ML17333A910
| ML17333A910 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1997 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-04, 50-315-97-4, 50-316-97-04, 50-316-97-4, AEP:NRC:1260C, NUDOCS 9706090357 | |
| Download: ML17333A910 (40) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1997004
Text
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleDriveBuchanan,
Ml491071395
INblANAMICHIGANPOWERJune5,1997DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,-D.-C.
-20555Gentlemen:
AEP:NRC:1260C
10CFR2.201DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCZNSPECTZON
REPORTSNO.50-315/97004
(DRP)AND50-316/97004
(DRP)REPLYTONOTZCEOFVZOLATZON
ThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromJ.L.Caldwell,
datedMay6,1997,thattransmitted
anoticeofviolation
andanoticeofdeviation
toIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Thenoticeofviolation
contained
atotalofeightviolations
ofNRCrequirements
identified
duringanNRCinspection
conducted
fromFebruary16,1997,throughMarch29,1997.Theviolations
pertaintoprocedures,
corrective
actions,reportability
requirements,
and10CFR50.59.issues.Ourresponsetotheseviolations
isprovidedinattachment
1.Thenoticeofdeviation
involvesinoperability
ofcontrolroompowerrangepenrecorders.
Ourresponsetothisitemisprovidedinattachment
2.EE+pWE.E.Fitzpatrick
'1icePresident
SWORNTOANDSUBSCRZBED
BEFOREME~=-"TEZS.~gDAYOF1997NotaryPublicvlbUNDALBOIlCKENororyPublic,BerrlenCoonly,MlAttachments
MyCommr&onIorpiresjonoory21,200I9'706090357
970605PDRADOGK050003i5
1ndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleDriveBvchanan,
Ml491071395
INDIANANICHIGAHPOWERMay5,1997DocketNos.:56-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
ATTN:33ocument
ControlDesk-Washington,
--D.--C;-20555
Gentlemen:
AEP:NRC:3.260C
3.0CFR2.201DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTION
REPORTS--NO.
50.-3/5/97004
-(DRP)AND50"316/97004
(DRP)REPLYTONOTICE.OFVIOLATION
Thisletterisin'response
toaletterfromJ.L.Caldwell,
datedMay6,1997,thattransmitted
anoticeofviolation
andanoticeofdeviation
to1ndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Thenoticeofviolation
contained
atotalofeightviolations
ofNRCrequirements
identified
duringanNRCinspection
conducted
fromFebruary16,1997,throughMarch29,1997.Theviolations
pertaintoprocedures,
corrective
actions,reportability
requirements,
and10CFR50.59issues.Ourresponsetotheseviolations
isprovidedinattachment
1.Thenoticeofdeviation
involvesinoperability
ofcontrolroompowerrangepenrecorders.
Ourresponsetothisitemisprovidedinattachment
2.E.E.Fitzpatrick
'1icePresident
SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED
BEFOREMETHISDAYOF3.997NotaryPublicvlbUNDAlSOEt,CKENo&yPubhc,BergsonCooniy,MlAttachmentsg
QyCpzmi+~~fQ$
PDRADQCK050003i58',,PDR;,n'j>QQ5Illlmllll!
Iillllllllllljlll(lllllll
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Page2AEP:NRC:1260Cc:A.A;BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW&RPDNRCResidentInspector
J.R.Padgett~~l><l
ATTACHMENT
1TOAEP:NRC:1260C
RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONS
~~
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page1DuringanNRCinspection
conducted
fromFebruary17,1997,toMarch29,1997,fourviolations
ofNRCrequirements
'ereidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe'."General
Statement
ofPolicyandProcedure
forNRCEnforcement
Actions",
theviolations
arelistedbelow.NRCViolation
1a"10CFR50AppendixB,CriteriaV,Inspections,
Procedures,
andDrawings,
requiresinpart,thatactivities
affecting
qualityshallbeprescribed
byprocedures
ofa'typeappropriate
tothecircumstances
andshallbeaccomplished
inaccordance
withthese---=---=--procedures;--
Contraryto-theabove,Theinspectors
identified
thatProcedure
02-OHP4023.ES-01
"ReactorTrip.Response",
revision11,dated11/21/96,
wasnotappropriate
tothecircumstances
becauseitdidnotcontainguidanceforadequately
controlling
steamgenerator
(SG)levelswhileactionswerebeingtakentominimizethereactorcoolantsystemcooldownrate.Asaresult,onMarch11,1997,aUnitoperatorresetaturbinedrivenauxiliary
feedpump(TDAFP)tooclosetothelow-lowSGlevelsetpointwhichresultedinaninadvertent
Engineering
Safeguard
Featureactuation.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."ResonsetoViolation
1a1.dmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonforViolation
Thisviolation
resultedfromincomplete
guidanceinprocedure
02-OHP4023.ES-O.l,
"ReactorTri'porSafetyInjection",
thatallowedtherestoration
oftheTDAFPpriortotheunitbeinginastablecondition.
Duringtheperformance
of02-OHP4023.ES-0.1,
thecontrolroomteamisallowedtoremovetheTDAFPfromserviceifsufficient
isbeingsuppliedtotheSGsfromthetwomotordrivenauxiliary
feedpumps.
