch vip were considered in the setup calculations.

No credit was taken for any thrust increase.

The assumed design basis differential pressures are conservative.

Conservative assumptions such as use of pump shutoff head, ignoring alternate flowpaths and neglecting frictional losses were commonly made during development of these differential pressures.

NRC Inspection Report No. 50400/92-06 Section 3.b. noted that conservative assumptions were used in determining our design basis differential pressures.

The methodology used to develop the PSA is consistent with NUMARC 93-05, and follows the draft methodology proposed by the Electric Power Research Institute and developed by Quadrex Energy Services.

Torque needed to open the valve using a stem factor based on a 0.20 COF or the actual diagnostic stem factor if greater (applies to gate and globe valves only).

"As-left" thrust at close switch setting.

Actuator torque available is based on available motor torque at degraded voltage conditions.

The Test" Stem factor Coefficient of Friction (COF) value was based on static diagnostic values of thrust and torque at CloseTorque Switch Trip.

The Test packing load value was obtained from the static test data using VOTES thrust measuring diagnostic equipment.

Page 2 of 3

0

TABLE B Setup of dP Testable HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves Notes:

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

The design basis dP is very conservative because it assumes operation against shutoff head of the pump.

During an actual design basis event, certain valves are opening as others are closing, therefore, alternate flow paths are created and the pump is not operating at shutoff head.

Actual thrust value from dynamic testing was used as the base number to establish the minimum thrust setup.

Sensor failed during dP testing, scheduled to be retested during RF06.

Indeterminate dP across valve, therefore, valve factor could not be determined.

The test provided a dP similar to that expected in a design basis event.

The higher" opening packing load is from a recent static test, the closing packing load from the same test was only 120 pounds.

The opening and closing packing loads should be closer in value to each.

Only able to use calibrator as auxiliary sensor to measure closing stroke.

High temperature had caused yoke sensor to fail. Closing packing load was 950 pounds.

t Only able to use calibrator as auxiliary sensor to measure closing stroke.

High temperature had caused yoke sensor to fail. Closing packing load was 1,875 pounds The design basis dP assumed for this valve occurs during the performance of an OST. The dP test pressure represented 99% of the maximum accident dP.

The design basis dP assumed for this valve occurs during the performance of an OST.

The CSIPs are shutoff when this valve is cycled per the EOPs, therefore, the dP test pressure represented 1,788% of the maximum accident dP.

Testing was performed against CSIP head at recirculation flow(near shutoff). During an actual design basis event, this valve receives a close signal at the same time the Sl Injection Valves receive a signal to open.

This would result in significantly reduced pump head (lower dP).

The PSA assumes multiple failures which go well beyond our design basis.

This valve was included in the PSA Group 1 because it could be used as an alternate flow path during the injection mode iftwo of the four BITvalves were to fail to open and the two valves which fail to open would have to be on seperate trains.

The GL 89-10 design function for this valves is to operate in support of Sl recirculation.

The Close Torque Switch Bypass willpermit flow isolation if isolation of a faulted steam generator were to be required.

NOTE: These valves were analyzed to have a torque switch trip thrust value greater than the extrapolated thrust needed to isolate the fluid flow at design dP. The minimum setup thrust was changed subsequent to the dynamic test to include margin adders which increased the minimum setup thrust above the as-left thrust at torque switch trip.

This valve is limited seated, no close torque switch in control circuit.

A differential pressure test was performed on this valve, however, the system configuration (manual throttle valve downstream) did not permit a detectable dP across the valve. This test was representative of design basis accident conditions of high pressure and there was no detectable dP on closing.

Actuator torque required for valve operation is 146 ft-lbs, actuator torque available at degraded voltage conditions is 160 ft-lbs. Valve is limitcontrolled.

Actuator torque required for valve operation is 152 ft-lbs, actuator torque available at degraded voltage conditions is 160 ft-lbs. Valve is limitcontrolled.

Actuator torque required for valve operation is 180 ft-lbs, actuator torque available at degraded voltage conditions is 243 ft-lbs. Valve is limitcontrolled.

The actuator torque need for operation of these valves is 123 ft-lbs. This amount of torque is based on vendor methodology.

The dynamic test information for these valves indicated the vendor method to predict operating torque requirements is conservative.

