ELV-03308, Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Testing Requirements for Charcoal Filters

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Testing Requirements for Charcoal Filters

ML20091Q495
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	01/23/1992
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20091Q481	List: ELV-03308, Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Testing Requirements for Charcoal Filters ML20091Q478
References
ELV-03308, ELV-3308, NUDOCS 9202040447
Download: ML20091Q495 (30)

Text

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t a-R.

1 ATTAtriMENT 1 TO ELV-03308 i

REVISED FSAR DESCRIPTION I

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9902040447 920123 PbR. ADDCK 05000424 i

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VEGP-FSAR-1 Add / dr~ 2 2-4.

C.5.e Fuel handling post accident filter satisfies 99.0 percent retention of DOP on EEPA filters instead of 99.95 percent.

5.

C.5.d Fuel handling post accident filter satisfies 99.0 percent retention of gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant on the adsorbe instead of l

99.95 percen

• m r

rotteWW6)

~

6.

C.6.b C

bon samples taken for laboratory tests shall meet the acceptance criteria :f 7:::::: th;n ;r :q;;l 2NSERY $,

t; 70 0 F;;;;;t h'#-4 G;;d Cth ;;0hY1 ledid; a; 20'O i

nd 70 p;r::n

12:1c; h :;dity as specified in the VEGP Technical Specifications.

Wherever ANSI H509-1976 is referenced in the regulatory guide, conformance is with ANSI N509-1976 or ANSI N509-1980 depending on the date of the applicable purchase order.

Conformance may be with ANSI N509-1980 when specifically called out in the l

corresponding specification.

Wherever ANSI H510-1975 is referenced in the regulatory guide, conformance is with ANSI N510-1975 or ANSI N510-1980 depending on the date of the applicable purchase order.

Conformance may be with ANSI H510-1980 when specifically called out in the corresponding specification.

1.9.53 REGULATORY CUIDE 1.53, JUNE 1973, APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE-FAIuJRE CRITERION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS 1.9.53.1 Requiatory Guide 1.53 Position The guidance in trial-use IEEE Std. 379-1972 for applying the single-failure criterion to the design and analysis of nuclear power plant protection systems is generally acceptable and l

provides an adequate interim basis for complying ed *h Section 4.2 of IEEE Std. 279-1971, subject to the qualifications identified in the guide.

l 1.9.53.2 VEGP Position l

l Conform.

Refer to paragraph 7.1.2.6 and subsection 15.0.8.

(

1.9-48 L

?A6E 2 of 2.1 FSAR Section 1.9.52.2 (6)

Insert "A"

a. Control Room Emermanev Filtration Evatam 99.8 percent when tested with methyl iodide at 30 c and 70 percent relative humidity

• b. Pleina Panatration Area filtration _ and Erhaust System, and Fuel Handlina Buildina Post Accident Ventilation System 90.0 percent when tested with methyl lodida at 30 C and 95 percent relative humidity-t 4

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09^t 3 of 2L l

VEcP-F8AR-6 D.

The piping penetration filter exhaust syctem as designed to maintain the filtration unit rooms at - 1/4 in. WG with respect to atmosphere which cnnures that the piping penetration areas are maintained at a negative pressure with respect to ad3acent areas to prevent uncontrolled exfiltration of potentially contaminated air and to minimi:o release of airborne radioactivity to the outside atmosphere rosulting from containment and penetration area leakago under accident conditions.

The piping penetration (11 tor exhaust system ensures that tne offsite radiation exposures resulting from the postulated post-LOCA leakage in recirculation piping, as discussed in subsection 15.6.5, are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100.

It also ensures that the emergoney core cooling nyctem and containment spray pump rooms can be purged to allow access for repair and maintenance of the equipment.

C.

The fuel handling building post-accident exhaust system is designed to maintain a slightly negative pressure within the fuel handling building following a fuel handling accident to minimize release of airborne fi[ER 4'80'1 bradioactivity to the outside atmosphere.

The radiation exposures and expo $ ensure / that the effolte

. post-accident exhaust system

,g, g DcH sures to operating

To W personnel in tha control room resulting from a postulated fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building, nr dirruered in rub

::ti : 15 ' t, are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, CDC 19, respectively.4 D.

