ML022900736
| ML022900736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/2002 |
| From: | Ernstes M Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| 50-338/02-301, 50-339/02-301 | |
| Download: ML022900736 (198) | |
See also: IR 05000338/2002301
Text
North Anna
Draft Sim
Scenarios
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Facility: North Anna
Examiners:
Scenario No.: NRC 1
up-iest No.:
I/A
Operators:
Initial Conditions: EOL. 100% reactor power. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in A S/G.
1 H EDG is OOS for Maintenance.
Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.
POD: Maintain 100% power. Monitor A S/G leakage. Return 1H EDG to service as soon as
possible.
Event
Malf. No.
Event
Event
No.
Type*
Description
1
N/A
N (B)
Swap condensate pumps.
2
RC0801
I (R)
Pressurizer level LT-459 spikes low (this should isolate
(N)
letdown.) (restore letdown) (T/S for SRO)
3
FW1201
I (B)
"A" S/G selected feed flow transmitter fails low.
(T/S for SRO)
4
CH1602
C (R)
1-CH-P-1B trips (bearing trouble). No auto-start of remaining
charging pumps.
5
RC0703
I (A)
PT-455 fails high, RCS leak (small steam space break)
6
N/A
R (A)
Ramp down due to exceeding RCS T/S leakage.
7
TU 101
C (B)
EH pump trips, standby pump fails to auto start.
8
RC48
M (A)
SBLOCA (Steam space break) 200 gpm.
9
EL01
C (A)
(N)ormal,
(R)eactivity,
(I)nstrument,
(C)omponent,
(M)ajor
Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
O~p-TIest No.:
1A'
Facility: North Anna
Examiners:
Scenario No.: NRC 2
Op-Test No.:
1A
Operators:
Initial Conditions: EOL. 12% Rx power, main turbine startup in progress. 10 gpd tube leakage in
"A" S/G. 1H EDG is 0OS for maintenance.
Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.
POD: Sync main
"A" S/G leakage.
generator to grid; raise reactor power to 30% and hold for chemistry. Monitor
Return 1 H EDG to service as soon as possible.
Event
Malf.
Event Type*
Event
No.
No.
Description
Oa
N/A
C (All)
Failure of BIT isolation valves to open.
0b
S10701
C (All)
Failure of a single train SI/phase A, equipment will function
S11303
manually.
0c
N/A
C (All)
Failure of benchboard 1 reactor trip switch.
1
N/A
N (BOP)
Sync main generator to grid, begin ramp to 30%.
2
MS16
I (RO)
PT-464 fails high.
3
N/A
R (RO)
Continue ramp to 30%.
4
BC0501
C (BOP)
Running bearing cooling pump trips, standby pump fails to
auto-start.
5
CH18
I (RO)
PCV-1145 fails closed, causing letdown high pressure.
6
FW0109
I (BOP)
"C" SG level channel III fails high resulting in the "C" FRV
going full closed.
7
RC0701
I (All)
PT-1444 fails high, PORV sticks open, block valve won't
close.
8
RC2403
M (All)
- (N)ormal,
(R)eactivity,
(I)nstrument,
(C)omponent,
(M)ajor
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1 (R8, $1)
Facility: North Anna
Scenario No.: NI-C 3
up-lest No.:
I/A
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions: MOL. 100% reactor power. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" S/G. 1H
EDG is OOS for Maintenance. PT-457 has failed, and is in test with maintenance working.
Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.
POD: Maintain 100% power. Monitor A S/G leakage. Return IH EDG to service as soon as
possible. Support maintenance by starting 1-CH-P-1B.
Event
Malf. No.
Event
Event
No.
Type*
Description
0
N/A
C (All)
Failure of normal charging valve to reopen after SI. (1289B
breaker trips when valve is taken to open)
1
CV01
C (BOP)
Containment air in-leakage
2
N/A
N (RO)
Swap charging pumps.
3
CHI202
I (RO)
VCT level transmitter 115 fails high.
