ML18061A036
| ML18061A036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/2018 |
| From: | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) |
| To: | NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| NSNI/OSART/195/2017 | |
| Download: ML18061A036 (82) | |
Text
NSNI/OSART/195/2017 ORIGINAL: English DIVISION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SAFETYOPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW MISSION IAEA-NSNI/OSART/195/2017 REPORT OF THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW TEAM (OSART) MISSION TO THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14 31 AUGUST 2017
PREAMBLE This report presents the results of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review of Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, USA. It includes recommendations for improvements affecting operational safety for consideration by the responsible USA authorities and identifies good practices for consideration by other nuclear power plants. Each recommendation, suggestion, and good practice is identified by a unique number to facilitate communication and tracking. Any use of or reference to this report that may be made by the competent USA organizations is solely their responsibility.
FOREWORD by the Director General The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme assists Member States to enhance safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although good design, manufacture and construction are prerequisites, safety also depends on the ability of operating personnel and their conscientiousness in discharging their responsibilities. Through the OSART programme, the IAEA facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members who are drawn from different Member States, and plant personnel. It is intended that such advice and assistance should be used to enhance nuclear safety in all countries that operate nuclear power plants. An OSART mission, carried out only at the request of the relevant Member State, is directed towards a review of items essential to operational safety. The mission can be tailored to the particular needs of a plant. A full scope review would cover nine operational areas: management, organization and administration; training and qualification; operations; maintenance; technical support; operating experience feedback; radiation protection; chemistry; and emergency planning and preparedness. Depending on individual needs, the OSART review can be directed to a few areas of special interest or cover the full range of review topics. Essential features of the work of the OSART team members and their plant counterparts are the comparison of a plant's operational practices with best international practices and the joint search for ways in which operational safety can be enhanced. The IAEA Safety Series documents, including the Safety Standards and the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, and the expertise of the OSART team members form the bases for the evaluation. The OSART methods involve not only the examination of documents and the interviewing of staff but also reviewing the quality of performance. It is recognized that different approaches are available to an operating organization for achieving its safety objectives. Proposals for further enhancement of operational safety may reflect good practices observed at other nuclear power plants. An important aspect of the OSART review is the identification of areas that should be improved and the formulation of corresponding proposals. In developing its view, the OSART team discusses its findings with the operating organization and considers additional comments made by plant counterparts. Implementation of any recommendations or suggestions, after consideration by the operating organization and adaptation to particular conditions, is entirely discretionary. An OSART mission is not a regulatory inspection to determine compliance with national safety requirements nor is it a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of a plant's overall safety status, a requirement normally placed on the respective power plant or utility by the regulatory body. Each review starts with the expectation that the plant meets the safety requirements of the country concerned. An OSART mission attempts neither to evaluate the overall safety of the plant nor to rank its safety performance against that of other plants reviewed. The review represents a `snapshot in time'; at any time after the completion of the mission care must be exercised when considering the conclusions drawn since programmes at nuclear power plants are constantly evolving and being enhanced. To infer judgements that were not intended would be a misinterpretation of this report. The report that follows presents the conclusions of the OSART review, including good practices and proposals for enhanced operational safety, for consideration by the Member State and its competent authorities.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report describes the results of the OSART mission conducted at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant in the USA from 14-31 August 2017. The purpose of an OSART mission is to review the operational safety performance of a nuclear power plant against the IAEA safety standards, make recommendations and suggestions for further improvement and identify good practices that can be shared with NPPs around the world. This OSART mission reviewed twelve areas: Leadership and Management for Safety; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience Feedback; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Accident Management; Human, Technology and Organization Interactions; and Long Term Operations. The mission was coordinated by an IAEA Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader and the team was composed of experts from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, and the IAEA staff members. The collective nuclear power experience of the team was approximately 409 years. The team identified nineteen issues, resulting in six recommendations, and thirteen suggestions. Two good practices were also identified. Several areas of good performance were noted: The plant has developed an overall Emergency Management Guideline flowchart to provide a comprehensive overview of all strategies, guidelines and other relevant documents. The plant has adopted an effective process to optimize the preventative maintenance programme. The plant has implemented a comprehensive seasonal preparation program. The most significant issues identified were: The plant should place a higher priority on evaluating and improving the material condition of equipment commensurate with its safety significance. The plant should continue to improve the performance of management and staff in challenging inappropriate behaviours and coaching plant staff. The plant should improve the effectiveness of event investigation and corrective action implementation to minimize the risk of event recurrence. Sequoyah NPP management expressed their commitment to address the issues identified and invited a follow up visit in about eighteen months to review the progress.