Thisflexibility
toremovetheTDAFPfromserviceprovidestheoperators
withadditional
reactorcoolantsystem(RCS)temperature
control.Technical
specifications
(T/Ss)3.7.1.2and3.3.2.1requiretheTDAFPbeoperableandcapableofautomatically
startinginmode3.Tocomplywiththeserequirements,
ES-0..1directstheTDAFPgovernortoberesetandthevalvealignment
tomeetthestandbyreadiness
requirements.
Theautostartfunctionisenabledafterallstandingautomatic
startsignalshavecleared.Duringthepost-trip
scenariothestandingautomatic
startsignalsarethelow-lowSGlevelon.twoef.fourSGs,~and,the.mticipated.t
ransientwithout"scrammitigatien'ystem
actuation
circuitry
(AMSAC)signal.The
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page23~AMSACsignaloccursafterallhighpowertripsandisonlyrequiredabove40%power.TheAMSACsignalisthenclearedmanuallyduringtheperformance
ofES-0.1.TheSGlow-lowlevelactuation
signalsareclearedbyrecoveryofSGlevels,utilizing
theAFWpumps.DuringtheposttriprecoveryonMarch11,'997,theAMSACsignalwasresetpriortothecompleterecoveryofallSGlevelstoabovethelow-lowautomatic
actuation
setpoint.
The¹21SGlevellaggedtheothers,as,thelossofmainfeedwater
tothatSGwastheinitiating
eventwhichresultedinthereactortrip,andcontinuous
feedingof.theSGswasinprogress-to-recover=secondary
sideinventory
levels.WhilefillingtheSGs,small.oscillations
normallyoccurinthesensedlevel.Withthe¹21SGlevelstillbelowthelow-lowsetpoint,,a
.smalloscillation
occurredin¹23SGthatcausedtheTDAFPautostartsignaltoclearatitshighpoint,followedby.theengineered
safetyfeature(ESF)actuation
whenitsubsequently
droppedandwentbelowtheESFsetpoint.
Becausethesetpointhasa1%resetdeadband,
itis'extremely
sensitive
tominoroscillations.
Duetotheincomplete
guidanceprovided..:in
theemergency
.procedure,
-emphasis
wasplacedontherestoration
of.theTDAFPtostandbyreadiness,
ratherthanonstabilizing
SGlevelsabovetheESFactuation
setpointpriortosecuringtheTDAFPandplacingitinstandbyreadiness.
Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchieved4~TheTDAFPstartedasdesignedandperformed
itsdesiredfunction.
Manualcontrolofth'eSGlevelsduringtheposttriprecoverycontinued.
Noimmediate
corrective
actionswererequired.
Corrective
ActionstoAvoidFurtherUiolations
Thepost-trip
recoveryprocedures
willberevisedregarding
placement
oftheTDAFPinstandbyreadiness.
Theserevisions
willallowoperators
flexibility
inequipment
management
duringposttripresponses,
sothattheoperatormayfocusattention
ontheplantresponseaspost-trip
stabilization
occurs,whilecontinuing
tomeettherequirements
oftheT/Ssforauxiliary
andESFactuations.
Anengineering
reviewoftheSGlow-lowlevelinstrument
deadbandisbeingperformed.
Thepurposeofthereviewistodetermine
theappropriateness
ofthe1\resetdeadband.
Thisreviewwillbecompleted
priortothenextscheduled
calibration
surveillance
oftheassociated
instruments.
5.DateWhenFullColianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
willbeachievedbySeptember
1,,1997,with.thecompletion
oftheengineering
reviewoftheresetdeadband,
andtherevisionoftheappropriate
posttriprecoveryprocedures.
Fwe'll4d
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page3NRCViolati.on
1b"OnMarch23,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatthelicenseefailedtofollow,instructions
whenpersonnel
woxkingadjacenttotherefueling
cavityinaforeignmaterialexclusion
zone,failedtosecurelighthandtoolstothemselves
bywayofalanyardortagline,andfailedtorestraintoolsin,theFMEZwhentheysetthe'oolsdown.TheseactionswererequiredbyPlantManager's
Instruction
(PMI)2220,"ForeignMaterialExclusion",
revision9,dated3/26/96.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."ResonsetoNRCViolation
1b1~AAdmission-or
'DenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany,admitstotheviolation
asci.tedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
3.Contracttechnicians,
underI&Msupervision,
were,makingrepairstoadualviewcamerafixtureinaforeignmaterialexclusion
zone(FNEZ)whentheywereobservedusinghandtoolswithlanyardaattachedtothe.tools,butnotsecuredtoapersonorfixedobject.Thiscondition
resultedfromamisi.nterpretation
oftherequirements
ofplantprocedure
12PMP2220.001.001,
"ForeignMaterialExclusion"
(FNE).Section5.2.7ofthisprocedure
states,inpart,"Lighthandtoolsshallbesecured'to
thepersonusingthembywayofalanyardortagline."
.However,fuxtheroninthesameprocedure
underasectionentitled"Securing
Tools"(attachment
2,part6a)itisstated"Toolsorequipment
whichcouldfallintoopeningsbeyondthereachofpersonnel
MUSTbesecuredwithalanyardortagline,wherepractical."
