ML093570497

Watts Bar, Unit 2 - Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 96, Table of Contents - Section 6 - Table of Contents, Engineered Safety Features Page 6-i Through 6.26-28

ML093570497
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	12/14/2009
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML093570497 (474)

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Table of Contents 6-iWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.0ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES6.1ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS6.1-16.1.1Metallic Materials6.1-16.1.1.1Materials Selection and Fabrication6.1-1 6.1.1.2Composition, Compatibility, and Stabi lity of Containment and Core Spray Coolants 6.1-26.1.2Organic Materials6.1-3 6.1.2.1Electrical Insulation6.1-36.1.2.2Surface Coatings6.1-36.1.2.3Ice Condenser Equipment6.1-4 6.1.2.4Identification Tags6.1-46.1.2.5Valves and Instruments within Containment6.1-46.1.2.6Heating and Ventilating Door Seals6.1-4 6.1.3Post-Accident Chemistry6.1-46.1.3.1Boric Acid, H3BO36.1-56.1.3.2Lithium Hydroxide6.1-5 6.1.3.3Sodium Tetraborate6.1-56.1.3.4Final Post-Accident Chemistry6.1-56.1.4Degree of Compliance with Regulatory Gu ide 1.54 for Paints and Coatings Inside Containment6.1-56.2CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2.1Containment Functional Design6.2.1-16.2.1.1Design Bases6.2.1-1 6.2.1.1.1Primary Containment Design Bases6.2.1-16.2.1.2Primary Containment System Design6.2.1-36.2.1.3Design Evaluation6.2.1-3 6.2.1.3.1Primary Containment Evaluation6.2.1-36.2.1.3.2General Description of Containment Pressure Analysis6.2.1-46.2.1.3.3Long-Term Containment Pressure Analysis6.2.1-46.2.1.3.4Short-Term Blowdown Analysis6.2.1-86.2.1.3.5Effect of Steam Bypass6.2.1-176.2.1.3.6Mass and Energy Release Data6.2.1-20 6.2.1.3.7Accident Chronology6.2.1-246.2.1.3.8Energy Balance Tables6.2.1-246.2.1.3.9Containment Pressure Differentials6.2.1-246.2.1.3.10Steam Line Break Inside Containment6.2.1-276.2.1.3.11Maximum Reverse Pressure Differentials6.2.1-336.2.2CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-16.2.2.1Design Bases6.2.2-1 Table of Contents 6-iiWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.2.2.2System Design6.2.2-36.2.2.3Design Evaluation6.2.2-56.2.2.4Testing and Inspections6.2.2-76.2.2.5Instrumentation Requirements6.2.2-86.2.2.6Materials6.2.2-86.2.3Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-16.2.3.1Design Bases6.2.3-16.2.3.1.1Secondary Containment Enclosures6.2.3-1 6.2.3.1.2Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)6.2.3-16.2.3.1.3Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)6.2.3-26.2.3.2System Design6.2.3-2 6.2.3.2.1Secondary Containment Enclosures6.2.3-26.2.3.2.2Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)6.2.3-76.2.3.2.3Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)6.2.3-106.2.3.3Design Evaluation6.2.3-126.2.3.3.1Secondary Containment Enclosures6.2.3-126.2.3.3.2Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)6.2.3-156.2.3.3.3Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)6.2.3-196.2.3.4Test and Inspections6.2.3-216.2.3.4.1Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)6.2.3-216.2.3.4.2Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)6.2.3-226.2.3.5Instrumentation Requirements6.2.3-236.2.3.5.1Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)6.2.3-236.2.3.5.2Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)6.2.3-236.2.4Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-16.2.4.1Design Bases6.2.4-16.2.4.2System Design6.2.4-46.2.4.2.1Design Requirements6.2.4-5 6.2.4.2.2Containment Isolation Operation6.2.4-56.2.4.2.3Penetration Design6.2.4-66.2.4.3Design Evaluation6.2.4-12 6.2.4.3.1Possible Leakage Paths6.2.4-146.2.4.4Tests and Inspections6.2.4-166.2.5Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-16.2.5.1Design Bases6.2.5-16.2.5.2System Design6.2.5-26.2.5.3Design Evaluation6.2.5-56.2.5.4Testing and Inspections6.2.5-5 6.2.5.5Instrumentation Application6.2.5-56.2.5.6Materials6.2.5-66.2.5AHydrogen Mitigation System6.2.5-6 Table of Contents6-iiiWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.2.5A.1Design Basis6.2.5-66.2.5A.2System Description6.2.5-66.2.5A.3Operation6.2.5-76.2.5A.4Safety Evaluation6.2.5-76.2.5A.5Testing6.2.5-76.2.6Containment Leakage Testing6.2.6-16.2.6.1Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test6.2.6-16.2.6.2Containment Penetration Leakage Rate Test6.2.6-2 6.2.6.3Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests6.2.6-66.2.6.4Special Testing Requirements6.2.6-66.3EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM6.3-16.3.1Design Bases6.3-16.3.1.1Range of Coolant Ruptures and Leaks6.3-1 6.3.1.2Fission Product Decay Heat6.3-26.3.1.3Reactivity Required for Cold Shutdown6.3-26.3.1.4Capability To Meet Functional Requirements6.3-2 6.3.2System Design6.3-26.3.2.1Schematic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams6.3-26.3.2.2Equipment and Component Design6.3-2 6.3.2.3Applicable Codes and Classifications6.3-176.3.2.4Materials Specifications and Compatibility6.3-176.3.2.5Design Pressures and Temperatures6.3-17 6.3.2.6Coolant Quantity6.3-186.3.2.7Pump Characteristics6.3-186.3.2.8Heat Exchanger Characteristics6.3-186.3.2.9ECCS Flow Diagrams6.3-186.3.2.10Relief Valves6.3-186.3.2.11System Reliability6.3-18 6.3.2.12Protection Provisions6.3-236.3.2.13Provisions for Performance Testing6.3-236.3.2.14Net Positive Suction Head6.3-24 6.3.2.15Control of Motor-Operated Isolation Valves6.3-246.3.2.16Motor-Operated Valves and Controls6.3-256.3.2.17Manual Actions6.3-25 6.3.2.18Process Instrumentation6.3-256.3.2.19Materials6.3-256.3.3Performance Evaluation6.3-256.3.3.1Evaluation Model6.3-256.3.3.2ECCS Performance6.3-26 6.3.3.3Alternate Analysis Methods6.3-266.3.3.4Fuel Rod Perforations6.3-276.3.3.5Evaluation Model6.3-27 Table of Contents6-ivWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.3.3.6Fuel Clad Effects6.3-276.3.3.7ECCS Performance6.3-276.3.3.8Peak Factors6.3-276.3.3.9Fuel Rod Perforations6.3-276.3.3.10Conformance with Interim Acceptance Criteria6.3-276.3.3.11Effects of ECCS Operation on the Core6.3-28 6.3.3.12Use of Dual Function Components6.3-286.3.3.13Lag Times6.3-306.3.3.14Thermal Shock Considerations6.3-30 6.3.3.15Limits on System Parameters6.3-306.3.3.16Use of RHR Spray6.3-306.3.4Tests and Inspections6.3-31 6.3.4.1Preoperational Tests6.3-316.3.4.2Component Testing6.3-326.3.4.3Periodic System Testing6.3-32 6.3.5Instrumentation Application6.3-336.3.5.1Temperature Indication6.3-336.3.5.2Pressure Indication6.3-33 6.3.5.3Flow Indication6.3-346.3.5.4Level Indication6.3-346.3.5.5Valve Position Indication6.3-356.4HABITABILITY SYSTEMS6.4-16.4.1 Design Bases6.4-1 6.4.2System Design6.4-16.4.2.1Definition of MCRHS Area6.4-16.4.2.2Ventilation System Design6.4-2 6.4.2.3Leak Tightness6.4-26.4.2.4Interaction with Other Zones and Pressure-Containing Equipment6.4-36.4.2.5Shielding Design6.4-4 6.4.2.6Control Room Emergency Provisions6.4-46.4.2.7MCRHS Fire Protection6.4-46.4.3System Operational Procedures6.4-5 6.4.4Design Evaluations6.4-76.4.4.1Radiological Protection6.4-76.4.4.2Toxic Gas Protection6.4-7 6.4.5Testing and Inspection6.4-96.4.6Instrumentation Requirements6.4-96.5FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEMS6.5-16.5.1Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Filter Systems6.5-1 6.5.1.1Design Bases6.5-16.5.1.2System Design6.5-26.5.1.3Design Evaluation6.5-5 Table of Contents 6-vWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.5.1.4Tests and Inspections6.5-56.5.1.5Instrumentation Requirements6.5-66.5.1.6Materials6.5-76.5.2Containment Spray System for Fission Product Cleanup6.5-86.5.2.1Design Bases6.5-86.5.2.2System Design6.5-8 6.5.2.3Design Evaluation6.5-86.5.2.4Tests and Inspections6.5-86.5.2.5Instrumentation Requirements6.5-8 6.5.2.6Materials6.5-86.5.3Fission Product Control Systems6.5-86.5.3.1Primary Containment6.5-8 6.5.3.2Secondary Containments6.5-106.5.4Ice Condenser as a Fission Product Cleanup System6.5-106.5.4.1Ice Condenser Design Basis (Fission Product Cleanup Function)6.5-116.5.4.2Ice Condenser System Design6.5-116.5.4.3Ice Condenser System Design Evalua tion (Fission Product Cleanup Function) 6.5-116.5.4.4Condenser System Tests and Inspections6.5-136.5.4.5Ice Condenser Materials6.5-136.6INSERVICE INSPECTION OF ASME CODE CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS 6.6-16.6.1Components Subject to Examination and/or Test6.6-16.6.2Accessibility6.6-16.6.3Examination Techniques and Procedures6.6-16.6.4Inspection Intervals6.6-1 6.6.5Examination Categories and Requirements6.6-16.6.6Evaluation of Examination Results6.6-16.6.7System Pressure Tests6.6-2 6.6.8Protection against Postulated Piping Failures6.6-26.7ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM6.7-16.7.1Floor Structure and Cooling System6.7-16.7.1.1Design Bases6.7-16.7.1.2Design Evaluation6.7-5 6.7.2Wall Panels6.7-86.7.2.1Design Basis6.7-86.7.2.2System Design6.7-86.7.2.3Design Evaluation6.7-96.7.3Lattice Frames and Support Columns6.7-9 6.7.3.1Design Basis6.7-96.7.3.2System Design6.7-126.7.3.3Design Evaluation6.7-13 Table of Contents6-viWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.7.4Ice Baskets6.7-146.7.4.1Design Basis6.7-146.7.4.2System Design6.7-156.7.4.3Design Evaluation6.7-186.7.5Crane and Rail Assembly6.7-206.7.5.1Design Basis6.7-20 6.7.5.2System Design6.7-206.7.5.3Design Evaluation6.7-216.7.6Refrigeration System6.7-21 6.7.6.1Design Basis6.7-216.7.6.2System Design6.7-226.7.6.3Design Evaluation6.7-25 6.7.7Air Handling Units6.7-296.7.7.1Design Basis6.7-296.7.7.2System Design6.7-30 6.7.7.3Design Evaluation6.7-316.7.8Lower Inlet Doors6.7-316.7.8.1Design Basis6.7-31 6.7.8.2System Design6.7-346.7.8.3Design Evaluation6.7-366.7.9Lower Support Structure6.7-37 6.7.9.1Design Basis6.7-376.7.9.2System Design6.7-396.7.9.3Design Evaluation6.7-40 6.7.10Top Deck and Doors6.7-496.7.10.1Design Basis6.7-496.7.10.2System Design6.7-51 6.7.11Intermediate Deck and Doors6.7-546.7.11.1Design Basis6.7-546.7.11.2System Design6.7-55 6.7.11.3Design Evaluation6.7-566.7.12Air Distribution Ducts6.7-576.7.12.1Design Basis6.7-57 6.7.12.2System Design6.7-586.7.12.3Design Evaluation6.7-586.7.13Equipment Access Door6.7-58 6.7.13.1Design Basis6.7-586.7.13.2System Design6.7-596.7.13.3Design Evaluation6.7-596.7.14Ice Technology, Ice Performance, and Ice Chemistry6.7-596.7.14.1Design Basis6.7-59 6.7.14.2System Design6.7-596.7.14.3Design Evaluation6.7-606.7.15Ice Condenser Instrumentation6.7-65 Table of Contents6-viiWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle Page6.7.15.1Design Basis6.7-656.7.15.2Design Description6.7-666.7.15.3Design Evaluation6.7-676.7.16Ice Condenser Structural Design6.7-686.7.16.1Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications6.7-686.7.16.2Loads and Loading Combinations6.7-68 6.7.16.3Design and Analytical Procedures6.7-686.7.16.4Structural Acceptance Criteria6.7-696.7.17Seismic Analysis6.7-70 6.7.17.1Seismic Analysis Methods6.7-706.7.17.2Seismic Load Development6.7-736.7.17.3Vertical Seismic Response6.7-74 6.7.18Materials6.7-746.7.18.1Design Criteria6.7-746.7.18.2Environmental Effects6.7-75 6.7.18.3Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B6.7-766.7.18.4Materials Specifications6.7-776.7.19Tests and Inspections6.7-786.8AIR RETURN FANS6.8-16.8.1Design Bases6.8-1 6.8.2System Description6.8-16.8.3Safety Evaluation6.8-26.8.4Inspection and Testing6.8-3 6.8.5Instrumentation Requirements6.8-3 Table of Contents6-viiiWATTS BARWBNP-76TABLE OF CONTENTS SectionTitle PageTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK List of Tables6-ixWATTS BARWBNP-76LIST OF TABLES SectionTitleTable 6.1-1Engineered Safety Feature MaterialsTable 6.2.1-1Structural Heat SinksTable 6.2.1-2Pump Flow Rates Vs. TimeTable 6.2.1-3Energy BalancesTable 6.2.1-4Energy BalancesTable 6.2.1-5Material Property Data Table 6.2.1-6TMD Inpu t for Watts BarrTable 6.2.1-7TMD Flow Inpu t Data For Watts BarTable 6.2.1-8Calculated Maximum Peak Pressures In Lower Compartment Elemen ts Assuming Unaugmented FlowTable 6.2.1-9Calculated Maximum Peak PressuresIn The Ice Condenser Compartm ent Assuming Unaugmented FlowTable 6.2.1-10Calculated Maximu m Differential Pressures Across The Operating Deck Or Lo wer Crane Wall Assuming Unaug-mented FlowTable 6.2.1-11Calculated Maximu m Differential Pressures Across The Upper Crane Wall Assuming Unaugmented FlowTable 6.2.1-12Sensitivity Studies For D. C. Cook Plant Table 6.2.1-13Watts Bar Ice C ondenser Design ParametersTable 6.2.1-14Allowable Leakage Area For Various Reactor Coolant System Break SizesTable 6.2.1-15Blowdown Data SummaryTable 6.2.1-16aBlowdown Double-Ended Pump Suction BreakTable 6.2.1-16b0.6 Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine Table 6.2.1-16d Double-Ended Ho t Leg Guillotine BreakTable 6.2.1-16eDouble-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine BreakTable 6.2.1-1719 Element W Reflood Model Table 6.2.1-18Reflood Data SummaryTable 6.2.1-19a Mass And Energy Releases Post-Blowdown Deps Guillotine Minimum Safeguards Table 6.2.1-19bMass And Energy Releases Post-Blowdown Double-Ended Pump Suc-tion Guillotine Maximum SafeguardsTable 6.2.1-19dMass And Energy Releas es 3 Ft2 Pump Suction SplitTable 6.2.1-19eMass And Energy Releases Double-Ended Hot Leg GuillotineTable 6.2.1-19fMass A nd Energy Releases Double-Ended Cold Leg GuillotineTable 6.2.1-20Watts Bar Ma ximum SI Post-Reflood Mass And Energy Release InformationTable 6.2.1-21Watts Bar Mi nimum SI Post-Reflood Mass And Energy Release InformationTable 6.2.1-22Available Energy Between 20.2 Psia And 14.7 PsiaTable 6.2.1-23Break Mass An d Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine List of Tables 6-xWATTS BARWBNP-76LIST OF TABLES SectionTitleTable 6.2.1-24Break Mass An d Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg BreakTable 6.2.1-25Double-Ended Pump Suction LOCATable 6.2.1-26aWatts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Max. S.I., W/FrothTable 6.2.1-26bWatts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/Froth Table 6.2.1-26c Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/FrothTable 6.2.1-26dWatts Bar Four Loop Plant 3 Ft2 Pump SuctionTable 6.2.1-26eWatts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Hot Leg Guillotine, Max. S.ITable 6.2.1-26fWatts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine, Max. S.ITable 6.2.1-27aSteam Line Break Blowdown Table 6.2.1-27bSteam Generator Enclosure GeometryTable 6.2.1-27dPeak Differe ntial Pressure - Steam Generator EnclosureTable 6.2.1-28Mass And Ener gy Release Rates Into Pressurizer Enclosure Table 6.2.1-29Pressurizer Geometric DataTable 6.2.1-29aPeak Differe ntial Pressure - Pressurizer Enclosure Table 6.2.1-30Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In2 Cold LegTable 6.2.1-31 Reactor Cavity VolumesTable 6.2.1-32Flow Path Data (Reactor Cavity)

Table 6.2.1-33Containment Data (Eccs Analysis)Table 6.2.1-34Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nucle-ar Plant Containment - Upper CompartmentTable 6.2.1-35Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nucle-ar Plant Containment - Upper CompartmentTable 6.2.1-36Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nucle-ar Plant Containment - Lower CompartmentTable 6.2.1-37Maximum Reverse Pressure Diff erential Pressure Analysis Base CaseTable 6.2.1-38Ice Condenser Steam Exit Fl ow vs. Time vs. Sump Temperature Table 6.2.1-39Table 6.2.1-40Steam Line Break Cases For Core IntegrityTable 6.2.1-41Line Break(1) Descrip tions For Mass And Energy ReleasesTable 6.2.1-42Small Break Descri ptions For Mass And EnergyTable 6.2.1-43Large Break Analysis - Associated TimesTable 6.2.1-44Small Break Analysis -

Small Split - Associated TimesTable 6.2.2-1CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP/MOTOR DESIGN PARAMETERSTable 6.2.2-2Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Design ParametersTable 6.2.3-1Dual Containment CharacteristicsTable 6.2.3-2Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Emergency Gas Treatment System List of Tables6-xiWATTS BARWBNP-76LIST OF TABLES SectionTitleTable 6.2.3-3Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTSTable 6.2.3-3Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)Table 6.2.4-1WATTS Bar Nuclear Plant Prim ary Containment and Shield Building Penetration Isolation System Data Sorted by: Containment Penetration NumberTable 6.2.4-2POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAG E PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDINGTable 6.2.4-3PREVENTION OF BYPASS LEAKAGE TO THE ATMOSPHERETable 6.2.4-4INSTRUMENT LINES PE NETRATING PRIM ARY CONTAIN-MENTTable 6.2.5-1Electric Hydrogen R ecombiner Typical ParametersTable 6.2.5-2Combustible Gas Control System Failure Mode and Effects AnalysisTable 6.2.6-1Penetrations Subj ected To Type B TestingTable 6.2.6-2aContainment Isolation Valv es Subjected to Type C TestingTable 6.2.6-2bValves Exempted From Type C Leak TestingTable 6.2.6-3Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration StatusTable 6.3-1Emergency Core Cooli ng System Component ParametersTable 6.3-2 Materials Employed For Emergency Core Cooling System ComponentsTable 6.3-3Sequence Of Change-Over Op eration, Injection To RecirculationTable 6.3-3aEVALUATION OF TIME SEQUENCE ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGEOVER OPERATION FROM INJECTION TO RECIRCU-LATIONTable 6.3-4NORMAL OPERATING STAT US OF EMERGENCY CORE COOL-ING SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR CORE COOLINGTable 6.3-5EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM SHAR ED FUNCTIONS EVALUATIONTable 6.3-6Maximum Recirculation Loop Leakage External To ContainmentTable 6.3-7DELETED BY AMENDMENT 85Table 6.3-8 Failure Modes And Effects Analysis For Active Failures For The Safety Injection SystemTable 6.3-9Failure Modes And Effects Anal ysis For The Safety Injection System (Passive Failures Recirc. Mode)Table 6.3-10 Principal Eccs Valve PositionsTable 6.3-11Normalized Decay HeatTable 6.4-1Air Leakage (Exfiltration)

Paths In The Watts Bar MCRHS Area Con-trol RoomTable 6.4-2Air Leakage (Infiltration) Paths In The Watts Bar Mcrhs Area Control RoomTable 6.5-1Regulatory Guide 1.52, Re

v. 2, Section Applicability For The Emergency Gas Treatment SystemTable 6.5-2Regulatory Guide 1.52, Re

v. 2, Section Applicability For The Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment SystemTable 6.5-3Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev.2, Section Applicability List of Tables6-xiiWATTS BARWBNP-76LIST OF TABLES SectionTitle For The Reactor Building Purge Ventilation SystemTable 6.5-4Regulatory Guide 1.52, Re

v. 2, Section Applicability For The Main Control Room Air Cleanup SubsystemTable 6.5-5ESF Air Cleanup Unit DataTable 6.5-6Deleted in FSAR Amendment 65Table 6.5-7Primary Containmen t Operation Following A DBATable 6.5-8Secondary Containmen t Operation Following A DBATable 6.7-1Wall Panel Design Loads(1)Table 6.7-2Ice Basket Load Summary Minimum Test Loads Table 6.7-3Summary Of Stresses In Basket Due To Design LoadsTable 6.7-4 Ice Basket Mate rial Minimum Yield StressTable 6.7-5Allowable Stress Limits (D

+ Obe) For Ice Basket MaterialsTable 6.7-6Allowable Stress Limits (D + Ss e), (D + Dba) For Ice Basket MaterialsTable 6.7-7Allowable Stress Limits (D

+ Sse + Dba) For Ice Basket MaterialsTable 6.7-8Ice Basket Clevis Pin Stress Summary Table 6.7-9Ice Basket Mounting Br acket Assembly Stress SummaryTable 6.7-10Ice Basket Plate Stress SummaryTable 6.7-11Ice Basket V-Bolt Stress Summary Table 6.7-12Ice Basket - Basket End Stress SummaryTable 6.7-13Ice Bucket Coupling Scre w Stress Summary3 Inch Elevation(1)Table 6.7-14Ice Bucket Coupling Scre w Stress Summary12 Foot Elevation(1)Table 6.7-15Ice Basket Coupl ing Screw Stress Summary 24 Foot Elevation(1)Table 6.7-16Ice Bucket Coupling Screw Stress Summary 36 Foot Elevation(1)Table 6.7-17Crane And Rail Assembly Design LoadsTable 6.7-18Refrigerati on System ParametersTable 6.7-18Refrigeration Syst em Parameters ContinuedTable 6.7-19Lower Inlet Door Design Parameters And LoadsTable 6.7-20Design Loads And Parameters Top Deck Table 6.7-21 Summary Of Results Upper Bl anket Door Structural Analysis - LocaTable 6.7-22Design Loads And Parameters Intermediate DeckTable 6.7-23Summary Of Waltz Mill TestsTable 6.7-24Ice Condenser RtdsTable 6.7-25Ice Condenser Allowable Limits (1)

Table 6.7-26Selection Of Structural Steels In Relation To Prevention of Non-Ductile Fracture Of Ice Condenser ComponentsTable 6.7-27Summary Of Watts Bar Loads - Tangential Case Obtained Using The Two-Mass Dynamic ModelTable 6.7-28Summary Of Watts Bar Loads - Radial Ca se Obtained Using The Two-Mass Dynamic ModelTable 6.7-29Summary Of Load Results Of Five Non-Linear Dynamic ModelsTable 6.7-30Summary Of Parameters Used In The Seismic Analysis List of Figures6-xiiiWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.1-1Containment Sump pH Versus TimeFigure 6.2.1-1Pressure vs. TimeFigure 6.2.1-2Temperature VS. TimeFigure 6.2.1-3Active and Inactive Sump Temperature TransientsFigure 6.2.1-4Ice Melt TransientFigure 6.2.1-4aIce Mass vs. Pressure Figure 6.2.1-5Plan at Equi ment Rooms ElevationFigure 6.2.1-6Containment Section ViewFigure 6.2.1-7Plan View at Ice Condenser Elevation Ice Condenser CompartmentsFigure 6.2.1-8Layout of Containment ShellFigure 6.2.1-9TMD Code NetworkFigure 6.2.1-10Upper and Lower Compartm ent Pressure Transient for WorstCase Break Compartment (Eleme nt 1) Having a DEHL BreakFigure 6.2.1-11Upper and Lower Compartm ent Pressure Transient for WorstCase Break Compartment (Eleme nt 1) Having a DECL Break.Figure 6.2.1-12Illustration of Choked Flow CharacteristicsFigure 6.2.1-13Sensitivity of Peak Pressure to Air Comrression RatioFigure 6.2.1-14Steam Concentration in a Vertical Distribution ChannelFigure 6.2.1-15Peak Comnression Pres sure Versus Compression RatioFigure 6.2.1-16Peak Compartment Pressure versus Blowdown RateFigure 6.2.1-17Sensitivity of Peak Compression Pressure to Deck Bypass Figure 6.2.1-18Pressure Increase versus Deck Area from De ck Leakage TestsFigure 6.2.1-19Energy Release at Time of Compression Peak Pressure From Full-Scale Section Tests with 1-Foot Diameter BasketsFigure 6.2.1-20Pressure Increase versus Deck Area from De ck Leakage Tests Figure 6.2.1-21Coolant Temperature at Core InletFigure 6.2.1-22Core Reflooding Rate - V inFigure 6.2.1-23Carryover Fraction - F outFigure 6.2.1-24Fraction of Flow through Broken Loop.Figure 6.2.1-25Post-Blowdown Down comer and Core Water Height.Figure 6.2.1-26Steam Generator Heat Content.Figure 6.2.1-27Containment Model Schematic.Figure 6.2.1-28Reactor Cavity TMD Network.

Figure 6.2.1-29Reactor Vessel AnnulusFigure 6.2.1-30127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-31127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-32127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-33127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-34127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-35127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-36127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-37127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-38127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-39127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

List of Figures6-xivWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.2.1-40127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-41127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-42127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-43127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-44127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-45127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-46127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-47127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-48127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-49127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-50127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-51127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-52127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-53127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-54127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity AnalysIS)Figure 6.2.1-55127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-56127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-57127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-58127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-59127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-60127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-61127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-62127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-63127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-64127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-65127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-66127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-67127 Square Inch Cold Le g Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-68127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break Reactor Cavity Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-69Compartment Temperature 1.4ft 2/Loop, 102% Power FCV FailureFigure 6.2.1-70Lower Compartment Pressu re 1.4 Ft2 Loop, 102% Power FCV FailureFigure 6.2.1-71Compartment Temperature 0.35 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW RunoutFigure 6.2.1-72Lower Compartment Pressure 0.35 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power Afw RunoutFigure 6.2.1-73Compartment Temperature 0.6 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW RunoutFigure 6.2.1-74Lower Compartment Pressure 0.6 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW Fail Figure 6.2.1-75

Figure 6.2.1-76 Figure 6.2.1-77 Figure 6.2.1-78 Figure 6.2.1-79 Figure 6.2.1-80 Figure 6.2.1-81Steam Generator Enclosure NodalizationFigure 6.2.1-82Flow Paths For TMD Steam Ge nerator Enclosure S hort-term Pressure Analysis List of Figures6-xvWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.2.1-83Pressure Transient Between Break Element And Upper Compartment (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-84Differential Pressure Tran sient Across The Steam Generator Vessel (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-85Differential Pressure Tran sient Cross The Steam Generator Vessel (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-86Pressure Versus Time For The Break Element (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-86aUpper Compartment Pressure Versus Time (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-87Nodalization Pr essure Enclosure AnalysisFigure 6.2.1-88Pressure Transient Between Break Element And Upper Compartment (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-89Pressure Differential Across The Pressurizer Vessel (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-90Pressure Differential Across The Pressurizer Vessel (Pressurizer Enclo-sure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-91Pressure Differenti al Across The Pressurizer Vessel (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.1-92Pressure Versus Time For The Break Element (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)Figure 6.2.2-1Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Flow Diagram Containment Spray SystemFigure 6.2.2-2Containment Spray Pump Performance Curves Figure 6.2.2-3Reactor Bldgs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System Piping Plan of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header AFigure 6.2.2-4Powerhouse-Auxiliary

& Reactor Bldgs Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System PipingFigure 6.2.2-5Reactor Blogs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System Pip-ing Plan of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header BFigure 6.2.2-6Reactor Bldgs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System Pip-ing Section of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header BFigure 6.2.3-1Typical Mechanical Penetration SeaksFigure 6.2.3-2Typical Purge Penetration ArrangementFigure 6.2.3-3Typical El ectrical PenetrationsFigure 6.2.3-4Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-5Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-6Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-7Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-8Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-9Auxiliary Build ing Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-10Auxiliary Bu ilding Isolation BarrierFigure 6.2.3-11Reactor Building - Units 1 & 2 Flow Diagram - Heat ing and Ventilation List of Figures6-xviWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitle Air FlowFigure 6.2.3-12Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 El ectrical Logic Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment SystemFigure 6.2.3-13Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 El ectrical Logic Diagram - Emergency Gas TreatmentFigure 6.2.3-14Powerhouse Unit 1 Electrical Logic Diagram -Emergency Gas Treat-mentFigure 6.2.3-15Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Elect rical Control Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment SystemFigure 6.2.3-15-SH-APowerhouse Unit 2 Electrical Control Diagram - Emergency Gas Treat-mentFigure 6.2.3-16Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Auxi liary Building -Flow Diagram -Heating

&Ventilating Air FlowFigure 6.2.3-17Post-Accident Annulus Pressu re and Reactor Unit Vent Flow Rate TransientsFigure 6.2.3-18Reactor Building Units 1

& 2 Mechanical Heat ing and VentilatingFigure 6.2.3-19Reactor Building Units 1

& 2 Mechanical Heat ing and VentilatingFigure 6.2.4-1Type 1, Main Stearn X-l3A, X-l3B, X-l3C, X-13D Figure 6.2.4-2Type II, Feedwater X-12A, X-l2B, X-12C, X-12DFigure 6.2.4-3Type III, Residual Heat Re moval Pump Return X-17, Pump Supply X-I07Figure 6.2.4-4Type IV and V (Type IV Socket Weld Ends, Type V Butt Weld Ends)Figure 6.2.4-5Type VI and VII (Type VI fo r Socket Weld SS Process Lines, Type VII for Butt Weld SS Process LinesFigure 6.2.4-6Type VIII, for Butt Weld C.S. Process LinesFigure 6.2.4-7Type IX, for SS Process LinesFigure 6.2.4-8Type X, Instrument Penetrations Figure 6.2.4-9Type XII, Emergency SumpFigure 6.2.4-10Type XI, Emergency SumpFigure 6.2.4-11Type XIII, Vent ilation Duct PenetrationFigure 6.2.4-12Type XIV, Equipment HatchFigure 6.2.4-13Type XV, Personnel AccessFigure 6.2.4-14Type XVI, Fuel Transfer Tube Figure 6.2.4-15Type XVII, Thimble Renewal LineFigure 6.2.4-16Type XVIII, Ice Blowing LineFigure 6.2.4-17Type XIX, Electrical PenetrationFigure 6.2.4-17AType XX Feedwater Bypass Penetrations X-8A, X-8B, X-8C, X-8DFigure 6.2.4-17BType XXI, Upper And Lo wer Cont ERCW Supply And Return CCW From Excess Letdown Heat Ex changer and from Pump OdolersFigure 6.2.4-17CType XXII Multi Line Penetration X-39Figure 6.2.4-17DType XXIII Instrument Room Chilled H20 Supply and ReturnFigure 6.2.4-17EType XXIV UHI X-l08, X*109Figure 6.2.4-18Mechanical Containment PenetrationsFigure 6.2.4-19Powerhouse Reactor Unit 1

& 2 Mechanical Sleeves-Shield Building List of Figures6-xviiWATTS BARWBNP-95 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.2.4-20Schematic Diagram of Leakage PathsFigure 6.2.4-21Electrical Logic Diagram Containment IsolationFigure 6.2.4-22Athrough 6.2.4-22II Deleted by Amendment 65Figure 6.2.4-23Ice Blowing and Negative Return Lines - Blind Flange DetailsFigure 6.2.5-1Deleted by Amendment 95 Figure 6.2.5-2De1eted By Amendment 62Figure 6.2.5-3Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 - Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air ConditioningFigure 6.2.5-4Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 Reactor Building - Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air ConditioningFigure 6.2.5-5Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 - Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air ConditioningFigure 6.2.5-6Function Flow Block Diagram - Containment Gas Monitor SubsystemFigure 6.2.5-7Deleted by Amendmen 95 Figure 6.2.5-7aDeleted by Amendment 95Figure 6.2.5-8Igniter Locations - Lo wer Compartment and Dead Ended CompartmentsFigure 6.2.5-9Igniter Locatio ns - Lower CompartmentsFigure 6.2.5-10Igniter Locations - U pper Plenum and Upper CompartmentsFigure 6.2.5-11Igniter Locations - Dome Figure 6.2.5-12Igniter Lo cations - ElevationFigure 6.3-1-1Powerhouse Unit 1 Safety Injection System - Flow DiagramFigure 6.3-1-2Powerhouse Unit 1 & 2 Electri cal Control Diagram - Safety Injection SystemFigure 6.3-1-2-SH-APowerhouse Unit 1 Electri cal Control Diagram - Safety Injection Sys-temFigure 6.3-1-3Powerhouse Unit 1 Electri cal Control Diagram Safety InjectionFigure 6.3-1-3-SH-APowerhouse Unit 2 Elect rical Control Diagram - Safety InjectionFigure 6.3-1-3-SH-BPowerhouse Unit 1 Elect rical Control Diagram - Safety InjectionFigure 6.3-2Performance Curves For The Residual Heat Removal PumpsFigure 6.3-3Performance Curves For The Safety Injection PumpsFigure 6.3-4Performance Curves For The Charging Pumps Figure 6.3-5Sheets 1 and 2, deleted by Amendment 63Figure 6.3-6Containment SumpFigure 6.5-1Ice Condenser Figure 6.7-1Isometric of Ice CondenserFigure 6.7-2Floor StructureFigure 6.7-3Wear Slab Top Surface Area Showing Typical Coolant Piping LayoutFigure 6.7-4Lattice Frame OrientationFigure 6.7-5Load Distribution for Tangential Seismic and Blowdown Loads in Analytical ModelFigure 6.7-6Lattice FrameFigure 6.7-7Lattice Frame Analysis Model List of Figures6-xviiiWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.7-8Typical Bottom Ice Basket AssemblyFigure 6.7-9Combinations of Concentric Axial Load and Distribution Load ThatWill Cause Failure of a Perforated Metal Ice Condenser Basket MaterialFigure 6.7-10Crane AssemblyFigure 6.7-11Crane Rail AssemblyFigure 6.7-12Refrigerant Cycle Diagram Figure 6.7-13Glycol Cycl e to Each ContainmentFigure 6.7-14Schematic Flow Di agrams of Air Cooling CycleFigure 6.7-15Air Handling Unit Support Structure Figure 6.7-16Flow Area - Pressure DifferentialFigure 6.7-17Lower Inlet Door AssemblyFigure 6.7-18Details of Lower Inlet Door Showing Hinge, Pr oportioning Mechanism Limit Switches and SealsFigure 6.7-19Inlet Door Frame AssemblyFigure 6.7-20Inlet Door Panel Assembly Figure 6.7-21Lower Inlet Door Shock Absorber AssemblyFigure 6.7-22Four Loop Ice Condenser Lower Support Structure Conceptual Plan and SectionsFigure 6.7-23Four Loop I ce Condenser Lower Support St ructure General AssemblyFigure 6.7-24ANTS Model AssemblyFigure 6.7-25Finite Elemen t Model of Ported FrameFigure 6.7-26Schematic Diagram of Forces Applied to Three Pier Lower Support StructureFigure 6.7-27Force Transient Hot Leg Break Figure 6.7-28DLF Spectra Hot Leg Break Force TransientFigure 6.7-29Top Deck Test AssemblyFigure 6.7-30Details of Top Deck Door AssemblyFigure 6.7-31Intermediate Deck Door AssemblyFigure 6.7-32Air Distribution DuctFigure 6.7-33Air Distribution Duct Figure 6.7-34Phase Diagram for Na 2 B 4 0 7.10 H 2 O/Water System at One Atmo-sphereFigure 6.7-35Ice Bed Compaction Versus Time Figure 6.7-36Test Ice Bed Compaction Versus Ice Bed HeightFigure 6.7-37Total Ice Compac tion Versus Ice Bed HeightFigure 6.7-38Ice Condenser RTD location Figure 6.7-39Block Diagram Ice Conde nser Temperature Monitoring SystemFigure 6.7-40Door Monitoring ZonesFigure 6.7-41Powerhouse Unit 1 Wiring Di agram Ice Condenser System Schematic DiagramsFigure 6.7-42Deleted by Amendment 89 Figure 6.7-43Deleted by Amendment 89Figure 6.7-44Model of Horizont al Lattice Frame StructureFigure 6.7-45Group of Six In terconnected Lattice Frames List of Figures6-xixWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleFigure 6.7-46Lattice Frame lce Basket GapFigure 6.7-47Typical Displacement Time Histories for l2-Foot Basket with End Supports - Pluck TestFigure 6.7-48Non Linear Dynamic ModelFigure 6.7-493-Mass Tange ntial Ice Basket ModelFigure 6.7-509-Mass Radi al Ice Basket ModelFigure 6.7-5148-Foot Beam ModelFigure 6.7-52Phasing Mass Model of Adjacent Lattice Frame BaysFigure 6.7-53Phasing Study Model, 1 Leve l Lattice Frame 300 Degrees Non-Linear ModelFigure 6.7-54Typical Cr ane Wall DisplacementFigure 6.7-55Typical Ice Bask et Displacement ResponseFigure 6.7-56Typical Ice Basket Impact Force ResponseFigure 6.7-57Typical Crane Wall Panel Load ResponseFigure 6.7-58Wall Panel Design Load Di stribution Obtained Using the 48-Foot Beam Model Tangential CaseFigure 6.7-59Wall Panel Design Load Di stribution Obtained Using the 48-Foot Beam Model Radial Case List of Figures6-xxWATTS BARWBNP-91 LIST OF FIGURES SectionTitleTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS 6.1-1WATTS BARWBNP-8506-1_Part_01_of_02_LTR.pdf 6.0 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS 6.1.1 Metallic Materials

6.1.1.1 Materials Sele ction and FabricationTypical material specifications used for the principal pressure retaining applications in components in the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) are listed in Table 6.1-1. All materials utilized are procured in accordance with the material specification requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, plus applicable and appropriate Addenda and Code Cases.The welding materials used for joining the ferritic base materials of the ESF conform to, or are equivalent to, ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.20. The welding materials used for joining nickel-chromium-iron alloy in similar base material combination and in dissimilar ferritic or austenitic base material combination conform to ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.11 and 5.14. The welding materials used for Joining the austenitic stainless steel base materials conform to ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.4 and 5.9. These materials are tested and qualified to the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III and Section IX rules and are used in procedures which have been qualified to these same rules. The methods utilized to control delta ferrite content in austenitic stainless steel weldm ents are discussed in Section 5.2.5.7.All parts of components in contact with borated water are fabricated of or clad with austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material. The integrity of the safety-related components of the ESF is maintained during all stages of component manufacture. Austenitic stainless steel is utilized in the final heat treated condition as required by the respective ASME Code Section II material specification for the particular type or grade of alloy. Furthermore, it is required that austenitic stainless steel materials used in the ESF components be handled, protected, stored, and cleaned according to recognized and accepted methods which are designed to minimize contamination which could lead to stress corrosion cracking. The rules covering these controls are stipulated in Westinghouse process specifications, which are discussed in Section 5.2.5.1. Additional information concerning austenitic stainless steel, including the avoidance of sensitization and the prevention of intergranular attack, can be found in Section 5.2.5. No cold worked austenitic stainless steels having yield strengths greater than 90,000 psi are used for components of the ESF within the Westinghouse standard scope.Westinghouse supplied components within the containment that would be exposed to core cooling water and containment sprays in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident utilize materials listed in Table 6.1-1. These components are manufactured primarily of stainless steel or other corrosion resistant, high temperature material. The integrity of the materials of construction for ESF equipment when exposed to post design basis accident (DBA) conditions has been evaluated. Post-DBA conditions were

6.1-2ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS WATTS BARWBNP-85conservatively represented by test conditions. The test program

[1] performed by Westinghouse considered spray and core cooling solutions of the design chemical compositions, as well as the design chemical compositions contaminated with corrosion and deterioration products which may be transferred to the solution during recirculation. The effects of sodium (free caustic), chlorine (chloride), and fluorine (fluoride) on austenitic stainless steels were considered. Based on the results of this investigation, as well as testing by ORNL and others, the behavior of austenitic stainless steels in the post-DBA environment will be very acceptable. No cracking is anticipated on any equipment even in the presence of postulated levels of contaminants, provided the core cooling and spray solution pH is maintained at an adequate level. The inhibitive properties of alkalinity (hydroxyl ion) against chloride cracking and the inhibitive characteristic of boric acid on fluoride cracking have been demonstrated. Coatings on exposed surfaces within the containment are not subject to breakdown under exposure to the spray solution and can withstand the temperature and pressure expected in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.6.1.1.2 Composition, Compatibility, and Stability of Containment and Core Spray CoolantsThe vessels used for storing ESF coolants include the accumulators and the refueling water storage tank.The accumulators are carbon steel clad with austenitic stainless steel. Because of the corrosion resistance of these materials, significant corrosive attack on the storage vessels is not expected.The accumulators are vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The nominal boron concentration, as boric acid, is 2000 ppm. Samples of the solution in the accumulators are taken periodically for checks of boron concentration. Principal design parameters of the accumulators are listed in Table 6.3-1.The refueling water storage tank is a source of borated cooling water for injection. The nominal boron concentration, as boric acid, is 2050 ppm, which is below the solubility limit at freezing. The temperature of the refueling water is maintained above freezing. Principal design parameters of the refueling mater storage tank are given in Section 9.2.7.The ice in the ice condenser is borated by adding sodium tetraborate to the ice. The aqueous solution resulting from the melted ice has a nominal boron concentration of 1900 +100 ppm. In the event of an accident, this solution would be delivered to the containment sump. Containment sump pH is also controlled by the sodium tetraborate in the ice. The pH of the ice is maintained between 9.0 and 9.5, which results in a sump pH of approximately 8.1.Information concerning hydrogen release by the corrosion of containment metals and the control of the hydrogen and combustible gas concentrations within the containment following a LOCA is discussed in Section 6.2.5.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS 6.1-3WATTS BARWBNP-85 6.1.2 Organic MaterialsFor paints and coatings inside containment, the conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 is described in Section 6.1.4.Organic materials within the primary containment are identified and quantified according to the following categories: electrical insulation, surface coatings, ice condenser equipment, and identification tags for valves and instruments. There is no wood or asphalt inside the containment.The information in this section is based on a single reactor unit.

6.1.2.1 Electrical Insulation 6.1.2.2 Surface CoatingsSteel surfaces are undercoated with a 2-mil thickness of a coating that is 85% zinc in a silicate binder (carbozinc 11).Protective coatings for use in the reactor containment have been evaluated as to their suitability in post-DBA conditions. Tests have shown that the epoxy and modified phenolic systems are the most desirable of the generic types evaluated for in-containment use. This evaluation considered resistance to high temperature and chemical conditions anticipated following a LOCA, as well as high radiation resistance

[2].MaterialMass, lbsSilicone Rubber7430Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC)3850Polyethylene Type Materials:Polyethylene2920Hypalon (chlorsulfonated polyethylene)390 Polyolefins200 Semiconducting plastic370MaterialMass, lbsConcrete Surfaces:Epoxy 2070Phenolic-epoxy 300Steel Surfaces:Phenolic-epoxy 1810 6.1-4ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS WATTS BARWBNP-85 6.1.2.3 Ice Conde nser Equipment 6.1.2.4 Identification Tags6.1.2.5 Valves and Instruments within ContainmentDiaphragms, O-Rings, Solenoid Seals:Buna-N (acrylonitrile-butadiene) 130 6.1.2.6 Heating and Ve ntilating Door SealsNeoprene (chloroprene) 1006.1.3 Post-Accident ChemistryFollowing a LOCA, the emergency core cooling solution recirculated in containment is composed of boric acid (H 3 BO 3) from the reactor coolant, refueling water storage tank (RWST), cold leg accumulators and affected injection piping, lithium hydroxide (LiOH) from the reactor coolant and sodium tetraborate (Na 2 B 4 O 7) from the ice in the ice condenser.MaterialMass, lbsLower Door Seals (Styrene butadiene)530Equipment Access Door Seals (Natural rubber) 5Vent curtain (Laminated mylar) 5Ice Condenser Seal:Natural Rubber600Nylon360Miscellaneous Washers: Noryl SEIOO (phenylene oxide)50Gasketing Material:Neoprene5060Drain Line Expansion JointMaterialMass, lbs Valves:ABS (acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene) 50Instruments:ABS (acylonitrile-butadiene-styrene) 30 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS 6.1-5WATTS BARWBNP-85 6.1.3.1 Boric Acid, H 3 BO 3Boric acid at a maximum concentration of 2000 ppm boron, is found in the reactor coolant loop (4 loops, reactor vessel, pressurizer), and boric acid at a maximum concentration of 2100 ppm boron is found in the cold leg injection accumulators, refueling water storage tank, and associated piping. This limit may be exceeded during Mode 6 operation. These subsystems, when at maximum volume, represent a total mass of boric acid in the amount of 49,254 pounds.

6.1.3.2 Lithium HydroxideLithium Hydroxide at a maximum concentration of 7.6 ppm lithium is found in the reactor coolant system for pH control.6.1.3.3 Sodium TetraborateSodium tetraborate is an additive in the ice stored in the ice condenser for the purpose of maintaining containment sump pH of at least 8.1 after all the ice has melted.The minimum analysis amount of ice in storage is 2.125 x 10 6 lbs. Boric acid and NaOH are formed during ice melt following a LOCA according to the following equation: 6.1.3.4 Final Post-Accident ChemistryIn the event of an accident, the final soluble acid and soluble base concentrations for a mixture of all containment and core cooling solutions have been calculated to be 5.13 x 10 5 moles (boric acid equivalent) and 7.6 x 10 4 moles (sodium hydroxide equivalent), respectively. These calculations are based on the acid and base inventories of boric acid, and sodium tetraborate.The final post-accident sump pH is approximately 8.1. The estimated time history of the sump pH is shown in Figure 6.1-1.6.1.4 Degree of Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 for Paints and Coatings Inside ContainmentTVA is committed to adhere to Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 and ANSI N45.2 as required to produce a quality end product. Basically, it is TVA's position that the Quality Assurance Program (QA) for protective coatings inside the containment should control four activities in the coating program. The four major areas to be controlled are:

(1)The coating material itself, by extending requirements on the manufacturing process and qualification of coating systems through the use of applicable portions of ANSI Standards N101.2 and N512.

(2)The preparation of the surface to which coatings are to be applied.

Na 2 B 4 O 7 7 H 2 O+2 NaOH 4 H 3 BO 3+

6.1-6ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (3)The inspection process.

(4)The application of the coating systems.All four of these controlled activities have appropriate documentation and records to meet Appendix B requirements.TVA agrees with Regulatory Guide 1.54, except the endorsement to ANSI N101.4 in paragraph C.1.TVA's protective coating application program within the containment is in conformance with Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and ANSI N45.2. In addition, applicable provisions found in ANSI N101.4 have been incorporated into TVA surface preparation, coating application/inspection specifications, and coating QA procedures.Controlled coatings are accounted for and maintained within the limits specified in the analysis for containment coatings and in the transport analysis for the zone of influence. The zone of influence is defined as that area at the water surface into which a falling paint particle does not settle to the bottom, but rather, is transported to the trash rack screens by the flow of water.REFERENCES (1)WCAP-7803, "Behavior of Austenitic Stainless Steel in Post Hypothetical Loss of Coolant Environment." (2)WCAP-7825, "Evaluation of Protective Coatings for Use in Reactor Containment."

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS 6.1-7WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.1-1 Engineered Safety Feature Materials Valves BodysBonnets DiscsSA182 Type F316 or SA351 Gr CF8 or CF8MSA182 Type F316 or SA351 Gr CF8 or CF8M SA182 Type F316 or SA564 Gr 630 Cond 1100°F Heat Treat- ment or SA351 Gr CF8 or CF8MPressure Retaining BoltingPressure Retaining NutsSA453 Gr 660SA453 Gr 660 or SA194 Gr 6Auxiliary Heat Exchangers HeadsNozzle Necks

Tubes Tube Sheets

ShellsSA240 Type 304SA182 Gr F304 SA 213 TP304 SA182 Gr F304 SA240 and SA312 Type 304Auxiliary Pressure Vessels, Tanks, Filters, etc.Shells & Heads3SA351 Gr CF8A and SA240 Type 304 or SA264 Clad Plate of SA516 Gr 70 with SA240 Type 304L Clad - Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 AnalysisFlanges & NozzlesSA182 Gr F304 or SA105 with SA240 Type 304 and Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 AnalysisPipingSA312 and SA240 TP304 or TP316 SeamlessPipe FittingsSA403 WP304 Seamless Closure Bolting & NutsSA193 Gr B7 and SA194 Gr 2H 6.1-8ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS WATTS BAR WBNP-0Auxiliary PumpsPump Casing & HeadsSA351 Gr CF8 or CF8M, SA182 Gr F304 or F316Flanges & NozzlesSA182 Gr F304 or F316, SA403 Gr WP316L SeamlessStuffing or Packing Box CoverSA351 Gr CF8 or CF8M, SA240 TP304 or TP316Closure Bolting & NutsSA193 Gr B6, B7 or B8M and SA194 Gr2H or Gr8M, SA193 Gr B6, B7 or B8M; SA453 Gr 660; and Nuts, SA194 Gr 2H, Gr 8M, and Gr 6Table 6.1-1 Engineered Safety Feature Materials (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS6.1-9WATTS BAR WBNP-85 yFigure 6.1-1 Containment Sump pH Versus Time

6.1-10ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALSWATTS BAR WBNP-85 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-1WATTS BARWBNP-856.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2.1 Containment Functional Design 6.2.1.1 Design Bases

6.2.1.1.1 Primary Containment Design BasesThe containment is designed to assure that an acceptable upper limit of leakage of radioactive material is not exceeded under design basis accident conditions. For purposes of integrity, the containment may be considered as the containment vessel and containment isolation system. This structure and system are directly relied upon to maintain containment integrity. The emergency gas treatment system and Reactor Building function to keep out-leakage minimal (the Reactor Building also serves as a protective structure), but are not factors in determining the design leak rate.The containment is specifically designed to meet the intent of the applicable General Design Criteria listed in Section 3.1. This section, Chapter 3, and other portions of Chapter 6 present information showing conformance of design of the containment and related systems to these criteria.The ice condenser is designed to limit the containment pressure below the design pressure for all reactor coolant pipe break sizes up to and including a double-ended severance. Characterizing the performance of the ice condenser requires consideration of the rate of addition of mass and energy to the containment as well as the total amounts of mass and energy added. Analyses have shown that the accident which produces the highest blowdown rate into a condenser containment will result in the maximum containment pressure rise; that accident is the double-ended guillotine or split severance of a reactor coolant pipe. The design basis accident for containment analysis based on sensitivity studies is therefore the double-ended guillotine severance of a reactor coolant pipe at the reactor coolant pump suction. Post-blowdown energy releases can also be accommodated without exceeding containment design pressure. The functional design of the containment is based upon the following accident input source term assumptions and conditions:

(1)The design basis blowdown energy of 318 x 10 6 Btu and mass of 493 x 10 3 lb put into the containment.

(2)A reactor power of 3579 MWt (plus 2% allowance for calorimetric error).

6.2-2CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (3)The minimum engineered safety features are (i.e., the single failure criterion applied to each safety system) comprised of the following: (a)The ice condenser which condenses steam generated during a LOCA, thereby limiting the pressure peak inside the containment (see Section 6.7).(b)The containment isolation system which closes those fluid penetrations not serving accident-consequence limiting purposes (see Section 6.2.4).(c)The containment spray system which sprays cool water into the containment atmosphere, thereby limiting the pressure peak (particularly in the long term - see Section 6.2.2).(d)The emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) which produces a slightly negative pressure within the annulus, thereby precluding out-leakage and relieving the post-accident thermal expansion of air in the annulus (see Section 6.5.1).(e)The air return fans which return air to the lower compartment.Consideration is given to subcompartment differential pressure resulting from a design basis accident discussed in Sections 3.8.3.3, 6.2.1.3.9, and 6.2.1.3.4. If a design basis accident were to occur due to a pipe rupture in these relatively small volumes, the pressure would build up at a faster rate than in the containment, thus imposing a differential pressure across the wall of these structures.Parameters affecting the assumed capability for post-accident pressure reduction are discussed in Section 6.2.1.3.3. Three events that may result in an external pressure on the containment vessel have been considered:

(1)Rupture of a process pipe where it passes through the annulus.

(2)Inadvertent air return fan operation during normal operation.

(3)Inadvertent containment spray system initiation during normal operation.The design of the guard pipe portion of hot penetrations is such that any process pipe leakage in the annulus is returned to the containment. All process piping which has potential for annulus pressurization upon rupture is routed through hot penetrations. Section 6.2.4 discusses hot penetrations.Inadvertent air return fan operation during normal operation opens the ice condenser lower inlet doors, which in turn, results in sounding an alarm in the MCR. Even with a hypothetical situation in which the operator cannot shut off the air return fan, the

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-3WATTS BARWBNP-85operator has the capability of opening an eight inch vacuum relief line (Penetration X-8O, Section 6.2.4) to relieve the net external design pressure.The logic and control circuits of the containment spray system are such that inadvertent containment spray would not take place with a single failure. The spray pump must start and the isolation valve must open before there can be any spray. In addition, the Watts Bar containment is so designed that even if an inadvertent spray occurs, containment integrity is preserved without the use of a vacuum relief.The containment spray system is automatically actuated by a hi-hi containment pressure signal from the solid state protection system (SSPS). To prevent inadvertent automatic actuation, four comparator outputs, one from each protection set are processed through two coincidence gates. Both coincidence gates are required to have at least two high inputs before the output relays, which actuate the containment spray system, are energized. Separate output relays are provided for the pump start logic and discharge valve open logic. Additional protection is provided by an interlock between the pump and discharge valve, which requires the pump to be running before the discharge valve will automatically open.Section 3.8.2 describes the structural design of the containment vessel. The containment vessel is designed to withstand a net external pressure of 2.0 psi. The containment vessel is designed to withstand the maximum expected net external pressure in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure and Vessel Code Section III, paragraph NE-7116.

6.2.1.2 Primary Cont ainment System DesignThe containment consists of a containment vessel and a separate Shield Building enclosing an annulus. The containment vessel is a freest anding, welded steel structure with a vertical cylinder, hemispherical dome, and a flat circular base. The Shield Building is a reinforced concrete structure similar in shape to the containment vessel. The design of these structures is described in Section 3.8.The design internal pressure for the containment is 13.5 psig, and the design temperature is 250°F. The design basis leakage rate is 0.25%/24 hr. The design methods to assure integrity of the containment internal structures and sub-compartments from accident pressure pulses are described in Section 3.8.6.2.1.3 Design Evaluation 6.2.1.3.1 Primary Containment Evaluation (1)The leaktightness aspect of the secondary containment is discussed in Section 6.2.5. The primary containment's leaktightness does not depend on the operation of any continuous monitoring or compressor system. The leak testing of the primary containment and its isolation system is discussed in Section 6.2.6.

6.2-4CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (2)The acceptance criteria for the leaktightness of the primary containment are such that at containment design pressure, there is a 25% margin between the acceptable maximum leakage rate and the maximum permissible leakage rate.6.2.1.3.2 General Description of Containm ent Pressure AnalysisThe time history of conditions within an ice condenser containment during a postulated loss of coolant accident can be divided into two periods for calculation purposes:

(1)The initial reactor coolant blowdown, which for the largest assumed pipe break occurs in approximately 10 seconds.

(2)The post blowdown phase of the accident which begins following the blowdown and extends several hours after the start of the accident.During the first few seconds of the blowdown period of the reactor coolant system, containment conditions are characterized by rapid pressure and temperature transients. It is during this period that the peak transient pressures, differential pressures, temperature and blowdown loads occur. To calculate these transients a detailed spatial and short time increment analysis was necessary. This analysis was performed with the TMD computer code with the calculation time of interest extending up to a few seconds following the accident initiation.Physically, tests at the ice condenser Waltz Mill test facility have shown that the blowdown phase represents that period of time in which the lower compartment air and a portion of the ice condenser air are displaced and compressed into the upper compartment and the remainder of the ice condenser. The containment pressure at or near the end of blowdown is governed by this air compression process. The containment compression ratio calculation is described in Section 6.2.1.3.4.Containment pressure during the post blowdown phase of the accident is calculated with the LOTIC code which models the containment structural heat sinks and containment safeguards systems.6.2.1.3.3 Long-Term Cont ainment Pressure AnalysisEarly in the ice condenser development program it was recognized that there was a need for modeling of long-term ice condenser containment performance. It was realized that the model would have to have capabilities comparable to those of the dry containment (COCO) model. These capabilities would permit the model to be used to solve problems of containment design and optimize the containment and safeguards systems. This has been accomplished in the development of the LOTIC code[1].The model of the containment consists of five distinct control volumes; the upper compartment, the lower compartment, the portion of the ice bed from which the ice has melted, the portion of the ice bed containing unmelted ice, and the dead ended compartments. The ice condenser control volume with unmelted ice is further CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-5WATTS BARWBNP-85subdivided into six subcompartments to allow for maldistribution of break flow to the ice bed.The conditions in these compartments are obtained as a function of time by the use of fundamental equations solved through numerical techniques. These equations are solved for three distinct phases in time. Each phase corresponds to a distinct physical characteristic of the problem. Each of these phases has a unique set of simplifying assumptions based on test results from the ice condenser test facility. These phases are the blowdown period, the depressurization period, and the long term.The most significant simplification of the problem is the assumption that the total pressure in the containment is uniform. This assumption is justified by the fact that after the initial blowdown of the reactor coolant system, the remaining mass and energy released from this system into the containment are small and very slowly changing. The resulting flow rates between the control volumes will also be relatively small. These small flow rates then are unable to maintain significant pressure differences between the compartments.In the control volumes, which are always assumed to be saturated, steam and air are assumed to be uniformly mixed and at the control volume temperature. The air is considered a perfect gas, and the thermodynamic properties of steam are taken from the ASME steam table.For the purpose of calculation, the condensation of steam is assumed to take place in a condensing node located between the two control volumes in the ice storage compartment.Containment Pressure CalculationThe following are the major input assumptions used in the LOTIC analysis for the pump suction pipe rupture case with the steam generators considered as an active heat source for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant containment:

(1)Minimum safeguards are employed in all calculations, e.g., one of two spray pumps and one of two spray heat exchangers; one of two RHR pumps and one of two RHR heat exchangers providing flow to the core; one of two safety injection pumps and one of two centrifugal charging pumps; and one of two air return fans.

