ML17228B189
| ML17228B189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1995 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B188 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506280119 | |
| Download: ML17228B189 (29) | |
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3/4.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCSSAFETYINJECTIONTANKS5tT)LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.5.1EachreactorcoolantsystemsafetyinjectiontankshallbeOPERABLEwith:a.Theisolationvalveopen,b.Between10'70and1170cubicfeetofboratedwater,c.Aminimumboronconcentration.of1720PPM,andd.Anitrogencover-pressureofbetween200and250psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2and3.*ACTION:ofacloseOPERABLEstatoursalve,res'erabletanktooor~MHOTSHUTDOWNwithinsaeyingectionansnoperaeueovalvebeingc,erimmediately-opeeisolationvalveorbeinHOTSTDSY~4tlriwonbeinHOTSHUTDOWN'M~enext8hours.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSandnitrogencover-pressureinax~~'AhtnWheehiui+sVerifyingthateachsafetyinjectiontankisolationvalveisopen.l.Verifinthe~kthetanksand,2.4.5.1EachsafetyinjectiontankshallbedemonstratedOPERABLE:a.Atleas'tonceper12hoursby:horeg~guoXevvoIume.*Withpressurizerpressure>1750psia.ST.LUCIE-UNIT19506280119950621PDRADOCK05000335PPDR3/45-1Asaan~otbio.,
~lgJ)~Cl,~~tI4f'40~s-!~A~g3FffA~m'~4'L'~ffdj'4LPPf.gfJv~~'"g~Ann4M~~ppgII'~q~vw'gt4u>svr.'.5'.)~y~g~aog.aW~w~~~~~>.P"$~+w++1~~~)%1&l&Pogpv++i~4-i"~g"-~lollit'1LVppp~~4JP~~'~~~><~;~:&wsi,;A St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionINERT-Aa~WithoneSITinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,orduetoaninabilitytoverifytherequiredwatervolumeornitrogencover-pressure,restoretheinoperableSITtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours;otherwise,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithinthenext6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing6hours.INSERT-Bb.WithoneSITinoperableduetoreasonsotherthanthosestatedinACTION-a,restoretheinoperableSITtoOPERABLEstatuswithin24hours;otherwise,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithinthenext6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing6hours.
0I~r EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS(Continued)b.Atleastonceper31daysandwithin6hoursaftereachsolution~volumeincreaseof>1%oftankvolumebyverifyingtheboroconcentrationofthesafetyinjectiontanksolution.Thisatte~surveillanceisnotrequiredwhenthevolumeincreasemakeupsourceistheRMTandtheRN'asnotbeendilutedsinceverifyingthattheRWTboronconcentrationisequaltoorgreaterthanthesafetyinjectiontankboronconcentrationlimit.c.Atleastonceper31dayswhentheRCSpressureisabove1750psia,byverifyingthatpowertotheisolationvalveoperatorisremovedbymaintainingthebreakeropenunderadministrativecontrol.d.Atleastonceper18monthsbyverifyingthateachsafetyinjec-tiontankisolationvaveoensautomaticallyundereachofthefollowingconditionsJOELPyr1.WhentheRCSpressureexceeds350psia,and2.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjectiontestsignal.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/45-2AmendmentNo.