4
MS0201
I
PT-446 fails low.
(BOP/RO)
5
MS 1401
C
Small steam leak to occur on "A" S/G safety valve, enough to
(RO/BOP)
cause reactor power to rise, and a ramp-down to be required.
6
N/A
R (RO)
Ramp unit down for small steam leak.
7
EL1301
I (All)
Loss of !-I vital bus.
8
N/A
M (All)
Inadvertent SI due to loss of vital bus and PT-457 being in trip.
(normal charging valve 1289B fails to open from MCR)
- (N)ormal,
(R)eactivity,
(I)nstrument,
(C)omponent,
(M)ajor
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Op-lest No.:
"1A
Facility: North Anna
Scenario No.: NRG 3
Form ES-D-1 (R8, $1)
Facility: North Anna
Scenario No.: NXU 4
up-lest 'Jo.:
I/A
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions: EOL. 50% reactor power, in the process of shutting down for refueling. A
confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" S/G. 1H EDG is OOS for maintenance.
Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.
POD: Shutdown a MFW pump, then continue with the unit shutdown. Monitor A S/G leakage.
Return 1H EDG to service as soon as possible.
Event
Malf. No.
Event
Event
No.
Type*
Description
1
N/A
N (BOP)
Shutdown the second MFW pump.
2
N/A
R (RO)
Continue with the unit shutdown.
3
MSO1O3
I (BOP)
"B" SG selected steam flow channel fails low.
4
N/A
I (BOP)
"B" SG PORV fails open due to a failure of its pressure
transmitter.
5
CH1601
C (RO)
"A" charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails to
CH1201
close.
6
RC4601
C (RO)
PRZR spray valve PCV-1455A fails open (able to manually
close).
7
RC04
M (All)
When PRZR spray flow was initiated the spray line broke,
which caused a PRZR steam space LOCA, requiring a reactor
trip and safety injection.
8
RD32
M (All)
The reactor will not trip automatically or manually and the crew
RD38
will respond to the ATWS.
- (N)ormal,
(R)eactivity,
(I)nstrument,
(C)omponent,
(M)ajor
Scenario Outline
Facility: North Anna
Scenario No.: 5
Applicants:
Scenario No.: NRC 4
Op-Test No.:
1A,
Facility: North Anna
Examiners:
Objectives: To evaluate the applicants' ability to reduce reactor power; to implement AP's,
AR's and Tech Specs in response to instrument failures, a loss of Service Water and a loss
of emergency bus; to respond to a loss of coolant outside containment (ECA-1.2) with
concurrent component malfunctions and subsequent Safety Injection termination (E-1 and
ES-1.1).
Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL. The unit has just returned to full power following a
load reduction for seal repairs on B MFW pump. C MFW pump, which had been tagged
for coupling repairs, was returned to service while the unit was at reduced power.
Turnover: 1H EDG was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator
has reported thunderstorms in the area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G. Shift
orders are to place unit 1 service water pumps in service and secure unit 2 service water
pumps in preparation for maintenance on 2-SW-P-1B. When requested, reduce power as
determined by Engineering in preparation for removing the C waterbox from service for
tube plugging.
Event
Malf.
Event Type*
Event
No.
No.
Description
1
- _
N:BOP/SRO
Shift SW pumps
2
C:ALL
Loss of H emergency bus
3
R:RO
Reduce reactor power (at least 5%)
4
I:RO/SRO
PT-145 fails low, PCV-145 closes fully
5
C:BOP/SRO
1-SW-P-1B trips, loss of B SW header flow
6
I:BOP/SRO
B SG steam flow channel fails high
7
M:ALL
Loss of coolant outside containment
8
C:ALL
Failure of Train B SI to actuate manually or
automatically
- (N)ormal,
(R)eactivity,
(I)nstrument,
(C)omponent,
(M)ajor
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 1
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV I
TIR NUMBER IREASON
SCENARIO NRC- 1 -DRR
0
N02-0293
Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,
2002
Page 1
DOMINION
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
INITIAL LICENSE CLASS
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO NRC 1
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
EVENT
DESCRIPTION
1.
