ML17333A842
| ML17333A842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1997 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17333A841 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704080224 | |
| Download: ML17333A842 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1996013
Text
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircieD;i'eBuclanan.III491071395
INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERMarch12,1997AEP:NRC:1238F
10CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTION
REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)
AND50-316/96013
(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONS
ThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG.E.Grant,datedFebruary4,1997,thatforwarded
anoticeofthreeviolations
andonenoticeofdeviation
toIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Theviolations
andthedeviation
wereidentified
duringasystemoperational
performance
inspection
(SOPI)ofthecentrifugal
chargingsystemportionoftheemergency
corecoolingsystemsandtheresidualheatremovalsystems.OurresponsewasduetoyouonMarch6,1997;however,werequested
abriefextension
torecoverthetimedelayfromwhenthereportwasissuedtowhenitwasreceived.
Theexten'sion
wasgrantedbyRonGareerofRegionIII,onFebruary14,1997.Thethreeviolations
addressed
the1)failuretoestablish
adequateinstructions/failure
tofollowprocedures
asrelatedtocollection
ofanoilsample,andadequateminimumthreadengagement
acceptance
criteria;
2)inadequate
testcontrolasrelatedtoincorporating
chargingpumpacceptance
limitsintotheISTprogram;and3)failuretoperformadequate/timely
corrective
actions,asrelatedtodetermining
thecorrectoilsight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,addressing
equipment
deficiency
taggingproblems,
andlocating/reconstituting
acentrifugal
chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionheadcalculation.
Thedeviation
wasfromactionscommitted
toinNUREG-0737
specifically
involving
thesourcetermusedforaradiological
evaluation.
'7704080224
'970403PDRADOCK050003158PDR
40
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Page2AEP:NRC:1238FOurreplytotheviolations
anddeviation
areprovidedintheattachment
tothisletter.Alsoincludedaretheresultsofourreviewoftechnical
specification
clarifications,
whichwecommitted
toperformattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Thereplydoesnotcontainanypersonalprivacy,proprietary,
orsafeguards
information.
Sincerely,
PCwp-E.E.FitpatrickVicePresident
SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED
BEFOREMETHs/XDAYQP)~'997NotaryPublicMyCommission
Expires:2/CrPING/vlbAttachment
JANlCEhl.BIG!<ERSNoeyPub5c,88menCcunlY,MQyQ0mmrsscpEyp;reFob,<6,2N$cc:A.A.Blind&3L"%%~8eachh'~:q
MDEQ-DWRRPDNRCResidentInspector
J.R.'adgett
fl'
ATTACHMENT
TOAEP:NRC:1238FREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:
NRCINSPECTION
REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013
(DRS)AND50-316/96013
(DRS)
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page1DuringanNRCsystemoperational
performance
inspection
conducted
November18throughDecember13,1996,ontheemergency
corecoolingsystemportionofthecentrifugal
chargingsystemandresidualheatremovalsystemthreeviolations
andonedeviation
wereidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe"GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,"
theviolations
andtheresponses
areprovidedbelow.Additionally,
wewererequested
torespondtothedeviation,
andtoprovideinformation
relatedtoacommitment
regarding
technical
specification
(T/S)clarifications
madeattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Ourresponsetotheseitemsisalsoprovidedbelow.NRCViolation
A"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,'Instructions,
Procedures,
andDrawings,'equires,
inpart,thatactivities
affecting
qualityshallbeprescribed
byinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawingsofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
andshallbeaccomplished
inaccordance
withtheseinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawings.
Maintenance
procedure
12MHP5021.001.009,
Revision8,'TorqueSelection,'ated
March21,1994,requiresthreadengagement
ofatleast80percentofnutheight.Contrarytotheabove:OnDecember4,1996,thei"spectorsidentified
thatamaintenance
workpackageforthe1Ecentrifugal
chargingpump,anactivityaffectingquality,~failedtoincludeadequateinstructions
forlubeoilsamplecollection.
