IR 05000263/2014007
| ML14322A309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/2014 |
| From: | Riemer K R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Fili K Northern States Power Co |
| References | |
| IR 2014007 | |
| Download: ML14322A309 (25) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352 November 18, 2014
Ms. Karen Fili Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION AND POWER UPRATE INSPECTION REPORT
Dear Ms. Fili:
On October 10, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2014, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at Monticello was generally effective. Issues were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold and were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner and addressed the associated causes. Lessons learned from industry operating experience were generally reviewed and applied when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were generally used to identify problems and appropriate actions.
No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2014007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2014007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 22 through October 10, 2014 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer-Team Lead R. Lerch, Project Engineer P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector-Monticello B. Jose, Senior Reactor Engineer J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer
Approved by: K. Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects 2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report 05000263/2014007; 09/22/2014-10/10/2014; Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the senior resident inspector. No violations or findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process" Revision 5, dated February 2014.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective at identifying, evaluating and correcting problems. A strong safety conscious work environment was evident, based on interviews with workers and a review of CAP issues and the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captur ed in the CAP. Operating Experience (OE) was appropriately evaluated. Although recent efforts to hold workers accountable to the process have resulted in some improvement, there continued to be examples where process requirements were not followed. Some of these issues may have resulted from frequent cross-referencing of CAPs, which increased the susceptibility for issues to be lost in the process. There were also examples where self-imposed limitations or "common prac tice" behaviors potentially impacted the efficacy of the CAP, particularly in the review of OE during cause evaluations and processing of escalated NOS findings. The licensee's efforts to address underlying human performance issues which had led to several, past plant events, appeared good, but recent events involving reactivity control raised questions about whether these actions would be effective in the long term.
3
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
The activities documented in Sections
.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152. .1 Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel. The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensee's CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in 2012. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items. The inspectors performed a more extensive review going back 5 years of the licensee's efforts to address issues with contractor control and aging management. This review consisted primarily of a 5-year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's efforts to address the underlying issues for the substantive cross-cutting issues (SCCIs) in H7, "Documentation," and H14, "Conservative Bias." These issues were identified in the licensee's 2014 mid-cycle assessment letter dated September 2, 2014. During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the station's CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors determined whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings. All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensee's implementation of the CAP was generally good. This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. Workers were generally familiar with using this database and were encouraged to identify issues. Of note, were that many workers felt that management feedback on these issues had improved since the 2012 NRC PI&R inspection. The inspectors also verified that workers were familiar with the various avenues (CAP, ECP, NRC, etc.) for raising concerns.
Observations The inspectors noted a number of CAP issues documenting apparent trends identified through the "binning" of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM)reports. The inspectors reviewed a selective sample of these trends and concluded that they were generally well handled. However, the inspectors identified a potential adverse trend where several issues were not entered into the CAP in a timely matter. Of note, was that a similar trend had been identified during a recent licensee assessment (CAP 1444328, "PI&R Prep CAP Initiation Review," dated 10/1/14). The licensee documented this issue as CAP 1449939. From February 17-24, 2014, the licensee took several steps to reduce the CAP backlog from about 3000 to 2400 items. The effort consisted of having department CAP liaisons identifying lower level issues that could be closed. These items were then screened by licensee management to validate that there was no significant risk toward closing the actions. The inspectors reviewed a sample of these issues and identified no problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. (1) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Identified problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance, including an appropriate consideration of risk. Most issues were either closed to trend or at a level appropriate for a condition evaluation. Those issues assigned to higher level evaluations, such as root and apparent cause evaluations, were generally technically accurate and of sufficient depth to effectively identify the cause and extent of condition. There were no items in the operations, engineering, or maintenance backlogs that were risk-significant, individually or collectively. The inspectors noted that the licensee generally, adequately evaluated equipment operability and functionality after identifying a degraded or non-conforming condition.
Observations The licensee had implemented several actions since the 2012 NRC PI&R inspection to improve worker adherence to the CAP process. However, the inspectors did identify several examples where process requirements were still not being followed, including: some examples where CAPs were not timely initiated, the failure to document the basis for CAP downgrades; inappropriate closure of corrective actions; and the failure to properly cross-reference CAPs. Some of these examples resulted, in part, from the licensee's frequent practice of "cross-referencing" CAPs. This often made it difficult to determine whether issues were properly addressed and increased the probability that issues may be "lost" in the CAP process. Although none of the individual examples were significant, they collectively indicated that additional licensee attention was warranted. The licensee documented this issue as CAPs 1449939 and 1448223. Aging Management Programs All engineers had received training on aging management, including refresher training, just after entering the period of extended operation. The training was also given to managers and supervisors. The team did not observe active questioning about possible aging issues during management review of CAPs at the PARB meeting; however, the team observed that this was specifically covered in the pre-screening meetings. The inspectors review of associated procedures and CAP documents did not identify any significant aging management issues.
