ML17059B009
| ML17059B009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1995 |
| From: | NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059B010 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9512060038 | |
| Download: ML17059B009 (134) | |
Text
Enclosure toNhP2L1596NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYREPORTDocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-699512060038
'951129PDRADOCK05000410,,K,,,PDR lCI SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-046Mod.PN2Y87MX063 Figure10.1-5bCondensate (CND)AnAdditionofCycloneSeparator toCondensate BoosterPumpSealWaterInjection LinesDescription ofChange:Thismodification installed twonewcycloneseparators onthesealinjection waterlinesofeachofthecondensate boosterpumps.Also,anewflowrestriction orificewasinstalled upstreamofeachcycloneseparator andassociated valves.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification isinaccordance withANSIB31.1-1973.
Thisnewequipment interfaces onlywiththeCNDsystemandhasnoimpacttoanyothersystems.Thismodification willensurecondensate boosterpumpreliability andpreventcostlypumpdowntimeformaintenance onmechanical seals.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage2of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-075Rev.7&8Mod.PN2Y87MX038 Figures9.5-8Sh1&2,9.5-10Sh1,9.5-24,9.5-29System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Communications (COJ,COP,COS)AdditionofCommunication Equipment Modifications totheGaitronics communications systemwerepreviously reportedwithUSARrevisions datedOctober30,1991,October29,1992,andOctober29,1993,underSafetyEvaluation 89-075,Revisions 3,4,5,6and7./Additional modifications toadd/improve
- speakers, jacks,andassociated equipment totheGaitronics communications systemhavebeenmadeasevaluated underSafetyEvaluation 89-075,Revisions 7and8.SafetyEvaluation Summary:i/Thismodification willadd/improve communication capabilities tomeettherequirements inUSARSection9.5.2.Thesechangeswillimprovecommunication capabilities requiredforsurveillance testing,personnel torespondtoalarmsinareaswithhighnoiselevels,andaddcommunication equipment inareasthathavebeenidentified asneedingcommunication capabilities.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage3of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:91-003Rev.7,8,Ec9Calculation ES-269N/ASecondary Containment Secondary Containment DrawdownAnalysisRevisions 7,8,and9ofthesafetyevaluation evaluated plantoperation fortheremainder ofthefourthfuelcycle.Thefollowing parameters werechangedforthehTrequirements forthefourthcycleascomparedwiththepreviouscycle.1.Sentfuelhealoads:Aspentfuelpoolheatloadof4.49x10'tu/hrcorresponding to50daysafterreactorshutdown(DARS)wasusedtodefinethehTrequirements forthefourthfuelcycle.iInordertoreducetheETrequirements and,hence,heatingofthe':building duringthesummermonths,alowerspentheatloadof2.31x10Btu/hrcorresponding to180DARSwasusedtodefinethehTrequirements fortheremainder ofthefourthrefueling cycle.2.Unicoolererformance:
Basedontheperformance testsperformed duringthe1992-93timeperiod,a2%degradation ofunitcoolers2HVR"UC413A
&.Bandanaveragedegradation of30%(sameaspreviouscycle)fortheremaining drawdownrelatedunitcoolerswasusedfordefiningthehTrequirements fortheentirefourthoperating cycle.Thisprovidessufficient margintoaccountforanyfurtherdegradation thatmayoccuroverthenextoperating cycle.3.Piinhealoadreduons:ToreducethehTrequirements, pipingheatloadshavebeenreducedassumingaminimumtemperature of80'F(Curve2)and90'F(Curves3and4)inthebuilding.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage4of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)
91-003Rev.7,8,L9(cont'd.)
4.Foradditional flexibility, drawdownanalysisisdoneassumingemergency corecoolingsystem,residualheatremovalheatexchangers andreactorcoreisolation coolingcubiclesinsecondary containment aremaintained at8'Fabovetheservicewatertemperature.
Thesecondary containment in-leakage testperformed onOctober27,1993,indicated thatin-leakage islessthan90kofthevalueusedinthedrawdownanalysis.
Thisprovidesamarginofabout10%(sameasthepreviouscycle)foranypotential degradation ofin-leakage overthenextcycle.NOTE:Thesechangesweresuperseded bySafetyEvaluation 94-049andassociated LicenseAmendment No.56.SafetyEvaluation Summary:IThedrawdownanalysis(Calculation ES-269andsubsequent dispositions) providesfourcurvesthatdefineATrequirements fortheentirefourthfuelcycle.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheuseofnew6Tcurvesdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage5of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:91-068Mod.PN2Y89MX080 Figures9.3-12h,9.3-12k,10.1-8bTurbineBuildingMiscellaneous DrainsReboilerSteamLineDrainValveInterlock Theturbineplantmiscellaneous drainsystemremovescondensate buildupfromthesteamsupplylineseitherthroughthedrainvalves2DTM-AOV128 and2DTM-AOV144 orthroughbypasslinesaroundthesedrainvalvesthroughrestricting orificessizedtopasscondensate.
Theoriginaldesignrequiredthedrainvalvestoopenwhenevertheauxiliary steamsupplyvalves2ASS-STV112 and/or2ASS-STV143 close,orwheneverturbinefirst-stage pressureindicated insufficient extraction steamwasavailable.
Theinterlocks betweentheauxiliary steamsupplyvalvesandtheircorresponding drainvalvehavebeenremoved.Thismodification allowsoperatorcontrolofthedrainvalvesirrespective ofthesteamsupplytothecleansteamreboilers and/orthebuildingheatingintermediate heatexchangers withintheboundaries allowedbytheturbinefirst-stage pressuresensor.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedrainvalvesarenonsafety relatedandarenotrequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Thismodification providesadditional increased operatorcontrolwhichwillresultinanenhancement toplantefficiency thatwillnotimpactthesafeoperation orshutdowncapabilities oftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage6of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:91-080Mod.PN2Y88MX193 8.3-10Low-Voltage Molded-Case CircuitBreakersforPowerDistribution TitleofChange:Replacement ofObsoleteITEMolded-Case CircuitBreakersDescription ofChange:Thismodification replacedsixdistribution panelsintheirentiretyandvariousobsoletemolded-case circuitbreakersinmotorcontrolcentersandotherdistribution panels.Thesebreakersprovidecircuitprotection forthelow-voltage powerdistribution atUnit2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUSAR.Replacement breakersareproperlycoordinated andadequately sizedtotheirapplication inaccordance withthestandardratingsforthemolded-case circuitbreakers.
Replacement ofobsoletebreakersandpanelswillprecludesystemoutages,LCOs,andplantoutageduetounavailable sparesshouldanyofthesecomponents failin-service orsurveillance testing.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage7of'131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:91-089SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0140-90 Figures1'1.2-1d, 11.2-1grLiquidRadwasteManagement (LWS)RetireNon-functional Conductivity MonitorsThissimpledesignchangeretiredinplaceconductivity elementsandconductivity indicating transmitters fromthefloordraincollector subsystem andtheregenerant wastesubsystem.
Theseinstruments providedisplayinputonlyandhavenologicfunction.
Sparingtheconductivity monitoring equipment eliminates repetitive maintenance andcalibration.
Grabsamplesareusedfordetermining effluentconductivity inthoseareaswhereelectronic monitoring isdisabled.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheLWSsystemprovidesdiverseoptionsfortheprocessing ofwastedepending onthequalityofthewaste.However,innocasecanthewastebypass.afiltration orevaporation process.Theconductivity ofthewasteisusedtoaidintheselection ofaprocessmethod.Althoughgrabsampleswillhavetobeusedinlieuofelectronic monitoring, nosacrifice totheintegrity oifunctionoftheLWSwilloccurfromtheproposedchange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage8of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-006Rev.1,2,465Mod.PN2Y89MX077 4A-2,5.2-21,5.2-21a;Tables3B-3Sh2,6.2-56Sh7,9.4-1Sh4;Figures1.2-7Sh2,1.2-11Sh3,54-2b,5.4-16a,9.3-5g,12.3-7,12.3%0System:TideofChange:CrackArrestVerification Installation oftheCrackArrestVerification SystemandRWCUExtension Tie-lnDescription ofChange:Thismodification implemented thefollowing changes:Installation ofthecrackarrestverification system(CAVS)includedacracklengthmonitor,waterchemistry station,electrochemical potential monitorandtubing.ThesuctionsideoftheCAVSwasconnected tothereactorrecirculation system(RCS)sampleline,downstream fromtheoutboardisolation valve,2RCSSOV105,beyondtheClass2lineclassification (i.e.,connection willbemadewherethelineisdesignated asClass4).ThereturnlineoftheCAVSwasconnected tothereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)extension tie-inwhichisdownstream fromoutboardisolation valve2WCS"MOV112.2.TheRWCUextension tie-inbeginsatline2-WCS-008-88-3, whichisdownstream ofoutboardcontainment isolation valve2WCS"MOV1'12intheRWCUvalvecubiclelocatedonelevation 240',secondary containment.
Existingvalves2WCS-V45and2WCS-V46werereplacedwith3/4-inchpipe.Thetestconnection, whichisusedduringtheleakratetestingofvalve2WCS"MOV112, wasmaintained byaddingathreadedcapandtwonewvalves,2WCS-V431 and2WCS-V432.
TheRWCUextension tie-inalsoincludedthe3/4-inchpiperun,including oneisolation valve,2WCS-V390,andacheckvalve,2WCS-V392, whichareinsidetheRWCUvalvecubicle,apenetration (i.e.,W-7512-C) throughthecubiclewall,andanisolation valve,2WCS-V391, outsidethecubicle,whichwereaddedviaTemporary Modification 90-054andarenowpermanent perthismodification.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage9of'131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:92-006Rev.l,2,4&5(cont'd.)
TheCAVSisnotasafety-related systemnordoesitperformanysafety-related
- function, anditsadditiontotheUnit2designdoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliability ofUnit2.Thesystem'sfunctionistocollectdatatoprovideanindication oftheperformance ofplantmaterials intheboilingwaterreactorenvironment.
TheClass3sectionofRWCUextension tie-inisconsidered QandtheClass4sectionoftheRWCUextension tie-inisnonsafety related.Bothofthesesectionsareproperlydesignedandwillnotaffectthesafeoperation orsafeshutdowncapability oftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage10of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:92-033Rev.2Procedure N2-OSP-RHS-R@009 N/AResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)Procedure N2-OSP-RHS-R5009 Thissafetyevaluation evaluated changestoprocedure N2-OSP-RHS-RQ009, whichallowsthetestingofthepressureisolation valvesintheRHSsystemwhichisolatetheRHSheatexchanger fromthereactorcorecoolinginjection system(ICS).Thestepsoftheprocedure delineate themethodology fortestingthesysteminordertocomplywithTechnical Specifications 4.0.5and4.4.3.2.2.
TestingofthevalvesintheRHSsystemwasconducted duringrefueloutages.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisprocedure andmethodoftestingwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition becausetheICSfunctions arenotrequiredinoperational conditions 4or5andtheRHSsystemsafetyfunctions areunaffected.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage11of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-004Temporary Mod.93-008N/A4.16-kVand600-VNormalAcDistribution Alternate FeedtoTransformer 2NJS-X1FThe600-Vunitsubdistribution transformer 2NJS-X1F(feedertounitsub2NJS-US5) wastemporarily poweredfrom4.16-kVstubbus2NNS-SWG015 insteadofitsnormalsource,2NNS-SWG014, whichwasoutofserviceforrepairofacrackedbushingincubicle14-6.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification doesnotaffectordealwithanysafety-related equipment intheplant.AnEngineering reviewoftheUSAR,Technical Specifications andrelateddocuments indicates thatthistemporary modification isacceptable withprocedural controlsandlimitations.
Withthischangein:place, thenormalacdistribution willcontinueperforming itsintendedfunction.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage12of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-008SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0008-93 Figure10.1-6cFeedwater (FWP)SealWaterInjection StrainerDrainValveandPressureGageDescription ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddedadifferential pressureindicator anddrainvalvestothesealinjection duplexstrainers tofacilitate drainageforperiodicmaintenance ofthestrainers.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThischangeisspecifictotheFWPsystem.Nosignificant effectsonanyotherplantsystemsand/orinterlocks arebeingintroduced.
Theadditionofthedifferential pressuregageanddrainvalveswillimprovetheperformance ofmaintenance onthesubjectstrainers.
Therefore, thesystemmaintainability/availability isimprovedduetotheeaseinperiodicchangeout ofthestrainerbaskets.Thesystemstructural integrity willnotbesignificantly affectedbythischangebecausetheweightofthevalvesandthedifferential pressuregagearenegligible relativetothepipingsizeandschedule.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage13of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-011Temporary Mod.93-015N/AAuxiliary BoilerDefeatSealCoolingLowFlowTripforAuxiliary BoilerRecirculation PumpsDescription ofChange:Thistemporary modification jumperedtheauxiliary boilerrecirculation pumpsealcoolingwaterflowswitchesinordertoallowthepumpstorunwhensealwaterflowisthrottled back.Throttling thesealwaterisdonetoreducethefrequency ofrequiredboilerblowdowns.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Althoughthistemporary changemayresultindamagetothepumpseals,thereisnonuclearsafetysignificance totheproposedchangesincetheauxiliary boilersarenotrequiredforthesafeshutdownofthereactor.Theriskassociated withoperating theboilerwiththelowflowtripdefeatedisacceptable sinceplantimpactwillbelimitedtoboileroperability.
Implementation oftheproposedchangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage14of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-017Rev.2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0375-91 N/AStandbyLiquidControl(SLS)RRCSLogicChangetoPrecludeSLSInoperability Description ofChange:Thismodification'changed thestoragetanklevelzerologicintheredundant reactivity controlsystem(RRCS)panelsfromdeenergize-to-trip toenergize-to-trip.
Previously, ifaRRCSpanelwastakenoutofservice,therespective SLSloopwouldbecomeinoperable becauseSLSidentified theRRCSout-.of-service signalasaSLStanklevelzero.TheSLStanklevelzerointerlock disablestheSLSpumpstoprotectthemfromdamageduetorunningthemdry.Previously, temporary jumpersneededtobeinstalled iftheRRCSpanelsweretakenoutofservicetomaintainSLSoperability.
Thischangeeliminates theneedforthesejumpersandprovidesannunciation inthemaincontrolroomtoalerttheoperators ifthestoragetanklevelzeroalaimisactivated.
Thismodification wasincorporated intoSLSandRRCSbychangingthelogicinRRCSpanels2CEC"P001 and2CEC"P002 fromdeenergize-to-trip toenergize-to-trip.
Thiswasdonebyminorpanelwiringchangestotheacloaddriverprintedcircuitboardinwhichitwillnolongerinvertthealarmsignal.Becauseofthislogicchange,newprogrammable readonlymemoryintegrated circuitswereinstalled intheselftestcircuitry ofRRCS.IVlinorwi'ringchangestothestoragetanklevelzerointerlock circuitry weremadeinpanels2CEC"PNL618and2CEC"PNL629toaccommodate thislogicchangeintheRRCSpanelstoenergize-to-trip.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification willkeepSLSoperableregardless ofthestatusoftheRRCSpanelsandwithouttheneedfortemporary jumpers.Thismodification hasno.impactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Nuclearsafetyisenhancedinthattemporary jumpersnowdonotneedtobeinstalled whenaRRCSpanelisoutofservicetokeepSLSoperable.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage15of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-018Rev.0,1,2Bc3Mod.PN2Y91MX054 5.4~,5.4&5;Figure5.4-16fReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)RWCUF/DImprovements Thismodification changedthereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)filterdemineralizer (F/D)systemasfollows:2.ReplacedseptainF/DvesselsA,B,C,Dwithanewdesign.Revisedresinfeedsystemtoincludereplacement ofthemeteringfeedpumpswithaneductorarrangement.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:/ThechangestotheRWCUF/Dsystemwillenhancethesystembymakingiteasierfortheoperatortocontrolandprovidemoreoperatoroptionstherebyincreasing flexibility, andimproveprecoating oftheF/Dvessels.Ultimately,.the systemruncycleswillincreaseandbetterutilization ofprecoatmaterialwillbeachieved.
Theproposedchangesarenonsafety relatedandwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Reactorwaterchemistry limitsoutlinedinRegulatory Guide1.56Rev.1,Table1,andspecified inTechnical Specifications Table3.4.4-1,willbemaintained.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage16of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:4System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0049-93 Figure9.4-10eRadwasteBuildingVentilation RadwasteControlRoomNoiseImprovement SafetyEvaluation 93-020waspreviously reportedinOctober1994whentheUnit2USARwasrevisedtoreflectreplacement ofthe7.5hpreturn/exhaust airfanswithnew3.0hpfans.ThisrevisiontotheUSARrevisestheflowdiagramtoshowareducedflowof10,700cfm.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdesignchangewillimproveenvironmental andworkingconditions intheRadwasteControlRoombyreducingnoiselevels.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectorinvolveanysafety-related equipment.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage17of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-027Rev.2N/A9.1-25,9.1-44Fuel-Preparation MachineFull-Up-Stop SettingsDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation addresses changingthepositionofthewestfuelpreparation machine(FPM)full-up-stops.
Thischangewillreducethetime/exposure spentduringthetransferofnewfueltothespentfuelpool.Additionally, thiswillreducethepotential forpersonalcontamination andplantcontamination.
Thewest(2FNR"TL1B)
FPMwillbechangedsothatitsnormalconfiguration willbe:~Full-up-stops permanently removed~Motivepowerremoved(air-supply linedisconnected andblocked)~Tobeactivated andusedonlywithnewnonirradiated fuelunderadministrative controlsandthendeactivated aftercompletion ofnonirradiated fuelhandlingThewest(2FNR"TL1B)
FPMwillhaveitsfull-up-stops removedsuchthatanewfuelassemblyloadedintoitscarriagewillhaveitsbailhandleabovethespentfuelpoolwaterlevel.PositivestoppingoftheFPlVIcarriageisperformed bytheendstopsonrollerchainmechanism.
Afterthecraneisdisconnected fromthenewfuelassembly, whichissittingintheFPM,theassemblywillbetransferred bytherefueling platformtoitstemporary storagelocationinthespentfuelstoragerack.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thefunctionofthefull-up-stops istoprovideenoughwatershielding whenusingaFPMtohandleirradiated fuelassemblies.
WhenaFPMisusedtotransferanonirradiated fuelassemblyintothespentfuelpool,aspecificfull-uplimitisnotrequiredbecauseitsspecificfunction(i.e.,providewatershielding) isnotrequired.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage18of131.SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
93-027Rev.2(cont'd.)
