05000272/LER-1981-062, Forwards LER 81-062/03l-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-062/03l-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009F010
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/20/1981
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20009F011 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107280602
Download: ML20009F010 (3)
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LER-1981-062, Forwards LER 81-062/03l-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721981062R00 - NRC Website
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text

LEA O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 July 20, 1981 Mr. Boyce H.

Grier Director of USNRC t-CD Office of Inspection and Enforcement g

g Region 1 p

1 g

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 (E

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631 Park Avenue f

JUL 2 719815 -

Dear Mr. Grier:

[ v,g m a j acam assas g,

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 s -

' 's b 8

DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-62/03L 4

Pursuant to the requiremer.ts of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-62/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

./

R.

A. Uderftz*

General Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) h *'{I 8107280602 810720 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR The Energy People 95 2001 (400M) 1-81

Report Number:

81-62/03L Report Date:

July 20, 1981 Occurrence Date:

6-21-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Residual Heat Removal System Valving Misalignments.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports81-200 and 81-201.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Modes 4 and 3 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 Mwe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1981, No. 11 residual heat removal (RHR) pump, No. 11 RHR heat exchanger, and the No. 11 and No. 12 RHR heat exchanger bypass valve 1RH2O were cleared and tagged for internal component inspection.

After the inspection was completed, the previously mentioned components were released by the Maintenance Department to the operating shift.

The release of the blocking tags and the improper restoration of the RHR System components, led to the in-advertent draining of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to less than the technical specifications limit of 350,000 gallons and an inoperable emergen:y core cooling subsystem.

At 0948 hours0.011 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.60714e-4 months <br />, June 21, 1981, control room personnel noticed that the RWST level had decreased to less than the minimum requirement of 350,000 gallons required by the technical specifications and action statement 3.1.2.8.b was entered.

The refilling of the RWST and an investigation to determine the reason for the decreasing level were initiated immediately.

The investigation revealed that two vent valves in the RHR System, 1RH72 and 1RH73, had been left in the open position during system restoration.

The vent valves, 1RH72 and 1RH73 were closed, and at 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br /> the RWST level was restored to greater than 350,000 gallons and action statement 3.1.2.8.b was terminated.

The results of the surveillance test performed on No. 11 RHR pump, l

when it was returned to service, were reviewed and found to be unsatisfactory.

At 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, June 21, 1981, during the valve alignment verification made in preparation for the surveillance re-test of No. 11 RHR pump, the No. 11 RHR heat exchanger inlet isolation i

l valve llRH14 was discovered to be in the locked closed position, instead of the required position of locked open.

Valve 11RH14 was immediately repositioned to the open position and locked.

The surveil-lance retest of No. 11 RHR pump was completed satisfactorily at 1216 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.62688e-4 months <br />.

The misalignment of valve llRH14 led to entry into l

i i

l

LER 81-62/03L July-20, 1981 operational mode 3 during unit heatap with an inoperable emergency core cooling subsystem.

The inoperable emergency core cooling system was restored to an operable condition when llRH14 was re-positioned at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, June 21, 1981.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with technical specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Personnel error.

When the RHR System tags were released and the system was realigned, vent valves 1RH72 and 1RH73 were not closed and valve llRH14 was left in the locked closed position.

Double verification of the system realignment was also not completed as required by departmental procedures.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURANCES:

Technical specification 3.1.2.8.b requires that with the refueling water storage tank inoperable, either restore the tank to an operable status within one hour or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Technical specification 3.5.2 requires that with one emergency core cooling subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Operations personnel directly involved were counseled on the errors l

they made in the clearing of the tags and the realignment of the RHR System.

A letter, dated June 29, 1981, was issued to all operating personnel, informing them of the occurrences and the errors made.

The j

letter also stressed the importance of fulfilling the responsibilities of'their jobs.

FAILURE DATA:

No Applicable Prepared By J.

J.

Espey

([

r Manager - Salem Generating Station SORC Meeting No.

81-63

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