~~~~4 3/4.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCSBASESgf.Pgcwe%@Nod-C34.5.1SAFETYINJECTIONTANKSTheOPERABILITYofeachoftheRCSsafetyinjectiontanksensureshatasufficientvolumeofboratedwaterwillbeimmediatelyforcedintothereactorcorethrougheachofthecoldlegsintheeventtheRCSpressurefallsbelowthepressureofthesafetyinjectiontanks.ThisinitialsurgeofwaterintothecoreprovidestheinitialcoolingechanismduringlargeRCSpiperuptures.Thelimitssnsafetyinjectiontankvolume,boronconcentrationandpressureensurethattheassumptionsusedforsafetyinjectiontankinjectionintheaccidentanalysisaremet.i'nehourforoperationwithaninoperanjectiontankminimizthe-exosf-thanttoaLOCAeventccurringconcurrentwhfailuroandditiasafetyinjectiontanhicesinunacceptablepeakcladdingtemperaes.4.5.2and34.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftwoseparateandindependentECCSsubsystemsnsuresthatsufficientemergencycorecoolingcapabilitywillbeavail-bleintheeventofaLOCAassumingthelossofonesubsystemthroughnysinglefailureconsideration.Eithersubsystemoperatinginconjunc-tionwiththesafetyinjectiontanksiscapableofsupplyingsufficientcorecoolingtolimitthepeakcladdingtemperatureswithinacceptablelimitsforallpostulatedbreaksizesrangingfromthedoubleendedbreakofthelargestRCScoldlegpipedownward.Inaddition,each,ECCSsubsystemprovideslongtermcorecoolingcapabilityintherecirculationodeduringtheaccidentrecoveryperiod.TheSurveillanceRequirementsprovidedtoensureOPERABILITYofachcomponentensurethatataminimum,theassumptionsusedintheccidentanalysesaremetandthatsubsystemOPERABILITYismaintained.ThelimitationsonHPSIpumpoperabilitywhentheRCStemperatureis(270'Fand(236'F,andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsprovideadditionaladministrativeassurancethatthepressure/temperaturelimits(Figures3.4-2aand3.4-b)willnotbeexceededduringamassadditiontransientmitigatedbyasinglePORV.T.LUCIE-UNIT1B3/45-1AmendmentNn.~,AA I,.3>A'4$rtflaw-~"7>3~le'pg St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionThelimitof72hoursforoperationwithanSITthatisinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,orduetotheinabilitytoverifyliquidvolumeorcover-pressure,considersthatthevolumeoftheSITisstillavailableforinjectionintheeventofaLOCA.IfoneSITisinoperableforotherreasons,theSITmaybeunabletoperformitssafetyfunctionand,basedonprobabilityriskassessment,operationinthisconditionislimitedto24hours.
St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionATTACHMENT4ST.LUCIEUNIT2MARKED-UPTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONPAGESPage3/45-1INSERT-A/INSERT-BPage3/45-2PageB3/45-1INSERT-C 3/4.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCS3/4.5.1SAFETYINJECTIONTANKS(5A)LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.5.1'achReactorCoolantSystemsafetyinjectiontankshallbeOPERABLEwith:a.Theisolationvalve.open,b.Acontainedboratedwatervolumeofbetween1420and1556cubicfeet,c.Aboronconcentrationofbetween1720and2100ppmofboron,andd.Anitrogencover-pressureofbetween500and650psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2.,3",and4".ACTION:44safetyinjectiontankinoperable,exceptasaclosedisolasonmalve~estorethoperaanktoOPERABLEstatuswithin1~v-b~naleast-HOTSTANDBYwithinthenextournHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowinghouith-onsafetyinjectiontankinoperableduetothei~flVebeingclose,esther-immediately~oe~he-i~o11onvalveorbeinatleastHOTS~TNOBY-withi~lioU~nd>>bHOTSHUTDOWNwithinh~ext72hours.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.5.1.1EachsafetyinjectiontankshallbedemonstratedOPERABLE:a.Atleastonceper12hoursby:~ggvt1~2.Verifinh~bnthecontainedborated4Q+watervolumeandnitrogencover-pressureinthetank,and~<IAL1Verifyingthateachsafetyinjectiontankisolationvalveisopen.Withpressurizerpressuregreaterthanorequalto1750psia.Whenpressurizerpressureislessthan1750psia,atleastthreesafetyinjectiontanksshallbeOPERABLE,eachwithaminimumpressureof235psigandamaximumpressureof650psigandacontainedwatervolumeofbetween1250and1556cubicfeetwithaboronconcentrationofbetween1720and2100ppmofboron.WithallfoursafetyinjectiontanksOPERABLE,eachtankshallhaveaminimumpressureof235psigandamaximumpressureof650psigandacontainedwatervolumeofbetween833and1556cubicfeetwithaboronconcentrationofbetween1720and2100ppmofboron.InMODE4withpressurizerpressurelessthan276psia,thesafetyinjectiontanksmaybeisolated.ST.LUCIE-UNIT23/45-1AmendmentNo.gg;P8",
4hI0-Oe-~~(~gag"Jjg~ks4>QJQBjf~~,8-+Q3wf)~;',4~.,~1~i'I'JK"'~~~2;I~'I~~t'aI St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionIERT-Aa~WithoneSITinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,orduetoaninabilitytoverifytherequiredwatervolumeornitrogencover-pressure,restoretheinoperableSITtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours;otherwise,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithinthenext6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing6hours.INSERT-Bb.WithoneSITinoperableduetoreasonsotherthanthosestatedinACTION-a,restoretheinoperableSITtoOPERABLEstatuswithin24hours;otherwise,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithinthenext6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing6hours.