(2)2.125 x 10 6 lbs. of ice initially in the ice condenser which is at 15°F. (This is less than the Technical Specification limit.)

(3)The blowdown, reflood, and post reflood mass and energy releases described in Section 6.2.1.3.6 were used.

(4)Blowdown and post-blowdown ice condenser drain temperatures of 190°F and 130°F are used

[5].

6.2-6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-89 (5)Nitrogen from the accumulators in the amount of 2218 lbs. included in the calculations.

(6)Essential raw cooling water temperature of 85°F is used on the spray heat exchanger and the component cooling heat exchanger.

(7)The air return fan is effective 10 minutes after the transient is initiated. The actual air return fan initiation can take place in 9 1 minutes, with initiation as early as 8 minutes not adversely affecting the analysis results.

(8)No maldistribution of steam flow to the ice bed is assumed.

(9)No ice condenser bypass is assumed. (This assumption depletes the ice in the shortest time and is thus conservative.)

(10)The initial conditions in the containment are a temperature of 100°F in the lower and dead-ended volumes and a temperature of 85°F in the upper volume. All volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 psig and a 10% relative humidity.(11)A containment spray pump flow of 4000 gpm is used in the upper compartment. A diesel loading sequence for the containment sprays to energize and come up to full flow and head in 135 seconds has been used in this analysis. This initial time sequence modification was made to ensure that a frequency transient did not occur for a simultaneous LOCA and loss of offsite power (LOOP) as desired by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9, Section C4. Subsequent analysis has changed the loading sequence to 221 seconds. However, this did not significantly affect the results obtained with the 135-second delay. It is also noted that the calculated CSS flow rate is 4550 gpm, which bounds the 4000 gpm flow rate used in the analysis and, being conservative, offsets any effect due to the sequence delay change.

(12)A residual spray (2000 gpm) is used starting 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the transient is initiated. The residual heat removal pump and spray pump take suction from the sump during recirculation.

The minimum time at which the RHR pumps can be diverted to the RHR sprays is specified in the plant operating procedures as one hour after the accident. A discussion of the core cooling capability of the emergency core cooling system is given in Section 6.3.1 for this mode of operation.

(13)Containment structural heat sink data is found in Table 6.2.1-1.

(14)The operation of one containment spray heat exchanger (UA = 2.446 x 10 6 Btu/hr-°F) for containment cooling and the operation of one RHR heat exchanger (UA = 1.61 x 10 6 Btu/hr-°F) for core cooling.

(15)The air return fan returns air at a rate of 40,000 cfm from the upper to lower compartment.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-7WATTS BARWBNP-85 (16)An active sump volume of 51000 ft 3 is used.(17)The pump flowrates vs. time given in Table 6.2.1-2 were used. (These flow values reflect ECCS pumps at runout against the design containment pressure, using the minimum composite pump curves shown in Figures 6.3-2, 6.3-3, and 6.3-4, which are degraded by 5% and bound what is achievable in the plant. Switchover times from injection to recirculation that are achievable in the plant for each ECCS pump are also conservative in the analysis.)

(18)A power rating of 102% of licensed power (3425 MWt) is assumed, but not explicitly modeled. [Decay heat is based on a reactor power of 3579 MWt (+2%) for mass and energy release computations. See Section 6.2.1.3.6.]With these assumptions, the heat removal capability of the containment is sufficient to absorb the energy releases and still keep the maximum calculated pressure well below design.The following plots are provided:

Figure 6.2.1-1, Containment Pressure Transient, Figure 6.2.1-2, Upper and Lower Compartment Temperature Transients, Figure 6.2.1-3, Active and Inactive Sump Temperature Transient, Figure 6.2.1-4, Ice Melt Transient.

Tables 6.2.1-3 and 6.2.1-4 give energy accountings at various points in the transient.

As can be seen from Figure 6.2.1-1 the maximum calculated Containment pressure is 11.21 psig, occurring at approximately 3600.9 seconds. Also, a parameter study of the ice mass was performed. These results are presented in Figure 6.2.1-4A.Structural Heat RemovalProvision is made in the containment pressure analysis for heat storage in interior and exterior walls. Each wall is divided into a number of nodes. For each node, a conservation of energy equation expressed in finite difference forms accounts for transient conduction into and out of the node and temperature rise of the node. Table 6.2.1-1 is a summary of the containment structural heat sinks used in the analysis. The material property data used is found in Table 6.2.1-5.The heat transfer coefficient to the containment structures is based primarily on the work of Tagami. An explanation of the manner of application is given in Reference [3].When applying the Tagami correlations a conservative limit was placed on the lower compartment stagnant heat transfer coefficients. They were limited to 72 Btu/hr-ft

2.

6.2-8CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85This corresponds to a steam-air ratio of 1.4 according to the Tagami correlation. The imposition of this limitation is to restrict the use of the Tagami correlation within the test range of steam-air ratios where the correlation was derived.6.2.1.3.4 Short-Term Blowdown AnalysisTMD Code - Short-Term Analysis (1)IntroductionThe basic performance of the ice condenser reactor containment system has been demonstrated for a wide range of conditions by the Waltz Mill Ice Condenser Test Program. These results have clearly shown the capability and reliability of the ice condenser concept to limit the Containment pressure rise subsequent to a hypothetical loss-of-coolant accident.To supplement this experimental proof of performance, a mathematical model has been developed to simulate the ice condenser pressure transients. This model, encoded as computer program TMD (Transient Mass Distribution), provides a means for computing pressures, temperatures, heat transfer rates, and mass flow rates as a function of time and location throughout the containment. This model is used to compute pressure differences on various structures within the containment as well as the distribution of steam flow as the air is displaced from the lower compartment. Although the TMD code can calculate the entire blowdown transient, the peak pressure differences on various structures occur within the first few seconds of the transient.

(2)Analytical Models (No Entrainment)The mathematical modeling in TMD is similar to that of the SATAN blowdown code in that the analytical solution is developed by considering the conservation equations of mass, momentum and energy and the equation of state, together with the control volume technique for simulating spatial variation. The governing equations for TMD are given in Reference [4].The moisture entrainment modifications to the TMD code are discussed, in detail, in Reference [4]. These modifications comprise incorporating the additional entrainment effects into the momentum and energy equations.As part of the review of the TMD code, additional effects are considered. Changes to the analytical model required for these studies are described in Reference [4].

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-9WATTS BARWBNP-85These studies consist of: (a)Spatial acceleration effects in ice bed (b)Liquid entrainment in ice beds (c)Upper limit on sonic velocity (d)Variable ice bed loss coefficient (e)Variable door response (f)Wave propagation effects Additionally the TMD code has been modified to account for fluid compressibility effects in the high Mach number subsonic flow regime.Experimental VerificationThe performance of the TMD code was verified against the 1/24 scale air tests and the 1968 Waltz Mill tests. For the 1/24 scale model the TMD code was utilized to calculate flow rates to compare against experimental results. The effect of increased nodalization was also evaluated. The Waltz Mill test comparisons involved a reexamination of test data. In conducting the reanalyses, representation of the 1968 Waltz Mill test was reviewed with regard to parameters such as loss coefficients and blowdown time history. The details of this information are given in Reference [4].The Waltz Mill Ice Condenser Blowdown Test Facility was reactivated in 1973 to verify the ice condenser performance with the following redesigned plant hardware scaled to the test configuration:

(1)Perforated metal ice baskets and new design couplings.

(2)Lattice frames sized to provide the correct loss coefficient relative to plant design.(3)Lower support beamed structure and turning vanes sized to provide the correct turning loss relative to the plant design.

(4)No ice baskets in the lower ice condenser plenum opposite the inlet doors.The result of these tests was to confirm that conclusions derived from previous Waltz Mill tests have not been significantly changed by the redesign of plant hardware. The TMD Code has, as a result of the 1973 test series, been modified to match ice bed heat transfer performance. Detailed information on the 1973 Waltz Mill test series is found in Reference [5].Application to Plant Design (General Description)As described in Reference [4], the control volume technique is used to spatially represent the containment. The containment is divided into 50 elements to give a detailed representation of the local pressure transient on the containment shell and internal concrete structures. This division of the containment is similar for all ice condenser plants.

6.2-10CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85The Watts Bar plant containment has been divided into 50 elements or compartments as shown in Figures 6.2.1.5, 6.2.1-6, 6.2.1-7, and 6.2.1-8. The interconnections between containment elements in the TMD code is shown schematically in Figure 6.2.1-9. Flow resistance and inertia are lumped together in the flow paths connecting the elements shown. The division of the lower compartments into 6 volumes occurs at the points of greatest flow resistance, i.e., the four steam generators, pressurizer and refueling cavity.Each of these lower compartment sections delivers flow through doors into a section behind the doors and below the ice bed. Each vertical section of the ice bed is, in turn, divided into three elements. The upper plenum between the top of the ice bed and the upper doors is represented by an element. Thus, a total of thirty elements (Elements 7 through 24 and 38 through 49 are used to simulate the ice condenser). The six elements at the top of the ice bed between bed and upper doors deliver to element number 25 the upper compartment. Note that cross flow in the ice bed is not accounted for in the analysis; this yields the most conservative results for the particular calculations described herein. The upper reactor cavity (Element 33) is connected to the lower compartment volumes and provides cross flow for pressure equalization of the lower compartments. The less active compartments, called dead-ended compartments (Elements 26 through 32 and 34 through 37) outside the crane wall are pressurized by ventilation openings through the crane wall into the fan compartments.For each element in the TMD network the volume, initial pressure and initial temperature conditions are specified. The ice condenser elements have additional inputs of mass of ice, heat transfer area and condensate layer length. For each flow path between elements flow resistance is specified as a loss coefficient "K" or a fraction loss "L/D" or a combination of the two based on the flow area specified between elements. Friction factor, friction factor length and hydraulic diameter are specified for the friction loss.Additionally, input for each flow path includes the area ratio (minimum area/maximum area) which is used to account for compressibility effects across flow path contractions. The code input for each flow path is the flow path length used in the momentum equation. The ice condenser loss coefficients have been based on the 1/4-scale tests representative of the current ice condenser geometry. The test loss coefficient was increased to include basket roughness effects and to include intermediate and top deck pressure losses. The loss coefficient is based on removal of door port flow restrictors. To better represent short term transients effects, the opening characteristics of the lower, intermediate, and top deck ice condenser doors have been modeled in the TMD code. The containment geometric data for the elements and flow paths used in the TMD code is confirmed to agree with the actual design by TVA and Westinghouse. An initial containment pressure of 0.3 psig was assumed in the analysis. Initial containment pressure variation about the assumed 0.3 psig value has only a slight affect on the initial pressure peak and the compression ratio pressure peak. TMD input data is given in Tables 6.2.1-6 and 6.2.1-7.The reactor coolant blowdown rates used in these cases are based on the SATAN analysis of a double-ended rupture of either a hot or a cold leg reactor coolant pipe CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-11WATTS BARWBNP-85utilizing a discharge coefficient of 1.0. The models and assumptions used to calculate the short-term mass and energy releases are described in Reference [9]. Tables 6.2.1-23 and 6.2.1-24 present the mass and energy release data used for this analysis.A number of analyses have been performed to determine the various pressure transients resulting from hot and cold leg reactor coolant pipe breaks in any one of the six lower compartment elements. The analyses were performed using the following assumptions and correlations:

(1)Flow was limited by the unaugmented critical flow correlation.

(2)The TMD variable volume door model, which accounts for changes in the volumes of TMD elements as the door opens, was implemented.

(3)The heat transfer calculation used was based on performance during the 1973-1974 Waltz Mill test series. A higher value of the ELJAC parameter has been used and an upper bound on calculated heat transfer coefficients has been imposed

[5].(4)One hundred percent moisture entrainment was assumed.

(5)Compressibility effects due to flow area contractions were modeled.Figures 6.2.1-10 and 6.2.1-11 are representative of the typical upper and lower compartment pressure transients that result from a hypothetical double-ended rupture of a reactor coolant pipe for the worst possible location in the lower compartment of the containment; i.e., hot leg and cold leg breaks in Element 1.Initial PressuresResults of the analysis for the Watts Bar Plant are presented in Tables 6.2.1-8 through 6.2.1-11. The peak pressures and peak differential pressures resulting from hot and cold leg reactor coolant pipe breaks in each of the six lower compartment control volumes were calculated.Table 6.2.1-8 presents the maximum calculated pressure peak for the lower compartment elements resulting from hot and cold leg double ended pipe breaks.

Generally, the maximum peak pressure within a lower compartment element results when the pipe break occurs in that element. A cold leg break in Element 1 creates the highest pressure peak, also in Element 1, of 18.5 psig.Table 6.2.1-9 presents the maximum calculated peak pressure in each of the ice condenser sections resulting from any pipe break location. The maximum peak pressure in each of the ice condenser sections is found in the lower plenum element of the section. The peak pressure was calculated to be 13.9 psig in Element 40.Table 6.2.1-10 presents the maximum calculated differential pressures across the operating deck (divider barrier) between the lower compartment elements and the upper compartment. These values are approximately the same as the maximum calculated differential pressure across the lower crane wall between the lower 6.2-12CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85compartment elements and the dead ended volumes surrounding the lower compartment. The peak differential pressure of 16.6 psi was calculated to be between Elements 1 and 25 for a cold leg break.Table 6.2.1-11 presents the maximum calculated differential pressures across the upper crane wall between the upper ice condenser elements and the upper compartment. The peak differential of 8.4 psi pressure was calculated to be between Element 7-8-9 and 25 for a hot leg pipe break.Consideration is given to the calculation of subcompartment pressures (and pressure differentials) for cases other than the design basis double ended reactor coolant pipe rupture in the lower compartment. Discussion of these analyses is treated in Section 6.2.1.3-9.Sensitivity Studies A series of TMD runs for D. C. Cook investigated the sensitivity of peak pressures to variations in individual input parameters for the design basis blowdown rate and 100 percent entrainment. This analysis used a DEHL break in Element 6 of D. C. Cook.

Table 6.2.1-12 presents the results of this sensitivity study.As part of the short-term containment pressure analysis of ice condenser units, the pressure response to both DEHL and DECL breaks are routinely considered for each of the loop compartments.Choked Flow CharacteristicsThe data in Figure 6.2.1-12 illustrate the behavior of mass flow rate as a function of upstream and downstream pressures, including the effects of flow choking. The upper plot shows mass flow rate as a function of upstream pressure for various assumed values of downstream pressure. For zero back pressure (P d = 0), the entire curve represents choked flow conditions with the flow rate approximately proportional to upstream pressure P

u. For higher back pressure, the flow rates are lower until the upstream pressure is high enough to provide choked flow. After the increase in upstream pressure is sufficient to provide flow chokings further increases in upstream pressure cause increases in mass flow rate along the curve for P d = 0. The key point in this illustration is that flow rate continues to increase with increasing upstream pressure, even after flow choking conditions have been reached. Thus, choking does not represent a threshold beyond which dramatically sharper increases in compartment pressures could be expected because of limitations on flow relief to adjacent compartments.The phenomenon of flow choking is more frequently explained by assuming a fixed upstream pressure and examining the dependence of flow rate with respect to decreasing downstream pressure. This approach is illustrated for an assumed upstream pressure of 30 psia as shown in the upper plot with the results plotted vs. downstream pressure in the lower plot. For fixed upstream conditions, flow choking represents an upper limit flow rate beyond which further decreases in back pressure do not produce any increase in mass flow rate.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-13WATTS BARWBNP-85Compression Ratio AnalysisAs blowdown continues following the initial pressure peak from a double-ended cold leg break, the pressure in the lower compartment again increases, reaching a peak at or before the end of blowdown. The pressure in the upper compartment continues to rise from beginning of blowdown and reaches a peak which is approximately equal to the lower compartment pressure. After blowdown is complete, the steam in the lower compartment continues to flow through the doors into the ice bed compartment and is condensed.The primary factor in producing this upper containment pressure peak and, therefore, in determining design pressure, is the displacement of air from the lower compartment into the upper containment. The ice condenser quite effectively performs its function of condensing virtually all the steam that enters the ice beds. Essentially, the only source of steam entering the upper containment is from leakage through the drain holes and other leakage around crack openings in hatches in the operating deck separating the lower and upper portions of the containment building.A method of analysis of the compression peak pressure was developed based on the results of full-scale section tests. This method consists of the calculation of the air mass compression ratio, the polytropic exponent for the compression process, and the effect of steam bypass through the operating deck on this compression.The compression peak pressure in the upper containment for the Watts Bar plant design is calculated to be 8.2 psig (for an initial air pressure of 0.3 psig). This compression pressure includes the effect of a pressure increase of 0.4 psi from steam bypass and also for the effects of the dead-ended volumes. The nitrogen partial pressure from the accumulators is not included since this nitrogen is not added to the containment until after the compression peak pressure has been reduced, which is after blowdown is completed. This nitrogen is considered in the analysis of pressure decay following blowdown as presented in the long term performance analysis using the LOTIC code. The following sections discuss the major parameters affecting the compression peak. Specifically they are: air compression, steam bypass, blowdown rate, and blowdown energy.Air Compression Process DescriptionThe volumes of the various containment compartments determine directly the air volume compression ratio. This is basically the ratio of the total active containment air volume to the compressed air volume during blowdown. During blowdown air is displaced from the lower compartment and compressed into the ice condenser beds and into the upper containment above the operating deck. It is this air compression process which primarily determines the peak in containment pressure, following the initial blowdown release. A peak compression pressure of 8.2 psig is based on the Watts Bar Plant design compartment volumes shown in Table 6.2.1-13.Figure 6.2.1-13 shows the sensitivity of the compression peak pressure with different air compression ratios.

6.2-14CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Methods of Calculation and ResultsFull-Scale Section TestsThe actual Waltz Mill test compression ratios were found by performing air mass balances before the blowdown and at the time of the compression leak pressure, using the results of three full-scale special section tests. These three tests were conducted with an energy input representative of the plant design.In the calculation of the mass balance for the ice condenser, the compartment is divided into two sub-volumes; one volume representing the flow channels and one volume representing the ice baskets. The flow channel volume is further divided into four sub-volumes. The partial air pressure and mass in each sub-volume is found from thermocouple readings by assuming that the air is saturated with steam at the measured temperature. From these results, the average temperature of the air in the ice condenser compartment is found, and the volume occupied by the air at the total condenser pressure is found from the equation of state as follows:where: V a2 = Volume of ice condenser occupied by air (ft

3) M a2 = Mass of air in ice condenser compartment (lb)

T a2 = Average temperature of air in ice condenser (°F)

P 2 = Total ice condenser pressure (lb/ft 2)R a = Ideal gas constantThe partial pressure and mass of air in the lower compartment are found by averaging the temperatures indicated by the thermocouples located in that compartment and assuming saturation conditions. For these three tests, it was found that the partial pressure, and hence the mass of air in the lower compartment, was zero at the time of the compression peak pressure.The actual Waltz Mill test compression ratio is then found from the following:

V a 2 M a 2 R a T a 2 P 2 s----------------------------

-=1 C V 1 V 2 V 3++V 3 V a 2+--------------------------------

=2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-15WATTS BARWBNP-85where: V 1 = Lower compartment volume (ft 3)V 2 = Ice condenser compartment volume (ft

3) V 3 = Upper compartment volume (ft 3)The polytropic exponent for these tests is then found from the measured compression pressure and the compression ratio calculated above. Also considered is the pressure increase that results from the leakage of steam through the deck into the upper compartment.The compression peak pressure in the upper compartment for the tests or containment design is then given by:where: P O = Initial pressure (psia)P = Compression peak pressure (psia)

C r = Volume compression ration = Polytropic exponent Pdeck = Pressure increase caused by deck leakage (psi)Using the method of calculation described above, the compression ratio is calculated for the three full-scale section tests. From the results of the air mass balances, it was found that air occupied 0.645 of the ice condenser compartment volume at the time of peak compression, orThe final compression volume includes the volume of the upper compartment as well as part of the volume of air in the ice condenser. The results of the full-scale section tests (Figure 6.2.1-14) show a variation in steam partial pressure from 100% near the bottom of the ice condenser to essentially zero near the top. The thermocouples and pressure detectors confirm that at the time when the compression peak pressure is reached steam occupies less than half of the volume of the ice condenser. The analytical model used in defining the containment pressure peak uses upper PP O C rPdeck+=3 V a20.645 V 2=4 6.2-16CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85compartment volume plus 64.5% of the ice condenser air volumes as the final volume. This 64.5% value was determined from appropriate test results.The calculated volume compression ratios are shown in Figure 6.2.1-15, along with the compression peak pressures for these tests. The compression peak pressure is determined from the measured pressure, after accounting for the deck leakage contribution. From the results shown in Figure 6.2.1-15, the polytropic exponent for these tests is found to be 1.13.Plant CaseFor the Watts Bar design, the volume compression ratio is calculated using Equation 2, modeling the upper plenum as part of the upper compartment, and Table 6.2.1-13

as: C r = 1.43The peak compression pressure, based on an initial containment pressure of 15.0 psia (0.3 psig), is then given by Equation 3 as:

P 3 = 15.0 (1.43)1.13 + 0.4 P 3 = 22.9 psia or 8.2 psigThis peak compression pressure includes a pressure increase of 0.4 psi from steam bypass through the deck (see Section 6.2.1.3.5).Sensitivity to Blowdown EnergyThe sensitivity of the upper and lower compartment peak pressure versus blowdown rate as measured from the 1974 Waltz Mill Tests is shown in Figure 6.2.1-16. This figure shows the magnitude of the peak pressure versus the amount of energy released in terms of percentage of RCS energy release rate.Percent energy blowdown rate was selected for the plot because energy flow rate more directly relates to volume flow rate and therefore pressure. There are two important effects to note from the peak upper compartment pressure versus blowdown rate: (1) the magnitude of the final peak pressure in the upper compartment is low (about 9 psig) for the plant design DECL blowdown rate; (2) even an increase in this rate up to 141%

of the blowdown energy rate produces only a small increase in the magnitude of this peak pressure (about 1 psi). The major factor setting the peak pressure reached in the upper compartment is the compression of air displaced by steam from the lower compartment into the upper compartment. The lower compartment initial peak pressure shows a relatively low peak pressure of 12.9 psig for the design basis DECL blowdown rate, and even a substantial increase in blowdown energy rate (141%

C r1109414 ,,698000,0.645122 400 ,+------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-=5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-17WATTS BARWBNP-85reference initial DECL) would cause an increase in initial peak pressure of only 3 psi. The peak pressure in the lower compartment is due mainly to flow resistance caused by displacement of air from the lower compartment into the upper compartment.

6.2.1.3.5 Effect of Steam BypassThe sensitivity of the compression peak pressure to deck bypass is shown in Figure 6.2.1-17, which shows that an increase in deck bypass area of 50% would cause an increase of about 0.2 psi in final peak compression pressure. Also, it is important to note that the plant final peak compression pressure of 8.2 psig already includes a contribution of 0.4 psi from the plant deck bypass area of 5 ft 2.This effect of deck leakage on upper containment pressure has been verified by a series of four special, full-scale section tests. These tests were all identical except different size deck leakage areas were used.The results of these tests are given in Figure 6.2.1-18 which includes two curves of test results. Each curve shows the difference in upper compartment pressure between one test and another resulting from a difference in deck leakage area. One curve shows the increase in upper compartment pressure at the end of the boiler blowdown (after the compression peak pressure, at about 50 seconds in these tests), and the second curve shows the increase in upper compartment peak pressure (at about 10 seconds in these tests). It should be noted that the pressure at the end of the blowdown is less than the peak compression ratio pressure occurring at about 10 seconds for reference blowdown test.The containment pressure increase due to deck leakage is directly proportional to the total amount of steam leakage into the upper compartment, and the amount of this steam leakage is, in turn, proportional to the amount of steam released from the boiler, less the inventory of steam remaining in the lower compartment. Notably, the increase in upper compartment compression peak pressure is substantially less than the upper compartment pressure increase at the end of blowdown, because the peak compression pressure occurs before the boiler has released all of its energy.The calculated maximum pressure rise due to deck leakage (when all of the boiler energy release has occurred) is also shown in Figure 6.2.1-18. The slope of this curve is 0.095 psi/ft 2 for the tests and is equivalent to 0.107 psi/ft 2 for the plant design. The difference between the two coefficients is due to a small difference in upper compartment volume between the plant design and these tests.As shown in Figure 6.2.1-18, the calculated curve for maximum pressure increase at the end of blowdown agrees closely with the measured curve at small deck leakage areas but deviates at larger leakage areas. This deviation apparently results from the condensation of upper compartment steam by the walls of the upper compartment and by the ice at the top of the condenser during the tests. Pressure would also be reduced by heat losses in a plant; however, for conservatism, no credit is taken for this effect.

As demonstrated by tests, the compression peak pressure in the upper compartment occurs before the boiler releases all of its energy, and the measured increase in peak compression pressure due to increased deck leakage, is proportionately reduced. For 6.2-18CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85the case of the plant design, the final peak compression pressure is conservatively assumed to occur when the reactor coolant system release is 75% of its total energy. This value is selected as a reference value, based on the results of a number of tests conducted with different blowdown rates and total energy releases, as shown in Figure 6.2.1-19. The actual deck leakage coefficient is therefore:The divider barrier including the enclosures over the pressurizer, steam generators and reactor vessel, is designed to provide a reasonably tight seal against leakage. Holes are purposely provided in the bottom of the refueling cavity to allow water from sprays in the upper compartment to drain to the sump in the lower compartment. Potential leakage paths exist at all the joints between the operating deck and the pump access hatches and reactor vessel enclosure slabs. The total of all deck leakage flow areas is approximately 5 ft

2. The effect of this potential leakage path is small and is found to be:

Pdeck = 5 x 0.080 = 0.4 psiIn the event that the reactor coolant system break flow is so small that it would leak through these flow paths without developing sufficient differential pressure (1 lb/ft

2) to open the ice condenser doors, steam from the break would slowly pressurize the containment. The containment spray system has sufficient capacity to maintain pressure well below design for this case.The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are geometrically very similar. Some differences between the two plants, are the design pressure, spray flow rates, and a slight difference in thermal ratings. The fact that the spray flow rate is higher for the Sequoyah plant (4750 gpm versus 4000 gpm) is offset by Watts Bar's higher design pressure (15 psig versus 12 psig). The following discussion presents the deck leakage analysis performed for the Sequoyah plant. The purpose of this analysis is only to show the substantial margin which exists between the design deck leakage of 5 ft 2 and the tolerable deck leakage. The Sequoyah analysis which shows conservatism by a factor of 7, is more than sufficient for this purpose.The method of analysis used to obtain the maximum allowable deck leakage capacity as a function of the primary system break size is as follows.During the blowdown transient, steam and air flow through the ice condenser doors and also through the deck bypass area into the upper compartment. For the containment, this bypass, area is composed of two parts, a known leakage area of 2.2 ft 2 with a geometric loss coefficient of 1.5 through the deck drainage holes location at the bottom of the refueling canal and an undefined deck leakage area with a conservatively small loss coefficient of 2.5. A resistance network similar to that used to TMD is used to represent 6 lower compartment volumes each with a representative P 3 A deck--------------0.1070.750.080psi/ft 2==

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-19WATTS BARWBNP-85portion of the deck leakage, and the lower inlet door flow resistance and flow area is calculated for small breaks that would only partially open these doors. The coolant blowdown rate as a function of time is used with this flow network to calculate the differential pressures on the lower inlet doors and across the operating deck.The resultant deck leakage rate and integrated steam leakage into the upper compartment is then calculated. The lower inlet doors are initially held shut by the cold head of air behind the doors (approximately one pound per square foot). The initial blowdown from a small break opens the doors and removes the cold head on the doors. With the door differential removed, the door position is slightly open. An additional pressure differential of one pound per square foot is then sufficient to fully open the doors. The nominal door opening characteristics are based on test results.One analysis conservatively assumed that flow through the postulated leakage paths is pure steam. During the actual blowdown transient, steam and air representative of the lower compartment mixture leak through the holes, thus less steam would enter the upper compartment. If flow were considered to be a mixture of liquid and vapor, the total leakage mass would increase, but the steam flow rate would decrease. The analysis also assumed that no condensing of the flow occurs due to structural heat sinks. The peak air compression in the upper compartment for the various break sizes is assumed with steam mass added to this value to obtain the total containment pressure. Air compression for the various break sizes is obtained from previous full-scale section tests conducted at Waltz Mill.The allowable leakage area for the following reactor coolant system (RCS) break sizes was determined: DE, 0.6 DE, 3 ft 2, 10 inch diameter, 6 inch diameter, 2.5 inch diameter, and 0.5 inch diameter. The allowable deck leakage area for the DE break was based on the test results previously discussed. For break sizes of 3 ft 2 and 0.6 DE, a series of deck leakage sensitivity studies were made to establish the total steam leakage to the upper compartment over the blowdown transient. This steam was added to the peak compression air mass in the upper compartment to calculate a peak pressure. Air and steam were assumed to be in thermal equilibrium, with the air partial pressure increased over the air compression value to account for heating effects. For these breaks, sprays were neglected. Reduction in compression ratio by return of air to the lower compartment was conservatively neglected. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 6.2.1-14. This analysis is confirmed by Waltz Mill tests conducted with various deck leaks equivalent to over 50 ft 2 feet of deck leakage for the double-ended blowdown rate and is shown in Figure 6.2.1-20.For breaks of 10 inch diameter and smaller, the effect of containment sprays was included. The method used calculates, for each time step of the blowdown, the amount of steam leaking into the upper compartment to obtain the steam mass in the upper compartment. This steam was mixed with the air in the upper compartment, assuming thermal equilibrium with air. The air partial pressure was increased to account for air heating effects. After sprays were initiated, the pressure was calculated based on the rate of accumulation of steam in the upper compartment.

6.2-20CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85This analysis was conducted for the 10 inch, 6 inch, and 2 inch break sizes, assuming one spray pump operated (4750 gpm at 100°F). As shown in Table 6.2.1-14, the 10 inch break is the limiting case for this range of break sizes.A second, more realistic, method was used to analyze the 10 inch, 6 inch, and 2 inch breaks. This analysis assumed a 30% air and 70% steam mix flowing through the deck leakage area. This is conservative considering the amount of air in the lower compartment during this portion of the transient. Operation of the deck fan increases the air content of the lower compartment, thus increasing the allowable deck leakage area. Based on the LOTIC code analysis, a structural heat removal rate of over 6000 Btu/sec from the upper compartment is indicated. Therefore, a steam condensation rate of 6 lbs/sec was used for the upper compartment. The results indicate that with one spray pump operating and a deck leakage area of 50 ft 2, the peak containment pressure is below design pressure.The 1/2 inch diameter break is not sufficient to open the ice condenser inlet doors. For this break, the upper compartment spray is sufficient to condense the break steam

flow.In conclusion, it is apparent that there is a substantial margin between the design deck leakage area of 5 ft 2 and that which can be tolerated without exceeding containment design pressure. A preoperational visual inspection has been performed to ensure that the seals between the upper and lower containment have been properly installed.

6.2.1.3.6 Mass and Energy Release DataLong-Term Mass and Energy ReleasesFollowing a postulated rupture of the reactor coolant system (RCS), steam and water is released into the containment system. Initially the water in the RCS is sub-cooled at a high pressure. When the break occurs, the water passes through the break where a portion flashes to steam at the lower pressure of the containment. These releases continue until the RCS depressurizes to the pressure in the containment (end of blowdown). At that time, the vessel is refilled by water from the accumulators and safety injection (SI) pumps. The analysis assumes that the lower plenum is filled with saturated water at the end of blowdown, to maximize steam releases to the containment. Therefore, the water flowing from the accumulators and SI pumps starts to fill the downcomer causing a driving head across the vessel which forces water into the hot core.During the reflood phase of the accident water enters the core where a portion is converted to steam which entrains an amount of water into the hot legs at a high velocity. Water continues to enter the core and release the stored energy of the fuel and clad as the mixture height in the core increases. When the level, two feet below the top of the core, is reached the core is assumed to be totally quenched which leaves only decay heat to generate steam. This type of break is analyzed at three locations.The location of the break can significantly change the reflood transient. It is for this reason that the (1) hot leg, (2) pump suction, and (3) cold leg break locations are CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-21WATTS BARWBNP-89analyzed. For a cold leg break, all of the fluid which leaves the core must vent through a steam generator and becomes superheated. However, relative to breaks at other locations, the core flooding rate (and therefore the rate of fluid leaving the core) is low because all the core vent paths include the resistance of the reactor coolant pump. For a hot leg pipe break the vent path resistance is relatively low, which results in a high core flooding rate, but the majority of the fluid which exits the core bypasses the steam generators in venting to the containment. The pump suction break combines the effects of the relatively high core flooding rate, as it in the hot leg break, and steam generator heat addition as in the cold leg break. As a result, the pump suction breaks yield the highest energy flow rates during the post blowdown period. The spectrum of breaks analyzed includes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, reactor inlet and outlet respectively, and a range of pump suction breaks from the largest to 3.0 ft

2. Because of the phenomena of reflood as discussed above, the pump suction break location is the worst case. This conclusion is supported by studies of smaller hot leg breaks which have been shown, on similar plants, to be less severe than the double ended hot leg. Cold leg breaks, however, are lower both in the blowdown peak and in the reflood pressure rise. Thus an analysis of smaller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes.The LOCA analysis calculational model is typically divided into three phases which are: 1) blowdown, which includes the period from accident occurrence (when the reactor is at steady state full power operation) to the time when zero break flow is first calculated, 2) refill, which is from the end of blowdown to the time the ECCS fills the vessel lower plenum, and 3) reflood, which begins when water starts moving into the core and continues until the end of the transient. For the pump suction break, consideration is given to a possible fourth phase; that is, froth boiling in the steam generator tubes after the core has been quenched. For a description of the calculational model used for the mass and energy release analysis

[9]. As per this model the flowsplit is assumed to be 100% at 1765 seconds for maximum safeguards and 1637 seconds for minimum safeguards.Basis of the Analysis (1)AssumptionsThe following items ensure that the core energy release is conservatively analyzed for maximum containment pressure.(a)Maximum expected operating temperature (618.2°F)(b)Allowance in temperature for instrument error and dead band (+4°F)(c)Margin in volume (1.4%)(d)Allowance in volume for thermal expansion (1.6%)(e)Margin in core power associated with use of engineered safeguards design rating (ESDR) 6.2-22CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (f)Allowance for calorimetr ic error (2% of ESDR)(g)Conservatively modified coefficients of heat transfer (h)Allowance in core stored energy for effect of fuel densification (i)Margin in core stored energy (+20%).

(2)Initial ConditionsLong-Term Mass and Energy Release DataBlowdown ResultsTable 6.2.1-15 lists the calculated mass and energy releases for the blowdown phase of the various breaks analyzed, with the corresponding break size.Reflood ResultsTable 6.2.1-17 presents the hydraulic parameters used for the reflood analysis. Figures 6.2.1-21 through 6.2.1-25 present the core inlet temperature, the core flooding rate, the carry over fraction, the fraction of flow through the broken loop, and the core and downcomer water levels, respectively, for the double-ended pump suction guillotine with minimum safeguards safety injection. Table 6.2.1-18 lists the table numbers for the calculated mass and energy releases for the reflood chase of the Core Power (License Application) (MWt)3411Engineered Safeguards Design Rating (ESDR) (MWt)3579 Vessel/Core Inlet Temperature (T c) (plus 2% allowance for calorimetric error) (F)558.1Vessel Average Temperature (T avg) (F)588.2Vessel Outlet Temperature (T h) (F)618.2Steam Pressure (psia)1000 Rod Array17xl7 Total Accumulator Mass (1bm)210,300 Accumulator Temperature (F)120Accumulator Pressure (psia)600Assumed Containment Reference Pressure (psia)26.7 Pumped Injection (assumed)Minimum (ft 3/sec)10.8Maximum (ft 3/sec)22.4Recirculation Time (assumed) (sec)1455 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-23WATTS BARWBNP-85various breaks analyzed along with the corresponding safeguards assumption (maximum or minimum).Two-Phase Post-Reflood ResultsTwo froth analyses were performed: a double-ended pump suction (DEPS) guillotine break with maximum safeguards SI flow, and a DEPS break with minimum safeguards SI flow. For both cases the release rates are based on a reference temperature for heat stored in the steam generator secondary fluid equal to saturation temperature corresponding to reference pressure of 20.2 psia. The table below presents a summary of the available secondary side energy for the broken loop and intact loop for both cases.The heat content of the broken and unbroken steam, generators as a function of time is shown in Figure 6.2.1-26 for the DEPS guillotine break minimum safeguards case.* Referenced to 228.0°F.Tables 6.2.1-20 and 6.2.1-21 present the calculated mass and energy release rate data for a DEPS break using maximum and minimum safeguards assumptions, respectively. These tables completely replace the mass and energy release data after the end of 10-foot entrainment occurs (see Tables 6.2.1-19a and 6.2.1-19b).Depressurization Energy ReleaseThe froth mass and energy release data presented in Tables 6.2.1-20 and 6.2.1-21 are based on a reference temperature for heat stored in the steam generator metal and secondary fluid of saturation at assumed containment back pressure (20.2 psia) up to the time at which the broken loop steam generator equilibrates.Since the containment pressure remains above this value until after the time of peak pressure, depressurization energy release need not be calculated until peak pressure has occurred and the pressure returns to 20.2 psia. At this point the energy remaining Case 1Case 2BreakDEPSDEPS

SI AssumptionMaximumMinimumAvailable Energy of SecondaryMass for Broken Loop Steam14.9*16.3*

Generator (10 6 Btu)Available Energy of SecondaryMass for Intact Loop Steam179.0*179.7*

Generators (10 6 Btu)Total Available Steam Generator193.9*196.0*Energy 6.2-24CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85in the system, presented in Table 6.2.1-22, can be added to the decay heat release by using the equation below:q= heat release rate (Btu/sec) qtotal= total available heat from Table 6.2.1-22 (Btu)T/t= rate of temperature change (°F/sec)T total= initial temperature differential (16°F)Short-Term Mass and Energy ReleasesThe short-term mass and energy release models and assumptions are described in Reference [9]. The LOCA short-term mass and energy release data used to perform the containment analysis given in Sections 6.2.1.3.4 and 6.2.1.3.9 are listed below:

6.2.1.3.7 Accident ChronologyFor a double-ended pump suction loss-of-coolant accident, the major events and their time of occurrence are shown in Table 6.2.1-25 for the minimum safeguards case.

6.2.1.3.8 Energy Balance TablesTables 6.2.1-26a through 6.2.1-26f give the initial energy distribution as well as the energy distribution at end of blowdown and end of reflood for various break locations and sizes. The release rate transients for this case are consistent with the 10 foot entrainment calculation.SectionBreak Size and LocationTable6.2.1.3.4Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine Break Outside the Biological Shield6.2.1-236.2.1.3.4Double-Ended Hot Leg Guillotine Break Outside the Biological Shield6.2.1-246.2.1.3.9Double-Ended Pressurizer Spray Line Break6.2.1-286.2.1.3.9127 in 2 Cold Leg Break at the Reactor Vessel6.2.1-30 q*q totalTtTtotal-----------------------------------

-=

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-25WATTS BARWBNP-856.2.1.3.9 Containment Pressure DifferentialsConsideration is given in the design of the containment internal structures to localized pressure pulses that could occur following a loss-of-coolant accident. If a loss-of-coolant accident were to occur due to a pipe rupture in these relatively small volumes, the pressure would build up at a rate faster than the overall containment, thus imposing a differential pressure across the walls of the structures.These subcompartments include the steam generator enclosure, pressurizer enclosure, and upper and lower reactor cavity. Each compartment is designed for the largest blowdown flow resulting from the severance of the largest connecting pipe within the enclosure or the blowdown flow into the enclosure from a break in an adjacent region.The following paragraphs summarize the design basis calculations:Steam Generator EnclosureThe worst break possible in the steam generator enclosure is a double-ended rupture of the steamline pipe at no load conditions. Based on an investigation of postulated break locations, the rupture is assumed to occur at the point where the steamline exits the steam generator. The blowdown for this break is given in Table 6.2.1-27a. The TMD computer code using the compressibility factor and assuming unaugmented critical flow is used to calculate the short-term pressure transients. The nodalization of the steam generator enclosure where the break occurs is shown in Figure 6.2.1-81. Node 51 is the break element and has a flow path to the adjacent steam generator enclosure which is a mirror image of the enclosure where the break occurs. Both enclosures are nodalized in the same manner; their nodal network is shown in Figure 6.2.1-82 and their input data is given in Tables 6.2.1-27b and 6.2.1-27c. This input data assumes that the insulation remains intact. The loss coefficients were computed using Reference [12]. The maximum number of nodes used is based on the geometry of the system. The steam generator compartment is essentially symmetrical with no major obstructions to flow which would introduce asymmetric pressures. In addition, the flow path to the adjacent steam generator is at the top of the enclosure. Therefore, a significant differential pressure will not occur across the steam generator vessel. The balance of plant data is similar to that presented in Section 6.2.1.3.4.The peak pressure differentials across the steam generator enclosure, the steam generator vessel, and the steam generator separator wall are given in Table 6.2.1-27d.

Figure 6.2.1-83 shows the differential pressure transient between the break element and the upper compartment (Node 25). Figures 6.2.1-84 and 6.2.1-85 illustrate the differential pressure transient across the steam generator vessel. As Figures 6.2.1-84 and 6.2.1-85 show, the pressure differentials across the vessel are low and are due solely to inertial effects. These are overpredicted in our analysis since changes in break flowrates are assumed to be instantaneous. The pressure vs time curve for the break element is given in Figure 6.2.1-86 and for the upper compartment (Node 25) in Figure 6.2.1-86a.

6.2-26CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Pressurizer EnclosureThe worst break possible in the pressurizer enclosure is a double-ended rupture of the six-inch spray line. The rupture is assumed to occur at the top of the enclosure. The blowdown for this break is given in Table 6.2.1-28. The TMD computer code using the compressibility factor and assuming unaugmented critical flow is used to calculate the short-term pressure transient. The nodalization of the enclosure is shown in Figure 6.2.1-87. Node 51 is the break element. The input data is given in Table 6.2.1-29.

This input data assumes that the insulation remains intact. The loss coefficients were computed using Reference [12]. The maximum number of nodes used was based on the geometry of the system. The pressurizer compartment is essentially symmetrical with no major obstructions to flow which would introduce asymmetric pressures on the pressurizer vessel. The balance of plant data is similar to that presented in Section 6.2.1.3.4.The peak pressure differentials across the pressurizer enclosure's walls, and across the pressurizer vessel are given in Table 6.2.1-29a. Figure 6.2.1-88 shows the pressure transient between the break element and the upper compartment (Node 25). As Figures 6.2.1-89 through 6.2.1-91 show, the significant pressure differential across the vessel are low, occur early, and are due solely to inertial effects. The pressure vs. time curve for the break element is given in Figure 6.2.1-92.Reactor CavityThe TMD computer code with the unaugmented homogeneous critical flow correlation and the isentropic compressible subsonic flow correlation was used to calculate pressure transients in the reactor cavity region.Nodalization sensitivity studies were performed before the analysis was begun. The total number of nodes used varied from 6 to 68. In the 6-element model, no detail of the reactor vessel annulus was involved, and for that reason the model was discarded. Subsequent model changes primarily involved greater detail in the reactor vessel annulus. First, the annulus was divided into two vertical and eight circumferential regions. Next, some additional detail was added to the region of the broken nozzle. The next changes were effected by increasing the model to three vertical and eight circumferential regions. The total integrated pressure in the reactor cavity changed only slightly because of the last change. The next change, to 68 elements, produced the model shown with detailed modeling around the nozzle sustaining the break. The additional elements from 48 to 52 are external to the reactor cavity (ice condenser). Additional elements were added to account for all real area changes in the immediate vicinity of the break (i.e., Elements 53 and 54 were added to model the broken loop pipe annulus and the broken loop inspection port, respectively).The nodal scheme around the reactor vessel produces a very accurate post accident pressure profile because of its design. Element 3 is a small element inside the primary shield. It would contain internal flow losses due to turning and thus contain a pressure gradient if it were made larger. The four elements numbered 33, 34, 45, and 46 are made small to minimize internal pressure variation, and the elements farther from the break are made larger because pressure gradients are low in those regions.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-27WATTS BARWBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-27 illustrates the positions of some of the compartments. Figure 6.2.1-28 shows the flow path connections for the 68 element model. Figure 6.2.1-29 illustrates the general configuration of the reactor vessel annulus nodalization. In the model, the lower containment is divided into four loop compartments (21 to 24). The upper containment is represented by Compartment 32. The ice condenser is modeled as five elements (48 to 52), neglecting any flow distribution effects. The break simultaneously occurs in Elements 1 and 25, immediately surrounding the nozzle. The corresponding broken loop pipe annulus is represented by Element 53. The lower reactor cavity is modeled by Element 2, the upper reactor cavity by Element 47, and the remainder of the elements, as shown in Figure 6.2.1-29, model the reactor vessel annulus.

Compartments 15, 42, and 16 are really adjoining Compartments 17, 43, and 18, respectively, and Compartment 13 is on the opposite side of the vessel from the assumed break. Element 54 represents the inspection port volume above the break.A break limiting restraint restricts the break size. A 127 in 2 cold leg break is the limiting case break for the reactor cavity analysis. The mass and energy release rates are presented in Table 6.2.1-30. Tables 6.2.1-31 and 6.2.1-32 provide the volumes, flow paths, lengths, diameters, flow areas, resistance factors, and area ratios for the elements and their connections.The inspection port plugs were assumed to be removed at the start of the accident. All insulation is assumed in place and uncrushed during the entire transient except for the insulation between the break and the reactor vessel annulus. This insulation was conservatively assumed to crush to zero thickness.The loss of coefficient (k) values were determined by changes in flow area and by turns the flow makes in traveling from the centroid of the upstream node to the centroid of the downstream node. The k and f factors for each path were determined using methods from such references as "Flow of Fluids through Valves, Fittings, and Pipes" by the crane company and "Chemical Engineering" by J. M. Coulson and J. A.

Richardson.Figures 6.2.1-30 through 6.2.1-68 show representative pressure transients for the break compartments, the upper and lower reactor cavities, the inspection port volume and pipe annulus near the break, the upper containment and the reactor vessel annulus. These plots demonstrate that the pressure gradient is steep near the break location and is very gradual farther away from the break. This indicates that the model must be very detailed close to the break location, but less detail is required with increasing distance.

6.2.1.3.10 Steam Line Break Inside ContainmentPipe Break Blowdowns - Spectra and AssumptionsA series of steam line breaks were analyzed to determine the most severe break condition for containment temperature and pressure response. The following assumptions were used in these analysis:

6.2-28CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-91 (1)The following break types were evaluated: (a)Double-ended 4.6 ft 2 ruptures occurring at the nozzle on one steam generator. Steam line flow restrictions in the stream generators limit the effective break area of a full double-ended pipe rupture to a maximum of 1.4 ft 2 per steam generator.(b)The largest split break which will not generate the low steamline pressure signal for steamline isolation.(c)Small split breaks of 0.6, 0.35, and 0.1 ft 2.(2)Steam line isolation signals and feedwater line isolation signals are generated by either a low steam line pressure signal, high-high containment pressure signal, or high steam line pressure rate signal. An allowance of 8 seconds is implicitly assumed for steam line isolation including generation, processing, and delay of the isolation signal and valve closure. An allowance of 8 seconds is implicitly assumed for feedwater line isolation including generation, processing, and delay of the isolation signal and valve closure.

(3)Failure of a diesel generator is assumed in all cases. This results in the loss of one containment safeguards train resulting in minimum heat removal capability.

(4)Blowdown from the broken steam line is assumed to be dry saturated steam.

(5)Plant power levels of 102% and zero of nominal full-load power for DER, and split pipe ruptures at 30% of nominal full-load power.

(6)Failure of a feedwater isolation valve (FIV) or control valve (FCV), failure of auxiliary feedwater runout control protection, and failure of a safety injection train are considered.

(7)Four cases for each double-ended rupture and power level scenario are evaluated. One case each models the feedwater isolation valve failure, feedwater control valve failure, and auxiliary feedwater runout control protection failure, individually. The fourth case assumes no single failure in the plant steam system.

(8)The auxiliary feedwater system is manually realigned by the operator after 10 minutes to terminate AFW to the faulted steam generator.

(9)For the full double-ended ruptures, the main feedwater flow to the steam generator with the broken steam line was calculated based on an initial flow of 100% of nominal full power flow and a conservatively rapid steam generator depressurization. The peak value of this flow occurring just prior to isolation is 326% of nominal.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-29WATTS BARWBNP-88 (10)An allowance is added to the mass and energy released from the break to account for steam from the main steam lines which could flow out of the break if the main steam isolation valve in the steam line with the break fails to close.Break Flow Calculations (1)Steam Generator BlowdownBreak flows and enthalpies from the steam generators are calculated using the Westinghouse LOFTRAN code[14]. Blowdown mass and energy release are determined using the LOFTRAN code which includes effects of core power generation, main and auxiliary feedwater additions, engineered safeguards systems, reactor coolant system thick metal heat storage, and reverse steam generator heat transfer.

(2)Steam Plant Piping BlowdownThe contribution to the mass and energy releases from the secondary plant steam piping is included in the mass and energy release rates presented in Table 6.2.1-39. For all ruptures, the steam piping volume blowdown begins at the time of the break and continues at a uniform rate until the entire piping inventory is released. The flowrate is determined using the Moody correlation, the pipe cross-sectional area, and the initial steam pressure. Following the piping blowdown, reverse flow from the intact steam generators continues to simulate the reverse steam generator flow until steam line isolation.Single Failure Effects (1)Failure of a feedwater isolation valve could only result in additional inventory in the feedwater line which would not be isolated from the steam generator. The mass in this volume can flush into the steam generator and exit through the break. The feedwater regulating valve closes in no more than 6.5 seconds precluding any additional feedwater from being pumped into the steam generator. The additional line volume available to flush into the steam generator is that between the feedwater isolation valve and the feedwater regulating valve, including all headers and connecting lines.

(2)Failure of a feedwater regulating valve to operate properly can result in an increased feedwater flow into the steam generator and exit through the break. Feedwater isolation valve closure limits the feedwater addition to the steam generator.

(3)Failure of the auxiliary feedwater runout control equipment would result in higher auxiliary feedwater flows entering the steam generator prior to realignment of the auxiliary feed system. For cases where the runout control operates properly, a constant auxiliary feed flow of approximately 1,500 gpm 6.2-30CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-88was assumed. This value was increased to approximately 2,250 gpm for the 100% and 0% power cases and 2040 gpm for the 30% power cases to simulate a failure of the runout control.

(4)Failure of a safety injection train results in less SI flow and will result in a greater return to power. For consistency, the steam line break core response analysis, in all cases, conservatively assumes failure of a safety injection train.(5)Failure to the main steam isolation valve (located outside of containment) in the steam line with the break allows steam from all four main steam lines (downstream of the other main steam isolation valves which close) to flow out the break. The analysis accounts for this effect by including an allowance for additional mass and energy released through the break due to the volume of steam contained in the main steam lines. No additional steam is released through the break if the postulated single failure is a main steam isolation valve in another steam line not closing. In this case, the main steam isolation valve in the broken steam line does close and there is no backflow from the downstream piping to the break.Worst-Case Mass and Energy ReleasesThe following steam line break cases were determined to represent the worst case steamline break results:

(1)Full double-ended rupture at 102% of nominal full power with a failure of the runout control system. This represents the limiting DER case in terms of calculated peak temperature.

(2)A 0.6 ft 2 split break at 30% of nominal full power with a failure of the runout control system. This represents the limiting SB case in terms of calculated peak temperature.

(3)A 0.35 ft 2 split break at 30% at nominal full power with a failure of the runout control system. This represents the limiting case SB case in terms of superheat temperature duration.Mass and energy releases for these cases are listed in Table 6.2.1-39.Maximum Containment Temperature Analysis for Steam Line BreakFollowing a steam line break in the lower compartment of an ice condenser plant, two distinct analyses must be performed. The first analysis, a short-term pressure analysis, has been performed with the TMD computer code (see Section 6.2.1.3.9). The second analysis, a long-term analysis, does not require the large number of nodes which the TMD analysis requires. The computer code which performs this analysis is the LOTIC computer code.The LOTIC-3 computer code was developed to analyze steamline breaks in an ice condenser plant. Details of the LOTIC-3 computer code are given in References [1],

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-31WATTS BARWBNP-85[2], and [3]. It now includes the capability to calculate superheat conditions, and has the ability to begin calculations from time zero

[17]. The LOTIC-3 computer code has been found to be acceptable for the analysis of steam line breaks[16],[18] with the following restrictions:

(1)Mass and energy release rates are calculated with an approved model.

(2)Complete break spectrums are analyzed.

(3)Convective heat flux calculations, as described in Reference [2], are performed for all break sizes.Two separate condensation models are used by the LOTIC-3 computer. The 100% condensate reevaporization model is used for large breaks. For small breaks, the conservative 0% condensate reevaporization and convective heat flux models are used. As pointed out in previous LOTIC-3 submittals[16],[17],[18], this position is felt to be justified. However, it has also been shown that the small steam line break temperature transients are more severe than large break transients, even if the large break calculations assume no reevaporization of the condensate heat flux

[3].Containment Transient CalculationsThe following are the major input assumptions used in the LOTIC-3 steam line break analysis for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant:

(1)Minimum safeguards are employed, e.g., one of two spray pumps, and one of two air return fans.

(2)A quantity of 2.125x10 6 lbs of ice is assumed for the DER cases, and 2.025x10 6 lbs of ice is conservatively assumed for the small split cases, to be initially in the ice condenser.

(3)The boron injection tank remains installed without heat tracing, and the boric acid concentration is reduced to zero ppm (Table 6.2.1-40).

(4)The air return fan is effective 10 minutes after the transient is initiated. Actual air return fan initiation can take place in 9+1 minutes. Initiation as early as 8 minutes does not adversely affect the outcome of the analysis.

(5)A uniform distribution of steam flow into the ice bed is assumed.

(6)The initial conditions in the containment are a temperature of 120°F in the lower compartment, 120°F in the dead-ended compartment, a temperature of 85°F in the upper compartment, and a temperature of 15°F in the ice condenser. All volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 psig (see Table 6.2.1-13).

(7)A containment spray pump flow of 4,030 gpm is conservatively used in the upper compartment. A diesel loading sequence for the containment sprays to energize and come up to full flow and head in 135 seconds was used in the analysis. As discussed in the Section 6.2.1.3.2 list of assumptions, 6.2-32CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85subsequent analysis has changed the loading sequence to 221 seconds. However, this does not significantly affect the results obtained with the 135 second delay time utilized. It is also noted that the calculated CSS flow rate is 4,650 gpm, which bounds the 4,030 gpm flow rate used in the analysis and, being conservative, offsets any effect due to the loading sequence delay change.(8)Containment structural heat sinks as presented in Table 6.2.1-1 were used. The material properties are given in Table 6.2.1-5.

(9)The air return fan empties air at a rate of 40,000 ft 3/min from the upper to the lower compartments. The total calculated air flow rate discharged to the dead-end compartment used is 41,885 cfm and is, therefore, bounded.

(10)A series of large break cases (1.4 - 4.6 ft 2 double-ended ruptures) were run to determine the limiting large break case (Table 6.2.1-41). In addition, a series of small breaks were analyzed with LOTIC at the 30% power level (Table 6.2.1-42).

(11)The mass and energy releases for the limiting breaks are given in Table 6.2.1-39. Since these rates are considerably less than the RCS double-ended breaks and their total integrated energy is not sufficient to cause icebed meltout, the containment pressure transients generated for the RCS breaks will be more severe. However, since the steam line break blowdowns are superheated, the lower compartment temperature transients calculated in this analysis will be limited. These temperature transients are given in Figures 6.2.1-69 through 6.2.1-74.

(12)The heat transfer coefficients to the containment structures are based on the work of Tagami. An explanation of their manner of application is given in Reference [3]. The stagnant heat transfer coefficients were limited to 72 Btu/hr-ft 2. This corresponds to a steam-air ratio of 1.4 (according to the Tagami correlation). The imposition of this limitation is to restrict the use of the Tagami correlation within the range of steam-air ratios from which the correlation was derived.The containment responses presented identifies the limiting and most severe cases for the large double-ended ruptures and small split breaks.Large BreakThe limiting case among the double-ended ruptures, which yielded a calculated peak temperature of 290.5°F and a peak pressure of 9.4 psig, is the 1.4 ft 2 loop break at 102% of nominal full power with a failure in a main feedwater control valve. Figure 6.2.1-69 provides the upper and lower compartment temperature transients, and Figure 6.2.1-70 illustrates the lower compartment pressure transients. Table 6.2.1-39 contains the mass and energy release rates for the above case.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-33WATTS BARWBNP-85Small BreakThe most severe transient in terms of superheat temperature duration for the small break spectrum is the .35 ft 2, 30% nominal full power, with AFW pump runout protection failure. The temperature transient with a peak temperature of 324.86°F and peak pressure of 6.33 psig for the case is presented in Figure 6.2.1-71, and the pressure transient is provided in Figure 6.2.1-72. Table 6.2.1-39 provides the mass and energy release rates for this case.The most limiting case in terms of peak calculated temperature is the 0.6 ft 2 , 30% power, with AFW pump runout protection failure case. This case resulted in a calculated peak temperature of 325.4°F and peak pressure of 6.97 psig. Figure 6.2.1-73 presents the temperature transient, and Figure 6.2.1-74 shows the pressure transient of the lower compartment. The mass and energy releases are provided in Table 6.2.1-39.Tables 6.2.1-43 and 6.2.1-44 provide the overall results of the calculated peak temperatures for the large and small break spectrums, respectively.

