05000400/LER-2002-004-01, Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits
| ML030910360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/2003 |
| From: | Waldrep B Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-03-047 LER 02-004-01 | |
| Download: ML030910360 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4002002004R01 - NRC Website | |
text
Progress Energy MAR 2 6 2003 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-03-047 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2002-004-01 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2002-004-01 is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73. This report describes an unanalyzed condition due to inadequate separation of associated circuits. LER 2002-004-00 submitted on February 18, 2003, described an unanalyzed condition due to the same cause. Commitments are identified in Section VI of this submittal.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor -
Licensing[Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, B. C. Waidrep Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant BCW/jpy Enclosure c:
Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Progress Energy Carolinas. Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562
0
Abstract
On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to mal-operation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern.
On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern.
The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis of certain conductor-to-conductor interactions. Design changes or other methods approved by the NRC will be used to restore compliance.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2000)
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VI.
COMMITMENTS
The actions committed to by Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. in this document are identified below. Any other actions discussed in this submittal represent intended or planned actions by Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.
Scheduled Commitment(s)
Completion Date
- 1. Complete a validation of the HNP safe shutdown analysis.
August 5, 2004
- 2. Restore the identified conditions of this LER to compliance by design Refueling Outage 12 changes or other methods approved by the NRC.
(Current schedule November 11, 2004)