The amount of actuator torque available at degraded voltage conditions for these valves is: 1CC-99 = 126 ft-lbs, 1CC-113 ~ 132 ft-lbs, 1CC-127 = 127 ft-lbs, and 1CC-128 = 128 ft-lbs. NOTE: These valves are controlled by the limitswitch.

1AF-55/74/93 were set up to be able to close against a high dP for the dynamic tests (higher than normal operating or accident) which results in needing a high thrust value at torque switc trip. 1AF-137/143/149 were set to respond to a lower design dP, and are only able to be tested during startup at a lower dP. These valves and actuators are identical, yet the dynamic results were varied. These valves are scheduled for maintenance during the next outage and are planned for a modification to move the Close Torque Switch Bypass rotor setting to 98%

(approximate).

The 98% setting would allow the close torque switch setting to be lowered while still having the full motor capability for the valve disc to isolate the fluid flowif needed for a higher dP.

The opening valve factors for these valves seem high. However, at low dP tests, the vibrations in the diagnostic data due to hydraulic pumped fluid flow can impact the derived valve factor (the thrust data can be interpreted to present different valve factors depending on the analyst). The diagnostic data selected to determine an open valve factor for these valves were chosen conservatively and with the knowledge that the actuators had more than sufficient opening torque capability.

Page 3 of 3

TABLE C Setup of Non dP Testable HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves Tag Va)ve Number Type Valve Factor Crdc.

Design Basis Thrust Additions-dP Diag.

TSR ROL Valves Which Have a Safety Function to Close Thrust-

COF dP"

-Packing load-Minimum Maximum Fie)d PSA Crdc.

Tests'hrust Calo.

Testrr Cate.

Cele.

Setup~

Group~

Conrnents 1CC-249 Gate 1CC-251 Gate 1CC-252 Gate 1CS-165 Gate 1CS-166 Gate 1CS-341 Globe 1CT.26 Gate 1CT-71 Gate 1ED-94 Gate 1ED-95 Gate IRc-113 Gate IRC-115 Gate 1RC-117 Gate 1SI-322 Gate ISI-323 Gate 1SW-39 BIIY 1SW-40 Bily 0.55 0.6 0.6 0.627 0.627 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.639 0.639 0.639 1.0 1.0 N/A N/A ICS.470 Globe 1.1 1CS-472 Globe 1.1 1CT-11 Globe 1.1 1CT-12 Globe 1.1 132 10%

132 10%

2.236 0%

95 10%

95 10%

0 10%

154.5 10%

154.5 10%

17.18 10%

17.18 10%

24 10%

24 10%

90 10%

90 10%

2,560 NIA 2,560 NIA 2,560 N/A 47 10%

47 10%

149 N/A 149 N/A 5%

5%

0%

5%

5%

5%

10%

10%

10%

10%

5%

5%

10%

20%

N/A N/A N/A 5%

5%

N/A NfA 10%

10%

0%

10%

10%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

0%

0%

N/A NIA N/A 10%

10%

N/A N/A 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.24 N/A N/A 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.26 0.28 N/A N/A 0.15 0.13 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.10 0.24 N/A NIA 724 789 13,373 614 614 0

469 469 36.28 36.28 1,393.5 1,393.5 362 362 9,246 9,246 9,246 5,376 5,376 NIA NIA 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 2,500 2,500 N/A N/A 248 230 381 182 8

235 502 584 NIA NIA 1,750 976 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 744 59 N/A N/A 3,070 3,151 2,765 2,765 6.023 2,659 2,659 4,295 3,670 1,699 1,841 13,291 13,291 13,291 10,030 10,030 N/A NIA 14,562 14,562 14,562 7,200 7,200 14,558 14,558 14,558 12,600 12,600 6,075 6,075 5,787 4,005 14,940 14,940 14,940 37,080 37,080 N/A N/A 7,088 8,954 9,612 3,297 3,771 9,122 6,840 6,269 5,132 5,391 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 27,454 13,126 N/A N/A See Note 1.

See Note 1.

See Note 2.

See Note 3.

See Note 3.

See Note 4.

See Note 4.

Sse Note 4.

See Note 5.

'See Note 5.

See Nots 6.

See Note 6.

Sae Note 7.

See Note 7.

See Note 8.