'helanyardswerefelttobe.impractical
bytheworkers~involvedinthejob.Becauseattachment
2didnotrequirelanyardswhereimpractical,
theworkersdidnotusethem.Additionally,
thesesamecontracttechnicians
wereobservedleavingtoolslyingloosewithinanFMEZ.The~personsinvolvedhadincorrectly
assumedthatthe"intent"oftheFNEprocedure
wasbeingfollowedbythecompensatory
actionstheyhadtakenpriortobeginning
theequipment
repair.Theseactionsincluded:
1)establishing
alaydownareawithintheFMEZforthespecificpurposeofrepairing
thisequipment;
and2)assigning
anindividual
tospecifi.cally
monitorandcontrolloosepartsandtoolsduringtherepairevolution.
SimilarFMEpracticea
hadbeenemployedatothernuclearsites.However,theCookNuclearPlantprocedure
thatgovernsactivities
withinanFNEZ(12PMP2220~001.001)specificallymandatestheuseoflanyards,
anddoesnot-.recognize
othermethodsofmaterialcontrol.Corx'ective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedUponnotification
oftheNRCinspectors'oncerns,
theprojectmanagement
ainstallation
services(PMRIS)production
supervisor
contacted.
thecontractor's
sitecoordinator,
-whoreinstructedthete'chnicians
onCookNuclearPlantFNE
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page44,requirements.
Noadditional
problemsrelatingtohandtoolusagewererecordedduringtheremainder
oftheproject.Corrective
ActionsToAvoidFurtherViolations
Proce'dure
12PMP2220.001willberevisedpriortothefall1997unit2outage.ThisrevisionwilIeliminate
th"dscrepancies
notedwithintheprocedure,
andprovidetheie"flexibility
forusingothermethodsofmaterialcontrol.OnMay27,1997,aplant-wide'-
>>time-out"
washeldtohighlight
management'.s
expectations
intheareaofprocedure
cmpliance.
-Duringthis-period,
plantandcontractemployees
(including
supervision)
werebroughttogethertofocusontheusageofplantprocedures.
PMZ-2011,
"Procedure
'seandAdherence",
wasreviewed.
Emphasized
topicsincludedthevarious.levelsofprocedure
usage(continuous
use,information
'use,referende
use)andthecompanypolicyofstrictprocedural
compliance.
Additionally,
PM&ISwillholdanotherprocedural
compliance
>>time-out"
priortothefall1997unit2outage.Procedural
adherence
issueswillbere-emphasized
tobothZaMandcontractpersonnel
(including
supervision),
aswellastoindividuals
broughtinspecifically
foroutagesupport.Withinthirtydaysoftheendoftheoutage,PM&ISwillalsoperformaself-assessment
intheareaofprocedure
adherence
todetermine
theeffectiveness
ofourprocedural
compliance
efforts.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBe.Achieved
Fullcompliance
wasachievedonMarch23,1997,afterallpysicalworkhadbeenstoppedandtheworkers'werereschooled
on'CookNuclearPlantFMErequirements
(PMZ-2220)
andourpolicyregarding
strictprocedural
compliance.
NRCViolations
1cand1d"OnMarch11,1997,thelicenseeidentified
thatduringrefurbishment
of1-QRV-114,
thereactorcoolant'xcessletdowntoexcessletdownheatexchanger
shutoffvalve,in1994,thevalvewasreassembled
withoutacagespacerthatwasrequiredbymaintenance
procedure
12MHP-5021.001.057,
"Copes-Vulcan
Isolation
ValveMaintenance>>'evision
1,dated3/14/97'hisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I).1d.OnMarch16,1997,thelicenseeidentified
thatduringthe1995refurbishment
of1-NRV-163,
thepressurizer
spraycontrolvalve,thevalvewasreassembled
withoutacagespacerthatwasrequiredbymaintenance
procedure
12MHP-5021.001;126,
"Copes-Vulcan
BellowsSealControlValveMaintenance",
revision1,dated3/13/97.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:126QC
Page5ResonsetoCViolation
1candZdAdmission
orDenialoftheViol'ations
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
ReasonsfortheViolation
Thisviolation
wascausedbystandards
andexpectations
forcontractvalvetechnician
performance
ofworktoanin-handprocedure
beingtoolow.Properimplementation
of,the-procedures-by-the-technicians
wasnotverifiedandreinforced
bythefirstlinesupervisors.
Anadditional
factorincludedthevalvetechnician's
lackoffamiliarity
withthespecificconfiguration
ofthisstyleofvalve.'UNormalmaintenance
'racticeforCopes-Vulcan
valvedisassembly
istoremovethebonnetwiththestemintact.Thisalsoincludesremovaloftheplug,cageassembly,
andcagespacer.Duringanormalrefurbishment
theplugandcageassemblyarereplaced.
Inthesecases,theeasiestwaytodisassemble
theinternalpartsistocutthestemandlettheplugandcageassemblyfallintoaradwastecontainer.
Thisusuallymeansthatthecagespaceralsofallsintothewastecontainer.
Thereplacement
cage,disc,andstemarenormallyprovidedtogetherasa"trimassembly".
Becausethecagespacerdoesnotseethewearthattheplugandcageassemblysee,itdoesnotnormaLLyneedtobereplacedduringarefurbishment.
Therefore,
th'ecagespacerisnotincludedwiththesepartsinatrimassembly.
TheexistingcagespacermustgeneraLLy
bereusedwhen.thevalveisreassembled.