Therefore, thissafetyevaluation isintendedtoallowthewest(2FNR."TLIB)
FPIVItobeconfigured tosupporttheapplication appropriate fornewfuelreceipt/transfer activities anddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage19of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-037SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0251-92 7A.1-5ReactorBuildingHeatingandVentilation (HVR),Containment Isolation (ISC),MainSteam(MSS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ReactorProtection (RPS),StandbyLiquidControl(SLC),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:ReplaceP5BMDRRelaysThissimpledesignchangereplacedexistingPotterandBrumfield (PUB)ModelMDRrelaysthathave'been usedasanisolation devicetoisolatenonsafety-related circuitsfromsafety-related
- circuits, ortoisolateredundant safety-related circuits.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:AThischangeenhancesthefunctionality ofPUBMDRrelaysusedasanis'olation deviceinthesystemslistedabovebecausethenewP8cBMDRrelaysaredesignedtoprecludethefailuremodesoftheserelays.Replacement relayswillbequalified tothesamerequirements astheoldrelays.Thenewrelayswillbeofthesameformandfitsuchthattheycanreplacetheoldrelaysasoneforonereplacement withoutrequiring anymajormodifications duringtheinstallation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage20of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-044SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0102-91 NIASystem:TitleofChange:NeutronMonitoring System(NIVIS)APRMUpscaleAlarmandRodBlock(SDCSC2-0102-91)
Description ofChange:Thischangereplacedtheneutronfluxinputsignaltotheaveragepowerrangemonitor(APRIVl)upscalealarmandrodblockcircuitwiththefilteredsimulated thermalpowersignal.Thepurposewastofilteroutandreducethenoiselevelsoftheneutronfluxsignal,whichinturnallowsUnit2operational entryintotheExtendedLoadLineLimitAnalysis(ELLLA)regionofthepower'flow mapalongwithareduction innuisanceupscalealarmsandrodwithdrawal blocks.,SafetyEvaluation Summary:/Thismodification allowsoperational entryintotheELLLAregionofthepowerflowmapwhichwasprohibited bynuisancerodblocks.Thismodification willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage21of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-055SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0342-92 9.5%,9A.3%6;Figure9.5-1bFireProtection Water(FPW)TitleofChange:Install'Curb Boxesfor2FPW-V1060 and2FPW-V1061 Description ofChange:Thischangeinstalled curbboxes(valveboxes)fortwounderground sectional isolation valvesinthefiremain.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesubjectvalveswereaddedduringtheconstruction ofthesitecafeteria building.
Duringfinalconstruction activities, thevalveswereinadvertently coveredpriortotheinstallation ofcurbboxesaswasintended.
Thischangedoesnotaffectthepipingandwillallowforuseofthetwovalvesaskey-operated, sectional isolation valvesinaccordance with10CFR50AppendixR,SectionIII.B.,Normal construction activities involving excavation andfillarerequiredforthisinstallation.
Whilethischangewilldisruptnormaltrafficflowintheareaofinstallation, noimpacttosystemorsafeplantoperation willresult,andtheabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantintheeventofafireisnotimpacted.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'SummaryReportPage22of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-056Rev.1,2L3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0328-92
-Figures1.2-1,2.4-1N/AConstruct aSpareTransformer FacilityThesparetransformer facilitywasconstructed southwest oftheUnit2345-kVswitchyard.
Thisfacilitywillbeusedforthestorageoftheadditional sparetransformer forUnit2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theconstruction ofthesparetransformer facilitydoesnotimpactthepertinent licensing issuesthatareassociated withhydrological engineering; i.e.,flooding, localintenseprecipitation (probable maximumprecipitation),
andtheimpactontheairintakeaccidentX/0(Chi/0),theatmospheric dispersion coefficient.
/Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage23of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-058Rev.2Calculation H21C-0279.1-39System:TitleofChange:FHSRemovalofReactorCavityShieldPlugsA,B,CandDat40%orLessReactorPowerDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpower.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheremovalofthereactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpowerdoesnotaffectthestructural integrity oftheshieldplugbarrier.Theradiological effectsoftheproposedchangehavebeencalculated anddetermined tobenegligible forradiological consequences totherefueling operators duringnormalrefueling operations.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage24of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-060Temporary Mod.93-038N/AReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR)Temporary CoolingforRWCUPumpRoomsThismodification installed atemporary airconditioning unitoutsidethereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)pumproomstoprovideadditional coolingtohelpalleviate hightemperature conditions intherooms.Theairconditioning unitispoweredfromaweldingreceptacle fedfromdistribution panel2WPS-PNL200.
/SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification doesnotaffectanysafety-related equipment, system,buildingorstructure requiredtoperformitssafetyfunctionduringnormaloperation orfollowing aloss-of-coolant accident.
Ananalysisofcalculations indicates thataslightincreaseinthegeneralareatemperature isinsignificant enoughtocauseanyeffectontheperformance ortheresponsetimeofasafety-related equipment orsystemtoperformitsintendedfunction.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage25of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-065Temporary Mod.93-043N/ASystem:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Ventilation ChilledWater(HVN)Temporary Removalof2HVN-TC17C Thethermocouple wellpipeconnection forthethermocouple bulbfromtransmitter 2HVN-TC17C wasleaking.Thethermowell connection wastemporarily removedandreplacedwithanisolation valveandpipecomponents untilpermanent replacement andmaintenance wasperformed.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage26of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description of-Change:93-075Rev.0h1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0014-93 8.3-72;Figure8.3-10Safety-Related 125-VdcBatterySystemBatteryChargerOutputBifurcation Thissimpledesignchangefacilitates periodictestingoftheDivisionIandIIbatterychargers, asrequiredbyTechnical Specifications Section4.8.2.1,withminimalimpacttoplantoperations.
Thissimpledesignchangerelocated thebatterychargerelectrical connections toseparatecubicleswithintheirassociated switchgear.
Thisbifurcation wasdoneutilizing theexistingelectrical powercablingbetweenthebatterychargersandthe125-Vdcswitchgear, andreterminating thecablingtoindividual cubicleloadstabswithintheswitchgear.
Onlyonechargerwasconnected tothe125-Vdcswitchgear busatatime.Thiswasaccomplished byusingabreaker.alternately betweenthebreakerchargerswitchgear cubiclesorinstalling abreakerinbothofthebatterychargerswitchgear breakercubicles.
Intheeventthe125-Vdcswitchgear breakersareinstalled forbothchargers(ofthesameDivision),
oneofthebreakersshallbeplacedinA/C"Disconnect" positionandlockedoutwhiletheotherbreakerisclosed.Althoughtherewillbeanadditional switchgear cubicle/breaker interface forbatterychargerconnections totheswitchgear, alarmsandoff-normal statusdisplayswillbemaintained atthoselocations whichcurrently providesuchindications.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangeenhancesthetestability ofthebatterychargersbyeliminating theneedforliftingleadstoperformthesurveillance testing.Thisdesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnot'nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage27of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-081Rev.0,1,25.3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0022-93 4.6-14;Figures4.6-6c,9.3-9a,9.3-9bSystem:ControlRodDrive(RDS),ReactorBuildingEquipment Drain(DER),ResidualHeat(RHS),ReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR),ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)TitleofChange:Elimination ofSteamEmissionfromtheReactorBuildingEquipment DrainsandRDSScramDischarge VolumeCollection TankInstallation Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeinvolvedthefollowing changes:1.Isolatedthehotpressurized drainlinesfromthecoolgravitydrains.2.AddedapressurereliefdeviceineachoftheReactorBuildingdrainloopstopreventoverpressurization ofthedrainheaderintheeventthatthedraincoolerinletvalvesareinadvertently closed.3.ReroutedtheRDSscramdischarge headerventlinetotheHVRsystemvia2DER-TK2B.
Thisbypassesdraincooler2DER-E2Bandeliminates apossibleblockageoftheventwhichwouldinhibitthescramdischarge volume(SDV)drainflow.4.Separated theRDSSDVdrainlinefromtheRHSandICSpressurized steam-condensing header,andreroutedthedraintoanewventedcollection tank.SDVwaterenteringthenewcollection tankpost-scram iscooledbymixingwiththeexistingwaterinthetank.Thenewtankthendrains,viaanoverflowline,intothegravitydrainheadertotheequipment draintank,2DER-TK2A.
Thehot,pressurized drainlineswithinthe"A"loop(i.e.,ICS,RHS,andSDVdrains)havebeenseparated fromthecoolgravitydrains,solvingtheALARAconcern.The"B"loop,hotpressurized drainsfromRHSandthemain SafetyEvaluation
'ummaryReportPage28of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)
93-081Rev.0,1,2&3(cont'd.)
steamsystemwereseparated fromtheDERsystem,theRDSventwasrerouted,
.andthepressurereliefdeviceswereinstalled duringRefuelOutage4.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Allworkassociated withthischangewillbeperformed inthesecondary containment elevations 175'-0"and196'-0",inaccordance withapprovedsiteWorkControlandRadiation Protection procedures.
Theconstructibility aspectsofthischangehavebeenreviewed, andappropriate worksequencing instructions includedwithintheapplicable WorkOrders.Theuseofconstruction aids,i.e.,tankleveltygontube,pipebladder,catchcontainments, flexiblehose,etc.,tofacilitate installation ofpermanent pipinghavebeenreviewedandfoundadequateforsystempressureretention andstructural integrity.
Temporary removalofpipespoolsisrequired; replacement backtotheoriginaldesign,asrequired, willbecontrolled withintheworkorderpackage.Temporary diversion ofReactorBuildingequipment draineffluenttotheReactorBuildingfloordrainsystemhasbeenapprovedandwillbemonitored bytheRadwasteDepartment.
iBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage29of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-097SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0078-93 Tables9.3-1,11.5-2Sh2;Figures9.3-5c,10.1-9eSystem:TitleofChange:ProcessSamplingDeletionofProcessSamplePointsforURCEffluents Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangedeletedprocesssamplepointsforthecondensate demineralizer system(CND)attheultrasonic resincleaner(URC)effluent, theURCresineffluent, andtheURCresinreceivertankeffluent.
These,processsamplelinesandassociated valvesarenonsafety related.SafetyEvaluation Summary:EachoftheaboveprocesssamplepointsbeginsatarootvalveintheCNDsystemandproceedsvia1/4"tubingtosamplesinkSAS4.The1/4"tubingwasremoved(priortoissuanceoftheplant.Operating License)bymodification PN2Y86lVIX044 inordertoreplaceitwith1/2"tubingtoalleviate pluggingofthesmallerdiametertubing.Themodification wassubsequently canceledandclosedoutbeforeinstalling the1/2"tubing.TheStandardReviewPlandescribes samplepointsforperformance monitoring attheinletandoutletofthecondensate polishing systemandsamplepointsforradiological analysisofURCwasteliquideffluentandbyresincapacityanalysisatpanelslocatedbetweenthedemineralizer andtheURCprocess.SamplepointsareprovidedforthecommoninfluentandcommoneffluentoftheCNDsystem.Inaddition, Chemistry monitorsURCperformance byconductivity analysisattheresinmixandholdtankeffluentandbyresincapacityanalysisatpanelslocatedbetweenthedemineralizers andtheURCprocess.ThewastewaterfromtheURCissenttothelowconductivity wastetank,alongwithotherliquideffluentfromtheCNDsystem.Thedischarge fromthelowconductivity wastetankisprovidedwithasamplepointbeforebeingsenttoeithertheanionregeneration tankorliquidradwaste.
Therefore, asamplepointexistsforradiological analysisofcommonCNDwasteeffluent, including URCwastewater, SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage30of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-097(cont'd.)
beforedischarge fromthelowconductivity wastetank.Inaddition, thesamplerootvalvesstillremainsothattemporary connections couldbemadetomonitortheURCprocess.Therefore, elimination oftheURCeffluent, URCresineffluentandtheURCresinreceivertankeffluentsamplepointsdoesnotviolateanydesignbasesorplantrequirements.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage31of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:93-113Unit1SimpleDesignChangeSC1-0173-91 Table2.3&aWeatherStationReplacement of30'evelDewpointMonitoring SystematthelVlainIVleteorological TowerDescription ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedthe30'eveldewpointmonitoring systematthemainmeteorological tower.AGeneralEasternModel'E1'onitor witha1211HMPsensorand175'finterconnecting cablewereprocuredforthischange.Thedewpointtemperature measurement ismadewithadirect-measuring sensorutilizing aPeltier-cooled mirror,automatically heldatthedewpointtemperature byaphoto-sensing, condensate-detecting, opticalsystemincorporating asolidstateLEDlightsourceanddirectandbiasphotodetectors.
Themirrortemperature, ifabovefreezing, measuresthetruedewpointtemperature and,ifbelow,measuresthefrostpointtemperature.
Thetemperature ismeasuredbyanembeddedlinearthermistor sensor.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thefrequency oftherepairsontheoldmodeldewpointhascausedtheneedtoreplacethemodel.Thenewmodeldewpointsystemisasaccurateastheoldsystemandmorereliable.
Thelocationofthenewdewpointsensorisindependent ofthe30-ft.levelboomandwasdetermined tobelocatedonthesoutheast legofthetower.Thislocationwaschosenbecauseofexistingboltholesinthetowersteel.Therelocation willnotaffecttheaccuracyorvalidityofthedataprovided.
Theholesarelocatedatthesamelevelastheboom.Puttingthedewpointsensoratthesamelevelastheboominstruments isrequiredforconsistency ininstrument readings.
Maintaining thesurgeprotection factorisrequiredtoprotectthenewcontroller/monitor.
Therefore, newsurgeprotection boardswereprocuredandwillbeinstalled inthemonitoring systemcircuit.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage32of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-129N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9A.3-1N/AConstruction oftheNewEngineering ServicesBuildingDescription ofChange:TheEngineering ServicesBuildinghasbeenconstructed outsidetheprotected area,northoftheP-Building wheretheR-Building andNorthOlympicBuildingstand.TheEngineering ServicesBuildingisatwo-story, nonsafety-related structure withaslabongrade.Thisfacilityprovidesadditional spacerequirements fordepartments relocated fromtheSalinaMeadowsfacility.
Thisbuildinghasatotalareaof,approximately 45,000squarefeetandprovidesofficespaceforabout250personnel.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatconstruction oftheEngineering ServicesBuildingdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage33of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-001SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0255-91 Figure9.2-5eMakeupWaterTreatingSystem(WTS)TitleofChange:Ecolochem FilteredandPurgeWaterConnections Description ofChange:TocontinuetheuseoftheEcolochem portabledemineralized trailer,permanent filteredandpurgewaterconnections wereaddedtotheexistingWTSsystempiping.Temporary Modification 91-093wasemployedproviding aconnection forthepurgewaterfromtheEcolochem tothemakeupwasteneutralizing tank(2WTS-TK1).
Thischangemadetheconnection permanent asinstalled.
Inaddition, anewconnection wasinstalled fromthewatertreatingfilterdrainline,2-WTS-002-134-4, tosupplytheEcolochem trailer.MakeupwaterfromtheEcolochem demineralized traileriscontrolled inaccordance withprocedure N2-OP-15.ISafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewofthechangefoundthatinstalling additional connections tofacilitate theEcolochem demineralized waterprocesswillimprovethesystemperformance withoutcausinganysafetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage34of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-006DER2-91Q-1718 11A-1through11A-6;Table11.4ASh1&2System:TitleofChange:SolidRadwasteAbandonment In-PlaceofAsphaltSolidification Equipment Description ofChange:Thischangeabandoned in-placeselectedportionsoftheoriginalasphalt-based solidradwasteprocessing system.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theoriginalplantdesignforradwastesolidification (i.e.,removaloffreewaterfrommiscellaneous wetwastes)utilizedtheWerner&Pfleiderer (WasteChem) asphaltvolumereduction systemaddressed byTopicalReportsWPC-VRS-001 andWPC-VRS-002.
Duetovariousdeficiencies, processproblems, andoffsitedisposalfacilityburialcriteriaassociated withtheuseofthissystem,theorigirial asphalt-basedsolidification systemwas"abandoned in-place."
Theabandonment in-placeoftheasphalt-based solidification systemwillhaveminimalimpactonradwasteprocessing, sincearadwastedewatering processproviding anacceptable methodofvolumereduction utilizing methodology andequipment addressed inChemNuclearSystems,Inc.,TopicalReportRDS-25506-01-P/NP (reviewed andapprovedbytheNRC)willbeutilized.
Abandonment in-placewasaccomplished insuchamannertoassureproperpressureboundaryconfinement ofailprocessapplications.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage35of131SafetyEvaluation No.:-Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-009Rev.0,I,253SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0015-94 104-33,10.4-34;Figure10.1-6cFeedwater (FWP)TitleofChange:InstallThrottleValvesinFeedPumpsSealWaterInjection LinesDescription ofChange:Thischangeinstalled throttlevalvesinfeedpumpssealwaterinjection lines.Theadditionofthethrottlevalvesallowseachsealwaterinboardandoutboardinjection linetobeequallybalanced, providing greaterreliability ofthefeedpumpseals.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewofthischangehasbeenperformed.
Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability, reliability maintainability, structural integrity, andsysteminteractions, hasfoundthattheimplementation ofthischangewillenhancesystemreliability/maintainability withoutcausinganysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage36of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-012N/ATable9A.3-15Sh3;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.5-1b,9A.3-1System:TitleofChange:N/ANewUnit2Maintenance BuildingDescription ofChange:TheUnit2Maintenance Buildinghasbeenconstructed insidetheprotected area,southoftheUnit2AccessControlBuildingandnorthofthenewOperations Building.
Thisbuildingconsolidates maintenance facilities intoanewsinglestructure whichislocatedclosertoexistingplantaccessways, enhancing theMaintenance Department's overallefficiency.
Thebuildingisatwo-story, nonsafety-related structure withapproximately 42,000squarefeetoffloorarea.Thestructure hasaslabongradeandprovidesshopareasforElectrical, Mechanical, andInstrumentation andControlsMaintenance Groups.Additional areasforlockerrooms,materialissue,andofficespa'cesforMaintenance Management andSupportpersonnel areprovided.
Also,aportionofthebuildingprovideshighbayvehicular accessequippedwithoverheadcranes.ThenewMaintenance BuildingandAccessControlBuildingareconnected, andanelevated'walkway betweentheMaintenance BuildingandtheOperations Buildinghasbeenconstructed.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepertinent safetyissuesidentified inthisSafetyEvaluation arefloodingandtheimpactontheControlRoomfreshairintakeradiological atmospheric dispersion coefficient.
TheMaintenance Buildinglocationprovidesadequateseparation fromsafety-related systemsandstructures toprecludeanyadverseimpactfromanycompressed gasesorchemicals storedinthebuilding.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage37of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-013SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0035-94 Figures10.1-9a,10.1-9b,10.1-9c,10.4-9Sh7,8,9System:TitleofChange:Condensate Demineraiizer (CND)Condensate Demineralizer FlowRecorders UpgradeDescription ofChange:Thischangereplacedfivecondensate demineralizer flowrecorders andtheresinstrainerdifferential pressuremetersassociated witheachcondensate demineralizer withnewrecorders thataredesignedforimprovedreliability.
Thischangealsoreplacedasixthrecorderwhichmonitorsthetotaldifferential pressureacrossallofthecondensate demineralizers, andanadditional meterwhichmonitorsresinrecyclestrainerdifferential pressurewithanewrecorderthatperformsthesecombinedfunctions.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Uponimplementation ofthissimpledesignchange,newrecorders willhavebeeninstalled thatprovideimprovedreliability ofmonitoring offlowthroughthecondensate demineralizers aswellasadequatemonitoring ofthestrainers differential pressure.
TheCNDsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage38of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:94-017SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0004-91 USARAffectedPages:Tables6.2-56Sh7,9A.3-15Sh5;Figures7.3-10Sh1,9.5-1gSystem:FireProtection Monitoring (FPM),FireProtection Water(FPW)TitleofChange:RemoveAbandoned FPWPipeSystemsfromFPMMonitoring Description ofChange:'Twoabandoned waterdelugepipingsystemsoriginally designedtosuppressfiresatthereactorrecirculation pumpswereremovedfromtheFPM>system.
This,changeremovednuisancespuriousalarms,troublesignals,horns,annunciations, andcomputerinputsfromtwopipingsystemswhichwereneverfunctional andnotrequired.
Thischangealsodisconnected cablingtospareddevicesintheplant,removedfusesandrelaysinthelocal,firecontrolpanel,andincludedtheremovalofdeactivated switchesandindication lightsintheMainControlRoom.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sincethetwoaffectedwaterdelugepipingsystemshavebeeninactiveandcappedpriortoplantoperation, theassociated components performnousefulfunction.
