ML25238A013
| ML25238A013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 06/10/2025 |
| From: | Young D Nuclear Energy Institute |
| To: | Cindy Rosales-Cooper Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| References | |
| Download: ML25238A013 (1) | |
Text
From:
YOUNG, David To:
Mike McCoppin; Don Johnson (don.johnson@nrc.gov); Eric Schrader; Nadir Chaudhry
Subject:
Follow-up information from 6/4/25 public meeting on EO & EP Date:
Tuesday, June 10, 2025 6:00:00 AM
- Cindy,
Good morning.
During the public meeting last Wednesday, I took two actions to provide follow-up information to you to support the NRCs assessment of the EP-related recommendations found in NEIs letter, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Input on Recent Executive Orders, dated February 10, 2025.
- 1. Industry interpretation of 10 CFR 50.54(t)-related information in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 7: We confirm that our understanding of the changes contained in DG-1423 is to allow the use of the ROP EP PIs to support extensions of EP program reviews from 12 months to 24 months, i.e., it addresses the frequency of reviews.
The changes in the Regulatory Guide do not affect the content of reviews. This is the understanding that I conveyed during the meeting. NEIs recommendation, as we discussed, is to change the requirement for the content of reviews after an eight-year period.
- 2. Existing regulatory constraints on using realistic exercise scenarios: We reviewed the applicable regulations again in light of the staffs feedback provided during the meeting and offer two observations.
- a. 10 CFR 50.47(b) - The NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented. We believe that FEMA has historically interpreted the reasonable assurance standard as absolute assurance, which, among other things, manifests as requiring OROs to demonstrate objectives based on worst-case, highly unlikely scenarios in every exercise (e.g., exceeding the EPA PAGs at three miles). There are also several references to reasonable assurance in Appendix E. It may be helpful to engage FEMA on the NRCs meaning of reasonable assurance and have a dialog about the alignment of FEMA exercise objectives to this standard.
- b. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, section IV.F.2.a and section IV.F.2.b - these sections
contain descriptions of exercise requirements that have, due to past application and precedent, acquired maximalist connotations with respect to the scope of ERO actions that must be demonstrated. Also, as Don Johnson indicated in the meeting, there have been issues with some FEMA regions imposing scenario release requirements that are not aligned with NRC requirements, and we understand that NRC is working to address these issues. That said, recognizing the need to avoid negative training, we believe the regulations should be revised to clearly state an expectation that 1) exercise scenarios are based on realistic (more likely) accident sequences, and 2) key skills associated with unlikely sequences may be demonstrated at some periodicity in other activities. This change would entail, among other things, removing the current requirements in section IV.F.2.j.(iii).(2), (3), and (4).
Feel free to contact me with any questions.
David YounglSenior Technical Advisor Security and Incident Preparedness Nuclear Energy Institute (202) 739-8127