See Nots 8.

See Note 8.

See Nots 9.

See Note 9.

See Note 10.

See Note 10.

Valves Which Have a Safety Function to Open Tag Valve Number Type Val Factor Cate.

Design Basis COF dP Cate.

Tea&

dP Thrust

-Packing load-Ca)c.

Test~

Torque Needed Avail.n PRA Group Comments 1CS-291 Gate 1CS-292 Gate 1CT-11 Globe 1CT-12 Globe ICT-50 Gate 1CT-88 Gate 1CT-102 Gate ICT-105 Gate 1SI-300 Gate 1SI.301 Gate 1$-31 0 Gate ISI.311 Gate 0.524 0.524 N/A N/A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 52.5 0.20 52.5 0.20 19.7 0.20 19.7 0.20 241 0.17 241 0.19 60.3 0.20 60.3 0.20 60.1 0.20 60.1 0.20 60.1 0.20 60.1 0.20 0.03 0.12 N/A N/A 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.15 932 932 6,362 6,362 2,918 2,9'I 8 3,519.3 3,519.3 3,519.3 3,519.3 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,000 900 1,000 1,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 581 710 N/A N/A 254 727 117 869 610 1,636 770 1,368 44 51 44 50 9.7 89 9.7 89 167.4 176 175.9 176 63.6 67.5 63.6 72.5 135 411 135 410 135 469 135 469 See Note 11.

See Note 11.

Row under seat globe idP assists valve opening).

Row under seat globe (dP assists valve opening).

Ses Notes 12 Sr 15.

See Notes 12 sr 15.

See Note 12.

Sse Note 12.

See Note 13.

See Note 13.

See Notes 13 Sr 14.

See Notes 13 /k 14.

Page 1 of 3

TABLE C Setup of Non dP Testable HNP GL 89-'t0 Program Valves (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Simple addition method (Diagnostics + Torque Switch Repeatability + Rate-of-Loading) in lieu of Square Root Sum of Squares Method. The values noted in the "thrust additions column is the thrust margins added to the calculated value of closing thrust to determine the "minimum setup thrust".

Thrust component due solely from differential pressure effects as calculated using the standard industry equation (Differential Pressure *Area Valve Factor).

The methodology used to develop the PSA is consistent with NUMARC93-05, and follows the draft metholology proposed by the Electric Power Research Institute and developed by Quadrex Energy Services.

"As-left"thrust at close torque switch setting.

Actuator torque needed to open the valve using the 0.20 coefficient of friction stem factor unless otherwise noted.

Actuator torque available is based on the available motor torque at degraded voltage conditions.

The Test Stem factor Coefficient of Friction (COF) value was based on static diagnostic values of thrust and torque at CloseTorque Switch Trip.

The "Test packing load value was obtained from the static test data using VOTES thrust measuring diagnostic equipment Notes:

(1)

These valves were dynamically tested under containment isolation conditions (1CC-249 had a dP test of 90 psid with a line pressure of 120 psig, the dP for 1CC-251 was 86 psid with a line pressure of 116 psig).

They are included in this table because of their secondary function to isolate a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Thermal Barrier Tube Rupture (high hP conditions) should valve 1CC-252 fail to isolate. A 25 ft-Ib motor and a 97% close torque switch bypass logic provide the means for valve isolation under this scenario.

This approach was chosen because it provides for isolation against the higher differential pressure without requiring the operator to deliver the higher torque each time the valve is stroked under lesser conditions.

The close torque switch is set to close against containment isolation pressure conditions.

NOTE: The 97% close torque switch bypass is in the control circuit continuously rather than being implemented only during a safety signal. Thus, the valve factor assumed in the setup is not as important as the capability of the motor to produce thrust via the actuator.

(2)

This is a special catagory valve. It's sole function is to isolate a RCP Thermal Barrier Tube Rupture which is not an event described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

A 25 ft-Ib motor and a 97% close torque switchbypass logic provide the capability for valve isolation under this scenario. This approach was chosen because itprovides for isolation against the higher differential pressure without requiring the operator to deliver the higher torque each time the valve is stroked under lesser conditions.

The close torque switch is set similar to valves 1CC-249 and 1CC-251.

NOTE: The 97% close torque switch bypass is in the control circuit continuously rather than being implemented only during a safety signal.