OnNovember20,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatmaintenance
procedure
MDS-600,'GeneralErectionTolerances
forPipeandTubeSupports/Restraints,'as
notofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
sinceitfailedtocontainadequateminimumthreadengagement
acceptance
criteriaforactivities
affectingquality.3.OnNovember21,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatmaintenance
personnel
failedtoperformboltingonsafety-relatedequipment
inaccordance
withmaintenance
procedure
12MHP5021.001.009,
'TorqueSelection.'s
aresult,nutsassociated
withemergency
corecoolingsystemequipment
wereidentified
withthreadengagement
lessthan80percentofnutheight.ThisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
Al1.Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
indianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
ReasonfortheViolation
Thereasonfortheviolation
wasfailuretoremoveoilsamplinginstructions
fromapplicable
recurring
tasksthatwereno'cngerneededafterimplementation
ofaformaloilsamplingprogram.
,I"tl
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page2Theinstructions
foundinthejoborderactivityassociated
withtheworkonthelEcentrifugal
chargingpumpinstructed
personnel
to:"Drainoilfromfilterintoacontainer.
A.DeliveroilfromCUNOfiltertochemlabforanalysis.
(Theresultswillgototheengineers
forevaluation
ofwearinsystem)."
Thejoborderactivityinstructions
weredeveloped
priortoimplementation
ofourformaloilanalysisprogram.Atthetimeitwasinputasarecurring
task,itwasintendedtoprovidearoughindication
ofgrossmachineproblems.
Subsequently,
aformaloilanalysisprogramwasimplemented,
withproceduralized
samplingtechniques
beingutilizedbychemistry
personnel.
Underthissamplingprogram,donequarterly
(asopposedtofilterchange-outs
thataredoneyearly),wear,particles
ofconsiderably
lesssizethanthosedetectedviathefilterchange-out
methodcanbedetected,
thusgivingmuchearlierindication
ofmachineproblems.
Theinstructions
intherecurring
taskwereinadvertently
leftinplaceaftertheformalprogramwasinstituted.
Theoilcollected
viatheseinstructions
isnotanalyzedbychemistry
personnel;
anddecisions
astothecondition
oftheequipment
arenotbasedor.thesesamples.3.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstructions
requiring
filtercontentevaluation
wereremovedfromthechargingpumprecurring
tasksonFebruary11,1997~The1Echargingpumplubeoilwassampledbychemistry
personnel
onSeptember
12,1996,priortothefilterchange-out
observedonDecember4,1996,consistent
withtheformaloilanalysisprogram.4.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
A:eviewoflubeoilchangesrelatedtoequipment
includedintneoilanalysisprogramwasconducted.
Similarwordingwasfoundinrecurring
tasksforthemotor-driven
andturbine-drivenauxiliary
pumps.Thisredundant
wordingwillberemovedpriortothenextrequireddateforfilterchange-out
forthisequipment.
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonFebruary11,1997,whentheredundant
instructions
wereremovedfromthefourchargingpump'srecurring.
tasks.ResonsetoNRCViolation
A26A31.Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page3ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseoftheviolation,
ascitedinA3,isacombination
ofthewayworkwasdocumented
andadherence
toprocedural
requirements
thatwereinconsistent.
Thereference
toMDS-600,citedinA2,asa"maintenance
procedure"
requiresclarification.
MDS-600isnotaprocedure,
itisadesignstandardthatprovidestolerances
forinstallation
andevaluation
ofas-foundconditions
forpiping/tubing
supports.
MDS-600isnotanapplicable
reference
andthereisnohierarchial
connection
betweenMDS-600and**12MHP5021.001.009.
3.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedEightcondition
reportswerewrittentodocumenttheinspection
team'sconcerns.
Operability
reviewswereperformed
basedontheidentified
deficiencies,
andtheaffectedequipment
wasdetermined
tobeoperable.
Workhistoryforeachcomponent
wasreviewedtoassistindetermining
thepotential
cause(s).
Ingeneral,thisreviewidentified
ageneraltimeframewhenthedeficiency
wascreated,butnotaspecificworkactivity.
Actionrequestswerewrittentocorrectthedeficiency
whereanactionrequestdidnotalreadyexist,orthedeficiency
wasevaluated
andfoundtobeacceptable
asis.4.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Maintenance
standingorder,MSO.009,wasissuedonFebruary3,1997.Thisdocumentestablishes
anacceptance
criteriaof"flushorbetter"forthreadengagement.