CAP 1415802, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water In-Leakage: Historical Review of Event," 1/22/2014 Between August 9, 2013 and January 17, 2014, the licensee was responding to potential reactor coolant system leakage into the reactor building closed cooling water in-leakage (RBCCW) system. This leakage was eventually determined to be reactor pressure boundary leakage, a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications that required a forced shutdown to repair. As documented in Inspection Report 05000263/2014002, the NRC identified several weaknesses with the licensee's oversight and technical evaluation/decision-making for this event. Subsequently, the licensee did a root cause evaluation on the issue. The root cause focused specifically on why plant operators did not initially request a formal operability evaluation. The other aspects of the oversight/decision-making were subsumed in another root cause (which was cross-referenced to the above root cause)looking at common elements related to inadequate oversight/decision-making for the RBCCW and other plant events. The inspectors identified several concerns with the licensee's review of the RBCCW issue:
- In the root cause for the operability recommendation, the licensee concluded that there was insufficient procedural guidance in Operational Work Instruction 03-02, "Safety Related and Fire Protection Related System Operability Determination and Verification." However, the inspectors noted that fleet procedure FP-OP-OL-01, Operability/Functionality Determination," had sufficient guidance to prompt a formal operability recommendation; the root cause did not evaluate why the operators did not follow the fleet procedure.
- The second root cause looking at the common elements, did not evaluate the specific circumstances of the RBCCW event; therefore, it was uncertain whether there were specific issues associated with that event for which corrective action was not being taken.
The inspectors also considered the licensee's handling of the RBCCW issue as another example where "cross-referencing" may result in issues not being properly addressed. The licensee documented these concerns as CAP 1450086.
Findings No findings were identified. (2) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely. The in spectors' review of the contractor control and aging management issues did not identify any negative trend or inability by the licensee to address long term issues.
Observations Potential Adverse Trend Regarding Lack of Integrated Plant Knowledge Between 2013 and 2014, the licensee has had several significant events resulting in potential violations of Technical Specifications, challenges to operability/functionality and a forced shutdown. For each event, the licensee performed an apparent or root cause as appropriate and instituted corrective action. Although the individual evaluations and actions were generally adequate, the inspectors noted an apparent common element regarding a lack of "integrated plant knowledge" (licensing and plant design basis)among engineers and plant operators. This element was not identified as a potential adverse trend/common issue warranting independent review. It was unclear whether collectively; the individual corrective actions for the specific events would address this common concern. The licensee documented this observation as CAP 1450057. Licensee Actions to Address Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues Currently, Monticello has two open SCCIs, as assessed through the NRC operating reactor assessment program. Specifically, a substantive cross-cutting theme in Human Performance, Documentation (H.7) was identified during the 2013 End-of-Cycle assessment. A second substantive cross-cutting theme in Human Performance, Conservative Bias (H.14) was identified during the 2014 Mid-Cycle assessment. The licensee completed a root cause analysis for each substantive cross cutting theme in May 2014. Although the inspectors determined that, the corrective actions to mitigate each issue appear adequate, these actions have not yet been proven effective and sustained performance has not been observed Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, attended the weekly OE screening meeting, reviewed evaluations of OE issues and events, and reviewed self-assessments of the OE program. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. Assessment The inspectors determined that overall OE was effectively used at the station. OE was discussed as part of the daily planning meetings, and at operations and maintenance pre-job briefings. Generally, OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations; however, as stated below, the review was limited. During interviews, workers stated that OE was seen as a valuable learning too and that its use was encouraged by management. No issues were identified through the inspectors' review of selective OE evaluated by the station over the past 2 years.
Observations While reviewing licensee cause evaluations, the inspectors noted that the procedural threshold for "industry OE preventable" events was too restrictive, in that only industry events of high significance (such as those documented in NRC Information Notices)involving the same circumstances were considered. This high threshold essentially meant that the failure to use OE would likely never be identified as a potential precursor for events. There were several examples where the licensee had identified lower level industry events, involving similar issues and causes, which were discounted, as they did not meet the procedural threshold. The inspectors also noted that similar observations had been made during prior PI&R inspections in 2010 and 2012. The licensee documented this concern in CAPs 1448087, 1450065 and 1448222.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and NOS audits. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area and the NOS audits were thorough and critical. Where changes to the operating experience process were too recent for inspectors to assess, the NOS organization was monitoring the stations performance.