Theprimarycontainment doesnotrequirefireprotection systemsduringnormaloperation sinceitisinerted./Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage39of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-018Temporary Mod.94-020N/AHigh-Pressure CoreSpray(CSH)JumperControlSignalfor2CSH"MOV118 Atemporary jumperwasinstalled inthecontrolcircuitofthehigh-pressure corespray(HPCS)suppression poolsuctionvalve,2CSH"MOV118,tosimulateaclosedvalvesignalfromHPCStestreturnvalve2CSH"MOV112.Thisprovidedapermissive signalfor2CSH"MOV118 toopeneventhoughvalve2CSH"MOV112 wasdeenergized and/orbeingstrokedopen(notclosed).With,'2CSH" MOV118capableofopening,theHPCSwascapableoftransferring waterfromthesuppression pooltothereactorvesselandmettherequirements ofTechnical Specification 3/4.5.1.c.
TheHPCSwasdeclaredoperablewithout2CSH"MOV112 functioning, whichallowedittoreceivemaintenance andbeVOTEStestedpriortotherefueling outage.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheHPCSsystemcanbeconsidered operablesincethisjumperinstallation willallowittoperformitsdesignedfunctions withoutanyimpactfrom2CSH"MOV112 onthesystem'sflowrates,pressures, responsetimes,flowpaths,orsetpoints.
Thejumperwillnotaffectanyothercomponents orsystems.Therepairsandtestingof2CSH"MOV112canbeperformed safelypriortotherefueling outage.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'ummaryReportPage40of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation Document=-No.:
USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0405-91 Figure10.1-5bCondensate (CNM)Condensate BoosterPumpMechanical SealCavityDrainsDescription ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddeddrainlinestotheexistinginboardandoutboardmechanical sealcavityconnections.
Inaddition, theexistingdrainfromtheskidwasremovedandtheconnection capped.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Alldrainlines,whetherneworexisting, arenonsafety relatedandwillnotimpactthesafeoperation oftheplant.Thechangedoesnotaffecttheoperation oftheCNMsystem,TurbineBuildingequipment andfloordrainsystems(DET,DFT),nordoesitaffectthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Bothsystemsaredesignedtohandleinfluentfromoilyornonoilywastefromradioactive andpotentially radioactive sources.Bothsystemspumpwastefromtheirrespective collection tanksorsumpstoradwasteforprocessing.
Thecondensate pumpswillcontinuetofunctionasdesignedbecausethischangeinvolvesroutingwaterthatmaypassthroughthemechanical sealstotheDFTsystemwithoutimpacting pumpperformance characteristics.
Theexistingskiddrainlines2-CNM-150-330-4, 2CNM-150-3314 and2CNM-150-3324 willberemovedandashortnippleandcapwillbeinstalled.
Anywateroroilthatmaycollectontheskidmaybedrainedthroughthecappedconnection orwipedaway.Shouldawaterleakdeveloparoundthecondensate boosterpumpsandsaidflowwassufficient tooverflowthepumpskidcontainment, theDFTsystemwouldcollecttheaddedvolume.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage41of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-021Rev.0Bc1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0031-94 Table3.9A-12Sh12;Figure9.2-1fServiceWater(SWP)IST-SWPCheckValveInternals RemovalThissimpledesignchangeremovedtheinternals fromcheckvalves2SWP"V800A, BandV802A,B.Removaloftheinternals willprecludesedimentation withinthevalueandprecludetestfailuresduringin-service testing.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.
Deletionofthecheckvalveinternals willnotpreventtheSWPsystemfromperforming itsintendedsafetyfunction, norwillthesystempressureintegrity bedegradedduringanymodeofsystemorplantoperation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage42of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-023SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0174-93 Table7.6-6NeutronMonitoring System(NMS)ReviseAPRMFlow-Biased RodBlockSetpointSDCSC2-0174-93 Description ofChange:Thisdesignchangerevisedtheaveragepowerrangemonitor(APRM)flow-biased simulated thermalpower(STP)scramsetpointfrom0.66(W-hW)
+51%to0.58(W-hW)
+59%(theAPRMflow-biased STPupscalescramsetpointwasanalyzedunderTechnical Specification Amendment No.51),andtheAPRMflow-biasedrodblocksetpointfrom0.66(W-hW)
+42%to0.58(W-hW)
+50%.ThischangeallowsUnit2tobetterutilizetheextendedloadlinelimitanalysis(ELLLA)regionofthepower/flow map.SafetyEvaluation Summary:/ThischangeallowsOperations toentertheELLLAregionofthepower/flow map.Operation intheELLLAregionisrestricted becauseatlowerflowstheAPRMflow-biasedscramandtheAPRMflow-biased rodblockencroachontheELLLAregion.Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage43of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-024Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0361-91 Tables1.8-1Sh52,7.5-2Sh1Ea8Regulatory Guide1.97Monitoring andDisplayInstrumentation TitleofChange:Identification/Marking ofRegulatory Guide1.97DisplayInstrumentation onPanelsintheControlRoomDescription ofChange:ThischangeaddedtothepanelsintheMainControlRoomaredplastictrimplatearoundthecomponent identification labeloftheRegulatory Guide(RG)1.97Category1andCategory2displaydevicesforTypeA,B,andCvariables.
ThischangewillassisttheControlRoomoperators andsupervisors inquicklylocatingthemostimportant RG1.97displayinstruments (i.e.,thoseexpectedtobethemostusefulformonitoring, assessing, andresponding topostaccident conditions).
Thischangeimplements andconformstoarecommendation specified inRG1.97withthefollowing exceptions:
(1)thepositionindicating lightsfortheprimarycontainment isolation valveswerenotmarkedwiththeredtrimplate,and(2)themethodusedtoidentifytheRG1.97displaydevicesisthesameasthatusedtoidentifyseveralotherimportant systemcontrolswitchesanddisplayinstruments.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangedoesnotmodifyinanywaytheoperation orperformance ofanyplantsystemsorstructures, nordoesitrequirethatanychangesbemadetoanyinstructions currently specified inanyplantoperating, maintenance, orcalibration procedures.
Thischangedoesnotrequirechangingthecurrently specified safetyclassification orqualification criteriaofanysystemcomponent, andhasnoadverseimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Also,thestructural integrity ofthereactorcoolantsystempressureboundary, theprimarycontainment pressureboundary, andthesecondary containment pressureboundaryisinnowayaffectedbytheinstallation oftheproposedchange.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage44of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
94-024Rev.1(cont'd.)
Thetwonoteddeviations fromfullconformance withthesubjectrecommendations ofRG1.97haveeachbeenevaluated, andbothhavebeen.determined tobeacceptable onaplant-specific basis.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage45of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-026SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0134-93 Figure9.2-8bDomesticWater(DWS)DomesticHotWaterRecirculation PumpAbandonment Description ofChange:Thischangeabandoned inplacedomesticwatersystemrecirculation pump2DWS-P1andassociated motorandelectrical equipment.
Theassociated annunciator inthecontrolroomwasalsoremoved.Continuing problemsconcerning pumpleakageandmotoroverloading wereresulting'.in annunciator indication inthecontrolroom.Pumpabandonment includednecessary changestoassociated equipment.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheDWSsystemisnotsafetyrelated,isnotconnected toanypotentially radioactive processsystems,andisnonseismic exceptintheControlBuilding, whereappropriate designmeasureshavebeenimplemented.
Systemwaterpressureisprovidedbythenormalsourceofdomesticwater,OswegoCityWater,andisnotaffectedbytherecirculation pump.Byabandoning thepump/motor andassociated equipment in-place, anunnecessary annunciator willberemovedandtheneedforpumprepair/maintenance, whichhasproventobequiteextensive inthepast,willbeeliminated whilenotadversely affecting systemoperation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'ummaryReportPage46of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-027DER2-94-0157 9.3-20TurbinePlantSampling(SST),ReactorPiantSampling(SSR)TitleofChange:Tolerance ChangeforIsobathTemperature inSamplePanelsDescription ofChange:Thetemperature oftheconstantisothermal bathsismaintained at77Fa1Thetighttolerance forthetemperature requiresconstantchangeinrefrigeration modeandthisresultsinexcessive wearandtearontherefrigeration units.Thischangeprovidedforawidertemperature range(77Fs5)tobemaintained atthesamplesinkconstantbaths,therebyreducingtheconstantswitching ofrefrigeration modesandthewearandtearontheunits.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangewouldreducethewearandtearontherefrigeration unitsbyexpanding thetolerance oftheallowable constantbathtemperature andnotsignificantly affecttheaccuracyoftheconductivity measuring instrumentation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage47of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-028SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0020-94 9.5-84;Figures9.5-52a,9.5-52cAuxiliary BoilerSystems(ABD,ABF,and'BH)TitleofChange:AdditionofAuxiliary BoilerChemicalInjection PipingandBoilerFeedandBlowdownSampleConnections Description ofChange:Thischangeprovidedameansofaddingsodiumsulfitedirectlytotheauxiliary boilerswhentheboilersareinahotstandbycondition.
Inaddition, waterchemistry sampleconnections wereaddedtofacilitate boilerfeedwater andblowdownanalysis.
Allsamplepipinghasbeenroutedtoanewsamplesinkforconvenience.
Restricting orifice2ABF-RO128 boredimension hasbeendecreased toeliminate excessive steamlossfromtheauxiliary boilerdeaerator.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeupgradestheauxiliary boilersystemtoimprovesystemreliability anditscapability tosupportplantoperations.
Theauxiliary boilersystemandtheimpactedboilersubsystems areclassified asnonsafety related.Thesechangeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplantsincethehardwarechangeshavebeendesignedinaccordance withtheoriginalplantdesignbasis,andhavenoeffectonthefunctional capability oftheauxiliary boilersystems.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage48of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-029Temporary Mod.94-022N/AMakeupWaterStorage(MWS),ChilledWaterVentilation (HVN)TitleofChange:Temporary MakeupWatertotheHVNSystemDescription ofChange:Thistemporary changeprovidedanalternate sourceofmakeupwatertothechilledwaterventilation system.ThenewmakeupwaterisfromtheMWSsysteminlieuofthewatertreatment (WTS)system.TheWTSsystemisexperiencing areduction offlowduetopipingdegradation andisnotabletosupplytherequireddemand.MWSwaterwillberoutedfrom/toexistingconnections viatemporary hoseandassociated components.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thealternate makeupfromtheMWSsystemwillbesufficient throughahoseofequalsizeasaminimum.Thenewsourceofmakeupwaterisdemineralized waterinlieuoffilteredwater,waterqualityisenhanced, andsupplywillbeadequatetomeetdemand.Allhosesandassociated components shallberatedfortheirintendedserviceconditions andwillbeadequately secured.The60gphofwaterfromtheMWSsystemwillnotaffectthemakeupwatersystemcapacitytofeedwatertoitsoriginally intendedsystems.TheuseofMWSwaterinlieuoftheexistingWTSwaterwillnotcauseanyadversesafetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage49of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-032NUREG-0123 9A.3-31,9A.3-53,9A.3-56,9A.3-58N/AChangestotheUFSAR/USAR ActionsRequiredforInoperable FireProtection SystemsDescription ofChange:ThischangemodifiedtheUFSAR/USAR actionstatements forinoperable firebarriers, water-based extinguishing systems,Halonsystemsandcarbondioxidesystems.Inaddition, thedefinition offirewatchpatrolwaschangedintheUnit1UFSARtoreflecttheactionstatement changes.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesafetyevaluation analyzesthecurrentactionstatements andaugmentstheoptionsforcompensatory measureswithadditional optionstoaccountforareaswherefiredetection systemsareinstalled andoperable.
Further,theexpandeduseofengineering evaluation forimpairments, whichiscurrently recognized withintheUnit2USAR,isexpandedforapplication withintheUnit1andUnit2actionstatements.
Suchimpairment provisions allowgreaterflexibility indealingwithsystemimpairments withoutadversely affecting theFireProtection Program..
Theexistingactionstatement optionsalsoremainaspotential compensatory measures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage50of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:94-033SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0164-93 9C.8-5;Appendix9CTables3-1,34,4-1Sh2;Appendix9CFigure5-1-System:'itleofChange:MainSteam(MSS)ReplaceSRVCrane2MHR-CRN66 Description ofChange:Thefollowing changeswereimplemented bythissimpledesignchange:1.Retiredcrane2MHR-CRN66 andprovidedareplacement crane.Thisreplacement craneisanelectrical trolleyandchainhoist,and isdesignated
- ascrane2IVlHR-CRN66X.
2.Reworkedandrepairedelectrical trolleyandbus-barforreplacement crane2MHR-CRN66X.
3.Providedanadditional weld(nonstructural) forSRVcrane2IVIHR-CRN65X monorailspliceatazimuth240toimprovecranetrolleyperformance.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Replacement crane2MHR-CRN66X isbeingsuppliednonseismic andwillberemovedfromtheprimarycontainment duringplantoperations tomeetcommitments madeundertheGuidelines fortheControlofHeavyLoads(NUREG-0612)andUSARAppendix9CatUnit2.Theloadpathhasnotchangedandhasbeenpreviously evaluated suchthatthefailureofthecraneduringaseismiceventwillnotaffectplantsafety.Replacement crane2MHR-CRN66X isconsidered andincludedintheControlofHeavyLoadsAnalysis.
'hereplacement craneandinstallation conditions meetrequirements forseismicevaluation ofnonsafety-relatedcomponents insafety-related areas(insideprimarycontainment) anddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliability ofUnit2.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage51of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-034Rev.1N/A8.2-1,8.2-28;Figures8.1-1,8.2-1,8.2-1a,8.2-1b,8.2-9System:345-kVTransmission Output,115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesTitleofChange:Independence/Scriba 345-kVTransmission LineDescription ofChange:Thischangeaddedasixth345-kVtransmission linetoScribaStationthroughtwonew345-kVcircuitbreakers.
Thetwonew345-kVcircuitbreakersarethesameelectrical ratingastheothereight345-kVcircuitbreakers.
Construction workincludedtheelectrical interconnection ofoneofthetwo345-kVcircuitbreakersintheSpringof1994whileUnit1andUnit2wererunning.Inadditiontotheenergization ofthisbreaker,relaytestingwasalsoperformed.
Theelectrical interconnection ofthesecondbreakerandassociated relaytestingtookplaceduringtheUnit2refueloutageintheSpringof1995.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation addresses theimpactsonUnit1andUnit2resulting fromScribaSubstation construction activities.
Italsoanalyzestheeffectonthetransmission systemduetoincreased generation.
Worst-case scenarios wereidentified andfoundtobeboundedbypreviousaccidents andtransients analyzedinboththeUnit1andUnit2UFSARs.AProbabilistic RiskAssessment wasperformed toquantifytherisksassociated withthelineoutages,construction activities andoperation ofthenewtransmission lines.Theresultsshowtherelativechangeincoredamagefrequency issmallandisconsidered acceptable.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'ummaryReportPage52of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-035Rev.2NIA8.1-3,8.2-2,8.2-7,8.2-24;Figures8.2-1,8.2-1b,8.2&a,8.2-6dthrough8.2-6uSystem:TitleofChange:115-kVOffsitePowerSourceAlternate 115-kVTransmission Supply"NMP2Description ofChange:Thismodification allowstheUnit2115-kVtransmission line,No.5orNo.6,tobeenergized fromthe115-kVtransmission systeminsteadofScribaSubstation.
Either115-kVtransmission lineNo.5orlineNo.6wouldbeenergized fromNIVIPC's115-kVtransmission system'slineNo.2.Eithertransmission linewillbeconnected totheScribaStation115-kVmainbus(Cfor5line,Dfor6line)andwillprovide115-kVoffsitesupplythroughexisting115-kVfeederbreakersR50orR60.Nochangestoprotective tripschemesatUnit2wouldberequired.
Sinceexisting115-kVcircuitbreakerswouldstillbeenergized, relayprotective,,trip signalsatUnit2willbefunctional.
ISafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation addresses theimpactsonUnit1andUnit2resulting fromproviding anelectrical offsitepowersupplytoUnit2fromthe115-kVtransmission system.ltalsoanalyzestheeffectonthetransmission systemduetotheincreaseinelectrical load.Worst-case scenarios wereidentified andfoundtobeboundedbypreviousaccidents andtransients analyzedinboththeUnit1andUnit2USARs.Theanalysisperformed showsthatthe115-kVtransmission lineNo.2canbeusedasanalternate supplytothe115-kVNo.5orNo.6lineunderworst-case loadingconditions aslongascertainadministrative controlsaremaintained.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage53of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0040-94 Table10.2-1Sh2;Figure10.2-3Sh1Electro-Hydraulic Control(EHC)KeylockSwitchAdditiontotheTurbineBackupOverspeed TestCircuitDescription ofChange:Thischangeaddedakeylockswitchtotheturbinebackupoverspeed testcircuit.Redundant switchcontactswerenecessary topreventtheoriginalpotentially faultytestpushbuttonfromtrippingtheturbineduringnormaltesting.Thenewswitch,inthetestposition, disablesthetriprelayandservesasapermissive forthetest.Initiation ofthetestcontinues tobecontrolled bythepushbuttononlyafterthenewswitchisplacedinthetestposition.
Inthenormalpositionthenewswitchhasnoimpactonthebackupoverspeed tripcircuit.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theturbinegenerator, designedtominimizethepossibility ofafailurethatcouldproducehigh-energy
- missiles, isnotrequiredtotripfornuclearsteamsupplyupsetsbutdoessotoprotectitselffromconditions thatmaycausedamage.Theturbinegenerator isnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage54of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-039SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0113-94 Figure10.1-9cCondensate Demineralizer (CND)Condensate Demineralizer SystemImprovements:
Replacement ofValve2CND-PV188 andRemovalof2CND-RV278 Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedvalve2CND-PV188, a1-1/2",3000flangedTuflineplugvalve,actuatorandpositioner withaFisherControls2",3000flangedglobecontrolvalvewithactuatorandpositioner.
TheTuflineplugvalvewasnotadequateforpressurecontrolandcontrolled erratically.
Valve'2CND-RV278 wasremovedfromthesystem.Thevalveleaked,adversely impacting systemperformance.
ValveRV278isredundant andsystemoverpressurization wasprovidedby2CND-RV352.
Inaddition, pressureindicators 2CND-PI282, PI303andPI304werereplacedwithalargerscalegauge.//SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangedoesnotaffectanysystem,equipment orcomponent oftheplantwhichperformsasafety-related function.
Nuclearsafetywillnotbeaffectedasthechangeimpactsthenonsafety-related CNDsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage55of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-043Rev.2NEP-POL-0101 13.1-4,13.1-5;Figure13.1-3N/AEngineering Technical SupportOrganization ChangesDescription ofChange:Thefollowing changesweremadeintheUnit2Engineering organization:
1.GeneralSupervisor NuclearDesign-positionabolished.
/~2.SiteEngineering
-namechangedtoPlantSupport.3.4.Supervisor SafetyAnalysis-namechangedtoSupervisor Analysis.
Supervisor Chemistry/RP Support-positionabolished; RPSupportfunctionmovedunderSupervisor Analysis(see3above)andthechemistry functionmovedtoSupervisor Environmental Protection.
LeadEngineerInspection Program-positionabolished andthefunctionintegrated intoMechanical Design.6.LeadEngineerSpecialPrograms-positionabolished andfunctionintegrated underSupervisor Analysis(see3above).7.GeneralSupervisor Engineering Performance Services-functionintegrated underManagerUnit2Engineering.