NSNI/OSART/195/2017 ORIGINAL: English DIVISION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SAFETYOPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW MISSION IAEA-NSNI/OSART/195/2017 REPORT OF THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW TEAM (OSART) MISSION TO THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14 31 AUGUST 2017
PREAMBLE This report presents the results of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review of Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, USA. It includes recommendations for improvements affecting operational safety for consideration by the responsible USA authorities and identifies good practices for consideration by other nuclear power plants. Each recommendation, suggestion, and good practice is identified by a unique number to facilitate communication and tracking. Any use of or reference to this report that may be made by the competent USA organizations is solely their responsibility.
FOREWORD by the Director General The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme assists Member States to enhance safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although good design, manufacture and construction are prerequisites, safety also depends on the ability of operating personnel and their conscientiousness in discharging their responsibilities. Through the OSART programme, the IAEA facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members who are drawn from different Member States, and plant personnel. It is intended that such advice and assistance should be used to enhance nuclear safety in all countries that operate nuclear power plants. An OSART mission, carried out only at the request of the relevant Member State, is directed towards a review of items essential to operational safety. The mission can be tailored to the particular needs of a plant. A full scope review would cover nine operational areas: management, organization and administration; training and qualification; operations; maintenance; technical support; operating experience feedback; radiation protection; chemistry; and emergency planning and preparedness. Depending on individual needs, the OSART review can be directed to a few areas of special interest or cover the full range of review topics. Essential features of the work of the OSART team members and their plant counterparts are the comparison of a plant's operational practices with best international practices and the joint search for ways in which operational safety can be enhanced. The IAEA Safety Series documents, including the Safety Standards and the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, and the expertise of the OSART team members form the bases for the evaluation. The OSART methods involve not only the examination of documents and the interviewing of staff but also reviewing the quality of performance. It is recognized that different approaches are available to an operating organization for achieving its safety objectives. Proposals for further enhancement of operational safety may reflect good practices observed at other nuclear power plants. An important aspect of the OSART review is the identification of areas that should be improved and the formulation of corresponding proposals. In developing its view, the OSART team discusses its findings with the operating organization and considers additional comments made by plant counterparts. Implementation of any recommendations or suggestions, after consideration by the operating organization and adaptation to particular conditions, is entirely discretionary. An OSART mission is not a regulatory inspection to determine compliance with national safety requirements nor is it a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of a plant's overall safety status, a requirement normally placed on the respective power plant or utility by the regulatory body. Each review starts with the expectation that the plant meets the safety requirements of the country concerned. An OSART mission attempts neither to evaluate the overall safety of the plant nor to rank its safety performance against that of other plants reviewed. The review represents a `snapshot in time'; at any time after the completion of the mission care must be exercised when considering the conclusions drawn since programmes at nuclear power plants are constantly evolving and being enhanced. To infer judgements that were not intended would be a misinterpretation of this report. The report that follows presents the conclusions of the OSART review, including good practices and proposals for enhanced operational safety, for consideration by the Member State and its competent authorities.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report describes the results of the OSART mission conducted at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant in the USA from 14-31 August 2017. The purpose of an OSART mission is to review the operational safety performance of a nuclear power plant against the IAEA safety standards, make recommendations and suggestions for further improvement and identify good practices that can be shared with NPPs around the world. This OSART mission reviewed twelve areas: Leadership and Management for Safety; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience Feedback; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Accident Management; Human, Technology and Organization Interactions; and Long Term Operations. The mission was coordinated by an IAEA Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader and the team was composed of experts from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK, and the IAEA staff members. The collective nuclear power experience of the team was approximately 409 years. The team identified nineteen issues, resulting in six recommendations, and thirteen suggestions. Two good practices were also identified. Several areas of good performance were noted: The plant has developed an overall Emergency Management Guideline flowchart to provide a comprehensive overview of all strategies, guidelines and other relevant documents. The plant has adopted an effective process to optimize the preventative maintenance programme. The plant has implemented a comprehensive seasonal preparation program. The most significant issues identified were: The plant should place a higher priority on evaluating and improving the material condition of equipment commensurate with its safety significance. The plant should continue to improve the performance of management and staff in challenging inappropriate behaviours and coaching plant staff. The plant should improve the effectiveness of event investigation and corrective action implementation to minimize the risk of event recurrence. Sequoyah NPP management expressed their commitment to address the issues identified and invited a follow up visit in about eighteen months to review the progress.