05000346/FIN-2012004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Inadequate Administrative Controls Result in Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator and Essential Direct Current Distribution Equipment During Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Technical Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources Shutdown, LCO 3.8.2(b) requires that one EDG capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E ac electrical power distribution subsystems required by LCO 3.8.10 be maintained operable in Modes 5 and 6, and during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Inadequate Administrative Controls Result in Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator and Essential Direct Current Distribution Equipment During Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies As discussed in Section 4OA3.1 of this report, contrary to this requirement, licensee personnel failed to maintain EDG No.1 operable during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies from approximately 10:31 p.m. on May 19, 2012, until all movement of irradiated fuel was completed at approximately 6:00 p.m. on May 20, 2012, and then again during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the SFP during various periods on May 21 22, 2012. A licensee causal evaluation team concluded that this error resulted from less than adequate administrative controls for maintaining dc system power source operability with the distribution network cross-tied while in the cold shutdown and refueling plant conditions. The objective of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). A key attribute of this objective is configuration control, and specifically, control of operating and shutdown equipment alignment. In accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective. The licensees failure to maintain adequate administrative control over the operability of DC Train No. 1, such that it was allowed to be realigned to support EDG No. 1 operability without first being declared operable itself, caused EDG No. 1 to be rendered inoperable when it was required by TS to be operable during periods of irradiated fuel movement. As discussed in Section 4OA3.1 of this report, the licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2012-08422. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee included placing a hold on the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the SFP, and initiation of a Mode 6 entry hold to preclude core refueling until the issue could be resolved. In addition, the licensee immediately began performing the reviews necessary to support TS operability for DC Train No. 1. Other subsequent corrective actions performed by the licensee included a revision to the station DC switching procedure to ensure operability prior to distribution panel transfers, revision to applicable pre-job briefings, enhancements to the outage schedule to address DC power source availability, and a case study on DC system restoration during outages. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
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| Report | IR 05000346/2012004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Neurauter A Wilson D Kimble J Bozga J Cameron T Briley |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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