05000285/LER-1984-001, :on 840122,crane Supervisor Left Spent Fuel Pool Area While Key Still in Interlock Bypass Switch in Bypassed Position,Contrary to Tech Spec 2.11(2).Caused by Personnel Error.Event Discussed W/Individual

:on 840122,crane Supervisor Left Spent Fuel Pool Area While Key Still in Interlock Bypass Switch in Bypassed Position,Contrary to Tech Spec 2.11(2).Caused by Personnel Error.Event Discussed W/Individual

ML20081A293
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	02/22/1984
From:	William Jones, Richard A OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
FC-037-84, FC-37-84, LER-84-001, LER-84-1, LIC-84-041, LIC-84-41, NUDOCS 8403050124
Download: ML20081A293 (3)

LER-1984-001, on 840122,crane Supervisor Left Spent Fuel Pool Area While Key Still in Interlock Bypass Switch in Bypassed Position,Contrary to Tech Spec 2.11(2).Caused by Personnel Error.Event Discussed W/Individual

Event date:
Report date:
2851984001R00 - NRC Website

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, n Technical Specification 2.11(2) states the following:

The Auxiliary Building crane shall not be used to move material over irradiated fuel in the fuel storage pool.

If the crane interlocks are inoperable or bypassed, the crane operation will be under the direct control of a super-visor.

l The hooks on the Auxiliary Building crane cannot travel over the Spent Fuel Pool unless the travel interlocks are bypassed by means of a key switch on the crane.

Contrary to Technical Specification 2.11(2), the crane supervisor left the Spent Fuel Pool Area while the key was still in the interlock bypass switch in the bypassed position. When the Quality control inspector at the job site discovered l

that the crane supervisor had left, he immediately called for another crane super-visor. Approximately twenty minutes elapsed between the departure of the first crane supervisor and the arrival of the second. At no time during this period was the crane operated inside the interlocked zone over the Spent Fuel Pool.

The certification of the crane supervisor who failed to maintain proper admini-strative control of the key was withdrawn. The incident and its significance were discussed with the individual by plant supervision. The training and certi-l 1.* wtion of ' crane supervisors was reviewed and was found to be adequate with re-i gard to this incident.

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Technical Specification 2.11(2) states the following:

The Auxiliary Building crane shall not be used to move material over irradiated fuel in the fuel storage pool.

If the crane interlocks are inoperable or bypassed, the crane operation will be under the direct control of a super-visor.

Operating Instruction OI-HE-2 on normal operation of the Auxiliary Building crane lists the following precaution:

If the crane interlocks are inoperable during crane use, or if they are de-feated by means of the bypass key, the crane must be under the administrative control of a certified / qualified Crane Supervisor.

Certification of Crane Supervisors includes training on Technical Specification 2.11 and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2.

The hooks on the Auxiliary Building crane cannot travel over the Spent Fuel Pool unisss the travel interlocks are bypassed by means of a key switch on the crane.

Contrary to Technical Specification 2.11(2) and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2, the crane supervisor Icft the Spent Fuel Fool Area while the key was still in the inter. lock bypass switch in the bypassed position.

Before leaving the area, the Crane Supervisor had verified that the crane was out of the interlocked zone over the pool. When the Quality Control inspector at the job site discovered that the Crane Supervisor had left, he immediately called for another crane supervisor. Approximately twenty minutes elapsed between the departure of the first crane supervisor and the arrival of the second. The Quality Control inspector knew the provisions of Technical Specification 2.11(2) and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2 and understood the basis for the administrative requirement on the inter-lock bypass key. The crane operator was also aware of the basis for the admini-strative requirement. However, neither the Quality Control inspector nor the crane operator were certified Crane Supervisors. At no time during the absence of a Crane Supervisor was the crane operated in the interlock ~ed zone over the Spent Fuel Pool.

This incident occurred on January 22, 1984 at approximately 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />. The personnel error was a cognitive error and was contrary to approved procedures.

The certification of the Crane Supervisor who failed to maintain proper admini-strative control of the key was withdrawn. The individual is an engineer employed by the Omaha Public Power District. The incident and its significance was dis-cussed with the individual by plant supervision.

The training and certification of crane supervisors was reviewed and was found to be adequate with regard to this incident.

The Fort Calhoun Station was operating at 100% power at the time of the incident.

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Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000 February 22, 1984 FC-037-84 LIC-84-041 U.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

Licensee Event Report for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 84-001 dated February 20, 1984.

This report is being submitted per requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Sincerely,

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- T W.'C.

Jones Division Manager Production Operations WCJ/JCB:jmm Attachment cc:

Mr. Richard P.

Denise, Director Division of Resident, Reactor Project

& Engineering Programs U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 1

INPO Records Center l

Mr.

E.

G.

Tourigny, Project Manager l

SARC Chairman PRC Chairman Mr.

L.

A.

Yandell, Senior Resident N

f' Inspector Fort Calhoun File (2)

,f 455:24 Employment with Equal Opportunity maie/rema!c i