Further,itprovidesapolicyfordocumenting
as-foundthreadengagement
deficiencies
sotheycanbeevaluated
andcorrected.
Lastly,thepolicyprovidesforin-plantidentification
oflessthanflushthreadengagement
thathasbeenevaluated
andfoundtobeacceptabl
.Thisstandingorderstrengthens
management
expectations
forthreadengagement
andestablishes
amechanism
foridentification
ofanalyzed,
acceptable
conditions.
Awalkdownwasperformed
ofarandomsampleofplantcomponents
ofsufficient
sizetoprovidea99%confidence
levelthatthesecomponents
areastatistically
validsampleoftheplanepopulation
ofcomponents.
Theas-foundconfiguration
ofthefasteners
associated
withthesecomponents
wasevaluated.
Therewerenofasteneranomalies
identified
thataffectedcomponent
functionality
oroperability.
Plantmanagement
hasreinforced
procedural
adherence
toallplantpersonnel.
- 12MHP5021.001.009wasenhancedbytheadditionofacceptance
criteriaofflushthreadsorbetter.
I
Attachment
toAEP:NRC.:1238F
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage4Fullcompliance
wasachievedonMarch10,1997.Atthattimetheoriginal28NRC-identified
threadengagement
deficiencies
wereanalyzedasnotaffecting
operability/quality;
existingprocedures,
policies,
andstandards
wereupgraded;
andthefindingsofthethreadengagement
randomsampleconcluded
thattherewerenofunctionality/operability
concernscausedbythreadengagement
deficiencies
associated
withanyofthesampledcomponents.
NRCViolation
B"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XZ,'TestControl,'equires,
inpart,thatatestprogrambeestablished
toassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstrate
thatstructures,
systems,andcomponents
willperformsatisfactorily
inserviceisidentified
andperformed
inaccordance
withwrittentestprocedures
whichincorporate
therequirements
andacceptance
limitscontained
inapplicable
designdocuments.
Technical Specification 3.1.1.1,'Shutdown
Margin-Tavegreaterthan200'F,'pecifies
aborationcapability
of10gallonsperminute(gpm)of20,000partspermillion(ppm)boronsolutionorequivalent.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember11,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthecorrectacceptance
limitstoassurethatthecentrifugal
chargingpumpscouldperformtheirboroninjection
functionasspecified
inTechnical
Specification
3.1.1.1hadnotbeenincorporated
inthelicensee's
inservice
testing(ZST)program.ThisisaSeverityLevelZVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
BAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
ZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.Reason'fortheViolation
Thereasonfortheviolation
wasthatareviewtodetermine
applicability
totheZSTprogramwasnotconducted
priortoissuanceofatechnical
specification
(T/S)clarification
onT/S3.1.1.1.T/S3.1.1.1,ShutdownMargin-T,~greaterthan2004Fprovidesshutdownmarginrequirements
whileinmodes1,2,3,or4.Theactionstatement
forT/S3.1.1.1requiresimmediate
andcontinuous
borationatgreaterthanorequalto10gpmofasolutioncontaining
greaterthanorequalto20,000ppmboronor"equivalent".
performed
ananalysistoclarifythemeaningofthisstatement
iftherefueling
waterstoragetank(RWST)wasusedasasourceofboratedwater.Westinghouse
defined"equivalence"
as"xenonburnoutequivalence",
whichisthecapability
toinjectsufficient
borontoadjustaoronconcentration
tocompensate
forxenonburnoutfromitspeakvalueTheiranalysisassumedaplanttripfollowedbyastepreturnto100%.power
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page5atpeakxenonconcentration.
Znaddition,
theyassumedthatthereactorwouldbemaintained
atfullpowerduringthetransient.
Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedthatacentrifugal
chargingpump(CCP)flowof120gpmfromtheRWSTcouldcompensate
forxenonthroughout
thetransient
ifcertainrestrictions
wereobserved.
OnNovember5,1990,arevisiontoT/Sclarification
no.7wasissued,whichdefinedthe120gpmofRWSTwatercontaining
2400ppmboronasanacceptable
sourceofwatertosatisfyborationflowrequirements
forT/S3.1.1.1.Development
andissuanceofthisT/Sclarification
wasnotcoupledwithareviewofthetestprogramtoensurethetestprogramconfirmed
theabilityoftheCCPstoperformthisfunction.
