ML17333A842
| ML17333A842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1997 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17333A841 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704080224 | |
| Download: ML17333A842 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1996013
Text
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircieD;i'eBuclanan.III491071395INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERMarch12,1997AEP:NRC:1238F10CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTIONREPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)AND50-316/96013(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONSThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG.E.Grant,datedFebruary4,1997,thatforwardedanoticeofthreeviolationsandonenoticeofdeviationtoIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Theviolationsandthedeviationwereidentifiedduringasystemoperationalperformanceinspection(SOPI)ofthecentrifugalchargingsystemportionoftheemergencycorecoolingsystemsandtheresidualheatremovalsystems.OurresponsewasduetoyouonMarch6,1997;however,werequestedabriefextensiontorecoverthetimedelayfromwhenthereportwasissuedtowhenitwasreceived.Theexten'sionwasgrantedbyRonGareerofRegionIII,onFebruary14,1997.Thethreeviolationsaddressedthe1)failuretoestablishadequateinstructions/failuretofollowproceduresasrelatedtocollectionofanoilsample,andadequateminimumthreadengagementacceptancecriteria;2)inadequatetestcontrolasrelatedtoincorporatingchargingpumpacceptancelimitsintotheISTprogram;and3)failuretoperformadequate/timelycorrectiveactions,asrelatedtodeterminingthecorrectoilsight-glassfillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,addressingequipmentdeficiencytaggingproblems,andlocating/reconstitutingacentrifugalchargingpumpnetpositivesuctionheadcalculation.ThedeviationwasfromactionscommittedtoinNUREG-0737specificallyinvolvingthesourcetermusedforaradiologicalevaluation.'7704080224'970403PDRADOCK050003158PDR
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U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC:1238FOurreplytotheviolationsanddeviationareprovidedintheattachmenttothisletter.Alsoincludedaretheresultsofourreviewoftechnicalspecificationclarifications,whichwecommittedtoperformattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Thereplydoesnotcontainanypersonalprivacy,proprietary,orsafeguardsinformation.Sincerely,PCwp-E.E.FitpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHs/XDAYQP)~'997NotaryPublicMyCommissionExpires:2/CrPING/vlbAttachmentJANlCEhl.BIG!<ERSNoeyPub5c,88menCcunlY,MQyQ0mmrsscpEyp;reFob,<6,2N$cc:A.A.Blind&3L"%%~8eachh'~:qMDEQ-DWRRPDNRCResidentInspectorJ.R.'adgett
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ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1238FREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:NRCINSPECTIONREPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)AND50-316/96013(DRS)
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage1DuringanNRCsystemoperationalperformanceinspectionconductedNovember18throughDecember13,1996,ontheemergencycorecoolingsystemportionofthecentrifugalchargingsystemandresidualheatremovalsystemthreeviolationsandonedeviationwereidentified.Inaccordancewiththe"GeneralStatementofPolicyandProceduresforNRCEnforcementActions,"(NUREG-1600)theviolationsandtheresponsesareprovidedbelow.Additionally,wewererequestedtorespondtothedeviation,andtoprovideinformationrelatedtoacommitmentregardingtechnicalspecification(T/S)clarificationsmadeattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Ourresponsetotheseitemsisalsoprovidedbelow.NRCViolationA"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,'Instructions,Procedures,andDrawings,'equires,inpart,thatactivitiesaffectingqualityshallbeprescribedbyinstructions,procedures,ordrawingsofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancesandshallbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththeseinstructions,procedures,ordrawings.Maintenanceprocedure12MHP5021.001.009,Revision8,'TorqueSelection,'atedMarch21,1994,requiresthreadengagementofatleast80percentofnutheight.Contrarytotheabove:OnDecember4,1996,thei"spectorsidentifiedthatamaintenanceworkpackageforthe1Ecentrifugalchargingpump,anactivityaffectingquality,~failedtoincludeadequateinstructionsforlubeoilsamplecollection.OnNovember20,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatmaintenanceprocedureMDS-600,'GeneralErectionTolerancesforPipeandTubeSupports/Restraints,'asnotofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancessinceitfailedtocontainadequateminimumthreadengagementacceptancecriteriaforactivitiesaffectingquality.3.OnNovember21,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatmaintenancepersonnelfailedtoperformboltingonsafety-relatedequipmentinaccordancewithmaintenanceprocedure12MHP5021.001.009,'TorqueSelection.'saresult,nutsassociatedwithemergencycorecoolingsystemequipmentwereidentifiedwiththreadengagementlessthan80percentofnutheight.ThisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationAl1.AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationindianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.ReasonfortheViolationThereasonfortheviolationwasfailuretoremoveoilsamplinginstructionsfromapplicablerecurringtasksthatwereno'cngerneededafterimplementationofaformaloilsamplingprogram.
