ML083660190
| ML083660190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2008 |
| From: | Robert Daley Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Pardee C AmerGen Energy Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-007 | |
| Download: ML083660190 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000373/2008007
Text
December 31, 2008
Mr. Charles G. Pardee
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), AmerGen Energy Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2008007;
Dear Mr. Pardee:
On November 21, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial
fire protection inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report
documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on November 21, 2008, with
Mr. D. Rhoades and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, two NRC-identified findings of very low safety
significance were identified. The findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. However,
because of their very low safety significance, and because the issues were entered into your
corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issues as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) in
accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of these NCVs, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the
Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the LaSalle County Station.
C. Pardee
-2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by D. E. Hills Acting For/
Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000373/2008007 05000374/2008007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
Plant Manager - LaSalle County Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station
Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President
Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations
Senior Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Braidwood, Byron and LaSalle
Associate General Counsel
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer,
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
C. Pardee
-2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by D. E. Hills Acting For/
Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000373/2008007; 05000374/2008007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
Plant Manager - LaSalle County Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station
Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President
Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations
Senior Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Braidwood, Byron and LaSalle
Associate General Counsel
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer,
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
DOCUMENT NAME: G\\DRS\\Work in Progress\\LaSalle 2008-007 DRS RAL.doc
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive
Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RIII
N RIII
NAME
RLangstaff:ls
DHills for RDaley
DATE
12/31/08
12/31/08
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to Mr. Charles Pardee from Mr. Robert Daley dated December 31, 2009.
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2008007;
DISTRIBUTION:
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2
RidsNrrPMLaSalle
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Mark Satorius
Kenneth Obrien
Cynthia Pederson
DRPIII
DRSIII
Patricia Buckley
ROPreports@nrc.gov
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
05000373/2008007; 05000374/2008007
License Nos:
Report No:
05000373/2008007; 05000374/2008007
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Marseilles, IL
Dates:
November 3 through November 21, 2008
Inspectors:
R. Langstaff, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
Z. Falevits, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Winter, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
R. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000373/2008007, 05000374/2008007; 11/03/2008-11/21/2008; LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 & 2.
This report covers an announced baseline inspection by regional inspectors. Two Green
findings were identified by the inspectors. The findings were considered Non-Cited Violations
(NCVs) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical
Specifications was identified by the inspectors for the failure to implement a fire
protection program procedure for combustible controls. Specifically, the inspectors
identified three examples where transient combustible materials were staged adjacent to
cable risers contrary to the licensees procedure for combustible controls. The licensee
subsequently removed the transient combustible materials and entered the issue into
their corrective action program.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because, the finding was similar to
IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 4.k, in that the transient combustibles presented
credible fire scenarios, which could affect equipment important to safety. The issue was
of very low safety significance because, the finding represented a low degradation of the
licensees combustible controls program. Additionally, this finding has a cross-cutting
aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Work Practices component because,
multiple examples were identified where transient combustibles were staged contrary to
site procedures. H.4(b) (Section 1R05.2.b(1))
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of the license
condition was identified by the inspectors for the failure to install a sprinkler system.
Specifically, the licensee had installed a pre-action spray system above the suspended
ceiling in Fire Zone 4F3 instead of a pre-action sprinkler system as specified by the Fire
Protection Report. The licensee subsequently entered the issue into its correction action
program.
Enclosure
2
The finding was determined to be more than minor because, the installed spray system
was less capable than a sprinkler system in that, a fire would be permitted to grow to a
larger size and cause more damage as a result of delayed system actuation. The issue
was of very low safety significance due to remaining mitigating system capability.
(Section 1R05.4.b(1))
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
Enclosure
3
REPORT DETAILS
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)
The purpose of the Fire Protection Triennial Baseline Inspection was to conduct a
design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensees fire
protection programs defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a
fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire
protection in plant areas important to safety by:
preventing fires from starting;
rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; and
providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety
so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not
prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant.
The inspectors evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material
condition of the reactor plants fire protection program and post-fire safe shutdown
systems. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had
implemented a fire protection program that: (1) provided adequate controls for
combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection
and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good
material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service,
degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that
procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to
safely shutdown the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator
manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire
protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered
into the licensees problem identification and resolution program.
In addition, the inspectors review and assessment focused on the licensees post-fire
safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was
placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection
features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe
shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance
with U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T,
Fire Protection (Triennial), dated April 21, 2006. The NRC regulatory oversight
process IP used a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and/or fire zones
and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors with assistance from a senior reactor
analyst used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External Events to select
several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment to this report.
The fire areas and/or fire zones selected for review during this inspection are listed
below and constituted three inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05T.
