ML12340A811

Official Exhibit - RIV000060-00-BD01 - Prefiled Direct Testimony of Arnold Gundersen Regarding Consolidated Contention RK-EC-3/CW-EC-1 (Spent Fuel Pool Leaks)

ML12340A811
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	12/22/2011
From:	Gundersen A Riverkeeper, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 22950, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01
Download: ML12340A811 (35)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

___________________________________________ )

In the Matter of )

)

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) Docket Nos.

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating ) 50-247-LR Units 2 and 3) ) and 50-286-LR

___________________________________________ ) PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD GUNDERSEN REGARDING CONSOLIDATED CONTENTION RK-EC-3/CW-EC-1 (SPENT FUEL POOL LEAKS) On behalf of Riverkeeper, Inc. ("Riverkeeper") and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. ("Clearwater"), Arnold Gundersen submits the following testimony regarding Riverkeeper and Clearwater's Consolidated Contention RK-EC-3/CW-EC-1:

INTRODUCTION 1Q. Please state your name and address.

2A. My name is Arnold Gundersen and my business addresses are 376 Appletree Point Road, 3Burlington, VT 05408 and 96 South Union Street, Burlington, VT 05401.

4 5Q.Please state your occupation.

6A. I am an independent nuclear engineering and safety expert at Fairewinds Associates, Inc.

7My title is Chief Engineer.

8 9Q.Please describe your educational and professional background and qualifications.

10A. I have a Bachelor and Master Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Rensselaer 11Polytechnic Institute (RPI) cum laude. I was awarded an Atomic Energy Commission 12Fellowship to pursue my Master Degree in Nuclear Engineering.

13 14 After beginning my career as a reactor operator and instructor in 1971, I progressed to the 15position of Senior Vice President for a nuclear licensee before moving into independent 16consulting work. I have testified as an expert witness before the Nuclear Regulatory 17Commission (NRC) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) and Advisory Committee on 18 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit In the Matter of

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3)

ASLBP #:07-858-03-LR-BD01 Docket #:05000247 l 05000286 Exhibit #:

Identified:

Admitted: Withdrawn:

Rejected: Stricken: Other: RIV000060-00-BD01 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 RIV000060 Submitted: December 22, 2011 2Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the State of Vermont Public Service Board, the State of Vermont 1Environmental Court, the Florida Public Service Commission, and in Federal Court.

2 3I am an author of the first edition of the Department of Energy (DOE) Decommissioning 4Handbook. I have more than 39 years of professional nuclear experience including and not 5limited to: Nuclear Power Operations, Nuclear Safety Assessments, Nuclear Power Management, 6Nuclear Quality Assurance, Radiological Assessment, Archival Storage and Document Control, 7NRC Regulations and Enforcement, Licensing, Engineering Management, Contract 8Administration, Reliability Engineering, In-service Inspection, Thermohydraulics, Criticality 9Analysis, Radioactive Waste Processes, Decommissioning, Waste Disposal, Cooling Tower 10Operation, Cooling Tower Plumes, Consumptive Water Use, Source Term Reconstruction, Dose 11Assessment, Technical Patents, Structural Engineering Assessments, Nuclear Fuel Rack Design 12and Manufacturing, Nuclear Equipment Design and Manufacturing, Public Relations,Prudency 13Defense, Employee Awareness Programs, and Whistleblower Protection.

14 15My full curriculum vitae is attached to this testimonyas Riverkeeper Exhibit RIV000062.

16 17Q.Please describe your experience with respect to radiological leakage and discharge 18issues at nuclear power plants.

19A.When I began my career, I worked as a radiation-shielding engineer on Newbold Island, 20which entailed measuring radiation. Early in my career, when Northeast Utilities employed me, 21I began focusing on radiological releaseproblems at Northeast Utilities' Millstone 1 Nuclear 22Power Plant. I was the project engineer in the first Monte Carlo calculation of sky shine.

1I was 23the project engineer in developing an ammonia sniffer designed to detect Nitrogen 16 (N16) 24carryover into turbine buildings. I performed numerous gamma and neutron surveys of the 25Millstone and Connecticut Yankee sites. As the lead engineer for New York State Electric &

26Gas's proposed nuclear power plant, I was responsible for procuring the Nuclear Steam Supply 27System, which includes the nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel.

28 29 1Monte Carlo refers to a certain methodology of performing scientific calculations; Sky shine is the term used for radiation that originates near the surface of the earth with an upward velocity and then is scattered back by the molecules in the atmosphere.

3As a senior manager at Nuclear Energy Services in Danbury, Connecticut, I was a member of the 1radiation safety committee of this NRC licensee responsible for assuring that all conditionsof the 2NRC license were upheld. Personnel reporting to me conducted contamination assessments of 3the West Valley New York nuclear reprocessing facility and were assigned to the Shippingport 4nuclear power plant decommissioning project. I have been employed as a nuclear engineering 5consultant and engineering expert witness since 1990.

6 7I have provided expertise and testimony in relation to accidental radiological leak issues 8occurring at nuclear power plants across the U.S., including the following:

9In2007, I testified before the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding the 10failure of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.'s Aging Management Program to address the 11leaking buried and underground pipes at its Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant outside of 12Boston, MA.

13I served as a consultant to the Vermont Legislature's Joint Fiscal Office concerning 14leaking underground pipes at Entergy's Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. I 15identified the existence of leaking pipes, which Entergy executives had misled 16investigators about.

2I also advised the Joint Fiscal Office and Governorelect Shumlin, 17and provided recommendations to the state legislature, regarding the use of extraction 18wells at Vermont Yankee to address tritium contamination.

19I briefed the NRC's Regulatory Information Conference in 2009 concerning the 20identification and remediation of strontium and tritium leaks discovered at Vermont 21Yankee.22I briefed investigators of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concerning 23underground contamination from leaky pipes at nuclear reactors. GAO's investigation 24resulted in a report published in June 2011, entitled Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

25Oversight of Underground Piping Systems Commensurate with Risk, but Proactive 26 2 SeeVermont Yankee, Office of the Attorney General's Criminal Investigation Report (July 6, 2011), available at

,http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/Office%20of%20the%20Attorney%20Generals%20Criminal%20Investigation%20Report%20on%20Vermont%20Yankee.pdf, at 8 ("The AGO investigation, as did that of MLB [Morgan Lewis & Bockius], readily leads to the conclusion that ENVY and various of its personnel repeatedly misled State officials with direct misstatements and repeatedly failed to clarify misperceptions as to the existence of underground piping carrying radionuclides. These actions and inactions were at best negligent.").

4Measures Could Help Address FutureLeaks, for which I was an expert.

3 1 2My expertise and testimony providedinthe New York State proceeding regardingEntergy's 3Application for Clean Water Act § 401 Water Quality Certificationspecifically discussedthe 4ongoing radiological leakageissuesthat areunique toIndian Point and are impacting the Hudson 5River.6 7Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

8A.The purpose of my testimony is to provide support for, and my views on Riverkeeper and 9Clearwater's Consolidated Contention RK-EC-3/CW-EC-1.Riverkeeper and Clearwater assert 10that Entergy and the NRC Staff have failed to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of 11spent fuel pool leaks and groundwater contamination at the Indian Point nuclear power plant.

12Therefore,the purpose of my testimony is to appraise the adequacy of the evaluation by Entergy 13and the NRC Staff of spent fuel pool leaks and groundwater contamination in the Indian Point 14License Renewal Proceeding.This contention was initially admitted by the ASLB on July 31, 152008 as applied to the assessment of Entergy in its Environmental Report, 4and later accepted by 16the ASLB as applied to the assessment of NRC Staff in the Supplemental Environmental Impact 17Statement related to the Indian Point license renewal proceeding.

5 18 19Q. What did you review in preparing your testimony?

20A. I reviewed the pleadings related to Riverkeeper and Clearwater's Consolidated 21Contention RK-EC-3/CW-EC-1 and those portions of Entergy's Environmental Report and NRC 22Staff's draft and final supplemental environmental impact statements("DSEIS" and "FSEIS" 23 3 See Exhibit RIV000089.

4 SeeIn the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR, ASLBP No. 07-858-03-LR-BD01, Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Petitions to Intervene and Requests for Hearing) (July 31, 2008), at 161-62.

5In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos. 50-0247-LR and 50-286-LR, ASLBP No. 07-858-03-LR-BD01, Order (Applying Consolidated Contention Riverkeeper EC-3/Clearwater EC-1 to the NRC Staff's Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement) (May 28, 2009), ADAMS Accession No. ML091480466; In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos. 50-0247-LR and 50-286-LR, ASLBP No. 07-858-03-LR-BD01, Order (Ruling on Pending Motions for Leave to File New and Amended Contentions) (July 6, 2011), at 35-36, ADAMS Accession No. ML111870344.

5respectively) related to the Indian Point license renewal proceeding that discussed and evaluated 1spent fuel pool leaks and groundwater contamination. In addition, I also reviewed hundreds of 2documents provided by Entergy to Riverkeeper in discovery, which were designated by Entergy 3as relevant to radiological leakage issues at Indian Point. These documents included, but were 4not limited to: quarterly groundwater monitoring reports generated by Entergy's consultant, GZA 5GeoEnvironmental, Inc., groundwater monitoring data, engineering reports, documents 6concerning the investigation of leakage issues at Indian Point, procedure documents, Aging 7Management Program materials, condition reports, corrective action reports, e-mails, 8presentations, plans, manuals, notes, checklists, status reports, and other reports.I also reviewed 9documents generated by NRC, which were available through NRC's public document database 10(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System, ADAMS), related to radiological 11discharge and leakage issues at Indian Point, including inspection reports, other reports, e-mails, 12and correspondence.Additionally, I reviewed documents generated by other government 13agencies (including the aforementioned GAO report concerning radiological leak issues) and 14scientific organizations.I have reviewed all such documents to inform me of the relevant facts 15and formulate my conclusions.

16 17A list of the particular documents that I reference and rely upon in this written testimony is 18included at the end of this testimony. Those references have been provided as RIV000064 19through RIV000100, (or have been previously been provided as exhibits by another party in the 20proceeding), in support of my testimony. To the best of my knowledge, I have referred to true 21and accurate copies of each document thatIused and/or relied upon in preparingmytestimony.

22If adocument was extremely long and only a small portion is relevant to my testimony, an 23excerpt of that document is providedand the fact that it is only an excerpt is noted on the cover 24of the Exhibit.

25 26Q.What particular issues does your testimony address?

27A.My testimony addresses numerousdeficiencies found in the assessmentsconducted by 28Entergy and NRC Staffof spent fuel pool leaks and groundwater contamination at Indian Point, 29including:

30The failure torecognize and assess ongoing and likely future leaks from the Indian Point 31 6Unit 2 spent fuel pool; 1The failure to properly consider the toxic contamination that has resulted from the Indian 2Point Unit 1 spent fuel pools; 3The failure to address co-mingling of the radioactive plumes from both Unit 1's and Unit 42's spent fuel pools; 5The failure to account for and assess the impacts of current and likely future leaks from 6other plant components; 7The failure to properly categorize and assess the level of groundwater contamination at 8Indian Point; 9The failure to assess current and future impacts of the groundwater contamination on the 10Hudson River; and 11The failure to consider the numerous measures available to mitigate the adverse 12environmental consequences of radiological leaks and groundwater contamination at 13Indian Point.

14 15ONGOING AND FUTURE LEAKS FROM THE INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 SPENT FUEL 16POOL 17 18Q.Please assess theposition taken in Entergy's Environmental Report and NRC 19Staff's FSEIS that leaks from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool are under "control" and that there 20 is "no active leakage" from the pool.

21A.The Unit 2 spent fuel pool has continued to experience leakage since Entergy's discovery 22of cracks in the pool wall in 2005, 6and isapparently still actively leaking. In particular, anew 23leak of the Unit 2 SFP was identified recently in 2010:

24Beginning in the third quarter of 2010, we noticed increased 25tritium levelsin a monitoring location adjacent to the IP2 SFP . . . .

26[T]he increased flow appears to be attributable to . . . a leak path 27 6GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc., Hydrogeologic Site Investigation Report, Indian Point Energy Center, January 7, 2008, IPEC00195418, at viii, 2-5 (ExhibitRIV000066); Entergy, Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary, Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, NY (January 2008) (Exhibit RIV000068).

7from light boxes near the top of the SFP, allowing water to get 1behind the stainless steel liner plates on the face of the SFP.

7 2 3Since its discovery, only a temporary repair to this leak path has been applied and "additional 4evaluations continue, so as to fully understand this issue."

8 5 6In addition, there is no evidence thatall other potentialleaks in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool have 7beenidentified andcompletely repaired or that the pool is now leak proof. In fact, it is 8impossible to adequately inspect the spent fuel pool for leaks: Entergy has never inspected a 9significant portion of the stainless steel spent fuel pool liner due to the complete inaccessibility 10of portions of the pool.As explained in the NRC's 2009 Safety Evaluation Report ("SER")

11relating to the proposed relicensing of Indian Point, "[t]he licensee stated that it completed, in 12 2007, a one-time inspectionof the accessible 40 percentof the SFPliner above the fuel racks."

9 13 14Entergy cannot adequately access this liner for inspection due to the high density of fuel in the 15pool and the minimal amount of space between the fuel racks and the bottom and lower sides of 16the liner. For example, an Entergy e-mail correspondence explains the significant challenges to 17inspecting the Unit 2 spent duel pool for leaks (and the resulting lack of ability to repair any 18leaks) because without moving fuel, key areas are totally inaccessible to inspection.

10In 19particular, in this document, Entergy explains that 20the examination of the spent pool floor will be challenging. . . . but 21to obtain meaningful results is an entirely different story. . . .[A]

22challenge would be the 30 years of debris accumulated on the 23bottom of the fuel pool. . . . The alternative to not cleaning would 24be the equivalent of trying to located [sic] cracks in a sidewalk, 25with 2" of snow covering the sidewalk. . . . [T]he examination of 26 7In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc's Joint Application for CWA § 401 Water Quality Certification, Prefiled Testimony of Matthew J. Barvenik, Issue for Adjudication No. 3 -Radiological Materials (July 22, 2011), at 11("Barvenik Direct Testimony")(Exhibit RIV000071).

8 Id.9U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, (NUREG-1930) Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286 (November 2009), NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML093170671, at 3-134(hereinafter "IP SER")

10E-mail from Michael Rutkoske to Steven Verrochi (Entergy), Re: SFP Exams -What's Next? (Nov. 19, 2005), IPEC00065830 (Exhibit RIV000072).

8the spent fuel pool wall behind the fuel racks is especially 1challenging. . . . While it is important to identify any area of 2potential leakage, it is also important to consider the ability to 3repair areas of potential leaks. . . . there are hundreds of indications 4that would be considered unacceptable and potential leak paths by 5any welding standard, in the areas we have examined so far. I 6would not expect the quality of the floor plates or exposed wall 7sections to be any different.

11 8 9Another Entergy document states that Entergy's remote operated vehicle encountered 10"numerous interferences [and] substantial debris on the floor" (with no debris removal plan), 11when attempting to inspect the area beneath the spent fuel racks.

12Another Entergy report also 12notes how "only a portion of the pool has been able to be inspected due to interference 13limitations. . . .".

13Entergy's Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary explains that 14"active leaks cannot be completely ruled out."

14An Entergy e-mail correspondence further 15confirms that numerous areas of the Unit 2 spent fuel pool cannot be observed or inspected, and 16acknowledges the existence of additional leaks that have not yet been identified: "we believe 17there could be other leaks in the unit 2 fuel poolthat we cannot observe. . .".

15 18 19In addition, GZA explained in its quarterly monitoring report for the second quarter of 2010, the 20most recent quarterly report that Entergy provided to Riverkeeper as of the date of this 21testimony, that "analyses cannot definitively and completely rule out the possibility of a 22remaining small leak which could then also be supplying Tritium to the groundwater . . ."

16 23 24 11 Id.12Entergy, U2 SFP Leak Monitoring Wells and Underground Piping (3/31/06), IPEC00063518(Exhibit RIV000073).

13Entergy, Problem Development Sheet -Groundwater, IPEC00207416 (Exhibit RIV000074).

14Entergy, Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary, Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, NY (January 2008), at 2 (Exhibit RIV000068).

15E-mail from Ronald Sachatello to Donald Mayer (Entergy), Joseph Adler (TLG), Gary Hinrichs (Entergy), Re: IS THE POOL LEAK OFF COLLECTION BOX EFFECTIVE?, IPEC00063351 (Exhibit RIV000075).

16GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc. Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011), IPEC00227561, at p.1-3, footnote 6 (Exhibit RIV000076).

9In conclusion, there is no basis for the positions taken in Entergy's Environmental Report or 1NRC Staff's FSEIS that the leaks from theUnit 2 spent fuel pool are currently under control and 2accounted for.

3 4Q.In your opinion, are leaks from the Indian Point Unit 2 spent fuel pool likely to 5occur in the future?

6A. Yes.The fact that new leaks were identified as recently as 2010, more than three years 7after all leaks were reportedly repaired and an alleged thorough examination of the Unit 2 SFP 8was conducted, speaks to the lack of rigor that Entergy has applied to the inspections of the 9Indian Point Unit 2 SFP.

10 11Entergy was unable to identify the source of this new leak by either its inspection of the Indian 12Point site or its ongoing specific aging management and monitoring techniques currently applied 13to the Unit 2 SFP. The area where the 2010 leak occurred, unlike other portions of the SFP, was 14easily accessible during the 2007 inspection and it is likely that this newly identified leak existed 15undetected for many years. Additionally, the Unit 2 SFP leak-collection box installed in 2007 16failed in 2010 to meet its intended design function to collect any radioactive leaks and prevent 17such contamination from entering the groundwater.

18 19The ongoing leaks call into question the thoroughness of the initial inspection in 2005 by 20Entergy's team and alert us to Entergy's ongoing failure to adequately address the serious aging 21management issues confronting the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.Leaks from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool 22have not been eliminated because the sources have not yet been adequately identified or 23remediated.These circumstances make future undetected leaks from the already degraded Unit 2 24SFP very likely.

25 26The 2010 leak confirms and indicatesthat Entergy has no preventative measures in place to be 27able to detect and avert future leaks from the Unit 2 pool during the proposed relicensing term.

28Instead, Entergy relies upon a one-time inspection of a fraction of the pool liner as well as 29groundwater monitoring, which will admittedly only be able to detect leaks after they occur, for 30its assurance that the Unit 2 pool will remain sound during the proposed 20-year license renewal 31 10period.Notably, the Unit 2 spent fuel pool "does not have a tell tail[sic]drain collection system 1which poses a vulnerability for additional activity leakage."

17In contrast, Unit 3 and other 2nuclear power plants have a collection system underneath the stainless steel cladding of the fuel 3pool that works to detect leaks.

4 5As early as 2009, the NRC approved (with a very narrow implication) Entergy's plan to simply 6monitor radionuclide levels in the groundwater asthe method to detect any degraded condition of 7the pools:

8Entergy made no commitment for augmented inspection during the 9extended period of operation. . . . Due to the lack of a leak-chase 10channel system at IP2 to monitor, detect and quantify potential 11leakage through the SFP liner, the staff is concerned that there has 12been insufficient time following the corrective actions to be certain 13that the leakage problems have been permanently corrected . . . .

14The licensee stated that it completed, in 2007, a one-time 15inspection of the accessible 40 percent of the SFP liner. . . . To 16provide additional indication of potential spent fuel pool leakage, 17the applicant has committed to test the groundwater outside the IP2 18spent fuel pool for the presence of tritium . . . every 3 months. . . .

19Tritium in the groundwater would indicate leakage from the spent 20fuel pool, which may lead to degradation . . . .Based on . . .

21applicant's additional commitment to monitor the groundwater . . .

22there is reasonable assurancethat any degradation of the IP2 spent 23fuel pool would be identified.

18 24 25Entergy's approach will only discover leaks afterthey occur.Entergy's lax process of relying 26solely upon a groundwater-monitoring plan has previously taken months to detect leaks, while 27such leaks continually contaminated the groundwater and ultimately discharged into the Hudson 28River. This was precisely the case in relation to the newly discovered 2010 Unit 2spent fuel 29poolleak path.

30 31In addition, future leaks from the Unit 2 pool are increasinglylikely since the pool is 35-years 32old and facing the typical bathtub curve issues that aging plants face with concrete and systems 33degradation. A "bathtub curve" is defined as "the phenomenon that the fraction of products 34 17Entergy, Problem Development Sheet -Groundwater, IPEC00207416 ((Exhibit RIV000074).

18IP SERat 3-134, 1-139.

11failing in agiven timespan is usually high early in the lifecycle, low in the middle, and rising 1strongly towards the end. When plotted as a curve, this looks like the profile of a bathtub."

19 2The bathtub curve phenomenon shows that Entergy's Indian Point spent fuelpools will face 3more aging and leakage issues as the plant continues to operate, not less. In fact, an Entergy 4document listing areasand components at the Indian Point site that are susceptible to inadvertent 5leaks indicates that the potential for leakage relating to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool is "High."

20 6 7Given Entergy's own assessment, it is highly likely that the Unit 2 pool will continue to 8experience radiological leaks.

9 10In conclusion, given the already degraded condition of the Unit 2 SFP, currently ongoing leaks, 11and Entergy's remarkably insufficient preventative measures, it is my opinion that leaks from the 12Unit 2 SFP are likely to continue.

13 14Q.What do you mean that the NRC's approval of a groundwater monitoring system 15has a narrow implication?

16A.NRC accepted Entergy's groundwater monitoring program with only one purpose in 17mind: according to NRC, this monitoring system is adequate for detecting conditions that have 18safety implicationsand which could result in a catastrophic meltdown in the event of an accident.

19In other words, the NRC has only evaluated this program in terms of whether or not the program 20will assure that the safety function of the spent fuel pools will be maintained and not result in a 21"loss of intended function" of the SFP.

21The NRC did notapprove the groundwatermonitoring 22commitment as a system that stops components from leaking, and the NRC is not concerned 23about whether leaks enter the environment. To the contrary, from the NRC's perspective 24Entergy's monitoring programwill work despitecomponent leak.

25 26 27 19WordIQ.com, Bathtub curve -Definition, http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Bathtub_curve (last visited Dec.21,2011).20Entergy Chart of Leak Locations, IPEC00059360 (Exhibit RIV000077).

21IP SERat 3-139.

12Q. Please describe any limitationsof Entergy's network of monitoring wells.

1A.The network of wells will not detect all leaks. GZA has acknowledged that certain 2minimum leaks remain undetectable by the groundwater monitoring system at Indian Point.

22 3Therefore, Entergy'sability to detect smaller, longer lasting leaks apparently is highly 4questionable.

5 6In addition, while the monitoring wells may indicate that a leak is occurring, a monitoring well 7has a limited ability to identify theexactlocation of the leak associated with the elevated 8findings.As such, monitoring wells are not necessarily conducive to being able to rapidly 9respond to and repair leak issues. The 2010 Unit 2 spent fuel pool leak path is evidence of this:

10elevated tritium levels were detected in the third quarter of 2010, and, as of July 2011, no 11permanent repair has been applied.

23 12 13FUTURE IMPACTS RESULTING FROM THE UNIT 1 SPENT FUEL POOL LEAKS 14 15Q.Please assess the findings in Entergy's Environmental Report and the NRC Staff's 16FSEIS related to the mitigatio n actions pertaining to the Unit 1 spen t fuel pool.

17A.While the Unit 1 spent fuel pools have beendrained, a considerableamount ofradiation 18remains in the concrete and surrounding soil, andgroundwater. This contamination will remain 19in the groundwater and actively leach into the Hudson Riverfor decades.

20 21In addition, a substantial amount of contamination from the Unit 1 pools remains stored in 22structures associated with the Unit 1 pools, including the north curtain drain and the sphere 23foundation drain sump.

24So, even though the pools have been drained, residual contamination 24from these structures will continue to periodically release to the groundwater, until the entire 25Indian Point siteis decommissioned.

26 22GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc. Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011), IPEC00227561, at pg.1-3, footnote 6 (Exhibit RIV000076).

23Barvenik Direct Testimony at 11 (Exhibit RIV000071).

24 SeeIn the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc's Joint Application for CWA § 401 Water Quality Certification, Combined Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Thomas C. Esselman, Ph.D., Matthew J. Barvenik, and Owen Hoffman, Ph.D., Radiological -Issue for Adjudication No. 3 (October 4, 2011), at 23 ("BarvenikRebuttalTestimony")(Exhibit RIV000099).

13 1ONGOING AND FUTURE LEAKS FROM OTHER SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND 2COMPONENTS AT INDIAN POINT 3 4Q. Please describe any other sources of accidental radiological leakage at the Indian 5Point site in addition to the spent fuel pool leaks.

6A.Aging components and underground piping at Indian Point have experienced leakage 7issues. For example, in 2009 due to unmonitored, undetected corrosion, a pipe buried eight feet 8underground at Indian Point leaked, and was discovered only when a plant worker observed 9water on the floor. This particular leak resulted in more than 100,000 gallons of tritiated water 10being releasedto the groundwater.

25 11 12During the first quarter of 2009, leakage of water froma distillation tank valve located within the 13Indian Point Unit 1 chemical systems building resulted in increased tritium levels in nearby 14monitoring wells.

26 15 16Just recently, "[o]n June 27, 2011 while reviewing the second quarter 2011 groundwater 17monitoring well sample results, Entergy personnel identified an increase in tritium 18concentrations in Unit 1 monitoring wells MW-56 and MW-57 (76,000 pCi/L and 20,000 pCi/L, 19respectively)."

27Though "Entergy personnel conducted an investigation of this unexpected 20condition" NRC reported recently in November 2011 that "thesource of the contamination has 21not been identified."

28At the time this report is written, it is unclear whether the sourceof the 22leakis from Unit 1, Unit 2 or Unit 3.

23 24 25IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 1, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2009), IPEC00225217 (Exhibit RIV000078); Annie Correal, Indian Pt. Broken Pipe Spurs Safety Worries ,THE NEW YORK TIMES(March 1, 2009) (Exhibit RIV000079).

26Barvenik Direct Testimony at 10 (Exhibit RIV000071).

27Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 -NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000286/2011004 (November7, 2011), at 15-16 (Exhibit RIV000085).

28 Id.

14Accidental spills have also been documented. For example, two Energy Groundwater 1Monitoring Checklists reveal that in November 2009, a "RWST[

29]processing skid" spilled 2"RWST water to the MOB yard area adjacent to the Unit 2 PAB" 30,which resulted in the 3detection of "greatly elevated" levels of tritium in the groundwater.

31 4 5The persistent presence of elevated levels of radioactivity in the storm drains at Indian Point is 6further evidence of radiological leaks and discharges from plant components, such as pipes and 7other undetermined/unspecified onsite sources. Entergy's report entitledTroubleshooting Plan 8 for H-3 32investigation: Storm Drains System A, March/April 2009 (EN-MA-125)explains that 9tritium was found in Storm Drain System A in March of 2009.

33Concentrations of tritium in 10Storm Drain System A were at 90,000 pCi/L, which is at least three times higher than the EPA 11Maximum Contaminant Level for tritium, that is, 20,000 pCi/L. In following the leak path 12delineated in the report, one will note that Storm Drain System A ". . . empties into A-6 drain, 13which does NOT retain water long, passing quickly to the E system where it drains down the old 14roadway to the old command post area and into the discharge canal" which exits into the Hudson 15River.34The plant staff speculated that these high levels of contamination might be due to 16failures in "underground piping or an unknown source," but determined that "[t]he most likely 17cause of the elevated H-3 [tritium] in the effected storm drains was determined to be an 18accumulation of liquid H-3 condensation from the various airborne vents (washout)-".

35 Thus, 19this report reveals that "washout" is also a problem at Indian Point.

20 21 29RWST stands for "Reactor Waste Storage Tank."

30PAB stands for "Primary Auxiliary Building."

31IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 3, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2010), IPEC00225219 (Exhibit RIV000080); IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 1, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 2, 2010), IPEC00225223 (Exhibit RIV000081).

32H-3 stands for tritium.

33Entergy, Nuclear Management Manual, EN-MA-125, Rev. 4, Attachment 9.1, Initial Investigation, Troubleshooting Plan for H-3 Investigation, Storm Drain System A, March/April 2009, IPEC00194517 (Exhibit RIV000082).

34 Id.35 Id.

15Entergy's "Groundwater Monitoring Program Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist" for the 1fourth quarter of 2010 as well as the same report for the first quarter of 2011, both state that 2elevated levels of tritium were again detected in storm drains onsite;this is indicative of ongoing 3rainout, and/or leaks elsewhere onsite that have yet to be identified and addressed.

36 4 5Q.Please explain what "washout" is.

6A. "Washout," also known as "rainout," is a nuclear industry term for airborne tritium 7releases that are regularly released from nuclear power plants. Such airborne tritium releases are 8caused by hot radioactive water or radioactive steam leaking from components in the nuclear 9facility.

10 11Q.How is washout problematic at Indian Point?

12A.Aged plants like Indian Point are more susceptible to leakage, as their components have 13deteriorated and are approaching the end of their design life. These leaks contaminate the air 14inside the plant with radioactivity. The contaminated air is then released through vents in the 15roof or out the exhaust stack of the plant.Entergy's Indian Point plants contain numerous 16airborne vents. Once this humid, radioactive air is released from the building, it condenses and 17rains down or washes outof the air.

18 19Radioactive rain falls on the landscape surrounding Indian Point and also directly into the 20Hudson River. Leakage that Entergy views as normal on the Indian Point site is creating clouds 21of tritiated water that migrate offsite and deposit tritium in the Hudson River and adjacent offsite 22lands. Where the rainout/washout migrates and deposits its radioactive isotopes depends upon 23weather patterns along the Hudson River and adjacent to the Indian Point site.

24 25Q.Please describe the impact of other component leaks discussed above has on the 26plumes of contamination caused by the spent fuel pool leaks at Indian Point.

27A.Newly identified leaks will add to and commingle with the existing radionuclides in the 28groundwater. This is evidenced by the fact that the newly discovered leaks discussed above led 29 36IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 3, 8.6 RGWMPQuarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 4, 2010), IPEC00233519 (Exhibit RIV000083); IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 4, 10.7 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2011), IPEC00233515 (Exhibit RIV000084).

16to spikes in the levels of tritium found in Entergy's monitoring well samples.

37 1 2Q.In your opinion, are leaks from other plant components likely to occur in the 3future?4A.Yes, leaks from pipes and otherstructureswill most definitely occur in the future. One 5chart provided by Entergy lists numerous varied locations at the Indian Point site that may 6currently be leaking tritium and other radioactive isotopes or have a high potential for leakage 7of tritium and other radioactivity in the future.

38According to Entergy, there are at least 8nineteen (19) sources at the Indian Point site that have a "High" potential for leakage of tritium 9and other radioactive isotopes.

39Many of the sources of radiological leaks identified by 10Entergy have already introduced radioactive contamination into the soil and site groundwater at 11Indian Point. Entergy's (undated) chart evidences a site overrun by significant aging 12management issues, and once again, Indian Point's aging, degrading components face a bathtub 13curve, whereby leakage issues will most likely increase over time, and not lessen or cease.

14 15Furthermore, Entergy does not have adequate aging management methods in place in order to be 16able to detect and prevent future leaks.

17 18Q.Please elaborate upon your position that Entergy does not have adequate aging 19management methods and programs for detecting and preventing future leaks.

20A.I have reviewed various documents related to Entergy's program for managing 21problematic leaking components, includingEntergy's fleet-wide Aging Management Program 22(AMP) for leaking buried components and structures, 40a supplement to the Indian Point Safety 23Evaluation Report which discusses aging management of buried components, 41as well as an 24Entergy document concerning inspection methods employed for potential sources of tritium at 25 37Barvenik Direct Testimony at 10-11 (Exhibit RIV000071).

38Entergy Chart of Leak Locations, IPEC00059360 (Exhibit RIV000077).

39 Id.40Entergy Nuclear Management Manual, EN-DC-343, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program (Exhibit NYS000172); CEP-BPT-0100, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring (Exhibit NYS000173).

41U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, (NUREG-1930, Supplement 1) (August 2011), at 3-1 to 3-5, ADAMS Accession No. ML11242A215.

17Indian Point.

42My review of these documents leads me to conclude that Entergy's programs and 1methodsare inadequate to prevent radiological leaks in the future.

2 3Entergy's AMP for buried structures is not designed to identify or stop all potential radiological 4leaks. In fact, this program is not intended to prevent any radiological leaks, since it is only 5concerned with maintaining safety functions of the relevant plant components.

6 7A considerable number of components at Indian Point are inaccessible to examination because 8they are buried, or otherwise obstructed. However, Entergy's AMP does not requireinspections 9of 100% of such components. Many of Indian Point's underground pipes and structures have 10been buried since the plant began operating and have never been inspected during the plants 11nearly 40 years of operation. Rather, Entergy's AMP largely provides only for opportunistic 12inspections, which only uncover a few piping components periodically. Entergy itself readily 13acknowledges its inability to identify and stop leaks, as an spokesperson stated in response to the 14February 2009 accidental underground pipe leak: "[i]t's eight feet underground, so there's no 15way of knowingwhen you have to replace it."

43 16 17These problems are confirmed by GAO's recent investigation report regarding tritium leak 18issues. In particular, GAO concludes that because "underground piping systems tend to corrode" 19and are "largely inaccessible and difficult to inspect, . . . pipes will continue to age and further 20corro[de]" and that the "severity of leaks could increase without mitigating actions."

44 GAO 21further states that "[t]he occurrence of leaks at nuclear power plants from underground piping 22systems is expected to continue."

45 23 24Another major concern with Entergy's methods for preventing future radiological leaks is that a 25 42Potential Sources of Tritium at IPEC & Inspection Method, IPEC00065506 (Exhibit RIV000087).

43Annie Correal, Indian Pt. Broken Pipe Spurs Safety Worries ,THE NEW YORK TIMES(March 1, 2009) (Exhibit RIV000079).

44GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Oversight of Underground Piping Systems Commensurate with Risk, but Proactive Measures Could Help Address Future Leaks, GAO-11-563 (June 2011) (Exhibit RIV000089).

45 Id.

18vast majority of Indian Point's inspection methods rely only upon physical inspections. Industry 1experience with physical inspections indicates that they are completely inadequate to detect a 2leak before it occurs, since this type of inspectiondoes not analyze the piping internally, nor does 3it completely examine the outside of the pipes.These external inspections are called 4"opportunistic" and are limited to situations where the pipe is uncovered for other reasons. One 5Entergy documentidentifies physical inspection methods for dozens of locations that may 6currently, or in the future, leak tritium and/or other radioactive isotopes.

46 7 8An additional problem is that Entergy's approach to identifying and repairing degraded and/or 9leaking components is completely reactive, and not proactive or preventative in nature. For 10example, several Entergy documents I reviewed demonstrate Entergy's reactive approach in 11addressing the initial discovery of the spent fuel pool leaks in 2005.

47One document, entitled 12 Top Ten Lessons Learnedindicates that Entergy couldhave attained earlier indications of a 13problem if staff had performed evaluations earlier, and that Entergy did not effectively review 14information concerning elevated levels of contamination in sampling results.

48Various other 15documents indicate that outside pressure (including from non-profit organizations like Union of 16Concerned Scientists, the public, the NRC, the media, and public officials such as the former 17President Bill Clinton and then-Senator Hilary Clinton) was the primary reason Entergy 18developed a tritium mitigation program at Indian Point.

49Entergy continues to employ a 19reactive approach to the management of radiological leaks at the Indian Point site, as evidenced 20by numerous instances whereby Entergy only identifies new leaks when they literally spring, or 21when they have already manifested in well samples, as opposed to proactively engaging in 22necessary inspections of problematic or potentially problematic components and structures.

23 24Yet another issue with Entergy's approach to managing radiological leaks at Indian Point is that 25Entergy is failing to sufficiently fund its maintenance programs. Anindependent report 26commissioned by the Vermont Legislatureacknowledges this, explaining that"[l]imited resource 27 46Potential Sources of Tritium at IPEC & Inspection Method, IPEC00065506 (Exhibit RIV000087).

47Entergy correspondence, e-mails regarding approach to groundwater contamination, IPEC00067228, IPEC00065510, IPEC00130549, IPEC00062936 (Exhibit RIV000086).

48 Id.49 Id.

19allocation for non-safety systems" can be characterized as "systemic within Entergy."

50This 1report further explains that at Indian Point, "[t]he physical condition of the plant in non-safety 2areas is visibly deficient" and that "the care and maintenance of some . . . plant systems and 3structures do not meet the standards of high-performing plants."

51This failure to adequately 4fund maintenance contributes significantly to the likelihood of radiological leaks at Indian Point.

5 6Based upon Entergy's failure to adequately manage the aging of increasingly degraded plant 7components, as well as the fact that only a limited number of components will be inspected using 8inferior inspection methods,it is highly likely that many tanks, pipes, and other components on 9the Indian Point site will leak in the future prior to detection by Entergy.

10 11THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN THE GROUNDWATER 12 13Q. Please assess Entergy's characterization of the groundwater contamination as "low" 14in the Environmental Report.

15A.By characterizing the groundwater contamination as low in its Environmental Report, 16Entergy is simplyattemptingto minimize the significance of the severity of the radioactive 17contamination at Indian Point. Due to the size of the plumes, the varied range of radionuclides 18present in the groundwater, the dangerous toxicity of various radionuclides in the plumes 19(including Strontium-90 and Cesium-137), and the persistence of the plumes, I believe that the 20contamination at Indian Pointmakes it one of the most contaminated operating nuclear power 21plant sites in the United States. At the time of my review, I have been unable to find any other 22operating U.S. nuclear power plant that is leaking such extensive amounts of tritium and 23strontium contamination into any major body of water like the Hudson River.

24 25Because Entergy and NRC focus onlyonthe dose to humans through the consumption of fish 26from the Hudson River, they do not speak at all to the level of contamination actually in the 27 50Supplemental Report of the Public Oversight Panel Regarding the Comprehensive Reliability Assessment of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, July 20, 2010, at 10 (Exhibit RIV000088) 51 Id.at 9-10.

20groundwater, or address EPA Maximum Contaminant Levels ("MCLs").

52These EPA limits are 1ahighlyconservativebenchmark that areregularly usedfor comparison purposes toassessthe 2degreeof radioactivecontamination.

53 3 4At Indian Point, a reviewof the exceedances over EPA MCLs quickly reveals that the level of 5contamination isdefinitelynot "low." Since the groundwater contamination at Indian Point was 6discovered, radionuclides have regularly been detected at high levels, well in excess of EPA 7MCLs. The most recent monitoring well sampling data provided by Entergy and in 8Riverkeeper's possession as of the date of this testimony, from the second quarter of 2011, 9shows that Entergy continues to detect excessive levels of contamination in numerous sample 10locations, as follows: Cesium-137 was detected in monitoring well ("MW")-42 at 21,500 pCi/l, 11more than 100 times the EPA MCL set at 200 pCi/l; Tritium was detected in MW-30, MW-56, 12and MW-57 at 113,000 pCi/l, 76,4000 pCi/l, and 20,300 pCi/l, respectively, all in excess of the 13EPA MCL for tritium set at 20,000 pCi/l; Nickel-63 was detected in MW-42 at 190 pCi/l, almost 14four times the EPA MCL set at 50 pCi/l; and Strontium-90 was detected in eight monitoring 15wells and an additional sampling location in excess of the EPA MCL for Strontium-90 set at 8 16pCi/l: MW-37 (8.72 pCi/l), MW-49 (12.6 pCi/l, 15.7 pCi/l and 16.2 pCi/l), MW-50 (9.53 pCi/l 17and 26.3 pCi/l), MW-53 (35.5 pCi/l), MW-54 (12 pCi/l and 19 pCi/l), MW-57 (31.1 pCi/l), MW-1866 (10.6 pCi/l), MW-67 (12.5 pCi/l), and at sample location U1-CSS (16.1 pCi/l).

54 19 20Levels of radionuclides in the groundwater are likely not decreasing. Decades worth of 21contamination that is now underneath the site will bleed out slowly, and not rapidly, to the 22Hudson River. As a result, the few years of monitoring that have been completedare not likely 23to be enough to establish a definitive downward trend. GZA flatly recognizes that years of 24monitoring are necessary in order to confirm the status of the plumes.

55Also, over time, the 25 52U.S. EPA, Radionuclides in Drinking Water: A Small Entity Compliance Guide (February 2002) at 13 (Exhibit RIV000065).

53See, e.g., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 -NRC Special Inspection Report No. 05000247/2005011, March 16, 2006, at 3, A1-3, A1-7 (Exhibit RIV000069).

54Entergy Groundwater Well Data, Quarter 2, 2011, IPEC00225100 (Exhibit RIV000090).

55GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc. Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011), at p.1-3, IPEC00227561 (Exhibit RIV000076).

21contamination spreads wider and deeper, causing individual monitoring well concentrations to 1decrease, which may cast an inaccurate picture of the rate of any overall decline of these 2radiologically contaminated plumes.

3 4To the contrary, levels of radionuclides in the groundwater will likely remain high in the future.

5Even if there are no additional leaks, additional peaks will occur. As GZA explains, "[p]eaks of 6tritium have been observed in multiple sampling points. . . This long term variability appears to 7be with the episodic releases of Tritium historically stored in the subsurface. . . . This additional 8unsaturated zone source will likely be manifested in the future as additional non-specific peaks in 9radionuclide levels due to episodic releases to the groundwater . . .".

56Furthermore, ongoing and 10future leaks will continue to add to the existing plumes of contamination. For example, as noted 11in the 2010 Quarter 2 GZA Monitoring Report, "70% of the sampling intervals exhibited an 12increase in Tritium levels" due to the RWST "skid surface spill," discussed above.

57This 13incident "resulted in an increase in the Unit 2 plume total Tritium activity."

58 14 15All indications are that Entergy is going to simply allow such persistent contamination to sit in 16the groundwater for decades to come without any removal or remediation. New leaks, including 17the 2010 Unit SFP leak, and other likely future leaks from aging components at Indian Point, 18guarantee that the present groundwater contamination will not be abated --and, to the contrary, 19will grow. It is, therefore, foreseeable that levels in the groundwater will remain high, and 20continue to exceed EPA MCLs.

21 22 23 24 25 26 56 Id.atp.1-2.57 Id.;IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 3, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2010), IPEC00225219 (Exhibit RIV000080); IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 1, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 2, 2010), IPEC00225223 (Exhibit RIV000081).

58GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc. Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011), at p.1-2, IPEC00227561 (Exhibit RIV000076).

22CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPACTS OF GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION ON 1THE HUDSON RIVER 2 3Q.Please explain whether radiological leaks and discharges from Indian Point have 4contaminated the Hudson River.

5A.Entergy documents explicitly acknowledge that the underground radioactive plumes of 6contamination migrate and eventually discharge to the Hudson River.

59As one Entergy 7document I reviewed explains, the tritium plume fromthe Unit 2 spent fuel pool "tracks with 8downgradient groundwater flow through the Unit 2 transformer yard, under the Discharge Canal 9and discharges to the river between IP2 and IP1 intake structures."

60 10 11Entergy currently implementsMonitored Natural Attenuation toallegedly"manage the 12contamination" 61at Indian Point. My nearly 40-year experience as a nuclear engineer indicates 13that the process to completely eliminate any radioactive contamination by simply hoping it will 14eventually "flush" out into a nearby body of water will take many decades if not an entire 15century after the shutdown and dismantlement of Indian Point before the site is free of 16radioactive contamination. Thus, because the contamination at Indian Point will persist, likely 17grow, and migrate slowly, Indian Point will continue to dischargeradiologically contaminated 18waterintothe Hudson River for decades.

19 20Q.Please describe the nature of the radionuclides that arecurrently beingreleased, 21and will continue to be released,into the Hudson River.

22A.Entergy has acknowledged that the plumes of contamination at the site contain not only 23tritium but also deleterious substances including Nickel-63, Cesium-137, and Strontium-90.

24 59GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc., Hydrogeologic Site Investigation Report, Indian Point Energy Center, January 7,2008, IPEC00195418, at viii,ix(ExhibitRIV000066);Entergy, Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary, Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, NY (January 2008) (Exhibit RIV000068).

60GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc., Hydrogeologic Site Investigation Report, Indian Point Energy Center, January 7,2008, IPEC00195418, at 90(ExhibitRIV000066).

61 Id.at127;GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc. Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011), at p.1-3, IPEC00227561 (Exhibit RIV000076).

23With a 30-year half-life, meaning it contaminates the environment for 300 years, 62the toxicity of 1strontium is much greater than that of almost every radioactive isotope released by a nuclear 2reactor. Strontium-90 is called a bone seeker because if it is ingested, it mimics calcium and is 3absorbed by bone where it can create leukemia and other forms of cancer. Cesium-137 mimics 4potassium and is absorbed by muscle where it too can cause cancers and deformities. Tritium is 5basically radioactive water. Wherever there is water in an organic substance, radioactive tritium, 6also known as tritiated water, can replace water at a cellular level. Tritium can be ingested, 7inhaled, or absorbed through the skin.

8 9Q.In your opinion, could the discharges of these radionuclides to the Hudson River 10impact the aquatic ecosystem during the proposed period of extended operation?

11A.Yes. Strontium-90contaminates the environment for decades and is abone seeker that 12bioaccumulatesinstead of dissipating; it is, therefore, possible that Strontium-90 and/or other 13radionuclides could impact Hudson River fish in the future.

14 15Entergy's own Indian Point monitoring wells have clearly determined that Strontium-90, tritium, 16and other toxic radionuclides contaminate the Indian Point site and flush directly into the Hudson 17River. These radionuclides have the potential to impact fish in the river during Entergy's 18proposed period of extended operation. For example, in January 2007, Entergy shared data with 19the NRC from the 1970s and 1980s (generated before NRC discontinued the requirement that 20nuclear licensees test for Strontium-90 in the offsite environment) that showed that both fish and 21shellfish showed detectable levels of not only Strontium-90, but also of Strontium-89, a shorter 22lived isotope that is not found in residual background radiation resulting from nuclear weapons 23testing.63This supports the need for further and ongoing assessment of the effect that Strontium-2490 and other radionuclides may have on Hudson River biota and nearby significant habitat of 25Haverstraw Bay.

64 26 62"Half-life" is defined as "[t]he time required for half the nuclei of a specific radionuclide or radioactive substance to undergo radioactive decay."

SeeThe American Heritage Medical Dictionary, HoughtonMifflin Company (2007). A radionuclide will essentially fully decay after approximately 10 half-lives.

63E-mailFromDaraGray(Entergy)toJ.Noggle(NRC)(Jan.24,2007),Re:HistoricalSrData(ExhibitRIV000100).

64NYS Department of State, Division of Coastal Resources, Coastal Fish & Wildlife Habitat Rating Form, Haverstraw Bay(Exhibit RIV000092).

24 1Additionally, while a 2009 NYSDEC report suggests that the Strontium-90 concentrations in fish 2near Indian Point are no different than Strontium-90 concentrations in fish upstream from the 3plant, this does not support a conclusion that that there is no effect on fish,or that there will not 4be an effect on fish in the future due to the radiological leaks. NYSDEC's report also fails to 5note that other possible upstream sources of Strontium-90, especially the Knolls Atomic Power 6Lab (KAPL), may have affected the NYSDEC's assessment of other non-fallout related sources 7of Strontium-90. In addition, the NYSDEC 2009 study appears to have been a one-time 8investigation.

9 10Q.In your opinion, could the discharges of radionuclides to the Hudson River have any 11other impacts during the period of extended operation?

12A.Yes. Because Entergy and NRC focus only on the impact of radiological releases to the 13Hudson River in terms of NRC dose calculations of radiation exposure by consumption of 14contaminated fish, they fail to acknowledge other potential impacts that radioactive releases to 15the Hudson River may have upon the health of residents in proximity to the Hudson River. The 16Biological Effects of Ionizing 65Radiation (BEIR) VII Report, issued by the National Academy 17of Science,reaffirmed the conclusion of the prior report that every exposure to radiation, 18regardless of how small, produces a corresponding increase in the likelihood of cancer.

66Based 19upon the BEIR VII report by the National Academy of Science, the radioactive releases 20"flushed" into the Hudson River via ground and surface water from the Indian Point site could 21increase the incidence of cancer to those exposed through recreational activities, such as 22swimming.23 24 25 26 27 28 65Ionizing radiation are alpha, beta, gamma, and neutrons that cause cellular damage by ionization, that is the process that breaks atomic bonds and creates negative and positive ions.

66National Research Council, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII -Phase 2(2006)(Exhibit RIV000093).

25AVAILABLE AND FEASIBLE MITIGATION MEASURES TO MINIMIZE OR 1REDUCE THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF THE RADIOLOGICAL LEAKS AND 2GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION AT INDIAN POINT 3 4Q.Please evaluate the effectiveness of Entergy's Monitored Natural Attenuationas a 5strategy for handling the contamination at Indian Point.

6A.Monitored Natural Attenuation is not a remedial approach, because it does nothing to 7mitigate the progress of the radioactive plumes to the groundwater adjacent to the Indian Point 8site or into the Hudson River. In light of Entergy's approach, radioactive contamination (from 9past leaks, current leaks, and likely future leaks) will persist in the groundwater, likely at high 10levels, and be released to the Hudson River for decades into the foreseeable future. As I stated 11previously in this testimony, all radioactive releases, no matter how low the concentration have 12potentially deleterious health effects.

67Therefore, Monitored Natural Attenuation is not a valid 13remediation approach to the extensive tritium and strontium leakage at Indian Point.

14 15Q.Please explain whether there is preferable approach to handling radiological leaks 16at Indian Point?

17A. Remediation of the radiological contamination via extraction wells is a far superior 18approach for handling the contaminationand leak issues at Indian Point.Such mitigation 19processes would clean the site much faster and more thoroughly than allowing the groundwater 20to flush radiological contamination directly into the Hudson River.

21 22Q.What are extraction wells and why do they matter?

23A.Extraction wells mitigate the volume and spread of radiation and draw contaminants out 24of the ground in order to prevent their movement to nearby bodies of water, the existing water 25table, or to prevent aquifer contamination. At Indian Point,for example, which has tritium and 26other radioactive isotopes like Strontium (Sr90), an extraction well would reduce the level of 27contamination in the groundwater and prevent radioactive contamination from spreading across 28the site and into the Hudson River. Removing a radioactive isotope like Sr90 would prevent its 29ongoing contamination for 300 years. Sr90 has a half-life of 30 years which means that it will be 30 67Seeid.

26in the environment for 300 years.

1 2Q.In your opinion, is extraction feasible to address the groundwater contamination at 3Indian Point?

4A.Yes. Entergy documentation indicates thatin May 2006, Entergy's consultant, GZA, 5recommended that a remedial extraction well be installed in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool building:

6The remedial option letter is . . . basically complete . . . I showed 7the team the results of the model and the locations of the proposed 8pumping wells and rates. Basically, we are recommending a 9pumping well in the IP2-FSB to address the source of the Tritium.

10A second pumping wellwould be located in the Superheater 11building, west of the CS Sump. This well should capture the 12majority of the Sr contamination on the Unit 1 side.

68 13 14Further Entergy documentation indicates that pilot pumping tests were performed, which 15indicated that remediation of the contamination at Indian Point is feasible. An Entergy document 16entitled Groundwater Investigation '06 Quarter 4 Activitiesand Resultsdetails pilot tests 17conducted on behalf of Entergy to determine if an extraction well would help to remove tritiated 18and other radioactively contaminated water from the ground on the Indian Point site. This 19document explains the success of the pilot testing as follows:

20Remediation Pilot Test: The groundwater investigation team 21conducted a pump test to determine if a recovery well, could be 22used to hydraulically prevent the migration of tritiated groundwater 23around the Unit 2 Fuel Building. The test is also designed to test 24the feasibility of pumping groundwater from the area near IP2.

25The test did indicatethat water could be drawn from around 26Unit 2 without drawing Sr-90 contaminated water from Unit 1.

27The RW-I well pumping did influence water in the Unit 2 28Transformer Yard (MW 69-34) as expected. Sampling from the 29monitoring wells has resumed. [

Emphasis Added

]70 30 31And, an Indian Point Energy Center Status Report from December of 2006 also memorializes the 32success of the pilot pumping from RW-1:

33 68Entergy E-mail from David Winslow (GZA) to Donald Mayer (Entergy), G. Hinrichs (Entergy), Re: Remedial Report (May 19, 2006), IPEC00064221(Exhibit RIV000094) 69"MW" stands for monitoring well.

70Groundwater Investigation '06Quarter 4 Activities and Results, IPEC00063899(Exhibit RIV000095).

27Tritium concentrations were reduced during the recent recovery 1well pump test. The tritium concentration in RW-1 atthe 2beginning of the test was about 100,000 pCi/L and dropped to 319,000 pCi/L at the end of the test. Levels remained lower (30,000 4pCi/L) three weeks later. A similar drop was observed in MW-30 .

5. . The tritium concentration was reduced by about half. This is a 6limited data set but does provide some evidence that groundwater 7tritium levels can be reduced in this fashion.

71 8 9Another Entergy document also explained that the pilot test decreased tritium levels 10significantly, and stated that a "permanent system installation [was] planned for completion in 11May 2007."

72 12 13The record suggests that there is no reason why extraction is not possible at Indian Point.

14Furthermore, the documents I have reviewed demonstrate that extraction of tritium and other 15radioactive isotopes would successfully mitigate the contamination. Moreover, Entergy already 16knows that the installation and application of extraction wells is a successful remediation 17technique: the extraction process currently applied by Entergy at some of its other operating 18nuclear power plant sites physically extracts radioactive water from underground leaks and 19deposits it into above-ground tanks. This radioactive water is then treated and processed. Thus, 20Entergy is fully aware of the positive effectiveness of extraction wells upon remediating 21radioactive isotopic contamination.

22 23In fact, a representative of GZA recently testified for Entergy about issues relating to 24radiological leaks at Indian Point and confirmed that extraction is feasible and could reduce the 25contamination on-site and prevent contamination from reaching the Hudson River:

26Based on my knowledge of the Indian Point site hydrogeology, and 27my experience with groundwater contamination, I have performed 28an analysis of possible measures that could be taken to prevent 29these radionuclides from reaching the Hudson River. Based on 30that analysis, I have concluded that Entergy could install a 31 sufficient number of groundwater extraction wells so as to contain 32 71Entergy E-mail from Kathleen McMullin (Entergy) to various, Re: IPEC Status Report for Dec. 21(Exhibit RIV000096).

72Entergy Document, "Unit 1 Status for ENC Presentation notes," "GroundwaterStatus," IPEC00062939(ExhibitRIV000097).

28these radionuclides on-site by establishing a groundwater gradient 1reversal . . . [T]he extraction wells would result in groundwater 2flowing from the Hudson River toward the wells located on-site.

3Entergy would then extract the groundwater containing 4radionuclides from the subsurface, and process that groundwater 5in an appropriate manner.

73 6 7As a result, there really is no dispute that extraction is a viable and preferable alternative to 8MNA.9 10Q.What is the current status of remediating radioactive underground water 11through extraction at Indian Point?

12A.Although numerous reports, as early as 2006, recommended remediation through 13extraction of radioactive water, and despite GZA'svery recent acknowledgement that extraction 14is feasible, Entergy has not implementedany of these recommendations, and instead continues to 15solelyrely upon Monitored Natural Attenuation.

16 17In the past, Entergy has attempted to rationalizeits choice to only rely uponMNA, namely 18because it would alter groundwater flow and possibly cause plume commingling.

74Since ample 19documentation demonstrates that pilot pumping did not alter Sr-90 contamination flow, and that 20the extraction had the clear advantage of being successful,Entergy'sposition on this issue is not 21justified.But, even if the extraction altered the groundwater flow and the contamination plumes, 22the benefit of extraction clearly outweighs any negative aspect of an allegedly altered 23groundwater flow. Moreover, Entergy's earlier position is no longer justified in light of GZA's 24recent admission that extractionmaybe successfullyexecuted.

25 26 27 28 29 73BarvenikRebuttalTestimonyat41-42(Exhibit RIV000099).

74Letter from Kathryn Sutton (Counsel for Entergy) to Deborah Brancato (Riverkeeper), Re: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR (June 24, 2011)(ExhibitRIV000098);Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1 & 2 -NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2007010 and 05000247/2007010, EA-08-088, May 13, 2008at13(Exhibit RIV000067).

29Q.Please describe whether there are any other feasible measures to mitigate or 1minimize the adverse impacts of the radiological leaks and groundwater contamination at 2Indian Point.

3A.There are a range of feasible measuresthat would mitigate the adverse impacts of the 4leaks and contamination at Indian Point. These include:

5 61.If Entergy chose to reduce the amount of spent fuel stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool by 7using dry cask storage instead, it would be possible to remove some racks and shuffle the 8remaining fuel to completely inspect the Unit 2 spent fuel pool liner for leaks and other 9imperfections.

102.At Entergy'sPalisades nuclear plant, published reports indicate that Entergy has chosen 11to movepipes containing radioactive material above ground for ease of inspection.

12Exelon is also employing a similar approach on Oyster Creek. This approach could also 13be used on Indian point 2 and 3 and would reduce the likelihood of leaksand greatly 14enhance Entergy's ability to inspect for leaks.

153.Thorough physical inspections of extensive segments of underground pipe could be 16employedas a pre-condition to license renewal.

174.Anincrease in inspection frequency of all underground pipe beyondthat whichEntergy 18has suggested in its AMPshould be required as a condition of license renewal.

195.And, in a public commitment to more openness and transparency, Entergy should be 20required to fully disclose Indian Point's radiological monitoring results and publish them 21on a monthly basis in an accessible online database in order to keep the publicfully 22informedof the ongoing radiological contamination of the groundwater at and adjacent to 23Indian Point and the radiological contamination of the Hudson River.

24 25CONCLUSIONS 26Q.Please summarize your conclusions regarding radiological leaks and 27groundwater contamination at Indian Point.

28The Unit 2 spent fuel pool is currently leaking and will most likely continue to leak in 29the future; 30The leaks that occurred from the Unit 1 spent fuel pools has resulted in contamination 31 30that will continue to impact the environment for the foreseeablefuture; 1Other plant systems, structures, and components, including buried pipes and 2structures, have recently caused leakage issues, and will most likelyleak in the future; 3such leakswilladd to and commingle with the existing plumes of contamination; 4Thecurrentlevel of groundwater contamination at Indian Pointis high, and will 5continue to reach high levels during the proposed period of extended operation; 6Thegroundwater contamination may cause impacts to the Hudson Riverduring the 7proposed extended licensing terms, including impacts toaquatic ecology,impacts to 8recreational activities in the river, and impacts to drinking water sources; and 9There exists a wide range of reasonable, feasible, cost-beneficial measures that could 10mitigate, minimize, and lessen theadverse environmental consequences of 11radiological leaks and groundwater contamination fromIndian Pointto the 12surrounding groundwater and Hudson River.

13 14Q.Does this conclude your direct testimony?

15A.Yes.16 31REFERENCES1.NUREG-1437,Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants(May 1996)(Exhibit NYS00131A-NYS00131I)2.NUREG-1437,Revision 1,Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants(July 2009),Draft Report for Comment(Exhibit RIV000064)3.Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, Supplement 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear GeneratingUnit Nos. 2 and 3, Draft Report, December 2008, ADAMS Accession Nos. ML083540594, ML083540614 (Exhibits NYS00132A-NYS00132D)4.Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, Supplement 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3,December 2010 available athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1437/supplement38/5.U.S. EPA, Radionuclides in Drinking Water: A Small Entity Compliance Guide (February 2002)(Exhibit RIV000065)6.GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc., Hydrogeologic Site Investigation Report, Indian Point Energy Center, January 7, 2008, IPEC00195418(Exhibit RIV000066)7.Indian PointNuclear Generating Units 1 & 2 -NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2007010 and 05000247/2007010, EA-08-088, May 13, 2008(Exhibit RIV000067)8.Entergy, Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary, Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, NY (January 2008)(Exhibit RIV000068)9.Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 -NRC Special Inspection Report No. 05000247/2005011, March 16, 2006(Exhibit RIV000069)10.Indian Point Energy Center Status Report (Sept. 6, 2007)(Exhibit RIV000070)11.In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc's Joint Application for CWA § 401 Water Quality Certification, Prefiled Testimony of Matthew J. Barvenik, Issue for Adjudication No. 3 -Radiological Materials (July 22, 2011)(Exhibit RIV000071)12.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-247and 50-286 (November 2009),accessible at,http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html, NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML093170671 3213.E-mail from Michael Rutkoske to Steven Verrochi (Entergy), Re: SFP Exams -What's Next? (Nov. 19, 2005), IPEC00065830(Exhibit RIV000072)14.Entergy, U2 SFP Leak Monitoring Wells and Underground Piping (3/31/06), IPEC00063518(Exhibit RIV000073)15.Entergy, Problem Development Sheet -Groundwater, IPEC00207416(Exhibit RIV000074)16.E-mail from Ronald Sachatello to Donald Mayer (Entergy), Joseph Adler (TLG), Gary Hinrichs(Entergy), Re: IS THE POOL LEAK OFF COLLECTION BOX EFFECTIVE?, IPEC00063351(Exhibit RIV000075)17.GZA, GeoEnvironmental, Inc.Final IPEC Quarterly Long-Term Groundwater Monitoring Report, Quarter Two 2010 (Report No. 10) (February 15, 2011),IPEC00227561(Exhibit RIV000076)18.Entergy Chart of Leak Locations, IPEC00059360(Exhibit RIV000077)19.IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 1, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2009), IPEC00225217(Exhibit RIV000078)20.Annie Correal, Indian Pt. Broken Pipe Spurs Safety Worries ,T HE N EW YORK T IMES(March 1, 2009)(Exhibit RIV000079)21.IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 3, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist(Quarter 1, 2010), IPEC00225219(Exhibit RIV000080)22.IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 1, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 2, 2010), IPEC00225223 (Exhibit RIV000081)23.Entergy, Nuclear Management Manual, EN-MA-125, Rev. 4, Attachment 9.1, Initial Investigation, Troubleshooting Plan for H-3 Investigation, Storm Drain System A

,March/April 2009, IPEC00194517(Exhibit RIV000082)24.IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 3, 8.6 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 4, 2010), IPEC00233519(Exhibit RIV000083)25.IPEC Site Management Manual, IP-SMM, CY-110, Rev. 4, 10.7 RGWMP Quarterly Integrated Review Checklist (Quarter 1, 2011), IPEC00233515(Exhibit RIV000084)26.Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 -NRC Integrated Inspection Report05000286/2011004 (November 7, 2011)(Exhibit RIV000085)27.Entergy correspondence, e-mails regarding approach to groundwater contamination, IPEC00067228, IPEC00065510, IPEC00130549, IPEC00062936(Exhibit RIV000086) 3328.Potential Sources of Tritium at IPEC & Inspection Method, IPEC00065506(Exhibit RIV000087)29.Supplemental Report of the Public Oversight Panel Regarding the Comprehensive Reliability Assessment of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, July 20, 2010(Exhibit RIV000088)30.GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Oversight of Underground Piping Systems Commensurate with Risk, but Proactive Measures Could Help Address Future Leaks, GAO-11-563 (June 2011)(Exhibit RIV000089)31.Entergy Nuclear Management Manual, EN-DC-343, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program (Exhibit NYS000172)32.CEP-BPT-0100, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring (Exhibit NYS000173)33.Entergy Groundwater Well Data, Quarter 2, 2011, IPEC00225100(Exhibit RIV000090)34.Guideline for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity, NEI 09-14,Rev. 1, December 2010 (Exhibit NYS000168).

35.Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, U.S. NRC (September 1, 2006)(Exhibit RIV000091)36.NYS Department of State, Division of Coastal Resources, Coastal Fish & Wildlife Habitat Rating Form, Haverstraw Bay(Exhibit RIV000092)37.National Research Council, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII -Phase2(2006)(Exhibit RIV000093)38.Entergy E-mail from David Winslow (GZA) to Donald Mayer (Entergy), G. Hinrichs (Entergy), Re: Remedial Report (May 19, 2006), IPEC00064221(Exhibit RIV000094)39.Groundwater Investigation '06 Quarter 4 Activities and Results, IPEC00063899(Exhibit RIV000095)40.Entergy E-mail from Kathleen McMullin (Entergy) to various, Re: IPEC Status Report for Dec. 21(Exhibit RIV000096)41.Entergy Document, "Unit 1 Status for ENC Presentation notes," "Groundwater Status," IPEC00062939(Exhibit RIV000097) 3442.Letter from Kathryn Sutton (Counsel for Entergy) to Deborah Brancato (Riverkeeper), Re: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR (June 24, 2011)(Exhibit RIV000098)43.Inthe Matter of Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc's Joint Application for CWA § 401 Water Quality Certification, Combined PrefiledRebuttalTestimony ofThomas C. Esselman, Ph.D.,Matthew J. Barvenik, and Owen Hoffman, Ph.D., Radiological -Issuefor Adjudication No. 3 (October 4, 2011)(Exhibit RIV000099)44.E-mailFromDaraGray(Entergy)toJ.Noggle(NRC)(Jan.24,2007),Re:HistoricalSrData(ExhibitRIV000100)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING UOARD In the Matter of Entcrgy Nuclear Operations, Inl!. (Indian Point Nuclear Units 2 and 3) ) ) ) ) ) ) ._-) Dock!.)t Nos, 50*247*LR and 5()*2Rfl*LR I>ECLARATION OF ARNOL!) GtlNDERSEN I, Arnold Gundersen, do hereby declare penalty of perjury that my statements in the foregoing testimony and my statement of professional qualifications are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and bdief. Exccut\:d in Accord with 10 CYR. § 2.304(d) tv 1:1 t, p'. ( Arnold () undersen 376 Appletree Point Road Burlington, VT 0540K 20 II