CopesVulcanvalveshaveauniquecage.spacer
configuration,
whichthetechnicians
~didnotcommonlyworkwith.Nonetheless,
theprocedure
doesspecifically
callforreinstallation
ofthecagespaceraspartofreassembly
ofthevalveinternals.
3.Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchieved4~1-QRV-114
wasproperlyreassembled,
withnewinternals,
underJOAR36179-02.
Thiswascompleted
onMarch18,1997.1-NRV-163
waspropeilyreassembled,
withnewinternals,
underJOAC34692-02.
Thiswascompleted
onMarch27,1997.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
TwoCopes-Vulcan
valveshavebeenpurchased
fortrainingpurposes.
Onevalveisconfigured
asa"typical"
Copes-Vulcancontrolvalve.Theothervalveisaduplicate
configuration
ofthepressurizer
sprayvalves.Designation
ofthecagespacerwillbeinboldinthereassembly
stepinMaintenance
procedures
forCopes-Vulcan
valves.Areview'f.themaintenance'procedures
forCopes-Vulcan
valveswillbeconducted.
EmphasiswilLbeonconsolidation
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page65.ofthepiocedures
andimplementation
ofengineering,
plannihg,
orsupervisory
identification
ofapplicable
procedure
information
basedontheinternalconfiguration
andapplication
ofthevalve.This.willbecompleted
bSeptember
1,1997.eeyMaintenance
personnel
havebeenremindedoftheneedto'roperly
implement
in-handprocedures.
Thismeanstheymustreadthestep,performthestep,documentcompletion
ofthestep,thenproceedtothenextstep.Atthetimeoftheoriginalvalveworkin1994,contractsupervisors..performed-
hands-onwork=aswell'sservingassupervisors.
Since1994,thishasbeenchangedandcontractsupervisors
nolongerperformhands-onwork,butfunctionrelsolelyinanoversight
role.Thisisreinforced
thrhoug8guarmeetingsheldduringtheoutage.Thecontrctnracbriupervisors
arenowmoreinvolvedinpreparation
andp-'re-joer'efings,andgeneralexpectations
forcontractpformance,
especially
regarding
procedural
adherence,,is
ordiscussed.
withcontractmanagement
priortothestartoftheoutage.DatewhenFullComliancewillbeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonMarch27,1997.Atthattime,bothvalveswereproperlyreassembled.
NRCViolation
2a"10CFR50AppendixB,CriteriaXVZ,Corrective
Actions,requiresinpart,that"Measures
shallbeestablished
toassurthatZnthecaseofsignifidant
conditions
adversetoqu1'tth(cor(rective)measuresshallassurethatthecauseofthecondition
isdetermined
andcorrective
actiontakentoprecluderepetition."
IIContrarytotheabove,a.OnMarch11,1997,inUnit2,thepreviouscorrective
actionstoprecludethebuildupofelectrostatic
discharge
.fromaffecting
TaylorMod30controllers
wereineffective
inpreventing
thefailureofthecontroller
forfeedwater
regulating
valve1-FRV-210.
Thiscontroller
failurecausedtheclosureof1-FRV-210andasubsequent
reactortrip."ThisisaSeverityLevelZV.violation
(Supplement
Z)."ResonsetoNRCViolation
2aAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
ZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseofthisviolation
'isaninadequate
rootcausedetermination
forthepreviouscontroller.
failurescaTheirootcausedetermin'ation
had'identified
thestaticelectricity
but
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page7~03.failed.to
identifytheseverityoftheproblem.Stepshadbeenimplemented
toreducetheoccurrence
ofstaticelectricity.'owever,
not.all",processes
thatcouldcausestaticwereidentified.
Althoughmeasureshadbeentakentoreducestaticbuildupandtoprovideameanstosafelydischarge
thestatic,someday-'o-day
practices
thatcouldgeneratestaticwerenotidentified,
norwasitidentified
thatthemethodsprovidedtodischarge
thestaticwerenotalwayseffective.
Zthadbeenverifiedthatthecarpetinstalled
in-thecontrolroomswasastaticdissipative
carpet,humiditylevelsinthecontrol~corns
-werebeingmaintained
above40%,andelectrostatic
discharge
(ESD)matshad-been.
placedinfrontofthecontrolpanels.However,aftertheunittrip,itwasdiscovered
thecontrolsofthesteamgenerator
'level,controllers
werelocatedataconvenient
heighttomakeitcommonpractice.
foroperators
toroll.overtothecontrollers
in'-wheeledofficechairandadjustthecontrols.
Thisrenderedthestaticdissipative
carpetandESDmatsinstalled
infrontofthecontrolpanelineffective
atdissipating
staticelectricity.'ngineering
hadalsoinstructed
theoperators
todischarge
theirstaticchargeonthecontrolpanelpriorto.contacting
controllers
butfailedtonotethepaintedsurfacesonthecontrolpanel-didnotprovideforpropergrounding;
Additional
grounding
methodsforthecontrollers
hadbeendeveloped
toreducethevulnerability
of,thecontrollers
tofailureduringESD.An'implementation
schedulewasdeveloped,
basedontheneedtoremoveacontroller
fromservicetoperformgrounding.
Becauseofthis,anumberofcontrollers
couldnotbedonewiththeunitoperating.
Thiswasjudgedtobeacceptable
inviewoftheactionstakentoreducestaticbuildupandproviding
ameanstodi.scharge
thestaticpriortoanoperatorinterfacing
withthecontroller.