1~~~*
EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSSURVEILLANCEREOUIREMENTS(Continued)b.Atleastonceper31daysandwithin6hoursaftereachsolutionvolumeincreaseofgreaterthanorequaltoLCoftankvolumebyverifyingtheboronconcentrationofthesafetyinjectiontanksolution.ThissurveillanceisnotrequiredwhenthevolumeincreasemaeupsourceistheRMTandtheRMThasnotbeendilutedsinceverifyingthattheRMTboronconcentrationisequaltoorgreaterthanthesafetyinjectiontankboronconcentrationlimit.C.Atleastonceper31dayswhenthe'RCSpressureisabove700psia,byverifyingthat,powertotheisolationvalveoperatorisdisconnectedbymaintainingthebreakeropenbyadministrativecontrols.d.Atleastonceper18monthsbyverifyingthateachsafetyinjectiontankisolationvalveopensautomaticallyundereachofthefollowingconditions::I.WhenanactualorsimulatedRCSpressuresignalexceeds515psia,and2.Uonreceitofasafetinectiontestsinal.pp3g-demons-trat~d-GPERABLE:-s4-once-per-31-days-by-the-pevfermance-o-f-a-CHANNEL-FUNGTNNALIt~eet-once-pe~months-by-the-per4remance~f-aMHANNB-CALISRATIONST.LUCIE-UNIT23/45"2AmendmentNo.
~'~Mt(->~~I~<<7'.t~4ttp 3/4.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)BASES3/4.5.1SAFETY'NJECTIONTANKSTheOPERABILITYofeachoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)safetyinjectiontanksensuresthatasufficientvolumeofboratedwaterwillbeimmediatelyforcedintothereactorcorethrougheachofthecoldlegsintheeventtheRCSpressurefallsbelowthepressureofthesafetyinjectiontanks.ThisinitialsurgeofwaterintothecoreprovidestheinitialcoolingmechanismduringlargeRCSpiperuptures.Thelimitsonsafetyinjectiontankvolume,boronconcentration,andpressureensurethattheassumptionsusedforsafetyinjectiontankinjectioninthesafetyanalysisaremet.Thesafetyinjectiontankpower-operatedisolationvalvesareconsideredtobe"operatingbypasses"inthecontextofIEEEStd.279-1971,whichrequiresthatbypassesofaprotectivefunctionberemovedautomaticallywheneverpermissiveconditionsarenotmet.Inaddition,asthesesafetyinjectiontankisolationvalvesfailtomeetsinglefailurecriteria,removalofpowertothevalvesisrequired.itsforoperationwithasafetyinjectiontankinoperablereasonexcepta'ionvalveclosedminimizesthetimeoftheplanttoaLOCAeventoccu'currentwithofanadditionalsafetyinjectiontankwhichmayresultin-lepeakcladdingtemperatures.Ifaclosedisolationvnotbeimmediateed,thefullcapabilityofonesafet'iontankisnotavailableandprompta'srequiredtoereactorinamodewherethiscaabilitisnotreuired3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftwoseparateandindependentECCSsubsystemsensuresthatsufficientemergencycorecoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCAassumingthelossofonesubsystemthroughanysinglefailureconsideration.Eithersubsystemoperatinginconjunctionwiththesafetyinjectiontanksiscapableofsupplyingsufficientcorecoolingtolimitthepeakcladdingtemperatureswithinacceptablelimitsforallpostulatedbreaksizesrangingfromthedouble-endedbreakofthelargestRCShotlegpipedownward.Inaddition,eachECCSsubsystemprovideslong-termcorecoolingcapabilityintherecirculationmodeduringtheaccidentrecoveryperiod.ST.LUCIE-UNIT2B3/45-l J'\ElyJ"i~-'"f(kgb..'J~~JIt~flA',Aber'l4',a'a),
St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionINSERT-Thelimitof72hoursforoperationwithanSITthatisinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,orduetotheinabilitytoverifyliquidvolumeorcover-pressure,considersthatthevolumeoftheSITisstillavailableforinjectionintheeventofaLOCA.IfoneSITisinoperableforotherreasons,theSITmaybeunabletoperformitssafetyfunctionand,basedonprobabilityriskassessment,operationinthisconditionislimitedto24hours.