The failure of any active component in a filtration system, assuming loss of offsite power, cannot impair the ability of the system to perform its safety function.

E.

The ESF filter systems are designed to remain intact and functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake.

bt bl.ica sse 0 in JW.rtertM /5.7. Q No egrotr is t TAK!d Fog Fn.rcA opgsn7 sod,

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w 6.5.I-2 L

Pnse 4 or 2.2.

VEOP-FSAR-6 F.

The ESP filter systems are designed to be consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9.

The design bases for sizing the filters, fans, and associated dut:twork are discussed in subsectionh, 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3, and 9.4.5.

6.5.1.2 Syotem. Design 6.b.1.2.1 Ceneral System Description Thir control room emergency ventilation and air-conditioning nyntem is described in section 6.4 and subsection 9.4.1.

The paping penetration filter exhaust system is described in

)

r.uhuection 9.4.3.

The fuel handling building post-accident

{

ciennup system is described in subsection 9.4.2.

l Flow diagrams for ench system are shown in the appropriate subsections.

g b.5.1.2.2 Componont Description l

ik Ear;h ESP filter train consists of a moisture separator, a

(

%)h herattnq coil, an upstream high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) j t a iter, a churcoal adsorber with fire detection tamparature iionsora, and a downstream HEPA filter.

The filtration trains

) are connected to f ans with direct drive motors, exsociated

. tut twork, and controls.

3 Specific component design parameters y

J.tre provided in table 6.5.1-1.

fThetalterhousingdesignprovidesadequatespaceforfilter

/rnnantenanceandinspection.

The housing is fitted with the a

k' lnnt:etsary ports for testing.

Pipe, cable, and conduit (marine-type,ponotrations are sealed to minimize leakage.

Access doors are d%

VT Lhangen.

bulkbed doors with gas-tight seals and double-pin wT 1

kM The charcoal adsorber portion of each filter train is provided g)7w2thafiredetectionsystemandawaterspraysystemtoallow tlooding of the charcoal bed to prevent bed ignition from radioactivity-induced heat.

Fire protection systems for the enrbon adcorbars are discussed in subsection 9.5.1.

ele <:tric heaters provided h air filtration units are rha i

doctqned to reduce the relative humidity of the entering air l

stronm mixture to 70 percent from as high as 100 percent.

l Helative humidity is maintained by use of a moisture controller

~

l which, as relative humidity approaches 70 percent, modulates the esloctric heater to gradually raise the air temperature, thus

wer

.ng the relative humidity, g {ypgi[

6.S.1-3 w>a l

1

1 SPd( 6 s/ 22.

FSAR Section 6.5.1.2.2 Insert "B"

l The electric heaters in the piping penetration filter exhaust system and the fuel handling building post-accident exhaust s'jstem provide defense-in-depth by reducing relative humidity and therkby improving adsorber efficiency. However, the heaters are not required to maintain the relative humidity of

-the entering air stream mixture to less than 70 percent.

Although a moisture controller is provided to modulate the electric heaters as relative humidity approaches 70 percent, no credit is taken for humidity control in these systems.

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VECT-FSAR-6 TABLE 6. 5.1-1 ( SHEET 2 0F 3 )

t Water entering temperature',

44

(*F)

Water exiting temperature 56

(*F)

Piping Penetration Filter System Quantity Capacity (ft'/ min) 2 (one on standby) 15,500 HEPA Filtera Number of stages 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal filter) cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in.

Pressure drop clean (in. WG) 1.0 Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for 0.3-um particles Charcoal Filter Bed depth (in.)

4 Face velocity ( f t/ min) 40 Average residence time (s) 0.25 per 2-in, bed depth Filter media Impregnated coconut shell

_ Decontamination efficiency

-00% ;t ""% =;1 tit:

0 */, etanture.reaeuc,7 h;;..i di t,, ( hr el

t11 3o*/, op u ute rot w Ey_f 122 :=;

i: i:2i===;

47 9 g y, rilter capacity 2.5 mg of total iodine per i a reve/ airy, gram of activated A

carbon Moisture Eliminator Eliminator media Spun glass fiber Maximum pressure drop 1.0 (in. WG)

Efficiency 99.7% for 2-um and larger particles Hunting Coil Heating capacity (kW) 80 Heating element Finned tubular Heating material 80% N1/20% Cr Fan Quantity 1

Type Vane axial Static pressure (in. WG) 16 Motor (hp) 75 Fuol Handling Building Post-Accident Filter System (shared by both unita)

Quantity 2 (one on standby) k

/

- - - - - - ~ -,

e-

$446 ? ef 2 2 VEGP-FSAR-6 TABLE 6.5.1-1 ( SHEET 3 OF 3 )

Capacity (ft'/ min) 5000 HEPA Filters Number of stagen 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal i

filter)

Cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in.