8.Supervisor Engineering Performance
-costestimating andscheduling functions integrated underSupervisor ProjectManagement Unit2.9.Supervisor Administrative Services-positionabolished; eachEngineering Supervisor willoverseetheirownadministrative staff.10.Associate SeniorStaffTechBuildingServices-positionupgradedandmovedunderManagerInformation Management as"Supervisor BuildingServices."
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage66of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)
94-043Rev.2(cont'd.)
11.ProgramDirectorIndependent SafetyEngineering Group-word"program" deletedfromthepositiontitle.Thefunctionremainsunchanged.
12.Supervisor DocumentControl(site),Supervisor DocumentControl(Salina),
Supervisor RecordsManagement andSupervisor ResourceCenters-thesepositions havebeenabolished andtheirfunctions havebeentransferred intoanewposition, "Supervisor DocumentControl/RecordsManagement."
13.Supervisor SoftwareDevelopment
-thisisanewpositionreporting toManagerInformation Management.
ISafetyEvaluation Summary:-
Afterimplementation ofthesechanges,adequateresources willexisttoprovideEngineering supportforsafeoperation andmaintenance ofthefacilityunderbothnormalandoff-normal conditions.
Consequently, thesafeoperation and'.maintenance ofthefacilityisnotadversely affected.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage57of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-044DER2-94-0036 N/ASystem:N/ATitleofChange:BoraflexCouponRemovalwithNETCOProcedure SEP-093-01 Description ofChange:Avisualinspection wasmadeandmeasurements takenofthefull-length surveillance assembly(SA)atUnit2.Theboraflexsheets,orcoupons,fromtheshort-length SAwereremovedandsenttoaqualified laboratory (PennState)fortestingandanalysis.
Thisanalysiswasusedtoestablish abaseline(the"original" datadescribed intheUSAR)tocomparefuturecoupontestsagainst.Thecouponswillalsobecomparedtounirradiated couponstakenfromtheoriginallotofBoraflexusedtomanufacture Unit2'sSAs.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Performing abaselinecharacterization oftheBoraflexcouponsinstalled inthespentfuelracksisnecessary todevelopaBoraflexPoisonSurveillance Programtotrackborondepletion.
Thelackofpreinstallation baselinecharacterization willnothaveasignificant impactonthedevelopment ofalong-term surveillance programandwillnotposeasafetyconcern.Standardindustrypracticeandstatistical studiesshowthatremovingalloftheshort-length couponsfromthespentfuelracks,forthetimeperiodrequiredtotakethisbaselinedata,willnothaveasignificant impactontheneutronandgammaexposures seenbythesecoupons,andfuturecouponsurveillance willbeaccurate.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage58of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:94-045N/AUSARAffectedPages:3.1-24,7.3-26,9.'l-18,9.3-16,9.4-54,9.5-73,and26.2-55,6.2-99,6.3-20,6.4-6,7.3-34,8.3-2,8.3-48,8.3-75,9.2-6,9.2-16,9.3-8,9.3-11,9.3-29,9.4-8,9.4-24,9.4-48,9.4-64,9.5-32,9.5%9,9.5-61,9.5-81,11.5-13;FMEAVolumes1System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:N/ARemovaloftheFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA),Book1and2,fromtheUSAR'/'heFMEAwasoriginally submitted totheNRCin1983aspartoftheOperating Licenseapplication, anditdocumented thesingle-failure analysesforsafety-related systemsatthattime.TheFMEAisaverydetailed, component-level, computer-basedfaulttreeanalysis.
ThetwoFMEAvolumeshavebeenremovedfromtheUSARandareretainedasaseparateengineering documentwhichisreferenced intheUSAR.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisisadocumentation-only changewhichhasnoeffectontheplant,itssystemsorprocedures, anddoesnotaffectthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant,nordoesitaffecttherequirement toconsidersingle-failure criterion asanormalpartofthedesignprocess.RemovingtheFMEAfromtheUSAReliminates therequirement toupdatethisdocumentannuallywiththeUSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage59of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-046Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0099-93 10.2%,10.2-5;Figure1.2-40Generator HydrogenSupply(GMH)BulkHydrogenControlCabinetDescription ofChange:Thischangereplacedallpiping,valves,andcontrolsassociated withtheexistingbulkhydrogenstorageunit.Changesincludedthereplacement ofallcylinderisolation valves,fabrication ofanewstainless steeldischarge
- manifold, installation ofanewtubetrailerdischarge station,installation ofavendor-supplied (AirProducts) standardpressurecontrolstation,andreplacement of'theexcessflowcheckvalvewithaproperly-sized unit.Inaddition, thedischarge heightforsafetyreliefventswasincreased.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:/'hischangewasmadetoaddressleakageandsafetyconcernswiththe.previouspipingarrangement, andtomodifythesystemtoprovideadequatemakeupflowrateforgenerator replenishment withoutdefeating theprotective featuresoftheexcessflowcheckvalve.Thedesignflowrateoftheexcessflowcheckvalvewasnotchanged.Themaingenerator hydrogensupplysystemisanonsafety-related system.thatisusedtoprovidehydrogentothemaingenerator afteranoutageoronanas-needed basistomakeupforhydrogenlossfromthegenerator.
Thesystemconsistsofavendor-supplied bulkhydrogenstorageunitwithpressure-reducing controlslocatedintheyardareabetweenUnit2andUnit1,andanetworkofdistribution pipingandcontrolswhichconveythehydrogenintotheturbinebuildingwhereitisusedforgenerator makeup.Thesystem'spurpose,function, methodofperforming itsfunction, anddesignbasiswasnotchanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage60of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-048SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0062-92 70733PlantProcessComputerSystem(PMS)RemoveBalanceofPlantPerformance Calculations (BOPCALC) andVesselTemperature RateofChange(VTC)SoftwarefromthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PMS)Description ofChange:ThischangedisabledthecurrentBOPCALCandVTCfunctions~by removingtheassociated softwareprogramsfromthePMScomputer.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:RemovingtheBOPCALCandVTCsoftwarewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.ThePMScomputerwillremainasasystemtoprovideoperators withthemeanstomonitornuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS)andBOPevents.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage61of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:.94-049Rev.05.1Mod.PN2Y89MX146 6.2-66through6.2-71;Table6.2-54;Figures6.2-77,6.2-95Athrough6.2-95DSystem:Secondary Containment andStandbyGasTreatment (SGTS)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:1-HourDrawdownAnalysisThissafetyevaluation supportsplantoperation for1-hourdrawdowntime.Thefollowing parameters havebeenchangedforthereducedhTrequirements ascomparedwiththefourthoperating cycle.Theseparameters arediscussed below:2.SpentFuelHeatLoads:Adesignbasisspentfuelpoolheatload(16batchesoffuelwith12daysofcoolingandpoweruprate)isusedforthehTrequirements.
Theuseofthedesignbasisheatloadisconservative.
/UnitCoolerPerformance:
Fortypercentdegradation forallunitcoolersisassumed.Basedontheperformance testsperformed duringthe1992-93timeperiod,theoveralldegradation ofallunitcoolersincluding 2HVR"UC413A 5Bis13%.Thisprovidessufficient margintoaccountforanyfurtherdegradation thatmayoccurinthefuture.3.Secondary Containment ln-leakage Rate:Themaximumallowable secondary containment in-leakage is2,670cfmtosupport1-hourdrawdowntimeandreducedhTrequirement.
Thisis17%higherthanthefourthoperating cyclebutstillmeetstheSRPSection6.2.3guideline.
DecayHeatRemovalFlowReduction:
The2,670cfmin-leakage selection willbemadesuchthatitwillpermitaflowdiversion upto300cfmforthedecayheatcoolingafter5hoursintoanaccident.
The300cfmflowdivisionismorethanthecoolingflowrequirement of145cfm.5.Elimination ofhTAnnunciation:
Existingfour-hour surveillance programissufficient toensurethatthehTrequirement willbemet.ThehTannunciation isnolongerrequiredbecauseofsignificantly lowerCRTrequirement, andperiodicsurveillance isadequate.
Therefore, thehTannunciation canbeeliminated.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage62of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)
94-049Rev.0&1(cont'd.)
6.Surveillance Acceptance Criteria:
Thesecondary containment andSGTSsystemsurveillance acceptance criteriaarerevisedtoreflect2,670cfmin-leakagerate.Theanalysismethodsarethesameasthoseusedpreviously.
7.UseofElectricHeaters:Upto45kWofelectricheaterscanbeusedtomaintainproperemergency corecoolingsystemroomtemperature (high-pressurecoresprayroomexcluded).
Thischangedoesnotadversely affect60minutesdrawdowncapacity.
Useofadditional heatersmaybeallowed,following Engineering evaluation andwithApplicability Review.NOTE:Revision1totheSafetyEvaluation evaluated theuseoftheelectricheatersasdescribed initem7.Theelectricheaterswereprohibited fromuseinRevision0.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedrawdownanalyses(Gale.ES-27,1,Rev.0andES-259,Rev.02)provideacurvethatdefineshTrequirements basedon1-hourdrawdowntimefortheremainder oftheplantlife.The6Trequirement variesfrom5to10Fduringsummermonths.BecauseoflowALTrequirement, buildingheatingisnotanticipated.'uring wintermonths,theavailable hTwillbemorethanthemaximum6Trequirement of20'F.Thesafetyevaluation concludes thatnosafetyconcernsareinvolvedandnounreviewed safetyquestions existifthehTrequirements ofFigure1andotherrequirements asstipulated inthesafetyevaluation areadheredto.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage63of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-050EDC2E10933Figures5.4-13d,5.4-13gResidualHeatSystem(RHS}ReviseSafetyClassofControlComponents forRHSSteamCondensing PressureReducingValves2RHS"PV21A/B fromSRtoQDescription ofChange:ThischangerevisedthesafetyclassfromSR(SafetyRelated)toQ(Quality}
forcomponents oftheRHSsteam-condensing pressure-reducing valveinstrument loopswhichperformnosafetyfunction.
Thesafetyclassification waschangedforthepressureindicating controller, pressureindicator andthecurrenttopneumatic converter for2RHS"PY218 andthecurrenttopneumatic converter for2RHS"PV21A.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Changingthesafetyclassification, fromSRtoQ,ofcomponents whichperformnosafetyfunction, willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage64of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-053Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0283-91 Figure7.4-1Sh1ICS-ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(RCIC)AddTimeDelayinRCICInitiated TurbineTripDescription ofChange:TheRCICsystematUnit2isdesignedinsuchawaythatRCICinitiation providesautomatic signaltotripthemainturbineinstantaneously, regardless ofthecauseofRCICactuation.
Therefore, anyinadvertent RCICactuation duetohumanerrororequipment malfunction willcauseanunnecessary tripofthe'mainturbine.Ifatthatmomentthereactorisrunningat35%powerorhigher,thereactorscramwillfollow.Toresolvethisdiscrepancy, atimedelaywasaddedtotheturbinetripsignalinitiated byRCIC.Thischangeallowstheoperatortoverifythecauseof,startingRCICpriortotheturbinetripandtakeappropriate actions.Toprovidethistimedelay,thenonsafety-related auxiliary Agastatrelaywasreplacedwithanonsafety-related timedelayAgastatrelay.SafetyEvaluation Summary:GeneralElectric(GE)reportGE-NE-E51-00171-01, datedJune1994,andGEletters,dated8/29/94,8/30/94,and9/13/94,providedrequested analysisoftheproposedchangebasedoncalculated moisturelevelinthesteamandsteampipingconfiguration.
TheGEreportconcluded thatatimedelayofuptofiveminuteswillnotcompromise theturbineprotection andcanbeintroduced totheRCICinitiated turbinetrip,providing thetotalaccumulated timeofRCICoperation ismonitored anddoesnotexceedeightminutesperyear.Itisconcluded thatthischangewillnotalterthedesignorfunctionofthemainsteamsystemormainturbineperformance inawaythatadversely affectstheturbineprotection orsystemperformance orplantnuclearsafety.TheadditionofthetimedelaywillnotaffecttheRCICperformance.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage65of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
94-053Rev.1(cont'd.)
Basedontheanalysisperformed, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangedoesnotalterdesign,function, ormethodofperforming thefunctionofthesafety-relatedsystemandisincompliance withNRCrequirements.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
.SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage66of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:.94-055Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y94MX004 Figure6.2-71aContainment Atmosphere IVlonitoring
'(CMS)'liminate MoistureFromH~/O~Analyzers Waterintrusion inthesamplelineshashadaconsistent deleterious effectontheperformance ofbothTrainAandTrainBhydrogen/oxygen (H~/0,)analyzerpanels(2CMS"PNL66Aand2CMS"PNL66B).
Problemsrangefromwaterintheanalyzing components (whichresultininaccurate outputs)toequipment failures(samplepumps,analyzers, etc.).Thesourceofwaterintrusion wasdetermined tobeduetothehighhumidity(intheprimarycontainment andtheareaabovethesuppression pool)beingcarriedintothesamplesuctionlines.Surveillance durations haveincreased asaresultofhavingtorepair/replace variouscomponents whicharepronetowaterincursion damage.Inaddition, a7-dayLCOisstartedwheneverasurveillance/maintenance isinitiated oneitherH~/O~train.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification installed amoisturecollector inboththesampleinletandreturnlinesforbothTrainsAandB.Whilethemoisturecollectors areidentified assafetyrelated,theyhavenopermissive orcontrolfunctions.
Theyfunctiononlytopreventwaterintrusion intotheH~/O~analyzersystemcomponents.
Themodification willincreasethesystems'eliability andavailability anddecreasemaintenance.
IVlostofthemodification wasinstalled priortoRefueling Outage4(RFOK)withfinaltie-instothesystemduringRFOK.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage67of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-056DER2-94-0217 6.4-2N/AChangeinNMP2ControlRoomSuppliesRequirement Description ofChange:Thischangeallowsfortheprovision offood,sleepingfacilities, andotherpersonalcomfortsuppliesfromoutsidetheControlRoomvitalareaenvelopeonanas-neededbasis.Providing foodandsleepingfacilities fromeitheronsiteoroffsitesourcescanbereadilyperformed whenUFSAR-identified accessroutesareconsidered.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Providing personalcomfortsuppliestothe.ControlRoomfromoutsidethevitalareaenvelopeduringdesignbasisaccident(DBA)conditions isinaccordance'with previously evaluated accessroutesdescribed intheUSAR.Habitability oftheControlRoomenvelopewithoutthesesupplieshasbeenevaluated asconsistent withtheguidelines setby10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria19.Thischangedoesnotaffectanyequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUSARandhasnoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Thischangehasnoimpactonradiological effluents ornonradiological consequences totheenvironment.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage68of131SafetyEvaluation No.:94-058Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:-TitleofChange:~DrawingEY-8S'igure1.2-1N/ANewStructures toConnectUnit2AccessControlBuildingtothePlantDescription ofChange:TheUnit2AccessControlBuilding(Phase1)wasconstructed in1993.Thisstructure wasconnected totheReactorBuildingviatemporary woodenstructure.
Thiswoodenstructure hasbeenreplacedwithapermanent structure andanadditional enclosedwalkwayfromthisstructure totheCardoxRoom/Auxiliary ServicesBuilding.
Thesestructures provideadditional entrypathstoboththeradiologically-controlled areasandthenonradiologically controlled areasofUnit2.Thenewpassageway totheCardoxRoomisoutsidetheradiologically-controlled zone.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepertinent safetyissuesidentified inthissafetyevaluation areimpactontheControlRoomfreshairintake,impactontheFloodAnalysis, additional loadsonAuxiliary Bayroof,ReactorBuildingandControlBuildingwalls,impactontheCO2tankruptureanalysis, andaccessibility fortheremovaloftheAuxiliary Bayroofplugs.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatconstruction oftheseinterconnecting structures betweentheAccessControlBuildingandtheUnit2Plantstructures doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage69of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-059Rev.051Mod.PN2Y93MX004 N/ASystems:CommonElectrical (CES),MoistureSeparator Vents/Drains (DSIVI),MoistureSeparator ReheaterVents/Drains (DSR),Feedwater PumpRecirculation (FWR),Feedwater (FWS),HighPressureFeedwater HeaterDrains(HDH),LowPressureFeedwater HeaterDrains(HDL),HotReheat(HRS),Meteorological Monitoring (IVIMS),MainSteam(lVISS),ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)TitleofChange:ModifiedASMEPTC6.1TurbineGenerator Performance TestCapability forUnit2Description ofChange:lAmodifiedASMEPTC6.1TurbineGenerator Performance Test(ASMETest)wasrequiredinorderforGeneralElectric(GE)towarrantee recovering theelectrical megawatts lostduetotheremovaloftwoL-1stagewheelsinlow-pressure turbines8andCbyreplacing rotorsforlow-pressure turbinesA,B,andC.Thismodification installed 50thermocouples, adataacquisition
- terminal, and6condenser (baskettip)backpressure sensinglines(2percondenser).
Theseitems,inadditiontoexistingplantinstrumentation, enabledtheASMEtesttobep'erformed.
Throughtheoutputsofthedataacquisition
- terminal, themodification alsoenabledthetemperatures (sensedbythethermocouples) tobemonitored onthesitemeteorological computer(METVAX).
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification willaddsupplementary instrument/pressure inputsinordertoenableamodifiedASMETesttobeperformed atUnit2.Thistestisrequiredinordertoevaluatetheefficiency oftheturbinegenerator beforeandaftertheinstallation ofthenewlow-pressure turbinemonoblock rotorsand,subsequently, theefficiency duetoimplementing poweruprate.Inaddition, thechangewillenableplantpersonnel topermanently monitortemperatures atthepowercycle SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage70of131SafetyEvaluation No.:94-059Rev.08c1(cont'd.)
SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
blockvalves(PCBV)closetothecondensers.
Significant increaseintemperatures, whenthevalvesareclosed,wouldbeindicative ofPCBVleakage.Thechangeswillhavenoimpactonsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.ThemodifiedASMEtestisnotdiscussed intheUnit2USAR.TheUnit1USAR,Sectionll.C.,describes themeteorology requirements andwillnotbeimpactedbythedatalinkinputtedfromUnit2recorder2CES-TJR100.
Unit2USARSection2.3.3.2.3 describes theMETVAXasaweatherdataprocessing systemanditwillnotbeimpacted.
'Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage71of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-061PN2Y94MXOOS Figures9.2-1c,9.2-1e,9.2-1f,9.2-1g,9.2-1J,9.2-'1pSystem:TitleofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)Installation ofServiceWaterSystemChemicalCleaningValveTie-InsDescription ofChange:Thismodification providedtheisolation andinterface tie-insnecessary tofacilitate chemicalcleaningofthesmalldiameterservicewaterpiping(i.e.,3-inchNPSandsmaller)intheReactorandControlBuildings.
Thecleaningoperation wasimplemented toremovecorrosion productandsiltdeposition fromtheaffectedpipingandassociated unitcoolercoils.Thecleaningprocesswasthefirststepinsuppressing furtheraggressive corrosion attackofthepipesurfaceduetomicrobiologically influenced corrosion.
Thisprecludes futurecostlypipingrepairsduetoexcessive pitting.Thescopeofthissafetyevaluation addresses theisolation valvetie-insnecessary toaccommodate futurecleaning.
Theactualcleaningoperation willbeaddressed inseparatedocumentation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdesignprovidesin-lineisolation valvesandfittingsforuseinafuturechemicalcleaningoperation.