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage2TheinstructionsfoundinthejoborderactivityassociatedwiththeworkonthelEcentrifugalchargingpumpinstructedpersonnelto:"Drainoilfromfilterintoacontainer.A.DeliveroilfromCUNOfiltertochemlabforanalysis.(Theresultswillgototheengineersforevaluationofwearinsystem)."Thejoborderactivityinstructionsweredevelopedpriortoimplementationofourformaloilanalysisprogram.Atthetimeitwasinputasarecurringtask,itwasintendedtoprovidearoughindicationofgrossmachineproblems.Subsequently,aformaloilanalysisprogramwasimplemented,withproceduralizedsamplingtechniquesbeingutilizedbychemistrypersonnel.Underthissamplingprogram,donequarterly(asopposedtofilterchange-outsthataredoneyearly),wear,particlesofconsiderablylesssizethanthosedetectedviathefilterchange-outmethodcanbedetected,thusgivingmuchearlierindicationofmachineproblems.Theinstructionsintherecurringtaskwereinadvertentlyleftinplaceaftertheformalprogramwasinstituted.Theoilcollectedviatheseinstructionsisnotanalyzedbychemistrypersonnel;anddecisionsastotheconditionoftheequipmentarenotbasedor.thesesamples.3.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstructionsrequiringfiltercontentevaluationwereremovedfromthechargingpumprecurringtasksonFebruary11,1997~The1EchargingpumplubeoilwassampledbychemistrypersonnelonSeptember12,1996,priortothefilterchange-outobservedonDecember4,1996,consistentwiththeformaloilanalysisprogram.4.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsA:eviewoflubeoilchangesrelatedtoequipmentincludedintneoilanalysisprogramwasconducted.Similarwordingwasfoundinrecurringtasksforthemotor-drivenandturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.Thisredundantwordingwillberemovedpriortothenextrequireddateforfilterchange-outforthisequipment.5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonFebruary11,1997,whentheredundantinstructionswereremovedfromthefourchargingpump'srecurring.tasks.ResonsetoNRCViolationA26A31.AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage3ReasonfortheViolationThecauseoftheviolation,ascitedinA3,isacombinationofthewayworkwasdocumentedandadherencetoproceduralrequirementsthatwereinconsistent.ThereferencetoMDS-600,citedinA2,asa"maintenanceprocedure"requiresclarification.MDS-600isnotaprocedure,itisadesignstandardthatprovidestolerancesforinstallationandevaluationofas-foundconditionsforpiping/tubingsupports.MDS-600isnotanapplicablereferenceandthereisnohierarchialconnectionbetweenMDS-600and**12MHP5021.001.009.3.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedEightconditionreportswerewrittentodocumenttheinspectionteam'sconcerns.Operabilityreviewswereperformedbasedontheidentifieddeficiencies,andtheaffectedequipmentwasdeterminedtobeoperable.Workhistoryforeachcomponentwasreviewedtoassistindeterminingthepotentialcause(s).Ingeneral,thisreviewidentifiedageneraltimeframewhenthedeficiencywascreated,butnotaspecificworkactivity.Actionrequestswerewrittentocorrectthedeficiencywhereanactionrequestdidnotalreadyexist,orthedeficiencywasevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableasis.4.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsMaintenancestandingorder,MSO.009,wasissuedonFebruary3,1997.Thisdocumentestablishesanacceptancecriteriaof"flushorbetter"forthreadengagement.Further,itprovidesapolicyfordocumentingas-foundthreadengagementdeficienciessotheycanbeevaluatedandcorrected.Lastly,thepolicyprovidesforin-plantidentificationoflessthanflushthreadengagementthathasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptabl.Thisstandingorderstrengthensmanagementexpectationsforthreadengagementandestablishesamechanismforidentificationofanalyzed,acceptableconditions.Awalkdownwasperformedofarandomsampleofplantcomponentsofsufficientsizetoprovidea99%confidencelevelthatthesecomponentsareastatisticallyvalidsampleoftheplanepopulationofcomponents.Theas-foundconfigurationofthefastenersassociatedwiththesecomponentswasevaluated.Therewerenofasteneranomaliesidentifiedthataffectedcomponentfunctionalityoroperability.Plantmanagementhasreinforcedproceduraladherencetoallplantpersonnel.**12MHP5021.001.009wasenhancedbytheadditionofacceptancecriteriaofflushthreadsorbetter.