6.2.1.3.11 Maximum Reverse Pressure DifferentialsFollowing a postulated pipe break accident, the occurrence inside the ice condenser containment may be characterized by two distinct periods:

(1)The initial blowdown, which occurs in approximately 10 seconds. During this period, the air initially in the lower compartment is swept into the upper compartment and the dead-ended compartment by the blowdown mass. Large mass and pressure gradients occur throughout the containment.

(2)The depressurization and post-blowdown period which occurs after the end of the initial blowdown. During this period the pressure gradient within the four compartments (upper, lower, ice condenser, and dead-ended) is almost nonexistent. The shape of the pressure transient resembles that of the mass and energy releases. Pressure decreases as blowdown diminishes, followed by a slow increase sometime during the reflood.The analysis for the first period will usually require the modeling of the containment into many nodes so that the non-uniformity of pressure and mass distribution may be properly represented. This has been done in the TMD code.On the other hand, the analysis for the second period will only require the modeling of the containment by a four-compartment system. These calculations are performed by the LOTIC code

[1].The code options and features discussed are used in calculating ECCS back-pressure and reverse pressure differentials across the operating deck.

6.2-34CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Basic Assumptions (1)The containment is assumed to be physically divided into four compartments: upper, lower, ice condenser, and dead-ended compartments. Each compartment is a control volume of uniform temperature, pressure and mass distribution. Steam is also assumed to be saturated in each control volume.

(2)Flow between compartments is related to the pressure differential between the compartments by a flow resistance factor.

(3)A two-sump model is assumed. Temperature is considered to be uniform in each sump.Conservation EquationsFor each control volume or compartment, the conservation equations of mass, energy, momentum, and volume, an ideal gas law for air, and the equation of state for saturated steam may be written:

(1)Energy equation:For the lower compartment:

R e = [Rate of energy out of break]+ [Rate of flow energy from accumulator in the form of steam, water, and nitrogen]- [Rate of structural heat removal]

- [Rate of flow energy of sprays if applicable]

- [Rate of heat transfer to the sump]

- [Rate of heat removal by the ice condenser drain flow, if acting as a spray]- [Rate of energy associated with the loss on condensate from atmosphere falling to floor]+ [Net rate of flow energy from the dead-ended compartment]For the upper compartment:

R e = [Flow energy of the entering spray]- [Structure heat removal rate]- [Energy rate associated with condensate falling from atmosphere]For the ice condenser:

d dt-----M a h a M s h s M c h c++V as V c+J---------------------- dP s P a+dt-----------------------------

--mhout mh R e=-+

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-35WATTS BARWBNP-85 R e =[Structure heat removal rate]- [Rate of heat transfer to the ice]- [Energy rate associated with ice melt and steam condensate falling from atmosphere]

(2)Conservation of steam and water masses:For the lower compartment:

R s = [Rate of flow out of the RCS]+ [Rate of flow out of the accumulator in the form of steam and water]+ [Flow rate of the entering spray if applicable]

- [Rate of condensate falling to the floor]

+ [Rate of steam flow from the dead-ended compartment]For the upper compartment:

R s = [Flow rate of the entering spray]- [Rate of condensate falling to the floor]For the ice condenser:

R s = - [Rate of condensate falling to the floor]

(3)Conservation of air mass:For the lower compartment:

R a = [Rate of nitrogen flow out of the accumulator] + [Rate of air flow out of the dead-ended compartment]For the upper compartment and the ice condenser:

R a = 0 (4)Conservation of momentum:

dM s dt----------

-dM c dt----------

-M sout M sin R s=-++dM a dt-----------

M aout M ain R a=-+

6.2-36CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (5)Volume conservation:For the lower compartment:

R v = [Rate of increase in sump water volume]For the upper compartment:

R v = 0For the ice condenser:

R v = [Rate of increase in free volume due to ice melting]

(6)Ideal gas law for air:

P a V as = M a R a T (7)Equations of state for saturated steam:

P s = f 1 (T), h s = f 2 (T), v s = f 3 (T)For the dead-ended compartment, the structure heat removal is assumed to be negligible, and the conservation equations of energy and mass simplified to: P i P j 1 2--- K ij A 2------ M ij 2 g c----------=-dV as dt------------

-dV c dt----------R v=+d dt-----M a h a M s h s+ v J---- dP s P a+dt----------------------------Rate of energy flow from the lower compartment=dM adt-----------------

-[Rate of air flow from the lower compartment]

=dM sdt----------------[Rate of steam flow from the lower compartment]

=

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-37WATTS BARWBNP-85Method of SolutionThe preceding equations were linearized and programmed for simultaneous solutions using the standard Gauss-Jordan reduction method. For each time step, the solutions are the rates of increase of mass and pressure for each constituent in each compartment, and the flow rates between the compartments. These rates are used to control the time step so that total change of the compartment conditions in each time step can be controlled. This assures more accurate and stable solutions.Structure Heat Transfer The standard Westinghouse ECCS containment structural heat transfer model is applied to this code. This model assumes one dimensional conduction heat transfer in the structure and uses film heat transfer coefficient based primarily on the work of Tagami. The Tagami correlation for the film heat transfer may be written as:where:For this application, we have found it is useful to relate the "coolant energy transfer", (E/t pV), to containment conditions. This may be done by writing:where:and s are respectively the enthalpies of saturated steam and water, and the specific volume of steam, at t p, the time when the peak containment pressure is reached. H max 75 E t p V--------0.6=(1)(2)HH max t t p----- for 0 tt p==HH stag H max Hstag-e0.5tt p-- for t p t+=(3)Hstag250 X+=(4)E t p V--------M s h s M f h f+t p V-------------------------------

-1 t p v s----------

h s M f M s-------h f-+==(5)h s h f 6.2-38CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Equations (1) through (5) are used for the lower compartment structure calculations. For the upper compartment, only the stagnant heat transfer correlation of Equation (4) is used because of little steam penetration into the upper compartment even during the initial blowdown period.Ice Condenser Heat TransferThe transfer of heat from steam to ice which results in the simultaneous occurrence of steam condensation and ice melting is a complex mechanism. During the initial blowdown period when high temperature blowdown steam and water hits the bottom of ice columns, and then flows over the ice surface, turbulent condensation results. During this period the heat transfer rate is strongly dependent on the thickness of the liquid film which separates the high temperature blowdown masses from the ice. This liquid film is composed of steam condensate and ice melt. On the macroscopic scale, this is the only heat transfer resistance and the effectiveness of the ice condenser is determined by the rate which this liquid film may be withdrawn. A semi-empirical model for the ice condenser heat transfer during this period is available and has been used successfully in the TMD code. The LOTIC code is not intended to duplicate this effort. Instead mass and energy balances are used to calculate the total ice melting during this period. Following the initial blowdown period, there is a transition period when the blowdown mass and energy rates are decreasing rapidly and the containment atmosphere as a whole is losing internal energy. Depressurization and decreasing compartment temperature generally characterize this transition period. As the containment conditions lapse into a much more stable and slowly changing pace after the transition period, the blowdown from the broken pipe is almost drawing to and end. Flow in the ice condenser is now at a rate which is almost negligible compared to that in the initial blowdown period. Temperature in the ice condenser atmosphere has also decreased. Thus, heat transfer is governed by combining natural convection and steam diffusion through an almost stagnant atmosphere. Due to the large air content, the resistance to diffusion is large. Therefore, most of the temperature difference between the free-steam steam-air mixture and the ice occurs between the free-steam and the free surface of the liquid film. Temperature difference across the liquid film is now comparatively small. Due to the loss of dominance for the liquid film resistance in the overall heat transfer mechanism, it is not surprising for Yen, Zender, Zavohik, and Tien

[11] to conclude that ice melting has very little effect on the overall heat transfer coefficient for condensation-melting heat transfer in the presence of a substantial air concentration. From this, we may therefore treat the ice as if it were simply a cold structure and use Equation (4) to calculate the heat transfer coefficient after the transition period.During the transition period, it is plausible to assume that the ice condenser is capable of maintaining its internal energy by condensing any excess energy which flow into the ice condenser.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-39WATTS BARWBNP-85Special Code Capabilities in Response to Previous NRC Concerns (1)Heat removal from the lower compartment by the ice condenser drain may be accounted for by input of a spray-like efficiency.

(2)Heat transfer between the lower compartment atmosphere and the sump surface can also be taken into account.Drains are provided at the bottom of the ice condenser compartment to allow the melt/condensate water to flow out of the compartment during a loss of coolant accident. In the modified LOTIC code, a calculation of the flow rate at which water leaves these ice condenser drains is included. The solution was reached by using the hydraulic incompressible flow equations commonly found in the literature for both filled pipe flow and fall (weir) flow conditions and at any point in time using the minimum flow rate calculated by the two methods. The filled pipe flow equation employed was a simplified Bernoulli balance:where:Z = Elevation

V = Velocity g = Gravitational constant

Density h f = Subscripts 1 and 2 represent conditions at the inlet and outlet of the drain, respectively.The area of the ice condenser sump was taken to be 3170 ft 2, and the height of the door sill to be 8.75 inches. After calculating the velocity from the previous equation, the mass flow rate can be calculated from Since a filled pipe flow condition may not exist during the entire post accident transient, a calculation of the draining rate based on the existence of a fall flow phenomena was included. The corresponding equations are outlined below, Z V 2 2 2g-------h f Z 2++=fl sd------V 2 2 2------ g m* V 2 A 2=Q 2 3---2gH e 32 h 1 32-

6.2-40CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85where:Q = Discharge per foot of width (ft 3/sec-ft)H e = Energy of fluid upstream of the fall h 1 = Energy of the fluid at the fall edge minus the flowing height D 1 = 0.643 D c h 1 = H e - D 1By assuming the approach velocity equals zero and through substitution, we arrive at the simplified equation:

orwhere: D c = ft.Calculation of Maximum Reverse Pressure DifferentialThe computer model previously described was used to calculate the reverse differential pressure across the operating deck. In order to calculate a maximum reverse differential pressure the following assumptions were made:

(1)The dead-ended compartment volumes adjacent to the lower compartment (fan and accumulator rooms, pipe trenches, etc.) were assumed to be swept of air during the initial blowdown. This is a very conservative assumption, since this will maximize the air mass forced into the upper ice bed and upper compartment thus raising the compression pressure. In addition, it will minimize the mass of the noncondensables in the lower compartment. With this modeling the dead-ended volume is included with that of the lower compartment (see Figure 6.2.1-75), resulting in a 3-volume simulation of the containment.

(2)The minimum containment temperatures are assumed in the various subcompartments. This will maximize the air mass forced into the upper containment. It will also increase the heat removal capability of the cold lower compartment structures.

Q 2 3---2gD c 320.357D c-32=Q4.2088 D c 32=

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-41WATTS BARWBNP-85 (3)An RWST temperature of 100°F is assumed. This will help raise the upper containment temperature and pressure higher for a longer period of time.

(4)The upper containment spray flowrates used were runout flows.

(5)Containment spray to the upper compartment was assumed to start at 25 seconds. An early start time is conservative in that it raises the upper compartment temperature and pressure when the air mass in the upper compartment is at its highest value.

(6)The containment geometry is the same as that used in the minimum pressure analysis for ECCS purposes. (See Tables 6.2.1-33 through 6.2.1-36.)

(7)The Westinghouse ECCS model (see WCAP-8339) was used for heattransfer to the structure.

(8)The mass and energy releases used are based on the analysis presented in WCAP-8479.

(9)Ice condenser doors are assumed to act as check valves, allowing flow only into the ice condenser.

(10)The loss coefficient (k/A

2) of the deck fins for air flow from the upper to the lower compartment was taken to be 0.0072 ft

-4. This value was based on the capabilities of the fans while running. With the fans not running the loss coefficient would be 0.0278 ft

-4.With these assumptions the maximum reverse pressure differential across the operating deck was calculated to be 0.65 psi. The following plots have been provided:Figure 6.2.1-76 which shows upper and lower compartment pressures.

Figure 6.2.1-77 which shows upper and lower containment temperatures.

Figure 6.2.1-78 which shows upper to lower containment flowrates.

Parametric studies have been made with this model. Various effects have been investigated to determine changes in the maximum reverse pressure differential.

Table 6.2.1-37 gives some of these studies with their results. For Case 6, Figures 6.2.1-79 and 6.2.1-80 give plots similar to Figures 6.2.1-76 and 6.2.1-77. Presented in Table 6.2.1-38, also for Case 6, are the sump temperature and the steam exit flow from the ice condenser, both as a function of time.Significant margin exists between the design reverse differential pressures, TVA's Scope psi and 8.6 psi across the operating and the ice condenser lower inlet doors, respectively, and those calculated pressures presented in Table 6.2.1-37.

6.2-42CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 NomenclatureSUBSCRIPTSYMBOLDESCRIPTION AFlow area ETotal energy JConversion constant, 778 ft-lbf/Btu KFlow resistance factor MMass PPressure RGas constant RRate TTemperature VVolume g cConversion constant, 32.2 ft-lbm/lbf-sec 2 hEnthalpy mMass flow rate between two compartments tTime xSteam-air ratio vSpecific volumeDensityaAirasAir and steamcSuspended or entrained watereEnergyii-th compartment jj-th compartmentijfrom i-th compartment to j-th compartmentsSteam CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-43WATTS BARWBNP-85REFERENCES (1)Grimm, N. P., Colenbrander, B. G. C., "Long Term Ice Condenser, Containment Codes - LOTIC Code", WCAP-8354-P-A (Proprietary), July 1974, and WCAP-8355-A (Non-Proprietary), July 1974.

(2)"Final Report Ice Condenser Full Scale Section Test at the Waltz Mill Facility", WCAP-8282 (Proprietary), February 1974, WCAP-8211 and Appendix (Non-Proprietary), May 1974.

(3)Hsieh, T., and Raymond, M., "Long Term Ice Condenser Containment Code - LOTIC Code", WCAP-8354-P-A Supplement 1 (Proprietary), June 1975, and WCAP-8355-A Supplement 1 (Non-Proprietary), June 1975. Hsieh, T.,

and Liparulo, N. J., "Westinghouse Long Term Ice Condenser Containment Code - LOTIC-III Code," WCAP-8354-P-A Supplement 2 (Proprietary), February 1979.

(4)Salvatori, R. (approved), "Ice Condenser Containment Pressure Transient Analysis Method," WCAP-8078, March 1973.

(5)Salvatori, R. (approved), "Ice Condenser Full-Scale Section Test at the Waltz Mill Facility," WCAP-8110, Supplement 6, May 1974.

(6)Deleted by Amendment 85.

(7)Deleted by Amendment 85.

(8)Deleted by Amendment 85.

(9)R. M. Shepard, et al, "Westinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data for Containment Design," WCAP-8312-A, August 1975.

(10)Deleted by Amendment 85.

(11)Yen, Y. C., Zender, A., Zavohik, S. and Tien, C., "Condensation - Melting Heat Transfer in the Presence of Air," Thirteenth National Heat Transfer Conference, AICHE - ASME Denver.

(12)Crane Technical Paper #410, "Flow of Fluid." (13)"Electrical Hydrogen Recombiner for PWR Containments," WCAP-7709-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-7820-A (Non-Proprietary) and Supplements 1, 2, 3, and 4.(14)Burnett, T. W. T., McIntyre, C. J., Buker, J. C., and Rose, R. P., "LOFTRAN Code Description," WCAP-7907 (Proprietary), June 1972, WCAP-7907-A (Non-Proprietary), April 1984.

(15)King, H. W., "Handbook of Hydraulics," 4th Edition, 1954.

6.2-44CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (16)Eicheldinger, C., Westinghouse letter NS-CE-1626 to the NRC dated 12/7/77, Responses to NRC Staff Questions Concerning LOTIC-3 Computer Code.(17)Eicheldinger, C., Westinghouse letter NS-CE-1250 to the NRC dated 10/22/76, Supplemental Information on the Ice Condenser, Computer Code

LOTIC-3.(18)Eicheldinger, C., Westinghouse letter NS-CE-1453 to the NRC dated 6/14/77, Responses to NRC Staff Questions Concerning LOTIC-3 Computer Code.(19)US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.7, Rev. 2, November 1978, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss of Coolant Accident."

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-45WATTS BARWBNP-55Table 6.2.1-1 Structural Heat Sinks (Page 1 of 2)A.Upper Compartment Area(ft 2)Thickness (ft) 1.Operating Deck Slab 1 4880 1.1 Concrete Slab 218280 .0005 1.4 Paint ConcreteSlab 3 760 .00125 1.5 Paint ConcreteSlab 4 3840 .0208 1.5 Stainless Steel Concrete2.Shell and Misc Slab 556331 .000625 Paint .08 SteelB.Lower Compartment1.Operating Deck, Crane Wall, and Interior Concrete Slab 631963 1.43 Concrete 2.Operating Deck Slab 7 2830 .00125 Paint 1.0 ConcreteSlab 8 760 .0005 Paint 1.75 Concrete3.Interior Concrete and Stainless Stell Slab 9 2770 .021 2.0 Stainless Steel ConcreteA.Lower Compartment 4.Floor*

Slab 10 15921 .0005 Paint Concrete5.Misc Steel Slab 11 28500 .000625 Paint SteelC.Ice Condenser1.Ice Baskets Slab 12180,628 0.00663 Steel 6.2-46CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-55*In contact with sump.2.Lattice FramesSlab 13 76,650 0.0217 Steel 3.Lower Support Structure Slab 14 28,670 0.0267 Steel 4.Ice Condenser Floor Slab 15 3,336 0.000833 0.333 Paint Concrete5.Containment Wall Panels & Containment Shell Slab 16 19,100 1.0 0.0625 Steel & Insulation Steel Shell6.Crane Wall Panels and Crane Wall Slab 17 13,0055 1.0 1.0 Steel & Insulation ConcreteTable 6.2.1-1 Structural Heat Sinks (Continued) (Page 2 of 2)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-47WATTS BARWBNP-89

• 3788 gpm from sump** All flow from sump from this point until end of transientTable 6.2.1-2 Pump Flow Rates Vs. TimeTime after Safeguards Initiation (sec) SIS Flow to Core (gpm)Spray Flow (gpm) RHR Spray Flow (gpm) 0 0 0 0 15 460 0 0 20 1065 0 0 25 4853 0 0 135 4853 4000 01768 4853 4000 0 1788 4853* 4000 0 1938 3788** 4000 0 2754 3788 4000 0 2774 3788 0 0 2894 3788 4000** 0 3600 1078 4000 2000End of transient 1078 4000 2000 6.2-48CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85*Integrated energies, Btu Table 6.2.1-3 Energy Balances SinkApprox. End ofBlowdown (Btu)Approx. End ofReflood (Btu) (t=216 sec)*Ice Heat Removal 186 (10

6) 298 (10

6) *Structural Heat Sinks 20 (10

6) 58 (10

6) *RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 0 0*Spray Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 0 0 Energy Content of Sump 170 (10

6) 246 (10

6) Ice Melted 0.6 (10

6) 1.05 (10

6)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-49WATTS BARWBNP-85*Integrated energies, Btu Table 6.2.1-4 Energy Balances SinkApprox. Time ofIce Bed Melt Out (Btu) (t=2990) Approx. Time of Peak Pressure(Btu) (t=3600.9)*Ice Heat Removal 557 (10

6) 567 (10 6)*Structural Heat Sinks 71.4 (10

6) 88.9 (10 6)*RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 34.7 (10

6) 48.5 (10 6)*Spray Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 20.9 (10

6) 50.3 (10

6) Energy Content of Sump 644 (10

6) 611 (10

6) Ice Melted 2.125 (10

6) 2.125 (10

6) 6.2-50CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-5 Material Property DataMaterialThermal ConductivityBtu/hr-ft-°FVolumetricHeat CapacityB/tu/ft 3-°FPaint on Steel 0.2114.0Paint on Concrete 0.08328.4Concrete .828.8Stainless Steel 9.456.4Carbon Steel26.056.4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-51WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-6 TMD Input for Watts Barr (Page 1 of 2)ElementVolume (ft 3) PSteam(psia)PAir(psia)InitialTemperature (°F) 1 2 3 4 5 6 28700. 36800. 70200. 38800.

36800. 25114.0.3

14.7

120.

25 26 27 28 29 30 651000. 11700. 17900. 11200. 18700. 11200.0.3

14.7

120

6.2-52CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BAR WBNP-0 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 50 18000. 10100.

15300. 13000. 4400.

4400. 9300. 1400.0.3

0.314.7

14.7 120.

120.Table 6.2.1-6 TMD Input for Watts Barr (Page 2 of 2)ElementVolume (ft 3) PSteam(psia)PAir(psia)InitialTemperature (°F)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-53WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-7 TMD Flow Input Data For Watts Bar (Page 1 of 2)Flow PathElement to ElementFlow Path Length (ft) Flow Area (ft 2) LossCoefficient

K AreaRatio a/A 1 to 33 2 to 27 3 to 33 4 to 33 5 to 31 6 to 33 6.5 3.510.2 7.9 3.5 5.722.48.

64.44.42.

16.1.5 4.2 1.5 1.5 4.2 1.50.0480.027 0.0480.0480.027 0.04826 to 2727 to 328 to 27 29 to 3630 to 3131 to 6 9.0 9.3 9.0 3.7 9.011.023.46.23.

15.23.58.2.7 4.2 2.7 3.0 2.7 4.20.0670.0270.067 0.0440.0670.02732 to 3133 to 534 to 2635 to 28 36 to 3037 to 32 9.0 7.8 6.6 2.8 2.8 3.223.36.59.17.

17.23.2.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.50.0670.0480.1710.049 0.0490.06750 to 450 to 450 to 30 3.6 3.9 3.8 1.6 2.5 6.8 1.5 1.5 1.50.0020.002 0.0671 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5 5 to 6 6 to 117.324.222.319.7 17.229.4550.550.600.550.

550.140.0.33 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.33 1.35 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.0926 to 3227 to 128 to 2629 to 3530 to 2831 to 4 1.0 6.980.0 3.851.0 9.3126. 60.146. 15. 81.

44.1.6 4.2 0.5 3.0 1.6 4.20.8430.027 0.9770.0440.542 0.02732 to 3033 to 234 to 27 35 to 2736 to 3137 to 3180.0 8.1 4.5 3.7 3.1 3.4146. 38. 17.

15. 10. 10.0.5 1.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.00.9770.0480.049 0.0440.0290.029 6.2-54CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BAR WBNP-040 to 141 to 242 to 3 43 to 444 to 545 to 610.3610.3610.36 10.3610.3610.36121.9144.0288.0 199.4155.1155.1Table 6.2.1-7 TMD Flow Input Data For Watts Bar (Page 2 of 2)Flow PathElement to ElementFlow Path Length (ft) Flow Area (ft 2) LossCoefficient

K AreaRatio a/A CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-55WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-8 Calculated Maximum Peak Pressures In Lower Compartment Elements Assuming Unaugmented FlowElement 1 2 3 4 5 6Peak Pressure (psig)18.514.012.812.913.917.9DECL - 100% Ent.Peak Pressure (psig)16.012.010.510.612.115.8DEHL - Ent.

6.2-56CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-9 Calculated Maximum Peak PressuresIn The Ice Condenser Compartment Assuming Unaugmented FlowElement404142434445Peak Pressure (psig)13.910.3 9.4 9.410.213.6DECL - 100% Ent.Peak Pressure (psig)11.5 8.5 7.8 7.8 8.711.4DEHL - Ent.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-57WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-10 Calculated Maximum Differential Pressures Across The Operating Deck Or Lower Crane Wall Assuming Unaugmented FlowElement 1 2 3 4 5 6 Peak P (psi)16.611.2 9.0 9.211.016.2DECL - 100% Ent.

Peak P (psi)15.711.7 8.8 8.911.815.5DEHL - 100% Ent.

6.2-58CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-11 Calculated Maximum Differential Pressures Across The Upper Crane Wall Assuming Unaugmented FlowElement7-8-910-11-1213-14-1516-17-1819-20-2122-23-24 Peak P (psi) 7.2 5.9 5.6 5.7 6.0 7.2DECL - 100% Ent.

Peak P (psi) 8.4 7.1 6.4 6.37.01 8.4DEHL - 100% Ent.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-59WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-12 Sensitivity Studies For D. C. Cook Plant (Page 1 of 2)PARAMETERCHANGE MADE FROM BASE VALUE (1) CHANGE IN OPERATING DECK P (1) CHANGE IN PEAK PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHELL(1)Blowdown Blowdown Blowdown Blowdown + 10% - 10% - 20% - 50% + 11% - 10% - 20% - 50%+ 12%- 12%- 23%- 53%Break Compartment Inertial Length + 10% + 4%+ 1%Break CompartmentInertial Length - 10% - 4%- 1%Break Compartment Volume + 10% - 2%- 1%Break Compartment Volume - 10% + 2%+ 1%Break Compartment Vent Areas + 10% - 6%- 5%Break Compartment Vent Areas - 10% + 8%+ 5%

Door Port Failure in Break Compartmentone door port fails to open + 1- 1%

Ice Mass Ice Mass Door Inertia Door InertiaAll Inertial Lengths All Inertial Lengths + 10% - 10% + 10% - 10% + 10% - 10% 0 0 + 1% - 1% + 5% - 5% 0 0 0 0+ 4%- 3%Ice Bed Loss Coefficients + 10% 0 0 Ice Bed Loss CoefficientsEntrainment LevelEntrainment Level Entrainmnet LevelEntrainment Level - 10% 0% Ent30% Ent 50% Ent75% Ent 0 - 27% - 19%

- 13% - 6% 0- 11%- 15%

- 12% - 6%Lower Compartment Loss Coefficients + 10% 0 0Lower Compartment Loss Coefficients - 10% 0 0Cross Flow in Lower Plenumlow estimate of resistance 0 - 7%Cross Flow in Lower Plenumhigh estimate of resistance 0 - 3%Ice Condenser Flow Area + 10% 0 - 3%

6.2-60CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 (1) All values shown are to the nearest percent.Ice Condenser Flow Area - 10% 0 + 4%Ice Condenser Flow Area + 20% 0 - 6%

Ice Condenser Flow Area - 20% 0 + 8%Initial Pressure in Containment + 0.3 psi + 2% + 2%

Initial Pressure in Containment - 0.3 psi - 2% - 2%Initial Ice Bed TemperatureInitial Ice Bed Temperature + 15°F - 15°F 0 0 0+ 1%Table 6.2.1-12 Sensitivity Studies For D. C. Cook Plant (Page 2 of 2)PARAMETERCHANGE MADE FROM BASE VALUE (1) CHANGE IN OPERATING DECK P (1) CHANGE IN PEAK PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHELL(1)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-61WATTS BARWBNP-85* Includes RCP power (14 MWt)Table 6.2.1-13 Watts Bar Ice Condenser Design ParametersReactor Containment Volume (net free volume, ft 3)Upper Compartment 651,000 Ice Compartment 110,520 Lower Compartment253,114 Lower Compartment (dead-ended)129,900 Total Containment Volume1,144,534NSSS Fraction of Nominal (FON) based onReactor Power of, MWt3,425*Analysis weight of ice in condenser,lbs (100% & 0% power DER cases)Analysis weight of ice in condenser,lbs (30% power, small split cases)Core Nuclear Power - % FON 100% power cases

30% power cases 0% power cases 2.125x10 62.025x10 6 1.02 0.30 Critical at 0.0 6.2-62CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85*This case assumes an upper compartment structural heat sink steam condensation of 6 lb/sec and 30% of deck leakage is air.Note:One spray at 4750 gpm at 100°F was assumed for all breaks smaller than the 3 ft 2 break.Table 6.2.1-14 Allowable Leakage Area For Various Reactor Coolant System Break SizesBreakSize 5 ft 2 Deck Leak Air CompressionPeak (psig)Deck LeakageArea (ft 2)Resultant Peak Containment Pressure (psig)Double-ended0.6 Double-ended3 ft 210 inch diameter10 inch diameter*6 inch diameter6 inch diameter*2 inch diameter2 inch diameter*1/2 inch diameter 7.8 6.6 6.255.75 5.75 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.0 3.0 54 40 46 38 50 41 50 50 50>50 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.7* 12.0 10.0* 5.0 4.2* 3.0 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-63WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-15 Blowdown Data SummaryBreaksDouble Ended Pump Suction.6 Double Ended Pump Suction 3 ft 2 Pump Suction SplitDouble Ended Hot Leg Double Ended Cold Leg6.2.1-16a6.2.1-16b 6.2.1-16c 6.2.1-16d 6.2.1-16e 6.2-64CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-16a Blowdown Double-Ended Pump Suction BreakTime(sec)Mass Rate(lbs/sec)Energy Rate(Btu/sec)1.00000E-082.50331E-021.25218E-01 2.50276E-013.50283E-014.50334E-01 5.75504E-017.25475E-018.75455E-011.07552E+001.35026E+001.65024E+00 1.90023E+002.75014E+004.25035E+00 5.75034E+007.25076E+008.75090E+00 1.02500E+011.20020E+011.37519E+01 1.52508E+011.67506E+011.82507E+01 1.97504E+01 2.15006E+012.32505E+012.40056E+012.40112E+017.01135E+047.01135E+047.74512E+04 8.27959E+047.96880E+047.33320E+04 7.02176E+046.71328E+046.41607E+04 6.05893E+045.66415E+045.19535E+04 4.75583E+043.86340E+043.15758E+04 2.88951E+042.60857E+042.30263E+04 2.05454E+041.76466E+041.46272E+04 1.24415E+041.01873E+047.28281E+03 4.15947E+03 2.26931E+036.49016E+029.37511E+010. 3.92484E+073.92484E+074.34598E+07 4.67551E+074.53219E+074.21250E+07 4.07680E+073.94242E+073.80113E+073.61407E+073.40634E+073.16012E+07 2.92134E+072.43129E+072.32677E+07 1.86041E+071.69035E+071.55946E+07 1.41215E+071.23493E+071.04894E+07 8.99497E+067.17505E+064.82533E+06 2.87425E+06 1.32581E+063.73793E+052.71096E+040.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-65WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-16b 0.6 Double-Ended Pump Suction GuillotineTime(sec)Mass Rate(lbs/sec)Energy Rate(Btu/sec)1.00000E-082.50299E-021.25329E-01 2.75628E-014.00528E-015.25375E-01 6.75264E-018.25324E-011.00043E+00 1.25040E+001.55034E+001.85026E+00 2.75030E+004.50032E+006.25035E+00 7.75033E+009.25022E+001.10014E+01 1.30015E+011.47511E+011.65009E+01 1.82505E+012.00008E+012.20006E+01 2.37505E+01 2.55004E+012.75002E+012.85410E+01 2.85821E+014.79640E+044.79640E+046.31848E+04 6.36324E+046.17803E+045.93017E+04 5.66199E+045.30648E+044.99152E+04 4.88309E+044.80839E+044.30301E+04 3.96863E+042.95092E+042.64339E+04 2.42472E+042.09389E+041.80135E+04 1.58736E+041.37137E+041.18047E+04 9.64089E+037.78744E+034.46210E+03 2.87242E+03 1.85402E+036.52229E+029.00244E+010. 2.68810E+072.68810E+073.54951E+07 3.59799E+073.51421E+073.40101E+07 3.27632E+073.09105E+072.92173E+07 2.87375E+072.84306E+072.79501E+07 2.41877E+071.86615E+071.68526E+07 1.55843E+071.41847E+071.25018E+071.11191E+079.77383E+068.41174E+067.02915E+065.24305E+063.08245E+06 1.79967E+06 1.01407E+063.30052E+052.51400E+040.

6.2-66CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-16c 3.0 FT

² Pump Suction Split BreakTime(sec)Mass Rate(lbs/sec)Energy Rate(Btu/sec)1.00000E-08 2.50I98E-02 1.50202E-01 3.25255E-01 4.75198E-01 6.50203E-01 8.25258E-01 1.05018E+00 1.40021E+00 1.75031E+00 2.70033E+004.50033E+00 6.50058E+00 8.75048E+00 1.07504E+01 1.27520E+01 1.52518E+01 1.80006E+01 2.10011E+01 2.40011E+01 2.67507E+01 2.90006E+01 3.10006E+01 3.32504E+01 3.52502E+01 .70004E+013.92505E+01 4.09874E+01 4.14743E+01 2.68063E+042.68603E+044.56233E+04 4.50196E+044.38802E+044.19298E+04 3.97821E+043.73363E+043.44804E+04 3.24718E+042.73104E+042.34960E+042.11243E+041.95321E+041.69029E+04 1.45476E+041.32818E+041.16929E+04 9.93231E+038.21381E+036.58449E+03 5.35300E+034.08384E+032.42247E+03 1.76877E+03 1.86478E+031.33534E+022.44842E+01 01.49186E+071.49186E+072.55286E+07 2.52160E+072.47597E+072.39053E+07 2.29166E+072.17363E+072.02816E+07 1.92259E+071.63721E+071.43062E+07 1.29734E+071.20108E+071.08458E+07 9.63951E+068.89267E+067.98823E+06 6.97085E+065.98077E+065.08452E+06 4.12997E+062.92654E+061.71390E+06 1.06222E+06 7.60013E+051.64594E+052.94524E+04 0

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-67WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-16d Double-Ended Hot Leg Guillotine BreakTime(sec)Mass Rate(lbs/sec)Energy Rate(Btu/sec)1.00000E-082.51261E-021.00235E-01 2.00266E-013.00398E-014.25354E-01 5.50405E-016.50302E-017.75231E-01 9.00263E-011.07512E+001.30026E+00 1.55026E+001.85030E+002.50026E+00 3.50033E+004.75050E+006.00122E+00 7.25178E+008.75165E+001.05023E+01 1.22515E+011.37503E+011.50005E+01 1.62505E+01 1.77502E+011.90003E+011.96416E+01 1.97828E+016.96547E+046.96547E+048.15972E+04 7.34083E+046.98929E+046.68622E+04 6.46194E+046.31444E+046.16152E+04 6.01975E+045.87096E+045.71064E+04 5.50804E+045.18404E+044.53849E+043.89711E+043.55118E+043.37713E+04 2.94095E+042.47901E+042.07998E+04 1.66694E+041.28715E+049.30597E+03 5.50193E+03 2.38147E+036.88399E+022.41188E+020. 4.58031E+074.58031E+075.37630E+07 4.81065E+074.54532E+074.31261E+07 4.14575E+074.04248E+073.94045E+07 3.84834E+073.75333E+073.65080E+07 3.52799E+073.33336E+072.94695E+07 2.54537E+072.31258E+072.18334E+07 1.96306E+071.70620E+071.45049E+07 1.19824E+079.54153E+066.76967E+06 4.22690E+062.11086E+065.41005E+052.02620E+050.

6.2-68CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-16e Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine BreakTime(sec)Mass Rate(lbs/sec)Energy Rate(Btu/sec)1.00000E-082.50459E-021.00114E-01 2.00119E-013.25172E-014.50202E-01 5.50125E-016.75058E-018.00023E-01 9.00050E-011.02506E+001.25015E+00 1.50024E+001.70015E+002.15012E+00 3.00013E+004.25057E+005.50071E+00 6.75047E+008.00094E+009.25178E+00 1.07513E+011.20002E+011.32504E+01 1.45009E+01 1.57503E+011.72504E+011.82102E+01 1.84200E+015.74645E+045.74645E+049.03492E+04 9.18449E+049.06893E+048.90442E+04 8.80348E+048.65350E+048.48007E+04 8.32524E+048.23989E+047.96964E+04 7.55285E+047.26571E+046.40333E+04 5.19763E+044.26906E+043.70909E+04 3.23565E+042.70288E+042.09152E+04 1.51420E+049.28263E+036.13172E+03 3.85781E+03 2.39742E+037.18563E+021.57874E+020. 3.28466E+073.28466E+075.18057E+07 5.26979E+075.20413E+075.11007E+075.05383E+074.97178E+074.87821E+07 4.79554E+074.75621E+074.61989E+07 4.40130E+074.25099E+073.76596E+07 3.10462E+072.65828E+072.37146E+07 2.07472E+071.74891E+071.41635E+07 1.10073E+077.77219E+065.28681E+06 3.30780E+06 2.03887E+068.07354E+052.01111E+050.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-69WATTS BAR WBNP-0(1)The analysis accounts for transient pump resistances due to pump coastdown. (2)The path around the downcomer is specified only to provide a loop reference point for pressure at top of downcomer. The frictional pressure drop data are estimated and provide negligible pressure drop.Table 6.2.1-17 19 Element W Reflood ModelBroken LoopUnbroken LoopForm FactorEquivalent LengthHydraulic Diameter Element Area(Ft 2)Area(Ft 2) K (Ft) (Ft)

1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.Hot Leg NozzleHot Leg Piping Steam Generator Inlet PlenumSteam Generator TubesSteam Generator Outlet Plenum Crossover Leg Piping Pump (forward)

Cold Leg Piping Cold Leg Inlet Nozzle Around Downcomer (est.)(2)Cold Leg Inlet Nozzle Cold Leg Piping Pump (reverse)

Crossover Leg Piping Steam Generator Outlet Plenum Steam Generator Tubes Steam Generator Inlet Plenum Hot leg Piping 4.59 4.59 4.59 11.24 5.24 5.24 4.50 4.12 13.77 13.77 13.77 33.72 15.72 15.72 13.50 12.36 12.36 20.0 4.12 4.12 4.50 5.24 5.24 11.24 4.59 4.59 .181 .447

.442 3.01 .317 .691 (1) .310 .373 0.01 .373 .310 (1) .691 .317 3.01 .442 .447 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.9 0.0 0.0 2.42 2.42 2.42 .055 2.58 2.58 2.4 2.29 2.29 4.0 2.29 2.29 2.4 2.58 2.58 0.055 2.42 2.42 6.2-70CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-18 Reflood Data SummaryBreaksTablesDouble-Ended Pump Suction Minimum SIDouble-Ended Pump Suction Maximum SI 0.6 Double-Ended Pump Suction Maximum SI 3 ft 2 Pump Suction Split Maximum SIDouble-Ended Hot Leg Maximum SI Double-Ended Cold Leg Maximum SI6.2.1-19a6.2.1-19b6.2.1-19c6.2.1-19d 6.2.1-19e6.2.1-19f CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-71WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1) Entrainment ends at 195.00 secondsTable 6.2.1-19a Mass And Energy Releases Post-Blowdown Deps Guillotine Minimum Safeguards Time(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 5)2.4000000E+012.5080000E+01 2.5210000E+012.6010000E+013.1010000E+01 3.2010000E+013.2010000E+013.6010000E+01 4.7010000E+015.0000000E+015.4010000E+01 6.4010000E+016.4010000E+017.4010000E+01 8.4010000E+011.0000000E+021.4401000E+02 1.9499900E+02(1)1.9500100E+02 2.0000000E+02 5.0000000E+021.0000000E+031.4999990E+03 1.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+035.0000000E+031.0000000E+04 2.0000000E+041.0000000E+060. 4.4535613E+02 2.3648755E+023.6059006E+029.7221735E+02 1.0546636E+031.0579200E+031.0194988E+03 9.2782863E+029.0445180E+028.7837558E+02 7.2257377E+027.2186668E+026.1354674E+02 5.4344647E+025.0943384E+024.2507584E+02 4.0363473E+021.5140372E+021.5046056E+02 1.0753474E+028.3065608E+017.3412585E+01 8.2843218E+01 7.6853863E+015.8619500E+014.8076742E+01 3.9523537E+011.1999430E+010. 5.7759761E+05 3.0670323E+054.6764922E+051.2588249E+06 1.3644830E+061.3685351E+061.3153768E+06 1.1882574E+061.1559287E+061.1200505E+06 9.1625920E+059.1534335E+057.7492356E+05 6.8418096E+056.3848652E+055.2736718E+05 4.9586537E+051.8596837E+051.8480579E+05 1.3189885E+051.0172258E+058.9786862E+04 1.0131827E+05 9.3879329E+047.1208424E+045.8075932E+04 4.7433722E+041.3945929E+04 6.2-72CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1) Entrainment ends at 167.00 secondsTable 6.2.1-19b Mass And Energy Releases Post-Blowdown Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine Maximum SafeguardsTime(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 5)2.4000000E+012.5010000E+01 2.6010000E+012.7010000E+013.1010000E+01 3.2010000E+013.2010000E+013.4010000E+01 3.7010000E+014.5010000E+015.0000000E+01 5.4010000E+017.0010000E+018.4010000E+01 1.0000000E+021.4401000E+02 1.6699900E+02(1)1.6700100E+022.0000000E+025.0000000E+02 1.0000000E+031.4999990E+031.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+03 5.0000000E+031.0000000E+042.0000000E+04 5.0000000E+041.0000000E+060. 3.2911002E+023.5178251E+025.0915921E+021.0174371E+03 1.0403702E+031.0456572E+031.0250232E+03 9.9838583E+029.3259202E+028.9624439E+02 8.6810003E+027.6576687E+026.9297570E+02 6.3350166E+024.6917311E+024.0929915E+02 1.5871940E+021.5026145E+021.0753474E+02 8.3065608E+017.3412585E+018.2843218E+01 7.6853863E+01 5.8619500E+014.80767425+013.9523537E+01 3.0543703E+011.1999430E+010. 4.2682516E+05 4.5623152E+056.6025506E+051.3171506E+06 1.3534354E+061.3524546E+061.3239151E+06 1.2869778E+061.1959739E+061.1458270E+06 1.1073057E+069.6822679E+058.7060582E+05 7.9081213E+055.7788924E+055.0188401E+05 1.9457442E+051.8417356E+051.3163706E+05 1.0153356E+058.9629853E+041.0114041E+059.3721244E+047.1117839E+045.8025135E+044.7410502E+04 3.6316472E+041.3945907E+04 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-73WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-19c Mass and Engery ReleaseTime(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 5)2.8600000E+01 2.9670000E+01 3.0110000E+01 3.0610000E+01 3.5610000E+01 3.9610000E+01 4.8610000E+01 5.0000000E+01 5.3610000E+01 6.0610000E+01 7.8610000E+01 9. 9650000E+01 1.0000000E+02 1.2861000E+02 1.4861000E+02 1.7059900E+02 1.7060100E+02 1.7079900E+02

(¹)1.7080100E+02 2.0000000E+02 5.0000000E+02 1.0000000E+03 1.4999990E+03 1.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+03 5.0000000E+03 1.0000000E+04 2.0000000E+04 1.0000000E+06

0. 5.8926898E+02 2.8303831E+02 3.5426500E+02 1.0271490E+03 9.9780491E+02 9.2177392E+02 9.1222348E+02 8.8265601E+02 8.3700178E+02 7.3032468E+02 6.3186100E+02 6.2785516E+02 5.1883900E+02 4.5833808E+02 4.0715255E+02 3.9935071E+02 3.9934552E+02 1.5819036E+02 1.5109456E+02 1.0771956E+02 8.3103659E+01 7.3420381E+01 8. 2851725E+01 7.6855683E+015. 8619500E+01 4.80i'6742E+0l 3.9523537E+0l 1. 1999430E+01 0. 7.6569765E+05 3.6775932E+05 4.6029821E+05 1.3321612E+06 1.2906958E+06 1.1854595E+06 1.1722791E+06 1.1315763E+06 1.0689368E+06 9.2426316E+05 7.9295345E+05 7.8768698E+05 6.4501941E+05 5.6763498E+05 4.9687693E+054.9207727E+05 4.9207062E+05

1. 9489679E+05 1.8612162E+05 1.3248813E+05 1.0203180E+05 9.0016658E+04 1.0157696E+05 9.4100179E+04 7.1339029E+04 5.8152101E+04 4.7471394E+04 1.3945923E+04 6.2-74CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1) Entrainment ends at 182.51 secondsTable 6.2.1-19d Mass And Energy Releases 3 Ft 2 Pump Suction SplitTime(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 5)4.1500000E+014.2680000E+014.3510000E+01 4.9510000E+015.0000000E+015.6510000E+01 6.1510000E+016.6510000E+017.1510000E+01 8.1510000E+019.1510000E+011.0000000E+02 1.1374000E+021.4151000E+021.6151000E+02 1.8250900E+02(1)1.8251100E+021.8289900E+02 1.8290100E+022.0000000E+025.0000000E+02 1.0000000E+031.4999990E+031.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+03 5.0000000E+031.0000000E+042.0000000E+04 1.0000000E+060. 6.7191477E+022.8142791E+02 9.1074969E+029.7405084E+029.1843783E+02 8.8458777E+028.5389483E+028.2181484E+02 7.6530291E+027.1653478E+026.8022180E+02 6.2007089E+025.1920500E+024.5633792E+02 4.0140774E+022.4851142E+022.4851115E+021.5640830E+021.5254775E+021.0824998E+028.3211201E+017.3440869E+018.2874008E+01 7.6858829E+01 5.8617894E+014.8075425E+013.9522455E+01 1.1999101E+010. 8.7107099E+053.6477252E+05 1.1783529E+061.2598686E+061.1825077E+06 1.1354443E+061.0928981E+061.0485744E+069.7113123E+059.0491471E+058.5581957E+05 7.7568913E+056.4333099E+055.6224391E+05 4.9234933E+053.0475763E+053.0475730E+05 1.9180789E+051.8705735E+051.3255538E+05 1.0173360E+058.9676032E+041.0119188E+059.3735455E+047.1100225E+045.7995931E+044.7377723E+04 1.3945329E+04 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-75WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1) Entrainment ends at 129.30 secondsTable 6.2.1-19e Mass And Energy Releases Double-Ended Hot Leg GuillotineTime(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 5)1.9800000E+012.0000000E+01 2.0410000E+012.0510000E+012.0710000E+01 2.1610000E+012.6810000E+012.9810000E+01 3.7810000E+015.0000000E+015.5810000E+01 6.3810000E+016.9810000E+017.9810000E+01 9.9810000E+011.0000000E+02 1.2929900E+02(1)1.2930100E+022.0000000E+025.0000000E+03 1.0000000E+031.4999990E+031.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+03 5.0000000E+031.0000000E+042.0000000E+04 5.0000000E+041.0000000E+060. 1.2255363E+03 1.1062387E+031.0687712E+034.4278860E+02 6.8216035E+021.9629021E+031.9949716E+03 1.8417703E+031.5319554E+031.3848108E+03 1.1690957E+031.0667600E+039.8498857E+02 9.2584339E+029.2449665E+027.7958780E+02 1.7010402E+021.5016167E+021.0736836E+02 8.3031351E+017.3405566E+018.2835559E+01 7.6852224E+01 5.8619500E+014.8076742E+013.9523537E+01 3.0543703E+011.1999430E+010. 3.1953427E+05 4.5042751E+054.5157073E+054.1377824E+05 4.8675568E+058.1212676E+058.2479356E+05 7.8488364E+057.0257474E+056.6410252E+05 6.0798705E+055.8010146E+055.5580778E+055.3341112E+055.3291239E+054.8695008E+05 2.0092702E+051.7736875E+051.2681619E+05 9.8065589E+048.6692914E+049.7829762E+04 9.0759231E+04 6.9210825E+045.6745978E+044.6627441E+04 3.5992603E+041.3996067E+04 6.2-76CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1) Entrainment ends at 497.00 secondsTable 6.2.1-19f Mass And Energy ReleasesDouble-Ended Cold Leg GuillotineTime(sec x 10 2)Mass Rate(lbm/sec x 10 2)Energy Rate(Btu/sec x 10 51.8400000E+012.0000000E+01 2.0640000E+012.2410000E+012.5410000E+01 2.8410000E+013.8410000E+015.0000000E+01 5.8410000E+017.8410000E+019.8410000E+01 1.0000000E+021.1841000E+022.0000000E+02 2.1841000E+023.1841000E+024.1841000E+02 4.9699900E+02(1)4.9700100E+02 5.0000000E+02 1.0000000E+031.4999990E+031.5000010E+03 2.0000000E+03 5.0000000E+031.0000000E+042.0000000E+04 5.0000000E+041.0000000E+064.0206092E+013.6096903E+02 1.6422536E+021.9902935E+022.6405340E+02 2.7290008E+022.6793330E+022.6735934E+02 2.6665917E+022.5637723E+022.4678501E+02 2.4609000E+022.4070208E+022.1941085E+02 2.1466465E+021.9143203E+021.6864794E+02 1.4895299E+021.0753159E+021.0753150E+02 8.3020034E+017.3403247E+018.2833029E+01 7.6851683E+01 5.8619500E+014.8076742E+013.9523537E+01 3.0543703E+011.1999430E+015.2178964E+044.7095009E+05 2.1425283E+052.5965535E+053.4446796E+05 3.5598031E+053.4941184E+053.4856086E+05 3.4757169E+053.3399541E+053.2133790E+05 3.2041854E+053.1326385E+052.8498083E+05 2.7869617E+052.4797559E+052.1802051E+05 1.9230197E+051.4090801E+051.4090790E+05 1.0820367E+059.5261958E+041.0749028E+05 9.9318426E+04 7.4302652E+045.9723887E+044.8014843E+04 3.6285953E+041.3945396E+04 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-77WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-20 Watts Bar Maximum SI Post-Reflood Mass And Energy Release Information TIME SECONDS STEAM FLOWMASS ENERGY LB m/SEC 10 3 BTU/SECWATER FLOWMASS ENERGY LB m/SEC 10 3 BTU/SEC 167 202 302 402 502 602 702 727 732 802 902 1002 1102 1302 1502 1637 131.128.126.126.

126.126.127.

127.92.390.3 87.785.583.5 80.277.475.7156.152.150.149.

148.148.148.

148.106.104.

101.98.996.6 92.789.587.61250.1260.1260.1260.

1260.1260.1260.

1260.1290.1290.

1290.1300.1300.

1300.1310.1310.199.199.188.186.

190.186.183.

182.189.187.

190.186.188.

188.186.187. INTEGRATED10 3 LB m 10 6 BTU10 3 LB m 10 6 BTU 1637146. 171. 1890.277.

6.2-78CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-21 Watts Bar Minimum SI Post-Reflood Mass And Energy Release InformationTIME SECONDS STEAM FLOWMASS ENERGY LB m/SEC 10 3 BTU/SECWATER FLOWMASS ENERGY LB m/SEC 10 3 BTU/SEC 195 200 300 305 310 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1200 1400 1600 1765 297. 297. 297. 297.

149. 140. 131.

131. 124. 118.

118. 112. 105.

100. 96.697.1354. 353. 344. 344.

172. 161. 152.

152. 143. 136.

137. 129. 121. 116. 112. 112. 370. 370. 371. 371.

519. 528. 536.

536. 543. 549.

549. 556. 563.

567. 571. 570.72.972.973.073.0 102.104.106.

106.107.108.