Resistance Clean (in. WO) 1.0 Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for 0.3-um particles Charcoal Filters Bad depth (in.)

4.0 Face velocity (ft/ man) 40 Average renadence time (a) 0.25 per 2-in, bed depth Filter media Impregnated coconut shell v.

Decontamination efficiency

-00%

t '0% ::liti":

yoy,Its 4,usp hun; di t',

;; :l:::nt:1 33 y, oK6 4W oc %** *dE> sf

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fL7:20 AT 98 I' Filter capacity' 2.5 my of total lodine 4 Att4rivt Wux!AsrY per-gram of activated catbon Moisture Eliminator Eliminator media Spun glass fiber Maximum pressure drop 1.0 (in. WG)

Efficiency 99.7% for 2-um and larger particles Heating coil Heating capacity (kW) 20 Heating element Finned tubular Heating coil material 80% Hi, 20% Cr Fan Quantity 1

Type Vane axial Static pressure (in. WG) 14 Motor (hp) 40

PACE 6 0F.22.

VEGP-FSAR-9 Air infiltration into the FHB is the supsly air for this mode of operation, and the building is maintstrad under a r.egative pressure to minimize release of radicactivity to the atmosphere.,

?. 5:: ing ::1-1 i: pr:v:d:d t: ';;;p th:

Wiv: h=id!%ref the

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nt:r:.n; th: :h r ::1 bel:u

"'O per::v.<

9.4.2.2.3 Safety Evaluation I

A.

The post-accident EHB ventilation subsystem prevents hl % y exfiltration of contaminated air by imposing a negative l

g presw"Je on the building.

Two 100-per-cent-capacity g

i exhaur. anits are provided so that a single failure i

a4g*

wil' not nullify the negative pressure and thus allou he d an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

The normal ventilation subsystem supply and exhaust ducts are D y(Q t

)

provided with redundant isolation dampers, so the area

~? )u @g is isolated from the normal ventilation system after an N

f,q{yu accident.

Table 9.4.2-2 presents the resul_ts of_a failure modes and effects analysis, ruous ke caseer ss rean q

Jt w oort enteaursaM w

D y to R D The contaminated air is filtered through HLPA anu l

g4 Tghdi charcoal filters to remove airborne radioactive

% q g y' j

contamination before release to the plant stack.

fhe

,{}C filters '-1.mit radiological ;onsequences of a fue t

g I T k 4 ',

A Fall to peelstiere store teone: loss of' train 15 I

m A; train a eventobte piping penetration entract esisture operate Teeperetirte erediceter peo c.t s ee r e r r 4 M y ar r ase rose rs8tration end exhoust unit r

bester; 16 trovide continuity A

rein to close switchgeer eiere none; toss or tre.in

.: t,el,,A e.eit...

me tas b..re.aker en s d protect -t...

footer indicating i

15 1..:

-v I

switchgeo r: 1E bees;. Itee 16 sights train a; no restor indicating leone; loss of train 17 16 1-1%1-4F-002-8eD1 Provide estive A

Fall to train A eventette i

start end eights 8; piping penetration power te cirectete operate i

room flitration ee94 eir Flow storm tow i

I2 enheust unit noter 4'

and ren train 9 Position indicating Stone: no foss of 18 train 8.

Itee 19 is A

enedvertent 17 me.' 28 brecher on

. Provide continuity lights en m0/f 0 deeper; open penet (??Of and protect motor, 240-V): 1988 8eCC itee 19 thus it does not i

block air passege.