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC.:1238F5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage4FullcompliancewasachievedonMarch10,1997.Atthattimetheoriginal28NRC-identifiedthreadengagementdeficiencieswereanalyzedasnotaffectingoperability/quality;existingprocedures,policies,andstandardswereupgraded;andthefindingsofthethreadengagementrandomsampleconcludedthattherewerenofunctionality/operabilityconcernscausedbythreadengagementdeficienciesassociatedwithanyofthesampledcomponents.NRCViolationB"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXZ,'TestControl,'equires,inpart,thatatestprogrambeestablishedtoassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstratethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinserviceisidentifiedandperformedinaccordancewithwrittentestprocedureswhichincorporatetherequirementsandacceptancelimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocuments.TechnicalSpecification3.1.1.1,'ShutdownMargin-Tavegreaterthan200'F,'pecifiesaborationcapabilityof10gallonsperminute(gpm)of20,000partspermillion(ppm)boronsolutionorequivalent.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember11,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthecorrectacceptancelimitstoassurethatthecentrifugalchargingpumpscouldperformtheirboroninjectionfunctionasspecifiedinTechnicalSpecification3.1.1.1hadnotbeenincorporatedinthelicensee'sinservicetesting(ZST)program.ThisisaSeverityLevelZVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationBAdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.Reason'fortheViolationThereasonfortheviolationwasthatareviewtodetermineapplicabilitytotheZSTprogramwasnotconductedpriortoissuanceofatechnicalspecification(T/S)clarificationonT/S3.1.1.1.T/S3.1.1.1,ShutdownMargin-T,~greaterthan2004Fprovidesshutdownmarginrequirementswhileinmodes1,2,3,or4.TheactionstatementforT/S3.1.1.1requiresimmediateandcontinuousborationatgreaterthanorequalto10gpmofasolutioncontaininggreaterthanorequalto20,000ppmboronor"equivalent".Westinghouseperformedananalysistoclarifythemeaningofthisstatementiftherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)wasusedasasourceofboratedwater.Westinghousedefined"equivalence"as"xenonburnoutequivalence",whichisthecapabilitytoinjectsufficientborontoadjustaoronconcentrationtocompensateforxenonburnoutfromitspeakvalueTheiranalysisassumedaplanttripfollowedbyastepreturnto100%.power
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage5atpeakxenonconcentration.Znaddition,theyassumedthatthereactorwouldbemaintainedatfullpowerduringthetransient.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedthatacentrifugalchargingpump(CCP)flowof120gpmfromtheRWSTcouldcompensateforxenonthroughoutthetransientifcertainrestrictionswereobserved.OnNovember5,1990,arevisiontoT/Sclarificationno.7wasissued,whichdefinedthe120gpmofRWSTwatercontaining2400ppmboronasanacceptablesourceofwatertosatisfyborationflowrequirementsforT/S3.1.1.1.DevelopmentandissuanceofthisT/SclarificationwasnotcoupledwithareviewofthetestprogramtoensurethetestprogramconfirmedtheabilityoftheCCPstoperformthisfunction.Thisdeficiencywasidentifiedbyourengineersduringeffortstorespondtoaninspector'squestiononthedesignfunctionsoftheCCPsduringtheinspection.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedFollowingidentificationofthisdeficiency,acalculationwasperformedtodeterminethemaximumdegradationtheCCPscouldtoleratewhilestill~eingabletodeliver120gpmofRWSTwatertothereactorcoolantsystem.ThiscalculationrevealedthattheCCPscouldtolerateadegradationof9.5%forUnit1and3.5%forUnit2.AreviewofZSTdataasfarbackas1990determinedthatthepumpswerecapableofperformingthisfunction.TheZSTprogramhasbeenrevisedtoincludelimitationsforallowabledegradationoftheCCPstoensurethat120gpmof2400ppmboroncouldbesuppliedfromtheRWST.Additionally,asapointofinformation,sincetheoriginalanalysisbyWestinghouse,whichdefinedthe120gpmvalueof2400ppmboronincludedaveryconservativeassumptionthatastepincreaseinpowerto100%occurredwhileatpeakxenon,areanalysiswasperformedusingamorerealisticramprateof10'k/hr,whichisalimitationcontainedinplantprocedures.ThisreanalysisindicatedthattheborationflowrequirementsofT/S3.1.1.1couldbesatisfiedbyaslittleas60.1gpmof2400ppmboron.WemayrelaxtheallowabledegradationfortheCCPsbasedonthisrevised60.1gpmflow.