The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments. The inspectors reviewed the self-assessment performed on the CAP, found no issues and generally agreed with the overall results and conclusions drawn. The self-assessment of CAP was a very thorough look at the process which concluded that the process was effective.
Observations The inspectors noted some issues with how the licensee handled escalated NOS findings. These findings were issued when NOS had concerns with how the licensee was addressing previously identified NOS issues. They were considered more significant than regular NOS findings (which were handled commensurate with their significance in the CAP), but less significant than adverse findings (which were typically assigned a minimum CAP significance of "B" and an apparent cause evaluation). By contrast, escalated findings were assigned a lower CAP significance level ("C") and were resolved using an NOS specific process. This separate process did not evaluate why the issue had been escalated, but instead focused on those corrective actions necessary for NOS to close the issue. Once resolved, the associated CAP was closed with a cross-reference to the associated NOS documentation. This practice prevented the licensee from investigating why the CAP process did not adequately address the original NOS concern and potentially diminished the role of NOS as an independent overseer of station performance. The licensee documented this observation as CAP 1449547.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee's sa fety conscious work environment (SCWE) through the reviews of the facility's employee concern program implementing procedures, discussions with coordinators of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results from a Safety Culture Survey and partial results of an organization effectiveness survey. As part of the overall inspection effort, inspectors discussed department and station programs with a variety of people. In addition, the inspectors interviewed approximately 30 individuals from various departments to assess their willingness to raise nuclear safety issues. Other items discussed included:
- knowledge and understanding of the CAP;
- effectiveness and efficiency of the CAP;
- willingness to use the CAP; and
- knowledge and understanding of the ECP.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Assessment The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern regarding the licensee's safety conscious work environment. Information obtained during the interviews indicated that an environment was established where licensee personnel felt free to raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation; licensee personnel were aware of and generally familiar with the CAP and other processes, including the ECP and the NRC, through which concerns could be raised, and safety significant issues could be freely communicated to supervision. Documents provided to the inspectors regarding safety culture surveys and monitoring of the safety culture and SCWE generally supported the conclusions from the interviews. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Observations Interviewed personnel generally expressed the view the CAP was serving its intended functions and stated that they were aware of and complied with the expectations to document concerns in the CAP. The licensee had a Safety Culture Survey completed in August 2013, which concluded that overall the plant had a safety culture that supported the traits of a healthy nuclear safety culture, had a respect for nuclear safety, and assured that nuclear safety was not compromised by production priorities. The survey and the team that conducted the
survey identified several positive observations and several weakness observations where action for improvement might be warranted. The weakness observations were associated with a respectful work environment and leadership safety values and actions. The report documented that some employees believed that the communications from management on changes could be improved and management did not show respect for employees and their opinions. Several workers interviewed by the inspectors stated that following several management changes in 2014 that communication between workers and licensee management had improved since the survey. The licensee had an organizational effectiveness survey in December 2013 that also looked at various traits associated with an effective safety culture. While generally the results of the survey were positive for the