IR 05000416/2011004
| ML113140185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2011 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Mike Perito Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-11-004 | |
| Download: ML113140185 (57) | |
Text
November 9, 2011
Mike Perito Vice President Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Subject: GRAND GULF
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000416/2011004
Dear Mr. Perito:
On September 27, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 11, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified three issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has determined that violations are associated with these issues.
Additionally, one licensee
-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as a noncited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the significance of the noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555
-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011
-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555
-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility. In addition, if you disagree with the cross
-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this U N I T E D S T A T E S N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N R E G I O N I V 6 12 EAST LAMAR BLVD
, S U I T E 4 0 0 A R L I N G T O N , T E X A S 7 6 0 1 1-4125 Entergy Operations, Inc. inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Sincerely,RC Hagar for VGaddy Vincent Gaddy, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50
-416 License: NPF
-29
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2011004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information Distribution via Listse rv for GGNS Entergy Operations, Inc. Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Rich.Smith@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Blake.Rice@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/C (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/C (Rayomand.Kumana@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/C (Jonathan.Braisted@nrc.gov)
GG Administrative Assistant (Alley.Farrell@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Alan.Wang@nrc.gov)
Acting Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov
) RIV/ETA: OEDO (Mark.Franke@nrc.gov)
DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
OEMail Resource ROPreports File located: R:
\_REACTORS\_GG\20 11\GG 2011004 RP-RLS.docx SUNSI Rev Compl.
Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials VGG Publicly Avail Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials VGG SRI:DRP/PBC RI:DRP/PBC SPE:DRP/P BC C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 RLSmith BBRice BHagar TRFarnholtz NFO'Keefe E-RLS FOR RCH E-RLS FOR RCH /RA/ RLM FOR VGG
/RA/ 11/9/11 11/9/11 11/8/11 10/26/11 10/26/11 C:DRS/OB AC:TSS C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRP/C MHaire DPowers MHay GEWerner VGaddy /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ RCH FOR VGG 10/21/11 11/9/11 11/8/11 11/8/11 11/9/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E
-mail F=Fax Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000416 License: NPF-29 Report: 05000416/2011004 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: 7003 Baldhill Road Port Gibson, MS 39150 Dates: June 28, 2011
, through September 27, 2011 Inspectors:
R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector B. Rice, Resident Inspector B. Baca, Health Physicist L. Carson II, Senior Health Physicist N. Greene, Ph.D., Health Physicist B. Larson, Senior Operations Engineer C. Steely, Operations Engine er Approved By:
Vincent Gaddy, Chief Reactor Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000 416/2011004; 06/28 - 09/27/2011
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Integrated Resident Report and Regional Report;
Operability Evaluatio ns and Identification and Resolution of Problems. The report covered a 3
-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and two announced baseline inspection s by region al inspector s. Three Green , noncited violations of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Component s Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG
-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Green.
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for inadequate preventative maintenance instructions, which resulted in the loss of control of the fuel handling bridge in the spent fuel pool. On July 15, 2011, while moving spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to the dry cask loading pool, the fuel handling platform did not stop when the paddle switch was released from the reverse position. The paddle switch did not return to the neutral position as designed, and the bridge continued to move in the reverse direction. The fuel handling bridge tripped the zone limit switches and came to a stop. The licensee concluded that the switches ha d to be cleaned, adjusted, and re-greased periodically to ensure proper operation. Immediate corrective actions included replacing the paddle switch and revising the preventive maintenance instruction to clean and re-grease the paddle switch before every dry cask fuel campaign. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-04896. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected cornerstone's objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity because the fuel handling bridge movement was arrested prior to coming in contact with the spent fuel pool wall. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operational experience component because the licensee failed to evaluate the need to update the preventative maintenance procedure for known issues associated with the fuel handling bridge paddle switch prior to the implementation of the dry fuel storage campaign P.2(b) (Section 4OA2).
- Green.
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to install the correct amperage fuses in the hydrogen igniter control circuit. On August 4, 2011, the inspectors were performing an operability review of a condition report dealing with the division 1 hydrogen igniters. The licensee had determined that half the division 1 hydrogen igniters would not energize, and in their investigation, they determined that the loss of power to the hydrogen igniters was due to a blown fuse. The licensee also determined that the blown fuse was 0.3 amps and should have been 0.8 amps per plant drawings. The licensee performed an operability determination for the "as found" condition and determined that the circuit required 0.193 amps to power the circuit, which included the light bulbs. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination and the calculations and determined that the licensee's conclusions were reasonable. The licensee immediate corrective action was to replace the incorrect fuses one division at a time with the correct size 0.8 amp fuses and restore the hydrogen igniters to operable status. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-005388. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone's objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," inspectors determined that Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process," was required. Inspectors determined that this was a type B finding and, using section 6.0, determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because during their review, the inspectors noted that the hydrogen igniters had maintain functionality over the life of the plant based on satisfactory surveillance tests and no previous failures. Therefore, the exposed time for the de-energized hydrogen igniters was less than 3 days, resulting in very low safety significance.
The Appendix H evaluation and the final risk significance determination were reviewed and concurred on by a regional senior reactor analyst.
This issue is a latent issue associated with original plant equipment and is not indicative of current performance; therefore, no cross-cutting aspect was identified (Section 1R15).
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that required them to evaluate components of critical systems in order to establish a preventive maintenance strategy, which resulted in unscheduled unavailability of safety-related systems and associated unscheduled entries into 72
-hour shutdown Technical Specification action statements. The inspectors noted the following two examples dealing with failures of safety related equipment, which resulted in entering into shutdown limiting condition of operation. On June 2, 2011, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a failure of a relay in the standby service water B pump house ventilation system, which rendered the standby service water B system inoperable. The immediate corrective actions were to replace the relays and to restore the ventilation system. On June 22, 2011, the station experienced a failure of a motor contactor coil on breaker 52
-154128, which caused the engineered safety feature electrical switchgear room cooler fan coil unit 1T46B003A not to run. The maintenance personnel determined the failure was due to a burnt motor contactor coil. The immediate corrective action was to replace the contactor coil and restore the room cooler. In both cases, the failed equipment was original plant equipment and preventive maintenance measures had not been established. The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR
-GGN-2011-3730 and CR
-GGN-2011-4313. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone's objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification's allowed outage time. This issue is a latent issue associated with original plant equipment and is not indicative of current performance; therefore, no cross-cutting aspect was identified (Section 4OA2).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors.
Corrective actions , taken or planned by the licensee, have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Th e violation and condition report are listed in Section 4OA7.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station began the inspection period at 60 percent rated thermal power due to fuel leak location testing, which began the previous quarter.
During the inspection period, the plant was limited to 96 percent power due to the isolation of the second
-stage steam to both the A and B moisture separator reheaters on January 9, 2011.
On June 29, 2011, after locating and suppressing the fuel leak , the plant was returned to 96 percent power.
On July 9, 2011, operators reduced power to 63 percent for a planned control rod sequence exchange, control rod testing, and turbine testing. The plant was returned to 96 percent power on July 10, 2011.
On August 5, 2011, operators reduced power to 75 percent for control rod testing, control rod friction testing and turbine testing. The plant was returned to 96 percent power on August 7, 2011.
On August 12, 2011, operators reduced power to 94.5 percent to remove the heater drain pump B from service to repair a steam leak on a pipe plug on the pump casing.
The plant was returned to 96 percent power the same day
.
On September 1, 2011, operators reduced power to 85 percent for planned control rod testing and turbine testing. The plant was returned to 96 percent power on September 2,
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
1R04 Equipment Alignments
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk
-significant systems: Inspection Scope Standby gas treatment system A during a maintenance outage of standby gas treatment system B Standby fresh air system B during a surveillance run of standby fresh air system A
Division 3 emergency diesel generator following a surveillance run The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours
a. The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk
-significant plant areas:
Inspection Scope Division 1 switchgear room (OC202) Division 2 switchgear room (OC215) Division 1 and 2 remote shutdown rooms and division 3 switch gear room (OC208, OC208A , and OC210) Division 1 and 2 reactor protection motor generator set rooms (OC407, OC409, OC707 , and OC709)
Upper and lower cable spreading rooms (OC401, OC410 and OC702)
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed
- that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five quarterly fire
-protection inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05. b. No findings were identifie
d. Findings
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Quarterly Review
a.
On August 3, 2011, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
Inspection Scope Licensed operator performance Crew's clarity and formality of communications Crew's ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction Crew's prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms
Crew's correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures Control board manipulati ons Oversight and direction from supervisors Crew's ability to identify and implement appropriate technical specification actions and emergency plan actions and notifications The inspectors compared the crew's performance in these areas to pre
-establish ed operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed
-operator requalificati on program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.2 Biennial Inspection
The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are conducted over a 2
-year period.
In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.
a. Inspection Scope
To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification program, the inspectors conducted personnel interviews, reviewed both the operating tests and written examinations, and observed ongoing operating test activities.
The inspectors interviewed three licensee personnel, consisting of one operator, one instructor, and one senior operator, to determine their understanding of the policies and practices for administering requalification examinations. The inspectors also reviewed operator performance on the written exams and operating tests. These reviews included observations of portions of the operating tests by the inspectors. The operating tests observed included six job performance measures and two scenarios that were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the inspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator mastery of the training program content. The inspectors also reviewed medical records of six licensed operators for conformance to license conditions, the licensee's system for tracking qualifications
, and records of license reactivation for five operators.
The results of these examinations were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's appraisal of operator performance and to determine if feedback of performance analysis into the requalification training program was being accomplished. The inspectors interviewed members of the training department and reviewed minutes of training review group meetings to assess the responsiveness of the licensed operator requalification program to incorporate the lessons learned from both plant and industry events. Examination results were also assessed to determine if they were consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors", Revision 9, Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process."
In addition to the above, the inspectors reviewed examination security measures, simulator fidelity, and existing logs of simulator deficiencies.
On September 6, 2011, the licensee informed the lead inspector of the biennial examination results. The inspector compared these results to Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process."
The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator requalification program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant system
- Inspection Scope Neutron monitoring system (C51)
The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
Implementing appropriate work practices Identifying and addressing common cause failures
Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(b) Characterizing system reliability issues for performance Charging unavailability for performance
Trending key parameters for condition monitoring Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(1) or
-(a)(2) Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(1)
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors also performed a review of the (a)(3) Periodic Evaluation. This review is credited as an inspection sample.
These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety
-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
Inspection Scope The week of July 11, 2011, while the plant placed the mitigating monitor system in service after a design change The week of August 1, 2011, while the plant performed a system outage on the standby gas treatment system B The week of August 22, 2011, while the plant performed maintenance outage on the diesel driven fire pump A and the division 1 containment and drywell hydrogen analyzers The week of September 19, 2011, during emergent issues with a bearing replacement for reactor protection system motor generator set B
, resulting in the licensee having to enter yellow risk The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
Inspection Scope The interface of the mitigating monitoring system and the plant chilled water system not having a radiation monitor on the plant chill ed water system Standby service water system B degraded bolts on return flange Hydrogen igniter division 1 fuse failure Anticipated transient without a scram alternate rod insertion degraded batteries The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Update Final Safety Analysis Report to the licensee personnel's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four operability evaluations inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-04.
b. Findings
Introduction
. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to install the correct amperage fuses in the hydrogen igniter control circuit.
Description
. On August 4, 2011, the inspectors were performing an operability review of condition report CR
-GGN-2011-05388. Night shift operators were attempting to run the division 1 hydrogen igniters and determined that half the division 1 igniters would not energize.
The licensee investigated the loss of power to the igniters and determined that one of the fuses for the division 1 hydrogen igniter control circuit had blown. The licensee also determined that the blown fuse was 0.3 amps and should have been 0.8 amps per plant drawings. The shift manager declared the division 1 hydrogen igniters inoperable and entered the 30 day shutdown limiting condition of operation. The shift manager directed the maintenance department to replace the blown fuse with an available 0.3 amp fuse until engineering could perform an evaluation of the circuit while keeping the division 1 hydrogen igniters in an inoperable status. Through a review of site drawings and calculations, it was determined that the correct fuse size for the circuit was 0.8 amps. The licensee performed an operability determination for the condition and determined that the circuit required 0.193 amps to power the circuit, which included the light bulbs. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination and the calculations and determined that the licensee's conclusions were reasonable. The licensee replaced the incorrect fuses one division at a time with the correct size 0.8 amp fuses and restored the hydrogen igniters to operable status.
The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-05388. The short term corrective action included replacing the fuses with the correct size. Additionally, the licensee conducted a review of their documents to determine when the wrong fuses were installed.
