ML25229A002
| ML25229A002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/2025 |
| From: | Robert Kuntz Plant Licensing Branch III |
| To: | Tony Brown Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| EPID L-2026-LLA-0130 | |
| Download: ML25229A002 (1) | |
Text
August 17, 2025 Mr. Terry J. Brown Vistra Operations Company LLC c/o Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop P-DB-3080 5501 N. State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760
SUBJECT:
DAVIS BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 308 RE: SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX CHANNEL INOPERABLE (EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES) (EPID L-2026-LLA-0130)
Dear Mr. Brown:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 308 to NPF 3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1(Davis-Besse), in response to your application dated August 17, 2025 as supplemented by letter dated August 17, 2025.
The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.9 to Source Range Neutron Flux, to allow the use of alternate neutron instrumentation during startup from the current forced outage and through the end of the current operating cycle (Cycle 24), which is scheduled to end in March 2026.
The license amendment is issued under emergency circumstances as provided in the provisions of paragraph 50.91(a)(5) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations due to the time critical nature of the amendment. In this instance, an emergency situation exists due to an unexpected failure in a source range neutron flux channel during a forced outage on August 12, 2025, to repair a leak on a steam generator level transmitter sensing line.
A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The safety evaluation describes the emergency circumstances under which the amendment was issued and the final no significant hazards determination. A Notice of Issuance addressing the final no significant hazards
determination and opportunity for a hearing associated with the emergency circumstances will be included in a future monthly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert Kuntz, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 308 to Renewed License No. NPF-3
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC AND ENERGY HARBOR NUCLEAR GENERATION LLC DOCKET NO. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 308 Renewed License No. NPF-3
- 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by Vistra Operations Company LLC. (the licensee), dated August 17, 2025, as supplemented by letter dated August 17, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 308, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Vistra Operations Company LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 1 day of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ilka Berrios, Acting Chief Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 17, 2025 ILKA BERRIOS Digitally signed by ILKA BERRIOS Date: 2025.08.17 19:28:05 -04'00'
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 308 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346 Replace the following pages of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 and Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 REMOVE INSERT L-5 L-5 Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 3.3.9-1 3.3.9-1 3.3.9-2 3.3.9-2 3.3.9-3
L-5 Renewed License No. NPF-3 Amendment No. 308 2.C.
This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1)
Maximum Power Level Vistra Operations Company LLC is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2817 megawatts (thermal). Prior to attaining the power level, Toledo Edison Company shall comply with the conditions identified in Paragraph (3) (o) below and complete the preoperational tests, startup tests and other items identified in Attachment 2 to this license in the sequence specified. Attachment 2 is an integral part of this renewed license.
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 308, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license.
Vistra Operations Company LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
(3)
Additional Conditions The matters specified in the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission within the stated time periods following the issuance of the renewed license or within the operational restrictions indicated. The removal of these conditions shall be made by an amendment to the renewed license supported by a favorable evaluation by the Commission:
(a)
Vistra Operations Company LLC shall not operate the reactor in operational Modes 1 and 2 with less than three reactor coolant pumps in operation.
(b)
Deleted per Amendment 6 (c)
Deleted per Amendment 5
Source Range Neutron Flux 3.3.9 Davis-Besse 3.3.9-1 Amendment 308 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Source Range Neutron Flux LCO 3.3.9 Two source range neutron flux channels shall be OPERABLE.
NOTE--------------------------------------------
High voltage to detector may be de-energized with neutron flux
> 1E-10 amp on intermediate range channels.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One source range neutron flux channel inoperable with neutron flux 1E-10 amp on the intermediate range neutron flux channels.
A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.
OR A.2
NOTE--------------
Only applicable during Cycle 24.
Verify Neutron Flux (Source Range) instrumentation channels required by Table 3.3.17-1 Function 17 are OPERABLE.
Prior to increasing neutron flux Immediately AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter
Source Range Neutron Flux 3.3.9 Davis-Besse 3.3.9-2 Amendment 308 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Two source range neutron flux channels inoperable with neutron flux 1E-10 amp on the intermediate range neutron flux channels.