St.LucieUnit1andUnit2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProposedLicenseAmendmentsSafetIn'ectionTankAOTExtensionL-95-134ENCLOSUREJointApplicationsReportforSAFETYINJECTIONTANKAOT/STIEXTENSIONCENPSD-994,FinalReportCEOGTask836;May,1995,withPSL1andPSL2correctionstoTable6.3.2-1 ATTACHMENTA"Mark-up"ofNUREG-1432SECTIONS3.5.1&B3.5.1 SITs3.5.13.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.1SafetyInjectionTanks(SITs)LCO3.5.1[Four]SITsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withpressurizerpressure~[700]psia.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIMEA.OneSITinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1Restoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursI-j(OneSITinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionRestoreSITtoOPERABLEstatus.MM~q-mrsRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.DP.lBeinMODE3.ANDDp.EReducepressurizerpressureto<L'700]psia.6hours12hoursTwoormoreSITsinoperable.EP.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImnediatelyGEOGSTS3.5-1Rev.0,09/28/92 INSERTAB.OneSITinoperableduetoinabilitytoverifylevelorpressure.B.1RestoreSITtoOPERABLEstatus..72hours BASESACTIONSZNScPTH8A.l(continued)injection.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.Ifoneisinoperable,forareasonotherthanonconcentratio,theSITmustbereturnedtoOPBLEstatuswithin1hour.thisCondition,ther~redcontentsofthreeSITscannotbeumedtoreaecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseveritfconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditionshourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removowertotalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolornitrogencoversureensuresthatpromptaetioillbetakentoreturnthe>erableaccumultoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletioneminzestheexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAinthenditions..1and.2IftheSITcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHOOEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHOOE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<700psiawithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.IfmorethanoneSITisinoperable,theunitisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredinmediately.CEOGSTSB3.5-7(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 INSERTAAB1Section7.4ofReference5,NUREG-1366,discussessurveillancerequirementsintechnicalspecificationsfortheinstrumentchannelsusedinthemeasurementofwaterlevelandpressureinSITs.ThefollowingstatementismadeinSection7.4ofReference5:'Mecombinationofredundantlevelandpressureinstrumentation[foranysingleSIT]mayprovidesufficientinformationsothatitmaynotbeworthwhiletoalwaysattempttocorrectdriftassociatedwithoneinstrument[withresultingradiationexposuresduringentryintocontainment]ifthereweresufficienttimetorepaironeintheeventthatasecondonebecameinoperable.Becausetheseinstrumentsdonotinitiateasafetyaction,itisreasonabletoextendtheallowableoutageforthem.The[NRC]staff,therefore,recommendsthatanadditionalconditionbeestablishedforthespecificcase,where"Oneaccumulator[SIT]isinoperableduetotheinoperabilityofwaterlevelandpressurechannels,"inwhichthecompletiontimetorestoretheaccumulatortooperablestatuswillbe72hours.Whiletechnicallyinoperable,theaccumulatorwouldbeavailabletofulfillitssafetyfunctionduringthistimeand,thus,thischangewouldhaveanegligibleincreaseinrisk."INSERTABIfoneSITisinoperable,forareasonotherthanboronconcentrationortheinabilitytoverifylevelorpressure,theSITmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin24hours.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsofthreeSITscannotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCAasisassumedinAppendixKto10CFR50.Reference6providesaseriesofdeterministicandprobabilisticQndingsthatsupport24hoursasbeingeither"riskbene6cial"or"riskneutral"incomparisontoshorterperiodsforrestoringtheSITtoOPERABLEstatus.Reference6discussesbest-estimateanalysisthatconfirmedthat,duringlarge-breakLOCAscenarios,coremeltcanbepreventedbyeitheroperationofoneLowPressureSafetyInjection(LPSI)pumportheoperationofoneHighPressureSafetyInjection(HPSI)pumpandasingleSIT.Reference6alsodiscussesplant-specificprobabilisticanalysisthatevaluatedtherisk-impactofthe24hourrecoveryperiodincomparisontoshorterrecoveryperiods.