480-V; train S. 8BC Provide concisevity' A

Inedvertent Flow store low Ilone: I ns or train 19 5; tre.c A evellette 18 Electric contact to closure energire.Itee 19; for itee 19:

Position ineicetIng i

no 20: reesin open Ilyhts 19 Fv2SSIA, electric /

9esintain riegetive A

toedvertent Pressere diFrerentlet Itene; loss er train 20 s

9: trein A evellebte closure etere hydrewsle moduleting pressure inside as deeper: IIO/FO; flow store now train S; OIO:

j reseln open Position indicatievg iight i

w s

188 i

De ga i

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i VtGP-FSAR-9' j

taett 9.4.3-5 (sntti 5 or 63 rient fe thod of.

Feitere Effect Go to Oper-e O

stem Description Serety steng Feiture Feitere on Systee Safety Stee i

go or Component.

Function Mode-Feedeis1 Detection Twactioet CepetifIty leo.

i m

26 W12616, on-orr Allow return air A'

FeII to Flow store low Mone: loss or trein 27 deeper; trein 8:

to itee 16 open 8: trein A eveitable isC/FC Position indicating tights l

21 80 0 94 breeher en Provide conteneelty A

Fett to Swi tetigee r e ie re teene: loss ef" train 28 l

19816: 480-v and protect heater, close 5; trein A evellebte 9,..

staitetigesr iE bees; Itoe 78 peo. s ture a t a re srela 8. Sv0 feeperature Indienter 23 1-1361-8IT-00 3 -M82 Provide heet to A

Fall to 8eoisture s tore peonep 6 toss or train 29 piping penetration entreet moisture ope ra te 8: train A evettobte room ristret.on and Temperature indicator e

---

x---

e=houst unit No Mtorr r5 rweev /e j

h operampoaa e# pswr AeprEar;

"* * *

• U g,

l 29 W12605, s i r-tsetete norest air A

felt to Fosition indicator soone redomident 30 j

operated, on-orr supply to piping close lights deeper W12606 comper: seO/FC pene t ra tion rooms (8 tem 30) evellebte i

Jo W12606, s i e -

Isolete norest air A

Tell to e sition indicator aeone; redundant 31 o

l operated, on-orr.

stepply to piping close fights deeper W12605 deeper; IIO/FC penetration (ites 29) evelsebte roses 31 W12604. air-Isolete mores t air A

Fall to Position iridicator soone; redundant 32 i

oproted, on-off esteewst free close I&ghts deeper W12607 dea,,er; N0/FC piping penetre-(8 tee 323 ovellebte j

tien rooms

)

1 i

h.'!2607: 'elt-Isolete normes' air A

Fell to Position indicator leone: redundent 33 op.-ra ted. en-o Tr eutness t Froe ctese 8ights deeper 9W12604s deu r: 8sO M C piping penetration' (8 tem 31) eveitable tien rooms

}

J.I 1-1551-NF-001-000 Provide circwIetlon.

A 8eectmenIce I Ftow eeare Iow soone: Iess ar trein A; Og j

Fen, filter, vetwo, filtration, and felture trefn 8 avellebte Rt and deeper control or air Pressure d e rrorentis t

{

eiere higet l

Temperature a tare high i

i De f*

i

..;,_..s

....m, _.

m

VECP-FSAP-g faatt 9.4.3-5 IshttT 6 or 61 riant seethod or Fatsure Errect co to oper-stem Description Safety sting Failure restore on System Serety item f.

98 0. _

or Component FunctIog feede _

feedet $1 Detection functeen CseetiIitir Leem 34 1-1%1-N T-002-000, Provide cittvletion.

A peschenical Tsow stars low soone; loss or train 3; trein A evellebte ren, ritter, wegve, riftration, sad volume rotture Pressure differentist and deeper or air store high 35 1-1%1-t7-001-000 Prowlde cooling A

Leehe,e in Teeperstere eiere soone: fees or train A:

cooling cell higts train 8 avellebte cooling coil water riew store low 36 1-1%1-t7-002-000, Provide coo!Ing A

teskoge in Water flow storm low Stene; loss of trein 3; cooling cell traln A eveltable coeting cell Temperature s tore high O

wh h

u te 4 - ccident mode, both tre sne A sad a evt astien t ly stort ead rete ea e. ate ta= eat **at 8**'**" Sa*

s Quvm (* carorr se roare rM mioary cawrmes. me.aranno ay rme mnres.