Thisdeficiency
wasidentified
byourengineers
duringeffortstorespondtoaninspector's
questiononthedesignfunctions
oftheCCPsduringtheinspection.
Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedFollowing
identification
ofthisdeficiency,
acalculation
wasperformed
todetermine
themaximumdegradation
theCCPscouldtoleratewhilestill~eingabletodeliver120gpmofRWSTwatertothereactorcoolantsystem.Thiscalculation
revealedthattheCCPscouldtolerateadegradation
of9.5%forUnit1and3.5%forUnit2.AreviewofZSTdataasfarbackas1990determined
thatthepumpswerecapableofperforming
thisfunction.
TheZSTprogramhasbeenrevisedtoincludelimitations
forallowable
degradation
oftheCCPstoensurethat120gpmof2400ppmboroncouldbesuppliedfromtheRWST.Additionally,
asapointofinformation,
sincetheoriginalanalysisbyWestinghouse,
whichdefinedthe120gpmvalueof2400ppmboronincludedaveryconservative
assumption
thatastepincreaseinpowerto100%occurredwhileatpeakxenon,areanalysis
wasperformed
usingamorerealistic
ramprateof10'k/hr,whichisalimitation
contained
inplantprocedures.
Thisreanalysis
indicated
thattheborationflowrequirements
ofT/S3.1.1.1couldbesatisfied
byaslittleas60.1gpmof2400ppmboron.Wemayrelaxtheallowable
degradation
fortheCCPsbasedonthisrevised60.1gpmflow.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations'ailure
toensurethetestprogramfortheCCPsincludedprovisions
toensuretheCCPscoulddeliver120gpmof2400ppmboronoccurredasaresultoffailuretocouplethedevelopment
andissuanceofaT/Sclarification
withappropriate
reviewsofthetestprogram.AsnotedintheSOPZreport,severalexampleswereidentified
whereT/Sclarifications
couldnotbejustified.
Duringtheexitmeeting,wecommitted
toperformareviewofallofourT/Sclarifications.
Theresultsofthisreviewarecontained
inthe"Commitment"
'ectionofthisattachment.
Additionally,
asnoted,improvements
willbemadeintheT/Sclarificaticn
reviewprocesstoensureanadequatetechnical
reviewoffutureclarifications.
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238FPage6DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember18,1996,whentheISTprogramwasrevisedtoincludeappropriate
limitstoensurethateachunits'CPs
cansupply120gpmof2400ppmboronfromtheRWST.Violation
C"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,'Corrective
Actions,'equires,
inpart,thatmeasuresshallbeestablished
toassurethatconditions
adversetoquality,suchasfailures,
malfunctions,
deficiencies,
deviations,
defective
materialandequipment,
andnonconformances
arepromptlyidentified
andcorrected.
Contrarytotheabove:2.3.Corrective
actionstoaddresspotentially
inaccurate
sight-glassfillmarksforsafety-related
pumpsandmotors,acondition
adversetoquality,werenotinitiated
untilNovember27,1996,althoughin1995joborderswerewrittentoaddresspotentially
inaccurate
sight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-related
pumpsandmotors,andonMarch6,1996,anactionrequestwaswrittentodetermine
correctsight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-related.
pumpsandmotors.OnDecember5,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthelicenseefailedtotakecorrective
actionstoeitherlocateorre-constitute
acentrifugal
chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)calculation
althoughthecalculation
hadbeenidentified
asmissingabout18monthsearlier.OnDecember4,1996,theinspectors
determined
thatthelicenseefailedtotaketimelycorrective
actionstoaddressequipment
deficiency
taggingproblems.
Althoughthelicenseehadidentified
thatabout30percentofplantcomponents
inthework'control
systemreviewedinathreeweekperiodwerenotproperlytaggedinthefield,corrective
actionstoairessthisconcernhadnotbeeninitiated.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
ClAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseoftheuntimelyresponseforguidanceonplantpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasthelackofacommunication
protocolresulting
inanunrecognized
requesttoengineering
personnel
fromoperations
personnel
fortechnical
assistance.