B.1
NOTE--------------
Plant temperature changes are allowed provided the temperature change is accounted for in the calculated SDM.
Suspend operations involving positive reactivity changes.
AND B.2 Initiate action to insert all CONTROL RODS.
AND B.3 Open CONTROL ROD drive trip breakers.
AND B.4 Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR.
Immediately Immediately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter
Source Range Neutron Flux 3.3.9 Davis-Besse 3.3.9-3 Amendment 308 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more source range neutron flux channels inoperable with neutron flux
> 1E-10 amp on the intermediate range neutron flux channels.
C.1 Initiate action to restore affected channel(s) to OPERABLE status.
OR C.2
NOTE--------------
Only applicable during Cycle 24.
Verify Neutron Flux (Source Range) instrumentation channels required by Table 3.3.17-1 Function 17 are OPERABLE.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.9.2
NOTE------------------------------
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 308 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC AND ENERGY HARBOR NUCLEAR GENERATION LLC DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated August 17, 2025 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML25229A001), as supplemented by letter dated August 17, 2025 (ML25229A003), Vistra Operations Company LLC (the licensee) requested changes to the technical specifications (TS) for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse).
The proposed change would revise TS 3.3.9, Source Range Neutron Flux, to allow the use of alternate source range neutron monitoring instrumentation (Gamma-Metrics) per TS Table 3.3.17-1, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Function 17, during startup from the current forced outage. The proposed change is only applicable during the current operating cycle (Cycle 24), as Davis-Besse intends to perform permanent repairs no later than the March 2026 refueling outage.
1.1
System Description
Section 2.1 of the license amendment request (LAR) describes the system design and operation. The LAR states that the reactor protection system source range neutron flux channels provide the operator with an indication of the approach to criticality at lower power levels over a counting range of 10E-1 to 10E+6 counts per second (cps). The source range instrumentation has two redundant count rate channels originating in two high sensitivity proportional counters.
Section 3.1 states, in part that:
[T]he Gamma-Metrics neutron flux detectors consist of two (2) safety grade, Class 1E, electrically independent, physically separated fission chamber radiation level instrument strings, with the capability of a calibrated range to include a source range (10E-1 to 10E+5 cps) and wide range indication (10E-8 to 2 x 10E+2 percent power) indications in the Control Room.
1.2 Description of the Proposed Changes Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of the LAR describe the proposed change. Currently TS 3.3.9, Condition A, requires that an inoperable channel be returned to OPERABLE status prior to increasing neutron flux and Condition C requires initiation of actions to restore inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The LAR proposes modifying Conditions A and C to credit the use of TS Table 3.3.17-1 Function 17 Neutron Flux (Source Range) if one source range neutron flux channel is inoperable during Cycle 24.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
2.1 Regulatory Requirements The regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.91(a)(5) state that where the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plants licensed power level, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public comment.
Under 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses to the extent applicable and appropriate. Both the common standards for licenses in 10 CFR 50.40(a) (regarding, among other things, consideration of the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals) and those specifically for issuance of operating licenses in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3),
provide that there must be reasonable assurance that the activities at issue will not endanger the health and safety of the public, and that the applicant will comply with the Commission's regulations. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, requires, in part, that the operating license of a nuclear production facility include TS. Paragraph 50.36 (c)(2)(i) of 10 CFR requires that the TSs include limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO of a nuclear reactor is not met, Paragraph 50.36(c)(2)(i) requires that the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met. The remedial actions specified in the TS must provide the requisite reasonable assurance of public health and safety described in 10 CFR 50.40 and 50.57.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The licensees proposed change would credit the use of TS Table 3.3.17-1 Function 17 Neutron Flux (Source Range) as part of LCO 3.3.9 Condition A and C Required Actions if one source range neutron flux channels is inoperable with neutron flux 1E-10 amp on the intermediate range neutron flux channels. The licensee stated that this change would allow the use of Gamma-Metrics neutron flux detectors to monitor neutron flux during power accension when a source range instrument is inoperable. The Gamma-Metrics detectors are included in Davis-Besse Technical Specifications 3.3.17-1. The licensee noted that the source range neutron flux channels have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any design basis accident or transient analysis.