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f4Cf /fr W 2,1 VEGP-F3At-TABLE 15.6.5-4 (SHEET 3 0F 4)

Reactor coolant activity airborne in the containment (%)

Noble gas 100

+

lodine 100 Activity released to the containment atmosphere from the reactor coolant Isotope Curses 1-131 1.05 x 10' I-132 1.05 x 10' I-133

-1.58 x 10' I-134 2.69 x 108 I-135 8.66 x 108 Xe-131m 5.05 x 108 Xe-133m 3.91 x 108 Xe-133 6.21 x 10' Xe-135m 1.09 x 108 Xe-135 1.66 x 108 Xe-138 1.49 x 108 Kr-85m 4.60 x 108 Kr-85 1,68 x 108 Kr-87 2.98 x 108 Kr-88 8.29 x los Reetreulation Leakage outside Containment Leak rate (gal / min, measured at 70*F) h Temperature of recirculating fluid (*F)

O to 0.5 h No recirculation 0.5 to 2.0 h 240 2.0 to 720 h

<212 Mass of water in the containment sump (1b) 6.77 x 10' Activity in the sump solution at time = 0

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l VEGP-FSAR-15 TABLE 15.6.5-4 (SHEET 4 or 4)

Isotope Cu r i,e_s I-131 4.9 x 10' 1-132 7.2 x 10' I-133 1.0 x 10' I-134 1.1 x 10' I-135 9.4 x 10' Volume of building served by the 525,000 auxiliary building emergency ventilation system (ft')

Auxiliary building emergency ventilation system parameters (for each of two trains)

Recirculation flow (ft'/ min) 13,950 Discharge flow (ft'/ min) 70 Filter iodine removal efficiency (%) 0 l

t 0413Y k

fM/ /$ W 2t VECP-FSAR-15 TABLE 15. 6.5-6 (SHEET 1 OF 2 )

DOSES P.ESULTING FROM A LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT W S_ite_B_oundary Dos _e g te 2 h)

Containment leakage Thyroid (rem) 50.6 Gamma body (rem) 1.5 Beta skin (rem) 0.7 Containment purge Thyroid (rem) 0.32 1

Camma body (rem) 5.6 x 10-'

Beta skin (rem) 5.1 x 10"'

Recirculation leakage Thyroid (rem)

M Total Thyroid (rem)

-;;.: f/, 9 Camma body (rem) 1.5 Beta skin (rem) 0.7 Low Population Zone (0 to 30 days)

Containment leakage Thyroid (rem) 57.2 Camma body (rem) 1.0 Beta skin (rem) 0.6 Containment purge Thyroid (rem) 0.13 Gamma body (rem) 2.3 x 10' Beta skin (rem) 2.0 x 10

Recirculation leakage Thyroid (rem) 0.0 Total Thyroid (rem)-

i Camma body (rem)

20. 2 (f6g 1.0 Beta skin (rem) 0.6 0413Y

(

_ =.

M e /9

1. 7 22 VECP-TSAR-15 TABLE 15.6.5-6 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

Contro,l_]t.com ( O to 30 days )

Containment leakage Thyroid (rem)-

26.0

. Gamma body (r'm) 4.9 e

Beta skin (rem) 66.4'A' Containment purge Thyroid (rem) 0.01 Gamma body (rem) 4.2 x 10**

Beta skin (rem) 8.8 x 10-*

Recirculation leakage i

Thyroid (rem)

^0 0,3 Total Thyroid (rem) 2: 1 26.5 3

t Gamma body (rem) 4.9 Beta skin (rem) 66.4'A' l-1 The operator will take appropriate action to ensure that a.

the resultant doses are within the limits established by General Design Criterion 19.

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Ndf 2.0 of L t.

VEOP-rSAR-15 g

TABLE 15.6.5-7 (SHEET 1 or 2)

ACTIVITY RELEASES TO THE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO A LOSS-Or-COOLANT ACCIDENT O to 2 h (C1)

Containment Containment Recirculation I so t op,e

,,,Le,a_kage Purae Leakage 7

1-131 3.76 x 10' 1.6 7.3-1.0 i 30' j

2.7 x 1 1-132 4.73 x 108

1. 6.

76 1.0 - 003 i 0Fx 108 1-133 7.54 x 108 2.4 f,r 4,4-

' 0 % 108

• 71 1-134 5.94 x 108 0.4 6./

1.'