Therequestforassistance
wasmadebymeansofanactionrequest.Requestsforengineering
direction
aremadewithinthenuclearplantmaintenance
(NPM)computersystembymeansofanevaluation
request.Different
searchesarerequiredtolocateactionrequestsandevaluation
requests.
Engineering
personnel
didnotsearchactionrequestsbecausetheywerenotanexpectedmeansforrequesting
assistance.
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page7Therequestforguidanceonplantpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasbroughttoengineering
management's
attention
approximately
fivemonthsaftertheaction-equestwasinitiated.
Atthattimeengineering
personnel
beganworktoprovidetherequested
guidance.
Thebackground
researchwascompleted
andtheguidanceissuedonDecember5,1996.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTherequested
information
onpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasprovidedonDecember5,1996.Asearchofactionrequestsassignedtoengineering
personnel
hasbeenperformed
toensuretheresponsible
groupsareawareofassignments.
Additionally,
asaninterimaction,plantpersonnel
havebeeninstructed
tomakedailysearchestoensurenonewactionrequestsforengineering
assistance
gounrecognized.
4,Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Anacceptable
methodforrequesting
engineering
assistance
willbedeveloped
byMarch21,1997'.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember5,1996,whentherequested
technical
guidancewasprovided.
ResonsetoNRCViolation
C2Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
InJune1995,aspartofthedesignbasisdocumentation
(DBD)program,itwasidentified
thattheNPSHcalculation
fortheCCPscauldnotbelocated.ADBDactionitemwasinit'ated
inaccordance
withDBDprogramprocedures.
Thisitemwasclassified
asaninstanceofa"missingreference
document",
acategorization
withanormalresolution
timeof60days.Engineering
personnel
involvedintheclassification
ofthisitemwereawarethatanNPSHcalculation
fortheCCPshadbeenperformed
atonetime,.eventhoughitcouldnotbelocated.Operability
wasnotconsidered
tobeaconcernbecauseitwasknownthatthecalculation
hadbeenperformed
butcouldnotbefound.Therefore,
ahighprioritywasnotplaceuonreconstituting
thecalculation
orresolving
theDBDactionitem.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedAsnotedintheSOPIreport,anewcalculation
wascompleted
priortoandapprovedduringtheSOPIinspection,
whichconfirmed
adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Following
theSOPIinspection,
areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswasperformed,
byJanuary15,1997,toassess
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238FPage8theappropriateness
oftheirclassification.
Aseriesofadditional
DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective
actionsystem(viacondition
reports)asaresultofthisreview.Thecorrective
actionsystemincludesrequir'ements
fordetermining
operability
inatimelymanner.Entryintothecorrective
actionsystemensuresareviewoftheseissuesbyourcondition
assessment
group(CAG).Initsoversight
function,
theCAGassessestheneedandmakesassignments
forconfirmatory
operability
determinations
orsupplemental.
analysis.
Beginning
inJanuary1997,additional
resources
wereaddedtotheDBDprojecttoenablepromptclosureofDBDactionitems.Specifically,
theDBDprojectmanagerposition,
whichhadbeenvacantsinceSeptember
1996,wasfilledandtwoadditional
utilitypersonnel
andtwocontractpersonnel
wereassignedtotheproject.Thesepersonnel
areaggressively
pursuing,
resolution
ofopenDBD'actionitems.Thisaugmentation
ofpersonnel
will.continuethroughlate1997,bywhichtimeweexpecttohavemadesignificant
progressintheclosureofDBDactionitems.Additionally,
wearetrainingmembersofourstaff,whohaveownership
oftheDBDs,toensuretheyunderstand
theimportance
ofpromptlyresol"ing
DBDactionitemsandalsotoensuretheyclearlyunderstand
theprocessforeffecting
closureoftheseitems.Thistrainingcommenced
inearlyFebruary1997andwillbecompleted
byMarch15,1997.Finally,theDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened
tolimitthenumberofava.'lable
classifications
forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive
reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate
personnel.
Projectinstructions
relatedtoactionitemprocessing
arebeingrevised.Theserevisions
willbecompleted
byMarch28,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember2,1996,whenanewcalculation
wasapprovedwhichconfirmed
adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.ResonsetoNRCViolation
C3Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
Theprimaryreasonfortheviolation
isthatplantpersonnel
werenotsufficiently
awareoftheguidanceregarding
whentohangdeficiency
tagsforcorrective
maintenance.