SITs83.5.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.1.1Verificationevery12hoursthateachSITisolationvalveisfullyopen,asindicatedinthecontrolroom,ensuresthatSITsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbepartiallyclosed.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalveshouldnotchangepositionwithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysisassumptions.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensuretheunlikelihoodofamispositionedisolationvalve.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3SITboratedwatervolumeandnitrogencoverpressureshouldbeverifiedtobewithinspecifiedlimitsevery12hoursinordertoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.OuetothestaticdesignoftheSITs,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatorsufficienttimetoidentifychangesbeforethelimitsarereached.OperatingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.SR3.5.1.4Thirty-onedaysisreasonableforverificationtodeterminethateachSIT'sboronconcentrationiswithintherequiredlimits,becausethestaticdesignoftheSITslimitsthewaysinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31dayFrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakage.SamplingtheaffectedSITwithin6hoursaftera1~volumeincreasewillidentifywhetherinleakagehascausedareductioninboronconcentrationtobelowtherequiredlimit.ItisnotnecessarytoverifyboronconcentrationiftheaddedwaterisfromtheRMT,becausethewatercontainedintheRMTiswithintheSITboronconcentrationrequirements.ThisisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofNUREG-1366(Ref.5).(continued)CEOGSTS83.5-8Rev.0,09/28/92 INSERTAC,Reference6,andReference7.
SITsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.1.5Verification'every31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachSITisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureis~2000psiaensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultintheundetectedclosureofanSITmotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,onlytwoSITswouldbeavailableforinjection,givenasinglefailurecoincidentwithaLOCA.SinceinstallationandremovalofpowertotheSITisolationvalveoperatorsisconductedunderadministrativecontrol,the31dayFrequencywaschosentoprovideadditionalassurancethatpowerisremoved.ThisSRallowspowertobesuppliedtothemotoroperatedisolationvalveswhenRCSpressureis<2000psia,thusallowingoperationalflexibilitybyavoidingunnecessarydelaystomanipulatethebreakersduringunitstartupsor~shutdowns.Evenwithpowersuppliedtothevalves,inadvertentclosureispreventedbytheRCSpressureinterlockassociatedwiththevalves.Shouldclosureofavalveoccurinspiteoftheinterlock,theSIsignalprovidedtothevalveswouldopenaclosedvalveintheeventofaLOCA.REFERENCES).IEEEStandard279-1971.2.FSAR,Section[6.3].3.10CFR50.46.4.FSAR,Chapter[15].ID~~t)c.l5.~~UREG-)366,FCEOGSTS83.5-9Rev.0,09/28/92 INSERTAD6.7.NRCGenericLetter93-05,"Line-ItemTechnicalSpecificationsImprovementsToReduceSurveillanceRequirementsForTestingDuringPowerOperations,"September27,1993CENPSD-994,"CEOGJointApplicationsReportforSafetyInjectionTankAOT/STIExtension,"April1995.