- ;^'

4,4 A x 108 g 1-135 6.82 x 108 1.3 M Fx 10'

". { x 103.

(/. 5 J

(e. %

Kr-85m 3.87 x 10' O.1 NA 3.87 x 108 Kr-85 1.11 x los 0.3 NA 1.11 x 108 Kr-87 4.96 x 10' 5 x 10 4 NA 4.96 x 10' Mr-88 9.21 x 108 1.0 x 10-'

NA 9.21 x 10' Xe-131m 1.17 x 108 1.0 x 10-8 NA 1.17 x 10' Xe-133m 4.77 x 10' 6.0 x 10

NA 4.77 x 10' Xe-133 3.15 x 10' 9.4 NA 3.15 x 10' Xe-135m 1.24 x 10' 1.0 x 10"'

N/.

1.24 x 10' I

Xe-135 6.51 x 10' 2.5 x 10**

NA 6.51 x 108 l

Xe-138 5.40 x 10 8 2.0 x 10-8 NA 5.40 x 10' l

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?MCf 2l of LL VEOP-FSt.R-15 TABLE 15.6.5-7 (SHEET 2 0F 2) 2.29._720 h (Ci_),

Containment Recirculation I,soto_pe Leakage Leakage Total f.lh b x 108 h,5I 1 3 x 10' 1-131 1.18 x 10' f

1-132 2.38 x 108

1. 2 :: 10 9 2.y 7 - 2. ', " gx 108 g,7 2.^2 x 108 1-133 3.79 x 108

' j, o L 3,39 M x 108 I-134 6.2 x 108 j,4 &,4 g,y M 108 I-135 1.25 x 108

,g M 108 3x108 Kr-85m 1.02 x 10' NA 1.02 x 10' Kr-85 2.02 x 10' NA 2.02 x 10' Kr-87 2.50 x 108 NA 2.50 x 108 Kr-88 4.32 x 108 NA 4.32 x 108 Xe-131m 1.03 x 10' NA 1.03 x 10' Xe-133m' 1.14 x 10' NA 1.14 x 10' Xe-133 1.55 x 10' NA 1.55 x 108 Xe-135m 6.0 NA 6.0 Xe-135 3.62 x 10' NA 3.62 x 10' Xe-138 4.05 x 108 NA 4.0 x 108 t

l i

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$4 C f 2 2. of 22 l

VEGP-FSAR-15 temperature of the fuel.

It as conservatively assumed that the core has been operating at 100 percent for the entire burnup period.

The gap inventories are listed in table 15A-3.

The noble gas and iodine inventories released as a resuit of a fuel handling accident are listed in table 15A-4.

Iodine removal from the released fission product gas C.

takes place as the gas rises to the pool surface through the body of liquid in the spent fuel pool.

The extent of iodine removal is determined by mass transfer from the gas phase to the surrounding liquid and is controlled by the bubble diameter and contact time of the bubble in the solution.

The values used in the analysis result in a release of activity approximately a factor of 5 greater than anticipated.

The release of activity f rom the pool to the containment atmosphere is time dependent, and, consequently, there would be sufficient time for this activity to mix homogeneously in a significantly greater percent of the containment volume than_stsumed_tnJ he analysis.

Th; g us W au Q A M g D.

OF emergency filtration system charcoal filters pN'"DM#

Mhn:= t:

n

p:xt: 4th ;t 1:::t : ?? p:::=t-No CRroir HAS Perd i

fficient/.

This means a reduction in the lodine TAxe9 FoA THE8L concentrations and thus a reduction in the thyroid j( car 4 zDeery, doses at the exclusion area boundary and the outer boundary of the low population zone.

s E.

The containment purge exhaust system has charcoal adsorber units which filter any containment purge release.

However, no credit has been taken for its capability (90-percent efficiency, minimum) since these units are not specifically designed to Seismic Category 1 criteria.

It is expected that for any event which would produce a catastrophic failure of the charcoal adsorber unit to the extent that its filtering capability would be negated would also result in the 1

purge exhaust fan becoming inoperable. Therefore, failure within the purge exhaust system would terminate any high-volume release from the containment.

