05000335/LER-2009-001, Verbatim Technical Specification Surveillance Testing
| ML091180396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie |
| Issue date: | 04/20/2009 |
| From: | Johnston G Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 09-001-00 | |
| Download: ML091180396 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3352009001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
0 FPL Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 S. Ocean. Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 L-2009-087 10CFR 50.73 April 20, 2009 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 2009-001 Date of Event: February 19, 2009 Unit 1 Verbatim Technical Specification Surveillance Testing The attached Licensee Event Report 2009-001 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
R j~tfully Gordon L. Johnston Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant 6 UP GLJ/dlc Attachment 6c~
an FPL Group company
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB:. NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/201(
(9-2007)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
I3. PAGE St. Lucie Unit 1 05000335 1
OF 4
- 4. TITLE Unit 1 Verbatim Technical Specification Surveillance Testing
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR Y
SEQUENTIAL REVI RFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEA NUMBER REV MONTH DAY YEAR I
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 19 2009 2009 -
001 04 20 2009
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[: 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) rl 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 1 % 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[E OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in Analysis of Safety Significance Both Unit 1 EDGs are operable and within their surveillance requirement; the potential safety consequences of the event are low and there would have been no significant impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
The corrective actions and supporting actions were entered into the site corrective action program.
Any changes to the proposed actions will be managed under the corrective action program.
- 1. Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF),
TSTF-434-A, "Clarifying SR 3.0.1 Bases to state that Surveillance can be performed in steps" will be adopted for St. Lucie Technical Specifications, which will clarify the SR 4.0.1 Bases to state that surveillances can be performed in steps.
- 2. Revised Unit 1 procedure 1-OSP-59.01 A, "lA Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Surveillance," to perform steps 6.1.3 and step 6.1.35.A.
without overlap testing.
- 3.
Revised Unit 1 procedure l-OSP-59.01B "lB Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Surveillance," to perform steps 7.1.3 and step 7.1.35.A.
without overlap testing.
- 4. Both unit procedures 1(2)-OSP-01.02, "Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System Flow Path Verification" [or appropriate Operations Fill and Vent Procedure] will be revised to verify flow through the Reactor Coolant System vent paths during venting.
If TSTF-434-A is incorporated prior to the associated unit's outage, then this action will not be required to be completed.
- 5. Both unit procedures I(2)-OSP-69.13A/B, "ESF -
18 Month Surveillance for SIAS/CIS/CSAS -
Train A/B," will be revised for each safety injection tank to demonstrate operability by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically.
If TSTF-434-A is incorporated prior to the associated unit's
- outage, then this action will not be required to be completed.
Similar Events
An extent of condition evaluation was performed to identify if similar overlap testing was being performed when TS specified a direct test.
Two additional TS SRs on each unit were found where St. Lucie tests were performed by overlapping, contrary to TS wording.
A TS SR for the reactor coolant gas system vent path was tested as described in the TS up until 1997 for Unit 2.
The Unit 1 procedures were changed to match the Unit 2 procedures in 2001.
The 50.59 screening did not identify
this as being a change to the intent of the TS requirement and therefore no changes to the TS were identified as required.
A TS SR for the safety injection tank (SIT) valves were verified to open on a safety injection signal as described in the TS SR until it was changed in 1999.
The 50.59 screening for both Units did not identify this as being a change to the intent of the TS requirement, and therefore, no changes to the TS were determined to be required.
The procedures and schedules will be changed to test these components in future outages, unless TSTF-434-A is incorporated into St. Lucie's TS basis prior to the associated unit's outage.