Swap condensate pumps
2.
PRZR LT-1459 failure
3.
"A" SG selected feed flow channel failure
4.
"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A"
5.
PT-1455 fails low, RCS leak (steam space)
6.
Ramp down due to exceeding RCS T/S leakage
7.
EHC pump trips, standby pump fails to start
8.
SBLOCA (steam space - 200 gpm)
9.
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions after BOP entry
Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events
Major Transients
EOPs Entered
EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks
1 (LOOP)
7 (PRZR LT-1459 fails low, "A" SG feed flow channel failure,
"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A", PT-1455 fails
high, RCS leak, EHC pump trips and standby pump fails to start,
5 (PRZR LT-1459 fails low, "A" SG feed flow channel failure,
"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A", PT-1455 fails
low, RCS leak, EHC pump trips and standby pump fails to start)
2 (1-E-0, 1-E-1)
0
1 (Start a HHSI pump)
SCENARIO DURATION
120 Minutes
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY
SCENARIO NRC 1
The scenario will begin with unit 1 at 100% power with a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in
"A" SG and 1H diesel tagged for maintenance. Shift orders are to monitor "A" SG leakage and
return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is complete.
The first event will be a normal evolution. The crew will get a request from predictive
analysis to swap the condensate pumps due to higher than normal vibrations on "C". The crew will
swap condensate pumps in accordance with 1 -OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System." The
next event will occur when the pump swap is complete.
Pressurizer level channel 459 will fail low. The crew will identify the failure and enter I
AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." to take control of pressurizer level, select operable level
channels, and restore letdown. Crew will then return control to auto and reset the pressurizer
control heaters. After the crew has identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP,
the next event will occur.
The selected feedwater flow transmitter for "A" steam generator will fail low, causing the
"A" main feed regulating valve to go full open. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation," and the BOP will take manual control of the FRV and control level prior to
reaching the high level permissive. The crew will swap to an operable channel and return SG level
control to automatic. After technical specifications have been reviewed and the crew has identified
the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.
The "B" charging pump will trip and the "A" charging pump will not auto-start. The crew
will respond in accordance with the annunciator response for CH PP 1B 15J6 LOCKOUT and
manually start a charging pump. (Crew may enter 1-AP-49 and perform applicable actions.) The
SRO will declare the "A" and "B" charging pumps inoperable per technical specifications. The
next event will occur once technical specifications have been reviewed.
Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-455 will fail low and a small pressurizer vapor space
leak will start. The crew will enter 1-AP- 3 for the failed channel and 1-AP-16 for excessive
RCS leakage, and take actions to ramp the unit offline.
During the ramp the running EHC pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto
start. The BOP will be required to manually start the standby pump, or the turbine will trip. If
the pump is successfully started maintenance will be requested to investigate the trip of the
running EHC pump. If the unit trips the next event will occur as the crew enters 1 -E-0.
The RCS leak will ramp to 200 gpm and will require the crew to trip and safety inject.
The next event will occur when the crew transitions out of 1 -E-0.
The plant will experience a loss of offsite power that will require entry into AP-10. Since
1H diesel is tagged out all "H" bus equipment will be lost. The crew will initiate the procedure
for energizing the 1 H bus from the SBO diesel. The scenario can be terminated when the team
enters 1-ES-1.2, or when the lead examiner is satisfied.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET
Read the following to the crew:
Purpose:
This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks
associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be
completed in accordance with approved operations standards.
1. You are on a day shift during the week.
2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.
Unit Status:
Unit 1 is at 100% power. There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. All applicable actions
of 1 -AP-5 have been completed. RCS boron concentration is 52 ppm and core age is 17,000
MWD/MTU. The deborating IXs have not yet been placed in service. Both IXs are loaded with
fresh resin and available for use. The amount of RCS dilution required to raise temperature one
degree is 5,478 gallons and the boration required to lower temperature one degree is 18 gallons.