In fact, the purge exhaust f an is considerably more likely to be inoperable following any postulated event than the failure of a passive charccal adsorber unit.

Thus, although no credit in the analysis has been given for the normal purge exhaust filters, any release prior to containment isolation would be filtered. reducing the calculated releases by another factor of 10.

15.7.4-7

1 s

s s.

1 ATTACHMENT 2 TO ELV-03308 REVISED PAGES FOR ENCLOSURE 3 0F ELV-03182

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I

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t ENCLOSURE 3 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REY!$10N TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 4.7.6, 4.7.7, AND 4.9.12 INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION 1he proposed changes to the VEGP Technical Specifications would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Pace Intert Paae 3/4 7-1 and 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-and 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-17* and 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-17* and 3/4 7-18 3/4 9-15 and 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-15 and 3/4 9-16 8 3/4 7-4 8 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 9-3 B 3/4 9-3 l^

j Overleaf page containing no change E3-1

,o PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS py initiating, b.

from the control room, flow (FI-12191, FI-12192) through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the neater control circuit energized, At least once per 18 months or (1) af ter any structural maintenance c.

on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1)

Verifying that the filtration system satisfies the in place testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 99.35%

filter retention while operating the system at a flow rate of 19,000 cfm 110% and performing the following tests:

(a) A visual inspection of the control room emergency filtration system shall be made before each 00P test or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with Sec-tion 5 of ANSI N510-1980.

(b) An in place 00P test for the HEPA filtet5 shall be performed in accordance with Section 10 of ANSI N510-1980.

(c) A charcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous halo-genated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with Section 12 of ANSI N510-1980.

2)

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Section 13 of ANSI H510-1980 meets the laboratory testing cri-terion of greater than or equal to 99.8% when tested _with_ methyl iodide at 30*C and 70% relative humidity 6N'4ccoR0de/c/ w/@ 457/4 m

3)

Verifying a system flow rate of 19,000 cfm 1 10% during M D operation when tested in accordance with Section 8 of ANSI N510-1980.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, d.

within 31 days af ter removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Section 13 of ANSI H510-1980 meets the laboratory testing criterion of greater than or equal to 99.8% when tested with meth g ide at 30*C and 70% relative humidit agxpAacE w/rw ASTM p.5Bo3-89 At least once per 18 months by' h

e.

1)

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, charcoal adsorber banks and cooling coil is less than 7.1 inches Vater Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 19,000 cfm 1 10%;

2)

Verifying that on a Control Room Isolation Test Signal, the sys-tem automatically witches into an emergency mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adscrber banks; v0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 7-15

<r y

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7:7 PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2)

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Section 13 of ANSI N510-1980 meets the laboratory testing cri-terion of greater than or equal to when tested with methyl iodide at 30'C and relat_ivehumidit4-90, o g_

95 yJ,,

3)

Verifying a system flow r Wof 15,500 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with Section 8 of (jq A ccozomcc wtrk As7d 03803.g9 ANSI N510-1980.

c.

Af ter every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of c'harcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Section 13 of ANSI H510-1980 meets the laboratory testing criterie of greater than or equal to when tested _ with methyl iodid; et 30'C and ?M-relativehumidityj 76,gp, d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1)

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 15,500 cfm i 10%.

2)

Verifying that the system starts on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, 3)

Verifying that the system maintains the Piping Penetration Fil-tration Exhaust Unit Room at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/4 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere (PDI-2550, PDI-2551), and

,,gg g'fy 4)

Verifying that the heaters dissipate 00 i ' kW when tested in accordance with Section 14 of ANSI H510-1980. %

e.

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99.95% of the DOP when they are tested in place in accordance with Section 10 of ANSI N510-1980 while operat','.ig the system at a flow rate of 15,500 cfm i 10%.

• Unt!' rn':rt f:1 hub;-th; f:urth r: feeling ::t:;; cf Unit 1 =d at!'

t

rt f ikwing th; =:=d r:fuelh; nt:g: ;f Unit 2 thh :p::i"=the 91' r=d = f:1hu::

'h: =rnill== ny 5: :=dat;d by =rifyi.; th:t Sut /

=;=i ty b =f'ht =t t: n h t:fr th: r:hth: 5 =idit; :' th:

f r:trer t5 =;h th: l t=: :t 70 pu:=t = h:; ada d;; iga uni; :=idat :=di-i t! =:

h= t= t:d ia-u n rd n u.;ith en tica 14 ;f A;G ;G 0 1000.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 7-18 Amendment No.