108.109.111.112.112.112. INTEGRATED10 3 LB m 10 6 BTU10 3 LB m 10 6 BTU 1765200. 232. 848.167.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-79WATTS BARWBNP-86Table 6.2.1-22 Available Energy Between 20.2 Psia And 14.7 PsiaBroken Loop Stem Generator 3.696 x 10 6 Btu Unbroken Loop Steam Generator10.934 x 10 6 Btu Metal Energy (THIN + THICK) 4.816 x 10 6 Btu Core Stored .604 x 10 6 Btu TOTAL 20.05 x 10 6 Btu 6.2-80CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-86Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 1 of 10)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)0.000000.001010.002010.00301 0.004010.005010.00601 0.007010.008010.00900 0.010010.011010.01202 0.013010.014030.01503 0.016020.017000.01803 0.019030.020040.02101 0.02205 0.023000.024020.02504 0.026060.027020.02806 0.029020.030030.03101 0.032020.033040.03401 0.035010.036010.03703 0.038019.6110000E+034.3310502E+045.6464849E+046.1520189E+046.2907110E+046.2527557E+046.1359842E+04 5.9847065E+045.8188878E+045.6669717E+04 5.5334196E+045.4380116E+045.3848579E+04 5.3722982E+045.3913587E+045.4272426E+04 5.4632246E+045.4934445E+045.5232000E+04 5.5482063E+045.5707346E+045.5896536E+04 5.6078108E+04 5.6240106E+045.6414116E+045.6591029E+04 5.6764048E+045.6928226E+045.7102526E+04 5.7263203E+045.7428068E+045.7583531E+04 5.7746706E+045.7903222E+045.8052067E+04 5.8195321E+045.8331171E+045.8470775E+04 5.8606356E+045.3946543E+062.4100795E+073.1421870E+073.4231211E+073.4995181E+073.4773203E+073.4111223E+073.3257665E+073.2325854E+073.1475995E+07 3.0733067E+073.0206926E+072.9918413E+07 2.9856042E+072.9968612E+073.0172312E+07 3.0374580E+073.0543650E+073.0709908E+07 3.0849637E+073.0975819E+073.1082274E+073.1185010E+073.1277094E+073.1376145E+073.1476717E+07 3.1574969E+073.1668125E+073.1766906E+07 3.1857866E+073.1951113E+073.2038998E+07 3.2131054E+073.2219280E+073.2303155E+07 3.2383957E+073.2460804E+073.2540002E+07 3.2616877E+07561.30556.47556.49556.42 556.30556.13555.92 555.71555.53555.43 555.41555.48555.60555.74555.86555.94 555.98556.00556.02 556.03556.05556.07 556.10 556.14556.18556.21 556.25556.28556.31 556.34556.37556.39 556.41556.43556.45 556.47556.49556.52 556.54 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-81WATTS BARWBNP-86.04012.04101.04201

.04300.04401.04501

.04600.04700.04800

.04900.05000.05100

.05200.05302.05401

.05501.05601.05700

.05800.05902.06000

.06101.06202.06300

.06403

.06502.06611.06703

.06802.06902.07004

.07102.07203.07304

.07402.07501.07605

.07706.07803.07905

.080145.8872406E+045.9008660E+045.9153822E+04 5.9313778E+045.9490981E+045.9679056E+04 5.9873576E+046.0077022E+046.0407806E+04 6.0986562E+046.1649802E+046.2310578E+04 6.2917709E+046.3477117E+048.3423661E+04 7.3060968E+048.0518030E+048.2563578E+04 8.3815137E+048.3449231E+048.4269954E+04 8.4735994E+048.3970123E+048.4285244E+04 8.4394816E+04 8.4573828E+048.4787755E+048.5532633E+04 8.5992772E+048.5421297E+048.5727778E+04 8.6796001E+048.6870937E+048.7054880E+04 8.7178558E+048.7144334E+048.7239117E+048.7495940E+048.7779389E+048.8111858E+048.8437477E+043.2768324E+073.2846908E+073.2932609E+073.302664 E+073.3130077E+073.3239170E+07 3.3351437E+073.3468342E+073.3677849E+07 3.4009096E+073.4384106E+073.4754624E+07 3.5094556E+073.5407841E+074.6840941E+07 4.3557140E+074.5030731E+074.6098557E+07 4.6812762E+074.6592537E+074.7056412E+07 4.7306624E+074.6856778E+074.6484834E+07 4.7109317E+07 4.7202661E+074.7325979E+074.7747200E+07 4.8003061E+074.8244326E+074.8412801E+07 4.8448914E+074.8490730E+074.8594295E+07 4.8661343E+074.8640448E+074.8595232E+07 4.8840764E+074.9001329E+074.9189719E+07 4.9373735E+07556.60556.65556.73 556.81556.89556.97 557.03557.09557.51 557.65557.73557.76 557.79557.80561.48 557.99559.26558.34 558.52558.33558.40 558.28558.02558.14558.20 558.12558.17558.23 558.22558.25558.22 558.19558.19558.20 558.18558.16558.18 558.21558.23558.26 558.29Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 2 of 10) 6.2-82CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-86.08101.08237.08339

.08404.08701.08800

.08903.09005.09101

.09207.09305.09412

.09510.09608.09708

.09806.09903.19006

.19514.11012.11511.12001.12514.13014.13511.14004.14512.15007

.15519.16003.16505

.17002.17500.18010

.18509.19007.19508

.20001.21003.22004

.23008.240148.8713080E+048.8970751E+049.9150300E+04 9.9278550E+048.9412638E+049.0027554E+049.0281189E+049.0539626E+049.0743822E+04 9.0000901E+049.0086401E+049.1143158E+04 9.1106623E+049.1186559E+049.1302596E+04 9.1443286E+049.1592551E+049.1728833E+04 9.2351448E+049.2387798E+049.2236260E+04 9.2917771E+049.1727154E+049.1623195E+04 9.1748740E+04 9.2120808E+049.2579812E+049.2941215E+04 9.3225048E+049.3491097E+049.3818313E+049.4199119E+049.4556660E+049.4834408E+04 9.4979093E+049.4971100E+049.4787975E+04 9.4482682E+049.3857870E+049.3482892E+049.3115899E+049.2880327E+044.9529214E+074.9673906E+074.9774884E+07 4.9845700E+075.01462878+075.0267688E+075.0411020E+075.0556703E+075.0671166E+075.0758235E+075.0804912E+075.8835575E+07 5.0870216E+075.0914656E+075.0979666E+07 5.1058782E+075.1142472E+075.1218292E+075.1394011E+075.1578304E+075.1486172E+07 5.1359571E+075.1196412E+075.1144798E+075.1225781E+07 5.1446366E+075.1712621E+075.1919892E+07 5.2081879E+075.2233133E+075.24190993+075.2634778E+075.2836777E+075.2992611E+075.3072559E+075.3065115E+075.2958276E+07 5.2783541E+075.2426175E+075.2212471E+07 5.2007458E+075.1879691E+07558.31558.32558.32 558.32558.34556.36557.36557.39557.40 557.39557.38557.37 557.36557.36561.36 557.37559.37558.37 558.32558.28558.20 558.15558.14558.21 558.33 558.47558.57558.63 558.67558.70558.73 558.76558.78558.79 558.78558.75558.70 558.66558.57558.52 558.52558.56Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 3 of 10)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-83WATTS BARWBNP-86.25011.26085.27007

.28013.29015.30009

.31008.34021.35012.36001.37009

.38006.39010.40010

.41010.42012.43000

.44012.45008.46010

.47012.48011.49018

.50000

.51009.52016.53004

.54012.55066.56012

.57015.58001.59012

.60022.61017.62017

.63018.64017.65015

.66017.67013.680169.2987393E+049.3088912E+049.3293866E+04 9.3546973E+048.3725635E+049.3670696E+04 9.3507989E+049.2638976E+049.2708694E+049.2722621E+049.2570379E+04 9.2414695E+049.2271423E+049.2084414E+04 9.1843519E+049.1577114E+049.1310985E+049.1118166E+049.1177214E+049.1130754E+04 9.1171899E+049.1141485E+049.1030159E+04 9.0877513E+04 9.0716741E+049.0525631E+049.0280616E+04 9.0027339E+049.9853472E+049.9756392E+04 9.9702675E+049.9656269E+049.9574430E+04 9.9437753E+049.9276720E+049.9112503E+049.8927891E+049.8714678E+049.3497653E+04 9.8310815E+049.8164091E+049.8043186E+045.1899210E+075.2004007E+075.2120524E+07 5.2264903E+075.2365366E+075.2332535E+07 5.2239258E+075.2040402E+075.1748157E+07 5.1789509E+075.1797589E+075.1711187E+075.1623414E+075.1542499E+075.1436520E+075.1300115E+075.1149514E+075.0999398E+07 5.0891429E+075.0987004E+075.0901754E+07 5.0925777E+075.0908756E+075.0845649E+07 5.0759274E+07 5.0668508E+075.0550518E+075.0422042E+07 5.0279431E+075.0182236E+075.0128690E+07 5.0099544E+075.0074286E+075.0028693E+07 4.9951947E+074.9861529E+074.9769422E+07 4.9665729E+074.9545884E+074.9424142E+07 4.9319743E+074.9238154E+074.9171145E+07558.61558.65558.67 558.70558.71558.69 558.66558.62558.60 558.63558.63558.61 558.61558.60558.58558.56558.54558.52 558.52558.54558.56 558.57558.57558.56 558.55 558.54558.52558.50 558.49558.49558.50 558.51558.51558.52 558.51558.51558.50 558.49558.49558.48 558.48558.48558.49Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 4 of 10) 6.2-84CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-86.69053.70013

.71015

.72002

.73008

.74014

.75005

.76008

.77012

.78012

.81011

.82014

.83011

.84001

.85012

.85617

.87004

.88005

.89012

.90013

.91018

.92003

.93003

.94006

.95004

.96805

.97019

.98017

.99016 1.00013 1.01003 1.02009 1.03008 1.04013 1.05007 1.06002 1.07002 1.08015 1.09014 1.10008 1.11016 1.12013 1.130098.7936650E+048.7833343E+04 8.7699937E+04 8.7515577E+04 8.7289861E+04 8.7057520E+04 8.6822139E+04 8.6586328E+04 8.6371277E+14 8.6187553E+04 8.5732780E+04 8.5520138E+04 8.5279840E+04 8.5205251E+04 8.5219901E+04 8.5236961E+04 8.5239912E+04 8.5224810E+04 8.5153610E+04 8.5034214E+04 8.4921660E+04 8.4789254E+04 8.4585424E+04 8.4332775E+04 8.4133386E+04 8.4001069E+04 8.3879090E+04 8.3749242E+04 8.3650306E+04 8.3577220E+04 8.3483239E+04 8.3363850E+04 8.3228098E+04 8.3054020E+04 8.2852281E+04 8.2670415E+04 8.2522495E+04 8.2370134E+04 8.2204789E+04 8.2058899E+04 8.1925541E+04 8.1778838E+04 8.1614966E+044.9112289E+074.9055160E+07 4.8980863E+07 4.8877576E+07 4.8751064E+07 4.8620990E+07 4.8489298E+07 4.8357560E+07 4.8237750E+07 4.8135776E+07 4.7883581E+07 4.7765060E+07 4.7631116E+07 4.7592350E+07 4.7603442E+07 4.7615294E+07 4.7613376E+07 4.7612265E+07 4.7573612E+07 4.7507903E+07 4.7446462E+07 4.7373665E+07 4.7260284E+07 4.7119694E+07 4.7009576E+07 4.6937622E+07 4.6871592E+07 4.6801373E+07 4.6748791E+07 4.6710517E+07 4.6660040E+07 4.6595179E+07 4.6521139E+07 4.6425558E+07 4.6314604E+07 4.6215242E+07 4.6135141E+07 4.6052391E+07 4.5962487E+07 4.5883869E+07 4.5812566E+07 4.5733459E+07 4.5644519E+07558.50558.50 558.51 558.50 558.50 558.49 558.49 558.49 558.49 558.50 558.52 558.52 558.53 558.56 558.60 558.62 558.65 558.67 558.68 558.69 558.71 558.72 558.73 558.73 558.75 558.77 558.80 558.83 558.86 558.89 558.92 558.94 558.96 558.98 559.00 559.03 559.06 559.09 559.12 559.16 559.20 559.23 559.27Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 5 of 10)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-85WATTS BARWBNP-861.140141.150011.16016 1.170091.180051.19012 1.200141.210091.22016 1.230001.240051.25005 1.280041.290051.31002 1.310011.320021.330041.340111.350081.36005 1.370171.380181.39004 1.40005 1.410101.420101.430111.440011.450081.46010 1.470171.480131.49012 1.500121.510131.520181.530111.540141.550111.560141.570101.580108.1440550E+048.1233556E+048.0973459E+04 8.0728542E+048.0505981E+048.0276950E+04 8.0035318E+047.9809170E+047.9592878E+14 7.9352507E+047.9096790E+047.8854282E+04 7.8874567E+047.7872559E+047.7659289E+047.7437311E+047.7200854E+047.6991619E+04 7.6778950E+047.6585125E+047.6481499E+047.6219116E+047.6034026E+047.5849854E+04 7.5667828E+04 7.5482159E+047.5301664E+047.6139111E+047.5009647E+047.4931627E+047.4867239E+04 7.4753854E+047.4584355E+047.4392609E+04 7.4197644E+047.4006729E+047.3815196E+04 7.3936081E+047.3469148E+047.3320510E+04 7.3181275E+047.3026251E+047.2837043E+044.5549601E+074.5436190E+074.5290008E+07 4.5158681E+074.5037156E+074.4911852E+074.4779364E+074.4655876E+074.4537896E+07 4.4406088E+074.4266220E+074.4133853E+07 4.3707164E+074.3597579E+074.3481315E+07 4.3359385E+074.3229663E+074.3115571E+074.2999371E+074.2893425E+074.2793469E+07 4.2694227E+074.2593341E+074.2492871E+07 4.2393603E+07 4.2292249E+074.2193864E+074.2105856E+07 4.2036718E+074.1196682E+074.1963757E+07 4.1902791E+074.1810194E+074.1705259E+07 4.1598646E+074.1494259E+074.1389571E+07 4.1291938E+074.1201423E+074.1121431E+074.1046863E+074.0963136E+074.0859867E+07559.30559.33559.36 559.39559.43559.46559.50559.53559.57 559.61559.65559.69 559.81559.86559.90 559.93559.96560.00 560.04560.07560.11560.15560.19560.22 560.26 560.29560.33560.37 560.42560.47560.51 560.54560.58560.61 560.65560.68560.72 560.76560.80560.84 560.89560.94560.98Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 6 of 10) 6.2-86CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-861.590141.61016 1.61016 1.62016 1.63013 1.64018 1.65012 1.66000 1.67014 1.68057 1.69009 1.70017 1.71018 1.75021 1.76009 1.77019 1.78019 1.79014 1.80016 1.81014 1.82015 1.83015 1.84003 1.85001 1.86011 1.87003 1.88007 1.89010 1.90007 1.91019 1.92010 1.93016 1.94013 1.95012 1.96015 1.97008 1.98019 1.99010 2.00009 2.01004 2.02017 2.03017 2.040177.2631221E+047.2432964E+04 7.2278283E+04 7.2205320E+04 7.2141973E+04 7.2049835E+04 7.1952016E+04 7.1844712E+04 7.1713907E+14 7.1575164E+04 7.1433733E+04 7.1277095E+04 7.1122032E+04 7.0507943E+04 7.0358714E+04 7.0222660E+04 7.0103256E+04 7.0001645E+04 6.9902190E+04 6.9809830E+04 6.9723055E+04 6.9630793E+04 6.9530524E+04 6.9432184E+04 6.9343257E+04 6.9260802E+04 6.9176562E+04 6.9092618E+04 6.9003582E+04 6.8908110E+04 6.8805926E+04 6.8697856E+04 6.8580875E+04 6.8467934E+04 6.8363888E+04 6.8266519E+04 6.8166411E+04 6.8062479E+04 6.7955066E+04 6.7847138E+04 6.7766440E+04 6.7709804E+04 6.7640349E+044.0747358E+074.0639399E+07 4.0556143E+07 4.0519020E+07 4.0487008E+07 4.0438786E+07 4.0387622E+07 4.0331199E+07 4.0261546E+07 4.0187249E+07 4.0111463E+07 4.0027105E+07 3.9943672E+07 3.9613307E+07 3.9533318E+07 3.9460948E+07 3.9398041E+07 3.9345011E+07 3.9293287E+07 3.9245446E+07 3.9200754E+07 3.9152920E+07 3.9100463E+07 3.9049105E+07 3.9003180E+07 3.8960691E+07 3.8917304E+07 3.8873771E+07 3.8827388E+07 3.8777285E+07 3.8723321E+07 3.8665875E+07 3.8603405E+07 3.8543229E+07 3.8488157E+07 3.8436705E+07 3.8383543E+07 3.8328037E+07 3.8270409E+07 3.8212316E+07 3.8169703E+07 3.8140337E+07 3.8103566E+07561.02561.06 561.11 561.16 561.21 561.26 561.31 561.37 561.42 561.47 561.52 561.57 561.62 561.83 561.88 561.94 562.00 562.12 562.18 562.24 562.29 562.35 562.41 562.47 562.52 562.58 562.63 562.69 562.74 562.79 562.84 562.89 562.94 562.99 563.04 563.09 563.13 563.17 563.21 563.25 563.29 563.33 563.36Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 7 of 10)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-87WATTS BARWBNP-862.050122.060172.07014 2.080122.090122.100002.110052.120052.13015 2.140132.150152.160112.170062.180022.22006 2.230102.240102.25007 2.260162.270092.28000 2.290192.300042.31012 2.32009 2.330022.340222.35007 2.360082.370112.380112.390132.400082.41016 2.420122.430042.44010 2.450132.460122.470092.480112.490102.500176.7567787E+046.7489652E+046.7395491E+04 6.7294517E+046.7180594E+046.7053291E+04 6.6918837E+046.6783490E+046.6634430E+14 6.6483182E+046.6334740E+046.6191907E+04 6.6059863E+046.5933205E+046.5472840E+04 6.5360076E+046.5251847E+046.5145767E+04 6.5051047E+046.4966735E+046.4871310E+04 6.4761651E+046.4647948E+046.4535167E+04 6.4424230E+04 6.4315209E+046.4206194E+046.4100408E+04 6.3989278E+046.3868104E+046.3745218E+04 6.3629468E+046.3516321E+046.3407662E+04 6.3298226E+046.3189783E+046.3079669E+04 6.2968324E+046.2858904E+047.2751233E+04 7.2649538E+047.2546417E+047.2441011E+043.8064924E+073.8023025E+073.7971956E+07 3.7916962E+073.7854570E+073.7784487E+07 3.7710383E+073.7635639E+073.7553098E+07 3.7469266E+073.7386995E+073.7307832E+07 3.7234710E+073.7164554E+073.6909501E+07 3.6847037E+073.6787039E+073.6728253E+07 3.6675851E+073.6629350E+073.6576445E+07 3.6515617E+073.6452469E+073.6389939E+07 3.6348461E+07 3.6268106E+073.6207774E+073.6149250E+07 3.6087769E+073.6020573E+073.5952544E+07 3.5888539E+073.5826065E+073.5766110E+073.5705745E+073.5645942E+073.5585210E+07 3.5523846E+073.5463541E+073.5414285E+07 3.5348400E+073.5291722E+073.5233761E+07563.36563.39563.42 563.45563.47563.50 563.52563.55563.57 563.59563.61563.63563.65563.67563.74 563.75563.77563.79 563.80563.82563.83 563.85563.86563.88 563.89 563.91563.93563.95 563.97563.98564.00 564.02564.05564.07 564.09564.11564.13 564.15564.18564.20 564.22564.25564.27Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 8 of 10) 6.2-88CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-862.510152.520172.530022.540112.550042.560112.570122.580072.59017 2.600122.610122.62017 2.630122.640172.65000 2.690152.700152.71015 2.720012.730072.740112.750042.760112.770022.780112.780122.800072.810112.820072.830212.84003 2.850102.860062.870122.880112.890032.90000 2.910082.920072.93019 2.940062.950062.960106.2360248E+046.2285701E+046.2213377E+04 6.2144447E+046.2074492E+046.2002522E+04 6.1925868E+046.1839278E+046.1751078E+14 6.1655475E+046.1557127E+046.1453393E+04 6.1345872E+046.1236417E+046.1120804E+046.0636936E+046.0514075E+046.0392973E+04 6.0275870E+046.0158531E+046.0146178E+04 5.9935107E+045.9827207E+045.9721999E+04 5.9617017E+04 5.9516318E+045.9424684E+045.9332760E+04 5.9239848E+045.9146625E+045.9056308E+04 5.8965263E+045.8878112E+045.8792590E+04 5.8703158E+045.8611039E+045.8516521E+04 5.8420275E+045.8323527E+045.8224442E+04 5.8124578E+045.8018131E+045.7908517E+043.5189781E+073.5149251E+073.5109968E+07 3.5072628E+073.5034700E+073.4995675E+07 3.4954001E+073.4906740E+073.4858631E+07 3.4806378E+073.4752559E+073.4695764E+07 3.4636880E+073.4576903E+073.4513455E+07 3.4247943E+073.4180534E+073.4114134E+073.4049934E+073.3985641E+073.3924017E+07 3.3863317E+073.3804290E+073.3746760E+07 3.3689833E+07 3.3634378E+073.3584464E+073.3534409E+07 3.3483771E+073.3432986E+073.3383826E+07 3.3334296E+073.3286969E+073.3240574E+07 3.3191991E+073.3141918E+073.3090534E+07 3.3038213E+073.2985689E+073.2931900E+07 3.2877642E+073.2819800E+073.2760201E+07564.30564.32564.35 564.37564.40564.42564.45564.48564.50 564.53564.56564.59 564.62564.65564.68 564.80564.84564.87 564.90564.93564.97 565.00565.03565.06 565.10 565.13565.16565.19 565.22565.26565.29 565.32565.35565.39 565.42565.46565.49 565.53565.56565.60 565.64565.68565.72Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 9 of 10)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-89WATTS BARWBNP-862.970102.980152.99002 3.000065.7797561E+045.7687325E+045.7576594E+04 5.7464688E+043.2699923E+073.2640079E+073.2580065E+07 3.2519421E+07565.77565.81565.86 565.90Table 6.2.1-23 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (Page 10 of 10) 6.2-90CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-86Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 1 of 7)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)0.000000.00250 0.005020.007510.01002 0.012510.015020.01750 0.020010.022510.02501 0.027510.030000.03251 0.035030.037500.04002 0.042510.045020.04750 0.050020.052520.05501 0.05752 0.060030.062500.06502 0.067510.070020.07255 0.075010.077530.08001 0.082520.085060.08756 0.090020.092500.09501 0.097530.100080.102519.5000000E+038.3366021E+04 7.7261661E+046.9212037E+046.9198929E+04 7.0256102E+047.0488357E+047.1061056E+04 7.1751507E+047.2329964E+047.2847529E+04 7.3317785E+047.3729839E+047.4102693E+04 7.4425566E+047.4680137E+047.4861813E+04 7.4970099E+047.5032184E+047.5091651E+04 7.5182404E+047.5339506E+047.5615681E+04 7.6070086E+04 7.6618468E+047.7167510E+047.7719314E+04 7.8269593E+047.8788572E+047.9317101E+04 7.9810365E+048.0303796E+048.0766439E+04 8.1217125E+048.1642762E+048.2029389E+04 8.2387885E+048.2708495E+048.2989585E+04 8.3215688E+048.3360910E+048.3384152E+046.1732900E+065.3981726E+07 4.9885082E+074.4671873E+074.4701697E+07 4.5378071E+074.5540990E+074.5928796E+07 4.6383734E+074.6764991E+074.7105934E+07 4.7415620E+074.7687553E+074.7933725E+074.8146411E+074.8313842E+074.8433649E+07 4.8506310E+074.8550423E+074.8596843E+07 4.8666717E+074.8784748E+074.8985032E+07 4.9303128E+07 4.9677350E+075.0046721E+075.0413314E+07 5.0773994E+075.1111466E+075.1952175E+07 5.1767914E+075.2081424E+075.2373661E+07 5.2656350E+075.2921379E+075.3160708E+07 5.3380563E+075.3574748E+075.3742451E+07 5.3873165E+075.3950565E+075.3948819E+07649.82647.53 645.66645.44645.99 645.90646.08646.33 646.45646.55646.64646.71646.79646.86 646.91646.94646.97 647.01647.07647.17 647.32647.53647.82 648.13 648.37648.55648.66 648.71648.72648.69 648.64648.55648.46 648.34648.21648.07 647.92647.75647.58 647.39647.19646.99 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-91WATTS BARWBNP-860.105040.107580.110100.11251 0.115050.117570.12002 0.122550.125100.12764 0.130160.132630.13508 0.137620.140120.14260 0.145020.147580.15014 0.152560.155020.15758 0.160090.162600.16519 0.16754 0.170190.172540.17519 0.177580.180020.182700.185110.187720.19014 0.192610.195180.19762 0.200020.202520.20503 0.207508.3224047E+048.2846812E+048.2310335E+048.1735809E+04 8.1098574E+048.0492200E+047.9906381E+04 7.9318382E+047.8761980E+047.8253342E+04 7.7799330E+047.7397664E+047.7031158E+047.6689163E+047.6380797E+047.6093060E+04 7.5829184E+047.5565368E+047.5315976E+04 7.5093228E+047.4878984E+047.4673649E+04 7.4492138E+047.4333611E+047.4195208E+04 7.4087107E+04 7.3982177E+047.3903197E+047.3821471E+04 7.3750923E+047.3679828E+048.3600631E+04 8.3530498E+048.3456456E+048.3391431E+04 8.3329933E+048.3272436E+048.3221499E+04 8.3178925E+048.3137257E+048.3098113E+048.3060530E+045.3827401E+075.3565471E+075.3203143E+075.2818443E+07 5.2396220E+075.1995488E+075.1608231E+07 5.1220985E+075.0855277E+075.0521446E+07 5.0223807E+074.9959595E+074.9718321E+07 4.9492689E+074.9287963E+074.9096220E+07 4.8919745E+074.8742549E+074.8574325E+07 4.8423506E+074.8277964E+074.8137969E+07 4.8013597E+074.7904109E+074.7807226E+07 4.7730165E+07 4.7654413E+074.7595794E+074.7533480E+07 4.7478555E+074.7422428E+074.7359686E+07 4.7303918E+074.7244677E+074.7192111E+074.7141607E+074.7041292E+074.7049902E+07 4.7012004E+074.6974010E+074.6937497E+07 4.6902038E+07646.78646.56646.37646.21 646.08645.97645.86 645.76645.68645.61 645.56645.49645.43 645.37645.29645.21 645.13645.04644.94644.83644.75644.64 644.55644.45644.34 644.24 644.13644.03643.90 643.77643.63643.47 643.32643.17643.02 642.87642.71642.57 642.43642.27642.12 641.96Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 2 of 7) 6.2-92CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-860.210080.212710.215040.21762 0.220210.222530.22502 0.227720.230200.23265 0.235100.237540.24018 0.242560.245200.24769 0.250220.252550.25518 0.257610.260080.26261 0.265190.267330.27009 0.27266 0.275200.277580.28017 0.282540.285130.28770 0.290120.292700.29504 0.297600.300180.302 50.305200.307660.31020 0.312567.3019492E+047.2971863E+047.2924285E+047.2863276E+04 7.2792031E+047.2719274E+047.2632208E+04 7.2528486E+047.2 24247E+047.2315195E+047.2201162E+047.2042610E+047.1951100E+047.1830885E+047.1697100E+047.1572088E+04 7.1446885E+047.1334337E+047.1211486E+04 7.1102069E+047.0995474E+047.0891562E+04 7.0790622E+047.0702525E+047.0611282E+047.0523851E+04 7.0442164E+047.0368655E+047.0292576E+04 7.0224050E+047.0151601E+047.0081456E+04 7.0015740E+046.9947068E+046.9885463E+04 6.9818055E+046.9750621E+046.9688876E+04 6.9619964E+046.9555942E+046.9490098E+04 6.9428756E+044.6863606E+074.6820468E+074.6778800E+074.6727166E+07 4.6668884E+074.6611036E+074.6543311E+074.6469108E+074.6385682E+074.6304601E+07 4.6220523E+074.6133707E+074.6037989E+07 4.5950825E+074.5853958E+074.5763462E+07 4.5672780E+074.5591101E+074.5501645E+07 4.5421652E+074.5343313E+074.5266449E+07 4.5191236E+074.5125078E+074.5056173E+07 4.4989715E+07 4.4926984E+074.4869978E+074.4810367E+07 4.4756397E+074.4699085E+074.4643369E+074.4591188E+074.4536538E+074.4487471E+07 4.4433794E+074.4380130E+074.4331051E+07 4.4276364E+074.4225658E+074.4173606E+07 4.4125198E+07641.80641.62641.47641.30 641.13640.97640.81 640.63640.47640.32 640.16640.01639.85 639.71639.55639.40639.26639.12638.96 638.82638.68638.53 638.38638.24638.09 637.94 637.79637.64637.48 637.34637.18637.02 636.87636.72636.58 636.42636.27636.13 635.97635.83635.68 635.55Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 3 of 7)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-93WATTS BARWBNP-860.315020.31776 0.32026 0.32278 0.32500 0.32751 0.33003 0.33255 0.33507 0.33759 0.34012 0.34264 0.345170.347700.35022 0.35275 0.35528 0.35753 0.36006 0.36260 0.36514 0.34769 0.37076 0.37255 0.37515 0.37777 0.380120.382800.38521 0.38766 0.39014 0.39267 0.39525 0.39755 0.40024 0.40263 0.40505 0.40754 0.41008 0.41265 0.415220.417596.9364785E.046.9292945E+04 6.9228329E+04 6.9162511E+04 6.9104546E+04 6.9039481E+04 6.8974226E+04 6.8909148E+04 6.8844266E+04 6.8779396E+04 6.8714551E+04 6.8679846E+04 6.8585131E+046.8520434E+046.8455793E+04 6.8391227E+04 6.8326749E+04 6.8269558E+04 6.8205347E+04 6.8141484E+04 6.8077896E+04 6.8014722E+04 6.7952063E+04 6.7896887E+04 6.7835502E+04 6.7775061E+04 6.7722086E+046.7663597E+046.7612661E+04 6.7562816E+04 6.7514175E+04 6.7466809E+04 6.7420771E+04 6.7381410E+04 6.7338142E+04 6.7301204E+04 6.7265696E+04 6.7230577E+04 6.7196212E+04 6.7162616E+04 6.7129564E+046.7099339E+044.4074786E+074.4018417E+07 4.3967794E+07 4.3916352E+07 4.3871173E+07 4.3820519E+07 4.3769791E+07 4.3719287E+07 4.3669001E+07 4.3618794E+07 4.3568709E+07 4.3518771E+07 4.3468932E+074.3418197E+074.3369591E+07 4.3320125E+07 4.3270811E+07 4.3227127E+07 4.3179176E+07 4.3129458E+07 4.3081018E+07 4.3032888E+07 4.2985130E+07 4.2943032E+07 4.2896141E+07 4.2849802E+07 4.2809071E+074.2763911E+074.2724370E+07 4.2685441E+07 4.2647182E+07 4.2609616E+07 4.2572755E+07 4.2541088E+07 4.2505555E+07 4.2475007E+07 4.2445335E+07 4.2415619E+07 4.2368271E+07 4.2357391E+07 4.2328625E+074.2302439E+07635.41635.25 635.11 634.97 634.85 634.72 634.58 634.45 634.32 634.18 634.05 633.42 633.80633.67633.54 633.42 633.29 633.18 633.06 632.44 632.82 632.70 632.58 632.47 632.36 632.24 632.13632.01631.90 631.79 631.68 631.56 631.45 631.35 631.23 631.12 631.01 630.90 630.78 630.67 630.55630.44Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 4 of 7) 6.2-94CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-860.420160.42263 0.42509 0.42767 0.43024 0.43281 0.43510 0.43779 0.44015 0.44263 0.44503 0.44776 0.450310.452600.45518 0.45779 0.46006 0.46262 0.46518 0.46775 0.47030 0.47255 0.47512 0.47771 0.48032 0.18262 0.185270.187620.49034 0.49274 0.49517 0.49765 0.50024 0.51012 0.52016 0.53003 0.54020 0.55004 0.56004 0.57018 0.580180.590336.7047039E+046.7035782E+04 6.7004568E+04 6.6971284E+04 6.6936789E+04 6.6901398E+04 6.6868952E+04 6.6829329E+04 6.6792662E+04 6.6752389E+04 6.6712436E+04 6.6669435E+04 6.6620128E+046.6577783E+046.6529174E+04 6.6474055E+04 6.6434522E+04 6.6383646E+04 6.6332450E+04 6.6280967E+04 6.6229638E+046.6184 40E+046.6134141E+04 6.6083853E+04 6.6034259E+04 6.5991507E+04 6.5943495E+046.5902325E+046.5856311E+04 6.5817000E+04 6.5778874E+04 6.5741321E+04 6.5703604E+04 6.5570446E+04 6.5456120E+04 6.5347836E+04 6.5234080E+04 6.5114485E+04 6.4980058E+04 6.4832681E+04 6.4683520E+046.4537352E+044.2274388E+064.2247295E+07 4.2220317E+07 4.2191629E+07 4.2162210E+07 4.2132309E+07 4.2105162E+07 4.2072364E+074.204242 E+074.2010062E+07 4.1978278E+07 4.1941233E+07 4.1905799E+074.1872966E+074.1835621E+07 4.1797358E+07 4.1763609E+07 4.1725280E+07 4.1686877E+07 4.1648404E+07 4.1610156E+07 4.1576904E+07 4.1539141E+07 4.1501763E+07 4.1464870E+07 4.1433014E+07 4.1397152E+074.1366304E+074.1331688E+07 4.1301975E+07 4.1273019E+07 4.1244325E+07 4.1215508E+07 4.1111667E+07 4.1020126E+07 4.0933067E+07 4.0842628E+07 4.0750005E+074.06448900+074.0540699E+07 4.0432982E+074.0328174e+07630.33630.22 630.11 630.00 629.88 629.77 629.67 629.55 629.45 629.34 629.24 629.13 629.03628.93628.83 628.73 628.64 628.55 628.45 628.36 628.27 628.19 628.10 628.02 627.93 627.85 627.77627.69627.60 627.51 627.45 627.37 627.29 626.98 626.68 626.39 626.09 625.82 625.56 625.31 625.09624.88Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 5 of 7)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-95WATTS BARWBNP-860.600280.61006 0.62028 0.63028 0.64037 0.65032 0.66003 0.67035 0.68020 0.69008 0.70037 0.71029 0.720210.730100.74021 0.75002 0.76000 0.77025 0.78006 0.79033 0.80016 0.81028 0.82032 0.83026 0.84010 0.85016 0.860140.870130.88014 0.89016 0.90014 0.91001 0.92006 0.93002 0.94022 0.95016 0.96032 0.97003 0.98019 0.99034 1.000091.050306.4405682E+046.4291379E+04 6.4185296E+04 6.4088543E+04 6.3991051E+04 6.3890693E+04 6.3787662E+04 6.3673290E+04 6.3560494E+04 6.3444844E+04 6.3323594E+04 6.3206689E+04 6.3092848E+046.2978206E+046.2863312E+04 6.2754080E+04 6.2641845E+04 6.2527645E+04 6.2420690E+04 6.2310561E+04 6.2205817E+04 6.2097447E+04 6.1988143E+04 6.1877208E+04 6.1764525E+04 6.1646530E+04 6.1528079E+046.1410582E+046.1295125E+04 6.1181918E+04 6.1070276E+04 6.0959110E+04 6.0843976E+04 6.0728862E+04 6.0611678E+04 6.0502372E+04 6.0399882E+04 6.0310970E+04 6.0224576E+04 6.0141262E+04 6.0061803E+045.9639533E+044.0233863E+074.0151570E+07 4.0074475E+07 4.0003799E+07 3.9932853E+07 3.9860535E+07 3.9787307E+073.970717 E+073.9629252E+07 3.9550368E+07 3.9468650E+07 3.9390687E+07 3.9315454E+073.9240792E+073.9166115E+07 3.9094680E+07 3.9021892E+07 3.8948268E+07 3.8879349E+07 3.8809018E+07 3.8742510E+07 3.8674058E+07 3.8605382E+07 3.8536023E+07 3.8465890E+07 3.8392779E+07 3.8319750E+073.8247723E+073.8177357E+07 3.8108690E+07 3.8041150E+07 3.7973934E+07 3.7904302E+07 3.7834735E+07 3.7764186E+07 3.7698968E+07 3.7638703E+07 3.7587283E+07 3.7537977E+07 3.7490808E+07 3.7446007E+073.7210078E+07624.69624.52 624.36 624.20 624.04 623.89 623.75 623.61 623.49 623.38 623.29 623.20 623.14623.09623.04 622.98 622.94 622.90 622.86 622.83 622.81 622.80 622.79 622.78 622.78 622.79 622.80622.82622.84 622.88 622.91 622.94 622.98 623.01 623.05 623.10 623.16 623.22 623.30 623.38 623.46623.92Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 6 of 7) 6.2-96CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-861.100091.15005 1.20022 1.25009 1.30021 1.35018 1.40030 1.45011 1.50013 1.55010 1.60014 1.65001 1.700071.750101.80003 1.85003 1.90028 1.95028 2.000325.9161129E+045.8600069E+04 5.8110574E+04 5.7618787E+04 5.7172718E+04 5.6709129E+04 5.6244826E+04 5.5752608E+04 5.5230766E+04 5.4683919E+04 5.4098362E+04 5.3515705E+04 5.2934335E+045.2337170E+045.1749965E+04 5.1168201E+04 5.0574787E+04 4.9983327E+04 4.9412836E+043.6942041E+073.6621801E+07 3.6350936E+07 3.6075665E+07 3.5828693E+07 3.5567732E+07 3.5305636E+07 3.5023683E+07 3.4722152E+07 3.4403984E+07 3.4059730E+07 3.3718514E+07 3.3379803E+073.3032036E+073.2692856E+07 3.2359058E+07 3.2018724E+07 3.1680180E+07 3.1356166E+07624.43624.94 625.55 626.11 626.67 627.20 627.71 628.20 628.67 629.14 629.59 630.07 630.59631.14631.75 632.41 633.10 633.81 634.58Table 6.2.1-24 Break Mass And Energy Flow From A Double-Ended Hot Leg Break (Page 7 of 7)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-97WATTS BAR WBNP-0Table 6.2.1-25 Double-Ended Pump Suction LOCA Event Time (sec)RuptureAccumulator flow starts Assumed initiation of ECCS End of blowdown Assumed initiation of spray system Accumulators empty End of reflood Low level alarm of refueling water storage tankBeginning of recirculation phase of safeguards operation 015.5 24.0 24.0 55.0 56.1167.01095 1455 6.2-98CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26 Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Max. S.I., W/Froth (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOEEOFEOFILTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLE Initial RCS & AccADDED MASS Pumped Injection Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE

DISTRIBUTIONReactor Coolant AccumulatorTotal Contents EFFLUENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.94 24.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 64.99 156.67 221.66 493.21 0.00 493.21 714.87 167.00 714.94 173.01 173.01 887.95 148.27 0.00 148.27 587.76 151.92 739.68 887.95 727.00 714.94 940.91 940.91 1655.85 148.27 0.00 148.27 657.89 849.69 1507.58 1655.85 1642.00 714.94 2213.82 2213.82 2928.76 148.27 0.00 148.27 734.41 2046.08 2780.49 2928.76 ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOEEOFEOFILTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLE In RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY Pumped Injection

Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00 816.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.6124.00 816.61 0.00 9.86 -3.58 6.28822.89167.00 816.61 15.22 31.63 -3.58 43.27859.89 727.00 816.61 67.44 91.29 1.09 159.82 976.431642.00 816.61 154.00 168.24 8.83 331.071147.68 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-99WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulatorCore Stored Thin MetalThick MetalSteam Generator Total Contents EFFULENTBreak Flow ECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.29 18.51 28.38 25.01 30.78 411.65 816.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.61 17.33 13.79 11.12 20.50 30.78 411.00 504.51 318.39 0.00 318.39 822.90 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 23.74 343.05 408.86 437.48 13.37 450.85 859.71 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 23.74 262.31 328.13 520.34 118.15 638.49 966.62 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 23.74 161.39 227.21 608.85 291.00 899.85 1127.06Table 6.2.1-26 Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Max. S.I., W/Froth (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-100CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26a Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/Froth (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOEEOFEOFILTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLEInitial RCS & AccADDED MASS

Pumped InjectionTotal AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTIONReactor Coolant AccumulatorTotal Contents EFFLUENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.94 24.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 64.99 156.67 221.66 493.21 0.00 493.21 714.87 195.00 714.94 105.76 105.76 820.70 148.27 0.00 148.27 589.64 82.80 672.44 820.70 310.00 714.94 182.51 182.51 897.45 148.27 0.00 148.27 623.74 125.45 749.19 897.46 1770.00 714.94 1156.92 1156.92 1871.86 148.27 0.00 148.27 790.41 933.18 1723.59 1871.86 ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOEEOFEOFILTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLEIn RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY

Pumped Injection Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.

Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00 816.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.61 24.00 816.61 0.00 9.86 -3.58 6.28 822.89195.00 816.61 9.31 35.25 -3.58 40.98 857.59310.00 816.61 14.53 49.10 -3.10 60.53 877.141770.00 816.61 80.79 177.93 3.05 261.77 1078.38 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-101WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulator Core StoredThin MetalThick Metal Steam GeneratorTotal Contents EFFULENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.29 18.51 28.38 25.01 30.78 411.65 816.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.61 17.33 13.79 11.12 20.50 30.78 411.00 504.51 318.39 0.00 318.39 822.90 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 22.70 343.01 409.79 440.26 7.29 447.55 857.33 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 22.70 315.50 380.28 480.34 15.68 496.02 876.30 28.61 0.00 4.03 9.44 22.70 155.42 220.20 673.10 174.65 847.75 1067.95Table 6.2.1-26a Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/Froth (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-102CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26b Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/Froth (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLEInitial RCS & AccADDED MASS

Pumped InjectionTotal AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulatorTotal Contents

EFFLUENTBreak FlowECCS Spill Total EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.9428.58 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 77.61144.97222.58492.370.00492.37714.95 170.80 714.94 184.22184.22899.16160.890.00160.89584.17154.10 738.27899.16 1500.00714.941978.941978.942693.88160.89 0.00160.89711.871821.12 2532.992693.88 ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLEIn RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY

Pumped Injection Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.

Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00817.910.000.000.00 0.00817.9128.58817.910.0010.84-4.056.79824.70 170.80817.9116.2132.24-4.0544.40862.321500.00817.91174.15157.24-4.05327.341145.25 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-103WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulator Core StoredThin MetalThick Metal Steam GeneratorTotal Contents EFFULENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.2918.51 28.3825.0130.78412.95817.910.000.000.00817.91 20.1212.76 10.2320.0930.78414.26508.23316.480.00316.48824.71 31.400.00 4.039.4423.77348.72417.36432.4813.56446.04863.40 31.40 0.00 4.03 9.4411.79340.02398.67589.38160.26749.641146.31Table 6.2.1-26b Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Pump Suction Guillotine, Min. S.I., W/Froth (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-104CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26c Watts Bar Four Loop Plant 3 Ft 2 Pump Suction (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLEInitial RCS & AccADDED MASS

Pumped InjectionTotal AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulatorTotal Contents

EFFLUENTBreak FlowECCS Spill Total EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.94 41.50 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 100.22 127.36 227.58 487.28 0.00 487.28 714.86 182.50 714.94 171.82 171.82 886.76 183.50 0.00 183.50 575.98 127.28 703.26 886.76 1500.00 714.94 1950.74 1950.74 2665.68 183.50 0.00 183.50 702.28 1779.90 2482.18 2665.68ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLEIn RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY

Pumped Injection Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.

Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00 812.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 812.86 41.50 812.86 0.00 13.23 -18.89 -5.66 807.20 182.50 812.86 15.12 33.83 -18.89 30.06 842.92 1500.00 812.86 171.67 157.33 -18.89 310.11 1122.97 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-105WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulator Core StoredThin MetalThick Metal Steam GeneratorTotal Contents EFFULENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.29 18.51 28.38 25.01 30.78 407.90 812.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 812.86 24.06 11.21 7.65 19.08 30.78 401.58 494.35 312.84 0.00 312.84 807.19 35.34 0.00 4.03 9.44 23.82 335.52 408.14 424.59 11.20 435.79 843.93 35.34 0.00 4.03 9.44 11.80 327.62 388.22 579.14 156.63 735.77 1123.99Table 6.2.1-26c Watts Bar Four Loop Plant 3 Ft 2 Pump Suction (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-106CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26d Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Hot Leg Guillotine, Max. S.I (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLEInitial RCS & AccADDED MASS

Pumped InjectionTotal AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTIONReactor Coolant AccumulatorTotal Contents EFFLUENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.94 19.80 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 66.31 164.85 231.16 482.76 0.00 482.76 713.92 129.30 714.94 138.77 138.77 853.71 241.15 0.00 241.15 612.56 0.00 612.56 853.71 1500.00 714.94 1989.52 1989.52 2704.46 272.69 0.00 272.69 746.76 1685.01 2431.77 2704.46ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLEIn RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY

Pumped Injection Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.

Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00 814.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 814.71 19.80 814.71 0.00 8.83 -0.18 8.65 823.35129.30 814.71 12.21 26.33 -0.18 38.36 853.07 1500.00 814.71 175.08 156.93 -0.18 331.83 1146.53 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-107WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator.

DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulator Core StoredThin MetalThick Metal Steam GeneratorTotal Contents EFFULENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.29 18.51 28.38 25.01 30.78 409.74 814.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 814.71 17.63 14.51 9.73 21.02 30.78 406.21 499.87 323.39 0.00 323.39 823.26 36.96 0.00 4.03 9.44 25.11 389.32 464.86 389.59 0.00 389.59 854.45 39.74 0.00 4.03 9.44 11.78 386.72 451.71 547.99 148.28 696.27 1147.98Table 6.2.1-26d Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Hot Leg Guillotine, Max. S.I (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-108CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-26e Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine, Max. S.I (Page 1 of 2)MASS BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Mass (10 3 lbm)AVAILABLEInitial RCS & AccADDED MASS

Pumped InjectionTotal AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTIONReactor Coolant AccumulatorTotal Contents EFFLUENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 0.00 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 504.64 210.30 714.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 714.94 18.42 714.94 0.00 0.00 714.94 40.50 119.07 159.57 502.29 52.60 554.89 714.46 497.00 714.94 640.46 184.22 1355.40 123.78 0.00 123.78 601.39 630.23 1231.62 1355.40 1500.00 714.94 1994.73 1994.73 2709.67 123.78 0.00 123.78 686.99 1898.91 2585.90 2709.90ENERGY BALANCE 0.0EOBEOERECTime (seconds)Energy (10 6 Btu)AVAILABLEIn RCS, Acc, & S GenADDED ENERGY

Pumped Injection Decay Heat**Heat from Sec.

Total AddedTOTAL AVAILABLE 0.00 816.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.50 18.42 816.50 0.00 8.47 -3.71 4.76 821.25 497.00 816.50 56.36 68.97 -3.71 121.62 938.111500.00 816.50 175.54 156.77 -3.71 328.59 1145.09 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-109WATTS BARWBNP-85**Steam out and feedwater into the steam generator.

DISTRIBUTIONReactor CoolantAccumulator Core StoredThin MetalThick Metal Steam GeneratorTotal Contents EFFULENT Break FlowECCS SpillTotal EffluentTOTAL ACCOUNTABLE 302.29 18.51 28.38 25.01 30.78 411.54 816.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 816.50 11.35 10.48 16.03 21.09 30.78 410.71 500.43 316.24 4.63 320.87 821.30 22.63 0.00 4.03 9.44 15.76 374.72 426.57 444.84 55.46 500.30 926.87 22.63 0.00 4.03 9.44 11.78 362.62 410.50 556.54 167.10 723.64 1134.14Table 6.2.1-26e Watts Bar Four Loop Plant Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine, Max. S.I (Page 2 of 2) 6.2-110CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-27a Steam Line Break BlowdownTime (sec)Mass Flow Rate, m (lbm/sec) Energy Flow Rate, e (10 6 Btu/sec) 0 0.1150 0.1151 1.550 1.551 2.501 2.502 10.00196701967014260 142602168021680 425604256023.38823.38816.955 16.95519.34019.340 24.85524.855 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-111WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-27b Steam Generator Enclosure GeometryNodesVolume (ft 3)51, 56 52, 57 53, 58 54, 59 55, 605193157712761648 1363 6.2-112CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-27c Steam Generator Enclosure Flow Path DataPathkF LI(ft)DH(ft)A(ft²)LEO(ft)a/AH511.500.0218.59.2174.711.70.70H52, H572.040.0219.05.036.913.40.31H53, H582.040.0222.35.036.916.40.56 H54, H592.040.0219.65.835.913.60.34H55, H602.040.0222.95.835.917.00.59R51, R560.230.029.65.4108.97.60.29R52, R570.000.0214.85.4108.914.81.0R53, R580.000.0214.86.088.214.81.0 R54, R592.780.027.83.989.65.70.82R55, R602.780.028.34.277.16.20.9A51, 1560.230.029.26.088.27.50.24 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-113WATTS BARWBNP-89Table 6.2.1-27d Peak Differential Pressure - Steam Generator EnclosureAcross Enclosure WallsNodesDifferential Press. (psi)Time (sec)51 - Upper Compartment52 - " "53 - " "54 - " "

55 - " " 38.0 37.0 37.0 36.8 36.83.69 3.75 3.76 3.77 3.77 Across Steam Generator VesselNodesDifferential Press. (psi)Time (sec) 3 - 2 5 - 4 0.28 0.100.0160.024Across Steam Generator Separator WallNodesDifferential Press. (psi)Time (sec) 55-5919.390.0376 6.2-114CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-89Table 6.2.1-28 Mass And Energy Release Rates Into Pressurizer Enclosure Time (sec)Mass Flow (10 3 lbm/sec)Energy Flow (10 6 Btu/sec)0.0 0.002510.005020.01002 0.012510.017550.02505 0.032590.040020.05005 0.072500.090010.112530.137560.157550.17760 0.192540.212540.23508 0.277520.350270.0 5.04735.23335.1051 5.07465.38335.5402 5.87465.92215.6865 5.78775.49175.9404 5.54545.63925.4721 5.51895.47255.5465 5.53455.36490.0 3.09773.20133.1226 3.10293.27533.3601 3.54793.57163.4332 3.48683.31573.5710 3.34453.39793.3026 3.32913.30253.3446 3.33783.24110.380010.41515 0.450060.570020.77015 1.00005 2.000155.29855.3825 5.26605.24925.1816 5.1562 5.03263.20313.2507 3.18423.17383.13363.11693.0400 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-115WATTS BARWBNP-89Table 6.2.1-29 Pressurizer Geometric Data NodeVolume (ft 3)51 52 53 542262 502 667 647Flow Path k f L 1(ft)D H(ft)A(ft 2)L EQ(ft)a/A51-5251-5351-5453-52 54-5253-54 52-lowercompartment53-lower compartment54-lower compartment0.50.50.50.0 0.00.01.01.01.00.020.020.020.02 0.020.020.020.020.02 13.3 13.8 13.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 12.03.3 4.8 4.8 3.5 1.5 0.93.3 4.8 4.8 20.927.726.942.6 18.511.322.127.724.4 12.1 12.1 12.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.12 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.2-116CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-86Table 6.2.1-29a Peak Differential Pressure - Pressurizer Enclosure Across Enclosure WallsNodesDifferential Press. (psi)Time (sec)51 - Upper Compartment11.40.06 52 - Upper Compartment 7.7 0.10 53 - Upper Compartment 7.7 0.10 54 - Upper Compartment 7.7 0.10Across Pressurizer VesselNodesDifferential Press. (psi)Time (sec)52 0.040.038 52 0.230.046 53 0.200.050 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-117WATTS BARWBNP-86Table 6.2.1-30 Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In 2 Cold Leg (Page 1 of 5)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)0.000000.002510.005020.00751 0.010010.012530.01503 0.017530.020060.02255 0.025060.027510.03001 0.032540.035030.03757 0.040090.042550.04502 0.047520.050010.05266 0.05514 0.057570.060120.06257 0.065000.067630.07009 0.072590.075030.07759 0.080020.082530.08504 0.087520.090040.09260 0.095000.097510.100070. 1.1982845E+041.5308269E+041.7398501E+04 1.9131092E+041.9948352E+041.9716482E+04 2.1905036E+042.2170478E+042.1560830E+04 2.1315153E+042.1626356E+042.1729350E+04 2.2084361E+042.2542872E+042.2895385E+04 2.3203939E+042.3446963E+042.3464854E+04 2.3298089E+042.3145127E+042.3018004E+04 2.2950194E+04 2.2904460E+042.2779154E+042.2510846E+04 2.2164087E+042.1888594E+042.1850009E+04 2.2019590E+042.2242956E+042.2352310E+04 2.2278656E+042.2036897E+042.1670113E+042.1266578E+042.0857542E+042.0466616E+042.0201194E+042.0053059E+042.0025022E+040. 6.7296740E+068.5974676E+069.7720743E+06 1.0741761E+071.1193906E+071.1050978E+07 1.2288321E+071.2426731E+071.2069870E+07 1.1923450E+071.2094688E+071.2147779E+07 1.2345775E+071.2603165E+071.2800602E+07 1.2973383E+071.3108981E+071.3115753E+071.3017402E+071.2927663E+071.2853122E+07 1.2812973E+07 1.2785675E+071.2713027E+071.2559119E+071.2360966E+071.2203861E+071.2182079E+07 1.2278820E+071.2406073E+071.2468054E+07 1.2425609E+071.2287536E+071.2078517E+07 1.1848983E+071.1617001E+071.1395523E+07 1.1245397E+071.1161858E+071.1146521E+07 0.00561.61561.62561.66 561.48561.14560.49560.98560.51559.81 559.39559.26559.05 559.03559.08559.09 559.10559.09558.95 558.73558.55558.39 558.29 558.22558.10557.91 557.70557.54557.53 557.63557.75557.80 557.74557.59557.38 557.16556.97556.79 556.67556.62556.63 6.2-118CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-860.105150.11011 0.11505 0.12008 0.12502 0.13007 0.13509 0.140010.145080.15009 0.15504 0.16006 0.16505 0.17007 0.17514 0.18005 0.18504 0.19010 0.19507 0.20009 0.21252 0.225070.237590.25011 0.26253 0.27516 0.28761 0.30014 0.31261 0.32509 0.33757 0.35003 0.36251 0.37512 0.38764 0.400070.412630.42512 0.43769 0.45005 0.462602.0170943E+042.0365487E+04 2.0647554E+04 2.0944972E+04 2.0977664E+04 2.0780412E+04 2.0500682E+04 2.0096382E+041.9569603E+041.9235427E+04 1.9138491E+04 1.9034644E+04 1.8879080E+04 1.8748148E+04 1.8720580E+04 1.8785810E+04 1.8911550E+04 1.9101126E+04 1.9311878E+04 1.9465602E+04 1.9617023E+04 1.9458748E+041.9647389E+041.9804565E+04 1.9395307E+04 1.8760813E+04 1.8860759E+04 1.9381793E+04 1.9557340E+04 1.9428795E+04 1.9460687E+04 1.9510288E+04 1.9334731E+04 1.9237392E+04 1.9172556E+04 1.9255351E+041.9518505E+041.9566788E+04 1.9443279E+04 1.9309158E+04 1.9325193E+041.1230305E+071.1341279E+07 1.1501747E+07 1.1670752E+07 1.1688856E+07 1.1576250E+07 1.1417226E+07 1.1187990E+071.0889944E+071.0701397E+07 1.0647134E+07 1.0588880E+07 1.0501358E+07 1.0427857E+07 1.0412805E+07 1.0450146E+07 1.0521664E+07 1.0629209E+07 1.0748514E+07 1.0835436E+07 1.0920644E+07 1.0830336E+071.0937376E+071.1026138E+07 1.0793667E+07 1.0435112E+07 1.0492777E+07 1.0787950E+07 1.0886714E+07 1.0813221E+07 1.0831309E+07 1.0859152E+07 1.0759415E+07 1.0704384E+07 1.0667882E+07 1.0715044E+071.0864131E+071.0890843E+07 1.0820460E+07 1.0744438E+07 1.0753755E+07556.76556.89 557.05 557.21 557.20 557.08 557.92 556.72556.47556.34 556.32 556.30 556.24 556.21 556.22 556.28 556.36 556.47 556.58 556.65 556.69 556.58556.68556.75 556.51 556.22 556.33 556.60 556.66 556.56 556.57 556.59 556.48 556.44 556.41 556.47556.61556.60 556.51 556.44 556.46Table 6.2.1-30 Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In 2 Cold Leg (Page 2 of 5)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-119WATTS BARWBNP-860.475150.48751 0.50010 0.52505 0.55001 0.57500 0.60009 0.625020.650010.67502 0.70006 0.72503 0.75008 0.77503 0.80011 0.82503 0.85012 0.87505 0.90005 0.92504 0.95005 0.975091.000241.02501 1.05002 1.07501 1.10003 1.12501 1.15013 1.17512 1.20008 1.22506 1.25010 1.27506 1.30002 1.325051.350061.37504 1.40009 1.42508 1.450041.9427001E+041.9463982E+04 1.9412566E+04 1.9416927E+04 1.9520981E+04 1.9439249E+04 1.9432289E+04 1.9570908E+041.9484134E+041.9537413E+04 1.9557525E+04 1.9556471E+04 1.9566953E+04 1.9575425E+04 1.9613175E+04 1.9623035E+04 1.9607042E+04 1.9625149E+04 1.9642366E+04 1.9652418E+04 1.9665495E+04 1.9657157E+041.9674801E+041.9674211E+04 1.9685832E+04 1.9689581E+04 1.9688612E+04 1.9688440E+04 1.9691682E+04 1.9694412E+04 1.9690643E+04 1.9686074E+04 1.9682378E+04 1.9685597E+04 1.9688096E+04 1.9673388E+041.9668391E+041.9669445E+04 1.9673705E+04 1.9668652E+04 1.9667081E+041.0811564E+071.0832327E+07 1.0802979E+07 1.0805655E+07 1.0864335E+07 1.0817886E+07 1.0814194E+07 1.0892620E+071.0843384E+071.0873742E+07 1.0885106E+07 1.0884559E+07 1.0890551E+07 1.0895394E+07 1.0916838E+07 1.0922366E+07 1.0913377E+07 1.0923689E+07 1.0933451E+07 1.0939158E+07 1.0946566E+07 1.0941870E+071.0951903E+071.0951587E+07 1.0958208E+07 1.0960360E+07 1.0959861E+07 1.0959833E+07 1.0961746E+07 1.0963374E+07 1.0961334E+07 1.0958870E+07 1.0956913E+07 1.0958900E+07 1.0960455E+07 1.0952302E+071.0949690E+071.0950509E+07 1.0950139E+07 1.0950505E+07 1.0950053E+07556.52556.53 556.49 556.51 556.55 556.50 556.51 556.57556.52556.56 556.57 556.57 556.58 556.59 556.61 556.61 556.60 556.62 556.63 556.63 556.64 556.64556.65556.65 556.65 556.66 556.66 556.66 556.67 556.67 556.68 556.68 556.69 556.70 556.70 556.71556.72556.73 556.74 556.75 556.76Table 6.2.1-30 Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In 2 Cold Leg (Page 3 of 5)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm) 6.2-120CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-851.475011.50004 1.52500 1.55005 1.57502 1.60008 1.62509 1.650081.675081.70000 1.72523 1.75002 1.77506 1.80004 1.82507 1.85004 1.87501 1.90005 1.92505 1.95013 1.97508 2.000012.025042.05011 2.07503 2.10004 2.12507 2.15003 2.17504 2.20000 2.22510 2.25001 2.27507 2.30008 2.32510 2.350002.375032.40011 2.42510 2.45013 2.475101.9675943E+041.9668050E+04 1.9665596E+04 1.9671043E+04 1.9666568E+04 1.9662702E+04 1.9658419E+04 1.9652327E+041.9641445E+041.9631684E+04 1.9622211E+04 1.9611372E+04 1.9600265E+04 1.9586316E+04 1.9570844E+04 1.9558044E+04 1.9547428E+04 1.9533703E+04 1.9518588E+04 1.9504270E+04 1.9490671E+04 1.9475975E+041.9460138E+041.9443525E+04 1.9425610E+04 1.9406458E+04 1.9386749E+04 1.9366596E+04 1.9344857E+04 1.9321966E+04 1.9298174E+04 1.9274722E+04 1.9250836E+04 1.9225729E+04 1.9199767E+04 1.9189974E+041.9159580E+041.9117138E+04 1.9108543E+04 1.9096201E+04 1.9042948E+041.0955165E+071.0950970E+07 1.0949895E+07 1.0953307E+07 1.0951104E+07 1.0949279E+07 1.0947234E+07 1.0944186E+071.0938449E+071.0933366E+07 1.0928465E+07 1.0922805E+07 1.0917009E+07 1.0909616E+07 1.0901377E+07 1.0894662E+07 1.0889183E+07 1.0881955E+07 1.0873945E+07 1.0866400E+07 1.0854264E+07 1.0851512E+071.0843124E+071.0834315E+07 1.0824775E+07 1.0814547E+07 1.0804030E+07 1.0793269E+07 1.0781622E+07 1.0769339E+07 1.0756568E+07 1.0743996E+07 1.0731182E+07 1.0717684E+07 1.0703706E+07 1.0698897E+071.0682347E+071.0659079E+07 1.0654963E+07 1.0648650E+07 1.0633130E+07556.78556.79 556.80 556.82 556.84 556.86 556.87 556.89556.91556.92 556.94 556.96 556.98 556.00 557.02 557.04 557.06 557.09 557.11 557.13 557.15 557.17557.20557.22 557.24 557.27 557.29 557.31 557.34 557.36 557.39 557.41 557.44 557.47 557.49 557.53557.55557.57 557.60 557.63 557.65Table 6.2.1-30 Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In 2 Cold Leg (Page 4 of 5)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-121WATTS BARWBNP-852.500112.52510 2.55010 2.57508 2.60006 2.62512 2.65025 2.675042.700182.72514 2.75003 2.77504 2.80005 2.82511 2.85006 2.87505 2.90005 2.92505 2.95003 2.97508 3.000201.9042948E+041.9038224E+04 1.9011234E+04 1.8977430E+04 1.8963744E+04 1.8950653E+04 1.8927642E+04 1.8894421E+041.8869044E+041.8846108E+04 1.8827068E+04 1.8815133E+04 1.8795707E+04 1.8768598E+04 1.8741259E+04 1.8723005E+04 1.8704799E+04 1.8678392E+04 1.8650919E+04 1.8627102E+04 1.8605296E+041.0619918E+071.0617984E+07 1.0603416E+07 1.0585017E+07 1.0578049E+07 1.0571411E+07 1.0559161E+07 1.0541167E+071.0527674E+071.0515517E+07 1.0505586E+07 1.0499666E+07 1.0489482E+07 1.0474967E+07 1.0460340E+07 1.0450857E+07 1.0441382E+07 1.0427269E+07 1.0412569E+07 1.0399953E+07 1.0388476E+07557.68557.72 557.74 557.77 557.80 557.84 557.87 557.90557.93557.97 558.00 558.04 558.08 558.11 558.14 558.18 558.22 558.25 558.29 558.32 558.36Table 6.2.1-30 Mass And Energy Release Rates 127 In 2 Cold Leg (Page 5 of 5)Time(sec)Mass Flow(lbm/sec)Energy Flow(Btu/sec)Avg. Enthalpy (Btu/lbm) 6.2-122CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-31 Reactor Cavity Volumes (Page 1 of 2)COMPARTMENT NUMBERCOMPARTMENT LOCATIONVOLUME (ft

3) 1 2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Break LocationLower Reactor Cavity Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel AnnulusReactor Vessel AnnulusReactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus

Lower Containment

Lower Containment Lower Containment Lower Containment

Break Location Inspection Annulus Inspection Annulus Inspection Annulus Inspection Annulus Inspection Annulus Inspection Annulus

Upper Containment Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel AnnulusReactor Vessel AnnulusReactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Reactor Vessel Annulus Upper Reactor Cavity

Ice Condenser164.59512,000.

1.319 1.938 8.601 8.601 9.825 17.202 9.82517.202 9.205 17.202 9.206 17.202 9.825 17.202 9.825 17.202 9.206 17.202 60,000.

60,000.60,000.60,000.

165.206 165.819 165.206 164.595 165.206 165.819 165.206 651,000.

1.404 1.404 1.938 8.601 8.60117.202 17.202 17.202 17.202 17.202 17.202 17.202 0.602 0.602 15,500.

24,241.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-123WATTS BARWBNP-85 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68Ice Condenser Ice Condenser

Ice Condenser

Ice CondenserPipe AnnulusInspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Inspection Port Pipe Annulus Pipe Annulus Pipe Annulus Pipe Annulus Pipe AnnulusPipe AnnulusPipe Annulus28,760.28,760.

28,760.

47,000.150.17.280 17.280 17.280 17.280 17.280 17.280 17.280 17.280 47.

47.

47.

47.

47.47.150.Table 6.2.1-31 Reactor Cavity Volumes (Continued) (Page 2 of 2)COMPARTMENT NUMBERCOMPARTMENT LOCATIONVOLUME (ft

3) 6.2-124CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-32 Flow Path Data (Reactor Cavity) (Page 1 of 3) Between Compartments k f Inertia Length (ft) Hydraulic Diameter (ft) Flow Area(ft 2)Equiv.Length (ft) Area Ratio a/A 1 to 3 2 to 22 3 to 34 4 to 35 5 to 36 6 to 37 7 to 9 8 to 10 9 to 1110 to 1211 to 13 12 to 14 13 to 15 14 to 16 15 to 17 16 to 18 17 to 19 18 to 2019 to 420 to 6 21 to 22 22 to 23 23 to 24 24 to 21 25 to 7 26 to 9 27 to 1128 to 1329 to 15 30 to 17 31 to 19 33 to 3 34 to 7 35 to 7 36 to 38 37 to 8 38 to 3939 to 4040 to 41 41 to 42 42 to 43 43 to 44 44 to 5 45 to 3 46 to 3 53 to 154 to 155 to 25 56 to 260.42.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.040.01.04 0.0 1.04 0.0 1.04 0.0 1.0 0.01.00.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.82.82.8 2.8 2.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.40.50.5 0.50.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.021.6 28.

