LER-2010-014, For Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inadequate Planning Resulting in Extended Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 4822010014R00 - NRC Website |
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text
W LF CREEK
'NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Russell A. Smith Plant Manager February 4, 2011 WO 11-0006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2010-014-00, "Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inadequate Planning Resulting in Extended Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability" Gentlemen:
During planned maintenance on the Train 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG), Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation was unable to return the EDG to operable status within the seven-day completion time of Technical Specification 3.8.1.
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) to document this condition.
This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4156, or Mr. Gautam Sen at (620) 364-4175.
Sincerely, Russell A. Smith RAS/rlt Enclosure cc:
E. E. Collins Jr (NRC) w/e G. B. Miller (NRC) w/e B. K. Singal (NRC) w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC) w/e PO. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 10-2010)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52),
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
If a means used to (See reverse for required number of impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required digits/characters for each block) to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000 482 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inadequate Planning Resulting in Extended Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER 1
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONT SEQUENTIALAREV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER S
DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL R MONTH DAY YEAR 0
HNUMBER N.105000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 06 2010 2010 014 00 02 04 2011 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) ol 20.2201(b)
[l 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
Mode 1 El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[1 73.71 (a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100%
[1 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[I OTHER [I 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
Gautam Sen, Manager Regulatory Affairs (620) 364-4175CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONEN MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX T
FACTURER TO EPIX A
EK DG Fairbanks y
A_
Morse
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15.SEXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE DBSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On December 6, 2010, at 0948 Central Standard Time (CST), Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) entered Mode 3 in accordance with Required Action H.1 of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating." The TS required shutdown was due to inoperability of the Train 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG), which was removed from service on November 29, 2010, for planned maintenance.
The cause of the TS required shutdown of WCGS was the inability to return the EDG to operable status within the seven-day completion time of Required Action B.4.2.2 of TS 3.8.1.
The extended out-of-service time was due to excessive emergent work activities, including a drop in peak firing pressure in one cylinder during the surveillance run of the EDG.
The Command and Control structure used for seven-day TSEOs was changed to improve management of work delays and effectively control emergent work.
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE I SEQUENTIAL I
REV WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000 482 YEAR NUMBER N
NO.
2 OF 3
1 1 2010
-- 014--
00 PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT Mode 1 100% power
EVENT DESCRIPTION
At 0500 Central Standard Time (CST) on November 29, 2010, the Train 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) [EllS Code: EK-DG] was removed from service for a scheduled seven-day Technical Specification Equipment Outage (TSEO) in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 Condition B. The Wolf Creek Generating Station EDGs are Fairbanks Morse Pielstick Model 2.5 Diesel Generators. The scope of the TSEO included removal and replacement of the Jacket Water heat exchanger [EIIS Code: LB-HX] and preventative maintenance activities.
During the TSEO, a number of delays occurred and a high number of emergent work activities impacted the schedule. On December 6, 2010, the final surveillance run for declaring the Train 'A' EDG operable was being conducted per procedure STS KJ-01 5A, "Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading Of EDG NE01." During the surveillance run, engine analysis identified that the peak firing pressure for cylinder No. 12 was almost 500 psig less than the data collected during the maintenance run performed on December 5, 2010. This condition occurred with approximately three hours left until the Allowed Outage Time for the TSEO was exceeded. It was determined that the condition could not be fixed within the remaining time in the TSEO.
On December 6, 2010, at 0418 CST, a shutdown of the reactor was commenced. Required Action H.1 of TS 3.8.1 was entered on December 6, 2010, at 0500 CST. As a result, Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) entered Mode 3 on December 6, 2010, at 0948 CST.
The retaining bolt for the fuel injector pump timing adjustment lock plate on the No. 12 cylinder had backed out due to a loose/deformed keeper plate. This affected the timing of the injector pump and caused the reduction in the cylinder pressure. The remaining cylinders were inspected and no other problems were found.
