05000341/LER-1994-001, :on 940127,loss of Div I Power Occurred Due to Weather & Breaker Failure.Power Restored to Div I Utilizing Fermi-Custer & Fermi-Luzon Lines
| ML20064C707 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1994 |
| From: | Gipson D, Hare E DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-94-0014, CON-NRC-94-14 LER-94-001, LER-94-1, NUDOCS 9403100174 | |
| Download: ML20064C707 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
| 3411994001R00 - NRC Website | |
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Douglas R. Gipson Senior Vice Prn@nt Nuclear Generahen Detroit '
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10CFR50 73 February 28, 1994 NRC-94-0011 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Reference:
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) No.94-001 Please find enclosed LER No.94-001, dated February 28, 1994, for a reportable event that occurred on January 27, 1994.
A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.
If you have any questions, please contact Elizabeth A. Hare, Senior Compliance Engineer, at (313) 586-1427 Sincerely, Ecclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A cc:
T. G. Colburn J. B. Martin H. P. Phillips K. R. Riemer P. i.. Torpey Wayne County Emergency Management Division I j 9403100174 940228 PDR ADOCK 05000341 i
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February 28, 1994 NHC-94-0011-1 Page 2-bec H. A. DeLong l
H. H. Eberhardt, Jr.
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Fessler D. H. Gipson L. S. Goodman D. R. Hahn (Michigan Dept./Public Ilealth)
H. T. Ilobbs J. A. Ilughes H.
McKeon W. E. Hiller, Jr.
R. A. Newkirk J. P. Nolloth D. P. Ockerman J. 11. P l ona R. B. Stafford J. A. Tibal J. G. Walker Information Hanagement - 140 NOC OSRO Secretary NSRG Secretary /ISEG Coordinator (316 NOC)
HACTS Coordinator UFSAR Coordinator NRC Chron File LER File Production Information Center Secretary's Office (2412 WCB)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Routing Copy 4
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Loss Of Division I Power Due tO Weather and Breaker Failure EVENT DATE (5)
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On January 27,1994 at 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br /> with the plant in Cold Shutdown, a loss of Division I power was experienced. As a result of this, power was lost to Division I RPS and Division I Emergency Diesel Generators received an auto-start initiation on bus undervoltage.
All expected Engineered Safety Feature actuations/isolations occurred. Within 58 minutes, shutdown cooling was restored. All safety related buses were restored to offsite power by 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />.
The cause for the loss of all three Division I incoming offsite feeds was related to an ice storm in conjunction with the failure of an incoming feed breaker to open. The probable cause of the breaker failure was the trip linkage on the "Y" phase was mechanically inhibited due to water intrusion creating ice in combination with below freezing weather conditions.
Power was restored to Division I utilizing two of the three incoming offsite feeds. The Fermi-Swan Creek feed remains deenergized pending replacement of Swan Creek overhead lines and troubleshooting the failure of the breaker to open on that line.
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Initial Plant Conditions
Operational Condition: 4 (Cold Shutdown)
Reactor Power:
O percent Reactor Pressure:
O psig Reactor Temperature:
105 degrees Fahrenheit
Description of Event
On January 27, 1994 at 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />, a loss of Division I power occurred. The cause for the loss of power was due to combination of system faults resulting from an ice storm and the failure of a 120 kilovolt (kV) breaker at Fermi to trip and isolate in response to the system faults.
As a result of the event, the Division I Emergency Diesel Generators received an auto-start initiation on bus undervoltage and loaded to the Engineering Safety Features buses.
Power was lost to Reactor Protection System "A" [(RPS)(JC)] and therefore, several Engineering Safety Features [(ESP)(JE)] actuated.
All of the expected actuations/isolations were received. The following ESFs were actuated:
1)
Emergency Diesel Generators 11 and 12 [(EDG)(EK)]
automatically started on bus undervoltage.
2)
The Control Center Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System [(CCHVAC)(VI)] shifted to recirculation mode.
3)
Division I of Standby Gas Treatment System
[(SBGT)(BH)] automatically started. Secondary Containment isolated.
4)
Division I Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System
[(EECW)(CC)] automatically started.