Theisolation valvessegmenttheaffectedheadersintosixindependent cleaningloops.Duringnormaloperation, theisolation valvesaremaintained inthefullopenpositionandperformnoactivethrottling orisolation function.
Duringthecleaningoperation thevalvesareclosed,isolating theaffectedloopfromthemainheader.Consideration forcomponent accesswasaddressed inthedesignandplacement ofthenewvalvesandfittings.
Thesystemchangeshavebeenreviewedagainsttheexistingsystemflowcalculations andsystempipestresscalculations.
Thesechangesdonotchangeorimpedethefunctionoftheoriginalinstallation.
Thenewdesignprovidesisolation capabilities notincludedintheoriginalinstallation, enhancing theoperability andmaintainability ofthesystem.Thisinstallation doesnotchangetheoperation ofthesystemoritsfunction.
Thecleaningvalvetie-insprovidethecapability tosupportafuturechemicalcleaningoperation.
Theaddedisolation capability enhancessystemmaintenance SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage72of'l31SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-061(cont'd.)
capabilities.
Theseadditions tothesystemdonotchangeanylicensing ordesignbasesrequirements oftheSWPsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage73of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-062PN2Y94MX009 Figures9.2-1c,9.2-1e,9.2-1g,9.2-1L,9.2-1m,9.2-1pSystem:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)Resize/Reroute SWPPiping,Thismodification upsizedapproximately 1,100ft.ofSWPpipingintheReactorBuildingandAuxiliary Baystoimprovethehydraulic performance ofselectedunitcoolers.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisprojectwillreplaceapproximately 1,100ft.ofthesafety-related pipe.Thispipewasidentified, throughhydraulic
- analysis, tobeundersized forthedutyrequirements ofthesystem.Thisreviewidentified portionsofpipingfor,unitcoolers2HVR"UC401A throughF,UC406,UC407A,BandC,UC408A"and B,UC410A,UC411CandUC414AandBashavingmarginalcleanpipehydraulic performance.
Thisdesignchangesthesizeofthecurrently installed pipingandinmostcasesconformstotheoriginalroutingoftheexistingpipe.Therearesomesectionsofthepipingthatwillrequireminorreroutesforgreateraccessibility.
Thepipingchangeshavebeenreviewedagainsttheexistingsystemflowcalculations andsystempipestresscalculations.
Thesechangesdonotaffectthefunctionoftheoriginalinstallation.
Thenewdesignprovidesisolation capabilities notincludedintheoriginalinstallation, enhancing theoperability andmaintainability ofthesystem.Portionsofthenewpipingwillbeinstalled inparallelwiththeexistingpiping.Theexistingpipewillbeabandoned inplacefollowing thesystemtie-ins.Mostpipinginstallation willtakeplaceduringnormalpoweroperation.
Theremainder ofthepipeandalltherequiredsystemconnections willbeinstalled duringRefueling Outage4.Precautions willbetakentoinsurethatinstallation activities willnotinterfere withplantoperation orendangertheabilityofplantsystemstoperformtheirnecessary functions.
Thepipingsizeincreaseenhancesthecapability ofthesystemtorespondtoplantneeds.Thisisaccomplished byincreasing thecapability ofthesystemtosupply SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage74of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-062(cont'd.)
servicewatertothecoolers.Theincreases inpipesizewillnotchangeorimpactthefunctionofthesystem.Considering thedocuments reviewedithasbeendetermined thatthismodification complieswithallofthedesignandlicensing requirements applicable totheUnit2SWPsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage75of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-063SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0029-94 Figure9.4-9Sh1,2L3ReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR)HVRFansRepeatedly FailedtoStartReactorBuildingnormalventilation systemspare/standby supplyandexhaustfanshaverepeatedly failedtoautostartormanuallystart.Thestartcircuitsforthefanscontainapermissive logicrequiring respective discharge damperstobegreaterthan40%open.Whenafanstartsignalisreceived, arelay/timer isinitiated.
Also,thestartsignalinitiates theopeningoftheasso'ciated discharge dampers.Iftheassociated discharge dampertakeslongerthan10secondstoopento40%openposition, thetimerwilltimeoutandsendasignaltoclosethedischarge damper;thefanwillnotautostart.Fieldtestingdemonstrated thestartsequencewasbetween,7.3 and9.2secondswiththerelay/timer trippingin10.1seconds;relay/timer rangewas1.5.to15seconds.Themarginallowedbetween"Start"and"FailtoStart"wastoorestrictive anddidnotallowforanyanomalyorvarianceofoperation.
Therefore, therelay/timer setpointwasincreased toa12seconds.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangewillenhancetheperformance ofthenonsafety-related portionoftheReactorBuildingnormalheating,ventilating andairconditioning systemandwillnotaffecttheoperation ofanysystemsimportant tothesafeoperation andshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'SummaryReportPage76of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation'Document No.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-064SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0118-94 9.5-33,9A.3-16,9A.3-17,9A.3-63;Table9A.3-7Sh2&3;Figure9A.3-5N/ADeletionofFireBarrierRating-DieselGenerator DayTankRoomsDescription ofChange:Thischangedeletedtherequirement forathree-hour ratedfirebarrierseparating eachdieselfueldaytankfromitsassociated dieselgenerator.
/SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThecurrentFireHazardsAnalysis, aspresented inUSARSection9.A,postulates afireineachdieselgenerator areawhichincludestheentireinventory ofdieselfuelcontained withinthedaytank.Sincethedieselgenerator willnotfunctionwithoutthedaytanksupplying fuelandthedaytankhasnovaluewithouttheavailability ofadieselgenerator, theprovision ofafirebarriertoisolatethefuelsupplyfromthedieselgenerator isoflittlevalue.Thepostulated firedoesnotcreditthefirebarrierwithisolating thedaytankfromthedieselgenerator.
Elimination ofthefirebarrierdoesnotplacetheareaoutsideofcompliance withapplicable criteriasincedikingandspillcontainment, inaccordance withBTPCMEB9.5-1PositionC.7.i.(2),
ismaintained.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage77of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-065SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0034-94 Table3.9A-12Sh128c13;Figures9.2-1e,9.2-1f,9.2-1J,9.2-1LSystem:TitleofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)SWPCheckValveRemoval,Relocation orReplacement Description ofChange:TheSWPsystemwasreviewedbytheprojectteaminresponsetoindustryconcernsandUnit2performance problemsnotedduringSWPcheckvalveandunitcoolertests.Astudywasperformed whichnotedseveralareasforimprovement ofthesystemperformance.
Thescopeofthisprojectaddressed oneaspectoftheproposedsystemimprovements recommended bythestudy.Thisprojectaddressed checkvalveperformance enhancements whichincluded:
Removaloftheinternals fromcheckvalves2SWP"V75A and75B.Relocation ofcheckvalves2SWP"V1024 andV1025,and;theinstallation ofblockingvalvesanddrainprovisions.
Replacement ofliftcheckvalves2SWP"V201A and201Bwithnozzlecheckvalves,andrerouting theassociated piping.Replacement ofswingcheckvalves2SWP"V240A and240Bwithnozzlecheckvalves.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecheckvalvechangesenhancethecapability ofthesystemtorespondtoplantneeds.Thisisaccomplished byimproving valvereliability, eliminating unnecessary maintenance andtesting,andincreasing thecapability ofthesystemtosupplyservicewatertotheassociated heatloads.Thesechangesdonotadversely changeorimpactthefunctionofthesystemandcomplywithallofthedesignandlicensing requirements applicable totheUnit2SWPsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage78of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-066Temporary Mod.94-039N/AReactorProtection System(RPS),NuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS),MainSteamSystem(MSS)TitleofChange:DefeatofMainSteamLineRadMonitoring TripSignalChannelB1Description ofChange:Thistemporary modification installed ajumperinpanel2CEC"PNL633 BayBinordertodefeatatripsignal(ChannelB1)whichwouldnormally, beprovidedwheneverdetector2MSS"RE46Bisinoperable.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification allowsforampletimeforthereplacement of,thefaultydetectorwithoutenteringaLCOperTechnical Specifications 3/4.3.1.a and3/4.3.2.b.1.b.
Thischangereducestheplant'svulnerability toafullscrambyprohibiting thehalfscramsignaltobepresentduringthetimeperiodthatthedetectorisbeingreplaced.
Intheeventoffueldamage,theremaining mainsteamlineradiation monitorswillfunctiontodetectthereleaseoffissionproductsandinitiatetheappropriate mitigating actionstolimitthereleaseandtoshutdowntheplant.Thischangedoesnotimpacttheremaining detectors fromperforming theirsafetyfunctions asoriginally designed.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage79of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:=USARAffectedPages:System:TideofChange:94-067DER2-94-0036 9.1-9,9.1-10N/AUpdateUFSARDescription ofaRevisedBoraflexSurveillance ProgramandUseofNewSurveillance Assemblies Description ofChange:USTool&.Die(USTED)originally suppliedasurveillance sampleconsisting of2-inchsquarepiecesofBoraflexfortheUnit2spentfuelstorageracks.Thiswasshippedin1984andwasthestandardsurveillance samplesuppliedbyUSTEDatthattime.However,thesesampleswerelostandtherefore neverinstalled intheUnit2spentfuelpool.Replacement Boraflexsurveillance sampleswerepurchased in1990.Thesecouponswereinstalled priortotheracksbeingputintouseandthehottestbundlesfromeachreloadhavebeenplacedaroundthem.Thissafetyevaluation updatedthedescription intheSARoftheBoraflexcouponsurveillance assemblies tobeinagreement withtheactualcouponswhichwereinstalled in1990.Inaddition, thelong-term BoraflexSurveillance Programhasbeenmodifiedtobeinagreement withthemostrecentindustryguidanceforBoraflexsurveillance, issuedinareportbytheElectricPowerResearchInstitute (EPRI).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Performing periodictestingoftheBoraflexcouponsinstalled inUnit2'sspentfuelracksisnecessary toprovideassurance thattheBoraflexmaterialinthespentfuelrackscontinues toperformacceptably overtheservicelifeoftheracks.Thereplacement couponsandtheirassociated surveillance programwillprovideadequateassurance thattheBoraflexmaterialisperforming asintendedandwillprecludetheoccurrence ofacriticality accidentduetodegradation oftheBoraflexmaterial.
Thisrevisedsurveillance programwillcontinuetoimplement therequirements ofGDC61andisamoreconservative programthantheoriginalonedescribed intheUSAR.NeithertheBoraflexcouponsortheirassociated surveillance programpresentasafetyconcernforUnit2.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage80of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-068Rev.05,1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0040-93 9.1-23,9.1-24,9.1%0,9C.3-4,9C.3-5,9C.8-1,9C;8-2,9C.8-3;Tables3.9A-4Sh6,3-1Sh1,3-3Sh1;Figure5-2System:MHRTitleofChange:Upgradeof125TonPolarCraneto132TonCapacityDescription ofChange:Thischangetothepolarcrane'suseandfunctionupgradedthemainhoistfrom125-tonto132-toncapacitytoallowforthefullutilization ofthereactorpressurevessel(RPV)headcarouselstrongback whichwasinitially employedduringRefueling Outage3.Theupgrading ofthepolarcranemainhoistinvolvedmodifications andrecertification loadtestingofthehoistat125%ofthenewratedcapacityduringplantoperation.
Theconstructibility review,theloaddropassessment calculation, andtheloadtestprocedure ensuredthatplantequipment wasnotaffectedbytheworkandtesting.Theupgrading ofthepolarcranemainhoistreducespersonnel exposureandsavescriticalpathrefueloutagetimebypermitting theremovalandreinstallation oftheRPVhead,thestudtensioners, the76studs,nuts,andwashersinoneliftingoperation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedesignchangesandreanalysis ofthepolarcranemainhoistfortheupgradeto132tonsmeetsthesamesingle-failure proofcriteriaofNUREG-0612, asdidtheexistingequipment.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage81of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-069Procedure N2-CSP-2V 10.4-2,10.4-22through10.4-27Condensate Demineralizer SystemCondensate Demineralizer WaterPurityMaintenance Description ofChange:Thischangereplacedcondensate demineralizer resinatintervals whicharebasedoninletconductivity anditsrelationship tothecomposition ofthecirculating water,andcondensate flowratethroughthebedssinceregeneration ofresinisnolongerperformed atUnit2.Thisapproachtotheoperation ofthedemineralizers eliminates thepotential forcontamination fromtheproductsformedduringacidandcausticregeneration oftheresin.SafetyEvaluation Summary:CThecondensate demineralizer resinwillbereplacedsuchthatadequateremaining capacitywitlexisttohandlethepostulated maincondenser leakeventwithinthetimepermitted foranorderlyshutdown.
Theeffluentqualityofthedemineralizer systemwillsatisfytheacceptable limitfoundinTable2ofRegulatory Guide1.56,Rev.1,July1978.Thereplacement ofcondensate demineralizer resinsatthesefrequencies isincompliance withparagraph Coftheregulatory guide.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage82of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-070SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0028-94 Figure10.1-6bFeedwater (FWS)Replacement ofDrainValves2FWS"V89A&Band2FWS"V90A&BDescription ofChange:Thischangereplaceddrainvalves2FWS"V89A&B andV90A&Bforcontainment isolation valves2FWS"V12A&B.
Thesevalvesare3/4"NPSandarenormallyclosed.Thevalvesarenotactivecomponents andtheironlysafetyfunctionispressureretention.
/Thesevalvesarelocatedintheprimarycontainment andwerereplacedtoenhanceleak-tightness andpreventleakageinthedrywell.SafetyEvaluation Summary:\Installation ofthereplacement drainvalvesdoesnotimpactthedesignoftheFWSsystem.Thesystemcanstillprovideitsintendedflowandnewdrainvalves2FWS"V89A&B andV90A&Bwillassuresystemintegrity.
Basedontheevaluation-performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage83of131SafetyEvaluation No.:94-071Implementation DocumentNo.:N/AUSARAffectedPages:2.2-1,2.2-3,2.2-8;Table2.2-3;Figure2.1-2System:TitleofChange:N/AGasPipeline¹63toSitheEnergiesUSAPlantand¹58toIndeckEnergyDescription ofChange:SitheEnergiesUSAhasconstructed a1000-MWnaturalgas-fired electrical generating stationknownasIndependence Generation Plant.Itisacogeneration plantlocatedinOswegoCounty,NewYork./Twonaturalgaspipelines liewithin8km(5miles)oftheNineMilePointStation.Onepipeline(¹63)suppliesgastotheSitheplantandtheotherpipeline(¹58)toIndeckEnergy.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thenearestpointofthepipelines isover2milesfromUnit2.Duetothedistancebetweenthepipelines andNineMileStation,atmospheric dispersion wouldconservatively reducethenaturalgasconcentration belowitslowerexplosive limitmorethan1milefromNineMilePoint.Thedetonation ofanunconfined naturalgasdispersal inairisnotacredibleevent.Duetothedistancefromthepipelines totheUnit2ControlRoomairintake(>2miles),theresultant atmospheric dispersion wouldconservatively reducethenaturalgasconcentration attheintakestolessthan9g/m'.Thisiswellwithinthenaturalgastoxicitylimitof287g/m'.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatinstallation ofthegaspipelines doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage84of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-073SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0142-94 9.4-71;Figures9.4-22bthroughdHeatingandGlycol(HVG),WaterTreatment (WTS)TitleofChange:WaterTreatingMakeupWaterSupplytoHVGDescription ofChange:Thischangeisolatedthehotwaterheatingandglycol(HVG)system.frommakeupwatersuppliedbythemakeupwatertreatment system(WTS)becauseWTShasbeenrepeatedly contaminated byglycolintrusion throughleaky/HVG valves.TheneededmakeupwaterforHVGwassuppliedmanuallybyOperations underprocedural controls."
Theisolation wasaccomplished byremovingthein-linecheckvalvesandblankingoffthelines.SafetyEvaluation Summary:I/NeithertheHVGnortheWTSsystemshaveanysafety-related functions.
Failureormalfunction ofthesystemsorcomponents willnotcompromise anysafety-relatedsystemsorcomponents orpreventasafereactorshutdown.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage85of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-076DER2-93-1935 Table6.2-56Sh2,4,7,10,11,12,20,21PrimaryContainment AppendixJDiscrepancies, DER2-93-1935 DER2-93-1935 addressed discrepancies involving editorial changestotheUfSARclarifying theUnit2AppendixJProgram.Thissafetyevaluation addresses changestoUSARTable6.2-56asfollows:II1.Deletedreference toTypeCtestingforthefollowing valves:2RHS"MOY1A, 2RHS"MOV1B,2RHS"MOV1C,2CSH"MOV118,2CSL"MOV112and2ICS"MOV136 2.RevisedNotes23,24and25todeletereference toTypeAtestingofthefollowing relief,safety,checkandvacuumbreakervalves:2RHS"SV34A/B, 2RHS"SV62A/B,2RHS"RV56A/B,2RHS"V20,2RHS"V19, 2RHS"V1'17, 2RHS"V118, 2RHS"RVV35A/B, 2RHS"RVV36A/B, 2RHS"RV108,2RHS"RV20A/B/C, 2RHS"RV61A/8/C, 2RHS"RV110,2CSL"RV123,2CSL"RV105,2RHS"RV139,2CSH"RV113and2CSH"RV1143.RevisedTable6.2-56toindicateaTypeCtestforvalves2CCP"RV170 and2CCP"RV101.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThevalvesinItem1areECCSsuctionvalvesthattakesuctionfromthesuppression poolatanelevation belowminimumsuppression poolwaterlevelof199'-6"and,assuch,'are waterfilled post-LOCA.
ThevalvesinItem2arerelief,safety,checkandvacuumbreakervalvesthatterminate inthesuppression poolbelowtheminimumwaterlevelof199'-6".Thesuppression poolwatereffectively sealsthesecontainment isolation valvesfromtheprimarycontainment atmosphere, therebypreventing gaseousreleasesfromtheprimarycontainment.
Sincethese SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage86of13194-076(cont'd.)
SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:{cont'd.)'alves donotseecontainment atmosphere post-LOCA, theydonotrepresent
.,potential containment atmospheric leakagepathsandarenotsubjecttoleaktestingasdefinedinAppendixJ.Reliefvalves2CCP"RV170 and2CCP"RV171 arelocatedinsideprimarycontainment andtheiroutletsterminate openendedinsidetheprimarycontainment atanequipment drainand,assuch,provideanatmospheric leakpathfromtheprimarycontainment.
Therefore, thesevalvesareconsidered containment isolation valvesasdefinedinAppendixJandareTypeCtestedtosatisfytherequirements ofAppendixJ.ThischangerevisesUSARTable6.2-56toaccurately denotetheproperleaktestingprovisions forthevalvesinItems1,2and3.Thisisaneditorial changeanddoesnotchangeleaktestingrequirements orleaktestingmethodsoftheUnit2AppendixJtestprogram.Theapplicable containment isolation valvesinItems1,2and3willcontinuetobeproperlyleaktestedperexistingprocedures toensureleak-tight integrity asrequired.
by10CFRSOAppendixJandASMEXI.IBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage87of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-077Procedure N2-OP-100B 9.5%3,9.5-69Emergency DieselGenerator LubeOllDiv.3EDGLubeOilTemperature Thelubeoiltemperature fortheDiv.3emergency dieselgenerator (2EGS"EG2) wasstatedintheUSARtobeabove120Fduringstandbyconditions.
However,actuallubeoiltemperature wasobservedtobebetween90Fand110'Fduringstandbyconditions.