Thus, the valve factor assumed in the setup is not as important as the capability of the motor to produce thrust via the actuator.

(3)

A hP test was performed, no hP effects observed due to pressure bottled-up downstream.

Characteristic of what is expected during an accident where upstream pressure of VCT and downstream pressure of RWST are expected to be approximately the same. The valve setup calculation conservatively assumes an upsueam pressure based on the VCTrelief valve setpo)nt~

of 75 psig s 2.25 psig tolerance (or 77.25 psig) and assumes a downstream pressure of 0 psia (-14.7 psig).

VCT pressure is maintained between 20 and 30 psig by plant operating procedure.

The valve factor used in this setup (0.627) was derived from methodololgy provided from the vendor (Westinghouse).

Other 4-inch Westinghouse gate valves that were dP tested (in the same fluid system but of a different valve pressure class) had close valve factors less than 0.12.

(4 )

The Valve Factor used for these globe valves is 1.1 which had been the standard typical in the globe valve thrust prediction. Similar dP tested globe valves had diagnostic Valve Factors which were less than 1.1 (See Table 8).

(5)

These valves were setup on torque (unable to use diagnostic equipment to measure thrust).

11.9 ft-Ibs of torque was calculated as needed to isolate flowusing the 1.1 Valve Factor and a 0.20 Coefficient of Friction Stem Factor. However, the valve toruqe calculation recommends a minimum close torque switch setting of 76 ft-Ibs to assure a good seal, based on vendor input. The current torque at Torque Switch Trip is 76.5 ft-Ibs for 1CT-11 and 88.3 ft-Ibs for 1CT-12. A minimum actuator output torque of 100 ft-Ibs is available under degraded voltage conditions.

(6)

Two six inch A/D MOVs were tested in the same system as these valves (not GL 89-10 Program MOVs). 1CT-47 had a diagnostic closing Valve Factor = 0.36 and 1CT-95 's closing diagnostic valve factor was 0.19.

The 0.6 Valve Factor was perceived to be conservative.

Page 2 of 3

TABLE C Setup of Non dP Testable HNP GL 89-10 Program Valves

~

~

(7)

These valves were setup on torque as thrust measuring diagnostic equipment was not able to be used. These valves are small 3 inch gate valves whose dp component of the thrust setup was small in comparison to the assumed packing load. The design dP was based on shutoff head of the associated system pump and the peak containment pressure during a design basis event (conservatively high). However, increasing the Valve Factor to a higher value would only provide a small amount of thrust increase (ex. currently the dP thrust component'is 362 Ibs from the above table; using 0.6 valve factor increases this component to 434 which is a 72 Ib increase).

The minimum setup torque value based on a 0.2 Coefficient of Friction Stem Factor is 28 ft-lbs. 1ED-94 is set at 34.4 ft-Ibs and 1ED-95 is set at 34.7 ft-lbs.

(8)

These valves are limitseated based on deflection of SB compensating unit. The torque switch is not wired in their circuits. Setup is supported by Marshall testing for EPRI TMI PORV Block Valve Program.

Static test was performed measuring motor current only. Valve Factor was determined by methodology provided by the vendor (Westinghouse).

(9)

Valve Factor of 1.0 was selected to be conservative.

These valves have large actuators due to the valve size and a low design dP (10)

These are liinited seated butterfly valves.

Four identical valves, all with very similar design basis differential pressures, were tested in the same system (Service Water).

The setu methodology provided by the valve vendor and adopted in our setup calculation was demonstrated to bound dynamic test results.

Actuator torque needed for 1SI-39/40 valve operation

= 114.3 ft-lbs. Actuator torque available: 1SI-39 = 159.9 ft-lbs, 1SI-40 ~ 159.3 ft-lbs.

(11)

These valves are located downstream of RWST, prior to CSIP suction header.

The valves were cycled against a RWST head at 780/o filland with downstream piping aligned to the Reactor Coolant System with the reactor vessel head reinoved for refueling. This pressure test was all that could be performed.

The Valve Factor was determined using methodology provided from the vendor (Westinghouse)

(12)

Two six inch A/D MOVs were tested in the same system as these valves (not GL89-10 Program MOVs). 1CT-47 had a diagnostic opening Valve Factor = 0.43 and 1CT-95 's opening diagnostic valve factor was 0.18.