In review of the proposed change, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide responses to the following requests for additional information (RAIs) and request for confirmation information (RCI).
In RAI-1, the NRC staff referred to Attachment 1, Section 2.1, second paragraph regarding the source range detectors, states:
An interlock provides a control rod withdraw "inhibit" on a high startup rate of +2 decades per minute in either channel.
The NRC staff requested the licensee to confirm that the remaining source range channel provided all the interlocks needed but is not single-failure proof. The licensee was also requested to explain how prosed Gamma-Metrics detectors would provide the interlock that is currently provided by the source range detectors.
The licensee provided the following response to the above RAI:
The interlock associated with the remaining detector is an independent channel that will inhibit outward rod motion if source range startup rate is >2 decades per minute (DPM). The intermediate range NI also provides similar interlock at
>3DPM.
Each Source Range NI independently generates a signal to inhibit rod withdrawal on a high startup rate of +2 decades. This is measured and provided independently to the Rod Control System. The inoperability of a single channel of Source Range NI will not prevent the function of the remaining operable channel.
Once source range power is within level of detection, each intermediate range instrument has a high startup rate of +3 decades per minute in either channel to initiate a control rod withdrawal inhibit. Gamma Metrics does not provide the withdraw inhibit interlock.
The NRC staff finds the above response acceptable because the licensee stated that (a) operable source range detector channel is independent and will provide the required control-rod withdraw inhibit on a high startup rate of +2 decades, (b) the intermediate range instrument high startup rate of +3 decades per minute in either channel will initiate a control rod withdrawal inhibit.
In RAI-2(a), the NRC staff requested the licensee to describe the safety function of the source range detectors during startup and shutdown of the reactor, including for the mitigation of accidents during startup and shutdown of the reactor. The licensees response is as follows:
(a) The source range detectors have no safety function. The function of the source range detectors during startup is to monitor count rates during approach to criticality or the addition of positive reactivity during startup. The intermediate range detectors are used to validate reactor shutdown following a trip. The detectors are also used during fuel movement. The source range nuclear instrumentation is not used in the analysis of accidents related to startup of the reactor.
The NRC staff finds the above response acceptable because the licensee confirmed that the source range detectors have no safety function during startup and shutdown of the reactor, In RAI-2(b), the NRC staff noted from the LAR that the source range detectors range 1 cps to 1E6 cps is greater than the Gamma-Metrics detectors range is 1E-1 to 1E5. The NRC staff requested the licensee to explain the impact of the lower range of gamma detectors on the performance during startup and shutdown of the plant and also describe the overlap with intermediate range detectors. The licensees response is as follows:
(b) The [G]amma [M]etrics source range detector provides 1 decade overlap with the intermediate range detector. The lower range of the gamma metrics source range detector will have no impact on startup and shutdown of the plant.
The NRC staff finds the above response acceptable because the licensee stated that the Gamma-Metrics has a 1 decade overlap with the intermediate range detectors and the lower range of the Gamma-Metrics will have no impact on the startup and shutdown of the reactor.
In RCI-3, the NRC staff requested the licensee to confirm that the operators will be actively using the gamma metrics monitors to monitor the operability of the remaining source range monitor and the core is behaving as appropriate. The licensees response is as follows:
A reactor engineer is required per the existing plant procedure to be present in the control room prior to withdrawing control rod groups to provide technical expertise and core monitoring.
Computer points are available and displayed in the control room during the reactor startup, providing visual trends to compare SRNI 1 to gamma metrics channels. The approach to criticality procedure requires diverse indication monitoring by the Licensed Operators using the gamma metrics source and wide range channels.
The NRC staff finds the above response to the NRC confirmation request acceptable.