Withthevendor'sconcurrence, ithasbeenestablished thattheminimumstandbylubeoiltemperature requirement fortheDiv.3dieselgenerator is85F.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Establishing therequirement of85'Fastheminimumlubeoiltemperature duringstandbyconditions isconsistent withtheacceptance criteriainNUREG-0800, thatthetemperature ofthelubricating oilismaintained aboveaminimumvaluetoenhancethe"first-try" startingreliability oftheengineinthestandbycondition.
Thischangeisalsoconsistent withthevendor'srecommendation forminimumlubeoiltemperature andwillsupplyproperstandbylubrication totheengine.Therefore, theactuallubeoiltemperature ofbetween90Fand110Fissufficient toverifythatenginelubeoiltemperature requirements aremetunderstandbyconditions.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage88of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-078Procedure N2-OPS-RPS-W001 N/AMSS,HRSTitleofChange:TurbineSteamValveSurveillance TestIntervalExtension Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluates changingthetestingrequirement forturbinecontrol,stop,andintercept valvesfromweeklytomonthly.(NOTE:Subsequent changeshavebeenevaluated underSafetyEvaluation 95-032).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepurposeofthistestingistodiscoveranyvalvemalfunctions thatcouldcontribute toaturbineoverspeed eventcausingturbinecomponents tobecomehigh-energy debris(missiles) capableofstrikinganddamagingsafety-related equipment.
TheNRCSafetyEvaluation ReportforUnit2(NUREG-1047, Section3.5.1.3.10),
withregardtotheturbinemissileissue,concluded thattheprobability ofunacceptable damagetosafety-related structures, systemsandcomponents duetoturbinemissilesisacceptably low(i.e.,10peryear),providedthatthetotalturbinemissilegeneration probability issuchthatconformance withtheNRCcriteria(i.e.,P1(10forfavorably orientedturbines, P1(10'orunfavorably orientedturbines) ismaintained throughout thelifeoftheplantbyacceptable inspection andtestprograms.
Inreachingtheconclusion, theNRCstafffactoredintoconsideration thefavorable orientation oftheUnit2turbinegenerator.
AlsointheUnit2SafetyEvaluation, theNRCidentified thattherelevantGeneralElectric(GE)missileprobability analysismaybeusedindetermining theinspection intervalfortheturbinediscsatUnit2..Theexistingrequirement forsurveillance testingofturbinestopvalves(TSVs),turbinecontrolvalves(TCVs)andturbinecontained stopandintercept valves(CIVs)istoperformthesetestsonaweeklybasis.Inordertoassureplantavailability anddecreaseanypotential ofplantscrams,thesurveillance testing SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage89of13'1SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-078(cont'd.)
frequency ofthesevalvesisbeingtemporarily extended(uptoRefuelOutage4(RF04))fromaweeklytoamonthlyinterval.
Justification forthischangeinfrequency isprovidedbelow.DuringRF04,thelow-pressure turbinerotorsarebeingreplacedbymonoblock rotors.Missilegeneration isnotaconcernformonoblock rotors.Aspartofthemonoblock rotormodification, aseparatesafetyevaluation willbepreparedwhichwillidentifysurveillance testingrequirements forTSVs,TCVsandCIVs.Itisanticipated thatwiththereplacement oftheexisting"built-up" low-pressure rotorswithmonoblock rotors,surveillance testingfrequency ofTSVs,TCVsandCIVscanfurtherbereduced(frommonthlytoquarterly)
~InresponsetoNiagaraMohawk'srequest,GErecalculated wheelmissileprobabilities fortheUnit2low-pressure turbinerotors.Thesenewcalculations werebasedonthe'revised calculation procedure that1)includedupdatedfailureratedataontheprimarysteamvalvesofGEnuclearunits,and2)includedthecapability ofcalculating wheelmissileprobabilities forextendedtimeintervals betweentheGEnormallyrecommended functional testsofthesteamvalves.jtGEevaluation indicates that,basedonNRCcriteria(P1<1x10forfavorably orientedunits),Q/Q/0testing,andwithnopre-warming, theinspection intervalisreducedto5.7yearsfortheArotor.Considering pre-warming, M/Q/Mtesting,andbasedonGErecommendation (P'I<1x10'ortheunit),theArotorinspection intervalisreducedto2.8years.Theexistinginspection intervalis6years.Basedonexistingfrequency oftesting(W/W/Wf)andtestscheduleofM/M/M(conservatively, Unit2shallutilizeM/M/MscheduleinsteadofM/Q/ManalyzedbyGE),whichisanticipated tobeutilizedforaveryshortdurationofthepresentoperating cycle,thereducedinspection intervalof2.8yearswouldrequireArotorinspection byR5.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage90of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-079Procedures N2-FSP-FPM-A001-1 through59.5-2,9A.3%3,9A.3~;Table9.5-3,Sh758System:TitleofChange:FireDetection System.Performance BasedFireDetectorSurveillance TestingDescription ofChange:Thischangeaddedaclarifying paragraph thatindicates thatsubsequent editionsofNFPAcodesandstandards maybeusedforsubsequent plantmodifications andprogramrevisions.
Clarification wasalsoaddedthatadeviation;from NFPA-72specified firedetectortestfrequencies isutilizedforfirezonesthatdonotcontainanyequipment considered important tosafety.Also,adeviation fromNFPA-72codespecified testingrequirements infirezonescontaining safety-related equipment hasbeenadopted.Thisdeviation isbasedonobtaining equivalent reliability betweentestintervals asallowedby'NFPAcodeequivalency provisions.
Therevisedtestingschemeusesa10%,20%expanded, totalzoneexpanded,'otating testsamplepopulation fortestingthatisconducted onanannualbasis.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theclarifications areinformation additions thatdonotaffectsafety-related equipment andarenotchangesfrompresentoperating policies.
Thechangetothetestingschemeforfiredetection insafety-related equipment areasisbasedontheplant-specific failurerate(failuretoalarmundersimulated fireconditions) offiredetection instruments.
Theschemeadoptedprovidesanequivalent orreducedprobability ofadetectorfailurebetweentestintervals thanthatgenerally assuredbyNFPA-72annualtestintervals usinggenericfailureprobability.
Thetestingschemechangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofapostulated fireintheFireHazardsAnalysis, nordoesitincreaseordecreasetheseverityofthefire..Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage91of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:'94-080Mod.PN2Y94MX006 3.7B-17,3.9A-3,3.9AM,3.9B%9;Table3.9B-2mSh1&2System:HydrogenRecombiner (HCS),ReactorWaterRecirculation (RCS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:NMP2SnubberReduction Thismodification reducedthenumberofmechanical snubbersonUnit2safety-relatedpipingsystemsbyreanalyzing thepipingsystemsforsnubberremovalorsnubberreplacement withstruts.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Duetofailureratesassociated withsnubbers, snubberremovalresultsinpipingsystemsthataremorereliable.
Otherbenefitsoftheprogramincludereducedlong-termmaintenance, inspection andtestrequirements.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage92of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94482DER2-93-2060-Figures10.1-9e,10.4-9Sh10Condensate Demineralizer (CND)CNDUltrasonic ResinCleaner(URC)LevelElement2CND-LE225 NotInstalled Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation documents theas-builtplantcondition fortheCNDsystemultrasonic resincleanertankasnothavingalevelelementinstalled andthecorresponding levelalarmsinoperative.
Additionally, theassociated sluicingwaterflowcontrolvalvehasbeenmaintained inthefullopenposition, sinceplantstartupwithapprovedholdouttagpreventing misoperation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theultrasonic resincleaningequipment doesnotinterface withoraffectanyequipment important tosafety,andtheCNDsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofanyreactorsafetyfeatures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage93of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-083Procedure N2-FSP-FPM-R001 Table9A.3-18Sh2FireDetection (FPM)Elimination ofPeriodicTestRequirements forThermalFireDetectors inFireZone252SWDescription ofChange:Thischangeremovedfourthermalfiredetectors fromthescopeofUSAR-specified periodictesting.Thethermaldetectors arelocatedintheSFPPhaseSep'arator TankRoomonReactorBuildingelevation 289'-0"andimmediately outsidetheroom.Theareaoutsidetheroomisalsoprovideddetection coveragebyionization detectors inanotherloopofthedetection zone.Thecombustible loadingw'ithintheroomisinsufficient towarrantfiredetection.
Thischangeleftthethermaldetectors installed butwillnotrequireperiodictestinginorderforthezonetobeconsidered operable.
Inaddition, shouldoneofthedetectors gointoalarmduetosomefuturefailure,thischangeallowsthelooptobebypassedinthepanelwithoutdeclaring thezoneofdetection inoperable.
Thischangewasimplemented sinceveryhighradiation levelsnormallypresentintheSFPPhaseSeparator TankRoompreventtestinginaccordance withpreviousrequirements.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereliability andmarginofsafetydiscussed inUSARSection9A.3.6.1.7 willbemaintained bythischangesinceredundant ionization detection intheareawillbemaintained.
Thecombustible loadingwithintheSFPPhaseSeparator TankRoomisinsufficient towarrantdetection andhasbeendocumented inafireprotection engineering evaluation.
Thesafeshutdownanalysisisunaffected bythischangeasistheFireHazardsAnalysis.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage94of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TrtleofChange:94-087NUREG-0654, NUREG-0696, NUREG-0737 13.3-2N/AEliminate Corporate Emergency Operations CenterDescription ofChange:NUREGS0654,0696,and0737containcriteriapertaining toemergency responsefacilities.
Thereisnorequirement specifictomaintaining anoffsiteCorporate Emergency Operations Center(CEOC).Thereis,however,arequirement tomaintainabackupEmergency Operations Facility(EOF)shouldtheonsite,EOFbecomeuninhabitable.
Theoffsitelocationpreviously usedtoobtainEngineering supportwasreferredtoastheCEOCintheSiteEmergency Plan.TheCEOChashistorically providedaconvenient locationforobtaining Engineering supportduringemergency scenarios.
TheCEOCcontained resources (drawings, calculations, personalreferences) typically usedbyEngineering personnel.
Thelocationwasoutsidetheten-mileemergency zoneanddedicated phonelineswereusedtoensure/communication withtheTechnical SupportCenter(TSC)andEOF.TheEngineering Department recentlyrelocated toabuildingonsiteandcouldbeaffectedbyevacuation requirements.
Foremergency eventswhichdonotrequireevacuation, communication viaphonelinesensuresaccesstothesameleveloftechnical supportpreviously available.
However,ifsiteevacuation isrequired, accesstotheresources contained intheEngineering Buildingcouldbelost.Underthesescenarios, technical supportwouldcomesolelyfromtheTSCandEOFandwouldbedependent ontheamountoftechnical information available inthosefacilities.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Conformance withapplicable criteriaisassuredsince:1)thereisnotaregulatory requirement foraCEOC,and2)exceptunderscenarios requiring evacuation, theproximity ofEngineering resources totheplantwillimprovesupport.Therefore, thereisnonetnegativeimpactfromrelocating theEngineering Department tothesiteandeliminating theCEOC.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolve'anunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage95of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-088SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0167-94 Page7.7-20;Figure7.7-6Sh3ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)TitleofChange:Recirculation FlowControlValveMinimumPositionChangeDescription ofChange:Thereactorrecirculation flowcontrolvalvescanbecomestuckatminimumpositionduetothedifferential pressureacrossthevalveaftertherespective pumpistransferred tohighspeed.Thischangenowpermitsincreasing thevalvepositiontoamaximumof22%open(hotindicated) withthevalvelimitswitchbypassedwhilethefirstpumpwasupshifted, andamaximumof20%open(hotindicated) whilethesecondpumpwasupshifted.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepeakneutronfluxthatwillresultfromtheincreased flowwhentherecirculation pumpsareupshifted isconservatively belowthehighneutronfluxscram.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage96of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-089SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0019-94 Figures104-1,10.4-2aCondensate AirRemoval(ARC)DesignChangeto2ARC-AOV104 Valve2ARC-AOV104 failedtoopenwhenrequired.
Therootcauseforthisdeviation wasdetermined tobeimproperly sizedspringforthedesigncondition.
Themostcost-effective repairwastoretrofitthisactuatortoopen(andclose)onair.Thisdesignchangedeletedthefailopenrequirement forthisvalve.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sincethevalveisnonsafety related,nosafetyconcernsexistinallowingthisvalvetoopenonair.Theairwillprovidethenecessary forcetobreakthevalveawayfromitsseat.Additionally, shouldthevalvefailonceopen,itwillremainopenmaintaining condenser vacuum.Allowingthevalvetoopenandcloseon:airwillnotadversely affectnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheretrofitofthisvalvedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage97of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:95-005Procedure NSAS-POL-01, Procedure NEP-POL-0101 USARAffectedPages:13.1-4,13.1-5,13.1.-7;Figures13.1-3,13.1-5System:TitleofChange:N/AReorganization oftheInformation
.Management BranchtotheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportDepartment Description ofChange:Thefunctions oftheInformation Management Branchhavebeenrelocated fromtheNuclearEngineering organization totheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupport(NSAS)organization.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Relocation oftheadministrative supportfunctions providedbytheInformation Management BranchtotheNSASDepartment isconsistent withthecharterandresponsibilities ofthatdepartment andmaintains clearmanagement controlandeffective linesofauthority andcommunication betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportfortheoperation ofthefacility.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage98of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:9530Procedures S-RTP-165, S-RPIP-3.11 Tables1.8-2Sh6,1.9-1Sh49&50,12.5-3System:N/ATitleofChange:UseofAudibleAlarmDosimeters andPersonnel AirSamplersDescription ofChange:ThischangerevisedtheUSARtoagreewithcurrentRadiation Protection Programprocedures fortheuseofaudiblealarmdosimeters andpersonnel airsamplers.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheproposedchangestotheUnit2USARwillmeettheintentof10CFR20andcomplywithapplicable portionsofregulatory guidelines.
~Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoes>notinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage99of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-032Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y93MX005 3.5-8,3.5-9,3.5-16,10.2-1,10.2-8,10.2-9,10.2-10,10.2-11;10.2-12,10.2-13;Tables3.5-3,3.5-6,3.5-9,3.5'-12,3.5-15,3.5-16,10.2-1Sh1&2System:TitleofChange:TMSLow-Pressure TurbineMonoblock RotorReplacement Description ofChange:Thismodification replacedthethreeexistinglow-pressure turbinerotors(2TMS-T2A,B,C)withGeneralElectric(GE)monoblock designrotors.Thepreviouslow-pressureturbinerotorswereofabuilt-updesign(shrunk-on wheels).Theshrunk-on wheeldesignhasapotential ofdeveloping crackinginthekeyway,webandhubareaduetostresscorrosion cracking(SCC).Themonoblock rotordesignhasbeenadoptedasacorrective measureagainstSCC.Thebenefitofreplacement oftheexistinglow-pressure turbinerotorswithmonoblock rotorisasfollows:a.RecoveryoflostMWeduetowheelremoval.GEguarantees a28.3MWerecovery.
b.Reducedlow-pressure turbinerotorinspections.
Therecommended inspection frequency reducesfrom6to10years.c.Reducedturbinevalvetesting.d.Replacement monoblock rotorssupportreducedoutagedurations.
e.Cobaltreduction.
Thepreviouslow-pressure turbinelast-stage bucketsutilizedstelliteerosionshields.Thereplacement bucketsareflamehardened.
Thereplacement last-stage bucketsresultinareduction inradiation exposuretoplantpersonnel.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage100of1310SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:95-032Rev.0L1(cont'd.)
Themonoblock rotorsweredesignedtomeettherequirements ofthepreviousdesign/operating conditions, including transient operating conditions.
Atthetimeofscheduled installation (1995),Unit2willbeundergoing apoweruprate.Themonoblock rotors,therefore, conformtothedesignrequirements established forpoweruprate.Therequirements includethefollowing:
Guaranteed Rating:InitialSteamConditions:
ExhaustPressure:
Guaranteed Flow:1,210,902 kW1003psia2.0"HgAbsbackpressure 13,583,244 Ibs/hrTheturbinerotorsaredesignedwith5percentflowmarginabovetheflowrequiredtomeetthemaximumguaranteed outputforpoweruprate.Theturbinegenerator isnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Theturbinegenerator is,however,designedtominimizethepossibility ofturbinerotorfailurethatmightproduceahigh-energy missilethatcoulddamageasafety-related component.
Replacement withmonoblock rotorsreducestheprobability ofmissilegeneration byremovingthepotential forSCCattheinterface betweenarotorandwheelviatheuseofamonoblock construction.
Theoverallprobability ofdamagebyturbinemissiles(formonoblock rotors)willbewithintheacceptance valueof10/yr,asoutlinedinSRP2.2.3,andtheacceptance valueof107/yr,asspecified inRegulatory Guide1.115.Theexistingoverspeed protection controlswillpreventtherotorfromexceeding themaximumtransient speedof120percent(designoverspeed) ofratedturbinespeed.Thissafetyevaluation alsore-evaluated testingrequirements forvariousturbinedevicesbasedonmonoblock rotorreplacement.
4Adequateprocedural controlsshallbemaintained suchthattherewillbenoadverseeffecttonuclearsafetybothduringthetransportation andinstallation ofthemonoblock rotorsandduringstorageoftheremovedrotors.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage101of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-033Mod.PN2Y94MX003 Figures9.2-8b,9.2-9bDomesticWater(DWS),SanitaryPlumbing(PBS),Auxiliary ServiceBuildingHVAC(HVL),PagingSystem(COP)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Auxiliary BuildingRenovation, RFO4ScopeThischangerenovated theAuxiliary ServiceBuildingelevation 261'-0"toallowuseascontrolled personnel ingressandegressto/fromtheTurbineandReactorBuildings viathelinkwayduringRefueling Outage4(RFO4).Thischangeinvolvedmakinganopeninginthe13linewallatelevation 261'eartheentrancetothesouthelectrical tunnelstairwell, installation ofanadditional 1.5-hr.fire-rated door(ET262-6)forstairwayisolation, removaloflockers,removalofthedrinkingfountainandwashbasins,thecappingoffloordrain(s)inthetemporary accesspassageway, andtheremovalofdoorAS261-7forimprovedaccess.Also,doorET262%wasremovedwhiletheareawasbeingusedonlyforaccessandegressduringRFO4.Thetemporary accesspassageway wascreatedbyinstalling paintedgypsumwallboard partitions.
Theceilingtilegridandassociated serviceswererevisedintheareaofthepassageway.
Thesechangesarepartialscopeforthismodification.
Afterthe1995refueloutage(RFO4),themodification wasresumedtoprovidearadiation protection calibration laboratory, storageroom,separatemale/female personnel decontamination facilities, removalofthe1,980-gallon hotwaterheaterandreplaceitwitha120-gallon
- capacity, installadifferent designdoorforET262-4,andinstallanequipment liftfromTurbineBuildingelevation 250'-0"andelevation 261'-0"oftheAuxiliary ServiceBuilding.
Thechangestobemadeaftercompletion ofRFO4willbeaddressed inasubsequent safetyevaluation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thechangesbeingmadetothesouthelectrical tunnelstairwell wereaddressed for'onformance withGeneralDesignCriterion (GDC)2andnoadverseimpactwascreated.Potential impacttoadjacentsafety-related areasandconformance toGDC3andIOCFR50AppendixRwereevaluated andconformance wasmaintained.