0.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 4.9 6.6 4.66.64.8 6.6 4.6 6.6 4.9 6.6 4.6 6.65.45.0 38.

38.

38.

32.

3.0 3.0 3.13.13.0 3.0 3.1 0.7 3.6 5.4 5.0 5.0 6.66.66.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.0 0.8 0.8 7.62.62.6 2.60.35.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 40.

40.

40.

8.0 0.2 0.2 0.20.20.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.832.52.5 2.52.7 36.

1.2 0.7 2.6 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.02.61.0 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.0 2.60.52.6 1560.

1560.

1560.

100.

1.1 1.1 1.31.31.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.5 2.2 2.6 2.62.62.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.5 0.5 5.54.94.9 4.9 1.2 19.

0.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 4.1 6.6 3.7 6.6 4.0 6.6 3.7 6.6 4.1 6.6 3.7 6.6 5.4 5.0 38.

38.

38.

27.

1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.7 3.3 5.4 5.0 5.0 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.0 0.8 0.8 6.8 1.9 1.9 2.00.28 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.46 1.00.46 1.0 0.46 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.46 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.130.130.12 0.12 0.13 0.99 0.66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.78 0.78 0.110.250.25 0.26 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-125WATTS BARWBNP-8557 to 2758 to 28 59 to 29 60 to 30 61 to 31 62 to 25 63 to 26 64 to 27 65 to 2866 to 2967 to 30 68 to 31 1 to 19 2 to 6 4 to 45 6 to 5 7 to 38 8 to 2 9 to 39 10 to 2 11 to 40 12 to 2 13 to 41 14 to 2 15 to 4216 to 217 to 43 18 to 2 19 to 44 20 to 2 21 to 48 22 to 48 23 to 48 24 to 48 25 to 326 to 727 to 9 28 to 11 29 to 13 30 to 15 31 to 17 33 to 46 34 to 46 35 to 4737 to 3638 to 8 39 to 100.50.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.40.43.7 0.6 0.01.03.7 9.2 3.7 1.0 3.7 9.2 3.7 1.03.79.2 3.7 1.0 3.7

.7837

.7837

.7837

.7837 0.40.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.2 2.2 1.10.00.0 0.00.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.022.62.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.03.03.0 7.63.16.5 2.4 13.6.06.6 6.7 6.6 5.5 6.6 6.0 6.6 6.06.66.7 6.6 5.5 6.6 10.36 10.36 10.36 10.36 1.63.03.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.0 13.13.

13.2.52.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.830.830.83 0.830.20.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.30.20.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.44.94.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.55.55.5 5.51.30.7 0.7 0.70.31.3 0.3 1.3 0.2 1.3 0.2 1.3 0.31.30.3 1.3 0.2 1.3 265.875 265.875 265.875 265.875 2.71.11.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.70.71.3 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 6.8 1.7 6.4 2.4 13.4.7 6.4 4.9 6.4 4.5 6.4 4.6 6.4 4.7 6.4 4.9 6.4 4.5 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 3.3 3.3 1.5 13.13.

13.0.250.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.110.110.110.110.13 0.0 0.95 1.00.23 0.0 0.23 0.0 0.17 0.0 0.17 0.0 0.23 0.00.23 0.0 0.17 0.0 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.280.120.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0Table 6.2.1-32 Flow Path Data (Reactor Cavity) (Page 2 of 3) Between Compartments k f Inertia Length (ft) Hydraulic Diameter (ft) Flow Area(ft 2)Equiv.Length (ft) Area Ratio a/A 6.2-126CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 40 to 1241 to 14 42 to 16 43 to 18 44 to 20 45 to 33 48 to 49 49 to 50 50 to 5151 to 5252 to 32 53 to 25 54 to 47 55 to 47 56 to 47 57 to 47 58 to 47 59 to 4760 to 4761 to 47 62 to 26 63 to 27 64 to 28 65 to 29 66 to 30 67 to 31 68 to 1 1 to 25 2 to 37 4 to 47 5 to 46 7 to 47 9 to 47 11 to 47 13 to 4715 to 4717 to 47 19 to 47 21 to 47 22 to 47 23 to 47 24 to 47 25 to 26 26 to 2727 to 2828 to 29 29 to 300.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.879791.43 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.01.01.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.41.03.7 1.1 9.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.11.11.1 1.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 1.0 1.01.01.0 1.00.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.1055 0.0592 0.05920.12490.0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 13.13.

13.

13.

13.

3.3 8.733 12.278 12.2788.85582.8 7.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.91.91.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 7.65.46.5 3.0 7.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.03.03.0 3.0 5.8 9.1 8.3 6.3 5.3 5.35.45.4 5.30.40.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.855 0.855 0.8550.8551.0 0.83 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.52.52.5 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.831.50.4 0.4 2.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.40.40.4 0.4 5.1 12.

11.

5.5 1.4 1.41.51.5 1.41.31.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 989.01 982.47 982.47982.472003.1 5.5 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.94.94.9 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.59.60.7 0.7 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.41.41.4 1.4 26.

74.

62.

32.

9.1 9.19.69.6 9.1 13.13.

13.

13.

13.

3.3 8.0 16.0 16.0 8.0 6.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 8.8 2.6 6.4 1.5 18.

2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.25 0.230 0.239 0.3590.3590.269 0.11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.110.47 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.44 0.440.470.47 0.4430 to 3131 to 1 33 to 1935 to 4636 to 4645 to 34 53 to 21 62 to 21 63 to 22 64 to 22 65 to 23 66 to 2367 to 2468 to 241.01.0 1.00.69.2 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.01.01.00.020.02 0.020.020.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.020.025.35.4 3.62.47.8 3.3 7.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.52.57.21.41.5 0.40.42.0 0.4 17.

1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.51.51.79.19.6 1.20.70.5 0.4 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.011.011.0 2.6 2.6 3.3 2.4 18.

3.3 8.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 6.80.440.47 0.610.950.95 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Table 6.2.1-32 Flow Path Data (Reactor Cavity) (Page 3 of 3) Between Compartments k f Inertia Length (ft) Hydraulic Diameter (ft) Flow Area(ft 2)Equiv.Length (ft) Area Ratio a/A CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-127WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-33 Containment Data (Eccs Analysis) (Page 1 of 2)I. Conservatively High Estimate of Containment Net Free VolumeContainment Area Volume (ft 3)Upper Compartment651,000 Lower Compartment271,400 Ice Condenser169,400Dead-Ended Compartments (includes all accumulator rooms, both fan compartments, instrument room pipe tunnel)129,900II. Initial ConditionsA.Containment Pressure 15.0 psiaB.Lowest Operational Containment Temperature for the Upper, Lower, and Dead-Ended Compartments 85°F 100°FC.Highest Refueling Water Storage Tank Temperature 100°FD.Lowest Temperature Outside Containment 5°FE.Highest Initial Spray Temperature 100°FF.Lowest Annulus Temperature 40°FIII. Structural Heat Sinks**A.For Each Surface1.Description of Surface 2.Conservatively High Estimate of Area Exposed to Containment AtmosphereSee Tables 6.2.1-34 through 6.2.1-363.Location in Containment by CompartmentB.For Each Separate Layer of Each Surface1.Material2.Conservatively Large Estimate of Layer ThicknessSee Tables 6.2.1-34 through 6.2.1-363.Conservatively High Value of Material ConductivitySee Tables 6.2.1-34 through 6.2.1-364.Conservatively High Value of Volumetric Heat CapacitySee Tables 6.2.1-34 through 6.2.1-36 6.2-128CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85 **Structural heat sinks should also account for any surfaces neglected in containment integrity analysis.***Runout flow is for a break immediately downstream of the pump. In that event, the spray water will not enter the containment.IV. Spray SystemA.Runout Flow for a Spray Pump*** (Containment Spray) 7700 gpmB.Number of Spray Pumps Operating with No Diesel Failure 2/UnitC.Number of Spray Pumps Operating with One Diesel Failure 1/UnitD.Assumed Post Accident Initiation of Spray System 25 sec V. Deck FanA.Fastest Post Accident Initiation of Deck Fans 10 min B.Conservatively High Flow Rate Per Fan42,000 cfmVI. Conservatively Low Hydrogen Skimmer System100 cfm/each Flow Rate Table 6.2.1-33 Containment Data (Eccs Analysis) (Continued) (Page 2 of 2)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-129WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-34 Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Containment - Upper Compartment Structure HeatTransferArea (ft 2) Thickness and Material (as noted) Thermal Conductivity(Btu/ft-hr-°F) Volume Heat Capacity(Btu/ft 3-°F)Operating Deck 4,4521.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 7,7496.3 mils coating1.1 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24 6721.6 ft concrete0.8430.24 11,4456.3 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.0870.8430.24 4,0320.26 in. stainless steel1.6 ft concrete 9.87 0.8459.2230.24 79815.7 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24Containment Shell22,8907.8 mils coating0.46 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.830.2418,3757.8 mils coating0.58 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 2,1007.8 mils coating1.51 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22Miscellaneous Steel 4,0957.8 mils coating0.26 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 3,5597.8 mils coating0.2127.329.859.22 3,5397.8 mils coating0.72 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 2737.8 mils coating1.57 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.2 6.2-130CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-35 Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Containment - Upper Compartment (Page 1 of 2)Structure HeatTransfer Area (ft 2) Thickness and Material (as noted) Thermal Conductivity(Btu/ft-hr-°F) Volume Heat Capacity(Btu/ft 3-°F)Operating Deck 4,4521.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 7,7496.3 mils coating1.1 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24 6721.6 ft concrete0.8430.24 11,4456.3 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.0870.8430.24 4,0320.26 in. stainless steel1.6 ft concrete 9.87 0.8459.2230.24 79815.7 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24Containment Shell22,8907.8 mils coating0.46 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.830.2418,3757.8 mils coating0.58 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 2,1007.8 mils coating1.51 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22Miscellaneous Steel 4,0957.8 mils coating0.26 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 3,5597.8 mils coating0.2127.329.859.22 3,5397.8 mils coating0.72 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.22 2737.8 mils coating1.57 in. carbon steel 0.2127.329.859.2Operating Deck 7,5071.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 2,9711.6 mils coating1.1 ft concrete 0.087 0.84 29.8 30.24 2,1311.6 ft concrete0.8430.24 7896.3 mils coating1.84 ft concrete 0.087 0.84 29.8 30.24 2,6462.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 2106.3 mils coating2.1 ft concrete 0.087 0.84 29.8 30.24 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-131WATTS BARWBNP-85Crane Wall14,7521.6 ft concrete0.8430.24 3,5706.3 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24Containment Floor 5671.6 ft concrete0.8430.24 7,6126.3 mils coating1.6 ft concrete0.087 0.8429.830.24Interior Concrete 3,7801.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 5671.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 2,9922.1 ft concrete0.8430.24 2,3840.26 in. stainless steel 2.1 ft concrete 9.8 0.8459.230.24 2,373 1,4802.1 ft concrete6.3 mils coating2.1 ft concrete 0.840.087 0.8430.2429.830.24Miscellaneous Steel12,9157.8 mils coating0.53 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2 7,5607.8 mils coating0.78 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2 5,2507.8 mils coating1.1 carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2 2,6257.8 mils coating1.45 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2 1,5757.8 mils coating1.7 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2Table 6.2.1-35 Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Containment - Upper Compartment (Continued) (Page 2 of 2)Structure HeatTransfer Area (ft 2) Thickness and Material (as noted) Thermal Conductivity(Btu/ft-hr-°F) Volume Heat Capacity(Btu/ft 3-°F) 6.2-132CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-36 Major Characteristics Of Structural Heat Sinks Inside Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Containment - Lower CompartmentStructure Heat Transfer Area (ft 2) Thickness and Material (as noted)Thermal Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F) Volume Heat Capacity (Btu/ft 3-°F)Containment Shell3,0457.8 mils coating0.78 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.24,3057.8 mils coating1.1 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.24,3057.8 mils coating1.25 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.23,7807.8 mils coating1.37 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.24,3057.8 mils coating1.51 in. carbon steel 0.2227.314.759.2Crane Wall7,2551.6 ft concrete0.8430.243,8016.3 mils coating1.58 ft concrete 0.87 0.8414.730.24Containment Floor4,8096.3 mils coating2.1 ft concrete0.087 0.8414.730.24Interior Concrete9,8701.1 ft concrete0.8430.243,9486.3 mils coating1.1 ft concrete0.087 0.8414.730.245,3761.58 ft concrete0.8430.24 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-133WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-37 Maximum Reverse Pressure Differential Pressure Analysis Base Case Westinghouse ECCS structural heat transfer model Sprays at runout flowOffsite power available spray start timeMinimum containment temperature Dead-ended volume is sweptMax. reverse differential pressure = 0.65 psiCaseVariableChange in Max. dP (psi)1Ice condenser flow through the drains acts as 50% thermal efficient spray +0.22Same as Case 1, except 100% thermal efficiency+0.43Maximum containment temperature-0.2 4Heat transfer coefficient to sump equals 5 times H max <0.15Same as Case 2, except drain flow rate times 1.5+0.6 6Combination of Cases 2 and 4+0.4 71 bay of ice condenser doors remains open-0.65 8Same as Case 6 except Equation (3) written asH = Hstag + [H max - Hstag] e-.025 [t-tp]

+0.559Same as Case 6 except 5 times upper to lower resistance+2.010RWST temperature = 105°F+0.2 6.2-134CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.1-38 Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow vs. Time vs. Sump Temperature (Page 1 of 3)Time (sec)Sump Temp. (°F)Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow(lb/sec)13.1190.3-1.74 13.8190.6-1.63 14.4190.7-1.76 15.0190.9-1.54 15.4191.1-1.37 15.9191.2-1.23 16.3191.3-.13 16.6191.4-.09 17.0191.5-.09 17.4191.6-.08 17.8191.7-.08 18.2191.8-.07 18.6191.9-.07 19.0192.0-.07 19.3192.1-.07 19.7192.2-.06 20.0192.3-1.04 20.3192.4-.93 20.9192.5-1.17 21.5192.7-1.43 21.8192.8-2.24 22.4192.9-2.95 23.0193.1-2.85 23.6193.2-2.64 23.9193.3-2.53 24.5193.4-2.34 25.1193.8-2.17 25.4194.0-2.05 25.7194.1-1.94 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-135WATTS BARWBNP-8526.0194.2-1.8526.6194.6-1.69 27.2194.8-1.58 27.5194.9-1.53 28.0195.2-1.45 29.5195.6-1.40 30.1195.8-1.42 30.7196.0-1.44 31.3196.2-1.45 31.9196.3-1.45 32.5196.4-1.43 33.1196.5-1.40 33.7196.6-1.36 34.3196.8-1.31 34.9196.9-1.26 35.5196.9-1.20 36.0197.0-1.115 36.9197.2-0.96 37.9197.3-0.80 38.9197.4-0.63 40.1197.4-0.44 41.3197.5-0.29 42.2197.5-0.20 44.0197.4-.09 44.9197.3-0.4 45.4197.3.12 46.7197.2.19 47.6197.0.20 48.9196.9.19Table 6.2.1-38 Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow vs. Time vs. Sump Temperature (Continued) (Page 2 of 3)Time (sec)Sump Temp. (°F)Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow(lb/sec) 6.2-136CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-6949.8196.7.1751.2196.5.12 52.3196.4.07 53.6196.1.01 54.4196.0-.01 55.2195.9-.03 56.2195.7-.05 57.1195.5-.07 58.0195.4-.10 59.0195.2-.17 59.9195.0-.14 60.9194.9-.15 61.6194.7-.17 62.8194.5-.18 63.7194.3-.20 64.7194.2-.22 65.6194.0-.24 66.6193.8-.31 67.5193.6-.41 68.4193.5-.60 69.4193.3.20 70.3193.2.63 71.3193.0.84 72.2192.91.05 73.2192.71.25 74.1192.61.39 75.1192.51.54 76.0192.41.66 77.0192.31.78Table 6.2.1-38 Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow vs. Time vs. Sump Temperature (Continued) (Page 3 of 3)Time (sec)Sump Temp. (°F)Ice Condenser Steam Exit Flow(lb/sec)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-137WATTS BARWBNP-69 tTable 6.2.1-39 Mass and Energy Release Rates For Specified Steam Line BreaksI. Run 1-1.4 ft

² Break, 102% Power, AFT RunoutTime (sec)Mass Flow Rate, m(1bm/sec)Energy Flow Rate, e(Btu/sec)0.1000E-010.1292E+050.1536E+08 0.2000E+000.1289E+050.1533E+08 0.2010E+000.1225E+080.1457E+08 0.1000E+010.1176E+050.1400E+08 0.2000E+010.1116E+050.1331E+08 0.3000E+010.1064E+050.1271E+08 0.4000E+010.1021E+050.1221E+08 0.5000E+010.9833E+040.1177E+08 0.6000E+010.9504E+040.1135E+08 0.7000E+010.9209E+040.1104E+08 0.8000E+010.8868E+040.1064E+08 0.8635E+018.8746E+040.1050E+08 0.8700E+010.2169E+040.2603E+07 0.9000E+010.2148E+040.2578E+07 0.1000E+020.2077E+040.2494E+07 0.1100E+020.2018E+040.2424E+07 0.1200E+020.1949E+040.2343+07 0.1300E+020.1881E+040.2261E+07 0.1400E+020.1815E+040.2183E+07 0.1500E+020.1753E+040.2109E+07 0.1750E+020.1625E+040.1957E+07 0.2000E+020.1510E+040.1818E+07 0.2500E+020.1321E+040.1590E+07 0.3000E+020.1184E+040.1426E+07 0.3500E+020.1082E+040.1301E+07 0.4000E+020.1004E+040.1209E+07 0.4500E+020.9470E+030.1140E+07 0.5000E+020.9000E+030.1083E+07 06.00E+020.8290E+030.9973E+06 0.7000E+020.7820E+030.9400E+06 6.2-138CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-690.9000E+020.7130E+030.8563E+060.1000E+030.6870E+030.8251E+06 0.1200E+030.6440E+030.7728E+06 0.1600E+030.5790E+030.6942E+06 0.1800E+030.5500E+030.6589E+06 0.2500E+030.4710E+030.5628E+06 0.3000E+030.4300E+030.5134E+06 0.4500E+030.3030E+030.3600E+06 0.6000E+030.2710E+030.3214E+06 0.6660E+030.0.

0.1000E-010.1398E+040.1658E+07 0.1500E+010.1389E+040.1648E+07 0.2500E+010.1379E+040.1636E+07 0.3500E+010.1374E+040.1630E+07 0.5500D+010.1356E+040.1610E+07 0.7500E+010.1365E+040.1620E+07 0.9500E+010.1371E+040.1627E+07 0.1150E+020.1371E+040.1628E+07 0.1450E+020.1354E+040.1608E+07 0.1750E+020.1268E+040.1511E+07 0.2050E+020.1176E+040.1404E+07 0.3050E+020.9751E+030.1169E+07 0.4050E+020.8537E+030.1026E+07 0.6050E+020.7004E+030.8430E+06 0.8050E+020.6120E+030.7371E+06 0.1005E+030.5547E+030.6682E+06 0.1505E+030.4758E+030.5730E+06 0.2005E+030.4270E+030.5141E+06 0.2505E+030.3886E+030.4675E+06 0.3005E+030.3450E+030.4257E+06Table 6.2.1-39 Mass and Energy Release Rates For Specified Steam Line BreaksI. Run 1-1.4 ft

² Break, 102% Power, AFT Runout (Continued)Time (sec)Mass Flow Rate, m(1bm/sec)Energy Flow Rate, e(Btu/sec)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-139WATTS BARWBNP-690.3505E+030.3260E+030.3918E+060.4005E+030.3027E+030.3635E+06 0.4505E+030.2821E+030.3385E+06 0.5005E+030.2633E+030.3158E+06 0.5505E+030.2462E+030.2951E+06 0.5825E+030.2381E+030.2852E+06 0.6005E+030.2452E+030.2939E+06 0.6265E+030.2780E+030.3338E+06 0.6285E+030.2990E+030.3588E+06 0.6305E+030.2825E+030.3390E+06 0.6485E+030.2730E+030.3275E+06 0.7005E+030.2652E+030.3180E+06 0.7505E+030.2607E+030.3127E+06 0.8005E+030.2609E+030.3128E+06 0.8285E+030.2614E+030.3135E+06 0.8645E+030.226E+030.3193E+06 0.9005E+030.2628E+030.3151E+06 0.9505E+030.2620E+030.3142E+06 0.1070E+040.2616E+030.3137E+06 0.1071E+040.0.

0.1000E-010.8256E+030.9790E+06 0.1500E+010.8221E+030.9750E+06 0.2500E+010.8182E+030.9705E+06 0.5500E+010.8102E+030.9616E+06 0.7500E+010.8039E+030.9543E+06 0.9500E+010.8097E+030.9609E+06 0.1250E+020.8194E+030.9721E+06 0.1550E+020.8231E+030.9766E+06 0.1850E+020.8158E+030.9683E+06 0.2050E+020.8104E+030.9626E+06Table 6.2.1-39 Mass and Energy Release Rates For Specified Steam Line BreaksI. Run 1-1.4 ft

² Break, 102% Power, AFT Runout (Continued)Time (sec)Mass Flow Rate, m(1bm/sec)Energy Flow Rate, e(Btu/sec) 6.2-140CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-690.3050E+020.6939E+030.8281E+060.4050E+020.6281E+030.7515E+06 0.5050E+020.5785E+030.6934E+06 0.1005E+030.4437E+030.5338E+06 0.1505E+030.3844E+030.4628E+06 0.2005E+030.3500E+030.4215E+06 0.2505E+030.3236E+030.3898E+06 0.3005E+030.2999E+030.3611E+06 0.3505E+030.2783E+030.3352E+06 0.4005E+030.2595E+030.3125E+06 0.4505E+030.2432E+030.2927E+06 0.5005E+030.2290E+030.2756E+06 0.5505E+030.2160E+030.2598E+06 0.6005E+030.2041E+030.2454E+06 0.6465E+030.2027E+030.2437E+06 0.6505E+030.2011E+030.2418E+06 0.1422E+040.2065E+030.2484E+06 0.1423E+040.0.Table 6.2.1-39 Mass and Energy Release Rates For Specified Steam Line BreaksI. Run 1-1.4 ft

² Break, 102% Power, AFT Runout (Continued)Time (sec)Mass Flow Rate, m(1bm/sec)Energy Flow Rate, e(Btu/sec)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-141WATTS BARWBNP-69Table 6.2.1-40 Steam Line Break Cases For Core IntegrityCase Type of Break Boric Acid Concentration (ppm) 1Hypothetical with offsite power, downstream of the flow restrictor02Hypothetical without offsite power, downstream of the flow restrictor 03Credible - Uniform04Credible - Nonuniform0 6.2-142CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-69Table 6.2.1-41 Line Break(1) Descriptions For Mass And Energy Releases 102% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 102% Power - Feed Control Valve (FCV) Failure 102% Power - No Failure 102% Power - Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) Failure 0% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 0% Power - Feed Control Valve (FCV) Failure 0% Power - No Failure 0% Power - Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) FailureNotes: (1) For 1.4 ft 2 break CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-143WATTS BARWBNP-69Table 6.2.1-42 Small Break Descriptions For Mass And EnergyBreak Size (ft2) Description 0.944 30% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 0.6 30% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 0.35 30% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 0.1 30% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 0.86102% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 6.2-144CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-69Table 6.2.1-43 Large Break Analysis - Associated Times Case Maximum Lower Compartment Temperature (°F) Time, Tmax (sec) 1.4 ft 2, 102% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 289.4843.111.4 ft 2, 102% Power - FCV Failure 289.4833.111.4 ft 2, 102% Power - FWIV Failure 289.4833.111.4 ft 2, 102% Power - MSIV Failure 286.963.311.4 ft 2, 0% Power - AFW Pump Runout Protection Failure 287.373.161.4 ft 2, 0% Power - FCV Failure 287.303.211.4 ft 2, 0% Power - FWIV Failure 287.283.211.4 ft 2, 0% Power - MSIV Failure 288.282.51 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6.2-145WATTS BARWBNP-69Table 6.2.1-44 Small Break Analysis - Small Split - Associated Times Case 1 (ft 2) 1 All with AFW pump runout protection failure and 30% power, except that 0.86 ft 2 break is at 102% power.Maximum Lower Compartment Temperature (°F)Time, Tmax (sec)0.86325.34 83.280.944325.12 80.460.6325.37 134.120.35324.86 262.920.1317.74 646.77 6.2-146CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS WATTS BARWBNP-69THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Containment Functional Design6.2.1-147WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-1 Pressure vs. Time

6.2.1-148Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-2 Temperature VS. Time Containment Functional Design6.2.1-149WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-3 Active and Inactive Sump Temperature Transients 6.2.1-150Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-4 Ice Melt Transient Containment Functional Design6.2.1-151WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-4a Ice Mass vs. Pressure 6.2.1-152Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-5 Plan at Equiment Rooms Elevation Containment Functional Design6.2.1-153WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-6 Containment Section View 6.2.1-154Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-7 Plan View at Ice Condenser Elevation Ice Condenser Compartments Containment Functional Design6.2.1-155WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-8 Layout of Containment Shell 6.2.1-156Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-9 TMD Code Network Containment Functional Design6.2.1-157WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-10 Upper and Lower Compartment Pressure Transient for WorstCase Break Compartment (Element 1) Having a DEHL Break 6.2.1-158Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-11 Upper and Lower Compartment Pressure Transient for WorstCase Break Compartment (Element 1) Having a DECL Break.

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-159WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-12 Illustration of Choked Flow Characteristics 6.2.1-160Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-13 Sensitivity of Peak Pressure to Air Comrression Ratio Containment Functional Design6.2.1-161WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-14 Steam Concentration in a Vertical Distribution Channel 6.2.1-162Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-15 Peak Comnression Pressure Versus Compression Ratio Containment Functional Design6.2.1-163WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-16 Peak Compartment Pressure versus Blowdown Rate 6.2.1-164Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-17 Sensitivity of Peak Compression Pressure to Deck Bypass Containment Functional Design6.2.1-165WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-18 Pressure Increase versus Deck Area from Deck Leakage Tests 6.2.1-166Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-19 Energy Release at Time of Compression Peak Pressure From Full-Scale Section Tests with 1-Foot Diameter Baskets Containment Functional Design6.2.1-167WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-20 Pressure Increase versus Deck Area from Deck Leakage Tests 6.2.1-168Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-21 Coolant Temperature at Core Inlet Containment Functional Design6.2.1-169WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-22 Core Reflooding Rate - V in 6.2.1-170Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-23 Carryover Fraction - Fout Containment Functional Design6.2.1-171WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-24 Fraction of Flow through Broken Loop.

6.2.1-172Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-25 Post-Blowdown Downcomer and Core Water Height.

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-173WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-26 Steam Generator Heat Content.

6.2.1-174Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-27 Containment Model Schematic.

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-175WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-28 Reactor Cavity TMD Network.

6.2.1-176Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.1-29 Reactor Vessel Annulus Containment Functional Design6.2.1-177WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-30 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-178Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-31 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-179WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-32 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-180Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-33 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-181WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-34 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-182Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-35 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-183WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-36 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-184Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-37 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-185WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-38 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-186Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-39 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-187WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-40 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-188Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-41 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-189WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-42 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-190Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-43 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-191WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-44 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-192Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-45 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-193WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-46 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-194Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-47 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-195WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-48 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-196Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-49 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-197WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-50 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-198Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-51 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-199WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-52 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-200Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-53 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-201WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-54 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity AnalysIS) 6.2.1-202Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-55 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-203WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-56 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-204Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-57 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-205WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-58 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-206Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-59 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-207WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-60 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-208Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Containment Functional Design6.2.1-209WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-61 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-210Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-62 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-211WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-63 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-212Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-64 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-213WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-65 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-214Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-66 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-215WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-67 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break (Reactor Cavity Analysis) 6.2.1-216Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-68 127 Square Inch Cold Leg Break Reactor Cavity Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-217WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-69 Compartment Temperature 1.4ft 2/Loop, 102% Power FCV Failure 6.2.1-218Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-70 Lower Compartment Pressure 1.4 Ft 2 Loop, 102% Power FCV Failure Containment Functional Design6.2.1-219WATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-71 Compartment Temperature 0.35 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW Runout 6.2.1-220Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-72 Lower Compartment Pressure 0.35 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power Afw Runout Containment Functional Design6.2.1-221WATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-73 Compartment Temperature 0.6 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW Runout 6.2.1-222Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-74 Lower Compartment Pressure 0.6 Ft 2 Split, 30% Power AFW Fail Containment Functional Design6.2.1-223WATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-75 6.2.1-224Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-76 Containment Functional Design6.2.1-225WATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-77 6.2.1-226Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-78 Containment Functional Design6.2.1-227WATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-79 6.2.1-228Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-69Figure 6.2.1-80 Containment Functional Design6.2.1-229WATTS BAR WBNP-27Figure 6.2.1-81 Steam Generator Enclosure Nodalization 6.2.1-230Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-27Figure 6.2.1-82 Flow Paths For TMD Steam G enerator Enclosure Short-term Pressure Analysis Containment Functional Design6.2.1-231WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-83 Pressure Transient Between Break Element And Upper Compartment (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-232Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-84 Differential Pressure Transient Across The Steam Generator Vessel (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-233WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-85 Differential Pressure Transient Cross The Steam Generator Vessel (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-234Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-86 Pressure Versus Time For The Break Element (Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-235WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.1-86a Upper Compartment Pressure Versus Time(Steam Generator Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-236Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-87 Nodalization Pressure Enclosure Analysis Containment Functional Design6.2.1-237WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-88 Pressure Transient Between Break Element And Upper Compartment (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-238Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-89 Pressure Differential Across The Pressurizer Vessel (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-239WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-90 Pressure Differential Across The Pressurizer Vessel (Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-240Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-91 Pressure Differential Across The Pressurizer Vessel(Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis)

Containment Functional Design6.2.1-241WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.1-92 Pressure Versus Time For The Break Element(Pressurizer Enclosure Analysis) 6.2.1-242Containment Functional DesignWATTS BAR WBNP-89 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-1WATTS BARWBNP-856.2.2 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSAdequate containment heat removal capability for the ice condenser reactor containment is provided by the ice condenser (Section 6.7), the air return fan system (Section 6.8), and two separae containment heat removal spray systems whose components operate in the sequential modes described in Section 6.2.2.2. One of these heat removal spray systems is the containment spray system, and the second is the residual heat removal spray system, which is a portion of the residual heat removal system (Section 6.3).Minimum engineered safety feature performance of the containment heat removal systems is achieved with the following:

(1)Ice condenser (Section 6.7)

(2)One train of the air return fan system (3)One train of the containment spray system (4)One train of the residual heat removal spray system (not required for steam or feed line break)Each spray system consists of two trains of redundant equipment per reactor unit. There are four spray headers per unit. Two headers are supplied from separate trains of the containment spray system; the other two are supplied by separate trains of the RHR spray system. Each individual train consists of a pump, a heat exchanger, appropriate control valves, required piping, and a header with nozzles located in the upper compartment of the containment with flow directed to obtain full coverage of the containment upper volume during an emergency. The systems use borated water supplied from the refueling water storage tank and/or the recirculation sump.6.2.2.1 Design BasesThe primary design basis for the containment heat removal spray systems is to spray cool water into the containment atmosphere when appropriate in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident or secondary side break and thereby ensure that the containment pressure cannot exceed the containment shell maximum internal pressure of 15.0 psig at 250°F, which corresponds to the code design internal pressure of 13.5 psig at 250°F (see Section 3.8.2). This protection is afforded for all pipe break sizes up to and including the hypothetical instantaneous circumferential rupture of the reactor coolant loop resulting in unobstructed flow from both pipe ends. After the ice has melted, the containment spray system and the residual heat removal spray system become the sole systems for removing energy directly from the containment. The containment heat removal systems are designed to provide a means of removing containment heat without loss of functional performance in the post-accident containment environment and operate without benefit of maintenance for the duration of time to restore and maintain containment conditions at atmospheric pressure. Although the water in the core after a loss-of-coolant accident is quickly subcooled by the emergency core cooling system (Section 6.3), the design of heat removal capability of each

6.2.2-2CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSWATTS BARWBNP-85containment heat removal system is based on the conservative assumption that the core residual heat is released to the containment as steam which eventually melts all ice in the ice condenser. The containment spray system provides two redundant heat removal trains. The system is designed such that both trains are automatically started by high-high containment pressure signal. The signal actuates, as required, all controls for positioning all valves to their operating position and starts the pumps. The operator can also manually actuate the entire system from the control room. Either of the two trains containing a pump, heat exchanger, and associated valving and spray headers is independently capable of delivering a minimum flowrate of 4,000 gpm.The containment heat removal spray systems are designed to withstand the design basis earthquake and the operational basis earthquake without loss of function. They satisfy the TVA Class B Mechanical Requirements. The containment heat removal spray systems maintain their integrity and do not suffer loss of ability to perform their minimum required function due to normal operation, faults of moderate frequency, infrequent faults, and limiting faults.Sufficient redundancy for all supporting systems necessary for minimum operational requirements of the containment heat removal spray systems is provided and complies with the single failure criteria for engineered safety features. Separate divisions on essential raw cooling water supply, power equipment heat exchangers, pumps, valves, and instrumentation are provided in order to have two completely separated trains.The system is provided with overpressure protection from excessive pressures that could otherwise result from temperature changes, interconnection with other systems operating at higher pressures, or other means.Those portions of the containment heat removal spray systems located outside of the containment which are designed to circulate, during post-accident conditions, radioactively contaminated water collected in the containment meet the following requirements:

(1)Shielding within guidelines of 10CFR20 and 10CFR100.

(2)Collection of discharges from pressure relieving devices.

(3)Remote means for isolating any sections under anticipated malfunction or failure conditions.

(4)Means to detect and control radioactivity leakage into the environs to limits consistent with guidelines set forth in 10CFR20 and 10CFR100.During accident conditions, cooling of the containment spaces is provided by the ice condenser system, containment heat removal spray systems, and the air return system. In addition, during non-LOCA accidents, the lower compartment cooler (LCC) fans are utilized to recirculate air throughout the lower containment spaces to prevent hot pockets from developing. The LCC units operate continuously throughout all

CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-3WATTS BARWBNP-89accidents which do not initiate a containment Phase B isolation signal, as long as the cooling coils are intact and the ERCW supply to them is available. During or after a LOCA, the LCC units, including their fans, are not required to be operable. However, after a MSLB, at least two of the four LCC fans are started manually a minimum of 1-1/2 hours and a maximum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the MSLB to recirculate air throughout the lower containment spaces.

6.2.2.2 System DesignThe containment spray systems consist of two separate trains of equal capacity with each train independently capable of meeting system requirements. This system can be supplemented with two residual heat removal system pumps and two residual heat exchangers in parallel, with associated piping, valves and individual spray headers in the upper containment volume. Each train includes a pump, heat exchanger, ring header with nozzles, isolation valves and associated piping, and instrumentation and controls. Partial flow from an RHR system pump through its associated heat exchanger can be used to supplement each train. Independent electrical power supplies are provided for equipment in each containment spray train. In addition each train is provided with electrical power from separate emergency diesel generators in the event of a loss of offsite electrical power. During normal operation, all of the equipment is idle and the associated isolation valves are closed. Upon system activation during a LOCA or other high energy line break, adequate containment cooling is provided by the containment spray systems whose components operate in sequential modes. These modes are: 1) spraying a portion of the contents of the refueling water storage tank into the containment atmosphere using the containment spray pumps; 2) after the refueling water storage tank has been drained, but while there is still ice remaining in the ice condenser, recirculation of water from the containment sump through the containment spray pumps, through the containment spray heat exchangers, and back to the containment (This spray is useful in reducing sump water temperatures.); 3) diversion of a portion of the recirculation flow from the residual heat removal system to additional spray headers. RHR spray operation is initiated manually by the operator only if the emergency core cooling system and containment spray system are both operating in the recirculation mode. If switchover to recirculation occurs prior to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after initiation of the LOCA, RHR spray operation can be commenced 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after initiation of the LOCA. If switchover to recirculation occurs later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after initiation of the LOCA, RHR spray operation can be commenced after completion of the switchover procedure.The spray water from the containment and RHR spray systems returns from the upper compartment to the lower compartment through two 14 inch drains in the bottom of the refueling canal. The curbing around the personnel access door and the equipment access hatch on the operating deck directs spray water flow towards the refueling canal. The air-water mixture entering the air return fans will be rerouted inside the polar crane wall through the accumulator rooms utilizing curbing, the floor hatch cover and floor drainage system.The flow diagram for this system is presented in Figure 6.2.2-1.

6.2.2-4CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSWATTS BARWBNP-85Component Description PumpsThe containment spray system flow is provided by two centrifugal type pumps driven by electric motors. The motors, which can be powered either normally or from an emergency source are direct coupled and non-overloading to the end of the pump curve. The design head of the containment spray pump is sufficient to ensure rated capacity with a minimum level in the refueling water storage tank or the containment sump when pumping against a head equivalent to the sum of the maximum pressure of the containment post LOCA/HELB, the elevational head between the pump discharge and the uppermost spray nozzles, and the equipment and piping friction losses. Each pump is rated for 4000 gpm flow at a design head of 435 ft. See Table 6.2.2-1 for additional design parameters and Figure 6.2.2-2 for characteristic curves.The residual heat removal pumps which also provide flow to the containment heat removal spray system are described in Section 5.5.7.2.1 and Table 5.5-8.Each residual heat removal pump provides 2000 gpm for upper containment spray.

Each containment spray pump is powered by a horizontal squirrel cage induction motor. Pump motor parameters are presented in Table 6.2.2-1.Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH)The plant and piping layout of the containment spray system ensures that the pump NPSH requirements are met at maximum runout conditions with the containment spray pumps taking suction from either the refueling water storage tank or the containment sump. The NPSH available from the containment sump is calculated using the maximum credible sump water temperature (190°F) with no credit taken for containment overpressure or height of water in the containment sump.Heat ExchangersThe containment spray heat exchangers are the vertical counter flow U-tube type with tubes welded to the tube sheet. Borated water from either the refueling water storage tank or the containment sump circulates through the tube side. Design parameters are presented in Table 6.2.2-2.

PipingAll containment heat removal spray system piping in contact with borated water is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints are welded except for the flanged connection at the pump.Spray Nozzles and Ring HeadersEach containment spray ring header provides 4000 gpm minimum and contains 263 hollow cone ramp bottom nozzles, each of which is capable of a design flow of 15.2 gpm with a 40 psi differential pressure. These nozzles have an approximately 3/8-inch diameter spray orifice and are not subject to clogging by particles less than 1/4 inch in CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-5WATTS BARWBNP-85maximum dimension. The nozzles produce a mean drop size of approximately 700 microns in diameter at rated system conditions. The spray solution is completely stable and soluble at all temperatures of interest in the containment and, therefore, does not precipitate or otherwise interfere with nozzle performance. Each nozzle header is independently oriented to maximize coverage of the containment volume inside the crane wall. This arrangement prohibits any flow into the ice condenser.The residual heat removal spray ring headers contain 147 nozzles per header and deliver 2000 gpm per header. They have the same design characteristics as the headers in the containment spray system.Refueling Water Storage TankDuring the injection phase immediately following a LOCA or HELB, the containment spray is supplied from the refueling water storage tank.Recirculation SumpThe recirculation sump is described in Section 6.3.2.2 under the discussion of the recirculation mode. Material CompatibilityAll parts of the containment spray system in contact with borated water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.6.2.2.3 Design EvaluationPerformance of the containment heat removal system is evaluated through analyses of the design basis accident and various other cases described in Chapter 15 and Section 6.2.1. The analyses were performed using the LOTIC code and show that the containment heat removal systems are capable of keeping the containment pressure below the containment maximum internal pressure of 15 psig, which corresponds to the code design internal pressure of 13.5 psig at 250°F (see Section 3.8.2) even when it is assumed that the minimum engineered safety features are operating. Section 6.2.1 presents a description of the analytical methods and models which were used along with verification of pertinent items from Waltz Mill tests, and curves showing the calculated performance of important variables following the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident.The design basis accident results in a required containment spray flow rate of 4000 gpm using 85°F constant temperature essential raw cooling water for the heat exchangers.The containment spray systems provide two full-capacity heat removal systems for the containment, each of which is sized as described in Section 6.2.2.1 to remove heat at a rate which precludes an increase of the containment maximum internal pressure above 15.0 psig, which corresponds to the code design internal pressure of 13.5 psig at 250°F (see Section 3.8.2). All spray headers and spray nozzles are located inside the containment in the upper compartment and can withstand, without loss of function 6.2.2-6CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSWATTS BARWBNP-89or maintenance, the post-accident containment environment. The remainder of the systems, with the exception of the refueling water storage tanks, which includes all active components, are located in the Auxiliary Building and, therefore, are not affected by wind, tornado, or snow and ice conditions.The design is based on the spray water being raised to the saturation temperature of the containment in falling through the steam-air mixture within the building. The minimum fall path of the droplets is approximately 75 ft from the spray ring headers to the operating deck. The actual fall path is longer due to the trajectory of the droplets sprayed out from the ring header nozzles. Figures 6.2.2-3 through 6.2.2-6 depict the containment spray coverage for the containment spray system.Except for the refueling water storage tank water supplied by the safety injection system, the containment spray system initially operates independently of other engineered safety features. For extended operation in the recirculation mode, water is supplied to the containment RHR spray headers through the residual heat removal pumps and residual heat removal exchangers. One containment spray system train, supplemented by one RHR spray train, when required, provides adequate heat removal capability to limit containment pressure below design (see Section 6.2.1.3).

RHR spray is required only after switchover to the recirculation mode and no earlier than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after initiation of the LOCA. At this time one RHR pump can provide sufficient RHR spray as well as adequate core flow via the high head (one centrifugal charging and one safety injection) pumps. (See Section 6.3.3 for the performance evaluation of the RHR pumps in their core cooling function.) All active components of the system were analyzed to show that the failure of any single active component does not prevent fulfilling the design function. This analysis is summarized in Table 6.2.2-3. A single failure in the residual heat removal system will not prevent long-term use of the spray system. The analyses of the loss-of-coolant accident presented in Chapter 15 reflect the single failure analysis. Each of the spray trains provides complete backup for the other.An analysis of the spray return drains located in the refueling canal has been made to show that they are adequately sized for a maximum RHR an d containment spray flow and ensures an adequate water supply in the lower compartment to satisfy pump NPSH requirements. It was shown that a water head of 4.16 feet between the refueling canal and the sump is sufficient to establish a steady-state drainage between the upper and lower compartment. The passive portions of the spray systems located within the containment are designed to withstand, without loss of functional performance, a post accident containment environment and to operate without benefit of maintenance.The spray headers which are located in the upper containment volume are separated from the reactor and primary coolant loops by the operating deck and inner wall of the ice bed. These spray headers are therefore protected from missiles originating in the lower compartment.

CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-7WATTS BARWBNP-85This evaluation shows that the containment spray systems can withstand expected conditions during the 40-year life of the plant without loss of capability to perform the required safety functions. Specifically, the system achieved this by having been designed to meet applicable General Design Criteria (GDC) as follows:

(1)The systems can withstand the effects of natural phenomena as required by GDC 2.(2)The systems are designed to accommodate the effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents including loss of coolant as required by GDC 4.

(3)The systems are not shared with another nuclear power unit as required by GDC 5.(4)The systems are designed to be capable of being inspected and tested to ensure reliability throughout their life as required by GDC 39 and 40.

(5)The systems are designed adequately to provide post-accident cooling inside the primary containment to reduce the containment pressure and temperature following any LOCA and maintain them at acceptable levels, as required by GDC 38.

(6)The systems are designed to aid in the control and removal of fission products, hydrogen, oxygen, and other substances which may be released into the reactor containment following postulated accidents to assure that containment integrity is maintained, as required by GDC 41.6.2.2.4 Testing and InspectionsPerformance tests of the active components in the system are performed in the manufacturer's plant and followed by in-place preoperational testing.Capability is provided to test initially and subsequently on a routine basis to the extent practical the operational startup sequence and performance capability of the containment spray system including the transfer to alternate power sources. Capability to test periodically the delivery capacity of the containment spray system at a position as close to the spray header as is practical and for obstruction of the spray nozzles is provided. As part of the preoperational test program, the containment spray nozzles are physically verified to pass an unobstructed flow of air. The air is introduced into the headers through an air test connection on each header.Initially, the containment spray system is hydrostatically tested to the applicable code test pressure.All periodic tests of individual components or the complete containment spray system are controlled to ensure that plant safety is not jeopardized and that undesirable transients do not occur.

6.2.2-8CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSWATTS BARWBNP-85The containment spray system is designed to comply with ASME Section XI, "Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Coolant System." Detailed test procedures are given in Chapter 14.6.2.2.5 Instrument ation RequirementsThe containment spray system is actuated either manually from the control room or external to the main control room or automatically by the coincidence of two sets out of four protection set loops monitoring the lower containment pressure. The high-high containment pressure signal starts the containment spray pumps and positions all valves to their operating configuration.The operation of the containment spray system is verified by instrument readout in the control room. Pump motor breakers energize indicating lights on the control panel to show power is being supplied to the pump motors. Status lights on the main control panel indicate valve position and are energized independently of the valve actuation signal.To protect the pumps from low flow conditions, a mini-flow recirculation line is provided to allow pump discharge to be circulated back into the pump suction line. This line is opened by a motor-operated valve when flow in the discharge line drops below that required for pump protection or if, upon starting, flow is not achieved in the spray header within a preset time interval. Elbow taps in each discharge line provide a delta-p measurement to monitor the flow rate and provide the flow signal for the control room flow indicators and to control the minimum flow recirculation valve.Local instruments monitor the following parameters: containment spray pump suction and discharge pressure, heat exchanger inlet temperature, heat exchanger inlet and outlet pressure, and containment spray test line flow.In the event of a main control room evacuation, the necessary control functions are transferable to outside of the main control room in order to assure that the system can be aligned and locked to prevent inadvertent operation and to manually initiate system operation if necessary. The control transfer is provided for the spray pumps, containment spray isolation valves, and containment sump isolation valves.The system is designed as Seismic Category I. The instrumentation and associated interconnected wiring and cables are physically and otherwise separated so that a single event cannot cause malfunction of the entire system.

6.2.2.6 MaterialsAll parts of the containment spray system in contact with borated water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant material. None of these materials produce radiolytic or pyrolytic decomposition products that can interfere with this or other engineered safety features.

CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS6.2.2-9WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.2-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP/MOTOR DESIGN PARAMETERS PumpQuantity Per Unit2 Design Pressure, psig300 Design Temperature, °F250 Design Flow Rate, gpm4000 Design Head, ft435MotorHorsepower, hp700Service Factor1.15Voltage, V6600 Phase3 Cycles, Hz60 6.2.2-10CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMSWATTS BARWBNP-91Table 6.2.2-2 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Design ParametersQuantity Per Unit2TypeCounter FlowPercent Tubes Plugged10%

Heat Transfer Per Unit, Btu/hr12.85 x 10 7Shell-Side Flow, gpm5,200Tube-Side Flow, gpm4,000 Tube-Side Inlet Temperature, °F190 Shell-Side Inlet Temperature, °F85 Tube-Side Outlet Temperature, °F124.7 Shell-Side Outlet Temperature, °F129.5Design Pressure (Shell/Tube), psig150/300Design Temperature (Shell/Tube), °F200/250 Heat Exchanger UA, Btu/hr-°F2.74 x 10 6 Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-11WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.2-1 Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Flow Diagram Containment Spray System

Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-12WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.2-2 Containment Spray Pump Performance Curves Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-13WATTS BAR WBNP-71Figure 6.2.2-3 Reactor Bldgs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray SystemPiping Plan of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header A Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-14WATTS BAR WBNP-89Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.2-4 Powerhouse-Auxiliary & Reactor Bldgs Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System Piping Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-15WATTS BAR WBNP-71Figure 6.2.2-5 Reactor Blogs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System PipingPlan of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header B Containment Heat Removal Systems6.2.2-16WATTS BAR WBNP-71Figure 6.2.2-6 Reactor Bldgs. Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Containment Spray System Piping Section of Spray Patterns From C.S. Loop Header B Design Bases 6.2.3-1WATTS BARWBNP-856.2.3 Secondary Contai nment Functional DesignStructures included as part of the secondary containment system are the Shield Building of each reactor unit, the Auxiliary Building, and the Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator (CDWE) Building. Depending on the configuration of the plant, the Primary Containment Building of a unit may also be included as a structure which is part of the secondary containment system. This condition exists when the primary containment is open to the Auxiliary Building. Primary containment may be open to the Auxiliary Building during cold shutdown or refueling, and also during the construction phase of Unit 2. The areas within the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) boundary at a minimum include the Auxiliary Building and CDWE Building and additionally include the annulus and primary containment of each unit for plant configurations during which these areas are open to the Auxiliary Building. The emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) is provided for ventilation control and cleanup of the atmosphere inside the annulus between the Shield Building and the Primary Containment Building of each reactor unit. The auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) provides a similar contamination control capability in the ABSCE.6.2.3.1 Design Bases 6.2.3.1.1 Secondary Containment EnclosuresDesign bases for the secondary containment structures were devised to assure that an effective barrier exists for airborne fission products that may leak from the primary containment during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Within the scope of these design bases are requirements that influence the size, structural integrity, and leak tightness of the secondary containment enclosure. Specifically, these include a capability to: (a) maintain an effective barrier for gases and vapors that may leak from the primary containment during all normal and abnormal events; (b) delay the release of any gases and vapors that may leak from the primary containment during a LOCA; (c) allow gases and vapors that may leak through the primary containment during a LOCA to flow into the contained air volume within the secondary containment where they are diluted, held up, and purified prior to being released to the environs; (d) bleed to the secondary containment each air-filled containment penetration enclosure which extends beyond the Shield Building and which is formed by automatically actuated isolation valves; (e) maintain an effective barrier for airborne radioactive contaminants, gases, and vapors originating in the Auxiliary Building during all normal and abnormal events.Refer to Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 for further details relating to the design of the Shield Building and the Auxiliary Building.

6.2.3.1.2 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)The design bases for the EGTS are:

6.2.3-2System Design WATTS BARWBNP-90 (1)To keep the air pressure within each Shield Building annulus below atmospheric pressure at all times in which the integrity of that particular containment is required.

(2)To reduce the concentration of radioactive nuclides in annulus air that is released to the environs during a LOCA in either reactor unit to levels sufficiently low to keep the site boundary and low population zone (LPZ) dose rates below the 10 CFR 100 values.

(3)To withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.

(4)To provide for initial and periodic testing of the system capability to function as designed.6.2.3.1.3 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)The design bases for the ABGTS are:

(1)To establish and keep an air pressure that is below atmospheric within the portion of the buildings serving as a secondary containment enclosure during accidents.

(2)To reduce the concentration of radioactive nuclides in air releases from the secondary containment enclosures to the environs during accidents to levels sufficiently low to keep the site boundary and LPZ dose rates below the 10 CFR 100 guideline values.

(3)To minimize the spreading of airborne radioactivity within the Auxiliary Building following an accidental release in the fuel handling and waste packaging areas.

(4)To withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.

(5)To provide for initial and periodic testing of the system capability to function as designed.

6.2.3.2 System Design 6.2.3.2.1 Secondary Containment Enclosures (1)Shield BuildingThe principal components that function collectively to form a secondary containment barrier around the steel primary containment vessel are the Shield Building itself, the Shield Building penetration seals, the isolation valves installed in the penetrations to the Shield Building, and the Shield Building penetration leakoff facilities.

Structure System Design 6.2.3-3WATTS BARWBNP-89The Shield Building is a reinforced concrete structure that encloses the reactor's steel primary containment structure; it has a circular horizontal cross section and a shallow domed roof. The vertical center line of this building is also the vertical center line of the steel primary containment vessel. The inside diameter of this building was sized to provide an annular shaped air space between the two reactor enclosures that is five feet wide. The total enclosed free air space between the two enclosures is approximately 396,000 cubic feet. Additional data on the Shield Building is provided in Section 3.8.1 and in Table 6.2.3-1.Penetrations To ensure that the Shield Building provides a nearly leak tight enclosure for the primary containment structure all openings in the shield building penetrations are sealed. Typical mechanical piping or ventilation penetrations are equipped with a flexible membrane seal as shown in Figure 6.2.3-1. The leakage rate for mechanical penetrations is no greater than 0.0052 cfm per square inch when secondary containment is at a minus 0.5 inch water gauge. The primary containment personnel hatch passes through the Shield Building and opens directly to the Auxiliary Building. This opening in the Shield Building wall is handled as an ordinary piping penetration and is provided with a flexible, double membrane seal as shown in Figure 3.8.2-5 (see Section 3.8.2). Personnel and equipment access doors to the secondary containment are treated as special cases and are provided with resilient seals as shown in Figures 3.8.4-21 through 3.8.4-23. (See Section 3.8.4 for descriptions of the personnel access doors and the equipment access doors.) The allowable leakage for each personnel access door is 0.5 cfm when secondary containment is at minus 1 inch water gauge, and 60 cfm for the equipment access hatch when secondary containment is at minus 0.75 inch water gauge.Air filled lines which must be isolated by automatic valve actuation and which penetrate both the primary containment and the shield building are considered more likely to pass airborne radioactivities than other lines. Therefore these lines are provided with a third isolation valve outside the secondary containment for additional leak protection. This single, third valve receives both Train A and B actuation signals. Electronic buffering prevents an electrical failure in one train from affecting the performance of the other.

To enhance the effectiveness of the third isolation valve as a barrier to leakage, the enclosed volume between the second and third isolation valves is opened to the annulus during isolation. Opening this enclosed space to the annulus is accomplished with leakoff facilities as shown in Figure 6.2.3-2. This allows the negative pressure in the annulus to include this small volume, and leakage from the primary containment outward or leakage from outside the Shield Building inward is drawn into the annulus for processing. The lines provided with this feature are those for the primary containment purge supply and exhaust and the lower compartment pressure relief.

6.2.3-4System Design WATTS BARWBNP-89Electrical penetrations are of either a cable tray/cable slot type or a conduit type. Typical seals for these penetrations are shown in Figure 6.2.3-3. For cable tray/cable slot penetrations, silicone room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) foam is used as the sealant around cables within the wall opening over a portion of the length of the cable slot penetration. In conduit penetrations, the interstitial spaces between cables and conduit or condulet walls are filled with RTV silicone rubber as the sealant over a portion of the length of the penetration. The leakage rate for electrical penetrations is limited to 0.014 cfm per square inch when secondary containment is at a minus 0.5 inch water gauge.The total expected infiltration rate across all leakage paths into the annulus is 250 cfm at the post accident annulus control setpoint. During normal operation the annulus is maintained at a negative pressure of 5.0 inches water gauge with respect to the outside atmosphere. Periodic tests demonstrate that inleakage is less than this value.The fraction of primary containment leakage which may bypass the Shield Building and go directly to the Auxiliary Building is specified to be no greater than 25% of the total primary containment out-leakage. Permitting this leakage fraction results in acceptable site boundary and LPZ doses for the LOCA condition as described in Chapter 15. There are no paths by which primary containment leakage may bypass both the Shield Building and the Auxiliary Building.Information concerning isolation features utilized in support of the secondary containment is presented in Section 6.2.4. Potential leakage paths by which primary containment leakage could bypass the secondary containment, and measures utilized to prevent such leakage are also discussed in Section 6.2.4.

(2)Auxiliary Building Structure The Auxiliary Building is a conventional reinforced concrete structure located between the Reactor Building and the Control Building as shown in Figures 1.2-4 through 1.2-10. Its basic functions are to house support and safety equipment for the primary steam system and to provide an isolation barrier during certain postulated accidents involving airborne radioactive contamination. Certain of the buildings interior and exterior walls, floor slabs, and a part of its roof form the isolation barrier as shown in Figures 6.2.3-4 through 6.2.3-10. The enclosed volume is approximately 6.9 x 10 6 cubic feet. The only openings in the isolation barrier are sealed mechanical and electrical penetrations or air locks. The building itself is by design and construction virtually leak tight. Additional data on the Auxiliary Building is provided in Section 3.8.4 and Table 6.2.3-1.The accident situations for which the Auxiliary Building isolation barrier serves as the containment barrier are those involving irradiated fuel within the System Design 6.2.3-5WATTS BARWBNP-89confines of the building and spills or leaks of radioactive materials from tanks and process lines inside the building. During a LOCA, the Auxiliary Building isolation barrier serves as part of the secondary containment enclosure for situations when any through-the-line leakage from primary containment bypasses the Shield Building and enters the Auxiliary Building.Penetrations Mechanical and electrical penetration seals in the isolation barrier are similar to those for the Shield Building. Other potential leakage paths into the Auxiliary Building are ventilation openings and equipment and personnel access points.Auxiliary Building ventilation supply and exhaust ducts except those for the ABGTS are provided with two low leakage isolation dampers in series. These two isolation dampers are heavy duty with resilient seals along the blade edges. The dampers are air-operated and fail in the closed position upon loss of power.Entrances and exits to those portions of the Auxiliary Building within the containment barrier for both equipment and personnel are through air locks. The air lock locations are shown in Figures 1.2-3 and 1.2-5. The doors in each air lock are electrically interlocked such that only one side of the air lock can be opened at a time. Local and control room alarms are provided should both sides of an air lock ever be opened simultaneously. As a safety precaution, an interlock defeat switch is mounted on the containment side of each air lock to allow emergency egress should either side of the air lock be blocked open in an accident. The railway access doors and hatches are described in Section 3.8.4.A special case is the interlock system for the large exterior door to the railway loading area. The large door is treated as one side of the air lock and either the two doors leading to the fuel handling area or the railway access hatch covers above can act as the other side of the lock. When the large railroad door is open, neither of the doors to the fuel handling area nor the access hatches above can be opened, and when either of these two doors and either of the access hatches above are open, the large railway access door cannot be opened. These doors are also provided with local and main control room alarms should both sides of the air lock ever be opened simultaneously.

