CLI-88-02, Informs of Encl Commission 880428 Order CLI-88-02,lifting Restrictions Placed on Employment for All Individuals Except Jr Floyd,Per Commission Order CLI-85-09.Update of Status of Various Conditions of Operations Requested
| ML20195E449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1988 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| CLI-85-09, CLI-85-9, CLI-88-02, CLI-88-2, NUDOCS 8806240052 | |
| Download: ML20195E449 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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-l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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Docket No. 50-320 16 W Mr. Henry D. Hukill, Vice President and Director - TMI-2 GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Dear Mr. Hukill:
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SUBJECT:
COMMISSION TMI LEAK RATE HEARING DECISION This letter is to inform you of the Comission's April 28, 1988 decision in the matter of the inquiry into Three Mile Island Unit 2 leak rate falsification. A copy of Memorandun and Order CLI-88-02 is enclosed for your information.
Commission Order CLI-85-9 permitted THI-1 to resume operation subject to the conditions imposed in the restart proceeding.
Harold R.-Denton's letter of October 2,1985 authorizing restart of TMI-1 forwarded a listing of those j
conditions to you. Condition No. (1)(s) pl6.ed restrictions on employment of l
certain individuals at TMI-1 who were in the TMI-2 operating crew prior to the accident. The Comission subsequently conducted a separate hearing to develop the facts surroundina falsification of reactor coolant leak rate data at TMI-2 in order to detennine what action, if any, should be taken. The Board found that:
(1) virtually all Operations Department personnel worked under an erroneous interpretation of the leak rate technical specifications; (2) there was nearly unanimous lack of confidence in the computer-calculated test results, although the tests were routinely submitted by Control Room Operators and approved by Shift Foremen exhibiting "remarkably unprofessional" conduct; and (3) fifty percent of the tests were discarded, with the knowledge of the Control Room Operators Shif t Foremen, Shift Supervisors, Supervisors of Operations t.nd Superintendent of Technical Support.
8806240052 080616 PDR ADOCK 05000320 P
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Fr. H. D. Hukill.
The Corsnission's decision has been to lift the subject condition for all individuals with the exception of James R. Floyd (see page 7 of the enclosed Memorandum and Order). Although employment of other pre-accident Unit 2 employees identified in the Memorandum and 0 der at Unit I no longer requires specific NRC approval, the staff requests to be kept informed of such assigr-n,ents.
The staff would also like an update of the status of the various conditions of operations listed in the attachment to Mr. Denton's October 2,1985 letter.
Sincerely.
N oh 'F. Stolz, Director Pro ect Directorate I isien of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Memorandum and Order CLI-88-02 cc w/ enclosure:
See next pogt
30-32.o Mr. H. D. Hukill,
The Comission's decision has been to lift the subject condition for all individuals with the exception of James R. Floyd (see page 7 of the enclosed Mer.orandumandOrder). Although eniploynent of other pre-accident Unit 2 en.ployees identified in the Memorandum and Order at Unit I no longer requires specific NRC approval, the staff requests to be kept inforned of such assign-nents. The staff would also like an update of-the status of the various conditions of operations listed in the attachment to Mr. Denton's October 2,1985 letter.
Sincerely,
- Muh 31 cum ag
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John F. Stolz, Director Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regt lation
Enclosure:
Femorandum and Order CLI-88-02 cc w/ enclosure:
See next page DIS _TRIBUTION ibocket Filer R. Hernan NRC8'LUal'PDRs OGC S. Varga E. Jordan B. Boger B. Grimes S. Norris ACRS(10)
Gray File LA:PDI FM:PDI-4 Y D:P 4
Sh RHernan:bd JStoiz 06/15/88 06/}[/88 06/4/88
Mr. F. R. Standerfer Three Mile Island Nuclear Station GPU Nuclear Corporation Unit No. 2 cc:
Frank Lynch, Editorial Regional Administrator, Region I The Patriot U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 812 Market Street 475 Allendale Road Harrisburg, PA 17105 King of Prussia, PA 19406 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Robert B. Borsum Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Babcock & Wilecx 433 Orlando Avenue Nuclear Power Division Stata College, PA 16801 Suite 525 1700 Rockville Pike Roc kville,110 20852 Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire Michael Churchill, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts, anc Trowbridge PILCOP 2300 N Street, N.W.