Work on the Train 'A' EDG was completed and the EDG was returned to operable status on December 7, 2010 at 0100 CST. WCGS returned to Mode 1 on December 8, 2010 at 1848 CST.
AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL I
REV WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000 482
.. YEAR NUMBER NO.
3 OF 3
1 2010
-- 014 00 BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) requires reporting "the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications." A shutdown of the plant was completed per TS 3.8.1 when Mode 3 was entered on December 6, 2010. Additionally, a 4-hour notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) when the plant shutdown was initiated on December 6, 2010.
ROOT CAUSE The cause of the plant shutdown was an excessive number of emergent work items occurred during the Train 'A' EDG TSEO. Each individual emergent work activity could have been managed within the allowed outage time, but the number and sequence of discovery was such that the cumulative effect of these activities precluded EDG recovery within the allowed out-of-service time. As a result, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation was unable to restore the Train 'A' EDG within the allowed seven-day completion time of Required Action B.4.2.2 of TS 3.8.1.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Prior to commencing the 'B' EDG TSEO, corrective actions included a re-evaluation of work package content, engineering dispositions, contingencies and workgroup preparations.
Additionally, the Command and Control structure used for seven-day TSEOs was changed to improve management of work delays and effectively control emergent work. These actions ensured that a similar TSEO for the Train 'B' EDG in January 2011 was successfully completed.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event is of low safety significance. The Train 'B' EDG, the off-site diesel gensets used for peak loading located at the Sharpe Station, and offsite power were available during the inoperability of the Train 'A' EDG.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE/PREVIOUS EVENTS LER 2010-011-00 details the completion of a required Technical Specification shutdown due to water leakage from a buried portion of the Train 'A' Essential Service Water (ESW) system [EllS Code: BI]. Subsequent Engineering evaluation of the through-wall leak concluded that the ESW system was capable of performing its design safety function.
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| 05000482/LER-2010-001, For Wolf Creek, Regarding Automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable During Startup in Mode 1 | For Wolf Creek, Regarding Automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable During Startup in Mode 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-002, Regarding Turbine Trip Function of Reactor Trip P-4 Interlock Defeated During Entry Into and in Mode 3 | Regarding Turbine Trip Function of Reactor Trip P-4 Interlock Defeated During Entry Into and in Mode 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-003, For Wolf Creek Regarding Post Fire Safe Shutdown Issue with the B Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Control Circuitry | For Wolf Creek Regarding Post Fire Safe Shutdown Issue with the B Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Control Circuitry | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-004, Regarding Positive Reactivity Addition in Mode 2 with One Source Range Neutron Flux Channel Inoperable | Regarding Positive Reactivity Addition in Mode 2 with One Source Range Neutron Flux Channel Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-005, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level from Trip of Main Feedwater Pump | Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level from Trip of Main Feedwater Pump | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-006, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Trip of Main Feedwater Pump | Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Trip of Main Feedwater Pump | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-007, For Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regarding Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operation Issues | For Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regarding Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operation Issues | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-008, Regarding Personnel Error Results in Missing High Security Key | Regarding Personnel Error Results in Missing High Security Key | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-009, For Wolf Creek Regarding Pressurizer Level Higher than Assumed in the Inadvertent Operation of ECCS Analysis | For Wolf Creek Regarding Pressurizer Level Higher than Assumed in the Inadvertent Operation of ECCS Analysis | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-010, Regarding Inadequate Analysis Results in a Component Cooling Water Train to Be Declared Inoperable | Regarding Inadequate Analysis Results in a Component Cooling Water Train to Be Declared Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-012, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Operators Inability to Control Steam Generator Level Oscillations at Low Power | Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Operators Inability to Control Steam Generator Level Oscillations at Low Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-013, Regarding Potential Safe Shutdown Unanalyzed Condition Identified During Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis | Regarding Potential Safe Shutdown Unanalyzed Condition Identified During Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2010-014, For Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inadequate Planning Resulting in Extended Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability | For Wolf Creek Generating Station, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inadequate Planning Resulting in Extended Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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