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations'ailuretoensurethetestprogramfortheCCPsincludedprovisionstoensuretheCCPscoulddeliver120gpmof2400ppmboronoccurredasaresultoffailuretocouplethedevelopmentandissuanceofaT/Sclarificationwithappropriatereviewsofthetestprogram.AsnotedintheSOPZreport,severalexampleswereidentifiedwhereT/Sclarificationscouldnotbejustified.Duringtheexitmeeting,wecommittedtoperformareviewofallofourT/Sclarifications.Theresultsofthisreviewarecontainedinthe"Commitment"'ectionofthisattachment.Additionally,asnoted,improvementswillbemadeintheT/Sclarificaticnreviewprocesstoensureanadequatetechnicalreviewoffutureclarifications.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage6DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember18,1996,whentheISTprogramwasrevisedtoincludeappropriatelimitstoensurethateachunits'CPscansupply120gpmof2400ppmboronfromtheRWST.ViolationC"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXVI,'CorrectiveActions,'equires,inpart,thatmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoquality,suchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivematerialandequipment,andnonconformancesarepromptlyidentifiedandcorrected.Contrarytotheabove:2.3.Correctiveactionstoaddresspotentiallyinaccuratesight-glassfillmarksforsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,aconditionadversetoquality,werenotinitiateduntilNovember27,1996,althoughin1995joborderswerewrittentoaddresspotentiallyinaccuratesight-glassfillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,andonMarch6,1996,anactionrequestwaswrittentodeterminecorrectsight-glassfillmarksonsafety-related.pumpsandmotors.OnDecember5,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthelicenseefailedtotakecorrectiveactionstoeitherlocateorre-constituteacentrifugalchargingpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)calculationalthoughthecalculationhadbeenidentifiedasmissingabout18monthsearlier.OnDecember4,1996,theinspectorsdeterminedthatthelicenseefailedtotaketimelycorrectiveactionstoaddressequipmentdeficiencytaggingproblems.Althoughthelicenseehadidentifiedthatabout30percentofplantcomponentsinthework'controlsystemreviewedinathreeweekperiodwerenotproperlytaggedinthefield,correctiveactionstoairessthisconcernhadnotbeeninitiated.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationClAdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationThecauseoftheuntimelyresponseforguidanceonplantpump/motoroilfilllevelswasthelackofacommunicationprotocolresultinginanunrecognizedrequesttoengineeringpersonnelfromoperationspersonnelfortechnicalassistance.Therequestforassistancewasmadebymeansofanactionrequest.Requestsforengineeringdirectionaremadewithinthenuclearplantmaintenance(NPM)computersystembymeansofanevaluationrequest.Differentsearchesarerequiredtolocateactionrequestsandevaluationrequests.Engineeringpersonneldidnotsearchactionrequestsbecausetheywerenotanexpectedmeansforrequestingassistance.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage7Therequestforguidanceonplantpump/motoroilfilllevelswasbroughttoengineeringmanagement'sattentionapproximatelyfivemonthsaftertheaction-equestwasinitiated.Atthattimeengineeringpersonnelbeganworktoprovidetherequestedguidance.ThebackgroundresearchwascompletedandtheguidanceissuedonDecember5,1996.