Aux steam is on unit 1. The maintenance rule window is green for all planned maintenance.
Unit 2 is at 100% power.
The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.
Equipment Status:
1H diesel is tagged for maintenance.
Shift Orders:
Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is complete.
Predictive analysis is monitoring vibrations on "C" condensate pump and may request a pump
swap.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 11:
Gv
itjh
ot
idýiekiveanalysisreporshigh ibratids n a:
Srunhig main
,onde
wap pumps in acicodanc&+h 1-0?
S,~3;0V %Op*ertibn of Condnsate Sys.ett
>,
,
..
.t
... ....
TIM..
....
EXPECTD.AT
INSTCO
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
NOTE: Predictive analysis contacts
control room concerning higher than
usual vibrations on the "C" main
condensate pump. They request that "B"
pump be started and "C" stopped.
US requests BOP to obtain 1-OP-30.1 for
swapping condensate pumps.
BOP directs watchstander to verify 1 -CN-P
1B is ready to start.
BOP directs watchstander to throttle 1 -CN
P-1 B discharge valve.
BOP starts 1-CN-P-1B.
BOP directs watchstander to open 1 -CN-P
l B discharge valve.
BOP directs watchstander to clope the
l
CN-P- 1B discharge vent.
BOP directs watchstander to throttle I1-CN
P-I1C discharge valve.
BOP secures 1-CN-P-1C.
BOP directs watchstander to open I1-CN-P
1Cdscharge vent.
NOTE: The next event may occur once
condensate pumps are swapped, or at the
discretion of the lead evaluator.
EVE
2
e ta t
i s
d
.AdsvetIeL* e¶nnl
s failed low the crew will'
" TIE
.
, .
EXPECTED ACTION
NSTRUCTOR REMARKSý3/4
RO identifies annunciators B-F8, "PZR LO
LEVEL," B-G7, "PZR LO LVL HTRS
OFF-LETDOWN ISOL," and B-H7, "PZR
CONTROL GROUP HTRS OL TRIP."
RO identifies PRZR level channel 459
failing low.
US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-3.
RO verifies redundant channels normal.
BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.
BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure
indication normal.
RO verifies operable PRZR level channels
selected (NO.)
Crew takes manual control of PRZR
level.
Crew restores letdown.
- BOP verifies TV-1204A and 1204B
V1145.
- RO adjusts PCV-1145 to obtain 300
psig and returns to AUTO.
RO verifies PRZR control group heaters not
tripped (NO.)
RO resets PRZR control group heaters.
BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure
channels normal.
BOP verifies operable channels selected for
SGWLC.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
,EVENT 2: Given that thte uit is: at poPwr and aP' RRlevel
be' eIxpected to respohd AI !Ss
of Vital Instrumentalull,
TIME
EXPETEDACION
INSTRUCTOR* REMA.'RKS
Crew refers to 1 -MOP-55.72 for placing the
failed channel in trip.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and determines that the
channel must be placed in trip within 72
hours.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the
crew identifies the appropriate MOP, or
I at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Page I
EVENT 3:*Giydnthat the unit is
M
pat&et*hwdjh eý6hri+ling SG feed flo.w charn*el has failed low
ý ?
the crew Will be ekpec t~
r
% LAW
43,tos of Vital*is
ntartionT.
',: ý
..
. .
.. ..
, , ' ý 1 1 1 ,I " 1,:
- ,
!
MEEXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUTOR.REMARKS.
BOP identifies "A" SG feedwater flow
channel III failing low.
US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-3.
RO verifies redundant channels normal.
BOP identifies "A" SG feedwater flow
channel III has failed low.
Crew manually controls steam
generator level.
RO verifies first stage pressure indications
normal.
RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level
channels normal.
RO verifies both first stage pressure
channels normal.