Enclosure
4
Fire Zone
Description
4D1
Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
4E1
Unit 1 Auxiliary Electric Room
4F3
Auxiliary Building, Ground Floor (Unit 1 portion)
.2
Shutdown from Outside Main Control Room
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as
necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least
one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the
selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of a fire in the Unit 1
auxiliary electric room requiring shutdown actions outside the control room. The
inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe
shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and
systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire area
selected for review. Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy
of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory makeup, reactor
heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The review also
included the fire safe shutdown analysis to ensure that all required components in the
selected systems were included in the licensees safe shutdown analysis.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis, normal and
abnormal operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical
drawings, their updated final safety analysis report, and other supporting documents to
verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the
control room for a fire in the Unit 1 auxiliary electric room that relies on shutdown from
outside the control room. This review included verification that shutdown from outside
the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite
power.
The inspectors also examined the operators ability to perform the necessary manual
actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing post-fire shutdown procedures, the
accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the
actions.
The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report and the licensees
engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license
amendments, Technical Specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and
deviations) to determine the licensing basis.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
5
.3
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a.
Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis,
safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe
shutdown capabilities were properly protected.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition
sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and
in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis.
The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being
properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the
process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any
potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown
analysis and procedures.
b.
Findings
(1) Unauthorized Transient Combustibles
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited
Violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications was identified by the inspectors for the
failure to implement a fire protection program procedure for combustible controls.
Specifically, the inspectors identified three examples where transient combustible
materials were staged adjacent to cable risers contrary to Procedure OP-AA-201-009,
Control of Combustible Material, Revision 7.
Description: On October 22, 2008, the inspectors identified a plastic chair staged
adjacent to cable risers in the auxiliary building. Specifically, the plastic chair was
located between two cable risers and was less than two feet from cable risers containing
safety-related cables. The licensee placed the issue into their corrective action program
(Action Request (AR) 00834512, NRC Identified Combustibles During Walkdown with
FP Engineer) and subsequently removed the chair. On November 4, 2008, the
inspectors identified an unattended fiberglass cart with rags and tools in the upper tray
adjacent to a cable riser containing emergency shutdown system cables (AR 00841326,
NRC ID: Transient Combustible Near Vertical Power Riser). On November 6, 2008,
the inspectors identified a black foam sheet of insulation material, approximately two feet
square, left behind and adjacent to a cable riser containing reactor protection system
cables (AR 00841490, NRC Triennial FP Inspection Walkdown). The licensee initiated
corrective action by removing the transient combustible material. Additionally, the
licensee performed an extent of condition review and documented their findings in their
corrective action program (AR 00841673, Transient Combustible Material Extent of
Condition Walkdown).
Procedure OP-AA-201-009 was the site procedure for combustible controls which, in
part, implemented the site fire protection program. Procedure OP-AA-201-009,
Section 4.4.2, Paragraph 6, directed licensee personnel to avoid staging exposed
Enclosure
6
Class A combustible material immediately adjacent to (i.e., within approximately three feet)
cable risers. The inspectors noted that National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 10,
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, defined Class A fires as fires in ordinary
combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics. As such,
the inspectors considered the identified materials to be Class A materials located in
manner contrary to site implementing procedures for the fire protection program.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that staging combustible materials adjacent to cable
risers was contrary to site implementing procedures for the fire protection program and
was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors identified three examples
where Class A combustible materials were staged near cable risers was contrary to
Procedure OP-AA-201-009.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was similar to
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Example 4.k. The Class A transient
combustible materials (i.e., the chair, the cart, and the foam insulation) were not in
approved temporary storage locations approved by an engineering evaluation.
Specifically, the transient combustibles were located within the zone of influence for
a 70 kiloWatt fire for the thermoset cables located within the vertical cable risers
(IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated
February 28, 2005, Table 2.3.2). Consequently, the transient combustibles created
credible fire scenarios that could affect equipment important to safety (such as the
safety-related cables and/or cables required for safe shutdown, within the vertical cable
risers). Therefore, this performance deficiency impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone
objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge
critical safety functions during plant operations.
The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix A, and determined that since the finding
affected administrative controls for fire protection, a significance determination evaluation
under IMC 0609, Appendix F, was required. The inspectors completed a significance
determination of this issue using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation
Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, dated
February 28, 2005. The inspectors determined that the staging of Class A combustibles
was a low degradation finding against the combustible controls program because the
identified materials would not cause a fire from existing sources of heat or electrical
energy. Question 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Task 1.3.1, Qualitative Screening for All
Finding Categories, showed that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)
due to the low degradation rating.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Work
Practices component because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate
expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel failed to follow procedures.
Specifically, multiple examples were identified where transient combustibles were staged
contrary to site procedures. (Example H.4(b)).