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTherequestedinformationonpump/motoroilfilllevelswasprovidedonDecember5,1996.Asearchofactionrequestsassignedtoengineeringpersonnelhasbeenperformedtoensuretheresponsiblegroupsareawareofassignments.Additionally,asaninterimaction,plantpersonnelhavebeeninstructedtomakedailysearchestoensurenonewactionrequestsforengineeringassistancegounrecognized.4,CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsAnacceptablemethodforrequestingengineeringassistancewillbedevelopedbyMarch21,1997'.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember5,1996,whentherequestedtechnicalguidancewasprovided.ResonsetoNRCViolationC2AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationInJune1995,aspartofthedesignbasisdocumentation(DBD)program,itwasidentifiedthattheNPSHcalculationfortheCCPscauldnotbelocated.ADBDactionitemwasinit'atedinaccordancewithDBDprogramprocedures.Thisitemwasclassifiedasaninstanceofa"missingreferencedocument",acategorizationwithanormalresolutiontimeof60days.EngineeringpersonnelinvolvedintheclassificationofthisitemwereawarethatanNPSHcalculationfortheCCPshadbeenperformedatonetime,.eventhoughitcouldnotbelocated.Operabilitywasnotconsideredtobeaconcernbecauseitwasknownthatthecalculationhadbeenperformedbutcouldnotbefound.Therefore,ahighprioritywasnotplaceuonreconstitutingthecalculationorresolvingtheDBDactionitem.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedAsnotedintheSOPIreport,anewcalculationwascompletedpriortoandapprovedduringtheSOPIinspection,whichconfirmedadequateNPSHtotheCCPs.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsFollowingtheSOPIinspection,areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswasperformed,byJanuary15,1997,toassess
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage8theappropriatenessoftheirclassification.AseriesofadditionalDBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrectiveactionsystem(viaconditionreports)asaresultofthisreview.Thecorrectiveactionsystemincludesrequir'ementsfordeterminingoperabilityinatimelymanner.Entryintothecorrectiveactionsystemensuresareviewoftheseissuesbyourconditionassessmentgroup(CAG).Initsoversightfunction,theCAGassessestheneedandmakesassignmentsforconfirmatoryoperabilitydeterminationsorsupplemental.analysis.BeginninginJanuary1997,additionalresourceswereaddedtotheDBDprojecttoenablepromptclosureofDBDactionitems.Specifically,theDBDprojectmanagerposition,whichhadbeenvacantsinceSeptember1996,wasfilledandtwoadditionalutilitypersonnelandtwocontractpersonnelwereassignedtotheproject.Thesepersonnelareaggressivelypursuing,resolutionofopenDBD'actionitems.Thisaugmentationofpersonnelwill.continuethroughlate1997,bywhichtimeweexpecttohavemadesignificantprogressintheclosureofDBDactionitems.Additionally,wearetrainingmembersofourstaff,whohaveownershipoftheDBDs,toensuretheyunderstandtheimportanceofpromptlyresol"ingDBDactionitemsandalsotoensuretheyclearlyunderstandtheprocessforeffectingclosureoftheseitems.ThistrainingcommencedinearlyFebruary1997andwillbecompletedbyMarch15,1997.Finally,theDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthenedtolimitthenumberofava.'lableclassificationsforDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensivereviewofactionitemsbyappropriatepersonnel.Projectinstructionsrelatedtoactionitemprocessingarebeingrevised.TheserevisionswillbecompletedbyMarch28,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember2,1996,whenanewcalculationwasapprovedwhichconfirmedadequateNPSHtotheCCPs.ResonsetoNRCViolationC3AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationTheprimaryreasonfortheviolationisthatplantpersonnelwerenotsufficientlyawareoftheguidanceregardingwhentohangdeficiencytagsforcorrectivemaintenance.Thiswasfurthercompoundedbythelackofclarityprovidedbytheadministrativerequirementsthatdefinedefi-iencytaghangingrequirements.Further,conditionreportswerenotgeneratedwhenmissingdeficiencytagswereidentifiedtopromptappropriateactionsviatheplant's,correctiveactionprogram.Whilewritten