RO verifies all SGWLC channels selected to
an operable channel (NO)
RO swaps SGWLC channels to channel IV.
BOP verifies SG levels on program and
returns FRVs to automatic.
BOP verifies that "A" SG feedwater flow
channel III is the only failed channel.
US directs crew to enter 1-MOP-55.78.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and determines that
the channel must be placed in TRIP within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The next event will occur after
the crew identifies the appropriate MOP,
or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 4: Given tihat the mt istpoer nd th rig
charging pum hs t
ip
start of ¬her pipn
6he wrlt*11
t a chaging pump in accordance'with k7
annunciator responseftrtCZA('CWPP>1B 15J6LOCKOUT
or I AP
Losso
N.ormalCharging."
TIME
EXPECTED ATION
iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: The following actions pertain to
annunciator response procedure C-A6.
RO identifies annunciators C-B5 "CH PP
TO REGEN HX LO PRESS", C-A6 "CH
PP 1B 15J6 LOCKOUT", C-G6 "RCP lA
B-C LABYTH SEAL LO FLOW"
RO recognizes that there are no running
charging pumps.
Crew reviews annunciator responses.
US directs RO to start either "A" or "C"
charging pump.
Crew restores char in flow.
CRITICAL TASK: Manually
start a charging pump.
RO restores letdown as directed by the US.
US reviews ITS-3.5.2 and declares "A" and
"B" charging pumps inoperable.
NOTE: If an operator is sent to check the
"B" pump breaker he/she will report the
breaker tripped on overcurrent.
US requests maintenance investigate trip of
"B"CHP and auto-start failure of"A" CHP.
NOTE: The following actions pertain to
1-AP-49, which the crew may choose to
enter.
US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-49.
Crew checks charging pumps for gas
binding.
Crew identifies that a charging pump
manipulation has not taken place.
RO identifies letdown automatically
isolated.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EET4:, Gentat the iiit is at bwiadternngc cargn pmhas tripped with no auto'"
/
startofan~ther pump*
tIe4%r*NWi~j
ta
bharging p
in accordance with
anunicaor reP5Js6fo`t-A6t*RP
B 15J6LOCKOUT, or -AP-49, ",oss of
S:~~or a Chr ing"
s'::2* s;
TIMEEXPECTED
CTI
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO verifies VCT level greater than 12%.
RO verifies charging pump suction MOVs
from VCT open.
RO verifies VCT pressure greater than 15
psig.
RO verifies charging pump discharge flow
path.
RO verifies charging parameters normal.
(NO)
Crew checks for piping rupture. (NO)
RO verifies running charging pump normal.
(NO)
US directs RO to start either "A" or "C"
I charging pump.
NOTE: Crew may have previously
started a charging pump IAW the
annunciator response procedure.
Crew restores char ing flow.
CRITICAL TASK: Manually
N
start a charging pump.
RO aligns RCS makeup via normal charging.
RO verifies seal injection flow.
Crew determines letdown should be placed in
service.
RO restores letdown as directed by the US.
RO verifies charging parameters normal.
NOTE: If crew started "C" charging
pump, then the "C" pump is operable per
ITS and 72-hour action applies.
US reviews ITS-3.5.2 and declares "A" and
"B" charging pumps inoperable.
NOTE: The next event will commence
after the US reviews Tech Specs, or at the
direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 5: Given that the nt t at pwt aridnd PTIý455 fails high, causing a RCS leak, the'crew
,,wi *llespon in:accordanceiwithi-AV31,
ELss ofVitl Inst
enin"
and:1-AP-16,
ncreas.ing Primar'y Plant Leakage- "
.. ....
r*, ,,
,*e,,*,e
.. .
.
. . ...
.
. ..
g.
.
..
I
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
TIME:
EXPECTED ACTIO1$
F
'INSTRUCTOR REMARKS,
NOTE: The following actions are from 1
AP-3. Once the RCS leak is identified the
crew may continue performance of this
procedure in conjunction with 1-AP-16.