Thecontroller
thatfailedandcausedtheMarch11,1997,unittripwasscheduled
forthegrounding
enhancement
duringthenextrefueling
outage.Corrective
StesTakenandResultsAchievedTheenhancedgrounding
methodswereinstalled
inunit2duringtheforced,outagefromthe'ontroller
failureandonunit1duringtherefueling
outage.Additional
in-housetestingofthecontroller
confirmed
themanufacturer's
identification
ofESDsensitivity
attherightedgeofthefaceplate.
Testingalsoshowedthatsealingtheedgeofthefaceplate
prevented
staticintrusion
anddoubledtheimmunitytostaticdischarge.
Allpanelmountedcontroller
faceplates
forbothuni.tsweresealedtopreventstaticintrusion.
Additional'SD
readingsweretakeninthecontrolroomswhileoperators
wereperforming
routineactivities,
tomorethoroughly
quantifythestaticproblem.Testingshowedanoperatorcouldgenerate3KVwithasimpleactofstandingupfromachair.Staticelectricity
alsofailedto,immediately
~drain,whilestanding;
on:>,theanti-static-.-carp'et;-'.and
'took-several=secondsto.drainwhilestandingontheESDgrounding
0
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page8matsduetotheinsulated
shoeswornbymostoperators.
Following
testing,ESD-proof
chairswereinstalled
inthecontrolroomandoperators
were'.requiredtowearcommercial
shoegrounding
straps.Follow-up
checksindicated
thatwhileoperators
arewearingthegrounding
strap,staticchargebuildupwoulddissipate
immediately
oncontactwiththeESDmatsandtherewasnochargebuildupwhileusingtheESD'hair.
Asapointofinformation,
adesignchangeisbeingfinalized
toincorporate
a.failovercontrolsystemdesigntopreventsinglepointcontroller
failureincriticalinstrument,
loopsfrom=shutting-down-the
controlloop.Failedcontrollers
willbebypassedwith-operator
notification
and,depending
onwhichcontroller
failed,continueinautoorreverttomanualforoperatorcontrol.4.Corrective
ActionsToAvoidFurtherViolations
Thecauseofthisviolation
wasfailuretoproperlyidentifyandfullycharacterize
rootcausesofthefailure.AreviewandrevisionofCookNuclearPlantPMI-7030,
"Corrective
ActionProgram,"wasrecentlycompleted
andadditional
trainingofpersonnel
inproperrootcauseanalysisisbeingperformed.
5.DateWhenFullColianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonMay9,1997,withthecompletion
ofthegrounding
modifications
duringtheunit2forcedoutage,andonunit1duringtherefueling
outage.PMI-7030,
revision23,"Corrective
ActionProgram",
waseffective
May19,1997,andpersonnel
trainingisongoing.NRCViolation
2b"10CFR50AppendixB,CriteriaXVI,Corrective
Actions,requiresinpart,that"Measures
shallbeestablished
toassurethatInthecaseofsignificant
conditions
adversetoquality,the(corrective)
measuresshallassurethatthecauseofthecondition
isdetermined
andcorrective
actiontakentoprecluderepetition."
Contrarytotheabove,OnMarch12,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatthecorrective
actionsfollowing
arepeatgasketfailureonl-IRV-311,
identified
onJanuary31,1996,wereinadequate
toprecluderepetition
ofspiralwoundgasketmaterialenteringthereactorcoolantsystem,asignificant
condition
'adversetoquality.Specifically,
thelicenseeperformed
anevaluation
to-determine
theeffectofspiralwoundgasketmaterialintheresidualheatremovalsystem;however,noactionwastakentoremovethismaterialwhichresultedinthe.re-introduction
ofspiralwoundgasketmaterialinthereactorcoolantsystemonMarch12,1997."ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."
Attachment
1toAEPsNRC:1260C
Page9onsetoVh.olation
2bAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
\IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonforViolation
Thisviolation
istheresultofaninaccurate
rootcausedetermination
fortheinitialfailureofthegasket,whichoccurredinAugust1995.Therootcausedetermination
wasnotaccurateMecause
=information--necessary
"tomakeanaccuratedetermination
wasnotavailable
atthetimeoftheinitialinvestigation.,
Adesign.changepreviously
installed
toimproveresidualheatremoval(RHR).flowcontrolreplacedthe.original
butterfly
valveswithaV-notched
ballvalve,modelV100-Sin-300lb,
manufactured
byFisherControls.
Whenthisdesignchangewlwasengineered,
itwasnotknownthatexcessive
turbulenouddevelopatthevalve'sdownstream
flangewhenthevalvewasthrottled
toanintermediate
position.
Thisturbulence
canresultinhydraulic
forcescapableofdamagingthemetallicwindingofthespiralwoundgasketusedtoseal-this.boltedconnection.
Subsequent
failuresofthegasket.providedinformation
notavailable't
thetimeoftheinitialinvestigation.