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage9memorandaidentifyingthemissingdeficiencytagsweregenerated,conditionreportswerenotwrittenandtherefore,appropriateattentionandfollow-throughwerenotinstituted.Znallcasesevaluated,theworkcontrolprocesshadcapturedtheidentifieddegradedcomponent,ensuringthatthedeficientconditionwouldbecorrectedinatimelymanner.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedRecentplantmanagementactionshavebeentakentoimprovefocusonpromptlyidentifyingproblemsandcorrectiveactionsdealing-withconditionsadversetoplantrequirements.AconditionreportwaspromptlywrittenwhentheNRCnotedthelackoftimelycorrectiveactiontoaddresstheidentifieddeficiencytaggingissue.Theconditionreport1)proposesthatthematerialconditiongroupreplacemissingtagswhendiscovered,2)recommendschangestothegoverningdocumentNPM-02CM,and3)requestsassistancefromcomputerpersonneltomodifyexistingNPMsoftwaretobettersupporttherehangingoftags.Thepersonnelresponsibleforident'yingmissingdeficiencytagswerecoachedontheexpectationtogenerateadditionalconditionreportsinthefuture.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsByApril1,1997,thegoverningdocument.detailingwhenandhowtotagdeficiencieswillberevisedandappropriatepersonnelwillbemadeawareof"therevisedrequirements.Also,asofApril1,1997,actionrequestsgeneratedthathavenotmetthereviseddeficiencytaggingrequirementswillbereturnedtotheoriginatingpersonnelforresolutionbeforetheactionrequestwillbeprocessedfurther.BySeptember1,1997,systemwalkdownswillhavebeenperformedtoverifythatdeficiencytagsassociatedwithexistingcorrectivemaintenanceactionrequests(thosegeneratedbeforeApril1,1997),complywiththerevisedrequirements.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewillbeachievedbyApril1,1997,whenthedeficiencytaggingrequirementshavebeenrevisedandappropriatepersonnelhavebeenmadeawareofthoserequirements.Further,conditionreportswillbewrittenasofApril1,1997,foranydeficiencytagnotincompliancewiththerevisedrequirement(regardlessofwhentheactionrequestandassociateddeficiencytagsweregenerated).
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FDeviationPage10Inadditiontotheabovethreeviolations,thenoticeofviolationcontained'thefollowingnoticeofdeviation,whichisaddressedbelow.DEV50-31596013-09DRSandDEV50-31696013-09DRS'"DuringanNRCinspectionconductedNovember18throughDecember13,1996,adeviationofyouractionscommittedtoinNUREG-0737,SectionIZ.B.2wasidentified.Inaccordancewiththe'GeneralStatementofPolicyandProceduresforNRCEnforcementActions,'UREG-1600,thedeviationislistedbelow:NUREG-0737,SectionZI.B.2,'DesignReviewofPlantShieldingandEnvironmentalQualificationofEquipmentforSpaces/SystemsWhichMayBeUsedinPostaccidentOperations,'equiresthat50percentofthetotaliodineand100percentofthenoblegasesareassumedtobereleasedfromthefuel~inthedesignbasisaccidentradiologicalanalysis.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember4,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthelicenseefailedtocorrectlytranslateSectionZZ.B.2ofNUREG-07~7intothecentrifugalchargingpumpemergencyleakoffvalvefailuredesignbasisaccidentradiologicalanalysis.Asaresult,onlyonepercentfueldamagewasassumedintheanalysisandresultedindoseestimateslowerthanrevisedcalculatedvalues."ResonsetoNRCDeviationReasonfortheDeviationInAugust1991,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentscenariorunontheplantsimulatoridentifiedaflowpaththathadthepotentialtodivertwaterawayfromtheemergencycorecoolingsystemandcontainmentbuilding.Theflowpathwasfromthesafetyinjectionsystem(SIS)cetrifugalchargingpumpdischargethroughanemergencyleakoffvalve,throughthereactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturnlinesafetyvalvetothevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthroughtheVCTsafetyvalvetothechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemholduptanks.ThisconditionwasdocumentedinLER91-007-00.Areviewwasconductedtoassessthesafetyconsequenceandimplicationsofthepostulatedevent.Analysisofthepotentialdoseratefromthedivertedwatertothewholebodyatthesiteboundarywascalculatedtobeinsignificantcomparedtothe10CFR100accidentdoselimitandevenwiththe10CFR20.105doselimitsforunrestrictedareasduringnormaloperations,basedontheassumptionof1%failedfuelsLER91-007-01providedoriginalcorrectiveactionforthisscenario.ThescenarioofconcernoccursfollowingtheswitchoveroftheCCPsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetanktotherecirculationsumpviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.WiththeRHRpumpssupplyingsuctiontotheCCPs,thepressureintheCCPemergencyleakoff(ELO)linescouldbeinexcessofthedownstreamsafetyvalvesetpressure,andthenapproximately60gpmflowwouldbedivertedfromtheECCStotheVCT.Correctiveactionsforthisscenarioincludedemergencyoperatingprocedure(EOP)
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage11modificationstoclosethechargingpumpELOvalvesaspartoftheswitchoverfrominjectiontorecirculationphasewheretheECCSpumpstakesuctionfromtherecirculationsump.InJune1995,aspartofourDBDprogram,itwasidentifiedthattheEOPsnotedabovecanbeimplemented,butwerenotsinglefailureproof.TheDBDprogramincludesaprocesstoidentify,classify(withrespecttosafetysignificance),andresolveactionitemsidentifiedduringthedevelopmentofDBDs.ADBDaction'temwascreatedtodocumentthatintheeventthesinglefailureisanELOvalvethat'cannotbeisolated,theleakagepathtotheVCTwouldstillpersist.WithintheDBDprogram,thisissuewasclassifiedasadiscrepancythatwasnotsafetysignificant,basedontheanalysisdescribed,aboveanddocumentedinLER91-007.TherelianceontheprioranalysisinLER91-007,whichprovidedapracticalassessmentofsafetysignificanceper10CFR50.73,toclassifytheDBDactionitemasanon-significantdiscrepancywasincorrectbecauseitdidnotconsiderdesignbasisassumptionsforsourcetermperNUREG-0737.ThemisclassificationoftheDBDactionitemwasmadebyengineeringpersonn1whoincorrectlyassumedthattheanalysispresentedinLER91-007wasalsoanadequatebasisforclassificationofthDBDactionitem.2.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheEOPshavebeenmodifiedtoinstucttheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.Flowthroughtheidlepumpofupto5.2gpmmaystillexist;therefore,instructionshavebeenaddedtoisolatethevalvemanually.(The5.2gpmiswithinthe10gpmvalueforoutsidecontainmentleakagepreviouslyevaluatedanddeterminedacceptableregardingoffsiteandcontrolroomdoses.)Themaximumdose'topersonnelexpectedtoisolatethevalveis0.28rem24hoursaftertheaccidentoccurs.3.CorrectireAction'sTakentoAvoidFurtherDeviationsFollowingtheSOPIinspection,areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswascompletedonJanuary15,1997,toassesstheappropriatenessoftheirpreviousclassification.AseriesofadditionalDBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrectiveactionsystemasaresultofthisreview.EntryintothecorrectiveactionsystemensuresathoroughscreeningoftheseissuesbytheCAGforassignmenttotheappropriateorganizationforresolution.Thecorrectiveactionsystemincludesrequirementsfordeterminingoperabilityinatimelymanner.Initsoversightfunction,theCAGasse'ssestheneedandmakesassignmentsforconfirmatoryoperabilitydeterminationsorsupplementalanalysis.TheDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthenedtolimitthenumberofavailableclassificationsforDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensivereviewofactionitemsbyappropriatepersonnel.Projectinstructionsrelatedtoactionitemprocessingarebeingrevised.TheserevisionswillbecompletedbyMarch28,1997.