overall station, there were some indications of decline in some departments from 2011, the last previous equivalent survey, to the present survey. When the inspectors questioned personnel for the reasons for the indicated declines and for any follow-up action, the majority of licensee personnel interviewed were not aware of the survey results or of any action, including the generation of CAP inputs that resulted from the survey. During the inspection, the licensee did not provide any documents that indicated that the results from the December 2013 were considered as items that should be addressed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Power Uprate Related Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the biennial PI&R inspection, the inspectors reviewed selected, routine items entered into the licensee CAP concerning the power uprate amendment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meeting
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On October 10, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Fili and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
PLANT PROCEDURES
Number Description or Title Date or RevisionFP-OP-COO-15 Conservative Decision Making
FP-STND-NSC-01
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Process
CD 2.1 Nuclear Oversight Corporate Directive
DP-NO-IA
Internal Assessments
DP-NOIA-07 Internal Assessment: Topic Selection, Scheduling, And Cycle Reporting
FG-PA-CTC-01 CAP Trend Code Manual
FG-PA-EVAL-01
Evaluation Methods
FP-PA-DRUM-01 Department Roll-Up Meeting (DRUM) Manual
FP-PA-ACE-01
Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual
and 2 FP-PA-ARP-01
CAP Action Request Process 35, 37 and 39 FP-PA-SA-01 Focused Self-Assessment Planning, Conduct, and
Reporting
FP-PA-PAR-01 Performance Assessment Review Board and Performance Assessment Oversight
OWI-03.02 Safety Related and Fire Protection System Operability Determination and Verification
FP-E-EVL-01 Engineering Evaluations 5 FP-E-SE-04 Conduct of System Engineering 18 FP-OP-OL-01 Operability/Functionality Determination 13 QF0398 Security Change/Activity Screening and Evaluation 5 FG-PA-KPI-01 Performance Assessment Data Reporting 3 CP 0021 Employee Concerns Program 5 FP-EC-ECP-01 Employee Concerns Program 6 FP-PA-ECE-01 Equipment Cause Evaluation Manual 1 FP-PA-EFR-01 Effectiveness Review Manual 1 FP-PA-OE-01 Operating Experience Program 19
FP-PA-RCE-01 Root Cause Evaluation Manual 1 FP-PA-SOER-01 Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) Processing
NSPM-1 Quality Assurance Topical Report 7 FP-NO-IA-12 Nuclear Oversight Finding Development, Issuance Tracking, and Issue Escalation
3271 Memo Distribution, PCR 01313901 07/23/13 3802 Visual Inspection of Heat Exchanger Condition 5
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Numbe r Description or Title
28268 Age Degradation Evaluation for Bolting Integrity Program 826605 GE Part 21 Notice (SC05-03) - Potential to Exceed Low Pressure Safety Limit 951636 Administrative Controls Documents Will be Revised 1008261 Change Commitment Cross-Reference Location for M87005A 1131704 Breaker Racking or Alignment Issues 1176715 #17 Battery's Capacity Calculation Contains Wrong Assumptions 1181868 Leaking Manifold Valve for DPIS-2-117A B Steam Line Flow 1185959 RCIC HELB at MO-2078 and Its Affect On MOC-311 1197202 CDBI- Calculation Quality Adverse Trend 1205719 APM S&C Refurbishment Not Performed In Accordance With Tech
Manual 1210803 Appropriate License Renewal Frequency Not Established 1217223 Gap to Excellence in License Renewal System Walkdowns 1221315 RBCCW Piping Thickness Below Expected Value 1221333 MO-2009 Failed To Properly Operate During Procedure 1381 1223696 Leak Discovered on SBLC Tank 1227961 #11 Offgas Compressor Flex Conduit Brocken 1228061 Reactor Feed Pump Control Cable Exposed to Elevated
Temperatures 1228167 Cable Tray in Turbine Building Has Corrosion Deposit 1228174 FP-13 Has Evidence of Selective Leaching 1265183 Ready To Install Task Caviats Could Cause Issues as Written 1266454 Recovery Plan for HELB Improvement Potentially Off Track 1268207 New LS-7211 EDG Level Switch Did Not Function as Expected 1274758 Potential HU Error Trap In Electrical Modification WOs 1280199 AR 1279926 Inappropriately Closed With No Actions 1280599 Insulation Nick In MCC-141 Refeed Connector 1298620 MO-2-53A/B Low Capability Margin for NSR Scenario 1300308 Main Access SCT Airlock EFR Acceptance Criteria Not Met 1307848 Class 1E Agastat Relay Replacement PM should be 10 Years 1309439 Core Spray Testable Check Valve Shows Dual Position 1314222 Potential Adverse Trend in Raw Water Pump Performance
