Letter Sequence Request |
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TAC:MD7791, Control Room Habitability, Revise Control Room Habitability Actions to Address Lessons Learned from TSTF-448 Implementation (Approved, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARWO 08-0001, Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2008-01-15015 January 2008 Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Project stage: Request PNO-IV-08-001, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Company, Unplanned Shutdown Greater than 72 Hours Due to Emergency Core Cooling System Voiding (Event Notification 43895)2008-01-15015 January 2008 PNO-IV-08-001, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Company, Unplanned Shutdown Greater than 72 Hours Due to Emergency Core Cooling System Voiding (Event Notification 43895) Project stage: Request 05000482/LER-2008-006, Entry Into Mode 4 Without an Operable Containment Spray System2008-07-0303 July 2008 Entry Into Mode 4 Without an Operable Containment Spray System Project stage: Request ML0826820472008-09-29029 September 2008 Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications in Accordance with TSTF-448, Control Room Envelope Habitability, Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Project stage: RAI ET 08-0048, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Revision to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 448, Revision 32008-10-27027 October 2008 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Revision to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 448, Revision 3 Project stage: Response to RAI ML0900800482008-12-22022 December 2008 Amendment Request-Control Room Habitability - License Conditions Project stage: Other ML0833908332008-12-24024 December 2008 Issuance of Amendment No. 179, Revise Technical Specifications Related to Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-448, Revision 3 Project stage: Approval 2008-12-22
[Table View] |
LER-2008-006, Entry Into Mode 4 Without an Operable Containment Spray System |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
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| 4822008006R00 - NRC Website |
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text
W0LF CREEK
'NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Stephen E. Hedges Vice President Oversight July 3, 2008 WM 08-0016 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2008-006&00, Entry Into Mode 4 Without An Operable Containment Spray System Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2008-006-00 is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) regarding a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Commitments made by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in the enclosed LER are identified in the Attachment to this letter.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4190, or Mr.
Richard D. Flannigan at (620) 364-4117.
Sincerely, E. Hedges SEH/rlt Attachment Enclosure cc:
E. E. Collins (NRC), w/a, w/e V. G. Gaddy (NRC), w/a, w/e B. K. Singal (NRC), w/a, w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/a, w/e P.O. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET
Attachment to WM-08-0016 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in this document. Any other statements in this letter are provided for information purposes and are not considered regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr.
Richard Flannigan, Manager Regulatory Affairs at Wolf Creek Generating Station, (620) 364-4117.
REGULATORY COMMITMENT DUE DATE A method for reviewing Open Work Orders against Technical Specification related systems before making an Operability December 15, 2008 Determination will be put in procedure AP 22D-001, "Refueling Outage Planning and Implementation."
F, W A P1:11 z"O Vl"-.ý-'
4Vk
?
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)
, the NRC may (See reverse for required number of not conduct or sponsor; and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for each block) information collection.
- 3. PAGE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION
,. 05000 482 1
OF 3
- 4. TITLE Entry into Mode 4 without an operable containment spray system
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEIENIL RVFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACIL NUMBER NO.,
05000 0 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05 07 2008 2008 006 00 07 03 2008 J05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 4 E] 20.2201(b)
[J 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
E] 20.2201(d)
[] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
E] 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
E) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(iii).
E 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[]
50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[] 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71 (a)(4) 000 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[1 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[
73.71 (a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) fl 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER Jj 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY:
The plant entered Mode 4 without confirming that the containment spray system was operable. This is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
ROOT CAUSE:
The Sub Work Order was miscoded as a Mode 7 restraint instead of a Mode 4 restraint. The miscoding led to the missed operability determination when the 'B' train containment spray system was returned to service.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A method for reviewing Open Work Orders against Technical Specification related systems before making an Operability Determination will be developed. This action shall be incorporated in procedure AP 22D-001, "Refueling Outage Planning and Implementation," by 12/15/08.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance of this event was low. Nuclear safety had the potential for being affected if the VT-2 examination had identified any flaws. The successful completion of the surveillance tests confirmed the containment spray system would perform its safety function per the license design basis. There was no affect to plant reliability, personnel safety, radiological safety, or environmental safety.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE/PREVIOUS EVENTS:
None.
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| 05000482/LER-2008-001, Regarding Completion of a Technical Specification Required Shutdown | Regarding Completion of a Technical Specification Required Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-002, Regarding Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time Exceeded Due to Room Cooler Leak | Regarding Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time Exceeded Due to Room Cooler Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-003, Re Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Steam Generator Level | Re Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Steam Generator Level | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-004, Regarding Loss of Offsite Power Event When the Reactor Was De-fueled | Regarding Loss of Offsite Power Event When the Reactor Was De-fueled | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-005, Re Unanalyzed Condition Discovered Due to Improperly Installed Fuse in Class 1 E Electrical Equipment Room Cooler | Re Unanalyzed Condition Discovered Due to Improperly Installed Fuse in Class 1 E Electrical Equipment Room Cooler | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-006, Entry Into Mode 4 Without an Operable Containment Spray System | Entry Into Mode 4 Without an Operable Containment Spray System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-007, Regarding Two Residual Heat Removal Trains Inoperable in Mode 3 Due to Check Valve Leakage | Regarding Two Residual Heat Removal Trains Inoperable in Mode 3 Due to Check Valve Leakage | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-008, Regarding Potential for Residual Heat Removal Trains to Be Inoperable During Mode Change | Regarding Potential for Residual Heat Removal Trains to Be Inoperable During Mode Change | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000482/LER-2008-009, Inadequate Compensatory Actions for a Fire Area | Inadequate Compensatory Actions for a Fire Area | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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