Enforcement: Technical Specification, Section 5.4.1 required, in part, that written
procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for fire protection program
implementation. The licensee established Procedure OP-AA-201-009 as the
implementing procedure for combustible controls for their fire protection program.
Section 4.4.2, Paragraph 6, of Procedure OP-AA-201-009 directed licensee personnel to
Enclosure
7
avoid staging exposed Class A combustible material immediately adjacent to (i.e., within
approximately three feet) cable risers.
Contrary to the above, On October 22, 2008; November 4, 2008; and November 6, 2008,
the licensee failed to implement a procedure for fire protection program implementation
in that Class A combustible materials were staged adjacent to cable risers contrary to
OP-AA-201-009. Specifically, a plastic chair was located less than two feet from cable
risers containing reactor protection system cables (October 22, 2008), an unattended
fiberglass cart with rags and tools in the upper tray was adjacent to a cable riser
containing emergency shutdown system cables (November 4, 2008), and a black foam
sheet of insulation material was left behind and adjacent to a cable riser containing reactor
protection system cables (November 6, 2008). Once identified, the licensee removed the
transient combustible materials and entered the issue into their corrective action program
(AR 00834512, AR 00841326, and AR 00841490). Because this violation was of very low
safety significance and it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, this
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000373/2008007-01(DRS);05000374/2008007-01(DRS)).
.4
Passive Fire Protection
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers,
penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical
cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed
barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details
and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such
as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National
Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire protection features met license
commitments.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe
material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire
doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of
penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the
installation met the engineering design.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5
Active Fire Protection
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and
detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of
Enclosure
8
the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design
documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis
documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations,
and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire suppression and
detection systems met license commitments.
b.
Findings
(1) Failure to Provide a Sprinkler System for Fire Zone 4F3
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of license
conditions 2.C(25) and 2.C(15) for Units 1 and 2, respectively, was identified by the
inspectors for the failure to install a sprinkler system in Fire Zone 4F3. Specifically, the
licensee had installed a pre-action spray system above the suspended ceiling in Fire Zone
4F3 instead of a pre-action sprinkler system as specified by the Fire Protection Report.
Description: Fire Zone 4F3 was centrally located on the ground floor of the auxiliary
building. In addition to serving as a chemistry laboratory area, the zone served as a cable
spreading area for Division I cables for both units. The cable spreading area was located
above the suspended ceiling for the chemistry laboratory facilities.
As part of licensing amendment 49, dated May 1980, the license committed to provide an
automatic sprinkler system for the cable concentration above the suspended ceiling in this
area. Additionally, Section H.3.4.18, Auxiliary Building Ground Floor - Fire Zone 4F3, of
the LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Report stated A pre-action sprinkler system is
located above the suspended ceiling to protect the cabling located there. The inspectors
noted that sprinkler systems generally have sprinklers located near the ceiling. The code
of record for sprinklers used at LaSalle County Station was NFPA 13-1976, Standard for
the Installation of Sprinkler Systems. The suppression system installed above the
suspended ceiling for Fire Zone 4F3 was not a sprinkler system and did not meet the
requirements of NFPA 13-1976. Specifically, Section 3-15.2.1 of NFPA 13-1976
required that listed sprinklers be used. The licensees installation used spray nozzles.
Section 4-3.2.1 of NFPA 13-1976 specified that deflectors of sprinklers be located 1 to
16 inches below floor decks (i.e., ceilings) for beam and girder construction. During
walkdowns of the Unit 1 portion of Fire Zone 4F3, the inspectors did not observe any
sprinklers or spray nozzles within 16 inches of the ceiling. The inspectors noted that the
suppression system installed was a spray system for the majority of cable trays located
above the suspended ceiling. Spray nozzles, connected to a water piping system, were
installed between or above cable trays to provide coverage for the majority of cable trays
installed above the suspended ceiling. The spray nozzles had 250 degree Fahrenheit
thermal elements with deflectors having a 65 degree conical spray pattern. The inspectors
consulted with the Fire Protection Branch within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR) on this issue and NRR concurred that the installed system did not meet the
licensing basis for LaSalle County Station.
The inspectors noted that sprinkler systems activate through plumes from a fire hitting a
ceiling with the resulting ceiling jets activating the nearest sprinkler head. As such,
sprinkler systems provide general area fire suppression and activate relatively quickly in
the event of a fire. In comparison, spray systems are generally designed with open (i.e.,
without thermal elements) spray nozzle heads and use a separate detection system for
Enclosure
9
activation. As such, spray systems are typically used to protect specific components from
fire (through activation of a separate detection system). In comparison, the spray system
installed in Fire Zone 4F3 was a pre-action system, which used closed heads for the spray
nozzles. The detection system for the spray system would cause a valve to open admitting
water to the spray piping. However, individual spray nozzle heads would also have to be
activated through localized heat for any water suppression to be provided. To activate
individual spray nozzles, either the overall hot gas layer temperatures for the area would
have to exceed 250 degrees Fahrenheit or a fire would have to be located in a cable tray
near a spray nozzle. The inspectors concluded that there typically would be considerable
delay in activation of the pre-action spray system installed versus a properly designed
sprinkler system for the area. As such, the inspectors determined that a closed-head spray
system would not provide an equivalent level of protection as a sprinkler system.