The NRC staff reviewed the amendment request, as supplemented, to determine if the proposed change to TS 3.3.9 is acceptable. The LAR, as supplemented, confirms that all interlocks will continue to function in the configuration permitted by the revised TS. Further the LAR, as supplemented, confirmed that the source range detectors are not required for any safety functions. The LAR, as supplemented, also confirmed that wide range monitors provide redundant indication across the source range and intermediate range such that more than one means of monitoring is provided through all ranges. The NRC staff finds that the proposed TS change provides the necessary functionality and is therefore acceptable.
3.1 Technical Evaluation Conclusion
The NRC staff reviewed the LAR against 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2). Based on this review, the staff determined that the proposed changes continue to provide the necessary LCOs required for safe operation of the facility.
Based on the above the staff concludes that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
4.0 EMERGENCY SITUATION
=
Background===
The regulations in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) state that where the NRC finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plants licensed power level, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public comment. In such a situation, the NRC will publish a notice of issuance under 10 CFR 2.106, providing for opportunity for a hearing and for public comment after issuance.
As discussed in the application dated August 17, 2026, the licensee requested that the proposed amendment be processed by the NRC on an emergency basis. The license amendment request stated that:
Why the Condition Occurred:
On August 12, 2025, Davis-Besse entered a forced outage to repair a leak on a steam generator level transmitter sensing line. During Mode 4 operations on August 13th at approximately 0930, SRNI2 failed to zero cps. A Problem Solving Decision Making Team was formed, and has been working both shifts since the beginning of the forced outage.
Why the Situation Could Not Be Avoided:
The team performed a failure modes analysis and efforts to rule out failure modes, have guided the troubleshooting, from the detector to instrumentation cabinet and indicators. There have been substantial efforts to restore SRNI2 to operable status through maintenance and engineering activities involving site and Vistra fleet subject matter experts and specialized vendor services.
With submittal of this request, the inoperability of SRNI2 remains the single resolution required prior to the resumption of power operation NRC Staff Conclusion The NRC staff reviewed the licensees basis for processing the proposed amendment as an emergency amendment (as discussed above) and agrees that an emergency situation exists consistent with the provisions in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5). Furthermore, the NRC staff determined that: (1) the licensee used its best efforts to make a timely application; (2) the licensee could not reasonably have avoided the situation; and (3) the licensee has not abused the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5). Based on these findings, and the determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration as discussed below, the NRC staff has determined that a valid need exists for issuance of the license amendment using the emergency provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).
5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
The NRCs regulation in 10 CFR 50.92(c) states that the NRC may make a final determination, under the procedures in 10 CFR 50.91, that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
An evaluation of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
- 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The source range neutron monitoring instrumentation and the proposed alternate instrumentation are not accident initiators. The source range instrumentation provides a rod withdraw block, which is retained by the unaffected channel. The source range rod withdraw block is not credited in the accident analysis.
Monitoring of the core reactivity state will continue to be provided by the unaffected source range neutron monitoring instrumentation channel and the alternate instrumentation. The alternate instrumentation is not new equipment and is required by other Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not alter the design function or operation of the source range neutron monitors or alternate instrumentation. There are no new or failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators created by the allowance for the use of alternate instrumentation to provide additional indication of the core reactivity.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not adversely affect the operation of plant equipment or the function of equipment assumed in the accident analyses. The source range instrumentation is not credited in the accident analyses. The proposed change does not alter any design basis or safety limits.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff has made a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved for the proposed amendment and that the amendment should be issued as allowed by the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.91.
6.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on August 17, 2025. The State official did not provide any comments.
7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes the requirements with respect to installation or use of a facilitys components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
8.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: Ahsan Salman, NRR Norbert Carte, NRR Date of Issuance: August 17, 2025
ML25229A002 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NRR/DORL/LPL3/LA NRR/DEX/EICB/BC NRR/DSS/SNSB/BC NAME RKuntz SLent FSanka NDifancesco FForsaty for DATE 8/17/2025 8/17/2025 8/17/2025 8/17/2025 OFFICE NRR/DSS/STSB/BC(A)
OGC NRR/DORL/LPL3/BC NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NAME SMehta (A) ARussel for DRoth NLO IBerrios RKuntz DATE 8/17/2025 8/17/2025 8/17/2025 8/17/2025