RO identifies various annunciators
associated with the instrumentation failure.
RO identifies PRZR PT-1455 has failed
high and notifies the US.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.
RO verifies redundant channels normal.
BOP verifies SG level control parameters
normal.
BOP verifies 1 " stage pressure indications
normal.
RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level
channels normal.
BOP verifies both turbine first stage
pressure channels normal.
BOP verifies operable channels selected for
all SGWLC instruments.
Crew identifies 1-MOP-55.73 for PRZR
pressure channel failures.
US directs crew to verify P-1I permissive
status per 1-MOP-55.73 within one hour.
US/STA consults ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2, and
enters action on failed channel to place in
trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The following actions concern the
RCS leak.
Crew identifies that charging flow has
increased and/or containment sump
I pumping frequency has increased.
US directs entry into 1-AP- 16.
Crew verifies that the unit is in mode 1.
verifies
that
PRZR
level,
subcooling, and VCT level are under control.
Page 1
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
EVENT 5: Given that the unit isatp "e>rnd P15ý5 fails ih
asn nRSlatece
will respond in accordance with 1-P-3 "ss
of Vital Instrmentation and 1 AP,
....
.Increasm* PrimarylateaKage.
TiME
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO checks that 1-CH-LCV-1115A is not
diverting.
Crew attempts to identify the source of the
leakage inside containment.
Crew quantifies RCS leakage as greater than
10 GPM.
US reviews ITS 3.4.13.
NOTE: If the US does not direct the crew
to ramp the unit off line, then the OMOC
will direct the US to remove the unit from
service.
US directs crew to ramp unit off line.
NOTE: The next event will be the crew
reducing unit power for the required
reactivity change.
Page I
EVENTI 6: Give In IIthat there is, an RUCS, leak that k66
f6ch spie& limits, the crew Will ramp the,
fflineinaccr
c w
O
"
t
eO'
.i..toMode
- ~ ~~.'..
...
- < .. .. ,
, . .. .
..
TIME
EXPECTED A
ON ..
STRUTR REMARKS
NOTE: Crew is given reactivity
calculations from reactor engineer,
verified by STA.
US briefs crew on ramp.
RO commences lowering Tave using
boration/control rods.
BOP commences lowering main turbine
load.
"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.
"* Lowers reference setter.
"" Pushes GO button.
BOP takes turbine to IMP-IN when power is
- 98%.
"* Pushes HOLD button
"* Matches reference and setter
"* Pulses VPL down until red light lit
"* Pulses VPL up until red light not lit
"* Verifies Governor tracking meter reads 0
"* Pushes IMP-IN button
- Resumes ramp.
BOP directs turbine building watchstander
to place LP heater drain pumps on recirc and
shutdown when power is approximately
90%.
NOTE: The next event will occur when
the lead evaluator is satisfied with the
I amount of reactivity change.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
EVENT,7,:G Giv Ien that Ian EHC, pu
has trp
id"
dtheb bakup EHIum
as not , ato ta'sta
the trew wi start tie b'ackuppum
1/2
TIME
EXPECTED ACTIN
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS....
BOP identifies K-F5, "TURB SUPERV
PANEL TROUBLE".
BOP identifies T-B4, "EH FLUID
RESERVOIR LOS-PRESSURE."
BOP identifies no EHC pump running.
US directs BOP to start EHC pump 1-TM
P4.
BOP manually starts EHC pump 1-TM-P-4.
NOTE: If the crew dispatches an
operator to look at EHC pumps, the
operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is
unusually hot, and 1-TM-P-4 appears
normal.
US requests maintenance to investigate trip
of EHC pump, and start failure of backup
pump.-
NOTE: The next event will occur after
the backup EHC pump is running, or at
the direction of the lead evaluator.