The licensee concluded that wrong fuses were installed at plant startup.
Analysis.
The inspectors determined that the failure to install the correct size fuse in the control circuit of the hydrogen igniters is a performance deficiency.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone's objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," inspectors determined that Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process," was required. Inspectors determined that this was a type B finding and, using section 6.0, determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because during their review, the inspectors noted that the hydrogen igniters had maintain ed functionality over the life of the plant based on satisfactory surveillance tests and had no previous failures. Therefore, the exposed time for the de
-energized hydrogen igniters was less than 3 days
, resulting in very low safety significance.
The Appendix H evaluation and the final risk significance determination was reviewed and concurred on by a regional senior reactor analyst.
This issue is a latent issue associated with original plant equipment and is not indicative of current performance; therefore no cross
-cutting aspect was identified.
Enforcement.
Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review of suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety
-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Contrary to the above, on August 4, 2011, and before, the licensee failed to ensure t he correct fuses were in installed in the hydrogen igniter control circuits during the startup of the plant. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGN-2011-05388. Because this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000416/2011004
-01, "Failure to Ensure Correct Fuses were Installed in the Hydrogen Igniter Control Circuits."
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing
a. The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
Inspection Scope Standby gas treatment system B after scheduled maintenance Diesel driven fire pump A after scheduled maintenance Standby service water system B fan C after scheduled maintenance Containmen t inner door seal after scheduled maintenance Reactor protection system A and reactor protection system B motor generator set after breaker work on A and bearing replacement on B motor generator set Safety related switchgear room ventilation fan bearing replacement The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following: The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Update Final Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of six postmaintenance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities liste d below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:
Preconditioning
Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures
Jumper/lifted lead controls Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability Test equipment removal Restoration of plant systems
Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements Updating of performance indicator data
Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems, structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct Reference setting data
Annunciators and alarms set
-points The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
On July 5, 2011, division 2, 125 Vdc battery charger 1B4 On August 3, 2011, residual heat removal A quarterly inservice test On August 13, 2011, containment isolation valves 1E61
-F009 and 1E61
-F010 On September 16, 2011, division 3 high pressure core spray diesel generator On September 20, 2011, main steam line high flow functional test channels 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 1C, 2C, 3C
, and 4C Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five surveillance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on July 19, 2011, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the control room simulator and the emergency operations facilit y to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector
-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone:
Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
2RS0 6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
a. Inspection Scope
This area was inspected to: (1) ensure the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems are maintained so radiological discharges are properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure; (2) ensure abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when effluent radiation monitors are out
-of-service, are controlled in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and licensee procedures; (3) verify the licensee's quality control program ensures the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements are satisfied so discharges of radioactive materials are adequately quantified and evaluated; and (4) verify the adequacy of public dose projections resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and I; 40 CFR Part 190; the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and licensee procedures required by the Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed and/or observed the following items:
Radiological effluent release reports since the previous inspection and reports related to the effluent program issued since the previous inspection, if any Effluent program implementing procedures, including sampling, monitor setpoint determinations and dose calculations Equipment configuration and flow paths of selected gaseous and liquid discharge system components, filtered ventilation system material condition, and significant changes to their effluent release points, if any, and associated 10 CFR Part 50.59 reviews Selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents (including sample collection and analysis)
Controls used to ensure representative sampling and appropriate compensatory sampling Results of the inter
-laboratory comparison program Effluent stack flow rates Surveillance test results of technical specification
-required ventilation effluent discharge systems since the previous inspection Significant changes in reported dose values, if any A selection of radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits Part 61 analyses and methods used to determine which isotopes are included in the source term Offsite dose calculation manual changes, if any Meteorological dispersion and deposition factors Latest land use census Records of abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges, if any Groundwater monitoring results Changes to the licensee's written program for indentifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to groundwater, if any Identified leakage or spill events and entries made into 10 CFR Part 50.75 (g) records, if any, and associated evaluations of the extent of the contamination and the radiological source ter m Offsite notifications
, and reports of events associated with spills, leaks, or groundwater monitoring results, if any Audits, self
-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS0 7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
a. Inspection Scope
This area was inspected to: (1) ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program verifies the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validates the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program; (2) verify that the radiological environmental monitoring program is implemented consistent with the licensee's technical specifications and/or offsite dose calculation manual, and to validate that the radioactive effluent release program meets the design objective contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; and (3)ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program monitors non
-effluent exposure pathways, is based on sound principles and assumptions, and validates that doses to members of the public are within the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 190, as applicable. The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following items: Annual environmental monitoring reports and offsite dose calculation manual Selected air sampling and thermoluminescence dosimeter monitoring stations Collection and preparation of environmental samples Operability, calibration, and maintenance of meteorological instruments Selected events documented in the annual environmental monitoring report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost thermoluminescence dosimeter, or anomalous measurement Selected structures, systems, or components that may contain licensed material and have a credible mechanism for licensed material to reach ground water Records required by 10 CFR Part 50.75(g)
Significant changes made by the licensee to the offsite dose calculation manual as the result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection Calibration and maintenance records for selected air samplers, composite water samplers, and environmental sample radiation measurement instrumentation Inter-laboratory comparison program results
Audits, self
-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to the radiological environmental monitoring program since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.07-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS0 8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
a. Inspection Scope
This area was inspected to verify the effectiveness of the licensee's programs for processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material. The inspectors used the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180 for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items: The solid radioactive waste system description, process control program, and the scope of the licensee's audit program Control of radioactive waste storage areas including container labeling/marking and monitoring containers for deformation or signs of waste decomposition Changes to the liquid and solid waste processing system configuration including a review of waste processing equipment that is not operational or abandoned in place Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult
-to-measure radionuclides Processes for waste classification including use of scaling factors and 10 CFR Part 61 analysis Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking, driver instructing, and preparation of the disposal manifest Audits, self
-assessments, reports, and corrective action reports radioactive solid waste processing, and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation performed since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.08-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Data Submission Issue
a. The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the second quarter 2011 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."
Inspection Scope This review was performed as part of the inspectors' normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed. Inspection Scope These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow
-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspector s accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.3 Selected Issue Follow
-up Inspection
- Inadequate Preventive Maintenance for the Refueling Platform
a. Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensee's corrective action program, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting a loss of control of the fuel handling bridge during the licensee's dry cask storage campaign. The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and associated corrective actions.
These activities constitute completion of one in
-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors reviewed a self
-revealing, Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for inadequate preventative maintenance instructions, which resulted in the loss of control of the fuel handling bridge in the spent fuel pool.
Description.
On July 15, 2011, while moving spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to the dry cask loading pool, the fuel handling platform did not stop when the paddle switch was released from the reverse position. The fuel handling platform is electrically controlled by a paddle switch that can be moved in the forward and reverse direction and has a spring return to neutral. When the fuel handling operator releases the paddle, it should return to neutral, which stops the movement of the motor. The bridge then coasts to a neutral state until the brak e sets and stops the bridge. The fuel handling bridge was entering the horizontal fuel transfer canal when the operator released the paddle switch from the reverse position. The paddle switch did not return to the neutral position as designed, and the bridge continued to move in the reverse direction. Efforts to bring the bridge to a stop by manipulating the paddle switch to the forward direction failed to prevent the bridge from tripping the zone limit switch. When the zone limit switch was actuated, the motor returned to a neutral state, and the bridge stopped as designed. The zone limit switch is the last defense preventing the fuel handling bridge from colliding into the fuel pool wall, and it performed its function as designed.
The licensee determined that the fuel bridge did not stop when the paddle was released because the paddle switch was stuck in the reverse direction. The licensee was aware that the fuel handling bridge paddle switches were prone to sticking for various reasons. In 2001, a condition report was written documenting that the grease used in the paddle switches can evaporate and become sticky over time. Furthermore, dust and moisture can affect the lubrication capability of the grease. The licensee concluded that the switches have to be cleaned, adjusted, and re
-greased periodically to ensure proper operation. The preventative maintenance strategy the licensee developed was based on an 18-month period to coincide with refueling outages. During the implementation of the dry fuel storage campaign, which occurs between refueling outages, the licensee did not perform the preventative maintenance on the paddle switch prior to utilizing the fuel handling bridge.
The licensee documented this issue in Condition Report CR
-GGN-2011-04896. Corrective actions included replacing the paddle switch and adjusting the preventive maintenance instructions to include cleaning and re
-greasing the paddle switch on the fuel handling platform before every dry fuel cask campaign.
Analysis.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement preventative maintenance prior to using the fuel handling bridge in support of the dry fuel storage campaign is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone's objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity because the fuel handling bridge movement was arrested prior to coming in contact with the spent fuel pool wall. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operational experience component because the licensee failed to evaluate the need to update the preventative maintenance procedure for known issues associated with the fuel handling bridge paddle switch prior to the implementation of the dry fuel storage campaign P.2(b).
Enforcement.
Title 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, states, in part, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures and drawings." Contrary to the above, on and before July 15, 2011, the licensee failed to prescribe preventative maintenance instructions for the fuel handling bridge paddle switch prior to implementing the dry cask loading campaign. The finding was entered into the corrective action program Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-04896. Because the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000416/2011004
-02, "Failure to Perform Preventativ e Maintenance on the Fuel Handling Bridge Paddle Switch."
.4 Selected Issue Follow
-up Inspection: Inadequate Preventive Maintenance for the Critical Equipment a. During a review of items entered in the licensee's corrective action program, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting excessive relay cycling associated with NUS thermal switches. The inspectors reviewed apparent cause evaluations and associated corrective actions.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152
-05.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors reviewed a self
-revealing, Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that required them to evaluate components of critical systems in order to establish a preventive maintenance strategy, which resulted in unscheduled unavailability of safety
-related systems and associated unscheduled entries into 72
-hour shutdown Technical Specification action statements.
Description.
While reviewing condition reports associated with NUS thermal switches, the inspectors noted the following two examples of failures of safety related equipment that occurred as a result of the licensee's failure to perform appropriate preventive maintenance on components:
On June 2, 2011, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a failure of a relay in the standby service water B pump house ventilation system, which rendered the standby service water B system inoperable. The immediate corrective actions were to replace the relays and to restore the ventilation system.
On June 22, 2011, the station experienced a failure of a motor contactor coil on breaker 52
-154128, which caused the engineered safety feature electrical switchgear room cooler fan coil unit 1T46B003A not to run. The immediate corrective action was to replace the contactor coil and to restore the room cooler.
In both cases, the failed components were original plant equipment. The inspectors determined that the failed components were correctly classified as high
-critical, but that the licensee had not established the need for any preventive
-maintenance measures for these components as required by procedure.. The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR
-GGN-2011-3730 and CR
-GGN-2011-4313. Immediate corrective actions implemented by the licensee included establishing preventive maintenance measures for the failed equipment and identifying any additional components that were used in critical systems that had not been previously identified.
Procedure EN
-DC-335, Rev. 3, "PM Basis Template," requires the licensee to perform preventive
-maintenance evaluations for all high-critical components. Procedure EN-DC-153, "Preventive Maintenance Component Classification," revision 6, says that any component whose failure causes the unit to enter a 72
-hour shutdown Technical Specification action statement is a high
-critical component.
Analys is. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to follow procedure EN
-DC-335 and evaluate the damper relays in the standby service water B pump house ventilation system and contactor coils in breaker 52
-154128 for preventative maintenance was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone's objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification's allowed outage time
. This issue is a latent issue associated with original plant equipment, so its cause is not indicative of current performance; therefore, no cross
-cutting aspect was identified.
Enforcement.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements," Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9a, includes procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Procedure EN-DC-335, Rev. 3, "PM Basis Template," requires a preventive maintenance basis template be applied to all critical components.
Contrary to the above, before June 2, 2011, the licensee failed to apply a preventive maintenance basis template to two critical components, in that:
damper relays in the standby service water B pump house ventilation system and contactor coils in breaker 52
-154128 were high
-critical components, and the licensee failed to apply preventive maintenance basis template to damper relays in the standby service water B pump house ventilation system and contactor coils in breaker 52
-154128.
The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR
-GGN-2011-3730 and CR-GGN-2011-4313. Because this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the NRC Enforcement Policy:
-03, "Failure to Establish Preventive Maintenance for Components Used in Critical Applications."
.5 In-depth Review of Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensee
's implementation of their process used to identify, document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant transients or accidents.
The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of operator workarounds. The documents listed in the attachment were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the inspection procedure. The inspectors reviewed current operational challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into their corrective action program
, and had proposed or implemented appropriate and timely corrective actions, which addressed each issue. Reviews were conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the possibility of an initiating event, if the challenge was contrary to training, required a change from long
-standing operational practices, or if it created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally, all temporary modifications were reviewed to identify any potential effect on the functionality of mitigating systems, impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was not designed. Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and operator aids or tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified operator workarounds.
These activities constitute completion of one operator workarounds annual inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow
-up (71153)
.1 Reactor Protection System Power Supply Issues
On September 3, 2011, the output breaker on the division 2 reactor protection system motor generator set tripped, causing a division 2 half scram. The operators responded by entering the "Loss of RPS Bus," off normal event procedure and transferred the reactor protection system to the alternate power supply, reset the half scram
, and exited the off normal event procedure. On September 11, 2011, while the reactor protection system B was still aligned with the alternate power supply, the division 1 reactor protector system motor generator set electrical protection assembly breaker C71S003C tripped, causing a division 1 half scram. The operators declared the electrical protection assembly breaker inoperable and entered an unplanned 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition of operation. The operators reset the electrical protection assembly breaker and re
-energized the motor generator set to supply power to the division 1 reactor protection system and reset the half scram. The operators remained in the limiting condition of operation until the cause of the electrical protection assembly breaker trip could be determined.
The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and reactor protection system operating instruction prohibited placing both divisions of the reactor protection system on the alternate power supply concurrently. The licensee proceeded down three parallel paths to exit the limiting condition of operation, one of which was to change the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and station procedures via the 10 CFR Part 50.59 process to allow the concurrent use of alternate power supply for both divisions of the reactor protection systems. On September 13, 2011, the licensee completed the process applicability determination that allowed the change to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and plant procedures. Prior to the expiration of the limiting condition of operation, the operators aligned the division 1 reactor protection system to its alternate power supply and exited the limiting condition of operation.
The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities to exit the unplanned limiting condition of operation, which included attending meetings, evaluating the license basis document change request for changing the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and plant procedures, and interfacing with licensee management to determine their plan of action.
Specific documents reviewed during this event follow
-up are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one event follow
-up as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153
-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.
4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors debriefed Marty Richey, Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff of the results of the licensed operator requalification program inspection on August 18, 2011, and telephonically exited with Michael Bacon, Superintendent, Simulator and Training Support, on September 26, 2011. The licensee representative acknowledged the inspection results. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On August 19, 2011, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Marty Richey, Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On October 11, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mike Perito, Site Vice President Operations , and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet s the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a noncited violation
.
.1 Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with prescribed procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to this requirement, on July 15, 2011, the refueling bridge operator was not able to stop the fuel handling platform when the paddle switch was released from the reverse position. The fuel handling platform stopped due to the zone limit switch actuating, the motor returned to a neutral state, and the bridge stopped as designed. The zone limit switch is the last defense preventing the fuel handling bridge from colliding into the fuel pool wall, and it performed its function as designed. The licensee stopped all fuel movement and determined that the paddle switch had malfunctioned due to the failure to perform the preventive maintenance tasks of cleaning, adjusting, and re
-greasing the paddle switches on the fuel handling platform prior to the start of the dry fuel cask campaign. A contributing cause to this event was a lack of procedure guidance provided in 04 01-F11-3, "Fuel Handling Platform," Revision 41. The refueling platform procedure did not have any step to direct the operator to immediately depress the stop button if the fuel handling platform is not operating as intended. The switch was replaced, returned to service, and the licensee revised the procedure to include a step to direct the operator to immediately depress the stop button if fuel handling platform was not operating as intended. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGN-2011-04896. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity because the fuel handling bridge movement was arrested prior to coming in contact with the spent fuel pool wall.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Browning, General Plant Manager
- M. Bacon, Superintendent, Simulator and Training Support
- R. Bevily, Specialist and Training Coordinator, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- D. Bowers, Supervisor/Coordinator, Maintenance
- J. Carey, Manager, Training
- D. Coulter, Senior Licensing Specialist
- H. Farris, Assistant Operations Manager
- K. Higgenbotham, Planning and Scheduling Manager
- J. Houston, Maintenance Manager
- D. Jackson, Sr. HP/Chem Specialist, Chemistry
- R. Jackson, Senior Licensing Specialist
- D. Jones, Manager, Design Engineering
- J. Lassetter, Supervisor, Chemistry
- C. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- C. Loyd, Supervisor, Engineering
- J. Miller, Manager, Operations
- L. Patterson, Manager, Program Engineering
- C. Perino, Licensing Manager
- M. Perito, Site Vice President of Operations
- M. Richey, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
- R. Scarbrough, Specialist and Lead Offsite Liaison, Licensing
- J. Seiter, Senior Licensing Specialist
- J. Shaw, Manager, System Engineering
- D. Wiles, Engineering Director
- R. Wilson, Manager, Quality Assurance
- T. Trichell, Manager, Radiation Protection
NRC Personnel
- R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Rice, Resident Inspector
Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000416/20110004
-01 NCV Failure to Ensure Correct Fuses were Installed in the Hydrogen Igniter Control Circui
ts (Section 1R15)
- 05000416/20110004
-02 NCV Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on the Fuel Handling Bridge Paddle Switch
(Section 4OA2)
- 05000416/20110004
-03 NCV Failure to Establish Preventative Maintenance for Components Used in Critical Applications (Section 4OA2)
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1RO4: Equipment Alignment
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 04-S-01-Z51-1 Control Room HVAC System
- 04-1-01-T48-1 Standby Gas Treatment
- 01-S-02-3 Temporary Change Notice 04
-1-01-P81-1 High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator
- 117
- CONDITION REPORT
- CR-GG N-2010-03319
- CR-GG N-2010-06713
- CR-G
- GN-2010-07593
- Attachment
- CR-GGN-2010-00638 C R-GGN-2010-00666
- CR-GGN-2010-06672 C R-GGN-2010-00641
Section 1RO5: Fire Protection
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 06-EL-SP65-SA-0001 Control building Fire Detector and Supervisory Panel Functional Test
- 103
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION Fire Pre Plan C
-03 Division I SWGR Area and Battery Room OC202 and OC207
- Fire Pre Plan C
-04 Division I Remote Shutdown OC208
- Fire Pre Plan C
-05 Division II Remote Shutdown Panel OC208A
- Fire Pre Plan C
-06 Division III SWGR and Battery Room OC210 and OC209
- Fire Pre Plan C
-07 Division II Switchgear Room and Battery Room OC211 and OC215 1 Fire Pre-Plan C-Lower Inverter Room OC407 and Oc409
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION 11-1 Fire Pre-Plan C-12-1 Lower Cable Spreading Room, H & J Battery Room & Corridor OC401, OC402 and OC410
- Fire Pre-Plan C-16 Upper Cable Spreading Room (U-1) OC702 1 Fire Pre-Plan C-18 Corridor - OC706, Motor Generator Room
- OC707, Unit 1 Support Area
- OC708, Electrical Space
- OC709 2
- DRAWING NUMBER TITLE REVISION E-0950 Control Building Elevation 93'0", 111'0", 133'0", and 148'0" Fire and Smoke detection System Units I & II
- CONDITION REPORTS
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
- GSMS-LOR-WEX07 Crew Evaluation #1
- September 14, 2011
- GSMS-LOR-WEX08 Crew Evaluation #2
- September 14, 2011
- EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
- 5
- EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations
- Attachment
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
- EN-TQ-202 Simulator Configuration Control
- EN-TQ-201 Systematic Approach to Training Process
- EN-NS-112 Medical Program
- EN-TQ-210 Conduct of Simulator Training
- EN-TQ-200 Training Oversight Program
- EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ DATE
- List of modifications that need to be made in TREX load per Control Room walkdown February 18, 2011
- 2011 CYCLE 4 Licensed Operator Requal Simulator Training Plan Simulator Written Exams
- September 2011 JPM's 2011 Exam
-Weeks 1-5
- September 2011 14-S-02-21 Preparers Guide For Simulator Evaluation Scenarios
- 14-S-02-20 Preparing, Conducting, and Review of Simulator Evaluation
s
- 7
- LER-2010-002-00 Loss of both trains of Control Room Air Conditioning
- 2010
- LER-2011-001-00 HPCS pump inoperable due to failed test equipment
- 2011
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ DATE
- LER-2009-003-00 Special Nuclear Material Inventory Discrepancy
- 2009
- LER-2009-004-00 Condition prohibited by TS due to control room air conditioning Sub System 'B' inoperability not recognized
- 2009
- LER-2010-001-00 Automatic reactor scram on decreasing coolant level due to inadvertent reactor feed pump trip
- 2010 Scenarios 2011 Exam-Weeks 1-5 Scenarios September 2011 CONDITION REPORTS
- CR-GGN - 2010-04538
- CR-GGN-2010-06225 CR-GGN-2011-05652
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-DC-207 Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment
- EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process
- 04-1-01-F11-3 Fuel Handling Platform
- EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(1) Systems List September 5, 2011
- GGNS Maintenance Rule Assessment A Requirement of 10
- CFR 50.65 (a)(3) Fuel Cycle 17 and Refueling Outage 17 (RF17) November 1, 2008- June 1, 2010
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Review of Maintenance Rule Program
-Neutron Monitoring (C51) System Maintenance Rule Database C51 Neutron Monitoring Syste
m
- C51 Neutron Monitoring System CR 2009
-5811, CA1 Disposition Maintenance Rule Status Evaluation November 23, 2009 GG UFSAR 7.5 Safety
-Related Display Instrumentation Attachment 9.2
- Typical Lower Tier ACE & Response Template for CR
-GGN-2011-4896
- CONDITION REPORT
- Attachment
- CR-GGN-2011-01 749
- CR-GGN-2008-06 705
- CR-GGN-2009-0 3180
- CR-GGN-2010-04666 CR-GGN-2010-04759
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N/ DATE
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process for the Week of July 11, 2011 7
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process for the Week of August 1, 2011 7
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process for the Week of August
- Attachment
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N/ DATE 21, 2011
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process for the Week of September 18, 2011
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process January 10, 2011
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- August 30, 2011
- GGNS Operations Logs (Nights)
- August 27, 2011 LCOTR NO.: 1
-TS -11-0219
- E12F003A INOP for motor rotor inspection AND rework control circuit.
- CONDITION REPORT
- WORK ORDER
- WO284214 WO52295123
- WO52322340 WO52322319
- WO255372-5
- WO221511-01 WO00283563
-01
- WO259985 WO00283563
-01 WO00283540
-01 WO00262139
- WO242320 WO52263318
- WO52263 318 WO52263319
- Attachment
-01
- WO272686 WO52335055
-01 WO52317708
-01
- WO277787-02 WO52332345
- WO276015 WO52345331
- WO262640-18 WO52346620
- WO264180-01 WO52323770
- WO262640-17 WO52312083
-01 WO52300264
- WO156586 WO52248453
-01 WO284059
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION 08-3-03-10 Chemistry Sampling Program
- ER-GG-2005-0050-000 Nuclear Change Response
- GLP-OPS-P7100 Operations Training
-Plant Chilled Water System
- EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Root Cause Analysis Report: Cross Contamination of Makeup Water Treatment System November 6, 2003
- NEDE-31096-P-A Anticipated Transients Without Scrams February 1987
- Grand Gulf Response to IE 80
-10 June 4, 1981
- NRC Bulleting IE 80
-10 May 6, 1980