Thisinformation
ledustotheconclusion
thatthevalveandflangegasketareincompatible,
andtheincompatible
designresultedinthegasketfailures.
flOnAugust11,1995,theunit1RHRheatexchanger
(Hx)bypasowcontrolvalve,1-IRV-311,
downstream
flangegasketassfailedwithRHRinserviceduringnormalcooldownattheendofcycle14.When1-IRV-311
wasdisassembled
forrepair,itwasdiscovered
thattheinsidediameterofitsgasketwassmallerthantheinsidediameterofthecorresponding
slip-anflange.This.resultedinapproximately
0.155inchesofthegasket'smetallicspiralwindingsbeingexposedtotheflowstream,andresultedingasketfailure.Therootcauseoftheinitialfailurewastherefore
determined
tobeanincorrectly
sizedgasket.~NeitheroftheothertwoRHRHxoutletflowcontrolvalves,1-IRV-310
and1-IRV-320,
havethistypeofslip-onbolted.flangeconnection
orevidenced
aflangeleak.Therefore,
theywerenot.inspected
atthistime.1-IRV-311
wasreturnedtoservicewithnewspiralwoundgasketsofthecorrectsize.Theemergency
corecoolingsystem(ECCS)andRHRwereflushedofdebris,andunit1beganoperation
forfuelcycle15.Shortlyafterthecompletion
oftheunit11995refueling
outage,withtheECCSandRHR.instandbyreadiness,
leakagefromthedownstream
jointof1-IRV-311
againoccurred.
Whenthevalve.wasremovedforrepaironJanuary31,.1996,itsdownstream
flangegasketwasfoundtohaveexperienced
damagesimilartothepreviousfailure,withaportionofthespiralwindingsmissing.Theroot,causeofthisfailurewasdetermined
tobeincompatibility
ofthespiralwoundgasketwith=theV-ball,type:of.controlvalve.Anon>>metallic
fibrousgasketwasinstalled
inplaceofthespiralwound
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:126QC
Page10gasket.Onceagain,1-IRV-310
and1-IRV-320
werenotopenedbecausetheywerenotexhibiting
anyevidenceofleakage,norweretheysuspected
ofsusceptibility
tothistypeoffailureastheirthrottling
characteristics.
differfrom1-XRV-311.
Asaprecautionary
measure.inMarchof1996,2-XRV-311,
theunit2RHRHxbypassflowcontrolvalve,was'openedforhadninspection
priortotheunit2refueling
outage.Thisalotevidenced
leakageatthedownstream
joint;however,itsspiralwoundgasketwasfoundtobedamageduponvalvedisassembly.
Thisprovided.thefirstevidencethattheflangegasketcouldbecomedamagedwithoutmanifesting-.external
leakage;-
-.A-fibrous
gasketwasinstalled
inplaceofthespiral,woundgasket.Duringtherefueling
outage,thespiralwoundgasketswere-removed"
from,2-IRV-310
and2-IRV-320andreplacedwithfibrousgaskets.Thespiralwoundgasketsremovedfrom2-XRV-310
and2-IRV-320
wereintact,reinforcing,
theconclusion
thatthe1-IRV-310
and1-IRV-320
werenotatriskforthistypeoffailure.Duringtherecentunit1refueling
outage,avisualinspection
ofthereactor's
lowercoreplaterevealedmorespiralwoundgasketdebristhanwouldhavebeenexpectedfromthefailureof1-IRV-311
discovered
inJanuaryof1996.Uptothispoint,allfailuresof-thespiralwoundgasketwere'believed
tobeisolatedtotheRHRHxbypassflowcontrolvalveusedinthenormalcooldowncircuit.Although1-1'RV-310and1-IRU-320
hadnoevidenceofleakage,theybecamesuspectasanotherpotential
sourceofdebris.Wheneachvalvewasdisassembled
foraninternalinspection,
theirdownstream
spiralwoundgasketswerefoundpartially
unwound."'.OnMarch3,1997,duringtheunit1RCS/ECCSasfoundpressureisolation
valve(PIV)leaktest,itwasdetermined
thattwoPIVcheckvalveshadfailedtheirleaktestduepresenceofgasketfragments.
Thisdebriswassubsequently
removedandanas-leftleaktestforallPIVSwasperformed
inApril1997todemonstrate
theclassIpressureboundarywasintactpriortothebeginninofcycle16.ingoCorrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchieved4.ThespiralwoundgasketswereremovedfromallRHRflowcontrolvalvesinbothunits.Corresponding
boltedconnections
arenowsealedwithfibrousgasketswhicharenotsusceptible
tothisformoferosioninducedbylocalized
turbulent
flow.TheRHRpipingnetworkbranches.
andECCSbranchesinbothunits1and2havebeenflushedtoremoveforeignmaterialdebris,including
gasketfragments.
Corrective
ActionsToAvoidPurtherUiolations
,Xtwasconfirmed
thatnootherincompatible
gasketdesignofthisnaturewasinstalled
inasystemreliedupontoachievesafeshutdownormitigatetheconsequences
ofanaccident.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page115.'DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFull'ompliance
wasachievedonMarch21,1997,whenthelastspiralwoundgasketswerereplacedfor1-IRV-310
and1-IRV-320.NRCViolation
3"10CFRPart50.72,paragraph
(b)(2)(i),
requiresthatanyevent,foundwhilethereactorisshutdown,that,haditbeenfoundwhilehereactorwasinoperation,
wouldhav'eresultedinthenuclearpowerplant,including
itsprincipal
safetybarriersbeingsananalyzed-condition
thatsigni.fi.cantly
compromises
plantsafety,bereportedtotheNRCwithinfourhoursofoccurrence.