Page I
EVENT 8: Given that the ,unift siat oe* afndaSBCOA has occured, the crekw
ill be expected
t orspond IAW ItAP" -
k
"
"'
ip"o
Sap e~jction,t'iad~-d4~
tdito
Secondatry Coolant.",,!
TIMEXECED TO
STRUCTORREMARKS
RO identifies charging flow increasing and
PRZR level decreasing.
US will refer back to step 2 of 1-AP-16.
RO verifies primary parameters under
operator control (NO).
RO isolates letdown and maximizes
charging flow.
RO commences a VCT makeup from the
blender.
RO informs US that PRZR level is still
decreasing.
US directs crew to manually trip the reactor
and enter 1 -E-0.
RO/BOP manually trips the reactor.
BOP verifies turbine trip.
RO verifies AC emergency busses
energized.
RO/BOP check if safety injection has
actuated (NO).
NOTE: Depending upon elapsed time, the
crew may determine SI is not required at
this time and transition to 1-ES-0.1. The
following actions are IAW 1-ES-0.1.
RO verifies charging in service.
RO checks PRZR level control.
RO checks PRZR pressure control.
RO verifies all IRPIs 10 steps or less.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENTS: Given that the unitis 4~p
~andaLOCA has occurred, the
v Wi1fbe ekpde d;
torpond AW
iii
a
Plant Le age,,
0
JEZ?,?
atoTridhp or
Safeky lin ection, aR
d&toro0, Second ar*j
°al
-
TIMEX
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
BOP verifies adequate HP turbine gland
steam pressure.
NOTE: The following actions will occur
after the crew identifies the need to SI
and are IAW 1-E-0.
Crew checks if safety injection is required.
US directs crew to manually initiate SI.
RO/BOP manually initiate SI.
US directs RO/BOP to manually initiate
phase A isolation.
RO/BOP manually initiate phase A
isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps running.
NOTE: Crew may have already started
the second charging pump.
Crew verifies SI pumps running.
S
in
uly
one)
Low-head SI pumps running (YES)
BOP verifies SW pumps running.
Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).
RO checks RCS temperature stable at or
trending to 547OF.
RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump
recirc criteria.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
EVENT, 8: Givený that, the ýunit is, ýApo'W-r,;4ftd jEOC ha ocur
edi~cr
vi1
ekpe---d
qto
espond !AWA
eaa
Tr
~~~~~~
r..
..
o> an*}::
,<
,::>
TIME::
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMAR
BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).
BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).
Crew checks if RCS is intact inside
containment (NO).
US directs crew to transition to l-E-1.
NOTE: The next event will occur once
the crew transitions out of 1-E-0, or at the
direction of the lead evaluator.-
Page I
EVENT 9: Given that the :umts tppett ndi&sf£ff-ite poer has &curred',te crew will be
ý,ei)eci~ke'd'to~respcin tnco
66<>Wit'0 O-P4 0,"Loss bfEectrical Thwer: -
TIME
EXPECTED ACTION-
<jFK>>
<INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
Crew identifies a loss of off-site power, loss
of"H" emergency bus.
US directs BOP to enter 0-AP-10 while RO
continues in E-0.
NOTE: The following steps refer to 0-AP
10 actions.
BOP performs 0-AP-10 diagnostics.
BOP reports results of diagnostics to US.
US directs BOP to initiate O-OP-6.4 to align
the SBO to supply tH emergency bus.
US directs an extra operator to initiate 0
MOP-26.64 to walk down the switchyard.
NOTE: The following steps refer to 1-E-1
actions.
RO checks secondary radiation.
RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.
RO checks if SI can be terminated (NO).
RO checks if QS is required. (NO)
RO checks QS pump status.
RO checks if low-head SI pumps can be
stopped. (YES)
RO resets SI and stops LHSI pumps.