Buildingserviceswererevisedanddidnotimpactanyoperation ofequipment important tosafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
II SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage102of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:95-034Calculation ES-216-OOB Calculation H21C-038-01B
'SARAffectedPages:System:Tables15.6-13Sh2through11,15.6-16bReactorContainment Purge(CPS),Gas-Nitrogen (GSN)TitleofChange:RevisedBypassLeakageDesignBasis2GSN~V205 Description ofChange:Thischangerevisedthedesignbasisanalysesfordetermination ofthebypassleakagethroughtheCPSwetwellanddrywellsupplylinesandresultant dosesdueftotheincreased leakage.Theincreased leakagewasduetoremovalofleakagemitigation creditforcheckvalve2GSN"V205.
Sincethisvalveisnotpartofaleaktestprogram,andwillnotbeaddedtoone,creditcannotbetakenforleakagereduction following adesignbasisLOCA,ashadbeenassumedintheoriginaldesignbasisanalyses.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation concludes thatanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofremovingleakagemitigation creditforcheckvalve2GSN"V205.
Thisconclusion isbasedonthecalculation oftheadditional leakageattributable todeletingcreditforthecheckvalve,anddetermination thattheresultant doseswillnotcausethelimitsof10CFR100or10CFR50GDC19tobeexceeded.
Thecalculated dosesattheexclusion areaboundary, lowpopulation zone,andintheControlRoomincreaseasaresultofthischange;however,theyremainbelowthelimitsof10CFRIOOandGDC19.SinceUnit2islicensedtothelimitsof10CFR100andGDC19,theconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentaredetermined nottohaveincreased.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage103of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-035SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0148-94 Figures9.2-6a,9.2-17bSystem:Condensate MakeupandDrawoff(CNS),MakeupWater(MWS)TitleofChange:Elimination ofHoseConnection HeadersforMWSandCNSSystemsDescription ofChange:Thischangeeliminated hoseconnection headersandinstalled newpermanent hoseconnections toallowmovementoflargeequipment intothedecontamination roomoftheDirtyWorkshoponelevation 261'.IISafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewfoundthateliminating hoseconnection headersinthedecontamination roomandinstalling newpermanent hoseconnections willimprovemovementoflargeequipment andstillsupplyCNSandMWStothedecontamination room.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage104of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0157-94 9.5-17,9.5-18,9.5-21;Table8.3-1Sh354;Figures8.3-2,8.3-3,8.3%,8.3-6Sh58L27System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:LAR,EJS,NJSChangePowerSupplyto2LAR-PNL200 Thischangeseparated thenondivisional ReactorBuildingnormallightingsystemfromitspresentDivisional Class1Epowersource2EJS"US1andconnected ittoitsoriginally designednondivisional source2NJS-US2.
Thischangealsodisconnected aloss-ofwoolant accidentsignalcircuitry to2EJS"US1whichp'rovided fortrippingthebreakerfeedingthelightingpanelandtheassociated computerpointsandannunciation circuitry totheplantprocesscomputerandtopanel2CEC"PNL852,respectively.
DuetoaNRCapprovedextension intheamountoftimeallowedfortheReactorBuildingdrawdown, anewdrawdownanalysishasdetermined thattheheatloadgenerated fromtheReactorBuildingnormallightingsystemwouldnolongerpreventthedrawdownfrombeingachieved.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theworkscopeisminimalandinvolvesthedisconnection andconnection ofexistingcablesandfunctional testing.Nonewcablesorracewayswillbeinstalled andthosecablestobesparedwillbeabandoned inplace.Separation
- criteria, AppendixRrequirements, andelectrical protection willbemaintained.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage105of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:95-037SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0019-95 Figure9.5-42EGSRerouteoftheGovernorOilCoolingLineThecoolingarrangement forthegovernoroilcoolerwasfoundtobeinadequate tokeepthegovernor's oiltemperature tothevendor'srecommended values.Thecauseofthiscondition wasattributed toinadequate coolingwaterflowratethroughthecooler.Thissimpledesignchangeimprovedthiscoolingarrangement byrerouting thereturntinefromthegovernoroilcoolertoalowpressurepointofthejacketwatersystemtoincreasethedifferential pressureandtheflowrate.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangewillmaintaindieselgenerator reliability byproviding propercoolingwaterflowtothegovernoroilcooler.Inaddition, athrottlevalvewillbe.,added tothereturnlinetoobtainoptimumgovernorcoolertemperature.
Operation ofthisvalvewillbecontrolled byprocedure N2-OP-100A tomaintaingovernortemperature between120Fand200F.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage106of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TdleofChange:95-038Calculation MS&3619.1-12,9.1-37,9.1-38FHSClarification ofDesignBasisforSpentFuelPoolRackExternalLoadingDescription ofChange:Thischangecorrected thediscrepancy betweenthedesignbasiscalculation, fuelhandlingprocedures, andSection9.1oftheUSAR.Thedesignbasiscalculation wasrevisedtoincludethecaseforthefuelbundledroppingontothespentfuelpoolrackswhilebeingmovedwiththepolarcrane1/2-tonhoist.Additionally, thecalculation revisionaddressed thecaseofafuelbundleandgrapplebeingdroppedoverthespentfuelpoolracksfromamaximumheight-of30inchesabovetheracks.Useofthe25-tonauxiliary hoistfortransferofnewfuelbundlesandthepositionofthefuelbundlecratewhenopenednowbetterdescribetheactualnewfuelreceiptactivities.
Therequiredchangesindicatetheuseofthe1/2-tonhoistforthetransferofnewfuelbundlestoeitherthenewfuelstoragevaultorthenewfuelinspection stand.-Also,thenewfuelbundlecratemaybeopenedinthehorizontal positionprovidedthatthecratestillfunctions tosupportthefuelbundles.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Clarification betweentheprocedure andthedesignbasisdocuments forthespentfuelstorageracks'xternal loadingwasdoneinaccordance withthedesignbasisforthespentfuelpoolracksasreferenced inUSARSection9.1.Thecorrection ofUSARSection9.1regarding newfuelreceiptactivities andassociated procedures wasdoneinaccordance withtheheavyloadcommitments perNUREG-0612, asreferenced inUSARAppendix9C.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage107of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-043LDCR2-95-UFS-038 15.7-8through15.7-14NIATitleofChange:UpdateSARDescription oftheBundleDropAccidentDescription ofChange:ThefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforthebundledropaccidentinSection15.7.4oftheUnit2USARhasbeenrevisedtoincorporate severalchangesintheassumptions oftheanalysis.
Theaccidentoccurs'during arefueling operation whenafuelassemblyismovedoverthetopofthecore.Whilethefuelgrappleisintheoverhoist condition (bottomoftheassembly32.95feetabovethetopofthecore),amainhoistcablefailsallowingtheassembly, thefuelgrapplemast,andheadtofallontopofthecoreimpacting agroupoffourassemblies.
Thegrappleheadandmastarefixedvertically tothedroppedassemblysuchthatallthekineticenergyistransferred throughthedroppedassemblytothegroupofimpactedassemblies.
Thedroppedassemblyimpactsthecoreataslightangleandtherodsinthisassemblyaresubjected tobending.Aftertheassemblyimpactsthecore,theassembly, grappleheadandmastfallontothecorehorizontally withoutcontacting thesideofthepressurevessel.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thenumberoffailedfuelrodsforthebundledropaccidentisdetermined bybalancing theenergyofthedroppedassemblage againsttheenergyrequiredtofailarod.Thedroppedassemblyisconsidered toimpactatasmallangle,subjecting allthefuelrodsinthedroppedassemblytobendingmoments.Thefuelrodsareexpectedtoabsorblittleenergypriortofailureasaresultofbending.Forthisreasonitisassumedthatalltherodsinthedroppedassemblyfail.Therefore, thetotalnumberoffailedrodsoninitialimpactis62+33=95.
Theassemblyisassumedtotipoverandimpacthorizontally onthetopofthecore.Theenergyfromthissecondimpactwillresultin9morefailedrods.Consequently, thetotalnumberoffailedrodsfrombothimpactsisdetermined tobe104.Thiscompareswith124failedrodsfromtheanalysispresented inthecurrentUSAR.Sincethenewanalysisshowsfewerfailedrods,theradiological consequences areboundedbythoseofthepreviousanalysis.
Therevisedbundledropaccidentmethodology incorporates severalconservative assumptions (i.e.,including theweightofthefuel SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage108of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)95-043(cont'd.)
assemblyandthemastandassumingagreaterdropheight)whilemaintaining theradiological consequences ofthisaccidentwithinthelimitsofthecurrentanalysisintheUSAR.Thismethodology isthestandardmethodology usedbyGeneralElectric(GE)forthelicensing ofallnewfueltypesandisincludedinGE'sStandardApplication forReactorFuel(GESTAR-ll).
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage109of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:95-049Rev.05.1Procedure N2-OP-526.2-66,6.2-68,6.2-69;Figure6.2-77StandbyGasTreatment (GTS)1-HourDrawdownAnalysisThissafetyevaluation addresses therevisiontothedrawdownanalysisandprocedural changestoreflecttheanalysis.
Thereviseddrawdownanalysisremovedexistingconservatism (reducethespentfuelpoolheatload,andreduceallowable 2HVR"UC413A, Bdegradation from40%to20%)forthefollowing siximprovements:
1.2.3.4.5.6.ReducehTrequirement andeliminate periodicETmonitoring Eliminate thenormallightingtripuponLOCAsignalUseonlyoneofthetwoECCSpumproomunitcoolersEliminate bTpenaltycurveforgeneralareaunitcoolersRestoreuseofelectrical heatersintheECCScubiclesandallowheatinginsecondary containment basedonspecificengineering evaluation IncreasetheGTSandservicewater(SWP)systemsinitiation timefollowing LOCAThesechangesweremadetoimproveplantflexibility andeaseofmaintenance work.Thereviseddrawdownparameters areasfollows:Thelongestcalculated drawdowntimeis57minutes.Emergency unitcoolers2HVR"UC413A,Bdegradation canbeashighas20%.~TheGTSandSWP/unitcoolerssysteminitiation timefollowing aloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)canbeashighas60and90seconds,respectively, fromdrawdownconsiderations only.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theconsequences ofthesechangeshavebeenevaluated againstthecurrentrequirements.
Itisconcluded thatthe1-hourdrawdowntimerequirement isnotimpacted.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage110of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
95%49Rev.0&1(cont'd.)
Theseimprovements donotimpactGTS/HVRsystemscapacitytorestoreandmaintainrequiredvacuuminthesecondary containment following aLOCA.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotincludeanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage111of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:95-050N/AN/AHigh-Pressure CoreSpray(CSH)Temporary Enclosure forCSHStrainerThehigh-pressure corespray(HPCS)systemtakeswaterfromthesuppression poolthroughsuctionstrainer2CSH"STR1,penetration 2-12,andsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118.Penetration Z-12andsuctionvalve2CSHMOV118areatelevation 194'-11'15/16"andsuctionstrainer2CSH"STR1 isatelevation 189'-8".Withminimumsuppression poolwaterlevelatelevation 199'-6",,
maintenance/repair workon2CSH"MOV118cannotbeperformed withoutisolating thesuppression pool.Thissafetyevaluation wasissuedtoaddresstheinstallation ofatemporary enclosure onthesuctionstrainer, 2CSH"STR1, inordertosupportsubsequent repairandmaintenance worktobeperformed on2CSH"MOV118.Theenclosure onthestrainerwillensuresufficient isolation ofthesuppression poolfromsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theenclosure willbeutilizedonlyforrepairandmaintenance activities on2CSH"MOV118.
Administrative controlspertheworkordershallbeinplaceaspartofthemaintenance workpackage,whichwillnotallowforworktobedoneon2CSH"MOV118iftheenclosure leaks.TheplantwillbeinMode5withthereactorvesselheadremoved,thecavityflooded,thespentfuelpoolgatesremoved,andthewaterlevelmaintained withinthelimitsofTechnical Specifications 3.9.8and3.9.9.Therefore, HPCSwillnotberequiredtobeoperational perTechnical Specification 3.5.2.Thesuppression poolisnotrequiredtobeoperableduringthisactivityperTechnical Specification 3.5.3.However,suppression poollevelwillbemaintained betweenelevation 199'-6"and201'-0"toensureadequatenetpositivesuctionheadforemergency corecoolingsystempumpsneededforShutdownSafetyCriteriaN+1.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage112of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)95-050(cont'd.)
ThevalvepitwalIelevation isequaltomaximumsuppression poolwaterlevel.Therefore, shouldthetemporary enclosure fail,thevalvepitwillcontainleakagefromthesuppression pool.Basedonthesizeofthevalvepit,thetotalleakagefromthesuppression poolwouldamounttoapproximately 5,723gallons.Thiswouldresultinloweringthesuppression poolwaterlevelbyapproximately
'l-1/2".Therefore, theavailability ofthesuppression'pool forwaterinventory controlwillnotbeaffected.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage113of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-051Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y94MX013 8.3-15;Tables3.9A-12Sh8,6.2-56Sh2,8.3-1Sh17&20,8.3-2Sh16,17,20,8.3%Sh8,15,8.3-5Sh1,2,3,4,8.3-6Sh2,3,4System:ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)TitleofChange:NewLimitorque Actuators for2RHSMOV15A/BandIVIOV25A/B Description ofChange:Basedonrevisedsizingcalculations duetochangesmadetotheUnit2motor-operatedvalve(MOV)sizingcalculation methodology, themotoroutputtorque/thrust capability forcontainment spayisolation valves2RHS"MOV15A/B andMOV25A/Bunderreducedvoltagecondition wasnotadequatetoclosethevalvesagainstthemaximumexpecteddifferential pressure.
Containment sprayinjection valves2RHS~MOV15A/B andIVlOV25A/B requiredreplacement oftheirSIVIB-1-40 Limitorque motor/actuators withSIVIB-2-80 motor/actuators.
Thenewmotor/actuators areratedat5.2HPand80ft-lbs.Thenewmotor/actuators meetvalveoperation testandevaluation system(VOTES)testingrequirements perGenericLetter89-10andverifyoperation underdesignbasesconditions.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Replacement oftheLimitorque motor/actuators forvalves2RHS"MOV15A/BandMOV25A/Bwithlargersizemotor/actuators willprovideanacceptable torqueswitchsettingthrustrangetoallowthevalvetooperateasintendedduringdesignbasisconditions.
Thisnewrangewillalsoaccommodate theuseoftheVOTESdiagnostic testequipment andallowforactuatordegradation.
Qualification forthenewLimitorque motor/actuators hasbeenperformed toensurecontinued structural integrity andoperability ofthemodifiedvalveassembly.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage114of131SafetyEvaluation No.:-Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-053Procedure N2-EMP-GEM-660 8.3-74,8.3-81;Table1.8-1Sh63BYSTitleofChange:Description ofChange:ChangeofIEEE-Std484YearofIssueUnit2replacedtheDiv.Isafety-related dcbatteryduringRefuelOutage3.TheDiv.IIbatterywasreplacedduringRefuelOutage4.Unit2iscommitted tocomplywithIEEE-Std484-1975, "IEEERecommended PracticeforInstallation DesignandInstallation ofLargeLeadStorageBatteries forGenerating StationsandSubstations,"
fornewbatteryinstallation.
Sincethetimeoftheinstallation, thestandardhasbeenrevisedseveraltimes.The1987issueisnowineffect.According toIEEE,thelatestissueofthestandardreflectsthecurrentstateoftheartandisrecommended foruse.Thecriteriaprovidedinthe1987issueofthestandardgenerally encompass orexceedthecriteriaofthe1975issue.Thenewcriteriawillincreasesafetyduringinstallation andtestingandreducetheinstallation time.The1987issueprovidesawiderrangeofacceptance criterion fortheintercell connectors resistance thatmayfacilitate installation andtesting.Thischangehasnoimpactonbatterycharacteristics orperformance.
Unit2dcsystemdesigncriterion istomaintain105Vdcminimumatthebatteryterminals regardless oftheintercell connection resistance.
Thiscriterion issatisfied.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theanalysisperformed revealedthatthenewresistance criteriaforintercell connections doesnotcompromise theabilityofthebatterytoperformthesafety-relatedfunctionasdesignedandasdescribed intheUSAR.Engineering calculation performed forthemostloadedbatterydetermined thattheimpactofthenewresistance criterion onthetotalbatteryvoltageduringdischarge cycleisnegligible.
Thebattery's
- capacity, shortcircuitcapability, andheatreleasearenotaffectedeither.Technical Specification operability criteriaandsurveillance requirements arealsosatisfied.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage115of'131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-055Rev.0&1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0107-94 9.2-14;Figure9.2-3C;ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWater(CCP)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Alternate DrywellCoolingInordertoprovideanalternate drywellcoolingsystemtobeusedduringoutages,thissimpledesignchangeaddedtwopermanent changes:~Twopipingpenetrations throughthesoutheast quadrantoftheReactorBuildingwall~New4"hoseconnection ontheCCPsupplyandreturnheadersDuringoutages,achiller(locatedintheyard)willbeconnected totheReactorBuildingpenetrations.
HoseswillberoutedfromtheReactorBuildingpenetrations throughemergency airlocktotheCCPconnections inthedrywell.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepermanent changesaredesignedinaccordance withdesigncriteriaforCCP.TheReactorBuildingpenetrations aredesignedtoASMEIIINC-3600requirements andincluderedundant spring-loaded checkvalves/blind flangestoassurethatsecondary containment integrity ismaintained whenalternate drywellcoolingisoperating/secured.
Thehoseswillberoutedsoastopreventphysicalinteraction withsafety-related itemsintheeventofconnector failure.Allpotentially affectedessential equipment orsystemsaredesignedforfloodorspray.Theimplementation ofthischangewillensurethatdrywelltemperature iscontrolled duringanoutagesuchthatpersonnel staytimesaremaximized.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage116of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:95%56SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0114-94 Table6.2-56,Sh4High-Pressure CoreSpray(CSH)ReplaceValveStem,DiscandOperatorGearSetfor2CSHMOV105Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangechangedtheoperatorgearsetandreplacedthevalvestemanddiscforsafety-related motor-operated valve(IVIOV)2CSH"lVIOV105.
Thenewgearsetwillincreasetheactuatoroutputcapacityunderreducedvoltageconditions andthenewstemanddiscwillprovidehigherASMEallowable stresses.
Thesechanges,inturn,willincreasethethrustwindowtoaccommodate diagnostic testequipment fortorqueswitchsettingasrequiredbytheGenericLetter89-10program.Asaresultoftheactuatorgearsetchange,thevalveclosuretimewillbeincreased.
ISafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering evaluation oftheproposedchangeconcluded thatthereplacement ofthestemanddiscwithahigherASIVlEallowable andanincreaseinthestroketimeduetothereplacement gearsetforthesubjectvalvehasnoimpactonthecontainment isolation requirements andthehigh-pressure corespraysystemoperation asdescribed intheUSAR.Thehigherstroketimeisstillwithinthedesignbasisofthesystemrequirements.
TheIVIOVaswellasthesystemwillperformitsintendedsafetyfunctionduringandafteranaccident.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage117of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-057SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0095-94 3B-2,3B-3,3B-5,3B-6,5.4-24;Table6.2-56Sh5System:TitleofChange:ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)ActuatorGearSetChangesfor2ICS"MOV121and2ICS~INOV128 Description ofChange:Thischangereplacedtheactuatorgearsetsforthesubjectvalvesinordertoprovideasufficient thrustwindowforthevalveoperation testandevaluation system(VOTES)diagnostic equipment.