Specifically, the installed spray system was less capable than a sprinkler system because a
fire would be permitted to grow to a larger size and cause more damage as a result of
delayed actuation.
During a partial walkdown of the suppression system, the inspectors identified one section
of safety-related cable tray, which did not have spray coverage (cable tray nodes 232C,
232E, and 234E). The inspectors confirmed that the cable tray sections contained cables,
which supported safety-related emergency core cooling systems. The licensee presented
the argument that localized lack of coverage was acceptable because the purpose was to
only control a postulated fire and to prevent its spread to adjacent safety-related areas. The
licensee noted that the NRC had based acceptance of the spray systems for the
cable spreading rooms, in part on, this argument as documented in Section 9.5.1.2 of
NUREG-0519, Supplement 3, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2. The inspectors noted that the cable spreading rooms had
overhead sprinkler systems in addition to the spray systems installed for the cable trays.
The argument concerning the purpose being only to control postulated fires to prevent
spread to adjacent areas only applied to specific deviations from NFPA 15-1973, Standard
for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection, for the cable spreading room spray
systems and was not applicable to other deficiencies or Fire Zone 4F3. Additionally,
Section 9.5.1.2 of NUREG-0519, Supplement 1, and Section H.3.4.18 of the Fire Protection
Report indicated that the suppression system for Fire Zone 4F3 was for the cables above
the ceiling (as opposed to controlling a postulated fire and preventing its spread to adjacent
safety-related areas).
The licensee entered issues relating to spray coverage into their corrective action system as
AR 00840401, NRC Identified Inspection Findings in Aux Bldg Ceiling, and AR 00855527;
Rotate FP Water Spray Nozzle to Optimize Spray Pattern, dated December 12, 2008. The
licensee entered the issue of the installed spray system not meeting the licensing basis
description of a sprinkler system into their corrective action system as AR 00849044, NRC
Potential Finding; Chemistry Overlab FP System, dated November 21, 2008.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to install a sprinkler system in Fire Zone
4F3 was contrary to Section H.3.4.18 of the LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Report
and was a performance deficiency.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because the failure to install a sprinkler
system was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection
Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring capability
Enclosure
10
of systems to respond to initiating events such as fire. Specifically, the installed spray
system was less capable than a sprinkler system because a fire would be permitted to grow
to a larger size and cause more damage as a result of delayed system actuation.
In accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04,
Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 3b the inspectors
determined the finding degraded the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. Therefore,
screening under IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination
Process, was required. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis. The inspectors
determined that the high transient combustibles and hot work frequencies (1.7x10-3 per year
and 6.9x10-4 per year, respectively) from IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 4, Fire Ignition
Source Mapping Information: Fire Frequency, Counting Instructions, Applicable Fire
Severity Characteristics, and Applicable Manual Fire Suppression Curves, were applicable
due to the presence of the normally occupied chemistry laboratory and heat producing
equipment in the area. The inspectors also determined that, though Division I equipment
would be unavailable, at a minimum, the following equipment and capabilities would be
available: high pressure core spray, depressurization capability, one train of low pressure
injection, one train of containment heat removal capability, containment venting capability,
survival of injection path following containment failure, and late depressurization with one
train of injection. Based on review of the Transients worksheet from the Risk-Informed
Inspection Notebook for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Revision 2.1a, the
inspectors determined that a conditional core damage probability of 1x10-4 could be credited
due to remaining mitigation capability. For ease of analysis, the inspectors did not credit
any suppression capability. Based on the above information and Step 2.9 of IMC 0609,
Appendix F, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance
(i.e., Green) due to remaining mitigating system capability.
The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding.
Enforcement: License conditions 2.C(25) and 2.C(15) for Units 1 and 2, respectively,
required the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire
protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and as
approved through Safety Evaluation Reports. Appendix H, Fire Hazards Analysis, of the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, stated that the appendix had to be relocated to the
LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Report. Section H.3.4.18, Auxiliary Building Ground
Floor - Fire Zone 4F3, of the LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Report stated that a
pre-action sprinkler system was provided for the cables above the suspended ceiling. The
LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Report listed NFPA 13-1976 as the code of record
for sprinkler systems. Section 3-15.2.1 of NFPA 13-1976 required that listed sprinklers be
used. Section 4-3.2.1 of NFPA 13-1976 specified that deflectors of sprinklers be located
1 to 16 inches below floor decks for beam and girder construction.
Contrary to the above, as of November 21, 2008, the licensee failed to provide a pre-action
sprinkler system for Fire Zone 4F3. Specifically, the suppression system installed in
Fire Zone 4F3 was a spray system and did not meet the requirements for a sprinkler
system as described in NFPA 13-1976. The installed suppression system did not use listed
sprinklers and no sprinklers were within 16 inches of below the floor deck. Because this
violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensees corrective
action program as AR 00849044, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with
Enclosure
11
Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000373/2008007-02; 05000374/2008007-02).
.6
Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a.
Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required
for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the
rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding.
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess
conditions, such as, the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment Elevations, and
spray protection.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7
Alternative Shutdown Capability
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative safe
shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems
necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused
on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control,
reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system
functions.
The team conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably
be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment
labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked
at operator training, as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures
and any associated administrative controls.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified
.8
Circuit Analyses
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the
licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown.
On a sample basis, the inspectors verified that the cables of equipment required achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, in the event of fire in the selected fire zones, had
been properly identified. In addition, the inspectors verified that these cables had either
been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated
with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults
Enclosure
12
(e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In
order to accomplish this, the inspectors reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing
data for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components.
In addition, on a sample basis, the adequacy of circuit protective coordination for the safe
shutdown systems electrical power and instrumentation circuit protection were evaluated.
Also, on a sample basis, a cable tray that contains both safe shutdown and non-safe
shutdown cables was evaluated for proper circuit protection to ensure that cables are
protected by a proper protective device in order to preclude common enclosure concerns.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9
Communications
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample bases, the adequacy of the communication system to
support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire
brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered
phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors
reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that
either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator
actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As
part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency
lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations.
The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown
and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11
Cold Shutdown Repairs
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine whether repairs were
required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures,
equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors
Enclosure
13
also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the
licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment
necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.12
Compensatory Measures
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place
for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown
equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment,
passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions
or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review on the adequacy of short term
compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate
corrective actions were taken.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On November 21, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Rhoades,
and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered
proprietary.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment
1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
D. Rhoades, Plant Manager
E. Ballou, Mechanical Design Engineer
J. Bashor, Engineering Director
R. Dudley, Operations
W. Hilton, Design Engineering Manager
J. Houston, Regulatory Assurance
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight Manager
S. Marik, Operations Director
J. Miller, Mechanical and Structural Supervisor
T. Simkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager
M. Taylor, Corporate Fire Protection Engineer
J. Vergara, Regulatory Assurance
E. Zacharias, Plant Electrical Systems Supervisor
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Daley, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Safety
G. Roach, Senior Resident Inspection, LaSalle County Station
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened 05000373/2008007-01
Unauthorized Transient Combustibles05000373/2008007-02
Failure to Provide a Sprinkler System for Fire Zone 4F3
Closed 05000373/2008007-01
Unauthorized Transient Combustibles05000373/2008007-02
Failure to Provide a Sprinkler System for Fire Zone 4F3
Attachment
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
1R05 Fire Protection Calculations and Analyses (71111.05T)
L-000776; LaSalle Combustible Load for Fire Zone 4F3; Revision 5