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Numbe r Description or Title
1316022 CV-1378 Cannot Control Pressure With Current Configuration 1322841 Safety Related Equipment Impacted by Tech Spec Allowed Frequency1323839 MO-2021 Found With Dual Indication 1328206 Actions from ACE 01266100 Found Not Effective 1330947 Questions About Equipment Safety Classification In Passport 1331618 NRC 2012 CDBI-Harmonics Issue with Degraded Voltage Relays 1332185 FME Found In New 13.8kv Switchgear 1334789 NRC Cross-Cutting Issue Potential In Human Performance 1337178 CRD HCU Piston Accumulators Do Not Meet HELB Environment 1337186 License Renewal PN Changes Not In Accordance With AWI 1342363 ODMI for Cable A602-G40/2 per Cable Program EWI-08.19.01 1343416 Adverse Trend In Equipment Re-Greasing Practices 1350445 MO-2010, Exceeded Maximum Closing Thrust 1351259 Discrepancy Between Fleet Process and Tec Spec 1353905 Adverse Trend-Bechtel Work Package Quality 1354966 MRule Unplanned SCRAMs Has Exceeded Criteria 1362098 Foreign Material Identified in 11 RHRSW Upper Reservoir 1368457 Rust Discovered in Feed Water Heater Nozzles 1373085 Leaks Identified on RHR-25-2 During DW Walkdown 1375410 Crack found in the P-1A, CD Pump Can / Suction Nozzle Weld 1376596 Support FW-17 Rigid Strut Recieved Not Correct Length 1378391 Inferior Bolts Found On New Valve - MS-116 1378744 E SRV Low-Low Set Tailpipe dP Root Valve Found Closed 1383340 EPU - Unacceptable Radiography (RT) Result On Piping Welds 1385118 Manufacturer Label Confusing To Personnel 1385313 Evaluate Shelf Life Guidance for Oil/Grease 1389519 IST Cold Shutdown Tests Not Scheduled Properly 1389604 NRC Question Regarding SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 Applicability 1390285 RF026 Was Planned 87 Days; Actual Will Be About 139 Days 1395575 NRC Questioning Results in Subm
itting 50.72 Unanalyzed Condition 1398625 NOS Escalation-Level 1 Performance Assessment 1402240 AO-13-22 Furmanite Injection Process Question 1402246 NRC Question on DSC PT Examination Times 1405367 NRC: Issues with Calculation 10-219 1405518 What Superseded Calc.00-082 1406284 NRC Inspection: Information Provided is Incorrect 1407041 HPCI Flow Time Delay Calculation Does Not Support HELB 1407385 NRC Inspection: Requirements for Soldering Electrical Connections Not Met 1410620 Floating FME Found in Cell #7 On #17 Battery 1412267 OE: NRC Pt 21 Event No. 49667 Cracking in KCR-13 Standby 1419279 PT Exam on DSC-16 - Linear Indication Found on Re-Exam
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Numbe r Description or Title
24048 Potential Adverse Trend on Accuracy of NRC Submittals 1425172 Strain Gauge Location Configuration Question on C MSL 1430435 Inaccurate Info Transmitted to NRC for EPU 1432184 Review Adequacy of EOC for Inaccurate Info in EPU Submittals 1440002 ARP-01 CAQ Definition More Restrictive than QATR 1442205 No Follow-Up Actions Taken For Increase in Sum Of Six Result
OPERATING EXPERIENCE
Numbe r Description or Title
1446300 LPCI During RHR Torus Cooling QF0463 NSPM OE Screen Team Meeting Template, Incoming Operating Experience Package 09/15/2014 QF0463 NSPM OE Screen Team Meeting
Template, incoming Operating Experience Package 09/22/2014 SE-0401 List of Open Operating Experience CAPs as of 9/25/2014 1224761 OE Evaluation of SOER 10-01 1297249 OE-IERL2-11-2, 2009-2010 Scram Analysis 1308589 Issue at PI May Impact Monticello Maintenance Instructions 1312510 OE IERL2-11-46, Extended Emergency Power Operations 1313396 OE: NRC Green Violation-Failure to Establish Inspection Procedures 1314536 OE: NRC IN 2011-20 Concrete Degradation 1325353 OE: IERL2-12-14 Automatic Reactor Scram Resulting from a Design Vulnerability in the 4.16-kV Bus Undervoltage Protection Scheme 1335244 OE IERL2-12-38 Reactor Trip and Generator Lockout 1357468 Prairie Island AR-During Round, Outplant Operator Discovered 121 Safeguards Traveling Screen Differential Pressure Switch Pegged
Low 1357487 GE SIL 433 Sup. 2 Shroud Head Bolt Inspection Recommendations 1359840 Prairie Island AR- Update of CAP 1354059 That Event Was
Considered A Minor NRC Violation 1382652 GE SIL 438 R2 Main Steam Line High Flow Trip Setting 1391239 GEH SIL 409 Rev3 Incore Dry Tube Cracks 1402093 Prairie Island AR-No Combustible Permits for Lead Shielding 1407735 OE: IERL2-13-53 Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) Analysis 1416736 ICES 19861 Reactor Feed Pump High Vibration 1431296 OE-IERL2-14-25 Heavy Snow and a Design Flaw Result in a Dual