Asaresultofthegearsetchange,thestroketimeforthesevalveswillincreasefrom15secondsto30seconds.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftherequested change,whichincludestheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability, reliability, maintainability, structural integrity andsysteminteractions, hasfoundthattheimplementation ofthischangewillhavenochangeonthesafetyoroperability oftheICSsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage118of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:95-059Rev.08c1Procedures N2-TSP-CNT-9001, N2-TSP-CNT-003, N2-TDP-IIT-0201, N2-TTP-CNT-001 USARAffectedPages:6.2-104;Figures6.2-71a,6.2-7'Ib, 6.2-73aSystem:TitleofChange:N/APrimaryContainment Integrated LeakRateTestDescription ofChange:Theprocedures fortheintegrated leakratetestwererevisedfor.theTypeAtesttobeperformed inRefueling Outage4(RFO4).Thechangesareasfollows:~lem1(Rev.0)ToallowtheuseofANSI/ANS-56.8-1987, Containment SystemLeakageTestingRequirements, forthe"MassPoint"method.NUREG-1047, SafetyEvaluation Reportrelatedtotheoperation ofNineMilePointNuclearStation,UnitNo.2,-Section6.2.6,statestheTypeAtestdatawillbeanalyzedusingthe"IVlassPoint"methodinANSI/ANS-56.8-1981.
The"MassPoint"methodwillstillbeusedtoanalyzetheTypeAtestdata,butamorecurrentrevisiontoANSI/ANS-56.8 wasused.Thereasonforthechangeisthat10CFR50AppendixJwasrevisedin1988toacceptthe"MassPoint"methoddescribed inANSI/ANS-56.8-1987 butNineIVlilePointdidnotupdatethelicensing basetoreflectthechangein10CFR50AppendixJ.Item2(Rev.0)Toallowtheinstallation anduseoftemporary instrumentation tomonitordrywellparameters duringtheTypeAtest.USARSection6.2.6statesthattwoindependent quartzdigital-type absolutepressuremanometers areconnected totheleakagemonitoring system(LMS)tomonitorprimarycontainment pressureduringtheTypeAtest.USARSection6.2.6alsostatesthat18temperature elementsand6humidityanalyzers areprovidedinthecontainment atmosphere monitoring system(CMS)tomonitordry-bulbanddewpointtemperatures, respectively.
Thetemporary instrumentation willbeplacedinthesamelocations asthepermanent plantequipment.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage119of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)
95-059Rev.0&1(cont'd.)
Thereasonforthechangeisthattheinstrumentation providesthetestdatafortheTypeAtest.Advancesinelectronic technology haveresultedinmorereliableandreducedinstallation timesoverconventional instrumentation.
Theresultisreducedcostsinman-hours andman-remduringtheinstallation andremovalphases.Item3(Rev.1)Procedure N2-TSP-CNT-@001 isbeingrevisedtoallowtheinstallation oftemporary depressurization flangeson2-CPS-014-9-4 andpipingpenetration 2PCB"Z74.
TheseflangeswillbeusedduringtheTypeAtesttoreduceprimarycontainment pressure.
Thereasonforthechangeistoallowasafeandcontrolled depressurization oftheprimarycontainment.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation hasconcluded thatanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofevaluating a24-hourTypeAleakagerateinaccordance withthe"MassPoint"methoddescribed inANSI/ANS-56.8-1987.
ANSI/ANS-56.8-1987 providesrecommendations fortheTypeAtestinstrumentation.
Theserecommendations includecalibration requirements, in-situchecks,andminimumquantities andlosscriteria.
N2-TTP-CNT-001 andN2-TSP-CNT4001 werewrittentoensurethattherecommendations ofANSI/ANS-56.8-1987 aremet.Also,thetemporary instrumentation willbeplacedinthecorresponding locations ofthepermanent plantequipment.
Therefore, anunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofusingtemporary instrumentation tomonitorprimarycontainment parameters duringtheTypeAtest.Thetemporary flangeswillbeinstalled onlyinOperational Conditions 4or5andareboundedbytheUSARloadcombinations andstresslimitsforpipesandpipepenetrations.
Therefore, thissafetyevaluation hasconcluded thatanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofconnecting temporary flangesto2-CPS-014-9-4 and2PCB"Z74.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage120of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:95%60SimpleDesignChangeSC2028-95 10A-30;Figure8.3-1Feedwater (FWS)Feedwater PumpMotorsHPUpgradeOnJanuary17,1995,feedwater pumpmotor2FWS-IVI1B trippedwhilerunningatapproximately fullpower.Thetripoccurredduetotheactionofthemotorrelayprotection.
Theinvestigation oftheeventrevealedthattheinsulation ofthestatorwindingofthemotorfailedcausingtheactionoftherelayprotection andmotortrip.ThemotorwassenttoMonarchElectricServiceCo.forrepair.Rootcauseevaluation performed byMonarchCo.identified thatthemotorinsulation failureoccurredduetocoronaerosionofgroundwallinsulation.
ThemotorwasrewoundandreturnedtoUnit2.Intheprocessofrepair,anewtypeofinsulation wasusedandtheHPratingofthemotorwasincreased from12,000to14,100.Sincethemotors2FWS-M1Aand2FWS-M1Cmayalsobesusceptible to~thesamemodeoffailure,thedecisionwasmadetorewindthesemotorsandupgradetheHPrating.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theupgrading ofHPofthefeedwater pumpmotorssatisfies functional requirements ofthesystem.Theperformance ofthepumpsisnotaffected.
Thesystemandcomponents willperformasdesignedandasdescribed intheUSAR.TheupgradedHPofthemotorsisadequateforthepoweruprateoftheplant.TheupgradedHPofthemotorsdoesnotadversely affectthemechanical interface systems.According toNMPCMechanical Engineering evaluation, themaximumHPrequirement forthepumpforpowerupratecondition is13,190HP.Therefore, theupgraded14,100HPisadequate.
Theelectrical equipment suchascables,circuitbreakers, currenttransformers, andrelaysratingswereevaluated fortheupgradedHPofthemotorsandwerefoundtobeadequate.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage121of131SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
9560(cont'd.)
Thefeedwater pumpsarenonsafety-related components andarenotrequiredfor'afeshutdownoftheplant.TheupgradedHPofthemotorshasnoimpactonsafety-related systemsandcomponents.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation
'ummaryReportPage122of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:95-062SimpleDesignChangeSC2%029-95 Appendix9CTable3-2MHRAlternate MeansfortheSRVRemoval(Replacing 2MHR-CRN200 With2MHR-CRN200A and2MHR-CRN200B)
Description ofChange:Thepurposeofthissimpledesignchangeistoprovideaninterchangeable handlingsystemfortheremovalandreplacement ofthesafetyreliefvalves(SRVs).Hoists2!VIHR-CRN200A and2MHR-CRN200B willreplacecrane2MHR-CRN200 fortheSRVremovalactivity.
TheSRVswereoriginally shippedtothesiteinthehorizontal positionandcouldbehandledwithasingle4-tonhoist.TheSRVsnowarriveintheverticalposition, requiring asecondhoisttosafelyremovethevalvesfromtheirshippingcontainer andreposition thevalveintothehorizontal position.
Uponcompletion oftheremovalandreplacement oftheSRVs,hoists2MHR-CRN200A and2lVIHR-CRN200B canberemovedfromthemonorailandcrane2MHR-CRN200 canbereinstalled.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theimprovement beingmadebythissimpledesignchangewiththeuseofalternate hoists2MHR-CRN200A and2IVIHR-CRN200B intheplaceofcrane2MHR-CRN200 meetstherequirements oftheseismicevaluation ofnonsafety-related components insafety-related areasanddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliability ofUnit2.Thereisnosafety-related equipment thatwouldbeaffectedbyaloaddropinvolving hoists2MHR-CRN200A or2MHR-CRN200B.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage123of131SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:95-064Calculations EC-044Rev.11,ECA45,Rev.7,EC-046Rev.5,EC-097Rev.2USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:8.3-76;Tables8.3-1.1through8.3-15BYS,BWSNonsafety-Related Batteries LoadProfileUpdateDescription ofChange:Thebatterysizingcalculations wereupdatedtoreflectas-builtdcloadsofthenonsafety-related system,andtoaccountfortheplantmodification whichwasimplemented withoutrevisingthesecalculations.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Therevisedbatterysizingcalculations concludethatthechangeofthedcloadsiswithinthecapabilities ofthebatteries andthechargers.
Thenonsafety-related dcsystemwillcontinuetoperformasdesignedandasdescribed intheUSAR,withtheupdatedloadseachbatteryisstillcapableofperforming itsdutycyclefollowing thelossofchargerwhilefullychargedat65F,andwithcapacitydeteriorated to80percent.Eachbatterycanstartandoperateallrequiredloadsforthedurationofthedischarge cycleaccording tothebatteryloadprofilewithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105Vfor125Vdcsystem,and21Vfor24Vdcsystem.Eachbatterychargercanstillsupplythecontinuous updatedloadonthebatterywhilerecharging thebatteryfromthedesignedminimumchargestatetothefullychargedstateinlessthan24hours.Theimpactofthischangeontheplantresponsetostationblackoutevent(SBO)hasalsobeenevaluated.
Basedonadditional batterycalculations performed forthenewrevisedloads,theconclusion ismadethatnonsafety-related batteries stillmeetthe.4-hourcapability requirement asspecified inNUMARC87-00andRegulatory Guide1.155,andasdemonstrated intheSBOstudyperformed byGeneralElectric.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage124of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:95-066Temporary Mod.95-011USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:N/AReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)ManualOperation of2ICSAOV130TheICSsystemisdesignedtoassuresufficient reactorwaterinventory ismaintained inthereactorvesseltopermit'adequate reactorcorecooling.Thistemporary modification manuallyopenedvalve2ICS"AOV130andmaintained itintheopenpositionuntilthenextsystemoutagebecausethevalveactuatorisnotcapableofkeepingthevalveopenduetodiaphragm failure.ThisvalveisoneofthetwonormallyopenvalvesinseriesonthedrainpotdrainlineofICSen-routetotheReactorBuildingequipment drainsystem(DER).SafetyEvaluation Summary:lBasedonareviewofthesystemdesignbasesandconfiguration, thereis~'nospecificreasonintheUSARforthedoubleisolation arrangement.
AsystemdesignreviewbyGeneralElectricdetermined thatdoubleisolation arrangement wasintendedtoprovideredundancy ofthedrainvalveclosureduringICSoperation.
Thisredundancy wastominimizethespreadofcontamination andradiation releaseintheReactorBuildingincaseofhighradiation levelsinthesteamsupplylinetotheICSturbine.Basedonthereviewsperformed, ithasbeendetermined thatthisisolation capability canstillbemaintained viaasinglevalvewithnoimpactonnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage125of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-068Procedure N2-MPM-GEN-R901 9.1-39,9.1%1FHPTitleofChange:RevisiontoFuelPoolGateRemovalProcessinUSARSection9.1Description ofChange:ThischangerevisedtheUSARtoindicatetheoptiontoremoveboththeinnerandtheouterspentfuelpoolgatesaftercompletion offlood-upactivities priortorefueling, asdescribed inprocedure N2-MPM-GEN-R901, Rev.1.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TherevisionoftheUSARtoindicatetheoptiontoremoveboththeinnerandtheouterspentfuelpoolgatesafterthecompletion offlood-upactivities resultsinamoreconservative plantconfiguration duringreactorvesseldisassembly activities.
Thiswasperformed inaccordance withtheGuidelines fortheControlof,HeavyLoads(NUREG-0612) asdescribed inUSARAppendix9C.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage126of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation Document'No.:
USABAffectedPages:System:95-069N/AN/A345-kVTransmission Output,115-kV.OffsitePowerSourcesTitleofChange:Description ofChange:ScribaStation,345+VBBusConnection Asixth345-kVtransmission linewasaddedtoScribaStationandconnected tothe345-kVAbusinJune1994.ScribaStationisa345-kVbreakerand1/2stationwithanAandaBbus.Thenewtransmission linewasconnected tothe345-kVBbus.ISafetyEvaluation Summary:Theplantwillbeshutdownforrefuelduringtheperiodwhentheworkwilltakeplace.Allapplicable Technical Specification requirements willbemet.Theworkandtheschedulehavebeenreviewedforsafeshutdowncriteria.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage127of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-071N/AA.0-1,A.4.3-1,A.4.4-3,A.5.2-1,A.5.2-2,A.5.2-4,A.6-1,A.6-2,A.'15.0-2, A.15.0-7, A.15.1-4, A.15.1-9, A.15.2-5, A.15.2-12, A.15.4-9, A.15B-1,A.15D-1;TablesA.5.2-1,A.5.2-2,A.6-2,A.15.0-4S}i1,2,3System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:VariousOperation ofNIVlP2Reload4/Cycle5Thischangeaddednewfuelbundlesandestablished anewcoreloadingpatternforReload4/Cycle5operation ofUnit2.Twohundredforty-eight (248)newfuelbundlesoftheGE11designwereloaded.Also,32twice-burned GE6Bbundlesthatweredischarged attheendofReload1/Cycle2werere-inserted.
All124oftheGE6BbundlesfromReload3/Cycle4,and156of196GE9Bbundles(PSCWB299),
weredischarged tothespentfuelpool.Variousevaluations andanalyseswereperformed toestablish appropriate operating limitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specificlimitsweredocumented intheCoreOperating LimitsReport.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereloadanalysesandevaluations areperformed basedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplication forReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10 andNEDE24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARll).Thisdocumentdescribes thefuellicensing acceptance criteria; thefuelthermal-mechanical, nuclear,andthermal-hydraulic analysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology.
ForReload4,theevaluations includedtransients andaccidents likelytolimitoperation becauseofminimumcriticalpowerratioconsiderations; overpressurization events;loss-of-coolant accident; andstability analysis.
Appropriate consideration ofequipment outofservicewasincluded.
Limitsonplantoperation wereestablished toassurethatapplicable fuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage128of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:95-077Calculations H21C%38%1C,H21C-043OB,A10.1-E-130 USARAffectedPages:15.6-13;Tables15.6-13Sh10&11,15.6-16bSystem:TitleofChange:ResidualHeat(RHS)Revise/Delete theLeakRateAcceptance CriteriaandTestFrequency forRHSValves2RHS"MOV142,MOV149,SOV35A/BandSOV36A/BDescription ofChange:IThischangerevisedtheleakrateacceptance criteriaandtestfrequency forvalves2RHS"MOV142,MOV149,SOV35A/B, andSOV36A/B.
Theleakageacceptance criteriaoflessthanorequalto1gpmtimesthenumberofhydrostatically testedvalveswasincreased to20gpmfor2RHS"SOV35A/B andSOV36A/B, andto10gpmfor2RHS"MOV142andMOV149atnormalsystemoperating pressure.
Thetestfrequency wasrevisedfromonceevery18monthstoonceevery2years.Leaktestingrequirements forthevalvesremainintheISTtestingprogram;however,changestoNIP-DES-04 (byrevisingthefootnote"m")andsupporting operations procedures wererequiredtoimplement thenewleakagecriteria.
Implementation ofsimpledesignchangeSC2-0046-95 toinstallASMEClass2reducerstoreplacetheleakagecontrolfunctionofthesolenoid-operated valves(SOVs)wasdetermined tobeanacceptable alternative toleaktestingtheSOVs.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation hasconcluded thatanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotresultfromtheproposedchange.Thisconclusion isbasedontheabilitytodemonstrate RHSsystemleakageboundaryintegrity bysatisfying thefunctional requirements ofthelow-pressure coolantinjection systemwiththeincreased leakage,anddetermining thattheconsequences oftheincreased leakageintosecondary containment post-LOCA areradiologically acceptable.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage129of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:'TitleofChange:95-078Procedure N2-FHP-021 N/AFNR,FNS,GTSRevisiontoControlBladeMovementProcedure Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation waswrittentoreviseprocedure N2-FHP21, "ControlRodUncoupling, Removal,andInstallation."
Thisrevisionallowscontrolroduncoupling, removal,andinstallation withoutsecondary containment integrity andSGTSoperability, providedsevendayshaveelapsedsincereactorshutdownandallmovements areofobjectstotalling lessthan617pounds(theestimated weightofafuelbundle).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Therevisedcontrolblademovementprocedure providesthesamelevelofsafetytotheControlRoomandpublicaswaspreviously available.
ThechangedoesnotalterTechnical Specifications, orguidanceprovidedbythevendor.Radiological analysishasshownthattheproposalallowsUnit2tomeet10CFR100limitsandremainincompliance withtheplantsafetyanalysisreport.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage130of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:~USARAffectedPages:95-079DER2-95-1183 8.3-11,8.3-12System:TitleofChange:VBBReviseUPS2VBB-UPS1C/1D Acceptable VoltageOutputCriteriaDescription ofChange:Uninterruptible powersupplies(UPSs)2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D feedselectedlightingandcommunications loads.TheoriginalUPSunitsinstalled duringconstruction werepurchased fromExide.In1991,theseunitswerereplacedwithunitspurchased fromHDRunderlVlodification PN2Y89MX042.
Duringthereplacement, itwasdiscovered thattheseunitsdidnotmeettheoutputvoltageacceptance criteriaofSpecification E-147,i.e.,+2%ofoutputvoltagevariation.
Engineering evaluation ofthedeficiency wasperformed andunitswereacceptedassuppliedbythevendorwithvoltageoutputacceptable upto+3%basedonthetypeofloadstheseunitsarefeeding.Theengineering specification E-147wasrevisedtoallowthenewacceptance criteriaforUPSs2VBB-UPS1C and1D.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangeofaccepting the+3%ofoutputvoltagevariation doesnotaffecttheperformance oftheconnected loads.Thepurposeofspecifying preciseoutputvoltageregulation fortheUPSsistomeettherequirements oftheprecision instrumentation andcontrolequipment whichtheyfeed.Mostofthisequipment willrequirepowersupplyvoltagevariation nottoexceed2%.ThetwoUPSsinvolvedinthischange,2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D providepowersupplyonlytotheessential
- lighting, egresslighting, andpageparty/public address(PP/PA)communication systemloads.Theessential andegresslightingsystemequipment aredesignedfor+10%supplyvoltagevariation.
ThePP/PAcommunication systemequipment aredesignedfor90-140VasshowninGaitronic specification.
Therefore, anoutputvoltagevariation of+3%for2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D willnotadversely affectoperation ofanyoftheirconnected equipment andisacceptable.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage131of131SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-080Rev.0L1Procedure N2-PM-S012 3C-25,3C-28,3C-29N/ATitleofChange:ChangetheVisualLeak/Flood Detection Walkdowns toaMinimumofOnceperCalendarDayDescription ofChange:AsdepictedintheUSAR,areawalkdowns byplantpersonnel forvisualleak/flood detection wereperformed onceevery8-hourshift.Inthepast,plantoperations personnel werescheduled forthree8-hourshifts.Plantoperations hasrevisedtheirshiftworkschedules fromthree8-hourshiftstotwo12-hourshifts.Calculations wererevisedtoreflecttheincreaseinwaterlevelsduetothechangeofthevisualleak/flood detections from12hourstoaminimumofoncepercalendarday,nottoexceeda24-hourtimeperiod(36-hourtimeperiodfortheControlBuildingbasement) betweeninspections.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TherevisiontotheUSARtochangethetimeintervals ofthevisualflood/leak detection walkdowns fromevery12khourstoaminimumofoncepercalendarday,nottoexceeda24-hourtimeperiod(36-hourtimeperiodfortheControlBuildingbasement) betweeninspections, doesnotaffectthesafetyandreliability ofUnit2.Thelossofsafety-related equipment duetofloodinghasalreadybeenevaluated intheUSARAppendix3CSpray/Flooding Evaluation andwillnotbechanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
4/>"0/./~I