The total permissible leakage rate for the ABSCE at a pr essure of -0.25 inches water gauge with respect to the outside is 9300 cfm maximum. This represents 165.5% of the ABSCE free volume per day. Periodic tests demonstrate that inleakage is less than the design value. Any improvement in the inleakage recorded during subsequent test, shall be used to establish the allowable margin for breaching permits.

(3)Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment EnclosureThe Auxiliary Building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) is that portion of the Auxiliary Building and CDWE Building (and for certain configurations, the annulus and primary containment, as discussed below) which serves to maintain an effective barrier for airborne radioactive contaminants released in the auxiliary building during abnormal events. Mechanical and electrical penetrations of this enclosure are 6.2.3-6System Design WATTS BARWBNP-89provided with seals to minimize infiltration. Piping penetrations are either analyzed to pressure boundary retention requirements, or the effects of their failure are demonstrated not to impair the ability of the ABGTS system to maintain the ABSCE under the required negative pressure of 0.25 inches w.g., or they are isolated by physical means (e.g., locked-closed valves, etc.) Airlock-type doors are provided at portals where needed by the frequency of use. A negative pressure is maintained within the ABSCE to ensure that no contaminated air is released to the environs following an abnormal event without first being processed by the auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS). The ABSCE is shown in Figures 6.2.3-4 though 6.2.3-10.During periods when the primary containment and annulus of a unit are open to the Auxiliary Building, the ABSCE also includes the primary containment and the annulus of that unit. During this condition, operator action is taken to ensure that the purge air ventilation system is shutdown. During the construction phase of Unit 2, the Unit 2 primary containment and annulus are alwa ys open to the ABSCE with the Unit 2 containment purge system physically isolated from the outside environment by means of locked-closed isolation dampers and valves.Doors and penetrations of the ABSCE perimeter are provided with seals to reduce infiltration. Doors entering the area are either locked or under administrative control.Automatic redundant isolation dampers are provided in ducts which pass from areas inside the ABSCE to areas outside of the enclosure. These permit isolation of the ABSCE and allow the ABGTS to maintain a negative pressure in the area following an abnormal event. The ABGTS maintains a negative pressure with respect to the outside in the ABSCE during emergency operation and processes all Auxiliary Building exhaust. Either train of the ABGTS may be used to maintain the negative pressure and treat air exhausted from the ABSCE.Isolation of the ABSCE is initiated by a Phase A containment isolation signal, a high radiation signal from the fuel handling area radiation monitors, or a high temperature in the Unit 1 outside air intakes for the Auxiliary Building. Any one of these signals automatically starts the ABGTS and clos es all isolation dampers in the ABSCE boundary.The annulus vacuum control subsystem continues to operate whenever the ABSCE is isolated, except for a Phase A containment isolation signal. A Phase A containment isolation signal which is generated by a LOCA starts the air cleanup subsystem of the emergency gas treatment system. Calculations have shown that this condition does not result in exceeding the limits given in 10 CFR 100. For additional description of the annulus vacuum control subsystem of the EGTS, see Section 6.2.3.2.2.Proper actuation of the isolation dampers associated with the ABSCE and operation of the ABGTS is confirmed during preoperational testing.

System Design 6.2.3-7WATTS BARWBNP-90 6.2.3.2.2 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)The EGTS is shown schematically in Figure 6.2.3-11. The logic and control diagrams for this system are shown in Figures 6.2.3-12 to 6.2.3-15. This system has two subsystems; one is the annulus vacuum control subsystem and the other is the air cleanup subsystem. The portions of the EGTS necessary to ensure that the system performs its functions during post-accident operation are classified Seismic Category I. Portions of the system which are not necessary for post-accident operation are seismically qualified to the extent that the system is not adversely affected if they should fail due to the seismic event; that is, they are qualified Seismic Category I(L).Annulus Vacuum Control Subsystem The annulus vacuum control subsystem is a fan and duct network used to establish and keep a negative pressure level within the annular space between the two reactor containment structures. It is utilized during normal operations in which containment integrity is required. In emergencies in which containment isolation is required, this subsystem is isolated and shut down. Under such an operating condition, this subsystem performs no safety-related function after the need for containment isolation has been established. Because of this, the annulus vacuum control subsystem is not classified as an engineered safety feature.This subsystem has two independently controlled branches. Each branch serves one reactor unit. These branches draw air from their assigned annuli and release it into the Auxiliary Building exhaust duct system. The air inlet for each branch is centrally located in the secondary containment volume above the steel containment dome. During the interim period when Unit 2 is under construction, the Unit 2 annulus vacuum control subsystem is isolated from the Unit 1 subsystem by means of blank-off plates located at the fan discharge.Air pressure control in each secondary containment annulus is achieved with a redundant fan, differential pressure sensor, motor operated damper and control circuitry installation incorporated into each branch. This equipment provides a capability to vary the volumetric flow rate drawn from the annulus to keep the pressure at a predetermined negative pressure level. This control function is accomplished with a modulating damper under control of a differential pressure sensor that adjusts the amount of outside air introduced upstream of a constant capacity fan in the proper manner to keep the annulus pressure within a designated narrow range. Two independent installations of these items are provided to promote operational efficiency. One of the two is utilized as a standby redundant unit that starts automatically in the event the operating control unit fails to function in the proper manner.The fans and flow control dampers serving both reactor secondary containment annuli are installed in an Auxiliary Building room at elevation 757' adjacent to the Unit 2 Shield

Building.The nominal negative pressure for each annulus vacuum control equipment installation is 5-inches of water gauge below atmospheric. The negative pressure level chosen for normal operation ensures that the annulus pressure will not reach positive 6.2.3-8System Design WATTS BARWBNP-89values during the annulus pressure surge produced by a LOCA in the primary containment. Two 100% capacity fans per reactor unit are utilized to maintain this negative pressure. One fan per unit is normally on standby.Air Cleanup SubsystemThe air cleanup subsystem is a redundant, shared airflow network having the capability to perform two functions for the affected reactor secondary containment during a LOCA. One of these is to keep the secondary containment annulus air volume below atmospheric pressure. The second function is to remove airborne particulates and vapors that may contain radioactive nuclides from air drawn from the annulus. Each of these is accomplished by this subsystem without disturbing operation of the unaffected reactor unit.Both of these functions are performed by processing and controlling a stream of air taken from the affected reactor unit secondary containment annulus. The air cleanup operation is conducted by drawing the air stream through a series of filters and adsorbers. Annulus air pressure control is accomplished by adjusting the fraction of the airstream that is returned to the annulus air space. During the interim period when Unit 2 is under construction, the EGTS ductwork which exhausts air from the Unit 2 annulus is isolated from the air cleanup units by means of locked-closed isolation valves, while the supply ductwork is isolated by blank-off plates.The negative pressure control setpoint chosen for post-accident operation is low enough that leakage across the boundary is into the annulus from both the primary containment and areas adjacent to the Shield Building. The minimum negative pressure in the annulus meets the requirements of NUREG-0800. The pressure differentials produced by wind effects are also overcome by appropriate selection of the annulus negative pressure level.The rated capacity of each redundant air cleanup unit in the subsystem is 4000 cfm. This subsystem of the EGTS is classified as an engineered safety feature.The air flow network for the air cleanup subsystem was designed to provide the redundant services needed for either reactor secondary containment annulus. The intakes and ducting in this network used to bring annulus air to the EGTS room on elevation 757' in the Auxiliary Building are those also used by the annulus vacuum control subsystem. The intake is centrally located within each Shield Building above the steel containment dome. Within the EGTS room the network branches out in a manner to supply two air cleanup unit installations that can be aligned with flow control dampers to serve either annulus air volume. After the air is processed, the air cleanup subsystem air flow network directs the air to redundant damper controlled flow dividers in each reactor unit annulus. At these points, the flow network contains two air flow paths leading to the reactor unit vent and two air flow paths to a manifold that distributes and releases the air uniformly around the bottom of the annulus. The vertical separation between the intake above the dome and the exhaust ports in the manifold is 168

feet. Butterfly valves, rather than dampers, are installed in the ducts just above the flow distribution manifold to minimize the outside air inleakage from the reactor unit vents into the annulus.

System Design 6.2.3-9WATTS BARWBNP-85Another feature incorporated into the air cleanup subsystem air flow network is the capability to cool the filters and adsorbers in an inactive air cleanup unit that is loaded with radioactive material. This is accomplished with two cross-over flow ducts that can draw air at 200 cfm from the active air cleanup unit through the inactive air cleanup unit. (Such an air flow is sufficient to keep the temperature rise through a fully loaded inactive air cleanup unit to less than 75°F.) Two butterfly valves in series are installed in each cross-over air flow path to assure sufficient isolation to perform accurate removal efficiency tests on the HEPA filter and carbon absorber banks. After a Phase A containment isolation signal has initiated EGTS operation, the control room operator will shut one of the two EGTS trains down and align the appropriate butterfly valves for automatic operation. In addition, the associated suction valve is remotely opened from the main control room to establish a flow path from the affected annulus through the air cleanup unit.This feature is provided in the event excessive absorber bed temperature occurs following the failure of an operating EGTS train. Absorber bed temperature is recorded in the main control room and status indication of each EGTS train is also provided. Upon failure of an operating EGTS train, absorber bed temperature is monitored to detect subsequent temperature rise. The two air cleanup units in the air cleanup subsystem are stainless steel housings containing air treatment equipment, samples, heaters, drains, test fittings, and access facilities for maintenance. See Section 6.5.1.2.1 for a description of the air cleanup units and information related to their design.Two centrifugal fans are provided outside the air cleanup unit housings. Each of these is associated with a specific air cleanup unit. These fans were designed to function in process air flow streams at temperatures up to 200°F. See Table 6.2.3-1 for additional information on these fans.Two air flow control modules are also included in the air cleanup subsystem. Each consists of a differential pressure sensor and transmitter, control circuitry, a damper actuator, and two modulating dampers. The single damper actuator adjusts the dampers simultaneously in opposite directions, i.e., one is closed as the other is opened.A pressure controller, located in the main control room, modulates pressure control dampers in the annulus to maintain the differential pressure setpoint. Two sets of independent pressure control dampers installed in the secondary containment annulus provide the capability to adjust the amount of air recirculated to the reactor unit annulus or discharged to the shield building exhaust vent. Annulus pressures that are more positive than the pressure controller setpoint produce a signal causing the damper actuator to begin closing the damper controlling the air flow to the annulus and to start opening the damper controlling the air flow to the Shield Building exhaust vent.

Annulus pressures that are more negative than the pressure controller setpoint initiate the opposite kind of damper motions.Four isolation valves installed in the secondary containment annulus provide isolation of the pressure control dampers. Two handswitches in the control room are positioned 6.2.3-10System Design WATTS BARWBNP-89so that one set of isolation valves is in auto and the other is in standby. A containment isolation Phase A signal causes the valves in the auto position to open and the standby valves to remain closed. The open isolation valves provide a flow path for one set of pressure control dampers which modulate to control annulus pressure. When abnormal annulus pressure is detected, an "open" signal is sent to the standby isolation valves and a "close" signal is sent to the valves in the auto position. This transfers annulus pressure control to the other set of pressure control dampers. For further details, see Figures 6.2.3-14 and 6.2.3-15.Operation of the air cleanup subsystem during accidents is initiated by the Phase A containment isolation signal. Both the A and the B trains will be started by this signal coming from either reactor unit. A capability is also provided to start both trains with a hand switch in the main control room. Damper alignment is also initiated by the same signal; however, just those associated with the affected reactor unit will be activated. Another adjustment of a hand switch in the main control room will change the operating mode to the single train operation with the redundant train in a standby status. Employment of this operating mode is expected after the first 30 minutes of operation. The control room operator can select either train to remain in operation.6.2.3.2.3 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)The ABGTS is a fully redundant air cleanup network provided to reduce radioactive nuclide releases from the secondary containment enclosure during accidents. It does this by drawing air from the fuel handling and waste packaging areas through ducting normally used for ventilation purposes to air cleanup equipment, and then directing this air to the reactor unit vent. In doing so, this system draws air from all parts of the Auxiliary Building and the CDWE Building to establish a negative pressure region in which virtually no unprocessed air passes from this secondary containment enclosure to the atmosphere. During the construction phase of Unit 2 and during certain shutdown or refueling conditions, the primary containment and annulus of the affected unit(s) may be open to the Auxiliary Building. The ABGTS has been designed to establish a negative pressure in these additional areas for these configurations. Since the purge ventilation fans and instrument room fans, in addition to the normal ventilation system, may be operating during these conditions, an ABI signal shuts down these ventilation systems and closes associated isolation dampers/valves and starts the ABGTS.All portions of the ABGTS that are required to ensure that the system functions properly are classified Seismic Category I. Certain portions of the system are not required for post-accident operation of the ABGTS. Those portions are seismically qualified to the extent that system operation is not adversely affected should they fail due to the seismic event (i.e., they are classified according to Seismic Category I(L)).The rated capacity of each redundant air cleanup unit in this gas treatment system is 9000 cfm. These were designed in accordance with engineered safety feature standards.The unique portions of the ABGTS are shown schematically in Figures 6.2.3-16 and 9.4-8. Logic and control diagrams for the ABGTS are shown in Figures 9.4-10 and System Design 6.2.3-11WATTS BARWBNP-899.4-17. The airflow network for this system consists of two parallel duct installations originating from exhaust ducting that normally serves the fuel handling and waste packaging areas in the building. Each of these ducts lead directly to an air cleanup unit, to the fan associated with the air cleanup unit, and then directly to the reactor unit

vent.The air flow network that is not unique to this system consists of most of the normal ventilation ducting install ed in the ABSCE. When the ABSCE is isolated, this duct network provides a flow path for reducing the air pressure level in all parts of this enclosure. In some instances, air is drawn in the opposite direction to the normal air flow pattern during operation of the ABGTS. Two air cleanup units are utilized in the ABGTS. Each unit includes air treatment components instrumentation, test fittings, and other equipment required for proper operations and testing of the system. Refer to Section 6.5.1.2.2 for a description of the ABGTS air cleanup units and information related to their design.Air is drawn through each of these air cleanup units by a belt driven centrifugal fan. The drive for the fan is an electric motor. Additional information on these fans is given in Table 6.2.3-1. The air flow control modules utilized in the ABGTS contain a differential pressure sensor and transmitter, control circuitry, and a modulating damper. These air flow control modules provide the capability for keeping the pressure within the ABSCE at a minimum of 1/4 inch water gauge below atmospheric. The modules do this by varying the amount of air drawn from this enclosed volume in a manner to keep the pressure at this desired negative value. This is done with a modulating damper that is controlled by the differential pressure transmitter and differential pressure controller circuit to adjust the amount of outside air introduced into the duct network just upstream of the constant capacity fan described above. Such action brings in sufficient outside air to keep the fan flow rate at its rated flow at all times. It also draws enough air from the ABSCE to establish and keep the desired negative pressure level.The negative pressure level chosen for post-accident operation is sufficiently low to ensure that airborne contamination present in the Auxiliary Building is not released to the environs without being processed by an air cleanup assembly. External pressure gradients produced by wind loadings on the building do not adversely affect the ability of the ABGTS to maintain the negative pressure in the ABSCE.The controls for the ABGTS are designed to provide two basic control modes. One control mode has either one of the air cleanup units in operation and the other in a state in which the redundant unit can automatically come into operation in the event the operating unit fails. Less than adequate pressure in the ABSCE is utilized in this control mode to make this failure determination. This operational redundancy is achieved with spatially separated power and control circuitry having different independent power sources to prevent a loss of function from any single system component failure. The term "Train A" is used to identify one complete set of full capacity equipment and the term "Train B" is used to identify the other set of full 6.2.3-12Design Evaluation WATTS BARWBNP-85capacity equipment. Power for both equipment trains is supplied by the emergency power system.Operation of the ABGTS begins automatically upon initiation of an auxiliary building isolation signal which is generated from any of the following signals:

(1)Phase A containment isolation signal from either reactor unit, or (2)High radiation signal from the spent fuel pool accident radiation monitors, or (3)High temperature signal from the Auxiliary Building air intakes. Note: Unit 1 air intake only provides signal while Unit 2 is under construction)A capability is also provided to start both trains with a hand switch in the main control room. Another adjustment capability provided in the hand switch in the main control room changes the operating mode to the single train operation with the redundant train in a standby status. Employment of this operating mode is expected after the first 30 minutes of operation. In this instance, the main control room operator has the capability to select either train to remain in operation. The standby unit selected automatically starts in the event the operating unit does not adequately maintain negative pressure in the ABSCE.6.2.3.3 Design Evaluation 6.2.3.3.1 Secondary Containment EnclosuresThe secondary containment enclosures are designed to provide a positive barrier to all potential primary containment leakage pathways during a LOCA and to radioactive contaminants released in accidental spills and fuel handling accidents that may occur in the Auxiliary Building. In a LOCA, the Shield Building containment enclosure provides the barrier to all airborne primary containment leakage, and the Auxiliary Building provides a barrier to through-the-line leakage which can potentially become airborne.(1)Shield Building StructureThe Shield Building provides the physical barrier for airborne primary containment leakage during a LOCA. Because the Shield Building completely encloses the free standing primary containment, all airborne leakage from primary containment passes into the annular region provided by this arrangement.The building construction employs monolithic pours of concrete. This approach for structures of this type produces a very low leakage barrier. The low leakage characteristics of this barrier help to reduce the rate at which purified annulus air Design Evaluation 6.2.3-13WATTS BARWBNP-92must be released to maintain the enclosed volume at a negative pressure. This factor contributes significantly to keeping the site boundary and the low population zone (LPZ) dosage levels within 10 CFR 100 guidelines.The size of the annular region between the primary containment and the shield building assures a residence time for all leakage into the annulus. Penetrations The shield building wall is provided with more than 200 penetrations to accommodate mechanical equipment piping, cable trays, and electrical conduit which leave and enter the Shield Building. Due to the low leakage characteristics of the building, leakage through the Shield Building wall is restricted almost entirely to openings in these penetrations. The design assures that penetration leakage does not exceed predetermined quantities. Such a capability ensures that the inleakage is sufficiently low to keep the dose contributions at the site boundary and to the LPZ within 10 CFR 100 guidelines.Openings in mechanical piping penetrations are sealed principally as shown in Figure 6.2.3-1. The seals are a flexible membrane type of single gaskets which incorporate fire resistant materials and are designed to withstand the combinations of Shield Building and piping movements in the SSE and retain their functional integrity. In addition, seals at or below the probable maximum flood elevation are designed to be water tight for flood static head and surge forces. All seals, where possible, are installed outside the Shield Building such that whether during normal operation, accidents, or flood, the differential pressures will tend to enhance the tightness of the seal. The design integrated dose for the Shield Building penetration following a LOCA is 6.7 x 10 6 rads and the penetration seal materials have been selected accordingly.Cables routed in cable trays pass through the Shield Building wall through rectangular cable slot penetrations as shown in Figure 6.2.3-3. The sealant material installed around cables over a portion of the length of the cable slot is silicone RTV (room temperature vulcanizing) foam and is RTV silicone rubber installed around cables within conduits. The seals are typically shown in Figure 6.2.3-3 and are designed to withstand the SSE and retain their integrity. Electrical penetration seals are allowed twice the leakage of mechanical seals to provide sufficient margin in meeting the total allowable Shield Building leakage requirements.The personnel and equipment access doors to the Shield Building are designed with heat resistant, resilient seals which reduce their leakage to the allowable values as stated in Section 6.2.3.2. These doors are designed to retain their structural integrity and leak tightness during a SSE as described in Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.2. To allow personnel access to the annulus during operation, the annulus personnel access doors form an airlock. The doors are electrically interlocked such that only one of the pair may be opened at a time, but an electric interlock defeat switch is provided inside the annulus to provide for emergency 6.2.3-14Design Evaluation WATTS BARWBNP-89egress from the annulus should the door on the Auxiliary Building side of the lock be blocked open during an accident. Therefore, a continuous secondary containment barrier is provided while allowing personnel movement. The interlock is equipped with a local alarm and a control room annunciation to indicate should both doors ever be opened simultaneously.The fuel transfer tubes penetrate the primary and secondary containment on their way to the Auxiliary Building. Each transfer tube has a blind flange on the inboard side of primary containment, equipped with double O-rings and a pressure test connection between the O-rings. The valve in the Auxiliary Building end of the transfer tube serves as the secondary containment isolation valve. The inner space between the primary containment flange and the isolation valve is bled to the annulus so that any leakage into the tube from primary containment or the Auxiliary Building flows into the annulus. The bleed line is routed above the maximum refueling pool water level to preclude accidental spills of refueling water.(2)Auxiliary Building StructureThe entire Auxiliary Building including walls, roof, and interior partitions is constructed by consecutive monolithic pours of concrete. This method of assembly produces a structure with very low leakage characteristics. The portions of the building chosen to constitute the isolation barrier were selected such that all sources of potential contamination are completely enclosed. Therefore, the structure utilized to form the Auxiliary Building containment envelope functions effectively as a barrier to the environs. This same structure also helps to reduce inleakage into the Auxiliary Building containment envelope during accidents to levels easily accommodated by the ABGTS.PenetrationsSeals for mechanical penetrations are a flexible membrane type or single gaskets. They are designed to withstand Auxiliary Building and piping movements in the SSE and retain their structural integrity. The materials chosen for the seals are fire resistant. All seals, where possible, are designed such that whether during normal operation or accidents, the differential pressures tend to enhance the tightness of the seal. Sealing methods for electrical penetrations are similar to those for the shield building electrical penetrations.Each ventilation duct penetrating the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) is equipped with two isolation dampers in series. The dampers have resilient blade end and blade edge seals which are designed to retain their functional characteristics. The motor operators for these dampers have been sized to tightly close the damper blades against their resilient seals. The damper and motor operator assemblies are designed to operate during and after the SSE.

Design Evaluation 6.2.3-15WATTS BARWBNP-89Piping penetrations are either analyzed to pressure boundary retention requirements, or the effects of their failure are demonstrated to not impair the ability of the ABGTS system to maintain the ABSCE under the required negative pressure of 0.25 inches w.g., or they are isolated by physical means (e.g., locked-closed valves, etc.

6.2.3.3.2 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)The EGTS has the capabilities needed to preserve safety in accidents as severe as the design basis LOCA. To verify that the proper features are provided, functional analyses were conducted which consist of failure modes and effects analysis of the system, reviews of Regulatory Guide 1.52 sections to assure licensing requirement conformance, and performance analyses to verify that the system has the desired accident mitigation capabilities. A detailed failure modes and effects analysis is presented in Table 6.2.3-2. The system is shown schematically in Figure 6.2.3-11.The functional analyses conducted on the EGTS have shown that:

(1)Adequate isolation of the annulus vacuum control subsystem during accidents is provided. The two low leakage valves in series upstream of the annulus vacuum control subsystem fans used to isolate the two subsystems--one operated by each subsystem train--give assurance that the annulus vacuum control subsystem will be isolated during accidents. These valves fail closed.

(2)The air flow control dampers in the air cleanup subsystem align to service the affected reactor units. The network was designed to have all of the air flow control dampers shown in Figures 6.2.3-18 and 6.2.3-19 needed to service a particular reactor unit responsive to only the containment isolation signal from that particular reactor unit.

(3)The system intake and recirculation air outlets, shown on Figures 6.2.3-18 and 6.2.3-19, within the Shield Building annulus are positioned to promote mixing and dilution of primary containment leakage. Positioning the recirculated air manifold and the air outlets almost completely around the base of the annulus below the level of the containment penetrations assures a clean air flow past most of the penetrations. This air, warmed by the relative humidity heater, flows upward past these likely sources of leakage. In doing so, the flow impediments (i.e., penetrations, and structures within the annulus) tend to redirect this air flow to induce mixing and dilution.

Substantial amounts of mixing and dilution are likely in the vertical rise of over 168 feet to the system air intake above the steel containment dome.

(4)System startup reliability is very high. The practice of starting up both full capacity trains in the system simultaneously gives greater assurance that one train of equipment functions promptly upon receipt of an accident signal.

6.2.3-16Design Evaluation WATTS BARWBNP-89 (5)The use of a single actuator in each equipment train to adjust dampers controlling the air flow recirculated and vented improves train reliability and minimizes the possibility of annulus pressure instability. Simultaneous adjustment that closes one damper and opens the other eliminates the hunting problems that could arise from nonsimultaneous operation of separately actuated dampers.

(6)The Train A and Train B air cleanup units are adequately protected from each other to eliminate the possibility of a single failure destroying the capability to process annulus air during emergencies. The 13.5 feet high and 27 inch thick concrete wall built between the two units protects each from missiles originating in the other unit.The EGTS, designed prior to issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, is in general agreement with requirements in the guide. Details on this compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 are given in Table 6.5-1.The performance analyses conducted to verify that the EGTS has the required accident mitigation capabilities were conducted in three basic parts. One of these was concerned with the capability for keeping the Shield Building annulus below atmospheric pressure at all times during a LOCA. The second part was an analysis of the cooling capabilities provided to keep temperatures within filters and adsorbers fully loaded with radioactive nuclides at safe levels. The third part was concerned with the site boundary and LPZ dosage contribution from radioactive nuclides present in annulus air releases during the design basis LOCA. These three analyses are discussed under the respective headings below.Annulus Negative Pressure Control CapabilityThe capability of the EGTS to keep the Shield Building annulus below atmospheric pressure during a design basis LOCA was established with a time iteration analysis performed by a computer. Energy and mass balances were accomplished successively in accordance with mass and volume changes calculated to take place during each time increment. Such a methodology allowed sufficient freedom to account for:

(1)Steel containment vessel growth from internal pressure, (2)Steel containment vessel growth from thermal expansion, (3)Outside air inleakage into the Shield Building annulus, and (4)Heat transfer from the steel containment structure to the annulus air mass.To assure that this analysis was valid and conservative:

(1)Heat transfer from the primary containment atmosphere to the primary containment vessel was assumed to be convective. An air-steam mixture convective heat transfer coefficient was chosen to maximize heat transfer to Design Evaluation 6.2.3-17WATTS BARWBNP-89the secondary containment atmosphere. The constant value of 400 Btu/hr-ft 2-°F given in Table 6.2.3-1 compares conservatively to the integrated transient heat transfer coefficients recommended in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1. Heat transfer from the primary containment vessel to the annulus atmosphere and from the atmosphere to the secondary containment wall was assumed to be convective. Heat transfer from the primary containment vessel to the secondary containment wall was assumed to be by radiation. Forms of the transient convective heat transfer coefficients and values for the constant radiative heat transfer coefficients are given in Table 6.2.3-1. Consideration was given to the heat capacity of both the primary and secondary containment structures. The thermal conductivity and capacitance for these walls, as given in Table 6.2.3-1, agree closely with those obtained from Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1.

(2)The thermal growth of the steel vessel was based on linear expansion which was applied to the transient containment vessel temperature increases above the initial steady-state values to obtain the transient radial expansion (see Table 6.2.3-1 for total containment expansion). Temperature gradients were calculated for three regions: upper compartment, ice condenser, and lower compartment. The radial expansions in each of these three regions were converted to volume changes which were summed to yield a total annulus volume change due to primary containment vessel thermal expansion.

(3)Table 6.2.3-1 presents the characteristics of the internal pressure effects on the containment vessel. This model uses linear elastic thin shell theory to determine the expansion. The cylindrical portion of the vessel is assumed to act as a cylindrical shell with capped ends. The hemispherical dome expands uniformly as a simple sphere and includes the axial expansion of the cylinder. External vertical and circumferential stiffeners are assumed not to be present so that conservative results are obtained. This pressure-induced growth was assumed to occur instantaneously at the start of the LOCA.

(4)Air leakage into the Shield Building annulus was assumed to be 250 cfm at the post accident annulus control setpoint.

(5)The air temperature in the annulus was assumed to be a thermally mixed average.(6)Only one train of the EGTS was assumed to operate, allowing for a possible single failure in the other.The initial steady state conditions used in this analysis were as follows (refer also to Table 6.2.3-1):

6.2.3-18Design Evaluation WATTS BARWBNP-89These initial values were chosen to maximize the secondary containment pressure after the LOCA. The initial pressure of minus 5.0 inches of water gauge with respect to the outside is the pressure maintained by the annulus vacuum control subsystem during normal operation. The initial temperature of 50°F is the estimated minimum temperature which was assumed for maximum annulus air density. Similarly, the initial relative humidity of 0% was assumed for maximum annulus air density.The results obtained from this analysis are shown in Figure 6.2.3-17. This annulus pressure and EGTS exhaust rate vs. time curve indicates that, after the initial containment pressure induced step increase, the pressure rises to a peak value of approximately minus 0.67 inch of water in about 90 seconds after the LOCA begins. The annulus pressure is then restored and maintained at or below the EGTS setpoint value as shown in Figure 6.2.3-17.The expansion of approximately 1,234 ft 3 due to internal temperature summed with the expansion of 766 ft 3 from internal pressure yields a total primary containment vessel expansion of approximately 2,000 ft

3. Such results indicate that:

(1)The negative pressure level of 5 inches of water below atmospheric in the Shield Building annulus maintained by the annulus vacuum control subsystem before an accident minimizes the amount of unfiltered radioactive nuclides potentially released to the environment before the air cleanup subsystem becomes operational.

(2)The rated flow rate of 4000 +10% cfm for each train of the air cleanup subsystem is adequate to keep the annulus pressure below the negative pressure setpoint throughout the remaining period of the LOCA.Inactive Air Cleanup Unit Cooling CapabilitiesThe second performance analysis conducted to show that the EGTS can cope with circumstances that may occur in a LOCA was concerned with temperature control capabilities provided for air filters and adsorbers loaded with radioactive material. The analysis conducted assumed accident releases in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.4 plus 1% solids, containment leakages of 0.25%/day for the first day and 0.125%/day from one to thirty days with all the activity being collected in a single air PressureTemperature Relative HumidityContainment upper compartment atm.110°F 0%

Ice condenser compartment atm. 15°F 0%

Containment lower compartment atm.120°F 0%

Shield Building annulus-5 in. w.g. 50°F 0%

Outside atm. 0° 0%

Design Evaluation 6.2.3-19WATTS BARWBNP-89cleanup unit. An additional assumption made was that all of the gamma and beta energy releases were transformed into heat within the filters and absorbers.This occurs a few days after the LOCA takes place. The design objective is to assure that the air cleanup unit component temperatures do not exceed 200°F; it was found that a cooling air flow rate of 90 cfm is required. Such results indicate that the cooling air flow rate of 200 cfm provided for this purpose should keep the temperature within the carbon absorber bank well below the 620°F carbon ignition temperature.Site Boundary and LPZ Dosage ContributionsThe last performance analysis conducted to show that the EGTS has the capability to perform in the required manner to preserve safety during a LOCA was concerned with the site boundary and LPZ dosage contributions arising from annulus air releases to the environs. This analysis is described and evaluated in Chapter 15.6.2.3.3.3 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)The ABGTS has the capabilities needed to preserve safety in accidents as severe as a LOCA. This was determined by conducting functional analyses of the system to verify that the system has the proper features for accident mitigation which consist of a failure modes and effects analysis, a review of Regulatory Guide 1.52 sections to assure licensing requirement conformance, and a performance analysis to verify that the system has the desired accident mitigation capabilities. A detailed failure modes and effects analysis is presented in Table 6.2.3-3.The functional analyses conducted on the ABGTS have shown that:

(1)The air intakes for the system are properly located to minimize accident effects. The use of the air intakes provided in the fuel handling and waste disposal areas minimizes the spread of airborne contamination that may be accidentally released at these positions in which the probability of an accidental release, e.g., a fuel handling accident, is more likely. This localization effect is provided without reducing the effectiveness of the system to cope with multiple activity released throughout the ABSCE that may occur during a LOCA. Such coverage is accomplished by utilizing the normal ventilation ducting to draw outside air inleakage from any point along the secondary containment enclosure to the fuel handling and waste disposal areas.(2)Accident indication signals are utilized to bring the ABGTS into operation to assure that the system functions when needed to mitigate accident effects.

Accidents in which this system is needed to preserve safety are automatically detected by at least one of the three instrumentation sets used to generate accident signals that result in system startup.

(3)System startup reliability is very high. The practice of allowing the automatic startup of either, or both, full capacity trains in the system gives greater assurance that one train of equipment functions upon receipt of an accident signal.

6.2.3-20Design Evaluation WATTS BARWBNP-89 (4)The method adopted to establish and keep the negative pressure level within this secondary containment enclosure minimizes the time needed to reach the desired pressure level. Initially, the full capacity of the ABGTS fans is utilized for this purpose. After reaching the desired operating level, the system control module allows outside air to enter the air flow network just upstream of the fan at a rate to keep the fans operating at full capacity with the enclosed volume at the desired negative pressure level. In this situation, the amount of air withdrawn from the enclosed volume is equal to the amount of outside air inleakage through the ABSCE. In addition, two vacuum breaker dampers in series are provided to admit outside air in case the modulating dampers fail.

(5)The ABSCE is maintained at a slightly negative pressure to reduce the amount of unprocessed air escaping from this secondary containment enclosure to the atmosphere to insignificant quantities. In addition, this negative pressure level is less than that which is maintained within the annulus; such that, any air leakage between the Auxiliary Building and the Shield Building is from the Auxiliary Building into the Shield Building.

(6)The Train A and Train B air cleanup units are sufficiently separated from each other to eliminate the possibility of a single failure destroying the capability to process Auxiliary Building air prior to its release to the atmosphere. Two concrete walls and a distance of more than 80 feet separate the two trains. The use of separate trains of the emergency power system to drive the air cleanup trains gives further assurance of proper equipment separation.During periods when the primary containment and annulus of a unit are open to the Auxiliary Building, the ABSCE also includes the primary containment and the annulus of that unit. During this condition, which exists during the construction phase of Unit 2 and certain shutdown and refueling operations, operator action is taken to ensure that the purge air ventilation system is shutdown.The review of the ABGTS conducted to determine its conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 has shown that this system, designed prior to issuance of the guide, is in general agreement with its requirements. Details on compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 are given in Table 6.5-2.The performance analysis conducted to verify that the ABGTS has the required accident mitigation capabilities has shown that the system flow rate is sized properly to handle all expected outside air inleakage at a 1/4 inch water gauge negative pressure differential. This indicates that the nominal flow rate of 9000 cfm is sufficient to assure an adequate margin above the expected ABSCE inleakage (ACU filters are replaced as needed to maintain a minimum flow capability of 9300 cfm under surveillance instructions).The performance analysis evaluated the capability of the ABGTS to reach and maintain a negative pressure of 1/4 inch water gauge with respect to the outside within

the boundaries of the ABSCE. The foll owing was utilized in the analysis:

Test and Inspections 6.2.3-21WATTS BARWBNP-89 (1)Leakage into the ABSCE is proportional to the square root of the pressure differential, and is 7930 cfm maximum at a negative differential pressure of 1/4 inch water gauge.

(2)Only one air cleanup unit in the ABGTS operates at the rated capacity.

(3)The air cleanup unit fan begins to operate 30 seconds after initiation of the postulated LOCA.

(4)The initial static pressure inside the ABSCE is conservatively considered to be atmospheric pressure, although the ABSCE is under a negative pressure during normal operation.

(5)The effective pressure head due to wind equals 1/8 inch water gauge.

(6)Initial average air temperature inside the ABSCE equals 104°F.

(7)Atmospheric temperature and pressure are 95°F and 14.4 psia, respectively.

(8)ABSCE isolation dampers/valves close within 30 seconds after receiving an ABI or a high radiation signal, except for the fuel handling area exhaust dampers which must close within 11.7 seconds. The non-safety-related general ventilation and fuel handling area exhaust fans are designed to shut down automatically following a LOCA. Each fan is provided with a safety related Class 1E primary circuit breaker and a safety related Class 1E shunt trip isolation switch which is tripped by a signal of the opposite train from that for the primary circuit breaker to ensure that power is isolated from the fan.The analysis utilizes the first law of thermodynamics and perfect gas relations in an iterative approach to determine temperature and pressure changes in the ABSCE. Heat sources and sinks (ESF equipment room coolers) are considered.The results obtained indicate that the ABGTS has the capability to reach and maintain a negative pressure differential of 3 inch water gauge within four minutes of the receipt of an Auxiliary Building isolation signal.The system contains sufficient air cleanup facilities to keep the contributions to the site boundary and LPZ dosage arising from Auxiliary Building air releases to small fractions of the 10 CFR 100 guideline values. This part of the analysis is presented and evaluated in Chapter 15.

6.2.3.4 Test and Inspections 6.2.3.4.1 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)Preoperational testing of the EGTS is conducted to verify that the Shield Building and the EGTS have the capabilities needed to keep LOCA generated activity releases from the affected reactor unit at or below limits specified in 10 CFR 100. Included in the scope of testing are functional tests on all system instrumentation, controls, and alarms. The tests are structured to accomplish the following:

6.2.3-22Test and Inspections WATTS BARWBNP-89 (1)Verification that Shield Building infiltration is less than or equal to the design value at the design negative pressure level for post-accident conditions.

(2)Verification of the system capability to establish and maintain the proper negative pressure level in the annulus.

(3)Verification that the air cleanup units meet requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52. Refer to Section 6.5.1.4.1 for further information related to tests applicable to the air cleanup units.

(4)Verification of proper operation of all system components, instrumentation, alarms, and data displays.The periodic test program for the EGTS fans and air cleanup units is described in the Technical Specifications. A periodic test is performed once every 18 months to verify that the EGTS can maintain the annulus at a negative pressure within the instrument deadband immediately above and below the nominal design value. This test also verifies that the Shield Building inleakage rate to the annulus is less than or equal to 250 cfm at the nominal design value. A verification of system flow capacity and Shield Building inleakage rates at the specified negative pressure is adequate to confirm that the calculated depressurization time is conservative. The EGTS fans start within 30 seconds following the initiation of a containment isolation phase A signal. 6.2.3.4.2 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)Preoperational testing of the ABGTS is conducted to verify that the ABGTS has the capabilities needed to reduce radioactive releases from the ABSCE to the environment during an accident to levels sufficiently low to keep the site boundary dose rates below the requirements of 10 CFR 100. Included in the test scope are functional tests on all system instrumentation, controls, and alarms. The tests are structured to accomplish the following:

(1)Verify the startup and control capabilities of the system, considering a single operating component failure.

(2)Verify the capability of the air flow control modules to create and maintain a negative pressure within the ABSCE.

(3)Verify that ABSCE infiltration is less than or equal to the design value at the design negative pressure level considering a postulated failure of a non-safety related component.

(4)Verify that the air cleanup units meet requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52. Refer to Section 6.5.1.4.2 for further information related to tests applicable to the air cleanup units.The periodic test program for the ABGTS fans and air cleanup units is described in the Technical Specifications. A periodic test is performed to verify that the ABGTS can maintain the ABSCE at a negative pressure between -0.25 and -0.5 inches of water with respect to atmospheric pressure. This test also verifies that the ABSCE inleakage Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-23WATTS BARWBNP-89rate is less than or equal to 7930 cfm while the ABSCE is being maintained at the negative pressure described above. A verification of system flow capacity and ABSCE inleakage rate at the specified negative pressure is adequate to confirm that the calculated depressurization time is conservative.6.2.3.5 Instrument ation Requirements 6.2.3.5.1 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)The air flow control instrumentation requirements for the EGTS are described in Section 6.2.3.2.2. Instrumentation associated with the air cleanup units is discussed in Section 6.5.1.5.1. The logic, controls, and instrumentation of this engineered safety feature system are such that a single failure of any component does not result in the loss of functional capability for the system.6.2.3.5.2 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)Instrumentation required for the air flow control modules and air cleanup units are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2.3. Instrumentation associated with the air cleanup units is discussed in Section 6.5.1.5.2. The logic, controls, and instrumentation of this engineered safety feature system are such that a single failure of any component does not result in the loss of functional capability for the system.

6.2.3-24Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BARWBNP-89Table 6.2.3-1 Dual Containment Characteristics (Page 1 of 2) I. Secondary Containment Design InformationShield Bldg.ABSCEA. Free Volume (ft 3)3.96 x 10 5 6.9 x 10 6B. Pressure (in. wg)#

Normal Operation Post-Accident-5.0-0.5-0.25-0.25C. Leak Rate at Post- Accident Pressure (%/day)91165.5D. Exhaust Fans Normal Operation Number Type Post-Accident Operation Number Type4 (2/reactor unit)*centrifugal 2***centrifugal 6**centrifugal 2****centrifugalE. Filters: Refer to Table 6.5-5 II. Transient AnalysisA. Initial Conditions

1. Pressure = 14.4 psig2. Annulus temperature = 50°F3. Outside air temperature = 0°F4. Thickness of secondary containment wall = 36 in.

5. Thickness of steel containment vessel = ranging from 0.8125 to 1.50 inches *Annulus vacuum control subsystem **Auxiliary Building general exhaust (2/unit) and fuel handling area exhaust (2)

• • • EGTS****ABGTS #Due to instrument locations and inaccuracies, the actual setpoints are more negative than therequired values shown.

Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-25WATTS BARWBNP-85 II. Transient A nalysis (continued)B. Thermal Characteristics1. Primary containment walla. Total expansion = 2000 ft 3 Pressure expansion = 766 ft 3 Temperature expansion = 1234 ft 3b. Thermal conductivity = 31 Btu/hr-ft-°Fc. Heat capacity = 0.111 Btu/lb-°F

2. Secondary containment wall

a. Thermal conductivity = 1.6 Btu/hr-ft-°Fb. Heat capacity = 0.22 Btu/lb-°F3. Heat transfer coefficients

a. Primary containment atmosphere to primary containment wall = 400 Btu/hr-ft 2-°Fb. Primary containment wall to secondary containment atmosphere = 0.19 (T)1/3 Btu/hr-ft 2-°Fc. Secondary containment wall to secondary containment atmosphere = 0.19 (T)1/3 Btu/hr-ft 2-°Fd. Primary containm ent emissivity = 0.90 e. Secondary containment emissivity = 0.90 Table 6.2.3-1 Dual Containment Characteristics (Page 2 of 2) 6.2.3-26Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Page 1 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS 1.EGTS ACU Fans (2)A-A & B-BDraws air from annulus to maintain negative pressure in the annulus during design basis eventsNo flow or low flow on one fanFan failure and/or dirty filtersLow flow alarm in the MCRLoss of flow through the affected EGTS trainMomentary reduction in exhaust from the annulusRedundant fan starts on low flow signal from failed fan and train. 2.EGTS ACU (2)

A-A & B-BFilter air to remove airborne particulates and vapors from the annulus of the affected reactor during design basis eventsFilters leakDefective filtersHigh radiation levels indicated in the MCR from shield building exhaust ventNone NoneHigh radiation levels are indicated in the MCR and the operator should start the redundant ACU. In addition, periodic testing of EGTS ACUs is conducted in accordance with R.G. 1.52 to verify leak tightness of HEPA and charcoal bank efficiencies. 3.Containment annulus vacuum fan isolation valves (4) 1-FCV-65-52 1-FCV-65-53 2-FCV-65-42-FCV-65-5 Isolate annulus vacuum control fans from EGTS during ACU operationOpenValve failureValve position indicating light in the MCR Lose one of two redundant valves in seriesNoneRedundant valve in series with failed valve provides

isolation function. 4.B train isolation valves (2) at EGTS Train A suction 1-FCV-65-8(for Unit 1)Provide decay heat removal cooling flow path for A-A ACU when B-B ACU is operating for Unit 1 (valve open by operator action)Open when ACU A-A is in operationOpen when ACU A-A is in stand-byValve failureValve failureValve position indicating light in the MCRValve position indicating light in the MCRParallel flow path to ACU A-A is openNegative pressure on ACU A-A by suction of ACU Fan B-B None NoneAdditional flow path is available which causes no adverse effect.Valve on Fan A-A discharge side (0-FCV-65-24) closes when ACU A-A is in standby and will prevent backflow.

Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-27WATTS BARWBNP-90 4.(Cont'd)Closed when by-pass cooling is requiredValve failureValve position indicating light in the

MCR See remarkNoneBypass cooling provision will not be used unless ACU fails and enough heat is generated by radioactivity which is collected on HEPA and charcoal adsorber to raise the charcoal bed temperature significantly.

Therefore, a second failed closed isolation valve need not be postulated. 4a.2-FCV-65-7(for Unit 2)Same as Item 4 except flow path is from Unit 2Same as Item 4Same as Item 4Same as Item 4Same as Item 4 except ACU A-A becomes ACU B-B and ACU B-B becomes ACU A-ASame as Item 4Same as Item 4 except A-A becomes B-B and valve on Fan B-B (0-FV-65-43) is

closed. 5.A train isolation valves (2) at EGTS Train B suction 1-FCV-65-51 (for Unit 1)Provide decay heat cooling path for B-B ACU when A-A ACU is operating for Unit 1 (valve open by operator action)Open when ACU B-B is in operationOpen when ACU B-B is in standbyClosed when bypass cooling is requiredValve failureValve failureValve failureValve position indicating light in the MCRValve position indicating light in the

MCRValve position indicating light in the MCRParallel flow path to ACU B-B is openNegative pressure on ACU B-B by suction of ACU Fan A-ASee remark on Item 4 None None NoneAdditional flow path is available which causes no adverse effect.Valve on Fan B-B discharge side (0-FCV 43) closes when ACU B-B is in standby and will prevent backflow.

Same as Item 4. 5a.2-FCV-65-50 *(for Unit 2)Same as Item 5 except flow path is from Unit 2Same as Item 5Same as Item 5Same as Item 5Same as Item 5 except ACU B-B becomes ACU A-A and ACU A-A becomes ACU B-BSame as Item 5Same as Item 5 except B-B becomes A-A and Valve 0-FCV-65-24 closes.*Valve 2-FCV-65-50 has been replaced with a steel plate to isolate Unit 1 operational boundary.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 2 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-28Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BARWBNP-85 6.Isolation valves (2) at EGTS Train A

suction 1-FCV-65-10 (for Unit 1)Isolation control valve. It opens on a containment isolation signal so that EGTS can exhaust air from the annulus of the affected unit. It also isolates Train A ACU during normal plant operation.Closed when ACU A-A is in operationClosed when both Trains A & B ACUs are in operationOpen when Train A ACU is in standbyValve failureValve failureValve failureLow flow alarm and valve position indicating light in MCRLow flow alarm and valve indicating light in MCRValve position indicating light in the

MCRMomentary decrease in flowMomentary decrease in flowOpen back flow path to ACU A-A None None NoneRedundant ACU Fan B-B starts on low flow signal from Fan A-A and Valve 1-FCV-65-30 or 2-FCV-65-29 opens. Fan starting signal is independent of valve failure.Train B ACU continues to operate with either Valve 1-FCV-65-30 or 2-FCV-65-29 open.Flow Control Valve 0-FCV-65-24 and Backdraft Damper 0-65-524 close when ACU A-A is in standby and will prevent back flow. 6a.2-FCV-65-9(for Unit 2)Same as Item 6 except flow path is from Unit 2 Same as Item 6 except A-A becomes B-BSame as Item 6Same as Item 6Same as Item 6NoneSame as Item 6 except A-A becomes B-B and Valve 0-FCV-65-43 and backdraft damper 0-65-523 close.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 3 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-29WATTS BARWBNP-85 7. Isolation valves (2) at EGTS Train A suction 1-FCV-65-30 (for Unit 1)Isolation control valve. It opens on a containment isolation signal so that EGTS can exhaust air from the annulus of the affected unit. It also isolates ACUs during normal plant operation.Closed when ACU B-B is in operationClosed when both Trains A & B ACUs are in operation.Open when Train B ACU is in standby.Valve failureValve failureValve failureLow flow alarm and valve position indicating in the MCRLow flow alarm and valve position indicating light in the

MCRValve position indicating light in the MCRMomentary decrease in flowMomentary decrease in flowOpen back flow path to ACU B-B None None NoneRedundant ACU Fan A-A starts on low flow signal from Fan B-B and Valve 1-FCV-65-10 or 2-FCV-65-9 opens. Fan starting signal is independent of valve failure.Train A ACU continues to operate with Valve 1-FCV-65-10 or 2-FCV-65-9 open.Flow Control Valve 0-FCV-65-43 closes when ACU B-B is in standby and will prevent backflow. 7a.2-FCV-65-29(For Unit 2)Same as Item 7 except flow path is from Unit 2 Same as Item 7 except B-B becomes A-ASame as Item 7Same as Item 7Same as Item 7NoneSame as Item 7 except B-B becomes A-A and Valve 0-FCV-65-24 closes. 8.EGTS fan isolation valves 0-FCV-65-240-FCV-65-43Isolates EGTS fan from duct distribution system when EGTS fan is on standbyClosed when EGTS fan is operatingValve failureLow flow alarm and valve position indicating light in the MCRLoss of flow through the affected EGTS

trainNoneRedundant fan starts on low flow signal from the affected train. Fan starting signal is independent of valve failure.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 4 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-30Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BARWBNP-90 9.Shield building exhaust isolation

dampers 1-FCO-65-261-FCO-65-27 (2-FCO-65-45)(2-FCO-65-46)Open air path for EGTS exhaust to be discharged to either shield building vent and recirculated air flow to either annulusOne damper is closed when EGTS fan is operatingDamper failure Damper position indicating light in the

MCRNoneNoneDamper in parallel flow path is open.10.EGTS inlet flow elements (2) 1-FE-65-54 *(2-FE-65-3)Senses flow to EGTS and records flow in MCRNo signalFlow element failureLow flow is recorded in MCRNone(see remark)NoneThese components are not required for accident mitigation. They are located in the system flow path to provide additional flow information to the operator. No control function.11.Annulus Recirc. & Shield building exhaust flow elements *1-FE-65-84 & 851-FE-65-78 & 79 (2-FE-65-84 & 85)(2-FE-65-78 & 79)Indicates air flow to outside or to the annulus ring header False signalFlow element failure Flow indication in the MCRNone(see remark)NoneThese components are not required for accident mitigation. They are located in the system flow path to provide additional flow information to the operator. No control function.*Flow elements 1-FE-65-54, -78, -84, and -85 have been abandoned in place; flow elements 1 & 2-FE-65-79 have been deleted; flow indicators 2-FI-65-78, -84, and -85 have been deleted, hence making their associated FEs non-functional. Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 5 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-31WATTS BARWBNP-9112. Back draft dampers (2) 0-65-5230-65-524Prevent backflow through Train A ACU when Train B ACU is in operationStuck closed when Train A ACU is in operation and Train B ACU is in standbyStuck closed when both Train A &

Train B ACUs are in operationSpring failureSpring failureLow flow alarm in MCR for Train A

ACULow flow alarm in MCR for Train A

ACUMomentary decrease in flow from annulus NoneNoneNoneRedundant ACU Fan B-B starts on low flow from Train A-A. Fan starting signal is independent of damper failure.Train B ACU continues to operate and Train A will be turned off by operator.13.Back draft dampers (2) 0-65-5250-65-526Prevent backflow through Train B ACU when Train A ACU is in operationStuck closed when Train B ACU is in operation and Train A ACU is in standbyStuck closed when both Train A &

Train B ACUs are in operationSpring failure Spring failureLow flow alarm in MCR for Train BLow flow alarm in MCR for Train BMomentary decrease in flow from annulus NoneNoneNoneRedundant ACU Fan A-A starts on low flow from Train B-B. Fan starting signal is independent of damper failure.Train A ACU continues to operate and Train B will be turned off by operator.14.Modulating dampers (8)1-PCO-65-801-PCO-65-82 1-PCO-65-881-PCO-65-89(2-PCO-65-80)

(2-PCO-65-82)(2-PCO-65-88)(2-PCO-65-89)Modulates EGTS flow released to outside atmosphere to control the annulus pressureClosed, open or improper modulation Damper failureDampers arming setpoint is not reached after 45.0 minutes from receipt of Phase A isolation signalPressure differential is indicated in MCRLoss of one of two redundant sets of dampersNoneRedundant set of modulating dampers in parallel flow path maintains the required

negative pressure in the annulus.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 6 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-32Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BARWBNP-9115.Isolation valves (8) 1-PCV-65-81 1-PCV-65-831-PCV-65-861-PCV-65-87 (2-PCV-65-81)(2-PCV-65-83)(2-PCV-65-86)

(2-PCV-65-87)Isolates EGTS ductwork from outside atmosphere and ring header during normal plant operationOne valve closed when EGTS is in operation Valve failureValve position indicating light in the

MCROne of the two parallel flow paths is

lost NoneRedundant flow path is available.16. Isolation valves (2) 0-FCV-65-28A0-FCV-65-28BValves open to remove decay heat in the idle train ACUOne valve opens when bypass cooling is not in operationOne valve closed when bypass cooling is in operationValve or instrument failureValve failureValve position indicating light in the MCRValve position indicating light in the MCRNone See remarkNoneNoneValve normally closed; fail-closed second valve in series maintains

isolation.Bypass cooling provision will not be used unless ACU fails and enough heat is generated by radioactivity collected on HEPA and charcoal adsorber to raise the charcoal bed temperature significantly. Therefore, a second failure (closed isolation valve) need not be considered.17.Isolation valves (2) 0-FCV-65-47A0-FCV-65-47BSame as Item 16Same as Item 16Same as Item 16Same as Item 16See remark on Item 16NoneSame as Item 16.18.Flow elements (2) 0-FS-65-31A/B0-FS-65-55A/B Opens decay heat removal isolation valves to the operating ACU when no flow is sensed at the idle ACUNo flow when decay heat removal cooling is requiredInstrument failureValve position indicating light in the MCRSee remark on Item 16NoneSame as Item 16.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 7 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-33WATTS BARWBNP-9119.Flow elements (2) 0-FS-65-31B/A 0-FS-65-55B/AStarts EGTS standby ACU unit upon loss of flow in normally operating ACU unitLoss of flow at the operating unitValve or instrument

failureRedundant ACU startsMomentary decrease in flow from annulusNoneRedundant ACU starts on low flow at the operating unit.20. Flow elements (2)0-FS-65-25A/B0-FS-65-44A/BShuts off relative humidity heater on low air flow and alarm in MCR Spurious signalFlow element failureLow flow and Hi-temperature alarms in the MCRHumidity heater may stay on after EGTS fan stopsNoneThe EGTS fan can be stopped either by operator action or fan failure, which is a single failure. The other EGTS fan is available to function. The heater is controlled by temperature switches; therefore, the spurious signal of the flow element has no effect.21.Flow elements (2)0-FS-65-25B/A 0-FS-65-44B/A Opens decay heat removal isolation valves on idle ACU when high flow is sensed at the operating unit No flow from decay heat removal cooling bypassValve or instrument

failureValve position indicating light in the

MCRSee remark on Item 16NoneSee remark on Item 16, except second failure of valve or instrument need not be considered.Table 6.2.3-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis EmergencyGas Treatment System (Continued) (Page 8 of 8)

COMPONENTIDENTIFICATIONFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIALCAUSE METHOD OFFAILUREDETECTIONEFFECT ONSYSTEM EFFECT ONPLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-34Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-90Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS1Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) signal Train ADeenergizes solenoid valves to close associated dampers and establish AB secondary containment enclosure; stops AB general ventilation fans; starts various ESF room coolers; starts ABGTS fans to maintain negative pressure in the ABSCE and remove contaminants from the ABSCE air prior to discharge to atmosphere.

Signal fails.Spurious signal.Train A vital ac bus failure; Relay VKA1 failure; Train A initiating signal (Phase A containment isolation, high rad in refueling area, high temp. in Aux. Building general supply duct) failure.Operator error, spurious initiating signal (initiating signals listed above).

MCR indication of only one train ABGTS fan starting and one train of ABSCE dampers closing.Loss of redundancy in ABSCE isolation and in ABGTS until operator starts Train A ABGTS manually from MCR, after ascertaining that Train B ABI

signal is not spurious.Unnecessary isolation of ABSCE and actuation of ABGTS.None.None.Train A and Train B ABI initiating signals are derived from independent (train-separated) qualified devices.

Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-35WATTS BAR WBNF-902Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) signal Train BDeenergizes solenoid valves to close associated dampers and establish AB secondary containment enclosure; stops AB general ventilation fans; starts various ESF room coolers; starts ABGTS fans to maintain negative pressure in ABSCE and remove contaminants from the ABSCE air prior to discharge to atmosphere.

Signal fails.Spurious signal.Train B vital ac bus failure; Relay VKB1 failure; Train B initiating signal (Phase A containment isolation, high rad in refueling area, high temp. in Aux. Building general supply duct) failure.Operator error, spurious initiating signal (initiating signals listed above).

MCR indication of only one train ABGTS fan starting and one train of ABSCE dampers

closing.Loss of redundancy in

ABSCE isolation and in ABGTS until operator starts Train B ABGTS manually from MCR, after ascertaining that Train A ABI

signal is not spurious.Unnecessary isolation of ABSCE and actuation of

ABGTS.None.None.Train A and Train B ABI initiating signals are derived from independent (train-separated) qualified devices.

Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-36Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-903ABGTS Exhaust Fan A-ADraws a portion of air in the ABSCE through an air cleanup unit (ACU) to remove radioactive contaminants and discharge into the shield building exhaust vent to maintain a negative pressure in the ABSCE relative to the outside.Fails to start or fails to run.Starts spuriously.Mechanical failure; Train A power failure; Train A ABI signal (HS in A-Auto).Spurious Train A ABI signal (HS in A-Auto); spurious low flow signal from Fan B-B after valid ABI signal (HS in P-Auto).

Indicating light in MCR.See "Remarks" column.Loss of redundancy in

ABGTS.Vacuum relief line dampers may open to prevent excessive negative pressure in ABSCE by admitting outside air.None. ABGTS Fan

B-B can perform the functions of maintaining the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants.

None.Handswitches for ABGTS Fans A-A and B-B in the MCR should normally be in the A-Auto position. On an ABI signal, both fans start and the operator may stop one fan and place its handswitch in the P-Auto (pull-out) position. This mode of operation is expected to occur after 30 minutes of two fan operation. During an ABI, the fan in the P-Auto mode will start automatically on insufficient negative pressure in the ABSCE relative to the outside. An alarm is provided for the condition when flow is inadequate 45 seconds after fan start.Status monitor light and ind. light in MCR provide indication to operator that fan is running. However, if only one ABGTS train starts when both fans are in A-Auto or if the fan in P-Auto starts, the operator cannot determine whether the signal is valid or spurious (no detection of spurious operation).

This is acceptable since there is no impact on plant safety without a second failure (e.g., failure of a vacuum relief damper).Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-37WATTS BAR WBNF-904ABGTS Exhaust Fan B-BDraws a portion of air in the ABSCE through an air cleanup unit (ACU) to remove radioactive contaminants and discharge into the shield building exhaust vent to maintain a negative pressure in the ABSCE relative to the outside.Fails to start or fails to run.Starts spuriously.Mechanical failure; Train B power failure; Train B ABI signal failure (HS in A-Auto).Spurious Train B ABI signal (HS in A-Auto); spurious low flow signal from Fan A-A after valid ABI signal (HS in P-Auto).

Indicating light in MCR.See "Remarks" column.Loss of redundancy in

ABGTS.Vacuum relief line damper/s may open to prevent excessive negative pressure in ABSCE by admitting outside air.None. ABGTS Fan

A-A can perform the functions of maintaining the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants.

None.Handswitches for ABGTS Fans A-A and B-B, in the MCR should normally be in the A-Auto position. On an ABI signal, both fans start and the operator may stop one fan and place its handswitch in the P-Auto (pull-out) position. This mode of operation is expected to occur after 30 minutes of two fan operation. During an ABI, the fan in the P-Auto mode will start automatically on insufficient negative pressure in the ABSCE relative to the outside. An alarm is provided for the condition when flow is inadequate 45 seconds after fan start.Status monitor light and ind. light in MCR provide indication to operator that fan is running. However, if only one ABGTS train starts when both fans are in A-Auto or if the fan in P-Auto starts, the operator cannot determine whether the signal is valid or spurious (no detection of spurious operation).

This is acceptable since there is no impact on plant safety without a second failure (e.g., failure of a vacuum relief damper).Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-38Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-905ABGTS Fan A-A Inlet Damper 1-FCO-30-146BProvides flowpath for ABGTS Exhaust Fan

A-A.Fails to open or stuck closed.Mechanical failure.Loss of redundancy in

ABGTS.None. ABGTS Fan

B-B can perform the functions of maintaining the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants.ABGTS Fan A-A Inlet and Outlet Dampers 1-FCO-30-146A and 1-FCO-30-146B open on starting of associated fan and close when the fan stops.Spurious opening of Dampers 1-FCO-30-146A and 1-FCO-30-146B when Fan A-A is not running is possible due to a short circuit in control wiring.

However, it is not listed as a failure mode since the exhaust ducting of the two fans is not directly connected, making it very unlikely that a non-running fan would rotate in reverse due to spurious opening of its dampers.6ABGTS Fan A-A Outlet Damper 1-FCO-30-146AProvides flowpath for ABGTS Exhaust Fan A-A.Fails to open or stuck closed.Mechanical failure.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS.None.ABGTS Fan B-B can perform the functions of maintaining

the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants. ABGTS Fan A-A Inlet and Outlet Dampers 1-FCO-30-146A and 1-FCO-30-146B open on starting of associated fan and close when the fan stops.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-39WATTS BAR WBNF-907ABGTS Fan B-B Inlet Damper 2-FCO-30-157BProvides flowpath for ABGTS Exhaust Fan

B-B.Fails to open or stuck closed.Mechanical failure.Loss of redundancy in

ABGTS.None. ABGTS Fan

A-A can perform the functions of maintaining the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants.ABGTS Fan B-B Inlet and Outlet Dampers 2-FCO-30-157A and 2-FCO-30-157B open on starting of associated fan and close when the fan stops.Spurious opening of Dampers 2-FCO-30-157A and 2-FCO-30-157B when Fan B-B is not running is possible due to a short circuit in control wiring.

However, it is not listed as a failure mode since the exhaust ducting of the two fans is not directly connected, making it very unlikely that a non-running fan would rotate in reverse due to spurious opening of its dampers.8ABGTS Fan B-B Outlet Damper 2-FCO-30-157AProvides flowpath for ABGTS Exhaust Fan B-B.Fails to open or stuck closed.Mechanical failure.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS.None. ABGTS Fan A-A can perform the functions of maintaining

the ABSCE at a negative pressure and removing contaminants.ABGTS Fan B-B Inlet and Outlet Dampers 2-FCO-30-157A and 2-FCO-30-157B open on starting of associated fan and close when the fan stops.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-40Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-909Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-137 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan A-A and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan

A-A.None. Train B Damper 0-FCO-30-138 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-137) and Train B (0-FCO-30-138) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.10Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-138 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan A-A and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan

A-A.None. Train A Damper 0-FCO-30-137 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-137) and Train B (0-FCO-30-138) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-41WATTS BAR WBNF-9011Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-140 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan

B-B.None. Train B Damper 0-FCO-30-141 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-140) and Train B (0-FCO-30-141) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.12Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-141 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan

B-B.None. Train A Damper 0-FCO-30-140 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-140) and Train B (0-FCO-30-141) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-42Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9013Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-21 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 2A-A and 2B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 2 side of

AB.None. Train B Damper 2-FCO-30-22 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-21) and Train B (2-FCO-30-22) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.14Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-22 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 2A-A and 2B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 2 side of

AB.None. Train A Damper 2-FCO-30-21 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-21) and Train B (2-FCO-30-22) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-43WATTS BAR WBNF-9015Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-86 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 1A-A and 1B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 1 side of

AB.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-30-87 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-86) and Train B (1-FCO-30-87) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.16Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-87 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 1A-A and 1B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 1 side of

AB.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-30-86 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-86) and Train B (1-FCO-30-87) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-44Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9017Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-106 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 1A-A and 1B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 1 side of

AB.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-30-107 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-106) and Train B (1-FCO-30-107) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.18Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-107 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 1A-A and 1B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 1 side of

AB.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-30-106 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-106) and Train B (1-FCO-30-107) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-45WATTS BAR WBNF-9019Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-108 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 2A-A and 2B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 2 side of

AB.None. Train B Damper 2-FCO-30-109 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-108) and Train B (2-FCO-30-109) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.20Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-109 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Supply Fans 2A-A and 2B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of part of ductwork on Unit 2 side of

AB.None. Train A Damper 2-FCO-30-108 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-108) and Train B (2-FCO-30-109) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-46Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9021Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-160 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1A-A suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1A-A.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-30-161 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-160) and Train B (1-FCO-30-161) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.22Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-161 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1A-A suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1A-A.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-30-160 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train B (1-FCO-30-160) and Train B (1-FCO-30-161) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-47WATTS BAR WBNF-9023Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-166 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1B-B suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1B-B.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-30-167 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-30-166) and Train B (1-FCO-30-167) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.24Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-167 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 1B-B suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB

Gen Exhaust Fan 1B-B.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-30-166 provides isolation and maintains the

ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train B (1-FCO-30-166) and Train B (1-FCO-30-167) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-48Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9025Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-271 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2A-A suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2A-A.None. Train B Damper 2-FCO-30-272 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-271) and Train B (2-FCO-30-272) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.26Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-272 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2A-A suction and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2A-A.None. Train A Damper 2-FCO-30-271 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCO-30-271) and Train B (2-FCO-30-272) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-49WATTS BAR WBNF-9027Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-275 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2B-B suction and Exhaust Fan B-B and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2B-B.None. Train B Damper 2-FCO-30-276 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCV-30-275) and Train B (2-FCV-30-276) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.28Isolation Damper 2-FCO-30-276 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2B-B suction area and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of AB Gen Exhaust Fan 2B-B.None. Train A Damper 2-FCO-30-275 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (2-FCV-30-275) and Train B (2-FCV-30-276) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-50Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9029Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-294 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Purge Air Supply Fan inlet duct and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Purge Air Supply Fan inlet duct.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-30-295 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCV-30-294) and Train B (1-FCV-30-295) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.30Isolation Damper 1-FCO-30-295 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate Purge Air Supply Fan inlet duct and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of Purge Air Supply Fan inlet duct.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-30-294 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCV-30-294) and Train B (1-FCV-30-295) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-51WATTS BAR WBNF-9031Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-122 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate the cask loading area exhaust and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of cask loading area exhaust.None. Train B Damper 0-FCO-30-123 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-122) and Train B (0-FCO-30-123) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.32Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-123 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate the cask loading area exhaust and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of cask loading area exhaust.None. Train A Damper 0-FCO-30-122 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-122) and Train B (0-FCO-30-123) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-52Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9033Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-129 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate the cask loading area supply and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of cask loading area supply.None. Train B Damper 0-FCO-30-130 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-129) and Train B (0-FCO-30-130) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.34Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-130 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate the cask loading area supply and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of cask loading area supply.None. Train A Damper 0-FCO-30-129 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-30-129) and Train B (0-FCO-30-130) dampers, in series, are provided with non-safety control air and both dampers fail closed on loss of control air. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.Table 6.2.3-3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-53WATTS BAR WBNF-90Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS35Isolation Damper 0-FCO-31-350 Train ACloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal to isolate PASF outside air intake and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of PASF outside air intake. None. Train B Damper 0-FCO-31-365 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCO-31-350) and Train B (0-FCO-31-365) dampers are in series. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.36Isolation Damper 0-FCO-31-365 Train BCloses on ABI or high radin refueling area signal to isolate PASF outside airintake and to establish boundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of PASF outside air intake.None. Train A Damper 0-FCO-31-350 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (0-FCV-31-350) and Train B (0-FCV-31-365) dampers are in series. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE mitigation.37Isolation Damper 1-FCO-31-342 Train ACloses on ABI or high radin refueling area signal

toisolate PASF Room No. 1 exhaust and to establishboundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train A ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of PASF Room No. 1 exhaust.None. Train B Damper 1-FCO-31-343 provides isolation and maintains the

ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train A 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-31-342) and Train B (1-FCO-31-343) dampers are in series. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.

6.2.3-54Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9038Isolation Damper 1-FCO-31-343 Train BCloses on ABI or high rad in refueling area signal toisolate PASF Room No.

1 exhaust and to establishboundary for ABGTS.Stuck open, fails to close, or spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; hot short in control wiring; Train B ABI or high rad in refueling area signal failure; HS failure to spring return from open to A-Auto.Status monitor light and indicating light in MCR.Loss of redundancy in isolation of PASF Room No. 1 exhaust.None. Train A Damper 1-FCO-31-342 provides isolation and maintains the ABSCE.Damper fails closed on loss of Train B 125 Vdc power. Train A (1-FCO-31-342) and Train B (1-FCO-31-343) dampers are in series. Independence of Train A and Train B isolation signals is discussed in "Remarks" under Items 1 and 2 of this table.Damper failure to open is not listed since the damper has no safety function to open for DBE

mitigation.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-55WATTS BAR WBNF-9039Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-149 Train ARegulates the amount of outside air to maintain ABSCE at negative pressure.Allows more outside air than required (stuck open or spuriously excessive opening).Does not allow the required amount of outside air (stuck closed or spurious inadequate opening).Train A vital ac power failure; Train A aux.

control air failure; spurious high dP signal; failure of E/I or I/P converter; positioner mechanical failure.Train A vital ac power failure; Train A aux. control air failure; spurious low dP signal from 0-FCO-30-149; failure of E/I or I/P converter; positioner mechanical failure."Hi Press. in Aux. Bldg." alarm.See "Remarks" column.None. Train B Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-148 will open to allow sufficient outside air to control the negative pressure.None. See "Remarks" column.None.ABI signal stops AB gen supply fans automatically. The Aux. Bldg.

is designed for minimum leakage and, with at least one ABGTS exhaust fan running, failure of the modulating damper can cause pressure in the Aux. Bldg. to approach outside pressure, but the AB pressure cannot become positive with respect to the outside. The DPIS used for alarm in the control room is separate and independent from the DPIS used for modulating control of the damper. If the (non-safety) alarm functions, the operator can either close the associated Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-280 or, if only

one ABGTS exhaust fan is in operation, can start the redundant fan to maintain negative pressure.Modulating Dampers 0-FCO-30-148 and 0-FCO-30-149 are provided with train-separated, safety-grade auxiliary control air.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-56Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9040Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-148 Train BRegulates the amount of outside air to maintain ABSCE at negative pressure.Allows more outside air than required (stuck open or spuriously excessive opening).Does not allow the required amount of outside air (stuck closed or spurious inadequate opening).Train B vital ac power failure; Train B aux.

control air failure; spurious high dP signal; failure of E/I or I/P converter; positioner mechanical failure.Train B vital ac power failure; Train B aux.

control air failure; spurious low dP signal from 0-FCO-30-149; failure of E/I or I/P converter; positioner mechanical failure."Hi Press. in Aux. Bldg." alarm.See "Remarks" column.None. Train A Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-149 will open to allow sufficient outside air to control the negative pressure.None. See "Remarks" column.None.ABI signal stops AB gen supply fans automatically. The Aux. Bldg.

is designed for minimum leakage and, with no air coming in and with at least one ABGTS exhaust fan running, failure of the modulating damper can cause pressure in the Aux. Bldg. to approach outside pressure, but the AB pressure cannot become positive with respect to the outside. The DPIS used for alarm in the control room is separate and independent from the DPIS used for modulating control of the damper. If the (non-safety) alarm functions, the operator can either close the associated Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-279 or, if only one ABGTS exhaust fan is in operation, can start the redundant fan to maintain negative pressure.Modulating Dampers 0-FCO-30-148 and 0-FCO-30-149 are provided with train-separated, safety-grade auxiliary control air. Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-57WATTS BAR WBNF-9041ABGTS Vacuum Relief Line Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-280 Train AProvides flow path for outside air.Fails to open, stuck closed, or spuriously closes.Fails to close, stuck open, or

spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; Train A power failure; Train A aux. control air failure; operator error (HS in wrong position).Mechanical failure; operator error (HS in wrong position).

Indicating light in MCR.Indicating light in MCR.Aux. Bldg. at more negative pressure (lower absolute pressure) than required to prevent leakage from outside.None. Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-149 can independently control amount of outside air.None. See "Remarks" column.None.Dampers 0-FCO-30-279 and 0-FCO-30-280 are provided with train-separated, safety-grade auxiliary control air. In addition, there are two vacuum breaker dampers, 0-DMP-30-1128 and 0-DMP-30-1129 in series which will admit outside air into the Bldg in case of increasing vacuum.42ABGTS Vacuum Relief Line Isolation Damper 0-FCO-30-279 Train BProvides flow path for outside air.Fails to open, stuck closed, or spuriously closes.Fails to close, stuck open, or

spuriously opens.Mechanical failure; Train B power failure; Train B aux. control air failure; operator error (HS in wrong position).Mechanical failure; operator error (HS in wrong position).Ind. light in MCR.

Indicating light in MCR.Aux. Bldg. at more negative pressure (lower absolute pressure) than required to prevent leakage from outside.None. Modulating Damper 0-FCO-30-148 can independently control amount of outside air.None. See "Remarks" column.None.Dampers 0-FCO-30-279 and 0-FCO-30-280 are provided with train-separated, safety-grade auxiliary control air. In addition, there are two vacuum breaker dampers, 0-DMP-30-1128 and 0-DMP-30-1129 in series which will admit outside air into the Bldg in case of increasing vacuum.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-58Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9043Train A Emergency

PowerProvides Class 1E diesel-backed power supply to active components of Train A of ABGTS.Loss of or inadequate voltage.Diesel generator failure; bus fault (Train A); operator error.Alarm and indication in MCR.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS exhaust flow paths.None. Redundant Train B exhaust fan can maintain required negative pressure.Train A isolation dampers are not directly affected since damper solenoids and control circuits are supplied either battery power or battery-backed vital ac power.

Loss of power to the damper control circuits does not result in loss of redundancy since circuits are such that isolation dampers fail closed.44Train B Emergency

PowerProvides Class 1E diesel-backed power supply to active components of Train B of ABGTS.Loss of or inadequate voltage.Diesel generator failure; bus fault (Train B); operator error.Alarm and indication in MCR.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS exhaust flow paths.None. Redundant Train A exhaust fan can maintain required negative pressure.Train B isolation dampers are not directly affected since damper solenoids and control circuits are supplied either battery power or battery-backed vital ac power.

Loss of power to the damper control circuits does not result in loss of redundancy since circuits are such that isolation dampers fail closed.45Fire Dampers 0-ISV-31-3834 and 0-ISV-31-3845Provide air flow path for common duct between ABGTS fans.Spurious closure.Failure of fusible link.Low flow alarm.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS. Low flow on 2-FS-30-157 will automatically start ABGTS Fan A-A if not running.None.Spurious closure of either or both has the same effect.46Deluge SystemFloods the carbon adsorbers in event of fire.Spurious actuation.Failure of fusible link.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS. Opposite train ABGTS fan is independent and remains available.

None.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Instrumentation Requirements 6.2.3-59WATTS BAR WBNF-9047Ductwork in the ABSCEProvides containment for air flow path.Leakage.Cracks.Minimal localized reduction of negative pressure.None.Only small cracks are postulated due to seismic qualification.

Minimal localized reduction of negative pressure will not affect the ABSCE.Loss of fluid (air) is not a concern since the system is submerged in

the same fluid.48ABGTS Air Cleanup Unit A

HeaterControls humidity of exhaust air.Fails to turn on or fails to operate.Train A power failure; temperature sensing error.Hi rad alarm in MCR for air to Shield Bldg. vent.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS. Failure of heater will allow humid air into carbon filter reducing its efficiency (see "Remark #2").None.1. Failure to cutout is not considered in this table since this is the safe position for controlling air humidity.2. Heater operation is tested every 31 days per procedure.49ABGTS Air Cleanup Unit B HeaterControls humidity of exhaust air.Fails to turn on or fails to operate.Train B power failure; temperature sensing error.Hi rad alarm in MCR for air to Shield Bldg. vent.Loss of redundancy in ABGTS. Failure of heater will allow humid air into carbon filter reducing its efficiency (see "Remark #2").None.1. Failure to cutout is not considered in this table since this is the safe position for controlling air humidity.2. Heater operation is tested every 31 days per procedure.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS 6.2.3-60Instrumentation Requirements WATTS BAR WBNF-9050Aux. Bldg. vacuum relief damper 0-DMP-30-1128Provides flow path for outside air.Fails to open; stuck closed.Fails to close; stuck open.Mechanical FailureMechanical FailureVisualVisual Aux. Bldg at more negative press. (lower absolute press.) than req'd to prevent leakage to outside.None. Vacuum relief damper 0-DMP-30-1129

can close independently and eliminate flow path from outside air.

None.None. See Remarks.This damper will only be used in the event that isolation damper 0-DMP-30-279 and 0-DMP-30-280 fail close. Therefore, for this damper to fail close, and one of the isolation dampers to fail close at the same time would consititute a double failure.Vacuum relief dampers 0-DMP-30-1128 and 0-DMP-30-1129 are installed in series.51Aux. Bldg. vacuum relief damper 0-DMP-30-1129Provides flow path for outside air.Fails to open; stuck closed.Fails to close; stuck open.Mechanical FailureMechanical FailureVisualVisual Aux. Bldg. at more negative press. (lower absolute press.) than req'd to prevent leakage to outside.None. Vacuum relief damper 0-DMP-30-1128

can close independently and eliminate flow path from outside air.

None.None. See Remarks.This damper will only be used in the event that isolation damper 0-DMP-30-279 and 0-DMP-30-280 fail close. Therefore, for this damper to fail close, and one of the isolation dampers to fail close at the same time would consititute a double failure.Vacuum relief damper 0-DMP-30-1128 and 0-DMP-30-1129 are installed in series.Table 6.2.3-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the ABGTS (Continued)ITEM NO.COMPONENTFUNCTIONFAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL CAUSEMETHOD OFDETECTIONEFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT ON PLANTREMARKS Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-61WATTS BAR WBNP-90Figure 6.2.3-1 Typical Mechanical Penetration Seaks

Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-62WATTS BAR WBNF-90Figure 6.2.3-2 Typical Purge Penetration Arrangement Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-63WATTS BAR WBNP-28Figure 6.2.3-3 Typical Electrical Penetrations Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-64WATTS BAR WBNP-28Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-4 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-65WATTS BAR WBNP-49Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-5 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-66WATTS BAR WBNP-52Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-6 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-67WATTS BAR WBNP-52Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-7 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-68WATTS BAR WBNP-52Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-8 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-69WATTS BAR WBNP-52Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-9 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-70WATTS BAR WBNP-52Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-10 Auxiliary Building Isolation Barrier Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-71WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.3-11 Reactor Building - Units 1 & 2 Flow Diagram - Heating and Ventilation Air Flow Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-72WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.3-12 Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Electrical Logic Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment System Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-73WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.3-13 Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Electrical Logic Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-74WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.3-14 Powerhouse Unit 1 Electrical Logic Diagram -Emergency Gas Treatment Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-75WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.3-15 Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Electrical Control Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment System Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-76WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.3-15-SH-A Powerhouse Unit 2 Electrical Control Diagram - Emergency Gas Treatment Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-77WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.3-16 Powerhouse Units 1 & 2 Auxiliary Building -Flow Diagram -Heating &Ventilating Air Flow Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-78WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.3-17 Post-Accident Annulus Pressure and Reactor Unit Vent Flow Rate Transients Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-79WATTS BAR WBNP-91Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-18 Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Heating and Ventilating Secondary Containment Functional Design6.2.3-80WATTS BAR WBNP-91Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10CFR2.390Figure 6.2.3-19 Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Heating and Ventilating Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-1WATTS BARWBNP-856.2.4 Containment Isolation SystemsThe containment isolation systems provide the means of isolating fluid systems that pass through containment penetrations so as to confine to the containment any radioactivity that may be released in the containment following a design basis event. The containment isolation systems are required to function following any design basis event that initiates a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation signal or releases radioactive materials into containment to isolate non-safety-related fluid systems penetrating the containment. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant does not have a particular system for containment isolation, but isolation design is achieved by applying common criteria to penetrations in many different fluid systems and by using ESF signals to actuate appropriate valves.6.2.4.1 Design BasesThe main function of the containment isolation system is to provide containment integrity when needed. Containment integrity is defined to exist when:

(1)The nonautomatic containment isolation valves and blind flanges are closed as required.

(2)The containment equipment hatch is properly closed.

(3)At least one door in each containment personnel air lock is properly closed.

(4)All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or are deactivated in the closed position or at least one valve in each line having an inoperable valve is closed.

(5)All requirements of the Technical Specification with regard to containment leakage and test frequency are satisfied.Containment integrity is required if there is fuel in the reactor which has been used for power operation, except when the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition with the reactor vessel head installed, or when the reactor is in the refueling shutdown condition with the reactor vessel head removed. Containment isolation is not essential for design basis events, such as HELBs, outside containment which do not release radioactive materials into containment. The failure of containment isolation valves for such an event would not result in the release of radioactive fluids from inside containment.In general, the containment isolation system is designed to the requirements of General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. The following are alternate containment isolation provisions for certain classes of lines:

(1)Fluid instrument lines penetrating the containment are designed to meet the referenced General Design Criteria except for the pressure sensor and reactor vessel level instrumentation system lines. Instrument lines which penetrate containment are listed in Table 6.2.4-4.

6.2.4-2Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85 (2)Remote-manual valves are used for isolation provisions on certain lines associated with engineered safety features (such as the ECCS) instead of automatic isolation valves.

(3)A closed system outside the containment is acceptable as one of the two isolation barriers if designed to the following criteria: (a)Does not communicate with the outside environment (b)Meets Safety Class 2 design requirements (c)Withstands the internal temperatures and pressures which occur as a result of the containment design basis events (d)Withstands loss-of-coolant accident transients and environment (e)Meets Seismic Category I design requirements (f)Protected against missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement.

(4)The isolation function of an engineered safety feature or system required to test an engineered safety feature requires one barrier to remain functional after the occurrence of a single active failure. Normally, this is accomplished by providing two isolation valves in series. If it can be shown that a single active failure can be accommodated with only one valve in the line and that fluid system reliability is enhanced by having one valve rather than two valves in series, then one valve and a closed system both located outside of the containment are acceptable. The single valve and piping between the containment and the valve are enclosed in a protective leaktight housing to prevent leakage to the atmosphere in the event of external leakage.

(5)Relief valves may be used as isolation valves in the backflow direction.The criteria for the number and location of containment isolation valves in each fluid system depend on the valves functions and whether they are open or closed to the containment atmosphere or reactor coolant system. Four isolation classes of fluid system penetrations are defined as follows:

(1)Isolation Class I - Fluid lines which are open to the atmosphere outside the containment and are connected to the reactor coolant system or are open to the containment atmosphere. Each isolation Class I system has a minimum of two isolation valves in series. Where system design permits, one valve is located inside and one valve is located outside containment.

(2)Isolation Class II - Fluid lines which are connected to a closed system outside the containment and are connected to the reactor coolant system or are open to the containment atmosphere. Also included in isolation Class II are fluid lines which are open to the atmosphere outside the containment and are Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-3WATTS BARWBNP-85separated from the reactor coolant system and the containment atmosphere by a closed system inside the containment. Each isolation Class II system has, as a minimum, one isolation valve.

(3)Isolation Class III - Fluid lines which are connected to a closed system both inside and outside the containment. Isolation Class III systems have, as a minimum, one isolation valve.

(4)Isolation Class IV - Fluid lines which must remain in service subsequent to a design basis event, such as lines serving ESF systems. Isolation valves on these lines are not automatically closed by the containment isolation signal. Each isolation Class IV system has, as a minimum, one isolation valve (remote-manual operation).The following design requirements for containment isolation barriers apply:

(1)The design pressure of all piping and connected equipment comprising the isolation boundary is equal to or greater than the design pressure of the containment.

(2)All valves and equipment which are considered to be isolation barriers and designed in accordance with Seismic Category I criteria shall be protected against missiles and jet impingement, both inside and outside the containment.

(3)All valves and equipment which are considered to be isolation barriers are designed, as a minimum, to ASME Section III Class 2 requirements except as noted in Item 1 of Section 6.2.4.2.1.

(4)A system is closed inside the containment if it meets all of the following: (a)It does not communicate with either the reactor coolant system or the reactor containment atmosphere.(b)It will withstand external pressure and temperature equal to containment design pressure and temperature.(c)It will withstand accident temperature, pressure, and fluid velocity transients, and the resulting environment, including internal thermal expansion.(d)It is protected against missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement.

(5)A check valve inside the containment on the incoming line is considered an automatic isolation valve.

(6)A pressure relief valve that relieves toward the inside of the containment is considered an automatic isolation valve.

(7)A locked closed valve is considered an automatic isolation valve.

6.2.4-4Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85 (8)To qualify as an automatic isolation valve, an air-operated valve must fail closed on loss of air, power, etc.

(9)All valves used for containment isolation will be capable of tight shutoff against gas leakage at containment design pressure.The design bases for the containment isolation system include provision for the following:

(1)A double barrier at the containment penetration in those fluid systems that are not required to function following a design basis event.

(2)Automatic, fast, efficient closure of those valves required to close for containment integrity following a design bases event to minimize release of any radioactive material.

(3)A means of leak testing barriers in fluid systems that serve as containment isolation.

(4)The capability to periodically test the operability of containment isolation valves.6.2.4.2 System DesignThe containment isolation system meets the design bases presented in Section 6.2.4.1 with the exception of those cases which are discussed in detail in Section 6.2.4.3.Containment isolation can be initiated by either Phase A or Phase B signals.A Phase A signal is generated by either of the following:

(1)Manual - either of two momentary controls (2)A safety injection signal, generated by one or more of the following: (a)Low steamline pressure in any steamline (b)Low pressurizer pressure (c)High containment pressure (d)Manual - either of two momentary controls.A Phase B signal is generated by either of the following:

(1)Manual - two sets (two switches per set) - actuation of both switches is necessary in either set for spray initiation (2)High-high containment pressure.

Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-5WATTS BARWBNP-85Containment isolation Phase A always exists if containment isolation Phase B exists, when the Phase B signal is initiated by automatic instrumentation. Phase A containment isolation does not occur when the Phase B signal is initiated manually. The instrumentation circuits that generate both Phase A and Phase B signals are described in Chapter 7.The containment isolation system provides for automatic, fast, and efficient closure of those valves required to close for containment integrity following a design basis event to minimize the release of any radioactive material. Closure times for isolation valves are included in Table 6.2.4-1.6.2.4.2.1 Design RequirementsContainment isolation barrier design includes the following requirements:

(1)As a minimum, containment barriers are designed to ASME Section III Class 2 requirements. This design meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the containment isolation systems, except that the four auxiliary feedwater lines incorporate safety-grade Quality Group C (ASME Section III, Class 3) valves outside containment for isolation. This has been documented in NUREG 0847 as acceptable to the NRC. All valves and equipment which are considered to be isolation barriers are designed to Seismic Category I requirements which is the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.29.(2)All isolation barriers either inside or outside of the containment are protected against missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement during a LOCA.

(3)All power operated isolation valves are tested for operability by the manufacturer and preoperationally after installation. Those automatic isolation valves with air or motor operators that do not restrict normal plant operation are periodically tested to ensure operability.Additional design information is included in Table 6.2.4-1.6.2.4.2.2 Containment Isolation OperationA containment isolation signal initiates closing of automatic isolation valves in those lines which must be isolated immediately following a design basis event. The containment isolation valves will close within the time specified in Table 6.2.4-1. However, on loss of ac power, the diesel will have to be started prior to closure. It is estimated that the time required to start the diesel is 10 seconds. The logic diagram for this system is shown in Figure 6.2.4-21.Check valves are used under conditions where differential pressure will close the valves to maintain containment integrity. Lines which, for safety reasons, must remain in service subsequent to a design basis event are provided with at least one isolation valve.

6.2.4-6Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85Each automatic isolation valve required to operate subsequent to an accident is additionally provided with a manual control switch for operation. The position of these automatic isolation valves is indicated by status lights in the main control room. Primary and secondary modes of valve actuation are shown in Table 6.2.4-1.Redundant isolation barriers are used to prevent any single failure from causing an open path from the containment. If two power operated valves are used in series in a line for isolation purposes, one valve is supplied with one train of control and power and the other valve is supplied by the other train. Redundancy in power, signals, and barriers is provided to assume isolation.Provisions for detecting leakage from remote manually controlled systems (such an the ECCS) include the use of pressure and flow meters, and inspection of the systems during normal plant operation. Details for leak detection are given in the appropriate system descriptions. Piping systems penetrating the containment have been provided with test vents and test connections or have other provisions to allow periodic leak testing (see Section 6.2.6).The manufacturers of isolation system components perform tests to demonstrate the ability of mechanical and electrical components located inside the containment to perform as required in the containment environment following the design basis accident. Accident conditions which are considered in the design of isolation components are pressure, humidity, radiation, and temperature. Section 3.11 gives information concerning the environmental conditions used in the design of the containment isolation system including more detail on qualification testing of ESF components.The description and design requirements for the instrumentation and control portions of the containment isolation system are discussed in Chapter 7.6.2.4.2.3 Penetration DesignThe penetrations are classified into 24 different types. These are shown in Figures 6.2.4-1 through 6.2.4-17E.The locations of these penetrations through the steel containment and the Shield Building are shown in Figures 6.2.4-18 and 6.2.4-19, respectively. The penetrations are tabulated in Table 6.2.4-1. The different types of penetrations are discussed below and the various possible leakage paths, as tabulated in Table 6.2.4-1 and shown in Figure 6.2.4-20, are also described below.Penetration Types I and II - Main Steam and FeedwaterThe main steam and feedwater line penetrations, shown in Figures 6.2.4-1 and 6.2.4-2, are the "hot" type in which the penetrations must accommodate thermal movement. Each "hot" process line where it passes through the containment penetration is enclosed in a guard pipe that is attached to the process line through a multiple fluid fitting. The guard pipe protects the bellows should the process line fail within the annulus between the containment vessel and the Shield Building, thereby precluding the discharge of fluids into the annulus. The inner end of the guard pipe is Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-7WATTS BARWBNP-85fitted with an impingement ring which protects the bellows from jets originating from pipe breaks inside containment. In addition, the guard pipe for this type of penetration extends through and is supported by the crane wall. This avoids transmitting, loads to the containment vessel. Also, in the event of a pipe rupture it discharges fluid into the reactor compartment rather than smaller rooms outside the crane wall, thus preventing, overpressurization of these smaller rooms.For each of these penetrations the penetration sleeve is welded to the containment vessel. The process line which passes through the penetration is allowed to move both axially and laterally. A two-ply bellows expansion joint is provided to accommodate any movement between the containment vessel and the Shield Building, under any conditions. The bellows is designed to withstand containment design pressure. When an embedded anchor is not utilized, a low-pressure flexible closure will seal the process line to the sleeve in the Shield Building, which will not impose significant stress on the penetration.The flexible closure described above is located outdoors and serves to contain any leakage from the fluid head so that the leakage is routed back to the annulus, and to seal the annulus from the outdoors.Guides and anchors limit movement of pipes such that design limits on the containment penetration and bellows are not exceeded during all conditions of plant operation, test, or postulated accidents.Penetration Type III - Residual Heat Removal Pump Supply and ReturnThe RHR pump supply and return penetrations, shown in Figure 6.2.4-3, are also the "hot" type. For these penetrations, the guard pipe does not penetrate the crane wall.

This type of penetration is anchored at the Shield Building wall in addition to being supported from the internal concrete structure to minimize loads transmitted to the steel containment vessel.The Shield Building sleeves have embedded anchors and the fluid heads are in the Auxiliary Building. There is no need for low-pressure flexible closures as used in penetrations types I and II, since any leakage from the fluid head will be processed by the auxiliary building gas treatment system. Penetration Types IV and VTypes IV and V penetrations are also thermally "hot" with insulation and bellows, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-4. Any leakage through the fluid heads or through the bellow will be into the annulus and thereby processed by the emergency gas treatment system. The two types differ by only the weld ends.Penetration Types VI, VII, and VIIIPenetrations types VI through X and XIII through XVIII are "cold" penetrations.For "cold" piping penetrations, a low-pressure flexible closure will seal the cold pipe to the sleeve penetrating the Shield Building. The piping configuration and supports on 6.2.4-8Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85either side of the penetration will be designed to preclude overstressing the containment vessel at the penetration under any conditions, including postulated accidents.Relatively small thermal movement or stress is expected for the "cold" penetrations. The clearance space provided for the pipe going through the Shield Building wall is computed by the summation of the relative movements of the pipe and the Shield Building for all design conditions. Ample clearance space is provided so that the pipe will not be in contact with the Shield Building sleeve under any condition.Penetration types VI and VII have provisions for dissimilar metal welding. The two types differ in their weld ends only. Penetration types VI and VII are illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-5. The fluid heads of both types are located in the annulus.Penetration type VIII is similar to that of penetrations types VI and VII, except that there is no dissimilar metal weld. Penetration type VIII is illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-6.Penetration Type IX Containment Spray and RHR Spray HeadersThere is no difference between penetration types VIII and IX except that penetration type IX is located at the dome. Penetration type IX is illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-7. The flued heads are located in the annulus.Penetration Type X - Multiple Line SleevesType X penetrations are primarily for instrumentation lines such as sampling and monitor lines. Typical multiple line sleeves are shown in Figure 6.2.4-8.Penetration Types XI and XII - Emergency SumpDuring long-term post-accident conditions, containment sump water is recirculated through the RHR system and the containment spray system. The water collects on the floor of the containment and flows to the emergency sump. The water flows out of the containment through type III penetrations (two per unit) shown in Figure 6.2.4-9. Each line contains an isolation valve. The valves are enclosed in a valve compartment (two per plant unit). The valve compartments are designed for the same conditions as the containment except for leaktightness. The penetration between the valve compartments and the Auxiliary Building is a type XI penetration (two per plant unit) illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-10.The type XII penetration has a flued head located in the containment sump. The outer sleeve (guard pipe) of the flued head is welded directly to the containment liner which is completely embedded in the concrete.The type XI penetration has the flued head located in the Auxiliary Building. The penetration is insulated because of the hot sump water which would pass through it in the event of a design bases event.

Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-9WATTS BARWBNP-85Penetration Type XIII - VentilationHeating and ventilation ducts utilize penetration type XIII, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-11. Process lines are welded directly to these penetrations. Additional information on ventilation duct penetrations is given in Section 6.2.4.3.1 on possible leakage paths. Penetration Type XIV - Equipment HatchAn equipment hatch fabricated from welded steel and furnished with a double-gasketed flange and bolted dished door is provided. A test connection to the space between the gaskets is provided to pressurize the space for leak rate testing, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-12.Penetration Type XV - Personnel AccessTwo personnel air locks are provided. Each personnel air lock, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-13, is a double door welded steel assembly. Quick-acting type equalizing valves are provided to equalize pressure in the air lock when personnel enter or leave the containment vessel. The doors are sealed with double gaskets. A test connection to the space between the gaskets is provided to pressurize the space for leak rate testing. The emergency air supply connection to the space between the double doors serves as a test connection to pressurize this space for leak rate testing. A special hold-down device is provided to secure the inner door in a sealed position during leak rate testing of the space between the doors.The two doors in each personnel air lock are interlocked to prevent both being opened simultaneously and to ensure that one door and its equalizing valve are completely closed before the opposite door can be opened. Remote indicating lights and annunciators located in the main control room indicate the door is in operational status. Provision is made to permit bypassing the door interlocking, system with a special tool to allow doors to be left, open during plant cold shutdown. Each lock door hinge is designed to be capable of adjustment to assure proper seating. A lighting and communication system capable of being operated from an external emergency supply is provided in the lock interior.Penetration Type XVI - Fuel Transfer TubeA 20-inch OD fuel transfer tube penetration is provided for fuel movement between the refueling canal in the containment and the spent fuel pool. The penetration consists of 20-in stainless steel pipe installed inside a 24-inch carbon steel pipe, as shown on Figure 6.2.4-14. The inner pipe acts as the transfer tube and is fitted with a double gasketed blind flange in the refueling canal and a standard gate valve in the spent fuel pool. The inner pipe is welded to the containment penetration sleeve. Bellows expansion joints are provided on the pipes to compensate for any differential movement between the two pipes or other structures.Penetration Type XVII - Thimble RenewalIncore instrumentation thimble renewal requires penetrations in both the steel containment and the Shield Building at the same elevation and azimuth. These are separate penetrations and are not connected in the annulus. The containment 6.2.4-10Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-90penetration is illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-15. A similar seal is used on the Shield Building. Double O-ring gaskets and leak rate test connectors are provided for both the containment penetration and the Shield Building penetration.Penetration Type - XVIII - Ice BlowingThe ice blowing line penetration has a blind flange with an O-ring gasket inside and outside of the containment as shown in Figure 6.2.4-16. Sealing between the Auxiliary Building and the annulus is provided by a blind flange fitted with a gasket.Penetration Type XIX - ElectricalThe electrical penetration assemblies provide a means for the continuity of power, control, and signal circuits through the primary containment structure.Each assembly consists of redundant pressure barriers through which the electrical conductors are passed, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-17.Each penetration assembly is sized such that it may be inserted into and be compatible with the penetration nozzles which are furnished as a part of the containment structure. Unless otherwise specified, the assembly is designed to be inserted from the outboard-end of the primary containment nozzle.The criteria and requirements for the design, construction, and installation of the modular type electrical penetrations conform to IEEE Standard 317-1976, "IEEE Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Fueled Power Generating Stations."Penetration Type XXThe feedwater bypass line penetrations, shown in Figure 6.2.4-17A are the 'hot' type in which the penetrations must accommodate thermal movement. Each 'hot' process line where it passes through the containment penetration is enclosed in a guard pipe that is attached to the process line through a multiple fluid fitting. The guard pipe protects the bellows should the process line fail within the annulus between the containment vessel, thereby precluding the discharge of fluids into the annulus. The inner end of the guard pipe is fitted with an impingement ring which protects the bellows from jets originating from pipe breaks inside containment. In addition, the guard-pipe for this type of penetration extends through and is supported by the crane wall. This avoids transmitting loads to the containment vessel. Also, in the event of a pipe rupture it discharges fluid into the reactor compartment rather than smaller rooms outside the crane wall, thus preventing overpressurization of these smaller rooms.For each of these penetrations, the penetration sleeve is welded to the containment vessel. The process line which passes through the penetration is allowed to move both axially and laterally. A two-ply bellows expansion joint is provided to accommodate any movement between the containment vessel and the Shield Building, under any conditions. The bellows is designed to withstand containment design pressure. When an embedded anchor is not utilized, a low-pressure flexible closure will seal the Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-11WATTS BARWBNP-90process line to the sleeve in the Shield Building, which will not impose significant stress on the penetration.The flexible closure described above is located outdoors and serves to contain any leakage from the fluid head so that the leakage is routed back to the annulus, and to seal the annulus from the outdoors.Guides and anchors limit movement of pipes such that design limits on the containment penetration and bellows are not exceeded during all conditions of plant operation, test, or postulated accidents.Penetration Type XXIThe ERCW lines and several component cooling water lines employ penetration type XXI, as shown in Figure 6.2.4-17B. Process lines are welded directly to these penetrations.Penetration Type XXIIThe type XXII penetration is used for the multiple line nitrogen penetration. This penetration is shown in Figure 6.2.4-17C.Penetration Type XXIIIThis type of penetration is used for the chilled water lines and each penetration contains a single chilled water line. The penetration is illustrated in Figure 6.2.4-17D.Penetration Type XXIVType XXIV penetrations are used for maintenance ports. These penetrations employ bellows as shown in Figure 6.2.4-17E. Any leakage through the flued heads or through the bellows will be into the annulus and thereby processed by the emergency gas treatment system.The following codes, standards, and guides were applied in the design of the containment isolation system.

(1)10 CFR Part 50 (2)ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III (3)Regulatory Guide 1.26 (4)Regulatory Guide 1.29 (5)ANSI N18.2-1973 (6)IEEE Standard 317-1976 6.2.4-12Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-856.2.4.3 Design EvaluationThe containment isolation systems are designed to present a double barrier to any flow path from the inside to the outside of the containment using the double-barrier approach to meet the single-failure criterion.When permitted by fluid system design, diverse modes of actuation are used for automatic isolation valves. In addition to diverse modes of operation, channel separation is also maintained. This also ensures that the single-failure criterion is met.Adequate protection is provided for piping, valves, and vessels against dynamic effects and missiles which might result from plant equipment failures, including a LOCA.Isolation valves inside the containment are located between the crane wall and the inside containment wall. The crane wall serves as the main missile barrier. Other missile barriers are discussed in Section 3.5.The requirements and intent of NRC General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57 have been met with four exceptions.(a)Primary containment monitoring instrument systems shall be designed to maintain the integrity of the containment isolation boundary in the event of a DBE. The instrument systems consist of pressure sensors (e.g., transmitters) located outside containment and associated sense lines that connect to the containment penetration nozzles. The sensors should be located as close as practical to the associated penetration

nozzle. Any drain or test line used shall meet the double isolation barrier by use of two normally closed manual valves in series.The instrument system shall be designed to Seismic Category I requirements and evaluated for effects of possible missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement. Refer to Section 7.4 for exceptions to requirements concerning the use of remote-manual or automatic isolation valves.(b.1)The reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) is required post accident for continual indication of the water level in the reactor vessel. The capillary sensing lines which transmit pressure from the reactor vessel to instruments in the Auxiliary Building are armored and designed to withstand DBE conditions. Any containment isolation valves installed in the RVLIS capillary lines will jeopardize the performance of the system. For this reason, isolation of these capillary lines is accomplished by a sealed sensor located inside containment and an isolator located outside containment. These devices utilize a type of bellows which transmits pressure while preventing mixing of the fluids on either side of the isolation devices. The capillary line is armored 3/16-inch O.D. stainless steel tubing and is filled with demineralized water and sealed. A postulated shear of this capillary Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-13WATTS BARWBNP-85line on either side of the containment would not allow a leak to develop through the containment boundary.(b.2)The RCS wide range pressure transmitter (PT-68-70) is required post accident for continual indication of the pressure in the reactor vessel. The capillary sensing lines which transmit pressure from the reactor vessel to instruments in the Auxiliary Building are armored and designed to withstand DBE conditions. Any containment isolation valves installed in the RCS wide range pressure transmitter capillary lines will jeopardize the performance of the system. For this reason, isolation of these capillary lines is accomplished by a sealed sensor located inside containment and an isolator located outside containment. These devices utilize a type of bellows which transmits pressure while preventing mixing of the fluids on either side of the steel tubing and is filled and sealed. A postulated shear of this capillary line on either side of the containment would not allow a leak to develop through the containment boundary.(c)Containment isolation for each RHR sump line penetration consists of: (a)A closed system outside containment.(b)A containment isolation valve outside containment in each of the two lines after the penetrating line branches in the RHR sump valve room. Both of these valves are remotely controlled from the main control room.An enclosure of the RHR sump lines and isolation valves is provided from the containment out to and including the isolation valves. However, this enclosure is not designed to be leaktight after an accident for the following reasons: (1)The maximum pressure which will be experienced inside the RHR sump line will only be about 25 psig.

(2)One of the isolation valves, the containment sump valve, is qualified to 600 psig. The other isolation valve, the containment spray valve, is qualified to 200 psig.

(3)This portion of the system only operates post accident and, therefore, only a limited leak passive failure need be postulated (and this would be at the valve). However, based on the above two statements and the fact that deadweight loading (i.e., normal operation) should not exceed the MELB criteria, the over-design should preclude any problem.

6.2.4-14Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85Thus, the penetration has such overconservatism in its design that an external leaktight enclosure around the valves is not necessary.(d)The pressure boundary valve leak rate test line containment isolation valves (63-158,63-112, 63-111,63-167, 63-174, 63-21, and 63-121) are remote manually actuated from the main control room and do not receive a containment isolation signal. These valves are open for short periods of time during normal operation for the performance of SIS and RHR system venting. Thus, these valves do not automatically close when the containment isolation or safety injection signal is initiated during the venting of the SIS and RHR system. This exception is acceptable because administrative controls exist in the test document to assure valve closure after testing and containment integrity is not compromised during pump operation (i.e., during testing at accident conditions) since flow is being maintained into containment.6.2.4.3.1 Possible Leakage PathsPossible leakage paths from the containment are defined below. The leakage paths are defined on the basis that the annulus pressure is always less than outdoor ambient, the Auxiliary Building, and the containment pressures. Therefore, whenever containment is required, leakage is into the annulus. The possible leakage paths considered do not include containment leakage through the steel plates or through the full penetration welds in the containment vessels. The possible leakage paths also do not include shield building embedments. This is acceptable, as any leakage through any of these paths will be into the annulus and the leakage will be processed by the EGTS.The more probable sources of containment and Shield Building leakage, such as elastomer seals, bellows, and through lines are considered as possible leak path types. Each penetration that contains elastomer seals or a bellows has at least one leakage path defined in Table 6.2.4-1. All penetrations not open to the annulus are considered as possible paths for through-line containment leakage and have one or more isolation valves. Thus every pipe penetration has at least one type of leak path listed in Table 6.2.4-1. The five different types of possible leakage paths are shown in Figure 6.2.4-20, tabulated in Table 6.2.4-1 and are discussed separately below.Type A - Leakage PathType A leakage is leakage from the Auxiliary Building into the annulus. Type A penetration leakage includes the following:

(1)Equipment hatch Shield Building sleeve leak (see Figure 6.2.4-12).

(2)Annulus access door leak.

(3)Ice blowing line Shield Building blind flange leak (see Figure 6.2.4-16).

Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-15WATTS BARWBNP-85 (4)Containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves outside Shield Building leak. The possible leakage is through the valves and the leakoff (see Figure 6.2.3-2) into the annulus.

(5)Shield Building penetration seal leakage.Type B - Leakage PathType B leakage paths are from the containment to the annulus. Type B leakage includes the following:

(1)Equipment hatch double O-ring through-line leak (see Figure 6.2.4-12).

(2)Ice blowing line O-ring and blind flange through line leak (see Figure 6.2.4-16).

(3)Penetration bellows leak.

(4)Containment purge supply and exhaust inboard and outboard valves through line leak. The leakage will pass through the leak off (see Figure 6.2.3-2) into the annulus.

(5)Containment thimble renewal line double O-ring through-line leak (see Figure 6.2.4-15).Type C - Leakage PathType C leakage is leakage from the out-of-doors into the annulus and includes the following:

(1)Shield Building thimble renewal line double O-ring through-line leak.

(2)Main steam and feedwater lines annulus seal leak.Type D - Leakage PathType D leakage path covers the through-line leakage from the containment to the Auxiliary Building (see Table 6.2.4-2). Included in this type of leakage are the lines associated with the safety systems required for post-LOCA operation, such as containment spray, RHR spra y, high-head SIS, low-head SIS, SIS pump discharge, charging pump discharge, and containment emergency sump. For "closed" systems inside the Auxiliary Building, the through line leakage will stay within the closed system.

The component cooling water system is basically a closed system, except for the vent header at the surge tank. Any through line leakage into the Auxiliary Building through this vent will be processed by the auxiliary building gas treatment system. Radiation monitoring is provided as a signal to initiate the closing of the vent. The nitrogen supply lines to the pressurizer relief tank and to the accumulators are normally closed. The high pressure outside of the isolation valves serves to minimize through line leakage outward. The personnel lock is yet another possible source for through line leakage, but the leakage through the double O-ring (assuming one door open) is small, if any, and will be processed by the auxiliary building gas treatment system.

6.2.4-16Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85Type E - Leakage PathType E leakage paths are paths from the containment that bypass the annulus and leak directly past a cleanup system. These leakage paths were considered during the design of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The design features utilized at Watts Bar eliminates all type E leakage paths. This is done by the following methods:

(1)Portions of the Auxiliary Building are maintained at a negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere for the duration of an accident. Section 6.2.3 describes the implementing system and its operation.

(2)Leakoff lines to the secondary containment and a third outboard valve receiving an isolation signal are used in certain lines (such as the containment purge lines) to prevent bypass leakage.

(3)A water seal at greater than peak containment accident pressure is used to prevent bypass leakage in certain lines (such as the safety injection pump discharge). The seals are available for at least 30 days after a design basis event (see Table 6.2.6-2b).

(4)The secondary side of the steam generator is kept at a higher pressure than the primary side soon after the LOCA occurs (see Section 10.4.9). Any leakage between the primary and secondary sides of the steam generator is thus directed inward to the containment.Table 6.2.4-3 lists potential bypass leakage paths to the atmosphere and the methods chosen to eliminate such leakage.6.2.4.4 Tests and InspectionsAll components of the containment isolation systems were designed, fabricated, and tested under quality assurance requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, as further described in Chapter 17. An alternative to visual examination during ASME Section III hydrostatic pressure testing was approved by Reference [1] for Unit 1 penetrations having inaccessible vender welds.Nondestructive examination was performed on the components of the system in accordance with the applicable codes described in Section 3.2.Subsequent to initial plant operation, containment isolation systems will be periodically tested under conditions of normal operation to determine that all systems are in constant readiness to perform the desired function.Automatic isolation valves that receive a containment isolation signal to close, where closure of the valve will not limit or restrict normal plant operation, are periodically functionally tested by the on-line testing capability described in Section 7.3. All other valves are periodically tested for CIS circui t electrical continuity. Other testing information is provided in Section 6.2.6.

Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-17WATTS BARWBNP-85REFERENCES (1)NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-390/90-04 and 50-391/90-04, dated May 17, 1990.

6.2.4-18Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.4-1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Containment Penetration and Barriers DUE TO THE SIZE OF TABLE 6.2.4-1IT IS LOCATED IN THE OVERSIZED TABLE FILE Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-19WATTS BARWBNP-63Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Page 1 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescriptionX-2 A, B X-3 X-15 X-16*X-17 X-19 A&B*

X-20 A&B*

X-21*

X-22*X-23 X-24*X-25A X-25DX-27 A, B, C, D X-28Personnel Access HatchFuel Transfer Tube Chemical and Volume Letdown LineNormal Charging LineRHR Return Line RHR Sump Suction line SIS RHR Pump Discharge Safety Injection Pump Discharge Charging Pump DischargePAS Containment Air Sample SIS Relief Valve DischargePressurizer Liquid SamplePressurizer Gas SampleSteam Generator Sample LinesPAS Containment Air SampleAny leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.System is in operation after an accident. Cross ties between pumps maintain flows in the event of a single failure.Line is always filled with water. No atmospheric bypass leakage to the Auxiliary Building can occur after a LOCA.System is in operation after a LOCA. Cross ties between pumps maintain flows and pressure in the event of a single failure.Line in use during a LOCA which will be pressurized even in the event of a single failure due to cross ties between pumps.Same as for Penetration No. 21.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage through the relief valve is prevented as the valves are pressurized outside containment by the SIS system. Any leakage would be into containment.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

6.2.4-20Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63 X-29 X-30 X-31 X-32*

X-33*X-34 X-35 X-39A X-39B X-40D X-41 X-42 X-43 A*,B*,C*,D*

X-44 X-45 X-46 X-47A X-47BCCS from RC Pump CoolersAccumulator to Holdup TankFire ProtectionSafety Injection Pump Discharge Safety Injection Pump DischargeControl Air I&CCCS from Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger

N 2 to Accumulators N 2 to Pressurizer Relief TankHydrogen Purge Floor Sump Pump DischargePressurizer Relief Tank MakeupTo RC Pump SealsFrom RC Pump SealsRC Drain Tank and PRT to Vent HeaderRC Drain Tank Pump DischargeGlycol Line to Ice Condenser Glycol Line from Ice CondenserAny leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Same as for Penetration No. 21.

Same as for Penetration No. 21.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Same as for Penetration No. 29.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.The line is pressurized during a LOCA even in the event of a single failure. If there was any leakage it would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) (Page 2 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescription Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-21WATTS BARWBNP-63 X-48 A&B*X-49 A&B X-50A X-50B X-52*X-53*

X-56A*X-57A*

X-58A*

X-58B X-59A*X-60A*

X-61A*

X-62A*

X-63A*Containment SprayRHR Spray RCP Thermal Barrier ReturnRCP Thermal Barrier SupplyCCS to RC Pump CoolersCCS to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Lower Containment ERCW SupplyLower Containment ERCW Return Lower Containment ERCW Supply

RCS Pressure SensorLower Containment ERCW ReturnLower Containment ERCW Supply Lower Containment ERCW Return Lower Containment ERCW Supply Lower Containment ERCW ReturnSystem in operation after a LOCA. A 30-day water leg seal is maintained in this line.System in operation after a LOCA. System pressure maintained even in the event of a single failure due to pump cross ties.Same as for Penetration No. 29.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Same as for Penetration No. 43.Same as for Penetration No. 43.

High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) (Page 3 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescription 6.2.4-22Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63 X-64 X-65 X-66 X-67 X-68*X-69*

X-70*

X-71*

X-72*

X-73*

X-74*

X-75*

X-76 X-77 X-78AC Chilled Water (ERCW)AC Chilled Water (ERCW)AC Chilled Water (ERCW)AC Chilled Water (ERCW)

Upper Containment ERCW SupplyUpper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply Upper Containment ERCW Supply

Service AirDemineralized WaterFire ProtectionAny leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.High water pressure maintained on outboard valve, even in the event of a single failure.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) (Page 4 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescription Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-23WATTS BARWBNP-63 X-81 X-82 X-83 X-84A X-84B X-84C X-84D X-85A X-85B X-86A X-86B X-86C X-87B X-87C X-87D X-90 X-91 X-92 A, B X-92CRC Drain Tank to Gas AnalyzerRefueling Cavity C-U Pump SuctionRefueling Cavity C-U Pump DischargePressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer Reactor Vessel Level Indicating SystemReactor Vessel Level Indicating System Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger to Boron AnalyzerHot Leg SamplePAS Containment Air Sample PAS Containment Air SamplePAS Containment Sump Sample Reactor Vessel Level Indicating SystemReactor Vessel Level Indicating SystemReactor Vessel Level Indicating SystemControl Air Control Air H 2 AnalyzersPAS Hot Leg SampleAny leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) (Page 5 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescription 6.2.4-24Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63 X-93 X-94 B, C X-95 B, C X-99 X-100 X-105 X-106 X-107 X-108 X-109 X-114X-115 Accumulator SampleContainment Atmosphere Radiation MonitorContainment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor H 2 Analyzers H 2 AnalyzersPAS Containment Air SamplePAS Hot Leg Sample RHR SupplyMaintenance PortMaintenance Port Ice Condenser (to Glycol Cool FL Pumps)Ice Condenser (from Glycol Cool FL Pumps)Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.

Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.Any leakage would be treated by the ABGTS.* Not a bypass leakage path to the Auxiliary Building.Table 6.2.4-2 POSSIBLE BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) (Page 6 of 6)

Penetration Number Penetrating Line NameDescription Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-25WATTS BARWBNP-63Table 6.2.4-3 PREVENTION OF BYPASS LEAKAGE TO THE ATMOSPHERE (Page 1 of 2)

Penetration Number Penetration Line NameDescription X-4 X-5 X-6 X-7 X-8A X-8B X-8C X-8D X-9A X-9BX-10AX-10B X-11 X-12AX-12BX-12CX-12DX-13AX-13BLower Compartment Purge Air ExhaustInstrument Room Purge Air ExhaustUpper Compartment Purge Air ExhaustUpper Compartment Purge Air ExhaustFeedwater BypassFeedwater BypassFeedwater BypassFeedwater BypassUpper Compartment Purge Air SupplyUpper Compartment Purge Air SupplyLower Compartment Purge Air SupplyLower Compartment Purge Air SupplyInstrument Room Purge Air Exhaust

Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater FeedwaterMain Steam LineMain Steam LineLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusSecondary side of the steam generator is pressurized above containment pressureSame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ALeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulusLeakoff lines to the annulus Same as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8A 6.2.4-26Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63X-13CX-13DX-14A, B, C, DX-40AX-40BX-56AX-57AX-58AX-59AX-60AX-61AX-62AX-63A X-68 X-69 X-70 X-71 X-72 X-73 X-74 X-75 X-80Main Stem LineMain Steam LineSteam Generator Blowdown Lines Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary FeedwaterLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW Supply Upper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyUpper Compartment ERCW SupplyLower Compartment Purge Air SupplySame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ASame as for Penetration X-8ALeakage prevented by combination of water sealand piping traps.Same as for Penetration X-56A Same as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56A Same as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ASame as for Penetration X-56ALeakoff lines to the annulusTable 6.2.4-3 PREVENTION OF BYPASS LEAKAGE TO THE ATMOSPHERE (Continued) (Page 2 of 2)

Penetration Number Penetration Line NameDescription Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-27WATTS BARWBNP-63Table 6.2.4-4 INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (Page 1 of 4)Line IdentificationNo.

Penetration Number LineSizeInchesOrificeInnerIsolationValve Number Valve Type ValveLocationOuter IsolationValve Number ValveType ValveLocation PAS Containment AirINTK LC Train BPressurizer LiquidSampleContainment AnnulusP Sensor 1Containment AnnulusP Sensor 1Pressurizer SteamSampleContainment AnnulusP Sensor 1Steam Generator No. 1 SampleSteam Generator No. 2 SampleSteam Generator No. 3 SampleSteam Generator No. 4 SamplePAS Containment Return Train B 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9 10 11 X-23 X-25A X-25B X-25C X-25D X-26C X-27A X-27B X-27C X-27D X-28 3/8 3/8 1/2 1/2 3/8 1/2 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/8 No No No No No No No No No No No43-31943-11

- 2

-

43-54D 43-56D 43-59D 3-63D 43-N0030 Globe Globe

- -Globe

-

Globe Globe Globe Globe CheckInside PrimContainmentInside PrimContainment

- -Inside PrimContainment

-Inside PrimContainmentInside PrimContainmentInside PrimContainmentInside PrimContainmentInside PrimContainment43-318 43-12

- 3

-

43-55 43-58 43-61 43-64 43-341 Globe Globe

- -Globe

-

Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Annulus Annulus

- -Annulus

-

Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus 6.2.4-28Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63Accum. to Holdup Tank Pressurizer ReliefTank to Gas AnalyzerReactor Vessel Level Ind Sys Reactor Vessel Level Ind Sys Reactor Vessel Level Ind Sys Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger to Boron AnalyzerHot Leg Sample - Loops 1 and 3Containment Annulus P Sensor 1PAS Containment Air INTK UC Train APAS Containment Air RTRN Train APAS Containment Sump RTRN Train AReactor Vessel Level Ind Sys 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 X-30 X-84A X-84B X-84C X-84D X-85A X-85B X-85C X-86A X-86B X-86C X-87B 3/4 3/8 3/16 3/16 3/16 3/8 3/8 1/2 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/16 No No No No No No No No No No No No63-07168-308 - - -

43-7543-22 -

43-288

-

-

-Globe Globe - - -

Globe Globe -

Globe Check Check

-Inside Prim ContainmentInside Prim Containment

- - -

Inside Prim ContainmentInside Prim Containment

-Inside Prim Containment

-Inside Prim Containment 08468-307 - - -

43-77 43-23 -

43-287 43-307 43-342

-Globe Globe - - -

Globe Globe -

Globe Globe Globe

-Outside Shield Building Annulus -

-

-

Annulus Annulus -

Annulus Annulus Annulus

-Table 6.2.4-4 INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (Continued) (Page 2 of 4)Line IdentificationNo.

Penetration Number LineSizeInchesOrificeInnerIsolationValve Number Valve Type ValveLocationOuter IsolationValve Number ValveType ValveLocation Containment Isolation Systems 6.2.4-29WATTS BARWBNP-63Reactor Vessel Level Ind Sys Reactor Vessel Level Ind Sys

Hydrogen Analyzer Train BHydrogen Analyzer Train BPAS Hot Leg 1 - Train AAccumulator Sample

Upper Compartment

Air MonitorUpper Compartment Air Monitor Lower Compartment

Air MonitorLower Compartment Air Monitor 26 27 30 31 32 33 35 36 38 39 X-87C X-87D X-92A X-92B X-92C X-93 X-95C X-95B X-94C X-94B 3/16 3/16 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/8 1-1/2 1-1/2 1-1/2 1-1/2 No No No No No No No No No No - -

43-207 43-208 43-251 43-34 90-11490-11590-11690-10890-10990-110 - -

Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe - -

Inside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim ContainmentInside Prim Containment

- -

43-435 43-436 43-250 43-35 90-113 90-117 90-107 90-111 - -

Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe - -

Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus AnnulusTable 6.2.4-4 INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (Continued) (Page 3 of 4)Line IdentificationNo.

Penetration Number LineSizeInchesOrificeInnerIsolationValve Number Valve Type ValveLocationOuter IsolationValve Number ValveType ValveLocation 6.2.4-30Containment Isolation Systems WATTS BARWBNP-63 1These have no in-line containment isolation valves - see Section 6.2.4.3 and Table 6.2.4-1.

Containment Annulus P Sensor 1Containment Annulus P SensorHydrogen Analyzer -Train AHydrogen Analyzer -Train A PAS Containment AirRTRN Train BPAS Hot Leg 3 -Train B 40 41 42 43 45 46 X-96C X-97 X-99 X-100 X-105 X-106 1/2 1/2 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/8 No No No No No No 134 43-202 43-201

-

43-310 -Globe Globe Globe Check Globe -Containment Containment Containment

-

- 135 43-434 43-433 43-325 43-309 -Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe -Annulus Annulus Annulus Annulus AnnulusTable 6.2.4-4 INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (Continued) (Page 4 of 4)Line IdentificationNo.

Penetration Number LineSizeInchesOrificeInnerIsolationValve Number Valve Type ValveLocationOuter IsolationValve Number ValveType ValveLocation Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-31WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-1 Type 1, Main Stearn X-l3A, X-l3B, X-l3C, X-13D

6.2.4-32Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-2 Type II, Feedwater X-12A, X-l2B, X-12C, X-12D Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-33WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-3 Type III, Residual Heat Removal Pump Return X-17, Pump Supply X-I07 6.2.4-34Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-4 Type IV and V (Type IV Socket Weld Ends, Type V Butt Weld Ends)

Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-35WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-5 Type VI and VII (Type VI for Socket Weld SS Process Lines, TypeVII for Butt Weld SS Process Lines 6.2.4-36Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-6 Type VIII, for Butt Weld C.S. Process Lines Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-37WATTS BAR WBNP-85Figure 6.2.4-7 Type IX, for SS Process Lines 6.2.4-38Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-8 Type X, Instrument Penetrations Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-39WATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-9 Type XII, Emergency Sump 6.2.4-40Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-10 Type XI, Emergency Sump Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-41WATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-11 Type XIII, Ventilation Duct Penetration 6.2.4-42Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-12 Type XIV, Equipment Hatch Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-43WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-13 Type XV, Personnel Access 6.2.4-44Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-14 Type XVI, Fuel Transfer Tube Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-45WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-15 Type XVII, Thimble Renewal Line 6.2.4-46Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-16 Type XVIII, Ice Blowing Line Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-47WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17 Type XIX, Electrical Penetration 6.2.4-48Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17A Type XX Feedwater Bypass Penetrations X-8A, X-8B, X-8C, X-8D Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-49WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17B Type XXI, Upper And Lower Cont ERCW Supply And ReturnCCW From Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger and from Pump Odolers 6.2.4-50Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17C Type XXII Multi Line Penetration X-39 Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-51WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17D Type XXIII Instrument Room Chilled H20 Supply and Return 6.2.4-52Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-17E Type XXIV UHI X-l08, X*109 Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-53WATTS BAR WBNP-52Figure 6.2.4-18 Mechanical Containment Penetrations 6.2.4-54Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.4-19 Powerhouse Reactor Unit 1 & 2 Mechanical Sleeves-Shield Building Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-55WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.4-20 Schematic Diagram of Leakage Paths 6.2.4-56Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-63Figure 6.2.4-21 Electrical Logic Diagram Containment Isolation Containment Isolation Systems6.2.4-57WATTS BAR WBNP-65Figure 6.2.4-22A through 6.2.4-22II Deleted by Amendment 65 6.2.4-58Containment Isolation SystemsWATTS BAR WBNP-42Figure 6.2.4-23 Ice Blowing and Negative Return Lines - Blind Flange Details Combustible Gas Control in Containment 6.2.5-1WATTS BARWBNP-956.2.5 Combustible Gas Control in Containment 6.2.5.1 The containment combustible gas control system is designed to control the concentration of hydrogen that may be released into the containment following a beyond-design-basis accident to ensure that containment structural integrity is maintained. The combustible gas control system of the containment air return system, the hydrogen analyzer system (HAS) and the hydrogen mitigation system (HMS) which conform to 10CFR50.44 requirements.

Design BasesIn an accident more severe than the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident, combustible gas is predominantly generated within containment as a result of the following:

(1)Fuel clad-coolant reaction between the fuel cladding and the reactor coolant.

(2)Molten core-concrete interaction in a severe core melt sequence with a failed reactor vessel.If a sufficient amount of combustible gas is generated, it may react with the oxygen present in the containment at a rate rapid enough to lead to a containment breach or a leakage rate in excess of Technical Specification limits. Additionally, damage to systems and components essential to continued control of the post-accident conditions could occur.The systems provided for combustible gas control have the following functional and mechanical requirements:

(1)The air return fans enhance the ice condenser and containment spray heat removal operation by circulating air from the upper compartment to the lower compartment through the ice condenser, and then back to the upper compartment. Hydrogen concentration is limited in potentially stagnant regions by providing air flow in these regions.

(2)The HAS provides the capability for extracting a sample and obtaining the measurement necessary to determine the volume percent concentration for hydrogen present in the sample. The system provides indication and alarms of volume percent concentrations in the main control room. Indication is also provided at the remote control center.

(3)The HMS is designed to increase the containment capability to accommodate hydrogen that could be released during a degraged core accident. The system is based on the concept of controlled ignition using thermal igniters.

(4)The air return fans and HAS are designed to operate continuously during accident conditions. The HMS igniter assemblies are qualified for a 30 year life of operational cycles.

(5)The combustible gas control system is designed for periodic testing and inspection.

6.2.5-2Combustible Gas Control in Containment WATTS BARWBNP-95 6.2.5.2 System DesignContainment Air Return SystemMixing of the containment atmosphere is accomplished by the containment air return system described in Section 6.8. The air return fans start automatically 9 + 1 minutes after receipt of a Phase B isolation signal. In addition, the fans may be started

manually.The associated ductwork, which must remain intact following a LOCA to assure that no localized hydrogen concentration exceeds 4%, consists of (1) two 12-inch ducts (one associated with each air return fan intake) which draw air from the containment dome region, (2) one 8-inch duct which circles the containment removing air from accumulator rooms and other dead-ended spaces and terminates at each air return fan housing, (3) two 12-inch ducts which circle the crane wall, removing air from the steam generator and pressurizer compartments and terminate through two 8-inch ducts at each air return fan housing, (4) two 8-inch pipes (one connected to each air return fan housing) which remove air from the refueling canal, and (5) the main duct between upper and lower compartment through the divider deck, including the non-return dampers.The ductwork described above is embedded in concrete, where possible, to prevent damage from buildup of pressure during a LOCA. Ductwork not protected by embedment is designed to withstand the LOCA environment. The air return system also includes heavy-duty backdraft dampers to prevent back flow from the lower compartment to the upper compartment under a differential pressure of 15 psig. These dampers prevent steam from bypassing the ice condenser during the initial blowdown. Figures 6.2.5-3, 6.2.5-4 and 6.2.5-5 are provided to show the routing of the recirculation ducts.During the post-blowdown period, the pressure gradient between containment compartments is almost nonexistent and hydrogen can accumulate in potentially stagnant regions. The regions of concern are the ten dead-ended compartments: the four steam generator enclosures; the pressurizer enclosure; the four accumulator spaces; and the instrument room. The air return fans provide recirculation flow through the dead-ended compartments to prevent excessive hydrogen buildup. Each fan will mix 1,960 cfm form the enclosed areas in the lower compartment to the general lower compartment atmosphere.Hydrogen AnalyzerThe HAS provides the capability to extract air samples from containment and to determine volume percent concentration of hydrogen. The primary functions of the system include continuous sampling from a remote location, measurement of hydrogen partial pressure, visual indication of volume percent concentrations and hydrogen concentration alarms in the main control room.The sampling system consists of a single, non-trained detection loop. The analyzer is fed by one process sample line and returns to containment on one process effluent Combustible Gas Control in Containment 6.2.5-3WATTS BARWBNP-95line. This line is equipped with two manually controlled isolation valves on both the sample and return lines. The system is installed at two locations. The sample loop station, mounted inside the Annulus, consists of the detection chamber, pressure transducer, solenoid valves, condensate management components and check valves for directing sample through the loop.The HAS remote control center is mounted is a mild environment in the Auxiliary Building where access is always permitted. The major components of the center include a PLC based signal conditioner/system controller, a remote touch screen display and the system switch panel.Containment isolation valve hand switches, a hydrogen concentration indicator and alarms are provided in the main control room.Upon actuation of the system, sample enters the loop assembly and passes through a "T" which separates the liquid and collects it in a condensate trap. The sample continues through a flow switch into the detection chamber. Inside the detection chamber, partial and total pressure measurements are obtained. The sample exits the detection chamber, passing through the sample pump which then drives the sample out of the loop assembly.The analyzer is designed to continually measure hydrogen concentration following a beyond-design-basis accident. The analyzer is calibrated to measure hydrogen concentrations between zero and ten percent with an accuracy of +0.2% hydrogen. A sample loop flow diagram is shown in Figure 6.2.5-6.The hydrogen analyzer components are seismically supported.Hydrogen Mitigation SystemTo assure that any hydrogen release would be ignited at containment locations as soon as the concentration exceeded the lower flammability limit, durable thermal igniters, capable of maintaining an adequate surface temperature, are used. An igniter developed by Tayco Engineering, operating at a nominal plant voltage of 120V AC, is used. The igniter has been shown by experiment to be capable of maintaining surface temperatures in excess of the required minimum for extended periods, initiating combustion and continuing to operate in various combustion environments.The igniters in the HMS are equally divided into tow redundant groups, each with independent and separate controls, power supplies and locations, to ensure adequate coverage even in the event of a single failure. Manual control of each group of igniters is provided in the main control room and the status (on-off) of each group is indicated there. A separate train of Class IE 480V AC auxiliary power is provided for each group of igniters and is backed by automatic loading onto the diesel generators upon loss of offsite power. Each individual circuit powers two igniters. See Figures 6.2.5-8 through 6.2.5-12 for igniter locations.

6.2.5-4Combustible Gas Control in Containment WATTS BARWBNP-95To assure adequate spatial coverage, 68 igniters are distributed throughout the various regions of the containment in which hydrogen could be released or to which it could flow in significant quantities (see Figures 6.2.5-8 through 6.2.5-12). There are at least two igniters, controlled and powered redundantly located in each of these regions. Following a degraded core accident, any hydrogen which is produced is released into the lower compartment inside the crane wall. To cover this region, 22 igniters (equally divided between trains) are provided. Eight of these are distributed on the reactor cavity wall exterior and crane wall interior at an intermediate elevation to ensure the partial burning that accompanies upward flame propagation.Two igniters are located at the lower edge of each of the five enclosures for the four steam generators and the pressurizer, two in the top of the pressurizer enclosure and another pair above the reactor vessel in the cavity. These 22 lower compartment igniters help prevent flammable mixtures from entering the ice condenser. Any hydrogen not burned in the lower compartment is carried up through the ice condenser and into its upper plenum. Since steam is removed from the mixture as it is passed through the ice bed, mixtures that were nonflammable in the lower compartment tend to be flammable in the ice condenser upper plenum. This phenomenon is supported by the CLASIX containment analysis code which predicts more sequential burns to occur in the upper plenum than in any other region. Four igniters are located around the upper compartment dome, four at intermediate elevations on the outside of the steam generator enlosures, four more around the top inside of the crane wall and on above each of the two air return fans. The air return fans provide recirculation flow from the upper compartment through several dead-ended compartments (see Section6.2.1.3.3) back into the main part of the lower compartment. To cover this region, there are pairs of igniters in each of the eight rooms (a total of 16 igniters) through which the recirculation flow passes. The location of the HMS igniters is shown in Figures 6.2.5-8 through 6.2.5-12.The components of the HMS inside containment are seismically supported.6.2.5.3 Design EvaluationContainment pressure during the post blowdown phase of a loss-of-coolant accident is calculated with the LOTIC code which models the containment structural heat sinks and containment safeguards system. The long-term containment pressure analysis accounts for hydrogen partial pressure. This transient is discussed in Section 6.2.1 and 15.4.1.2.The containment air return system is designed to reduce containment pressure after blowdown to prevent excessive hydrogen concentrations in pocketed areas, and circulate air through the ice condenser. The air return fans automatically start on a PhaseB containment isolation signal and can be started manually. The fans provide a continuous mixing of the containment compartment atmosphere for the long-term post-blowdown environment. The system has redundancy, is single-failure-proof and will remain operable with al oss of onsite or offsite power.The hydrogen analyzer is a highly reliable commerical grade. Category 3 instrument as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.97 and permitted by Regulatory Guide 1.7. The Combustible Gas Control in Containment 6.2.5-5WATTS BARWBNP-95system is capable of being energized and fully operational with 90 minutes. It is required to operate correctly and continuously following a beyond-design-basis accident.The HMS, due to its igniter type and locations, redundancy, capability of functioning in a post-accident environment, seismic support, main control room actuation, and remote surviellance, performs its intended function in a manner that provides adequate safety margins. The Unit 2 containment structures can survive the effects of credible degraded core accidents when hydrogen hazards are mitigated by HMS.6.2.5.4 Testing and InspectionsThe combustible gas control system is subjected to periodic testing and inspection to demonstrate its availability.The periodic test program for the containment air return system and the HMS are described in the Technical Specifications.The periodic test program for the HAS is described in the Technical Requirements Manual.Preoperational tests are described in Chapter 14.6.2.5.5 Instrument ation ApplicationThe instrumentation design details of the air return fans are shown on Figures 9.4-30 and 9.4-33. The logic, controls and instrumentation of this engineered safety feature system are such that a single failure of any component does not result in the loss of functional capability for the system.The HAS instrument range is configured to measure from 0-10% hydrogen by volume. There are two configurable hydrogen concentration alarms, one on the remote control center and one in the main control room. The HAS also provides a trouble alarm to indicate failures of the sensor and pump. An equipment status display monitors pump pressure and flow.Annunciation is provided in the main control room upon loss of power or undervoltage to the igniters. Each of the two HMS groups is placed in service from the main control room by a handswitch. The igniters are manually energized following any accident which indicates inadequate core cooling. This is done without waiting for a potential hydrogen buildup.

6.2.5-6Combustible Gas Control in Containment WATTS BARWBNP-95 Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-7WATTS BAR WBNP-95Figure 6.2.5-1 Deleted by Amendment 95

6.2.5-8Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-62Figure 6.2.5-2 De1eted By Amendment 62 Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-9WATTS BAR WBNP-89Figure 6.2.5-3 Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 - Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning 6.2.5-10Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.5-4 Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 Reactor Building -Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-11WATTS BAR WBNP-91Figure 6.2.5-5 Powerhouse Reactor Building Units 1 & 2 - Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning 6.2.5-28Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-95Figure 6.2.5-6 Function Flow Block Diagram - Containment Gas Monitor Subsystem Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-13WATTS BAR WBNP-95Figure 6.2.5-7 Deleted by Amendment 95 6.2.5-14Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-95Figure 6.2.5-7a Deleted by Amendment 95 Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-15WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.5-8 Igniter Locations - Lower Compartment and Dead Ended Compartments 6.2.5-16Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.5-9 Igniter Locations - Lower Compartments Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-17WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.5-10 Igniter Locations - Upper Plenum and Upper Compartments 6.2.5-18Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.5-11 Igniter Locations - Dome Combustible Gas Control in Containment6.2.5-19WATTS BAR WBNP-55Figure 6.2.5-12 Igniter Locations - Elevation 6.2.5-20Combustible Gas Control in ContainmentWATTS BAR WBNP-55 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-1WATTS BARWBNP-886.2.6 Containment Leakage TestingPrimary containment leakage tests and containment isolation system valve operability tests will be performed periodically to verify that leakage from the containment is maintained within acceptable limits set forth in the Technical Specifications. The types of leakage tests are as follows:

(1)Test Type ATests to measure the reactor primary containment overall integrated leakage rate. The containment leak rate test will be conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

(2)Test Type BTests to detect and measure local leaks of containment penetrations, hatches, and personnel locks as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

(3)Test Type CTest to detect and measure containment isolation valve leakage as described by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.The leakage rate testing pressure for the above tests, P a (as defined in 10CFR50 Appendix J), ha a nominal value of 15.0 psig with allowance for instrument error.

Exceptions to this test pressure are noted elsewhere in this section.

6.2.6.1 Containment In tegrated Leak Rate TestThe maximum allowable containment leakage rate for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is 0.25 weight percent per day as specified in the Technical Specifications. The preoperational testing will be conducted in full compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix J as shown in Table 14.2-1. Subsequent periodic testing will also be performed in accordance with Appendix J. Periodic testing durations of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> may be conducted when performed in accordance with Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1, Revision 1, "Testing Criteria for Integrated Leakage Rate Testing of Primary Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Plants."Prior to conducting the integrated leak rate test, those lines which penetrate primary containment are aligned as shown in Table 6.2.6-3.The containment is then pressurized in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, and the Technical Specification requirements. When test pressure is reached, the containment is isolated from its pressure source and the following parameters are recorded at periodic intervals:

(1)Containment absolute pressure (2)Dry bulb temperatures

6.2.6-2Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-88 (3)Water vapor pressures (4)Outside containment pressure and temperature conditionsDuring the test, ventilation inside the containment is operated as necessary to enhance an even air temperature distribution. The test data are processed at periodic intervals during the test to determine test status and leakage conditions. If it appears that the leakage is excessive, the pressure plateau is either maintained on the test or aborted to perform repairs. The test is run for a prescribed time period to obtain assurance of the leak test rate.Following the leak rate test, a second leak rate is performed to verify the information obtained in the first test. This verification test consists of slowly bleeding off pressure from containment at a known rate and measuring the total containment leak rate. The superimposed, measured flow is adjusted to a value which causes a change in the weight of air in the containment that is in the same order of magnitude as the allowable leakage rate.The total time equations or the mass point equations are used to determine the integrated leak rate. The mass point equations will be used for preoperational testing as discussed in Table 14.2-1.

6.2.6.2 Containment Pene tration Leakage Rate TestTable 6.2.4-1 lists penetrations in the primary containment. The Type B test is performed on all operational electrical equipment and personnel hatch, fuel transfer tube, thimble renewal, and ice blowing penetrations, and penetration bellows in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The dual-ply bellows on containment penetration will be tested at P a by applying the pressure between the plies. Airlock door seals are tested at 6.0 psig per Technical Specification requirements. Experience has shown that pressurizing the space between the seals to greater than 6.5 psig on personnel airlock doors of the design used at Watts Bar will lift the door and induce gross leakage unless strongbacks are used. Since the door seal test is intended to prove integrity of the seals, it is our position that a test conducted at 6.0 psig will conservatively demonstrate that seal integrity is maintained. Table 6.2.6-1 lists all penetrations subjected to type B testing. Spare electrical penetrations will be subjected to Type B testing as they become operational. Tables 6.2.4-1 through 6.2.4-4 and Figures 8.3-44 and 8.3-45 give details on these penetrations. The test is performed in full compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The acceptance criteria as required by Appendix J are specified in the Technical Specifications.Table 6.2.4-1 lists containment isolation valves. Table 6.2.6-2a identifies those valves that are tested during a Type C test.Isolation valves that are part of closed systems that are in use after a design basis event and valves that are water sealed for at least 30 days after a design basis event are not tested in the Type C test program. Table 6.2.6-2b lists the valves exempted Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-3WATTS BARWBNP-85from type C leak testing. Bases for exemptions and exceptions from type C leakage rate testing on a penetration by penetration basis are as follows:(I)Exemptions

(1)Feedwater Bypass - X-8A, X-8B, X-8C, X-8DFeedwater - X-12A, X-12B, X-12C, X-12D

Main Steam - X-13A, X-13B, X-13C, X-13D Steam Generator Blowdown - X-14A, X-14B, X-14C, X-14D Steam Generator Blowdown - X-27A, X-27B, X-27C, X-27DAuxiliary Feedwater, X-40A, X-40BThese penetrations are directly connected to the secondary side of the steam generator. The main steam and feedwater lines of PWR containments are not required to be Type C tested (see definition of Type C test in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J). These lines are assumed not to rupture as a result of an accident (missile protected). Any leakage through these lines would be identified during operation by the leakage detection program. In addition, during a design basis accident, the secondary side of the steam generator is filled with water and would be at a higher pressure than the containment atmosphere thus preventing outleakage from containment. The integrity of the inside piping is also verified during the Type A test.

(2)CVCS Normal Charging Line, X-16This penetration uses an inboard check valve and a closed loop outside containment (CLOC) as the means of containment isolation. Type C testing for this path is not required due to the seal pressure greater than 1.1 P a and the 30-day water seal inventory as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. A positive pressure preventing air outleakage is assured by the pressure applied against FCV-62-90 and FCV-62-91 (both of which receive a Phase A signal) by the high head SI pumps. Water testing for piping integrity is performed in accordance with ASME XI, IWV.

(3)RHR Hot Leg Injection, X-17This penetration uses inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C testing for this penetration is not required since a continuous water seal will be provided at a pressure greater than 1.1 P a and a 30-day water seal is provided, as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Testing is performed in accordance with ASME XI, IWV.

(4)RHR Cold Leg Injection, X-20A, X-20B Same as for X-17.

6.2.6-4Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85 (5)SIS Hot Leg Injection, X-21, X-32These lines make use of inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. These lines are postulated to be in-service post accident and the high head pumps will maintain a pressure seal greater than 1.1 P a for greater than 30 days, as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

(6)Charging Pump Discharge, X-22This line makes use of inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C testing is not required for the same reasons as X-21 and X-32. Water seal is provided by the high head pumps.

(7)SIS Cold Leg Injection, X-33Same as X-21 and X-32 (8)RCP Seal Injection, X-43A, X-43B, X-43C, X-43DThese lines made use of an inboard containment isolation valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C test is not required for the same reason as given for X-16.(II)Exceptions (1)Sump Suction to RHR, X-19A, X-19BThese lines make use of a containment isolation valve located outside of containment and a CLOC for containment isolation boundaries. During a design basis accident, these lines would be submerged under water which would preclude air outleakage. In addition, these valves are exposed to P a during each Type A test.

(2)SI Relief Valve Discharge to PRT, X-24The line uses an inboard containment isolation valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries. The maximum calculated containment accident pressure per 10 CFR 50 Appendix J (P a) during the design basis accident would not create a substantial outleakage driving force and, in any case, tends to cause the relief valves to seat rather than lift. The systems feeding this line are ECCS and, due either to operating pressure or static head, outleakage would be prevented. Therefore, no Type C testing will be performed for this line. However, this line is exposed to the P a test pressure during the Type A test.

(3)Containment Spray, X-48A, X-48B and RHR Spray, X-49A, X-49BThese lines make use of an inboard containment isolation check valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries of each line. Additionally, a water leg seal exists against a system valve outside containment in each line. This seal Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-5WATTS BARWBNP-85prevents the outleakage of containment atmosphere. An inventory test is performed to ensure a 30-day seal water inventory at a pressure greater than 1.1 P a, should one spray system shut down. The seal water inventory leakage rate test is performed in lieu of a Type C air leakage rate test of the containment isolation check valves.

(4)RHR Pump Supply, X-107This line makes use of inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. This penetration satisfies ANSI-N271-1976. In addition, an ASME Section XI water leakage test is performed to verify system integrity. Thus, no Type C test is required for this line.Test connections and pressurizing means are provided to test isolation valves or barriers for leaktightness. Either air, nitrogen or water is used as the pressurizing medium, depending on the physical location and service of each line. Leak testing of individual valves and penetrations is accomplished by one of the following methods:

(1)Method 1, Pressure DecayThe test volume is established by closing the appropriate isolation valves. The volume to be tested is established by either direct measurement of liquid drained from the system or by computation. The test volume is pressurized to 1 psig. With the test volume pressure recorded at intervals dependent on magnitude of test volume, the leakage rate is computed using the following equation:Where: L i = Local leak rate, cfmTV = Test volume, ft 3 P 1 = Initial pressure, psia P 2 = Final pressure, psia T 1 = Initial temperature, R T 2 = Final temperature, R T stp = 520R P stp = 14.696 psia L i TV t--------P 1 T 1------P 2 T 2-------Tstp P stp----------

-=

6.2.6-6Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85t = Test duration, min.

(2)Method 2, Airflow (Mass Flowmeter)The test volume is established by closing the appropriate isolation valves. This method does not require the determination of the volume to be tested. The test volume is pressurized and maintained at or slightly above 15 psig. Pressure and airflow are recorded after stabilization of temperature, pressure and air flow.

(3)Method 3, WaterflowThe test volume is established by closing the appropriate isolation valves. The test volume is filled with water and vented by using the test vents and test connections provided on the containment penetrations. The test volume is pressurized and the leakage flow is measured from each valve.The acceptance criteria for the Type C test are given in the Technical Specification which complies with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.6.2.6.3 Scheduling and Re porting of Periodic TestsType A integrated containment leakage tests are performed prior to operation of the plant and at three approximately equal intervals during each 10 years of operation with the last test occurring at the end of each 10-year period. Type B and Type C leakage rate tests are performed at each refueling interval, not to exceed 24 months.Test reports are made in accordance with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 and as specified in the Technical Specifications.

6.2.6.4 Special T esting RequirementsInleakage from the Shield Building to the Reactor Building annulus is checked preoperationally, and the exhaust flow rate to maintain the annulus at the specified negative pressure is continuously monitored when containment integrity is required except during abnormal or accident conditions. During accident conditions the Shield Building inleakage is not continuously monitored. Additional discussions on the engineered safety feature portion of the secondary containment air cleanup system are given in Section 6.2.3.The effectiveness of fluid filled systems is verified by use of the systems during normal operation or periodic testing to show operability and the ability to develop required pressures.

Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-7WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.6-1 Penetrations Subjected To Type B Testing (Page 1 of 3)PenetrationDescriptionX-121EX-122E X-123E X-124E X-125E X-126E X-127E X-128E X-129E X-130E X-131E X-132E X-133E X-134E X-135E X-136E X-137E X-138E X-139E X-140E X-141E X-142E X-143E X-144E X-145E X-146E X-147E X-148E X-149E X-150E X-151E X-152E X-153E X-154E X-155E X-156E X-157E X-158E X-159ERCP No. 1 - Non-Div.RCP No. 2 - Non-Div.

RCP No. 3 - Non-Div.

RCP No. 4 - Non-Div.

480V Power - Non-Div.

480V Power A 480V Power B 480V Power A 480V Power B Control - Non-Div.

480V Power - Non-Div.

Control Rod Drive Power Control Rod Drive Power 480V Power A 480V Power A 480V Power B 480V Power B Low Level - Non-Div.

Process Instr. Protection Incore Instrumentation 480V Power A Incore Instrumentation NIS Channel III 480V Power - Non-Div.

Control Rod Pos. Detection Control Rod Drive Power Control A Process Inst. Control Low Level - Non-Div.

Annunciation and Communication NIS Channel IV 480V Power - Non-Div.

Low Level - Non-Div.

Process Inst. Control 480V Power - Non-Div.

Control B Annunciation Process Inst. Protection Process Inst. Control 6.2.6-8Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85X-160EX-161E X-163E X-164E X-165E X-166E X-167E X-168E X-169E X-170E X-171E X-172E X-173EX-174E X-1 X-2A X-2B X-3 X-54 X-79A X-13A X-13B X-13C X-13D X-12A X-12B X-12CX-12D X-17 X-107 X-14A X-14B X-14C X-14D X-15 X-20A X-20B X-21 X-22 X-24 X-40DX-79B X-8A X-8B X-8C X-8D X-30 X-32 X-33Annunciation and Communication480V Power - Non-Div.

NIS Channel I Control A Process Inst. Protection Control - Non-Div.

480V Power - Non-Div.

Control - Non-Div.

Process Inst. Protection Process Inst. Control Control - Non-Div.

Control B Control - Non-Div.NIS Channel IIEquipment Hatch (Resilient Seal)

Personnel Hatch (Resilient Seal)

Personnel Hatch (Resilient Seal)Fuel Transfer Tube (Resilient Seal)

Thimble Renewal (Resilient Seal)

Ice Blowing (Resilient Seal)

Main Steam Line (Bellows)

Main Steam Line (Bellows)

Main Steam Line (Bellows)

Main Steam Line (Bellows)

Main Feedwater Line (Bellows)

Main Feedwater Line (Bellows)

Main Feedwater Line (Bellows)Main Feedwater Line (Bellows)RHR Pump Return Line (Bellows)

RHR Pump Supply Line (Bellows)

Steam Generator Blowdown (Bellows)

Steam Generator Blowdown (Bellows)

Steam Generator Blowdown (Bellows)

Steam Generator Blowdown (Bellows)

Chemical and Volume Control System (Bellows)Low Head Safety Injection System (Bellows)

Low Head Safety Injection System (Bellows)

Safety Injection Hot Legs (Bellows)

BIT Charging Pump Discharge (Bellows)

SIS Relief Valve Discharge (Bellows)

Hydrogen Purge (Resilient Seal)Ice Blowing (Resilient Seal)Feedwater Bypass (Bellows)

Feedwater Bypass (Bellows)

Feedwater Bypass (Bellows)

Feedwater Bypass (Bellows)

Accum. To Holdup Tank (Bellows)

High Head Safety Injection System (Bellows)High Head Safety Injection System (Bellows)Table 6.2.6-1 Penetrations Subjected To Type B Testing (Page 2 of 3)PenetrationDescription Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-9WATTS BARWBNP-85 X-45 X-46 X-47A X-47B X-81 X-108 X-108 X-109 X-109 X-36 X-37 X-117 X-118RC Drain Tank (Bellows)RC Drain Tank (Bellows)

Glycol (Bellows)

Glycol (Bellows)

RC Drain Tank to Anal. (Bellows)

Testable Spare (Resilient Seal)Maintenance Port (Bellows)

Testable Spare (Resilient Seal)Maintenance Port (Bellows)

Steam Generator Cleanup (Resilient Seal)Maintenance Port (Resilient Seal)Maintenance Port (Resilient Seal)Layup Water (Resilient Seal)Table 6.2.6-1 Penetrations Subjected To Type B Testing (Page 3 of 3)PenetrationDescription 6.2.6-10Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 1 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description X-430-56 (1)30-57Lower Compt Purge Air ExhaustX-530-58 (1)30-59Inst Room Purge Air ExhaustX-630-50 (1)30-51Upper Compt Purge Air ExhaustX-730-52 (1)30-53Upper Compt Purge Air ExhaustX-9A30-730-8(1)Upper Compt Purge Air SupplyX-9B30-930-10 (1)Upper Compt Purge Air SupplyX-10A30-1430-15 (1)Lower Compt Purge Air SupplyX-10B30-1630-17 (1)Lower Compt Purge Air SupplyX-1130-1930-20 (1)Inst Room Purge Air SupplyX-1562-7262-73 62-74 62-76 62-77 62-662 (1)Chem and Vol System LetdownX-2343-31843-319PAS Cont Air Intk TR-BX-25A43-1143-12 Pressurizer Liquid SampleX-25D43-243-3Pressurizer Steam SampleX-26B52-50052-504ILRT Sensor LineX-26A52-50152-505ILRT Sensor LineX-2843-34143-834PAS Cont Sump Rtrn TR-B Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-11WATTS BARWBNP-89X-2970-8970-92 70-698CCS from RC Pump CoolersX-3063-7163-84 63-23Accum to Holdup TankX-3126-24326-1296Fire ProtectionX-3432-11032-288 32-293 Control AirX-3570-8570-703 (1)CCS from Excess Letdn HX CCS to Excess Letdn HXX-39A63-6477-868 N 2 to AccumulatorsX-39B68-30577-849 N 2 to Press Relief TankX-4177-12777-128 77-2875Floor Sump Pump DischX-4281-1281-502Press Rel Tank MakeupX-4462-6162-63 62-639From RC Pump SealsX-4577-1877-19 77-20RC Drain Tank and Prt to VHX-4677-977-10 84-530RC Drain Tank Pump DischX-47A61-19161-192 61-533 (Unit 1)61-788 (Unit 2)Glycol SupplyTable 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 2 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description 6.2.6-12Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85X-47B61-19361-194 61-680 (Unit 1)61-935 (Unit 2)Glycol ReturnX-50A70-8770-90 70-687 RCP Therm Barrier ReturnX-50B70-67970-134 RCP Therm Barrier SupplyX-5270-1401-70-100 1-70-790CCS to RC Pump CoolersX-5370-143CCS to Excess Letdown HXX-56A67-1071-67-113 1-67-1054DLower Cont ERCW SupplyX-57A67-11167-112 67-575DLower Cont ERCW ReturnX-58A67-8367-8967-1054ALower Cont ERCW SupplyX-59A67-8767-88 67-575ALower Cont ERCW ReturnX-60A67-9967-105 67-1054BLower Cont ERCW SupplyX-61A67-10367-104 67-575BLower Cont ERCW ReturnX-62A67-9167-97 67-1054CLower Cont ERCW SupplyX-63A67-9567-96 67-575CLower Cont ERCW ReturnTable 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 3 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-13WATTS BARWBNP-85X-6431-30531-306 31-3421Inst Room Chilled H 2O ReturnX-6531-30931-308 31-3407Inst Room Chilled H 2O SupplyX-6631-32631-327 31-3392Inst Room Chilled H 2O ReturnX-6731-33031-329 31-3378Inst Room Chilled H 2O SupplyX-6867-14167-580DUpper Cont ERCW SupplyX-6967-13067-580AUpper Cont ERCW SupplyX-7067-13967-297 67-585BUpper Cont ERCW ReturnX-7167-13467-29667-585CUpper Cont ERCW ReturnX-7267-14267-298 67-585DUpper Cont ERCW ReturnX-7367-13167-295 67-585AUpper Cont ERCW ReturnX-7467-13867-580BUpper Cont ERCW SupplyX-7567-13367-580CUpper Cont ERCW SupplyX-7633-713 (Unit 1)33-714 (Unit 1)33-732 (Unit 2)33-733 (Unit 2)

Service AirX-7759-52259-698Demineralized WaterTable 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 4 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description 6.2.6-14Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85X-7826-24026-1260Fire ProtectionX-8030-3730-40Lower Comp Press ReliefX-8177-1677-17RC Drain Tk to Gas AnalyzerX-8278-56078-561Refuel Cav Purification Pump SuctionX-8378-55778-558Refuel Cav Purification Pump DischargeX-84A68-30768-308Prt to Gas AnalyzerX-85A43-7543-77Ex Lt Dn Hx to Boron AnalX-85B43-2243-23Hot Leg Sample - Loops 1 & 3X-86A43-28843-287PAS Cont Air Intk TR-AX-86B43-88343-307PAS Cont Air Rtrn TR-AX-86C43-34243-841PAS Cont Sump Rtrn TR-AX-9032-10232-308 32-313Control Air TR-BX-9132-8032-298 32-303Control Air TR-AX-92A43-20743-435Hydrogen Analyzer TR-BX-92B43-20843-436Hydrogen Analyzer TR-BX-92C43-25043-251PAS Hot Leg 1 TR-AX-9343-3443-35 Accum SampleTable 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 5 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-15WATTS BARWBNP-85 Notes:(1)These isolation valves are leakage rate tested in the reverse direction. This is acceptable since the results are equivalent or more conservative.X-94B90-11090-111Upper Comp Air Mon IntakeX-94C90-10790-108 90-109Upper Comp Air Mon ReturnX-95B90-11690-117Lower Comp Air Mon IntakeX-95C90-11390-114 90-115Lower Comp Air Mon ReturnX-96A52-50652-502ILRT Sensor LineX-96B52-50752-503ILRT Sensor LineX-9730-13430-135Containment P SensorX-9943-20243-434Hydrogen Analyzer TR-AX-10043-20143-433Hydrogen Analyzer TR-AX-10543-32543-884PAS Cont Air Rtrn TR-BX-10643-31043-309PAS Hot Leg 3 TR-BX-11461-11061-122 61-745Glycol Floor Cooling (From)X-11561-9661-97 61-692Glycol Floor Cooling (To)Table 6.2.6-2 Containment Isolation Valves Subjected to Type C Testing (Page 6 of 6)

Penetration No. IsolationValve No. Description 6.2.6-16Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-85Table 6.2.6-3 Valves Exempted From Type C Leak Testing (Page 1 of 4)

Penetration No. Valve No. SystemJustificationX-8AFCV 3-236LCV 3-164 LCV 3-174 FCV 3-164AFeedwater BypassAuxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary FeedwaterNote 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-8BFCV 3-239Feedwater BypassNote 1 X-8CFCV 3-242Feedwater BypassNote 1 X-8DFCV 3-245LCV 3-171 LCV 3-175 FCV 3-171AFeedwater BypassAuxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary FeedwaterNote 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-12AFCV 3-33 ISV 41-586 Main FeedwaterS. G. LayupNote 1Note 1X-12BFCV 3-47 ISV 41-589 Main FeedwaterS. G. LayupNote 1Note 1X-12CFCV 3-87 ISV 41-592 Main FeedwaterS. G. LayupNote 1Note 1X-12DFCV 3-100 ISV 41-595 Main FeedwaterS. G. LayupNote 1Note 1X-13AFCV 1-4FCV 1-147 FCV 1-15DRV 1-536 PCV 1-5 SFV 1-522 SFV 1-523 SFV 1-524 SFV 1-525 SFV 1-526Main SteamMain Steam Main SteamMain SteamMain Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main SteamNote 1Note 1 Note 1Note 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-13BFCV 1-11FCV 1-148 PCV 1-12 DRV 1-534 SFV 1-517 SFV 1-518 SFV 1-519 SFV 1-520 SFV 1-521Main SteamMain Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main SteamNote 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-17WATTS BARWBNP-85X-13CFCV 1-22FCV 1-23 FCV 1-149 DRV 1-532 SFV 1-512 SFV 1-513 SFV 1-514 SFV 1-515 SFV 1-516Main SteamMain Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main SteamNote 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-13DFCV 1-29FCV 1-150 PCV 1-30 DRV 1-538 FCV 1-16 SFV 1-527 SFV 1-528 SFV 1-529 FCV 1-530 SFV 1-531Main SteamMain Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main SteamNote 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-14AFCV 1-14Steam Generator BlowdownNote 1 X-14BFCV 1-32Steam Generator BlowdownNote 1 X-14CFCV 1-25Steam Generator BlowdownNote 1 X-14DFCV 1-7Steam Generator BlowdownNote 1 X-1662-543*Normal ChargingNote 3 X-1763-640*63-643*

FCV 63-158RHR (Low HD SIS)RHR (Low HD SIS)

RHR (Low HD SIS)Note 2Note 2 Note 2X-19AFCV 63-072FCV 72-044 SIS (Sump Suction)CS (Sump Suction)Note 5Note 5X-19BFCV 63-073FCV 72-045 SIS (Sump Suction)CS (Sump Suction)Note 5Note 5X-20AFCV 63-11263-633*

63-635*RHR (Low HD SIS)RHR (Low HD SIS)

RHR (Low HD SIS)Note 2Note 2 Note 2X-20BFCV 63-11163-632*

63-634*RHR (Low HD SIS)RHR (Low HD SIS)

RHR (Low HD SIS)Note 2Note 2 Note 2X-21FCV 63-16763-547*

63-549*SIS (Safety Injection)Note 6Note 6 Note 6Table 6.2.6-3 Valves Exempted From Type C Leak Testing (Page 2 of 4)

Penetration No. Valve No. SystemJustification 6.2.6-18Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-91X-22FCV 63-17463-581*SIS (Charging)

SIS (Charging)Note 7Note 7 X-24X-25BX-25C X-26CX-27AX-27B X-27C X-27D68-559*30-42C130-42C230-30CC130-30CC230-43C130-43C2 30-310C1 30-310C2FCV 43-55 FCV 43-58 FCV 43-61 FCV 43-64Reactor CoolantContainment P SensorContainment P SensorContainment P SensorSG Blowdown Sample LineSG Blowdown Sample Line SG Blowdown Sample Line SG Blowdown Sample LineNote 8Note 11Note 11 Note 11Note 1Note 1 Note 1 Note 1X-32FCV 63-2163-543*

63-545*SIS (Safety Injection)SIS (Safety Injection)

SIS (Safety Injection)Note 6Note 6 Note 6Table 6.2.6-3 Valves Exempted From Type C Leak Testing (Page 3 of 4)

Penetration No. Valve No. SystemJustification Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-19WATTS BARWBNP-91*Check ValveNote 1.This penetration is directly connected to the secondary side of the steam generator. The main steam, feedwater, and steam generator blowdown lines of PWR containments are not required to be tested (see definition of Type C test in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J). These lines are assumed not to rupture as a result of an accident (missile Protected). Any leakage through these lines would be identified during operation by the leakage detection program. In addition, during a design basis accident, the secondary side would be at a higher pressure than the X-33FCV 63-12163-551 63-553 63-555 63-557SIS (Safety Injection)Note 6Note 6 Note 6 Note 6 Note 6X-40ALCV 3-156LCV 3-173 LCV 3-156AAuxiliary FeedwaterAuxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary FeedwaterNote 1Note 1 Note 1X-40BLCV 3-148LCV 3-172 LXC 3-148AAuxiliary FeedwaterAuxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary FeedwaterNote 1Note 1 Note 1X-43A62-562*CVCS (Pump Seal Injection)Note 9 X-43B62-561*CVCS (Pump Seal Injection)Note 9 X-43C62-563*CVCS (Pump Seal Injection)Note 9 X-43D62-560*CVCS (Pump Seal Injection)Note 9 X-48A72-548*Containment SprayNote 10 X-48B72-549*Containment SprayNote 10 X-49A72-562*RHR (RHR Spray)Note 10 X-49BX-85C72-563*30-45C130-45C2RHR (RHR Spray)Containment P SensorNote 10Note 11X-96CX-10730-44C130-44C2 30-311C1 30-311C2FCV 74-2FCV 74-8 RFV 74-505 FCV 63-185Containment P Sensor RHR RHR RHR SISNote 11Note 4Note 4 Note 4 Note 4Table 6.2.6-3 Valves Exempted From Type C Leak Testing (Page 4 of 4)

Penetration No. Valve No. SystemJustification 6.2.6-20Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-91containment atmosphere, thus preventing outleakage from containment. The integrity of the inside piping is also verified during the Type A test.Note 2.This penetration uses inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C testing for this penetration is not required since a continuous water seal will be provided at a pressure greater than 1.1 P a and a guaranteed 30-day water inventory. Testing will be performed in accordance with ASME XI, IWV.Note 3.This penetration uses an inboard check valve and a closed loop outside containment (CLOC) as the means of containment isolation. Type C testing for this path is not required due to the presence of a 1.1 P a pressure and a 30-day inventory criteria as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. A positive pressure preventing air outleakage is assured by the pressure applied against FCV-62-90 and FCV-62-91 (both of which receive a phase A signal) by the high-head SI pumps. Water testing for piping integrity is performed in accordance with ASME XI, IWV.Note 4.This line makes use of inboard containment isolation valves an a CLOC for containment boundaries. This penetration satisfies ANSI-N271-1976. In addition, an ASME Section XI water leakage test will be performed to verify system integrity.Note 5.This line makes use of a containment isolation valve located outside of containment and a CLOC for containment isolation boundaries. During a design basis accident, this line would be submerged under water which would preclude air outleakage. In addition, these valves are exposed to P a during each Type A test.Note 6.This line makes use of inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. These lines are postulated to be inservice post-accident and when not in use, the pumps maintain a pressure seal greater than 1.1 P a.Note 7.This line makes use of inboard containment isolation valves and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C testing is not required for the same reasons as X-21 and X-32 as stated in Note 6. Water seal is provided by the high-head pumps.Note 8.This line uses an inboard containment isolation valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries. P a during the design basis accident would not create a substantial outleakage driving force and, in any case, tend to cause the relief valves in the CLOC to seat rather than lift. The systems feeding this line are ECCS and, due either to operating pressure or static head outleakage would be prevented. This line is exposed to the P a test pressure during the Type A test.

Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-21WATTS BARWBNP-91Note 9.This line makes use of an inboard containment isolation valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries. Type C testing is not required for the same reason as given for X-16 in Note 3.Note 10.This line makes use of an inboard containment isolation valve and a CLOC for containment boundaries. An inventory test is performed to ensure a 30-day inventory at a pressure greater than 1.1 P a exists, should one spray system shut down. This will prevent outleakage of containment atmosphere.Note 11.This instrument line has a CLOC for containment boundary. This design is required as discussed in Section 6.2.4. This instrument is tested at P a during the Type A test.

6.2.6-22Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-88Table 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 1 of 7)Penetration Description Status A. PENETRATION STATUS DURING TEST PERFORMANCE X-1 X-2A X-2B X-3 X-4 X-5 X-6 X-7 X-8 X-8A X-8B X-8C X-8D X-9A X-9B X-10A X-10BX-11 X-12A X-12B X-12C X-12D X-13A X-13B X-13C X-13D X-14A X-14B X-14C X-14D X-15 X-16 X-17 X-18 X-19A X-19B X-20AEquipment HatchElevation 719'- 4" Air LockElevation 760'- 4" Air Lock Fuel Transfer TubeHeating and Ventilating Air FlowHeating and Ventilating Air Flow Heating and Ventilating Air FlowHeating and Ventilating Air FlowSeal Welded Spare Feedwater BypassFeedwater BypassFeedwater Bypass Feedwater BypassHeating and Ventilating Air FlowHeating and Ventilating Air Flow Heating and Ventilating Air FlowHeating and Ventilating Air FlowHeating and Ventilating Air Flow Feedwater SystemFeedwater SystemFeedwater System Feedwater SystemMain and Reheat Steam SystemMain and Reheat Steam System Main and Reheat Steam SystemMain and Reheat Steam SystemSteam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Blowdown SystemSteam Generator Blowdown SystemSteam Generator Blowdown System Chemical and Volume Control SystemChemical and Volume Control SystemResidual Heat Removal System Seal Welded SpareSafety Injection SystemSafety Injection System Safety Injection System Closed Closed Closed ClosedVentedVented VentedVentedVented (see Note 1)

Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupVentedVented VentedVentedVented Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Drained & VentedNormal LineupNormal Lineup Vented (see Note 1)Normal LineupNormal Lineup Normal Lineup Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-23WATTS BARWBNP-88 X-20B X-21 X-22 X-23 X-24 X-25A X-25B X-25C X-25D X-26A X-26B X-26C X-27A X-27B X-27C X-27D X-28 X-29 X-30 X-31 X-32 X-33 X-34 X-35 X-36 X-37 X-38 X-39A X-39B X-39C X-39D X-40A X-40B X-40C X-40D X-41 X-42 X-43A X-43B X-43C X-43D X-44 X-45 X-46Safety Injection SystemSafety Injection System Safety Injection SystemPAS Cont. Air Intk LC Tr-BReactor Coolant System Radiation SystemContainment P Sensor (PdT30-42)Containment P Sensor (PdT30-30c)Radiation Sampling SystemILRT Sensor LineILRT Sensor Line Containment P Sensor (PdT30-43)Radiation Sampling SystemRadiation Sampling System Radiation Sampling SystemRadiation Sampling SystemPAS Cont. Sump Return Tr-B Component Cooling SystemSafety Injection SystemFire Protection Safety Injection SystemSafety Injection SystemControl Air System Component Cooling Water SystemSG Chem. CleaningMaintenance Port Seal Welded SpareWaste Disposal SystemWaste Disposal System Seal Welded SpareSeal Welded SpareAuxiliary Feedwater System Auxiliary Feedwater SystemSeal Welded SpareHydrogen Purge Waste Disposal SystemPrimary Water SystemChemical and Volume Control System Chemical and Volume Control SystemChemical and Volume Control SystemChemical and Volume Control System Chemical and Volume Control SystemWaste Disposal SystemWaste Disposal SystemNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupVented Normal Lineup Drained & VentedVentedVented Drained & VentedIn Use (see Note 2)In Use (see Note 2)

VentedNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupNormal LineupDrained & Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Normal LineupNormal LineupVented Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)VentedVented Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Normal Lineup Normal LineupVented (see Note 1)Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedNormal Lineup Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Drained & VentedVentedDrained and VentedTable 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 2 of 7)Penetration Description Status 6.2.6-24Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-88 X-47A X-47B X-48A X-48B X-49A X-49B X-50A X-50B X-51 X-52 X-53 X-54 X-55 X-56A X-56B X-57A X-57B X-58A X-58B X-59A X-59B X-60A X-60B X-61A X-61B X-62A X-62B X-63A X-63B X-64 X-65 X-66 X-67 X-68 X-69 X-70 X-71 X-72 X-73 X-74 X-75 X-76 X-77Ice Condenser SystemIce Condenser System Containment Spray SystemContainment Spray SystemContainment Spray System Containment Spray SystemComponent Cooling SystemComponent Cooling System Seal Welded SpareComponent Cooling SystemComponent Cooling System Thimble RenewalSeal Welded SpareEssential Raw Cooling Water Seal Welded SpareEssential Raw Cooling WaterSeal Welded Spare Essential Raw Cooling Water RCS Pressure SensorEssential Raw Cooling Water Seal Welded SpareEssential Raw Cooling WaterSeal Welded Spare Essential Raw Cooling WaterSeal Welded SpareEssential Raw Cooling Water Seal Welded SpareEssential Raw Cooling WaterSeal Welded Spare Air Conditioning SystemAir Conditioning SystemAir Conditioning System Air Conditioning SystemEssential Raw Cooling WaterEssential Raw Cooling Water Essential Raw Cooling WaterEssential Raw Cooling WaterEssential Raw Cooling Water Essential Raw Cooling WaterEssential Raw Cooling WaterEssential Raw Cooling Water Control and Service Air SystemDemineralized Water and Cask DeconIn UseIn Use Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Normal LineupDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Vented (see Note 1)Drained & VentedDrained & Vented In UseVented (see Note 1)Drained & Vented Vented (see Note 1)Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)

Drained & VentedNormal LineupDrained & Vented Vented (see Note 1)Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)

Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)Drained & Vented Vented (see Note 1)Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)

Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented VentedDrained & VentedTable 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 3 of 7)Penetration Description Status Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-25WATTS BARWBNP-88 X-78 X-79A X-79B X-80 X-81 X-82 X-83 X-84A X-84B X-84C X-84D X-85A X-85B X-85C X-85D X-86A X-86B X-86C X-86D X-87A X-87B X-87C X-87D X-88 X-89 X-90 X-91 X-92A X-92B X-92C X-92D X-93 X-94A X-94B X-94C X-95A X-95B X-95C X-96A X-96B X-96C X-97 X-98Fire ProtectionIce Blowing

Negative ReturnHeating and Ventilating Air FlowWaste Disposal System Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleaning SystemFuel Pool Cooling and Cleaning SystemRadiation Sampling System RVLISRVLISRVLIS Radiation Sampling SystemRadiation Sampling SystemContainment P Sensor (PdT30-45)Seal Welded SparePAS Cont. Air Intk UC Tr-APAS Cont. Air Rtrn Tr-A PAS Cont. Sump Rtrn Tr-ASeal Welded SpareSeal Welded Spare RVLISRVLISRVLIS Seal Welded SpareSeal Welded SpareControl Air System Tr-B Control Air System Tr-AHydrogen Analyzer Tr-BHydrogen Analyzer Tr-B PAS Hot Leg 1 Tr-ASeal Welded SpareRadiation Sampling System Seal Welded SpareRadiation Monitoring SystemRadiation Monitoring System Seal Welded SpareRadiation Monitoring SystemRadiation Monitoring System ILRT Sensor LineILRT Sensor LineContainment P Sensor (Pdt 30-44)Containment P Sensor (PdT30-133)Seal Welded SpareDrained & VentedVented VentedVentedDrained & Vented Drained & VentedDrained & VentedDrained & Vented Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Drained & VentedDrained & VentedVented Vented (see Note 1)VentedVented Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1) Vented (see Note 1)

Normal LineupNormal LineupNormal Lineup Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented VentedVentedVented Drained & VentedVented (see Note 1)Drained & Vented Vented (see Note 1)VentedVented Vented (see Note 1)VentedVented In Use (see Note 2)In Use (see Note 2)Vented VentedVented (see Note 1)Table 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 4 of 7)Penetration Description Status 6.2.6-26Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-88 X-99X-100 X-101 X-102 X-103 X-104 X-105 X-106 X-107 X-108 X-109 X-110 X-111 X-112 X-113 X-114 X-115 X-116 X-117 X-118 X-119 X-120 X-121E X-122E X-123E X-124E X-125E X-126E X-127E X-128E X-129E X-130E X-131E X-132E X-133E X-134E X-135E X-136E X-137E X-138E X-139E X-140E X-141E X-142EHydrogen Analyzer Tr-AHydrogen Analyzer Tr-A Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare PAS Cont. Air Rtrn Tr-B PAS Hot Leg 3 Tr-B Residual Heat Removal System Maintenance Port Maintenance Port Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Ice Condenser System Ice Condenser System Seal Welded Spare Maintenance Port Layup Water Treatment Seal Welded Spare Seal Welded Spare Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationVented Vented Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented Drained & Vented

Normal Lineup Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)In Use In UseVented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

In Use Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1) Table 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 5 of 7)Penetration Description Status Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.6-27WATTS BARWBNP-88 X-143E X-144E X-145E X-146E X-147E X-148E X-149E X-150E X-151E X-152E X-153E X-154E X-155E X-156E X-157E X-158E X-159E X-160E X-161E X-162E X-163E X-164E X-165E X-166E X-167E X-168E X-169E X-170E X-171F X-172E X-173E X-174EElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationSeal Welded Spare Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical Penetration Electrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationElectrical PenetrationVented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)

Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Vented (see Note 1)Table 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 6 of 7)Penetration Description Status 6.2.6-28Containment Leakage Testing WATTS BARWBNP-88 Notes:1.These penetrations are closed. Venting is provided by the design of the penetration such that any leakage is detectable by the integrated leak rate test.2.These penetrations are designed to facilitate ILRT performance. It may not be necessary to utilize all of the penetrations. If not in use, the penetration is vented.Watts Bar FSAR Section 6.0 Containment Leakage Testing B.TESTABLE PENETRATIONS REQUIRED TO BE INSERVICE DURING TEST PERFORMANCE X-26A X-26B X-47A X-47B X-54 X-96A X-96BIntegrated Leak Rate TestIce Condenser SystemIce Condenser SystemThimble RenewalIntegrated Leak Rate TestIsolation valves required to be open to monitor containment pressure (see Note 2)

Glycol cooling supply to air handling units in ice condenser required to ensure ice condition is maintainedSame as X-47AUsed as pressuriza-tion point for air compressorsIsolation valves required to be open to monitor containment pressure (see Note 2)

X-107X-114 X-115X-118Residual Heat Removal SystemIce Condenser System Ice Condenser System HatchResidual heat removal system required inservice to remove decay heat from fuelGlycol return from air handling units required to ensure ice condition is maintainedSame as X-114Used as source for verification flow and post-test depressurization; opened during DBF event to drain water from annulus to Reactor Building floor and equipment drain sumpTable 6.2.6-4 Containment Vessel Pressure And Leak Test Reactor Building Containment Penetration Status (Page 7 of 7)Penetration Description Status