05000261/LER-2008-001, Regarding Appendix R Pathway Impassable Due to Lock Configuration
| ML082060198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/2008 |
| From: | Kapopoulos E Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RNP-RA/08-0083 LER 08-001-00 | |
| Download: ML082060198 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 2612008001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
10-CFR 50.ý73 Serial RNP-RA/08-0083 JUL 21 2008 Attn: Document Control Desk United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/LICENSE NO. DPR-23 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2008-001-00 APPENDIX R PATHWAY IMPASSABLE DUE TO LOCK CONFIGURATION Ladies and Gentlemen:
The attached Licensee Event Report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. C. A. Castell at (843) 857-1626.
Sincerely,
/Ernest
- 1. Kapopoulos, Jr.
Plant General Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 CAC/ahv Attachment c:
L.A. Reyes, NRC, Region II M. G. Vaaler, NRC, NRR NRC Resident Inspector Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Robinson Nuclear Plant 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (See reverse for required number of Washington,* DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to digits/characters for each block) the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-110202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to I respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000261 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Appendix R Pathway Impassable due to Lock Configuration
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05 21 2008 2008-001 00 07 21 2008 1
05000
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
- 9. OPERATING MODE 1
- 10. POWER LEVEL 100%
El El El El El El El El F]
20.2201 (b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El El El E]
El El El El 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
IEl El El El El El El 1:1 13 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E]
El El El El El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 (a)(4) 73.71 (a)(5)
OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in effects of spurious actuation of components that may adversely affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown.
The health and safety of the public and plant personnel were not impacted by this event.
No actual fire events or loss of safe shutdown capability have occurred.
Engineering analyses of the potential safety significance determined the event to be of low safety significance.
The bounding case is the Pressurizer [AB:PZR] Power Operated Relief Valves [AB:PCV] spuriously opening as a result of cable-to-cable fire-induced circuit failures.
For this case, the analyses demonstrate that the difference in core damage frequency caused by the potential delay is minimal and that the core remains covered.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Completed Corrective Actions:
- The locks were changed to the proper configuration.
" The individual that locked the gate incorrectly was counseled.
- A sign was attached to the gate between the Radwaste Building and "C" Auxiliary Boiler showing a depiction of the proper locking configuration.
- RC gate keys were obtained and placed in the appropriate location (i.e., the Fire Equipment Building).
Planned Corrective Actions
Procedure OMM-043, "Verification and Validation," will be revised by August 28, 2008, to strengthen the verification and validation process for locked doors and gates.
A breakable seal will be installed to replace the security lock and the RC lock.
This action is expected to be completed by August 28, 2008.
V.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Previous Similar Events:
Recent Licensee Event Reports (LER) for HBRSEP, Unit No.
2, were reviewed.
The following similar event was identified:
LER 2003-003-00, Discovery of Two New Appendix R Safe Shutdown Vulnerabilities.
The cause of this event was the unclear guidance provided in the original Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for postulated fire-induced circuit failures.
The corrective action was to establish clear guidance on the performance of circuit analysis for safe shutdown purposes and to ensure the program is in alignment with this guidance.
The corrective actions associated with LER 2003-003-00 were predominantly focused on mitigation of the previously unidentified failure modes and hence would not have been expected to resolve the condition described in LER 2008-001-00.