1315 Walnut Street Washington, DC 20037 Suite 1632 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Secretary Marvin 1. Lewis U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission 7801 Roosevelt 51vd. #62 Washington, DC 20555 Philadelphia, PA 19152 Sally S. Klein, Chairperson Jane Lee Dauphin County Ecard of Commissioners 163 Valley Road Dauphin County Courthouse Etters, PA 17319 Front and Market Streets Harrisburg, PA 17101 Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Bureau of Raciation Protection Advoedte Departnent of Environmental Rescurces Department of Justice P. O. Box 206'J Strawberry Square, 14th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Harrisburg, PA 17127 Ad Crable lir. Edwin Kinter Lancaster New Era Executive Vice President 8 West King Street GPU Nuclear Corporation Lancaster, PA 17601 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, NJ 07054 U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Environmental Prot. Agency P. O. Box 88 Region III Office Middletown, PA 17057 Attn: EIS Coordinator CurtisBuilding(SixthFloor)
David J. McGoff 6th and Walnut Streets Office of LWR Safety and Technology Philedelphia, PA 19106 NE-23 U.S. Departrent of Energy Washington, DC 20545
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Mr. F. R. Standerfer Three Mile Island Nuclear Station GPU Nuclear Corporation Unit No. 2 cc:
T. F. Demmitt R. E. Rooan GPU Nuclear Corporation GPU Nucliar Corporation W. E. Potts S. Levin GPU Nuclear Corporation GPU Nuclear Corporation J. J. Byrne A. W. Miller GPU Nuclear Corporation GPU Nuclear Corporation l
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NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION 16 WR 28 P3 41 COMMISSIONERS:
f0CN5IN!'IN' I.
Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman BR t.NW Thomas M. Roberts Frederick M. Bernthal Kenneth M. Carr l
Kenneth C. Rogers SERVED APR 291988 l
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in the Matter of
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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND )
Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA FALSI-
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FICATION
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLi-88-02 in an order issued in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Unit 1 (TMI-1) Restart proteeoing, the Commission stated that it would institute a separate proceeding to consider what action should be taken concerning indiviavals possibly involved in falsification of reactor coolant system leak rates at Unit 2, and imposed the following condition on the Licensee:
(1) No pre-accident TMI-2 operator, shift supervisor, shift foreman, or any other individual both in the operating crew and on shift for training as a licensed operator at TMI-2 prior to the accident shall be employed at TMI-1 in a responsible management or operational position, without specific Commission approval.
"Operational position" as used here includes any position involving actual operation of the plant, the direction or supervision of operators, or independent oversight of operations.
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This condition shall also apply to the pre-accident Vice President, Generation, TMI-2 Station Manager, TMI-2 Supervisor of Technical Support (from January 1977 to November 1978), TMI-2 Superintendent of Technical Support (from December 1978 to the accident), and TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations.
This condition shall not apply to Michael Ross, and Brian Mahler may continue in his present position consistent with this condition.
Metropolitan Edisen Co.
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),
CLl-85-2, 21 NRC 282, 341-2.
The Commission stated that the purpose of the separate hearing was to develop the facts surrounding the leak rate cata falsification in sufficient detall to determine whether any individual participated in, or knew of,or condoned, or by dereliction or culpable neglect allowed the leak rate falsifications at TMI-2, 21 NRC at 305.
The Order and Notice of Hearing initiating that separate proceeding specified that the hearing wcs to be conducted in a legislative format designed solely to gather information, specified the procedures to govern the hearing,
and loentified the steps to be taken after the Presiding Board issued a recommended decislors setting forth the facts, in order for the Commission to determine what action. If any, should be taken.
CLl-85-19, 22 NRC 877.
After a hearing, totaling 33 hearing days and over 5,000 transcript pages, the Presiding Board issued its Recommended Decision on May 21, 1987.
It addressed each of the specific issues which the Commission, in CLI-85-19, had directed the Board to consider.
In sum, the Board found, first, that virtually all Operations Department personnel worked under an erroneous interpretation of the leak rate technical specifications.
% hen this improper interpretation was discovered by an NRC Inspector in October 1978, the licensee took Inadequate corrective actions to instruct personnel on proper leak rate surveillance testing practices.
Second, the Board found that there was a nearly unanimous lack of confidence in the l
computer-calculated test results, yet the tests were routinely submitted by Control Room Operators (CROs) and approved by Shift Foremen 1
exhibiting "remarkably unprofessional" conduct.
While operators felt a general sense of pressure to keep the plant on line, they did not feel j
that adverse actions would be taken against them if they failed to obtain "good" test results.
Third, the Board found that fifty percent or more
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of the tests were discarded, with the knowledge of the CRO's, Shift Foremen, Shift Supervisors. Supervisor of Operations and Superintendent of Technical Support. 1/
In addition, the Board found that many operators manipulated tests or falsified test
- results, that Shift Supervisors who cid not persorially participate in the tests were guilty of "culpable neglect" in falling to ensure that the performance of leak rate surveillance tests followed applicable technical specifications and administrative procedures, and that the Supervisor of Operations for Unit 2, James R. Floyd, knew about the difficulties the operators were having with the leak rate surveillance tests and was also guilty of 1/
There were two Superintendents of Technical Support from January 1977 until the accident at TMI-2.
This statement refers to the Superintendent of Technical Support from January 1977 until December 1978.
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. culpable neglect.
Finally, the Board found that three other members of TMI-2 management were also guilty of culpable neglect. 2/
After the issuance of that Recommenced Decision, the NRC staff, as instructed by the Commission in CLI-85-19, forwarded to the Commission its recommendations as to what action, if any, should be taken, including "whether the Commission should remove the condition imposed in the TMI-1 restart proceeding barring certain individuals from certain positions at TMi-1."
22 NRC at 883, in sum, the NRC ' staff recommended that no further enforcement action be taken against the facility licensee or the 35 individuals formerly at TMI-2 regarding leak rate surveillance testing irregularities at that facility.
