05000410/LER-2019-001, High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable
| ML20014D450 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2019 |
| From: | Morrow G Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NMP2L2720 LER 2019-001-00 | |
| Download: ML20014D450 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4102019001R00 - NRC Website | |
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Exelon Gen.eration@
NMP2l2720 December 31, 2019 U. $. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating LiGense No. NPF-69 Docket No. 50--41 O 10 CFR 50.73
Subject:
NMP2 Licensee Event Rep-ort 20i9-001, High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable In accordance with the.-reporting requirements contained In 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v}(D), please find enclosed NMP2 Licensee Event Report 2019~001, High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in th~ letter.
Should you have any questlons*regarding the information in ~his submittal, *please contact Brandon Shultz, Site R~ulatory AssuranQe Manager, at (315) 349-7012.
Glen K. Morrow Dir~ctor Organizational Performance and Regulatory, Nine Mile* Point Nuclear Statlqn Exelon Generation Company, LLC GKM/RMD Enclosure; NMP2 Licensee Event Report 2019-00'1-, High Pressu~~ Core Spray Declared Inoperable cc:
NRC Regional Adm.lnlstrator, Region I NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager
Enclosure NMP2 Ucensee Event Report 2019-001, High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69
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- 3. PAGE Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 05000410 1 OF 5
- 4. TITLE High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable
- 6. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NA>.£ DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR l'AJMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR NIA NIA FACIUTY NAAE DOCKET NUMBER 11 01 2019 2019 - 001
. 00 12 31 2019 NIA NIA
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check 111/ that apply)
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L DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDffiONS:
Prior to the event, NMP2 was operating at rated reactor power.
B. EVENT:
At 03:16 on November 1, 2019, NMP2 received Control Room Annunciation for HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE and INOP Status Light Indication for TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL.
Operators attempted to close 2CSH*MOV105, HPCS Minimum Flow Valve, to secure draining Condensate Storage Tanks (CST's) to Suppression Pool. However, the valve Immediately re-opened. At that time, the HPCS pump suction was swapped from Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) to Suppression Pool per N2-0P-33 H.6.0. As a result, Operations declared the HPCS System inoperable. The 04:03, the failed 24VDC Power Supply E22A-PS1 was identified. It was then replaced at 13:30.
At 15:55, 2CSH*MOV105, the HPCS Dlesel, and HPCS were declared OPERABLE.
Subsequently, T.S. 3.6.1.3 Condition C.1, T.S. 3.8.1, and T.S. 3.5.1 Condition B were exited.
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was unaffected by the HPCS System lnoperabllity at NMP2.
Operations performed the ENS notification (#54364) required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D) as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systemi;, that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
This event has been entered into the plant's corrective action program as IR 04293482.
C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:
No other systems, structures, or components contributed to this event.
NRC FORM 368A (04-2017)
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- 2. DOCKET NUMBER
- 3. LEA NUMBER Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 YEAR SEQUEN11AL NUMBER 2019 -
001 NARRATIVE D. DA TES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES AND OPERA TOR ACTIONS:
The dates, times, and major occurrences and operator actions for this event are as follows.
November 1, 2019 03:16-Received annunciator 601706 for "HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE" and associated computer point CSHBC01. lnop Status Light "TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL" lit concurrently. Multiple HPCS trip units were Indicating incorrectly, and HPCS minimum flow valve 2CSH*MOV105 repositioned open.
03:16 HPCS is INOPERABLE but remains AVAILABLE. T.S. 3.5.1 Condition B entered with B.1 met with "RCIC OPERABLE". Restoration Is required within 14 days per 8.2.
03:22 Operator attempted to close 2CSH*MOV105 to secure draining Condensate Storage Tanks (CST's) to Suppression Pool. Valve immediately re-opened.
03:24 HPCS pump suction swapped from CST to Suppression Pool per N2-0P-33 H.6.0.
04:03 HPCS Trip Unit Power Supply Breaker verified on and fuses verified good in accordance with N2-ARP-601700. Suspect Power Supply E22A-PS1 has failed.
10:03 Contacted NRC Operations Center, and notified' of Unplanned HPCS lnoperability pursuant to 1 OCFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Event Notification#54364.
13:30 Power Supply E22A-PS1 replaced.
14:00 HPCS Pump placed in Pull-To-Lock (PTL). Declared HPCS Diesel INOPERABLE per T.S. 3.8.1.
15:39 Performed N2-0SP-LOG-S001 for HPCS Trip Units to verify surveillance criteria met and consistent with associated reading prior to HPCS INOPERABILITY.
15:55 Declared HPCS Diesel OPERABLE, EXIT T.S. 3.8.1.
Declared HPCS OPERABLE, EXIT T.S. 3.5.1 Condition B.
E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY
This event was discovered by Reactor Operators when the Control Room Annunclatlon for HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE and INOP Status Light Indication for TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL was received.
F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
No operational conditions requiring the response of safety systems occurred as a result of this condition.
REV NO.
00 NRC FOAM 366A (04-2017)
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II. CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause of the HPCS lnoperabillty was determined to be the fallure of 24VDC Power Supply E22A-PS1. Failure of this component was confirmed by Exelon Powerlabs. The power supply has been sent to the manufacturer, TDK-Lambda, for component level analysis.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The direct cause of the HPCS System being declared Inoperable was the failed 24VDC Power Supply, E22A-PS1. Operators were able to stabilize HPCS System conditions by executing the respective operating procedures.
In accordance with T.S. 3.5.1 Condition 8.1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was available throughout the event. Additionally, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS), Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), and Automatic Depressurization (ADS) Systems remalned available. In accordance with T. S. LCO 3.5.1 ACTIONS 8.1 and 8.2, If the HPCS System is inoperable, and the RCIC System is Immediately verified to be OPERABLE (when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE), the HPCS System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this condition, adequate core cooling in ensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS Injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with the ADS.
Based on these conditions, it is concluded that the safety significance of this event is low.
This event does affect the NRG Regulatory Oversight Process Indicator for safety system function failures.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A.
ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
Replacement of the failed Power Supply, E22A-PS1, was completed.
B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Annunciators, computer points, and status lights provide adequate detection. PM Strategy requires replacement every 1 O years, which Is more conservative than the template recommendation of every 12 years. The power supply had only been installed for three years at the time of the failure, so it was well within the PM Strategy requirements. PM strategy is currently deemed sufficient, pending complete failure analysis. Operation of the equipment is within manufacturer specifications. The potentlal for creating an auctioneered, redundant power supply is being evaluated by strategic engineering.
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:
The failed HPCS 24VDC power supply Is currently with the manufacturer, TDK Lambda, for component level analysis.
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
None.
C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
COMPONENT 24VDC Power Supply High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS)
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FORM 366A (04-2017)
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