Thiswasfurthercompounded
bythelackofclarityprovidedbytheadministrative
requirements
thatdefinedefi-iencytaghangingrequirements.
Further,condition
reportswerenotgenerated
whenmissingdeficiency
tagswereidentified
topromptappropriate
actionsviatheplant's,corrective
actionprogram.Whilewritten
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page9memoranda
identifying
themissingdeficiency
tagsweregenerated,
condition
reportswerenotwrittenandtherefore,
appropriate
attention
andfollow-through
werenotinstituted.
Znallcasesevaluated,
theworkcontrolprocesshadcapturedtheidentified
degradedcomponent,
ensuringthatthedeficient
condition
wouldbecorrected
inatimelymanner.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedRecentplantmanagement
actionshavebeentakentoimprovefocusonpromptlyidentifying
problemsandcorrective
actionsdealing-withconditions
adversetoplantrequirements.
Acondition
reportwaspromptlywrittenwhentheNRCnotedthelackoftimelycorrective
actiontoaddresstheidentified
deficiency
taggingissue.Thecondition
report1)proposesthatthematerialcondition
groupreplacemissingtagswhendiscovered,
2)recommends
changestothegoverning
documentNPM-02CM,
and3)requestsassistance
fromcomputerpersonnel
tomodifyexistingNPMsoftwaretobettersupporttherehanging
oftags.Thepersonnel
responsible
forident'ying
missingdeficiency
tagswerecoachedontheexpectation
togenerateadditional
condition
reportsinthefuture.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
ByApril1,1997,thegoverning
document.
detailing
whenandhowtotagdeficiencies
willberevisedandappropriate
personnel
willbemadeawareof"therevisedrequirements.
Also,asofApril1,1997,actionrequestsgenerated
thathavenotmetthereviseddeficiency
taggingrequirements
willbereturnedtotheoriginating
personnel
forresolution
beforetheactionrequestwillbeprocessed
further.BySeptember
1,1997,systemwalkdowns
willhavebeenperformed
toverifythatdeficiency
tagsassociated
withexistingcorrective
maintenance
actionrequests(thosegenerated
beforeApril1,1997),complywiththerevisedrequirements.
DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
willbeachievedbyApril1,1997,whenthedeficiency
taggingrequirements
havebeenrevisedandappropriate
personnel
havebeenmadeawareofthoserequirements.
Further,condition
reportswillbewrittenasofApril1,1997,foranydeficiency
tagnotincompliance
withtherevisedrequirement
(regardless
ofwhentheactionrequestandassociated
deficiency
tagsweregenerated).
)I'
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Deviation
Page10Inadditiontotheabovethreeviolations,
thenoticeofviolation
contained
'thefollowing
noticeofdeviation,
whichisaddressed
below.DEV50-31596013-09DRSandDEV50-31696013-09DRS'"DuringanNRCinspection
conducted
November18throughDecember13,1996,adeviation
ofyouractionscommitted
toinNUREG-0737,
SectionIZ.B.2wasidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe'GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,'UREG-1600,
thedeviation
islistedbelow:NUREG-0737,
SectionZI.B.2,'DesignReviewofPlantShielding
andEnvironmental
Qualification
ofEquipment
forSpaces/Systems
WhichMayBeUsedinPostaccident
Operations,'equires
that50percentofthetotaliodineand100percentofthenoblegasesareassumedtobereleasedfromthefuel~inthedesignbasisaccidentradiological
analysis.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember4,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthelicenseefailedtocorrectly
translate
SectionZZ.B.2ofNUREG-07~7
intothecentrifugal
chargingpumpemergency
leakoffvalvefailuredesignbasisaccidentradiological
analysis.
Asaresult,onlyonepercentfueldamagewasassumedintheanalysisandresultedindoseestimates
lowerthanrevisedcalculated
values."ResonsetoNRCDeviation
ReasonfortheDeviation
InAugust1991,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentscenariorunontheplantsimulator
identified
aflowpaththathadthepotential
todivertwaterawayfromtheemergency
corecoolingsystemandcontainment
building.