- FORM 133 Nuclear Plant Engineering Issuance of Specification/ Standard Change Notice SCN No. 96/002 Against Specification/ Standard Change No. GGNS
-M-918.0 Revision 1 for Use
- December 13, 1996 FORM 131 Issuing Specification GGNS
-M-918.0 Revision 1
- November 16, 1995
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE ASME Section VIII Appendix 2
- Review of GGNS Chemistry Program as Related to IE80
-10 Sampling
- PCW Tritium and Isotopic Data
- DRAWING NUMBER TITLE REVISION E-1186-46 E61 Combustible Gas Control System Hydrogen Ignition Controls Unit 1
- CALCULATION
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EC-Q1R28-91019 Division I 120V AC Class 1E Power Panel Circuit Coordination Study
- EC-Q1R28-91020 Division
- II 120V AC Class 1E Power Panel Circuit Coordination Study
- CONDITION REPORT
- WORK ORDER
Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 07-S-12-95 Electrical Maintenance of Limitorque Actuators
- 07-S-12-81 Setting of Limitorque Valve Operators
- Attachment
Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 06-OP-1T48-Q-0003 Standby Gas Treatment Valve Test B Train
- 103 06-OP-SP64-M-0001 Diesel Fire Pump C003A Monthly Operability Test
- 108 06-ME-SP64-R-0001 Fire Protection Water System Diesel Check
- 103 06-ME-1M23-V-0001 Containment and Drywell Airlock Seal Leak Test
- 108 04-1-01-M23-1 Drywell/Containment Airlock System
- 01-S-06-5 Reportable Events or Conditions
- 108 06-ME-1M23-R-0001 Personnel Airlock Door Seal Air System Leak Test
- 113 07-S-14-56 Western Gear Speed Reducer
- 06-OP-1P41-M-0005 Standby Service Water Loop B Operability Check
- 2
- M-1124C Upper Containment Personnel Airlock Elevation
- 208' 10" Figure 7.2
-11 Block Diagram
-RPS Protective Circuit Electrical Protection Assembly
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE 2011-005 UFSAR
- Section 8.3.1.1.5.4 and figure 8.3
-14 to allow limited simultaneous connection of RPS A and RPS B to their alternate supplies to support emergent plant situations September 12, 2011
- CONDITION REPORT
- Attachment
- CR-GGN-2 011-06362
- WORK ORDER
-01 WO52275918
-01 WO5
- 2277216-01 WO00284220
-01 WO52316814
-01
- WO264246 WO52282296
- WO208284 WO215561
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 06-EL-1L51-R-0001 125V Battery Charger Capability Test
- 101 06-OP-1E12-Q-0023 LPCI/RHR Subsystem A Quarterly Functional Test
- 21 06-OP-1P81-M-0002 HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test
- 24
- CALCULATION
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- CONDITION REPORT
- Attachment
- CR-GGN-201
- 1-02393
- CR-GGN-2009-05 627
- WORK ORDER
-01
- WO276508-01 WO52350134
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N 1-S-02-3 Activation of the Emergency Plan
- 118
- Attachment
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N 10-S-01-6 Notification of Off Site Agencies and Plan On Call Emergency Personnel 49 01-S-10-4 Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises
- 10-S-01-1 Activation of the Emergency Plan
- 20
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- NEI 99-02 Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- CONDITION REPORT
- Section 2RS06:
- Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- 06-CH-1D17-M-0005 Building Ventilation Exhaust Gaseous Isotopic
- 109
- 06-CH-1Dl7-V-0062 Turbine Building Occasional Release Point Monitoring
- 100
- 06-CH-SGl7-V-0032 Inop Gaseous Monitor Analysis
- 111
- Attachment
- 06-CH-SGl7-V-0034 Radwaste Release Inop Radwaste Monitor Pre
-release Analysis
- 107
- 06-CH-SG17-0-0045 Radwaste Release Post
-release Calculations
- 103
- 06-CH-SG17-P-0041 Radwaste Release Pre
-release Analysis
- 107
- 06-ME-1Z51-R-0006 In-Place Testing of Control Room Emergency Filtration System 108
- 08-S-03-20 Interlaboratory Monitoring Program
- 08-S-03-23 Chemistry Quality Control Program
- 17-S-06-Z51-1 Control Room SBFAU Leakage Test
- 17-S-06-T48-1 SBGTS Filter Train Bypass Leakage Test
- EN-CY-102 Laboratory Analytical Quality Control
- EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process
- AUDITS,
- SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- 2009 AREVA NP Environmental Laboratory
- Analytical Service Final Quality Assurance Status Report
(January - December 2009)
- June 9 , 2010
- 2010 AREVA NP Environmental Laboratory
- Analytical Service Final Quality Assurance Status Report
(January - September 2010)
- October 18, 2010
- GLO 2011-00041 CA1 RETS / REMP / Groundwater Protection Initiative (Pre
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission) Self
-Assessment April - May 2011 NUPIC 20160, 20118, 20134, 20153 AREVA NP, Inc.
- January 8, 2009
- NUPIC 20317
- NCS Corporation (Nuclear Cont. Sys)
- June 16, 2009
- NUPIC 20371
- Eberline Services September 23, 2009
- Attachment
- QA-02/06-2009-GGNS-1 2009 Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Audit August 24
-
- Sept. 14, 2009
- QA-2/6-2009-GGNS-1 QA Follow-up Surveillance of the 2009 Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Audit March 17, 2010
- QA-216-2009-GGNS-1 QA Second Follow
-up Surveillance of the 2009 Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental Monitoring Audit October 20
- 21, 2010
- CONDITION REPORTS:
- CR-G
- GN-2010-06972
- 10
- CFR 50.75(g) ACTION REQUESTS:
- RELEASE PERMITS
- WO 002564 82
- IN-PLACE FILTER TESTING:
- Work Order
- TRAIN TEST DATE
- 51797845 Train A Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Canister July 15, 2009
- 51668162 Train A DOP Test September 15, 2009
- 51797846 Train B DOP Test September 15, 2009
- 00170587 Train B Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Canister September 30, 2009
- 51687534 Train B DOP Test August 20, 2010
- 256224 Train A DOP Test November 4, 2010
- Attachment
- 256223 Train A Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Canister November 22, 2010
- 275918 Train B Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Canister August 18, 2011
- MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE / REVISION
- Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revision 37
- 2009 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April 28, 2010
- 2010 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April 28, 2011
- Inspect Sealed Areas on Blower Housing May 12, 2009
- 1D17P015 Calibrate Loop Instruments May 20, 2009
- 1D17P014 Calibrate Loop Instruments August 30, 2010
- Inspect Sealed Areas on Blower Housing October 27, 2010
- 1D17P015 Calibrate Loop Instruments February 23, 2011
- Inspect Sealed Areas on Blower Housing May 17, 2011
- Inspect Sealed Areas on Blower Housing August 4, 2011
- Section 2RS07:
- Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- 01-S-06-12 GGNS Surveillance Program
- 110 06-EN-S000-O-0002 Surveillance Procedure: Land Use Census
- Safety Related 101
- Attachment
- 06-EN-S000-A-0003 Surveillance Procedure: Interlaboratory Comparison Program - Safety Related
- 101 06-EN-S000-V-0001 Surveillance Procedure: Radiological Environmental Sampling - Safety Related
- 108 06-IC-SC84-SA-1003 Primary Tower Wind Speed/Directional Air Temperature (T/dT)/Relative Humidity Calibration
- 2
- AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- 2010 Annual Quality Assurance Report for the REMP: GEL Lab, Inc.
