05000311/LER-1981-066, Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20030D021
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/19/1981
From:	Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20030D022	List: 05000311/LER-1981-066, Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8108310310
Download: ML20030D021 (3)

LER-1981-066, Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111981066R00 - NRC Website

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gfA O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 August 19, 1981 Mr. Boyce H.

Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR ~75 DOCKET NO. SC.. 1 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-66/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-66/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, f/hYD ff R. A. Uderitz General Manager -

Muclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) h6 h)-l 1 s

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Report Number:

81-66/03L Report Date:

August 19, 1981 Occurrence Date:

7-20-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Vital Heat Trace - Loss Of Two Independent Heat Tracing Channels.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 81-263.

CONDITIIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 44% - Unit Load 530 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On July 20, 1981, upon reviewing a vital heat tracing surveillance procedure, it was determined that two controllers, 2607A and 2610B, had failed due to low amperage reading on the heat trace.

The tape frua controller 2607A was reading 0.5 amps and the tape from controller 2610B was reading 0.25 amps.

Both tapes should have read greater than 0.5 amps.

The proper temperatures were maintained by redundant channels 2607B and 2610A; however, technical specification 3.5.4.2 requires tuo independent channels of heat tracing-shall be operable for the boron injection tank and for the heat traced portions of the associated flow paths.

Action statement 3.5.4.2 was entered and the temperatures of the boron injection tank and associated flow paths were verified to be greater than or equal to 145'F every eight hours until the two failed controllers were restored to service.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with technical specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

An investigation of the failed channels revealed that for controller 2610B a splice in the heat trace tape was defective, causing the low amperage reading.

For controller 2607A however, it was found that the readings were taken when the tape was hot and for short pieces of tape, the readings will be low when the tape is hot.

The tape was allowed to cool and when restarted the tape was reading 1.2 amps.

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BER 81-66/03L 8/19/81 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

j Action statement 3.5.4.2 requires:

With only one channel of heat tracing on either the i

boron injection tank or on the heat traced portion of an associated flow path operable, operation may l

continue for up to 30 days provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be greater than or equal to 145*F at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; otherwise, be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The ietective splice on the tape from controller 2610B was repaired an6 when tested read 2.8 amps.

A change to the vital heat trace surveillance procedure has been made informing the operators of the possibility of low readings on short tapes and actions necessary to determine reading validity.

In addition, the Engineering Department will review the acceptance criteria for short tapes.

A supplemental report will be issued at the completion of the review.

FAILURE DATA:

Chemelix Heat Trace Tape l

Manufacturer No. 10PTV 1

Prepared By J. Varga

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SORC Meeting No.

81-77 I

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