37 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.

17 (Unit 2)

9 REFUELING OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1)

Verifying that the cleanup systes satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 99.0% filter retention while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm

• 10%, (FI-12551, FI-12552) and performing the following tests; (a) A visual inspection of the Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System shall be made before each DOP test or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with Section 5 of ANSI N510-1980.

(b) An in place DOP test for the HEPA filters shall be per-formed in accordance with Section 10 of ANSI N510-1980, (c) A charcoal adsorber section leak test with a gaseous l

halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with Section 12 of ANSI N510-1980.

2)

Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory 1

analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Section 13 of ANSI N510-1980, meets the laboratorv 90 testing criteria of greater than or equal to Mwhen tested L.O*/,

with methyl todide at 30'C and humiditygand i

3)

Verifying a system flow rate of 5000 cfm 2 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with Section_8 of_

ANSI N510-l'80' liiinuci wdy ASTM D38o3-84

[c.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying, within 31 days af ter removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-i sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Section 13 of ANSI N510-1980 meets the laboratory testing criteria of greater than i

or equal to when tested with methyl iodide at 30'C and 3M relative humidityg 9o, og g,g d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1 1)

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 5000 cfm t 10%,

2)

Verifying that on a High Radiation test signal, the system automatically starts (unless already operating) and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber i

banks, i

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 9-15

.-m

.m

e,

- - _ =

Heaters are provided to ensure that tha relative ptANT SYST(MS humidity of the airstream entering the adsorbers does not exceed 70 percent.

)

BASES Verification of heater powor dissipation (KW) for surveillance testing is

.CjNTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (Continued) referenced to 460 volts.

i

~ moisture on the adsorbers and NEPA filters.

T' e OPERABILITY of this system in h

conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radia-tion exposure to personr.el occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Past 50.

ANSI N510-1980 will b_e used _as _a prccedural guide for surveillance ter. ting.

Ad h$TM D3$03 8Q 3/4.7.7 PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION ANO EXHAUST SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Piping Penetration Area Filtration and Exhaust System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the containment mechani-cal penetration rooms and ECCS equipment within the pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment.

Operation of the system with the heater control circuit energized for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is suf ficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.4 The operation of this system and the resultant effect on

{willbeusedasaproceduralguideforsurveillancetesting.offsite cosage calc ANSI N510-1980 Aw3 rTM D 3803*A A

^

^W Heaters are not required s b Nisorber testing is based on methyl m

i i

sairb penetratton, and safety for controlling the

(

relative humidity of the analysis Mted decxmtamination airstream through the efficiency used for dose analyses is adsorbers following a based m no bumMity cnttrols LOCH since no credit is (i.e. Inside crmtainment) consistent taken for heaters in the with regulatory Guide 1.52.

dose analyses.

However,

^

^

the heaters arc available during accidert conditions e

as defense-in-depth.

Verification of heater l

power dissipation (KW) for surveillance testing is referenced to 460 volts.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-4

?

N V ol; a.s

,y

-REFUELING OPERATIONS'

!BASESL 3/4.9.9 CONTAllMENT-VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERA 8ILITY of this system ensures--that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment.

The OPERA 8 U V of-this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive astertai /roa the containment atmosphero to the environment.-

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REALTOR VESSEL end STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap 4:Gvity i

taleased from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.

The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the' safety analysis.

3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING POST ACCIDENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

.The operability requirements on the Fuel Handling Building-Post-Accident

~

Ventilation Systems-are intended to ensure-that this equipment will-be available in the event that a fuel handling accident results-in the release of *adioactive

- material from an irradiated fuel assembly.

Although no credit is taken for the operation of this equipment in the safety analyses, its availability will

-serve as defense-in-depth in the event of'a fuel handling accident in the

~

fuel-handling building.- ANSI N510-1980 fwill be used as a procedural guide for surveillancetesting.4

[.

c n

Varification of heater

' powar dissipation (KW) for curveillance testing is roforenced to.460 volts.--

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4-9-3

.