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238F4.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage12CorrectiveactionwascompletedonDecember13,1996,whenchanges"eremadetotheEOPstoinstructtheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage13CommitmentTheinspectionreportrequestedwerespondinwritingregardingourreviewofT/Sclarifications.Thenoticeofviolationcontainedthefollowingdiscussion."Thelicenseehad37technicalspecificationclarifications(TSCs)ineffect.TheinspectorsreviewedtheTSCslistedbelowandquestionedwhetherthelicenseecouldprovidetechnicaljustificationtosupporttheTSCs.Subsequently,thelicenseedeterminedthatthefollowingclarificationscouldnotbetechnicallyjustifiedandshouldbecanceled:TSC¹14TSC¹l5TSC¹48AirborneRadioactivityMonitorOperabilityDieselGeneratorSurveillanceRuns-Paralleled.GridTechnicalspecification(TS)4.8.1.1.2.F.2LeakTestingofADandCDFuelOilTanksandAssociatedPipingTheinspectorsdidnotidentifyanypastuseoftheaboveTSCsthatresultedinexceedingtheactionrequirementsoftheassociatedtechnicalspecification.TheinspectorsconcludedthatthesafetysignificanceoftheTSCerrorswereminimal.Theinspectorsconcludedthatthelicensee'sapprovalofTSCswithoutappropriatetechnicaljustificationwasaweakness.Attheend,oftheinspection,thelicenseecommittedtoreviewallremainingTSCstoensuretheywerestillnecessaryandcouldbejustified."ReviewScoeTheNRCinspectionreportindicatedthat37TSCswereineffectatthetimeoftheinspection.AreviewoftheactiveTSCsfromthe,TSCindexindicatedthattherewereactually35activeTSCs.ThethreeTSCsdiscussedintheinspectionreportwerecanceled.ThescopeoftheTSCreviewwasoftheremaining32activeTSCs.ObservationandFindinsNineTSCswerecanceledTheyareasfollowsTSC¹5TSC¹12TSC¹26TSC¹37TSC¹38TSC¹45TSC¹47TSC¹60TSC¹61Operable-OperabilityDefinition-AttendantXnstrumentationD.C.Distribution-OperatingSteamGeneratorStopValveOperabilityDefinitionofMaintenanceonEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemValvesTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpOperabilitySnubberFunctional'estRetestResults10CFR50AppendixREquipmentOperabilityAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemandEssentialServiceWaterSystemAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemSurveillanceRequirementsOfthisgroup,twoTSCs(¹5and¹12),werecanceledduetoinsufficienttechnicalbasestosupporttheimpliedoperabilityprovidedbytheTSC.ThreeTSCs(¹37,¹60and¹61)werecanceled
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage14astheywereimplementedinamannerinconsistentwithcurrentexpectations.FourTSCs(¹26,¹38,¹45and¹47)weredeterminedtobeunnecessary.OneTSC(¹65),boricacidtransferpumpoperability,wasrevisedtoproperlyreflectitstechnicalbases(refertosection08.1oftheNRCinspectionreport).Theremaining22TSCsremainactive.ConclusionBasedonthereviewoftheexistingTSCs,itfollowsthattheTSCswerenotwelldefinedandwereimplementedinamannerinconsistentwithcurrentexpectations.The,programwasutilizedtocapturemanyeventdrivendecisionsthatwouldmoreappropriatelyfitanoperabilityprogram,orshouldbetranslatedintoapprovedproceduralcontrols.AnimprovedTSCprogramwillbedevelopedbyJune27,1997.Thisprogramwillprovideareviewofproposednewclarificationstoensureadequatetechnicaljustificationispresentpriortoapproval,andthataclarificationdoesnotchangeoraltertherequirementofthespecificationbeingclarified.Additionally,thenewprogramwillreg'uireplantimpactreviewsaspartoftheimplementationprocess.Theimpactreviewswillensureappropriatereviewandincorporationofclarificationinformationintoplantproceduresandprograms'heimpactreviewprocessisbeingincorporatedintotheimplementationprocesstoaddressaSOPIconcerninvolvingintegrationofTSC¹7intotheplant'sISTprogram.