The 0.5 Valve Factor was selected as representative.

(13)

The Opening Valve Factors for these valves were determined from methodology provided from the vendor (Westinghouse).

The open torque switch bypass for these valves are set at 15 /o to ensure fullmotor capability for valve opening. Comparing the torque needed for these valves to open to the amount of torque available under degraded voltage conditions indicates there is sufficient torque available for opening (torque needed based on a 0.20 coefficient of friction stem factor).

(14)

These valves are limitseated based on deflection of SB compensating unit. The close torque switchis not wired in the circuit, thus a diagnostic stem factor at Torque Switch Trip could not be obtained.

(15)

The design basis dP for these valves is very conservative: the dP assumes pump shutoff head pressure at the same instant the valves are going open. This scenario assumes the valvet gets a signal to open simultaneously with pump start and the pump instantly provides shutoff head pressure at the valve.

Page 3 of 3

TABLE D CLOSE TORQUE SWITCH BYPASS THRUST MARGIN FOR GATE VALVES'"'

Minimum Calculated Closing Thrust (a) in comparison to the 96% Close Torque Switch Bypass Logic Thrust Capability (b)

Valve No.

1AF-55 1AF-74 1AF-93 1AF-137 1AF-143 1AF-149 1CC-176 1CC-202 1CC-207 1CC-208 1CC-249 1CC-251 1CC-252 1CC-297 1CC-299 1CS-165 1CS-166 1

CS-214'4'CS-217 1CS-218 1CS-219 1CS-220 1 CS-235"'

CS-238'4' CT-26 1 CT-71 1 ED-94 1 ED-95 Setup Thrust 1 8,1 03-1 9,896 14,104-1 9,896 1 5,474-19,233 1 2,434-1 9,896 1 5,645-19,896 17,201-19,896 3,680-16,865 4,356-1 6,865 3,658-1 6,865 4,851-1 6,865 3,070-14,562 3,1 51-14,562 3,1 51-14,562 3,775-1 6,865 3,695-1 6,865 2,765-7,200 2,765-7,200 8,914-14,940 4,085-1 7,640 4,085-17,640 5,685-17,640 6,085-1 7,640 10,657-12,600 7,665-1 2,600 4,295-6,075 3,670-6,075 1,699-5,787 1,841-4,005 (a)

Minimum Calculated Closin Thrust 13,546 12,264 10,552 10,220 12,314 12,175 3,200 3,353 3,181 3,881 2,456 2,521 3,151 3,283 3 213 2,212 2,212 8,914 2,571 2,571 3,071 2,571 10,657 7,665 3,436 2,936 1,416 1,416 (b)

Thrust Potential with full motor ca abilit

"'0,115 18,229 17,677 35,376 35,934 38,537 7,429 6,771 7,048 7,190 13,192 14,650 18,700 5,143 7,190 4,339 4,392 12,138 9,206 9,683 9,683 9,683 14,069 14,276 5,689 5,210 1,829 2,439 Thrust margin

%(3)

~ba 48 49 67 246 192 216 132 102 122 85 437 481 493 57 124 96 98 36 258 277 215 277 32 86 66 77 29 72 2.

3.

This table is only for gate valves that have an active ("automatic") function to close upon receipt of an accident signal. There are other valves which have the torque switch and thermal overloads bypassed upon receipt of a specific signal and/or loss of offsite power.

This column has been calculated based on full motor capability under de raded volta e

conditions using the Stem Factor with a Coefficient of Friction = 0.20 or the diagnostic Stem Factor, whichever was higher.

The amount of thrust margin provided in this column is important as it indicates the amount of thrust potential for closing a gate valve with the 96% Close Torque Switch Bypass (CTSB) in the circuit (96% close would be sufficient to stop fluid flow)~ As an example, the minimum thrust value in the setup range for 1CS-165 was developed by adding 25% to the "Minimum Calculated Closing Thrust" (see Table C), or 2,212 " 1.25 = 2,765 lbs.

The CTSB thrust margin available for 1CS-165 is 96%.

This magin indicates the additional potential capability of the MOV with the CTSB during a design basis event.

These valves are limit seated, the close torque switch is not wired in the circuit.

They are included here to shown the thrust margin available.

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