Contrarytotheabove,thelicenseefailedtomakeatimelyreportinaccordance
with10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)whenonMarch21,1997,inspection
offlood-uptubesinUnit1identified
cracksinninetubesandtheequipment
associated
withtheseflood-uptubeswasdeclaredinoperable.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."ResonsetoNRCViolation
3Admission
orDenialoftheViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonsfortheViolation
The.primaryreasonfortheviolation
wasthelowemphasisplacedonresolution
ofanindeterminate
reportability
condition.
Environmental
qualification
(EQ)issuesarecomplex.Thepersonnel
whomadetheinitialreportability
decisionwhenthedegradedcondition
wasidentified
onunit1wereunfamiliar
withEQissuesastheyrelatetosystemandcomponent
operability.
Itwasdecidedtosubmitthecondition
forfurtherreportability
evaluation
viatheprocessembeddedinourcorrective
actionprogram.Theresulting
timetable
didnotappropriately
reflectNRCexpectations
forpromptlyevaluating
andreporting
degradedconditions.
Theparallelworktoinspect,evaluate,
andrepairtubesintheoperating
unit2,tookpriorityoverfurtherevaluation
oftheunit1conditions.
Thisprioritization
ofresources
wasappropriate
basedonthesafetysignificance
ofthecondition
intheoperating
unitversustheshutdownunit;however,itextendedanalreadyunacceptable
delayinthereporting
oftheunit1condition.
Acontributor
tothelengthofthedelayinreporting
wasthecompletion
oftheevaluation
toconfirmallinoperable
equipment.'his
providedfordetermination
ofthecompletesafetysignificance
priortomakingafinalreportability
determination.
Oftheoriginalninecrackedtubes,onlysevenresultedindeclaring
equipment
Twenty-threedeviceswereservicedbytheconduitinthesevenflooduptubes,andofthese,onlythirteendeviceswere.confirmed
tobeinoperable.
~~oiAttachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page13determination
thatthechangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed
safetquestion.
wesaeyContrarytotheabove,onMarch6,1997~,thelicenseeidentified
thataplexiglass
coverwasinstalled
belowthereturnairducttotheunit2controlroomwithoutaproper50'9safetyevaluation.
oehisplexiglass
coverhadthepotential
ofaffect'nth'CREVS).prabilityoftheunit2controlroomemergency
ventilation
tsysemThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."IResonse..to-NRC
Violation--4'.
Admission
orDenialofthe'AlleedViolation
iyiqpsrIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseofthisviolation
'sinadequate
procedural
guidance.
Specifically,
theprocedure
regarding
theadministrat'ion'f
"Temporary
Modifications",.1'2PMP5040.MOD.001,,
revision..5,definedatemporary
modification
(TM)asfollows:3.Anyconfiguration
changethatexistsonplantsystems,components,
orstructures,
(hereafter
referredtoasequipment)
whichdoesnotconformtoapprovedplantdrawings,
approvedvendordrawings,
orotherdesigndocuments
(i.e.,ECPs,EDSs,PDSs)andisbeingusedtomaintainoperation
oftheplant.Amodification
onanyequipment
beingreturnedtoservice,thoughnot.beingusedinsupportofplantoperations,
wherethemodification
hasthepotential
toadversely
affectplantequipment
orpersonriel
safety,shallbeconsidered
atemporary
modification.
Atthetimeoftheevent,installation
ofthedripcatchbasinsonthepanelsnearthecontrolroomemergency
ventilation
system(CREVS)intakeductswasnotconsidered
aTMpertheprocedure
becauseit,wasnottobeinstalled
onanoperating
system,andthe,basinswerenotrequiredtomaintainoperation
oftheplant.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedThedripcatchbasinswereremovedfrombothcontrolroomsonMarch6,1997,eliminating
potential
impactontheCREVS.*Testingofthe~CREVSwasconducted
inunit1onMarch13,1997,todetermine
systemperformance
withthedrip*,catchbasininstalled
belowthereturnairintakegrille.Thepanwasplacedinaconfiguration
whichmimickedtheintermittent
positionoftheunit2intakepanduringoperation
ofthesystemforblackouttesting.Thetestsperformed
verifiedcompliance
withT/S4.7.5.1andhabitability
dosecalculations.
J
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page14Theimpactontheunit1systemwasusedtoanalyzethestatusoftheunit2system,basedondataobtainedduringthelastsurveillance
testforunit2.Theresultfellwellwithintheacceptable
rangerequiredforoperability.
Basedonthetestfindingsandcapability
oftheunit2pressurization
system,theun'it2controlroomventilation
systemremainedoperable:with
thecatchbasinpartially'bstructing
theflow.4~5.Corrective
ActionstoAvoidFurtherViolations
TheTMprocedure,
'12-PMP5040.NOD.001,
willberevised'tostress-that-any-installation;-regardless
ofwhetherinstalled
oncanoperating
systemor,not,shouldbeconsidered
aTMifthereisreasonable
expectation
thatthepotential
existsto"adversely
impact~the
operation
ofanadjacentsystem.Thepxocedure
revisionwillbecompleted
byJune30,1997.IAsaninterimmeasureuntiltheprocedure
changecanbemade,management
willcommunicate
thiseventandtheirexpectations
regarding
theimplementation
oftheTMprocesstothose-employees
thatmay,beinvolvedinmakingthedecisiontoinvoketheTMprocess.ThiswillbedonebyJune.10,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBe.AchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonMarch6,1997,whenthebasinswereremoved.