Unit Scram
ROOT CAUSE and APPARENT CAUSES
Numbe r Description or Title
141582 RBCCW In-Leakage Historical Review of Event 1276006 Near Miss MSIV Bleeds Closed In Unplanned Fashion 1309399 13 Bus Failed to Re-energize
ROOT CAUSE and APPARENT CAUSES
Numbe r Description or Title
1334146 CDBI: Technical Specification Degraded Voltage Time Value 1334571 CDBI: Instrument Panel Y20 Voltage Nonconformance with USAR 1337244 RSW Pump Performance Trends Not Predictable 1343360 Adverse Trend Door #45 AEP Board Failures 1345334 Snubber Examinations Not Performed Per Code Requirements 1348567 CRD 18-07 Exceeds Friction Limit 1348931 Welder Qualification on Supports for 4kV HELB Barrier 1351292 V-FE-11: Negative DP During 0472-01 Testing 1351317 152-202 Initially Failed to Close During Planned Transfer 1351664 RMCS Failure During CRD Exercise Test 0074 1352773 Reactor Scram 130 1352778 Lockout of 4 kV Bus 12 During WO:446500-01 1353605 HPCI Concern With Y81 Inverter Out of Service 1353869 Danger Tagged Lifted Lead was Landed for P-903A Motor 1354309 HELB Barrier Bolts Found Loosened for Lower 4kV 1356091 Operability Concerns for Safety Related Inverter Supplied Loads 1356474 Potential Adverse Trend for Plant Configuration Control During Mods 1356625 Monticello HU Events 1357606 Four Findings in P.1© Cross-Cutting Aspect 1358371 Relay 10A-K35 for LPCI Loop Select Did Not Drop Out 1358924 RCIC System Found Inoperable and Unavailable 1367175 P-25B, #12 Reactor Building Floor Drain Pump Found Tripped 1367915 4-C-23 Recirc Pump Motor B Low Oil Level Alarm Received 1374981 Incorrect Cable Cut During Demolition 1378051 TI 2515 187, Inadequate Flooding Walkdowns 1378713 Work Hours Not Updated in WHM Tool IAW Procedure 1379117 NOS Finding: Adverse Trend With Common Cause Identified 1379814 Loss of Instrument Air Caused by PS-1469 Being Isolated 1381637 12 EDG Air Inlet Abstructed by Herculite 1383202 Agastat Relays Discovered Beyond Vendor Recommended Qualification Life 1384157 Essential Bus Transfer Occurred While Performing 2R Testing 1384157 Essential Bus Transfer Occurred while Performing 2R Testing 1385754 Reactor Water Level Controlled With an Inaccurate Instrument 1385754 Temporary Vessel Level Instrumentation Rise 1386518 Breaker 152-101 Fault Resulting in Loss of Offsite Power 1386536 Shutdown of 11 & 12 EDGs after LONOP 1388760 NOS: AAF: MNGP Leadership Nuclear Safety Concerns 1389520 3 NRC Findings In H.2.C Cross-Cutting Aspect 1390092 Diesel Oil Service Pump P-77 Low Flow T-45B 1390785 Loose Circuit Card for Alarm C-04-A-11 1391665 Security 1 Hour Report Under 10 CFR 73.71
ROOT CAUSE and APPARENT CAUSES
Numbe r Description or Title
1392528 Multiple EPU Design Issues Discovered During Plant Startup 1394150 TIA 2012-03 Final Response EDG Fuel Oil Supply NCV 2013007-04 1394150 NRC TIA 2012-03 Final Response EDG Fuel Oil Supply 1394412 Area Radiation Monitor UP-and DOWNSCALE Trips Out of Spec. 1394877 12 Recirc Pump Runback, Investigate Circuitry 1394877 12 Recirc Pump Runback, Investigate Circuitry 1395575 NRC Questioning Results In Subm
itting 50.72 Unanalyzed Condition 1395722 NOS Escalation Level 1-Power Uprate Readiness 1397406 Door 85/86 Plenum Room Airlock Failed Interlock Testing 1398300 2013 INPO Mid-Cycle FSA: AFI MA-2-25 1402240 AO-13-22 Furmanite Injection Process Question 1405035 Potential Adverse Trend in Ineffective CAPR EFRs 1405518 NRC Question: What Superseded Calc 00-082 HPCI Trip? 1406283 Improperly Identified Inputs Impact HRLB Calcs 1406283 Improperly Identified Inputs Impact HELB Calculation 1409551 NRC INSP: Failure to Maintain IEEE Qualifications of Relay 1411443 CV-1728 Went Closed When Only 13 RHRSW Pump Running 1418321 SR 3.8.1.12 Was Not Met By TS LOP Instrument Alone 1418669 13 Diesel Generator Output Breaker Failed to Close 1423979 Inaccurate Scaling Used on EPU Testing on DAS for Steam Dryer 1424346 LCB-083 Trip Interlock Bent Causing Unexpected Lockout/Alarm 1425443 Six NRC Findings in H.14 Cross-Cutting Aspect 1426098 5 Findings in Work Management H.5 Cross-Cutting Aspect 1429810 Preconditioning Evaluation Was Not Documented 1430165 C4.2-1 Auxiliary System Chemistry Parameters 1430930 Opening Identified in Fire Barrier Separating Both Divisions 1432015 E CS&RHR Area ARM Out of As Found Criteria During 1024 1433756 Diesel Oil Pump (P-77) Lost Flow, Pressure
AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND EVALUATIONS
Numbe r Description or Title
Revision USA Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment 09/17/2013 SAR 01436575 NEI 09-07 Nuclear Safety Culture 1
