05000293/LER-1917-002, Regarding Isolation of HPCI

Regarding Isolation of HPCI

ML17163A179
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	05/25/2017
From:	Perkins E Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 17-002-00
Download: ML17163A179 (6)

LER-1917-002, Regarding Isolation of HPCI

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2931917002R00 - NRC Website

text

~Entergx May 25, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report 2017-002-00, Isolation of HPCI Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Renewed License No. DPR-35 LETTER NUMBER: 2.17.034

Dear Sir or Madam:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth. MA 02360 The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2017-002-00, Isolation of HPCI, is submitted in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50. 73.

If you have any questions or require additional information please contact me at (508) 830-8323.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Sincerely,

~p~k Everett P. Perkins, d't.

Manager, Regulatory Assurance EPP/sc

Attachment:

Licensee Event Report 2017-002-00,. Isolation of HPCI (3 pages)

-~-------

1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station cc:

Mr. Daniel H. Dorman Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Mr. John Lamb, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8C2A Washington, DC 20555 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Letter No. 2.17.034 Page 2 of2

Attachment Letter Number 2.17.034 Licensee Event Report 2017-002-00 Isolation of HPCI (3 Pages)

BACKGROUND SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 002 REV NO.

- 00 The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System is provided to ensure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the nuclear system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI System permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water inventory until the reactor vessel is depressurized. HPCI continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the pressure at which Low Pressure Coolant Injection or Core Spray systems would maintain core cooling.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 27, 2017, at 1825 [EDT], with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, the HPCI System was declared inoperable and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.5.C.2 was entered. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) personnel were performing planned testing of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System per TS Table 4.2.B.

During the test, it has been determined that plant personnel heated the wrong temperature switch causing the HPCI system to isolate.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The Direct Cause of the event was the application of heat to a HPCI temperature switch. The system responded as designed and the HPCI primary containment isolation valves closed making HPCI unavailable.

The Root Cause of this event is two Nuclear Controls Technicians decided to deviate from procedure requirements while p~rforming procedure 8.M.2-2.6.3 Attachment 1, RCIC Steam Line High Temperature Instrument Functional Test.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The corrective action to preclude repetition documents that both individuals' qualifications have been removed and their site access restricted.

Specific disciplinary actions have been taken with the individuals involved pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56(c).

. Page 2 of 3 I(04-2017)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form htto://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LERNUMBER YEAR Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000- 293 2017

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 002 REV NO.

- 00 IThere are no consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety from this event. The isolation of HPCI has been evaluated and it has been determined that the individuals involved were not following procedure requirements for performing testing. The loss of safety

~unction created by isolating the HPCI System lasted for only thirty three minutes during this evolution.

No additional actions to reduce the consequence are necessary.

REPORT ABILITY IThis report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of Pilgrim Station License Event Reports (LE Rs) for the past 10 years was performed. The focus of

~he review was LERs that involved loss of HPCI system function. The following LERs were reviewed:

LER 2008-004 - HPCI System Inoperable Due to Undervoltage Relay Failure in Power Supply Circuit LER 2011-006 - HPCI System Inoperable Due to Governor Control Valve Mechanical Binding LER 2013-006 - HPCI Flow Controller Failure to Achieve Rated Flow while in Auto Mode LER 2016-009 - HPCI Declared Inoperable Due to Failed lnservice Testing IThese LER events do not identify any similar failure mechanisms to that described in this LER.

REFERENCES:

CR-PNP-2017-2622 Page 3 of 3