The staff also recommended that the conditieri imposed in the TMI-1 restart proceeding should be lifted as to all indivlouals except the pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, about wnom current questions as to suitability for licensta activities rerr.alnea, and those indivicuals employed in the TMI-2 Site Operations Departrrent as of July 9,1987, about whom allegations of sleeping while on duty at TMI-2 had recently been raised.
The Commission has reviewed the Presiding Board's Recommended Decision and the record before the Board.
Based on that review, we conclude that the Presiding Board's finoings are supported by the record.
We have also considered the Staff's recommendations, and have determined, for the following reasons, that the TMI-1 restart condition 2/
The Superintendent of Unit 2 and both Superintendents of Technical Support referred to in n.1, supra.
should be rescinded to remove the condition for Individuals other than the pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations.
The Board findings Indicate that virtually all Operations Department personnel worked under an erroneous interpretation of the leak rate technical specification and most of the personnel had some degree of culpability regarding leak rate surveillance testing irregularities or falsification.
The performance of 10 pre-t.ccident Individuals employed as licensed operators in 1965, as documented in the April 1, 1986 staff report to the Commission, appears to demonstrate that they now can be relled upon to conform with procedural and regulatory requirements. The current performance of the remaining 25 Individuals, 24 of whom were not licensed at the time of the joint Ol/NRR investigation, has not been evaluated in the same detall, or in some cases, at all. 3,/ However, there are other considerations which justify lifting the TMI-1 restart condition at this time on all indiviouais except the pre-accioent TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations.
The importance of the leak rate surveillance testing issue has certainly been driven home for those involved at TMI.
Improvements since the TMI-2 accident in the measurement procecures, techniques.
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Thirty-five individuals are subject to the TMl-1 restart condition No.1
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which bars them from certain positions at TMI-1.
The Board essentially exonerated 9 of the 35 Individuals, including 3 Individuals who were subjects of the joint Ol/NRR investigation.
Of the remaining 26, the staff conducted interviews with the supervisors of those Individuals who are currently employed by licensees in licensed activities (GPU Nuclear and one by Snuthern Californla Edison Co.)
No staff evaluation has, been made or the current performance of the remaining Individuals.
calculational methods,
and a clear understanding of the technical specification requirements establish a significantly improved basis for correctl" performing this routine task.
GPU Nuclear has made significant and substantial changes in management and operating pra:tices since the accident at TMI-2 which are reflected in high SALP evaluations.
Additionally, all individuals to be used in a licensed operator position woulo be subject to the normal licensing process required by the NRC regulations.
Apart from the record of this proceeding, the steff proposes to continue the restriction on employment for individuals who were a part of the TMI-2 Operations Department on July 9, 1987, on the basis of more recent allegations of steeping on duty at TMI-2. The Commission believes that a decision whether to lift the TMI-1 restart condition should be made witho >t regard to the ongoing investigation of new allegations unrelated to leak rate testing.
To continue the license restriction for rr.atters that did not form its basis work an unfairness against these individuals, particu-larly since the staff has ample enforcement authority to obtain additional information or to protect the public health and safety if the evidence
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warrants such action.
See, ea,10 CFR 55 2.202 and 50.54(f).
As for Mr. Floyd, the Presiding Board concluded that he bore greater responsibility for what went wrong with leak rate surveillance tests at TMI-2 than any other single Individual.
Furthermore, the Board found that Mr. Floyd was not fully forthcoming and candid before the Board and noted many confilets between Mr. Flo,*."s testimony and the
7 evidence in the record.
Moreover, Mr. Floya has been convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for making material false statements.
As noted in the staff's recommen-dations, all of this reasonably calls into question Mr. Floyd's present suitability for duty in connection with NRC licensed activities.
Thus,in the case of Mr. Floyd, the Commission does not find sufficient reason to remove the TMI-1 restart condition.
Mr. Floyd' does not currrently hold a position at a licenseo facility.
We need not reach today the question of whether Mr.
Floyd should be prohibited from a management or
operational position" at any other licensed facility.
Gi~ve'n the time that has passed and the fact that the leak rate surveillance testing irregularities directly flowed from management shortcomitigs in training and procedu res, therc is no clear reason to continue the restriction in restart concition No.1 for all individuals except for the pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, James R.
Floyd.
Accoralngly, the Commission has decided to lift the TMI-1 restart condition as it applies to all ihose except James R. Floyd, and to revise TMI-1 restart condition No.1 in CLl-85-02, 21 NRC 282, at 341-42 to read:
The pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, James R. Floyd, shall not be employed at TMl-1 In a responsible management or operational position without specific NRC approval.
"Operational Posi-
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tion" as used here includes any position involving actual operation of the plant, the direction or supervision of ope rations,
or independent oversight of operations.
p i
OR TfE COMMISSIONSI 8
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amuel qw
) Secretar,
? r***6 Cated at Rockville, MD this]g? day of April,1988 l
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Commissioner Carr was not present for the affirmation of this Order, if f
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he had been present he would have approved it.
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