st Quarter 2014 05/30/2014 Organizational Effectiveness Survey - Partial
Results 01/2014 01437361 Principles for Maintaining an Effective Technical Conscience
07/28/2014 Nuclear Oversight 1
st Trimester 2014 Executive
Summary 06/09/2014 SAR 01405321 Operations DRUM Report - 3
rd Quarter 2013 11/16/2013
AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND EVALUATIONS
Numbe r Description or Title
Revision SAR 01440695 Operations DRUM Report - 2
nd Quarter 2014 07/31/2014 01437361 Principles for Maintaining an Effective Technical Conscience
07/11/2014 2014-02-011 NOS Assessment of Corrective Action Program 07/21/2014 CAP 01290035 ECP Snapshot Self-Assessment 06/09/2011 SAR 01290035 ECP Snapshot Self-Assessment 08/12/2013 SAR 01404684 Pre-Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Assessment
03/10/2014 CAP 01447174 PI&R NRC Inspection Readiness Snapshot
Evaluation
07/28/2014 SAR 1356920 Site DRUM Report-3
rd Quarter 2012 SAR 01390911 Site DRUM Report-4
th Quarter 2013 2013-01-001 NOS Observation Report - Performance Assessment/Corrective Action Program
2013-02-005 NOS Observation Report - Performance Assessment/Corrective Action Program
2013-03-003 NOS Observation Repor
t - Monticello/Corrective
Action Program
2013-04-006 NOS Observation Report - Performance Assessment/Corrective Action Program
CY2014 Nuclear Oversight NOS Assessment Cycle Schedule 2014-02-031 NOS Observation Report - MT/Production
Planning 2014-02-043 NOS Observation Report - MT/Maintenance QF0434 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 4
th QTR 2013 SAR 01365272 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 4
th QTR 2012 QF0434 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 3
rd QTR 2012 SAR 01437435 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 2
nd QTR 2014 SAR 01429022 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 1
st QTR 2014 SAR 01407517 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 3
rd QTR 2013 QF0434 Maintenance Department DRUM Report, 1
st & 2 nd QTR 2013 NOS Trimester Report
1C14 Nuclear Oversight 1
st Trimester 2014 (January - April) Executive Summary
NOS 4Q2013 Report Nuclear Oversight 4
th Quarter 2013 Executive
Summary NOS 3Q2013 Report Nuclear Oversight 3
rd Quarter 2013 Executive
AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND EVALUATIONS
Numbe r Description or Title
Revision Summary NOS 2Q2013 Report Nuclear Oversight 2
nd Quarter 2013 Executive
Summary NOS 1Q2013 Report Nuclear Oversight 1
st Quarter 2013 Executive
Summary NOS 4Q2012 Report Nuclear Oversight 4
th Quarter 2012 Executive
Summary NOS 3Q2012 Report Nuclear Oversight 3
rd Quarter of 2012 for Monticello
23944 Snapshot Assessment of Operating Experience Evaluation for Significant Regulatory Events
List of Assessments, Benchmarking And
Self-Assessments For 2014 And 2015
1388760 NOS Adverse Assessment Finding on Leadership
Nuclear Safety Culture Concerns
2013-04-021 NOS Observation Report- Monticello Surveillance 2014-02-021 NOS Observation Report- Special Process
Control 2014-02-008 NOS Observation Report-Spent Fuel; Pool Level Instrumentation Project
WORK ORDERS AND DRAWINGS
Numbe r Description or Title
Revision 486966 Inject Sealant Into AO-13-22 Packing 02/14/14
87258 V-EF-26 Low Flow Light Lit 09/10/14
489570 P-39 Pump Seal Failure 10/08/14
493201 POI-2942 Not Indicating Position of CV-2942 02/18/14
496046 Operate 12 Reactor Recirc Pump with One Seal
W ater HX 02/04/14 4 97230 AO-2382A Dual Indication When Stroking 09/16/14
98423 V-AC-12A Replace Circuit 1 Compressor 04/25/14 502913 Sudden Pressure Alarms on Main Transforme
r 09/29/14 504480 FP-37 Inability To Close For Isolation 09/10/14
CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION
Number Description or Title
28206 Actions for ACE 01266100 Found Not Effective 1447666 PI&R: CAP Screening Missed Assignment of Some Evaluations 1447689 PI&R: Individual in Protected Area Without TLD 1447715 PI&R Question Response Was Not Complete Within 24 Hours 1447778 PI&R: ACE Grading Comments Not Incorporated in ACE 01276006-
CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION
Number Description or Title