ATTACHMENT
2TOAEP:NRC:1260C
RESPONSETONOTICEOFDEVIATION
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page1NoticeofDeviation
h"Duringan.NRCinspection
conducted
February16throughMarch29,1997,adeviation
ofyouractionscommitted
tointheupdatedFinalthe~~GSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)wasidentified.
~Inaccordanc
'theneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,NUREG-1600,'he
deviation
islistedbelow.UFSARSection7.4.1-stated,
inpart,"Thepowerrangechannelsarecapableofrecording
overpower
excursions
upto200percentoffullpower."'ontrary-'-to-the--above,-on-February
25;1997,theNRCinspectors
identified
threeoffourrecorderpens":inoperable
forthepowerrangechannelsthatwerecapableofrecording
overpower
excursions
upto200percentoffullpower.Xnaddition,
licenseepersonnel
statedthatsinceJuneof1991the-pen'sfailureratewassuchthatthepercentunavailability
averagewas14.9percent.Thepensfailureratewassuchthattheywerenotcapableofrecording,
overpower--
.=excursions."
ResonsetoNRCNoticeafDeviation
ReasonsfortheDeviation
Thedeviation
statesthattheresidentinspector
identifidthatthepowerrangechannelscapableofrecording
excursions
eupto200percentoffu11power,asdescribed
intheUFSAR,werefoundwiththree'fthefourchannelsincapable
ofperforming
thisfunction.
Anhistorical
reviewidentified
thatthisparticular
recording
capability
hasbeenchallenged
inthe.pastincluding
significant
periodsofrecorderunavailability.
Thecausefortheexcessive
failuresistherelativefragility
oftheservo-amplifier
electronics
andoverallage.The"fragility"
of'heelectronics
isexacerbated
bytheoriginaltimeresponsespecification
andbytheneedforspeciali2:ed
analogcomponents
(stateoftheartinthelate1960s)toperformthisfunction.
Theoriginaldesignphilosophy
wastocapturethespanoftheWestinghouse
NuclearInstrumentation
PowerRangechannels,
0-200percentpower.Inordertocapturethisrangeofpower,averyfastrecorderwasbelievedtoberequired.
Thetimeresponserequirements
haveledtoadesignthathasbeendifficult
andexpensive
tomaintain.
Veryfewreplacement
partsareavailable
fromthevendorandtheserecorders
willnotbeabletobemaintained
inthenearfuture.Theinoperability
periodsareinfluenced
bythefacttheserecorders
arenotqui'cklycorrected
whenidentified
asrequiring
service.Longrepair-by
dates-arestipulated
bytheworkcontrolprocessbasedontherecorders'egulatory
significance
andthelackofoperational
usefulness
onadailybasis.Nosurveillance
dataisrequiredbyoperators
~ontheserecorders
andthenormalpowerlevelisrecordedondifferent
instruments
inthecontrolroom.Thisledtothe.lackofattention'o
theserecorders
bycontrolroomoperations
personnel.
a~~Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1260C
Page22.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchieved3.Coxrective
actionwastakenconcerning
thethreefailuresnotedinthisdeviation.
Theunit2recorder2-SG-14wascalibrated
andthefailedpenreturnedtoserviceonMarch13,1997.Unit1wasinarefueling
outageandtheconcernswereaddressed
insection3ofthisresponse.
Corrective
ActionstoAvoidFurtherDeviations
Thecorrective
actionstoavoidfurtherdeviations
includeimproving
thecontrolboardmonitoring
toidentifysubstandard=-equipment,--increase
importance
ofallcontrolroominstrumentation/recorders
intheworkcontrolprocess,andupdatethespecificrecorders
mentioned
inthisdeviation
toalloweaseintheirmaintenance.
4,Theseactionswereaccomplished
bythefollowing
changes:Theoperations
department
standardOPP-1,"ControlRoomControlBoardMonitox'ing
DuringNon-emergency
Operation
Conditions",
wasrevisedtostresstheimportance
ofcontrolroompanelawareness
duringeverydayoperation.
Thisissuewasdiscussed
atthefollowing
shiftmanager's
meetingandcommunicated
totheoperatorcrews.Theworkcontrolstandardthatplacedtimerequirements
ontherepairofcriticalcontrolroomrecorders
'asrevisedtoincludeallcontrolroomrecorders.
Controlroomrecorders
requiring
maintenance
shallbeprioritized
tobewoxkedwithinfivetofourteendaysasdetermined
bytheoperations
department
asperthe1997AEPNGGsiteoperating
andmaintenance
plan.TheTracorWestronics
recorders
wereremovedfromunit1andtheirpointsplacedonanexistingYokogawarecorderinthecontrolroom.Similarchangesareplannedfortheunit2controlroominstrumentation.
Theserecorders
willalloweasiermaintenance
andthusreducetheunavailability.
DateWhenCorrective
ActionWillbeColetedTheunit1corrective
actionswexecompleted
priortotherestartaftextherefueling
outage.Unit2corrective
actionswillbecompleted
duringthenextrefueling
outagescheduled
for.thefallof1997.