Theflowpathwasfromthesafetyinjection
system(SIS)cetrifugalchargingpumpdischarge
throughanemergency
leakoffvalve,throughthereactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturnlinesafetyvalvetothevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthroughtheVCTsafetyvalvetothechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemholduptanks.Thiscondition
wasdocumented
inLER91-007-00.
Areviewwasconducted
toassessthesafetyconsequence
andimplications
ofthepostulated
event.Analysisofthepotential
doseratefromthedivertedwatertothewholebodyatthesiteboundarywascalculated
tobeinsignificant
comparedtothe10CFR100accidentdoselimitandevenwiththe10CFR20.105doselimitsforunrestricted
areasduringnormaloperations,
basedontheassumption
of1%failedfuelsLER91-007-01
providedoriginalcorrective
actionforthisscenario.
Thescenarioofconcernoccursfollowing
theswitchover
oftheCCPsuctionfromtherefueling
waterstoragetanktotherecirculation
sumpviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.WiththeRHRpumpssupplying
suctiontotheCCPs,thepressureintheCCPemergency
leakoff(ELO)linescouldbeinexcessofthedownstream
safetyvalvesetpressure,
andthenapproximately
60gpmflowwouldbedivertedfromtheECCStotheVCT.Corrective
actionsforthisscenarioincludedemergency
operating
procedure
(EOP)
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page11modifications
toclosethechargingpumpELOvalvesaspartoftheswitchover
frominjection
torecirculation
phasewheretheECCSpumpstakesuctionfromtherecirculation
sump.InJune1995,aspartofourDBDprogram,itwasidentified
thattheEOPsnotedabovecanbeimplemented,
butwerenotsinglefailureproof.TheDBDprogramincludesaprocesstoidentify,
classify(withrespecttosafetysignificance),
andresolveactionitemsidentified
duringthedevelopment
ofDBDs.ADBDaction'tem
wascreatedtodocumentthatintheeventthesinglefailureisanELOvalvethat'cannotbeisolated,
theleakagepathtotheVCTwouldstillpersist.WithintheDBDprogram,thisissuewasclassified
asadiscrepancy
thatwasnotsafetysignificant,
basedontheanalysisdescribed,
aboveanddocumented
inLER91-007.TherelianceontheprioranalysisinLER91-007,whichprovidedapractical
assessment
ofsafetysignificance
per10CFR50.73,toclassifytheDBDactionitemasanon-significant
discrepancy
wasincorrect
becauseitdidnotconsiderdesignbasisassumptions
forsourcetermperNUREG-0737.
Themisclassification
oftheDBDactionitemwasmadebyengineering
personn1whoincorrectly
assumedthattheanalysispresented
inLER91-007wasalsoanadequatebasisforclassification
ofthDBDactionitem.2.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheEOPshavebeenmodifiedtoinstucttheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.Flowthroughtheidlepumpofupto5.2gpmmaystillexist;therefore,
instructions
havebeenaddedtoisolatethevalvemanually.
(The5.2gpmiswithinthe10gpmvalueforoutsidecontainment
leakagepreviously
evaluated
anddetermined
acceptable
regarding
offsiteandcontrolroomdoses.)Themaximumdose'topersonnel
expectedtoisolatethevalveis0.28rem24hoursaftertheaccidentoccurs.3.CorrectireAction'sTakentoAvoidFurtherDeviations
Following
theSOPIinspection,
areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswascompleted
onJanuary15,1997,toassesstheappropriateness
oftheirpreviousclassification.
Aseriesofadditional
DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective
actionsystemasaresultofthisreview.Entryintothecorrective
actionsystemensuresathoroughscreening
oftheseissuesbytheCAGforassignment
totheappropriate
organization
forresolution.
Thecorrective
actionsystemincludesrequirements
fordetermining
operability
inatimelymanner.Initsoversight
function,
theCAGasse'sses
theneedandmakesassignments
forconfirmatory
operability
determinations
orsupplemental
analysis.
TheDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened
tolimitthenumberofavailable
classifications
forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive
reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate
personnel.
Projectinstructions
relatedtoactionitemprocessing
arebeingrevised.Theserevisions
willbecompleted
byMarch28,1997.