1447784 PI&R: NRC Inspector Access to OCA Denied 1447847 PI&R: PCR01410247 Progression is Not Timely 1447870 PI&R: Interview Delayed Due to Miscommunication 1447927 PI&R: Question on Performing 3-2-1 Results Assessment 1447970 PI&R: Question on the Use of CAPR Designation for Sustainability 1448036 PI&R: Level A CAP Action Inappropriately Closed 1448056 PI&R: Parent OE CAPs Not Assigned Keywords 1448087 PI&R: OE Preventable Event May Be Too Narrowly Defined 1448102 PI&R: RCE1391665 Missing Tracking Action for PCR01348402 1448106 PI&R: NRC Inspector Shown Unqualified When Logging Into RCA 1448117 PI&R: Potential IA by PI Planning Identified in B level CAP 1448123 PI&R: Some Station Personnel Not Proficient In Passport 1448129 PI&R: RCE and ACE Procedures Inconsistent Around OE Requirements 1448161 PI&R: Question Not Responded to Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1448222 PI&R: ACE01402240 Lacked Industry OE 1448223 PI&R: Actions Not Properly Cross-Referenced 1448228 PI&R: CA Inappropriately Closed to Another Action 1448901 PI&R: FP-E-RTC-01 Equipment Classification 1449520 PI&R: Question Not Responded to Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1449547 PI&R: Question on NOS Escalation Process 1449629 PI&R: CAP Assignment was Incorrectly Labeled EFR 1449678 New Interim EFR Not Created After Original EFR Failed 1449742 PI&R: Difficult to Follow CAP Issues Through Multiple
Cross-Referencing 1449785 PI&R: Action Closed Contrary to Statement in CA 1354309-08 1449863 PI&R 2014: Severity Classification Question for HU Events 1449939 PI&R Adverse Trend: CAP ARs Were Not Initiated Promptly 1449944 PI&R: Reactivity Control Formality 1450057 PI&R: Potential Common Cause With Integrated Plant Knowledge 1450065 PI&R: Observation on OE Preventable 1450086 PI&R: Observation on the RBCCW RCE
OTHER Numbe r Description or Title
Licensee's "We Get It" Licensee's "95002 and Safety Culture" Licensee's "95002 Inspection" SAR 01405363 Monticello Operations Department Excellence Plan , Rev 5 Dashway Report Book (Performance Indicators) January to July 2014 TIA 2012-03 Design And Licensing Basis On Diesel Fuel Oil Supply Of The
OTHER Numbe r Description or Title
Emergency Diesel Generators At Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant NOS 2013-04-016 Engineering/Operations Interface 11/04 to 11/08/2013 1/22/2014 Performance Assessment Functional Area MRM 8/25/2014 DashWay Report Book QF0145 Nuclear Oversight Escalation Letter, Rev. 1 RFI 13-A-002 Concern with AMES valve work RFI 13-A-018 Concern with HPCI and RCIC alignment work and grease used in
couplings 2011-A-0028 Concern with work done by DZ
WPC 11-26 Contractor concerned that cable was nicked during installation and not repaired/replaced
AT-0075 CAP Prescreening Report, 09/23/2014
AT-0075 / QF0429 NSPM CAP Screen Team Meeting Template / CAP Screening Report, 09/23/2014
AT-0075 / QF0429 NSPM CAP Screen Team Meeting Template / CAP Screening Report, 09/24/2014 Plant Manager"s weekly communications package from 10/05/14
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- P. Albares, Operations Manager
- D. Bosnic, Director, Business Support
- H. Butterworth, Manager, Nuclear Oversight (Prairie Island)
- D. Collins, Interim Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- C. England, Manager, Radiation Protection
- K. Fili, Site Vice-President
- P. Gardner, Director, Site Operations
- H. Hanson, Plant Manager
- M. Kelly, Manager, Performance Assessment
- M. Lingenfeter, Director, Site Engineering
- M. Murphy, Director, Regulatory Affairs (Xcel Corporate)
- K. Nyberg, Manager, Site Security
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Riemer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects
- P. Voss, Resident Inspector (Monticello)
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADAMS Agency wide Document Access Management System CAP Corrective Action Program CFR Code of Federal Regulations DRUM Department roll-up meeting
ECP Employee Concerns Program
IP Inspection Procedure
NOS Nuclear Oversight
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OE Operating Experience PARS Publicly Available Records System
PI&R Problem Identification & Resolution
RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water In-Leakage
SSCIs Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues SCWE Safety-Conscious Work Environment
K. Fili -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2014007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
DISTRIBUTION w/encl
- John Jandovitz
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource
RidsNrrPMMonticello
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Cynthia Pederson
DRPIII
DRSIII
Carmen Olteanu ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov
DOCUMENT NAME: Monticello 2014 007
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII NAME NShah:mt KRiemer DATE 11/18/14 11/18/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY