The team identified an apparent violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to establish procedural controls for evaluating the use of parts of indeterminate quality prior to their installation in safety-related applications. This procedural deficiency resulted in the installation of a voltage regulator circuit board of indeterminate quality that adversely affected the function of
Emergency Diesel Generator 2. Specifically, following installation of the part on November 11, 2006, failure of the part occurred following
35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> of operation resulting in an over-voltage trip of
Emergency Diesel Generator 2 on January 18, 2007. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding resulted in the loss of the safety function of
Emergency Diesel Generator 2 for greater than the Technical Specification completion time. The Phase 2 evaluation concluded that the finding was of low to moderate safety significance. A Phase 3 preliminary significance determination analysis also determined the finding was of low to moderate safety significance.