- February 15, 2011
- LO-GLO-2011-00041-CA1 RETS/REMP/Groundwater Protection Initiative (Pre
-NRC) Self-Assessment May 2011
- QA-02/06-2009-GGNS-1 Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental Monitoring Programs September 24, 2009
- QS-2010-GGNS-001 QA Follow-up Surveillance of the 2009 Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Audit March 17, 2010
- QS-2010-GGNS-01 6 QA Second Follow
-up Surveillance of the 2009 Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Audit October 21, 2010
- CONDITION REPORTS
- CALIBRATION AND MAINTENANCE RECORDS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Calibration for Met Tower Wind Speed, Wind Direction, Temperature, DT, and Relative Humidity September 14, 2010
- Calibration for Met Tower Wind Speed, Wind Direction, Temperature, DT, and Relative Humidity February 16, 2011
- Attachment
- Calibration for Met Tower Wind Speed, Wind Direction, Temperature, DT, and Relative Humidity May 25, 2011
- CHEM-003 Air Sampler #1 Calibration Data Sheet July 11, 2011
- CHEM-004 Air Sampler #3 Calibration Data Sheet July 11, 2011
- CHEM-007 Air Sampler #7 Calibration Data Sheet July 11, 2011
- CHEM-005 Air Sampler #3 Calibration Data Sheet January 19, 2011
- CHEM-006 Air Sampler #7 Calibration Data Sheet January 19, 2011
- CHEM-008 Air Sampler #1 Calibration Data Sheet January 19, 2011
- MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITL E REVISION / DATE
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April 20, 2010
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April 28, 2011
- Chapter 2.3.3
- GGNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Ground Water Monitoring Plan for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station April 2011
- 2006-2010 5-Year Wind Rose Data (10 meters)
- Section 2RS08:
- Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-NF-200 Special Nuclear Material Control
- EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure
- Attachment
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors
- 04-S-01-G17-3 Radwaste Filters and Demineralizers
- 06-CH-SG17-V-0047 Surveillance Procedure: Temporary Storage Tanks Activity Determination
- Safety Related
- 2 08-S-02-25 Radiation Protection Procedure: Radwaste Resin Transfer
- Safety Related
- 08-S-06-71 Radwaste Instructions: Sampling Procedures for Waste Classification
- Safety Related
- AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- 22765 NUPIC Limited Scope Audit/Survey January 12, 2011
- LO-GLO-2011-0039 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation April 22, 2011
- QA-14/15-2009-GGNS-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report: Radiation Protection/Radwaste October 22, 2009
- CONDITION REPORTS
- RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- GGN-2010-0303 1 Radiography Camera (Type B)
- March 8, 2010
- GGN-201 0-0616 4 CRDM Metal Boxes (Type A)
- June 17, 2010
- Attachment
- RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- GGN-2010-0901 2 CRDM Spud shields (LSA
-II) September 1, 2010
- RWCU-A HIC (Type B)
- November 16, 2010
- GGN-2010-1203 3 Bead Resin General (LSA
-II) December 13, 2010
- GGN-2011-0102 1 CPS Liner General (LSA
-II) January 10, 2011
- GGN-2011-0605 2 DAW/Metal/GIC General (LSA
-II) June 16, 2011
- CPS-A General (LSA
-II) July 18, 2011
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 02-S-01-25 Deficient Equipment Identification
- 02-S-01-37 Component Position Control
- 04-1-01-F11-1 Refueling Platform
- EN-DC-153 Preventive Maintenance Component Classification
- EN-DC-335 [Preventive Maintenance] Basis Template
- EN-FAP-OP-006 Operator Aggregate Impact Index Performance Indicator
- EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination
- EN-OP-102 Protective and Caution Tagging
- ER-GG-2003-0261-000 Remove Automatic Isolation from Selected Valves
- MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
- Chapter 11
- GGNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 9
- Chapter 12
- GGNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Basic Radioactive Waste Packaging, Transportation, and Disposal Training February 17, 2011
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- ESF Switchgear Room Cooler Ventilation (T46) System Data Collection for Work Order No. 276275
- 10-0020 Standing Order June 10, 2010 11-0004 Standing Order, Condition Report GGN
-2010-5081 for Moisture Separator Reheater A Second Stage Reheater Tube Leaks February 7, 2011 11-0010 Standing Order, Condition Report GGN
-2010-6941 identified a condition of excessive cycling of 1E51F005, RCIC TURB EXH OTBD DRN VLV.
- April 5, 2011
- 11-0019 Standing Order May 27, 2011
- 11-0020 Standing Order June 22, 2011 11-0021 Standing Order, Condition Report GGN
-2011-4391 documents that on 6/24/11 during a temp lift for uncoupled run of Heater Drain Pump B, TBCW to the pump seal cooler was incorrectly restored with the seal removed.
- June 26, 20 11
- 11-0024 Standing Order, Two recent examples of inappropriate equipment restoration have revealed inconsistent adherence to standards associated with the equipment clearance program.
- August 2, 2011
- 11-0025 Standing Order, Condition Report
- CR-GGN-2 011-5162 identified a condition of leakage from the inboard seal of Condensate Booster Pump A.
- This standing order implements the actions required from the Revision 0 ODMI generated from CR
-GGN-2011-5162. July 31, 2011
- 10-0022 Standing Order, The purpose of this Standing Order is to provide guidance to address concerns regarding increased dose rates due to operation with a SS Generator tube leak, with the potential for further degradation of the Seal Steam Generator June 18, 2010
- Attachment
- OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Seal Steam Generator Tube Leak ODMI Action Plan June 17, 2010
- Reactor Feed Pump Turbine A Lube Oil Pump Degradation June 8, 2010
- Condensate Booster A Pump Seal Leak
- ODMI Action Plan July 31, 2011
- Main Turbine Generator Exciter Bearing #11 Vibration ODMI Action Plan May 19, 2011
- CONDITION REPORT
- CR-GG N-2010-06660
- CR-G
- GN-2010-08750
- Attachment
- ENGINEERING CHANGE
- 4OA3: Event Follow
-up OTHER NUMBER TITLE DATE 2011-055 LBDCR RPS Alternate Power Supply September 12, 2011
- RPS Marked
-up Drawing E
-1174 11
- CONDITION REPORT
- 4OA7: Licensee-Identified Violations
- CONDITION REPORT