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
4.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage12Corrective
actionwascompleted
onDecember13,1996,whenchanges"eremadetotheEOPstoinstructtheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page13Commitment
Theinspection
reportrequested
werespondinwritingregarding
ourreviewofT/Sclarifications.
Thenoticeofviolation
contained
thefollowing
discussion.
"Thelicenseehad37technical
specification
clarifications
(TSCs)ineffect.Theinspectors
reviewedtheTSCslistedbelowandquestioned
whetherthelicenseecouldprovidetechnical
justification
tosupporttheTSCs.Subsequently,
thelicenseedetermined
thatthefollowing
clarifications
couldnotbetechnically
justified
andshouldbecanceled:
TSC¹14TSC¹l5TSC¹48AirborneRadioactivity
MonitorOperability
DieselGenerator
Surveillance
Runs-Paralleled.
GridTechnical
specification
(TS)4.8.1.1.2.F.2
LeakTestingofADandCDFuelOilTanksandAssociated
PipingTheinspectors
didnotidentifyanypastuseoftheaboveTSCsthatresultedinexceeding
theactionrequirements
oftheassociated
technical
specification.
Theinspectors
concluded
thatthesafetysignificance
oftheTSCerrorswereminimal.Theinspectors
concluded
thatthelicensee's
approvalofTSCswithoutappropriate
technical
justification
wasaweakness.
Attheend,oftheinspection,
thelicenseecommitted
toreviewallremaining
TSCstoensuretheywerestillnecessary
andcouldbejustified."
ReviewScoeTheNRCinspection
reportindicated
that37TSCswereineffectatthetimeoftheinspection.
AreviewoftheactiveTSCsfromthe,TSCindexindicated
thattherewereactually35activeTSCs.ThethreeTSCsdiscussed
intheinspection
reportwerecanceled.
ThescopeoftheTSCreviewwasoftheremaining
32activeTSCs.Observation
andFindinsNineTSCswerecanceledTheyareasfollowsTSC¹5TSC¹12TSC¹26TSC¹37TSC¹38TSC¹45TSC¹47TSC¹60TSC¹61Operable-Operability
Definition
-Attendant
Xnstrumentation
D.C.Distribution
-Operating
SteamGenerator
StopValveOperability
Definition
ofMaintenance
onEmergency
CoreCoolingSystemValvesTurbineDrivenAuxiliary
PumpOperability
SnubberFunctional'est
RetestResults10CFR50AppendixREquipment
Operability
Auxiliary
SystemandEssential
ServiceWaterSystemAuxiliary
SystemSurveillance
Requirements
Ofthisgroup,twoTSCs(¹5and¹12),werecanceledduetoinsufficient
technical
basestosupporttheimpliedoperability
providedbytheTSC.ThreeTSCs(¹37,¹60and¹61)werecanceled
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page14astheywereimplemented
inamannerinconsistent
withcurrentexpectations.
FourTSCs(¹26,¹38,¹45and¹47)weredetermined
tobeunnecessary.
OneTSC(¹65),boricacidtransferpumpoperability,
wasrevisedtoproperlyreflectitstechnical
bases(refertosection08.1oftheNRCinspection
report).Theremaining
22TSCsremainactive.Conclusion
BasedonthereviewoftheexistingTSCs,itfollowsthattheTSCswerenotwelldefinedandwereimplemented
inamannerinconsistent
withcurrentexpectations.
The,programwasutilizedtocapturemanyeventdrivendecisions
thatwouldmoreappropriately
fitanoperability
program,orshouldbetranslated
intoapprovedprocedural
controls.
AnimprovedTSCprogramwillbedeveloped
byJune27,1997.Thisprogramwillprovideareviewofproposednewclarifications
toensureadequatetechnical
justification
ispresentpriortoapproval,
andthataclarification
doesnotchangeoraltertherequirement
ofthespecification
beingclarified.
Additionally,
thenewprogramwillreg'uireplantimpactreviewsaspartoftheimplementation
process.Theimpactreviewswillensureappropriate
reviewandincorporation
ofclarification
information
intoplantprocedures
andprograms'he
impactreviewprocessisbeingincorporated
intotheimplementation
processtoaddressaSOPIconcerninvolving
integration
ofTSC¹7intotheplant'sISTprogram.