L-001726; Hydraulic Analysis to Determine the Adequacy of the Service Water Pumps
to Function as Fire Pumps; Revision 2
L-001947; Safe Shutdown Control Circuit Breaker-Fuse Coordination; Revision 01
L--002771; GL 86-10 Operator Action Evaluation for Fuse Pulling in AEER and Valve
Manipulation in Reactor Building for Post Fire Safe Shutdown; Revision 0
L-003289; LaSalle Fire Detector Smoke Stratification Justification; Revision 0
EC 0000331385; Safe Shutdown Control Circuit Breaker-Fuse Coordination Calculation
Revision; dated December 20, 2001
GE-NE-A1300384-43-01; LaSalle County Station Power Uprate Project, Task 611:
Appendix R Fire Protection [Proprietary]; dated September 1999
Schirmer Engineering Corporation: Automatic Sprinkler System Calculation, LaSalle
County Station; dated January 26, 1984
Corrective Action Documents
AR 00369313; Multiple Spurious Actuations of ADS Valves; dated September 1, 2005
AR 00578440; Replace Smoke Detector with New Style Detector; dated
January 12, 2007
AR 00632819; Fireproofing Removed Requiring Compensatory Actions; dated
May 23, 2007
AR 00637145; 0B Diesel FP Activities; dated June 5, 2007
AR 00659506; Two Different Battery Models Installed in B Diesel Fire Pump; dated
August 10, 2007
AR 00671437; Overlab FP System - Could not Test All Detectors; dated
September 14, 2008
AR 00704946; NOS ID Fire Doors not Inspected Under Proper Surveillance; dated
November 29, 2007
Attachment
3
AR 00704957; NOS ID Fire Door Sealing Device does not Meet Hour Rating; dated
November 29, 2007
AR 00711394; 1FP01C Still Short Cycling; dated December 13, 2007
AR 00716061; Fire Door 284 Door Latch not Operating Properly; dated
December 28, 2007
AR 00747573; Fire Line Pipe Corrosion; dated March 10, 2008
AR 00750853; Fire Doors/Barrier Reclassification; dated March 17, 2008
AR 00761675; 0B Diesel Fire Pump Troubleshooting; dated April 10, 2008
AR 00783879; Local Alarm will not Sound - Building 33; dated June 6 2008
AR 00836266; Declining Trend in Transient Combustibles; dated October 27, 2008
AR 00841673; Transient Combustible Material Extent of Condition Walkdown; dated
November 7, 2008
CR L2001-02263; Potential Spurious Operations During CR or AEER Fire; dated
April 5, 2001
Corrective Action Documents Initiated as a Result of Inspection
AR 00834512; NRC Identified Combustibles During Walkdown with FP Engineer; dated
October 22, 2008
AR 00835086; NRC Identified Chair Not Removed Until Following Morning; dated
October 23, 2008
AR 00837934; NRC TRI: Passport D030 Discrepancy for DFP Pressure SW; dated
October 30, 2008
AR 00839030; NRC Identified Issues - LaSalle Triennial Inspection; dated
October 30, 2008
AR 00840401; NRC Identified Inspection Findings in Aux Bldg Ceiling; dated
November 4, 2008
AR 00840264; FP Report Document Problem - LaSalle Triennial Inspection; dated
November 4, 2008
AR 00840339; NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection; dated November 4, 2008
AR 00840381; NRC Identified SLICE (Cable Analysis) Discrepancies; dated
November 4, 2008
AR 00840833; NRC Triennial Inspection-Equip. Number Error on 1E-1-4220AC; dated
November 5, 2008
Attachment
4
AR 00841245; NRC Triennial: ELBP 1LL142E North Side Fixed Lamp Aiming; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841304; NRC Triennial Inspection - FPR H.4.6.2 Discrepancy; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841326; NRC ID: Transient Combustible Near Vertical Power Riser; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841364; NRC FP Triennial Inspection - Calc L-001947 Recommendation; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841433; NRC Triennial: FP Related Drawing Deficiencies; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841355; NRC Triennial: Smoke from AEER Fire Affecting Operator Actions; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841458; NRC Triennial: LOA-FX-101 - Fuse Orientation Description; dated
November 6, 2008
AR 00841490; NRC Triennial FP Inspection Walkdown; dated November 6, 2008
AR 00841494; NRC Triennial FP Inspection Walkdown; dated November 6, 2008
AR 00842109; NRC FP Triennial: DFP Start Sequencing Compliance with NFPA; dated
November 7, 2008
AR 00843614; NRC FP Inspection - FZ 4F3 Hydraulic Calc Retrieval Difficult; dated
November 11, 2008
AR 00846249; NRC Triennial Inspection - Discrepancy on Dwg 1E-2-4601BA; dated
November 17, 2008
AR 00846419; NRC Fire Protection Triennial Inspection; dated November 18, 2008
AR 00846433; 2008 NRC FP Triennial - Drawing Discrepancy 1E-4220AQ; dated
November 18, 2008
AR 00846729; NRC Triennial Inspection-Description of Codes Not Available; dated
November 18, 2008
AR 00846731; NRC Identified SRV Issue During FP Triennial Inspection; dated
November 18, 2008
AR 00846760; NRC Fire Protection Triennial; dated November 18, 2008
AR 00846783; NRC Triennial: Smoke Detectors Affect Any Other Functions; dated
November 18, 2008
AR 00847185; FPR Table H.4-59 and Table H.4-60 Incorrectly List Cable 1NB335 As
Supporting Control Room Recorder 1B21-R884A; dated November 19, 2008
Attachment
5
AR 00847328; NRC Triennial Inspection-Discrepancy on S/D 1E-2-4220CH; dated
November 19, 2008
AR 00847337; NRC Triennial: FP Related Drawing Deficiencies; dated
November 19, 2008
AR 00847578; NRC FP Triennial - The Safe Shutdown Cable Routing Drawings
Incorrectly Show that Cable 1RH360 is Routed in Fire Zone 4E1-1; dated
November 20, 2008
AR 00847709; NRC FP Inspection: AEER Roll-Up Door Evaluation Canceled; dated
November 20, 2008
AR 00848042; NRC FP Triennial - SLICE Fire Zone Data Reference Only; dated
November 21, 2008
AR 00848063; NRC FP Triennial Inspection: FP Spray Nozzle Orifice Size; dated
November 20, 2008
AR 00847728; NRC Identified Sprinkler Heat NFPA Code Deviation; dated
November 20, 2008
AR 00847809; NRC Triennial: LOA-FX-101(201) AEER Validation Order; dated
November 20, 2008
AR 00846788; NRC FP Triennial: DFP Start Sequencing, Timing; dated
November 18, 2008
AR 00849044; NRC Potential Finding, Chemistry Overlab FP System; dated
November 21, 2008
AR 00855527; Rotate FP Water Spray Nozzle to Optimize Spray Pattern; dated
December 12, 2008
Drawings
15; Cable Spreading Rooms Supervised Pre-action Systems; Revision 10
16A; Auxiliary Building Elevation 7490 Cable Spreading Room Details & Section
1E-1-3445; Electrical Installation Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Equipment Room Plan EL.
731-0 Col. 12-15 & J-N; Revision AU
1E-1-3465; Electrical Installation Control Room Plan EL. 768-0 Col. 12-15 & J-N;
Revision Z
1E-1-3663; Cable Pan Routing Aux. Bldg. Plan EL. 7106 Cols 12-15; Revision S
1E-1-3694M, Sheet 1; Safe Shutdown Cable Routing Aux. Bldg. Plan El. 731-0 Cols.
12-15; Revision; A
1E-1-3694M, Sheet 2; Safe Shutdown Cable Routing Schedules for Aux. Bldg. Plan EL.
731-0 Cols. 12-15; Revision; A
Attachment
6
1E-1-3694P, Sheet 1; Safe Shutdown Cable Routing Schedules for Aux. Bldg. Plan EL.
749-0 Cols. 12-15; Revision; A
1E-1-3694P, Sheet 2; Safe Shutdown Cable Routing Schedules for Aux. Bldg. Plan EL.
749-0 Cols. 12-15; Revision; A
1E-1-4018ZE; Loop Schematic Diagram - Containment Monitoring System CM, Part 5;
Revision Q
1E-1-4201AA; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 1
1E-1-4201AC; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C)
Part 3; Revision AA
1E-1-4201AD; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C)
Part 4; Revision AC
1E-1-4201AE; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C)
Part 5; Revision V
1E-1-4201AF; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 6;
Revision AA
1E-1-4201AG; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C)
Part 7; Revision
1E-1-4201AJ; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 9;
Revision G
1E-1-4201AK; Schematic Diagram - Auto Depressurization System NB (B21C)
Part 10; Revision F
1E-1-4203AK; Schematic Diagram - Main Steam/Nuclear Boiler System NB (B21),
Part 10; Revision Y
1E-1-4214AA; Schematic Diagram - Remote Shutdown System RS Part 1;
Revision K
1E-1-4220BD; Schematic Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 28;
Revision N
1E-1-4220BX; Schematic Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 46;
Revision R
1E-1-4220BY; Schematic Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 47;
Revision K
1E-1-4220CH; Schematic Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 56;
Revision M
1E-1-4379AC; Internal Wiring Diagram - 480V MCC Detail; Revision K
Attachment
7
1E-1-4391AB; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Reactor Building 480V MCC 136Y-1,
Part 2; Revision W
1E-1-4442AA; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Automatic Depressurization Channel
A Relay Vertical Board 1H13-P628, Part 1; Revision R
1E-1-4622AB; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - 125VDC Distr. Bus 1B and 125VDC
Dist. Panel 112Y; Revision T
1E-1-4622AC; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Automatic Depressurization
Channel A Relay Vertical Board 1H13-P628, Part 2; Revision AA
1E-1-4622AD; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Automatic Depressurization
Channel A Relay Vertical Board 1H13-P628; Revision J
1E-1-4622AF; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Automatic Depressurization
Channel A Relay Vertical Board 1H13-P628, Part 3; Revision G
1E-1-4624AB; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Automatic Depressurization
Channel B Relay Vertical Board 1H13-P631; Revision AB
1E-1-4658AH; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - Remote Shutdown Panel
1C61-P001, Part 6; Revision Z
1E-1-4696AB; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - ADS/SRV Valves Aux Relay Vertical
Board Div. 1, Panel 1H13-P644; Revision K
1E-1-4696AC; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - ADS/SRV Valves Aux Relay Vertical
Board Div. 1, Panel 1H13-P644; Revision F
1E-1-4697AB; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - ADS/SRV Valves Aux Relay Vertical
Board Div. 2, Panel 1H13-P645; Revision P
1E-1-4697AC; Internal/External Wiring Diagram - ADS/SRV Valves Aux Relay Vertical
Board Div. 2, Panel 1H13-P645; Revision G
81-78483; Cable Trays over Lab ceiling Unit 1 & 2, EL. 7106 Supervised Pre-action
System; Revision 1, Figure 9.5-1, Sheet 15 of 41; Fire Protection System EL 7490;
Revision 17
Figure 9.5-1; Sheet 17 of 41; Fire Protection System EL 7400; Revision 17
Figure 9.5-1; Sheet 22 of 41; Fire Protection System EL 7106; Revision 17
Supervised Pre-action Systems; Revision 10
Attachment
8
Miscellaneous
LSCS-FPR; LaSalle Station Fire Protection Report- Appendix H.4, Safe Shutdown
Analysis; Revision 3
DBD-LS-E09; LaSalle Units 1 and 2, Electrical Separation, Table 4.4.1-1 Redundant
and Non-Redundant Divisions; Revision 0
DBD-LS-E09; LaSalle Units 1 and 2, Electrical Separation, Table 4.4.1-2 Electrical
Raceway Separation Design Requirements and Design Basis; Revision 0
SLICE Version 7.6; LaSalle Unit 1 Cable Transaction Report (S102); 1986-1999
SLICE Version 7.6; LaSalle Unit 1 Fire Shutdown Cables/Fire Zone Report (S115);
1986-1999
SLICE Version 7.6; LaSalle Unit 1 Fire Zones/Fire Shutdown Cable Report (S116);
1986-1999
SLICE Version 7.6; LaSalle Unit 1 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Discrepancy List
Report (S143); 1986-1999
SLICE Version 7.6; LaSalle Unit 1 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Discrepancies -
Unresolved Report (S143); 1986-1999
AR 707263707263 LaSalle Station Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Preparatory Self
Assessment; July/August 2008
AR 576593576593 LaSalle Station Fire Protection Program Audit Report Audit NOSA-LAS-07-
09; dated December 5, 2007
AR 219447-05; LaSalle Station Focus Area Self-Assessment Report; dated June 2005
1C-7-0784-002; Actions Necessary to Address Valve Failures or Spurious Operations;
dated April 2, 1985
CT.5ENG.4, Appendix R Spurious Operation Analysis, Phase 1 Report (AT-144623-01);
Revision 0
Procedures
CC-AA-206; Exelon Nuclear-Fuse Control; Revision 5
LOA-FP-101; Unit 0 Fire Protection System Abnormal; Revision 2
LOA-FP-101; Unit 1 Fire Protection Abnormal; Revision 9
LOA-FX-101; Unit 1 Safe Shutdown with a Loss of Offsite Power and a Fire in the
Control Room or AEER; Revision 13
Attachment
9
LOA-FX-101- Attachment C; Repair of 1E12-F009, RHR Inboard Shutdown Cooling
Valve; Revision 13
LOP-RH-17; Alternate Shutdown Cooling; Revision 25
LOA-SRV-101; Unit 1 Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve; Revision 5
LOS-FP-M4 U1; FP Deluge Valve Lineup 1112018-01
OP-AA-201-009; Control of Combustible Material; Revision 7
OP-MW-201-007; Fire Protection System Impairment Control; Revision 6
Work Orders
980089736 01; Hydro Test all Fire Hoses per TS 4.7.5.4.D or Replace Fire Hose; dated
August 29, 2000
00639790 01; Hydro Test all Fire Hoses per TS 4.7.5.4.D or Replace Fire Hose; dated
November 14, 2005
01044223 01; Annual Inspection of FP Strainer for Cleanliness; dated June 25, 2008
00465471 01; Electrical Fire Penetration Inspection; dated January 28, 2004
960119253 01; Electrical Fire Penetration Inspection; dated August 20, 1997
980074104 01; Electrical Fire Penetration Inspection; dated October 30, 1997
99236634 01; Electrical Fire Penetration Inspection; dated January 31, 2003
112018 01; LOS-FP-M4 U1 Deluge Valve Lineup; dated June 6, 2008
849192 01; LOS-FP-R6 U-0 Cable Trays Over Labs Sprinkler Sys; dated July 13, 2007
952500 01; Overlab Cable Tray Sprinkler Sys Channel Function Test; dated
November 27, 2007
859933 01; U-1 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler Sys Channel Function Test; dated
January 12, 2007
992888 01; U-1 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler Sys Chan. Function Test, LES-FP-06;
dated January 11, 2008
Attachment
10
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Agency Documents Access Management System
Action Request
Final Safety Analysis Report
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
IP
Inspection Procedure
Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR
Inspection Report
Limited Liability Corporation
Non-Cited Violation
National Fire Protection Association
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Publicly Available Records System