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n,.n...-. n..., N-- -, n The following Primary Containment isolations (JM) required due to loss of RF3 "A" occurred:
1)
Main Steam Isolation Valve [(MSIV)(SB)] drain valve (Group 1) 2)
Reactor Water Sample System (SB) (Group 2) 3)
Residual Heat Removal [(RHR)(BO)] Shutdown Cooling (Group 4) 4)
Reactor Water Cleanup [(RWCU)(CE)] (Group 10) 5)
Torus Water Management System [(TWMS)(BT)] (Group 12) 6)
Drywell Sumps (Group 13) 7)
Drywell and Suppression Pool Ventilation System (Group 14) 8)
Traversing Incore Probe [(TIP)(IG)] (Group 15) 9)
Nitrogen Inerting System (LK) (Group 16)
- 10) Recirculation Pumps Seal Purge (AD) Isolation Valve and Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System (IK) (Group 17)
- 11) Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System (Group 18)
In response to the loss of Division I power, Operations personnel (Utility, licensed) started Combustion Turbino Generator [(CTC)(EK)]
11-1 and restored power to Division I B0P loads. RPS was energized on Normal Supply at 1348 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.12914e-4 months <br /> and Division II of RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1402 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.33461e-4 months <br /> following system vent. All systems responded as expected with the exception of the H202 Honitoring System (IK). Following power restoration, the system had a logic problem that prevented its restart. However in operational condition 4, it is not required to be operable. At 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> all ESP busses were restored to offsite power..
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NUMBE'R NUMBER Fermi 2 05000 341 OF 4
5 94 001
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00 Tur y rw. me,, r w.1 us..saw,. cw, mc n, wm o n Caore of the Event The loss of all incoming Division I offsite power was the result of electrical faults experienced by the system during a heavy ice storm.
Specifically, two of the three incoming feeds that supply Division I had indications of faults.
In response to these faults protective relaying actuated as designed. However, the execution of the relaying was not successful for isolation of the Swan Creek incoming feed line. The 120 kV GH breaker (BKR) failed to trip and isolate upon receipt of an isolation signal. This resulted in a loss of Division I power to RPS "A" and an aute-start of Division I EDGs on bus undervoltage. When the Custer line isolated two minutes into the event due to a fault, the burden of the major fault present on the Swan Creek line was then carried by the Luzon feed.
Protective relaying subsequently isolated the remaining feed at the Luzon station resulting in a total loss of Division I offsite power.
The failure of the GM breaker to trip and isolate the system from the initial fault was the main contributor to this event.
Investigation into the failure of this breaker to trip indicates that the trip linkage on the "Y" phase may have been mechanically inhibited due to water intrusion creating ice in the linkage compartment above the "Y" phase tark in combination with the below freezing weather conditions.
Had the GH breaker worked properly, there would not have been a loss of Division I power.
Analysis of Event
The ESP actuations/isolations associated with this event were as expected for a loss of Division I power. The loss of either division of offsite power is an analyzed condition and the associated actuation and isolations were within the design basis of the various systems.
During this event, the Division II 345 kV power was unaffected by the weather conditions.
Due to the isolation of the RHR common suction inboard isolation valve on loss of RPS "A", Division II RHR Snutdown Cooling was isolated.
During the time RHR was not in Shutdoun Cooling, reactor coolant temperature increased approximately 15 degrees.
It was maintained well below the Technical Specification temperature limit for cold shutdown. Therefore, during this event, there was no impact on the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
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Corrective Action
Power was restored to Division I utilizing the Fermi-Custer and Fermi-Luzon lines. The Fermi-Swan Creek feed to Fermi remains dcenergized pending replacement of Swan Creek overhead lines. Hepair of the Swan Cr'eek substation is complete.
Troubleshooting of the GH breaker showed that the "Y" phase may have been mechanically inhib'ted due to water intrusion creating ice in the linkage compartment above the "Y" phase tank. The GM breaker is the only breaker of this type being utilized at tne Fermi Power Plant.
Pending review of System Maintenance final report on the cause of the GM breaker failure to function, the Fermi Preventive Haintenance events associated with these breakers may be revised accordingly to incorporate any necessary actions required to prevent recurrence of this event. This action will be complete by May 31, 1994.
Troubleshooting of the H202 Honitoring System failure to restart after power restoration will be completect in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.
Previous Similar Events
Licensee Event Reports89-003, 88-019,85-002, and 85-001 Failed Component Data Westinghouse, type GM4-F, 1200 Amp, 139 kV, 3500 HVA, O.C.B. with CAS-8 Pneumatic Hechanism.
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