RO/BOP checks RCS and SG pressures
RO/BOP checks if diesels should be
stopped. (NO)
RO/BOP verifies power available to at least
one train of cold leg recirculation. (YES)
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and
classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the
Lead Evaluator.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
EVENT 9: 'Given that the unit is trippedj and'a 1jss dfoff-site power has occurred, the crewU&wil be
t
t6 respond in accor dceVt*h0APt 0;, "Loss ofEleci
Power
TIME,
EXPECTED ACTION'1 >,
2
ISTRUCTOR'REMARK
RO/BOP checks auxiliary and safeguards
building status.
US requests SEM to direct chemistry to
sample RCS and containment.
US evaluates plant recovery equipment
RO/BOP checks containment hydrogen
concentration and initiates placing H2
analyzer in service.
Crew checks if RCS cooldown and
depressurizaion is required. (YES)
US directs transition to 1-ES-1.2
Note: Scenario can be terminated once
crew transitions to 1-ES-1.2, or at the
direction of the lead evaluator.
Page I
REFERENCES
SPR O
UREV,"
Operating Procedure 1-OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System."
27
Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."
47
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."
17
Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."
18
Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."
30
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
28
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
16
Station Annunciator Response Procedures.
N/A
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.
2
INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,
Jan. 1988
INOP,
ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines
Nov. 1990
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*
ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **
ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *
ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **
Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\
- *
Located in the Instructor Booth.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
1. SEN 122, Recurring Event: Unisolable Reactor Coolant System Leak
Loviisa Units 1 & 2/VVER (May 16, 1994)
An unisolable reactor coolant system leak developed in the pressurizer shutdown spray valve due to
fatigue caused by thermal cycling and stratification.
Note: The VVER design includes two different pressurizer spray systems: normal pressurizer spray
and shutdown spray. The normal spray system consists of two spray valves with water for sprays
taken from the discharge side of two of the six reactor coolant pumps. The two normal spray paths
are identical, each consisting of four parallel spray lines and one warm-up line. The capacity of the
normal spray system is sufficient to avoid high reactor pressure during most anticipated transients.
The shutdown spray system, which is supplied either from the cold leg of one RCS loop or the
normal volume control system, is used for primary pressure decrease during normal reactor
shutdowns and also in some transients.
On May 16, 1994, during a routine weekly operator walk-down, fluid leakage was noted from the
insulation near the Unit 2 pressurizer shutdown spray valve. The source was determined to be a
through-wall crack in the 2-inch diameter valve body, and the plant was shutdown for five days to
conduct repairs. Similar crack indications were found on the corresponding valve on Unit 1, and
Unit 1 was shutdown for repair on May 23, 1994.
The failed valve had been in service for about 15 years. Although the original design did not
provide a means to maintain the pipe warm when the spray valve was closed, in 1980 a small hole
was drilled in the valve disc to minimize cyclic thermal stresses. While investigating the cause of
the May 16, 1994 crack, temperature stratification was also detected on the outlet side of the valve
(a 721F gradient existed from the top to the bottom of the horizontal run of pipe). The valve is
made of forged, titanium-stabilized, austenitic stainless steel.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 1
Initial conditions
1. Recall 100% power end-of-life IC (IC-161).
2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
3. Tagout IH diesel per MOP.
4. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfinction RC2401 = 8E-4) and allow to run until "A"
SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.
5. Make sure LT-1459 is selected channel for pressurizer level.
6. Ensure "B" charging pump is running and "C" charging pump is powered from "J" bus.
7. Ensure "A" and "C" condensate pumps are running.
PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START
CONDITION..
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.
....
Auto start failure of "A" Enter the following switch overrides:
CHP
CHPIAIASTRT, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger =
N/A
CHPIAIASTP, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger =
N/A
CHP1A ASTP, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger = N/A
Auto start failure of EHC
Switch override: TMP4_ASTP, delay time = 0, O/R - OFF, trigger
Iump
= N/A.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO EVENTS
EVENT,
.......
I.T,-OVERRID,/COMMUNICATIONS
1) Swap condensate pumps
S
.
.
.
.
. ...
.
. .
f
2) RC-LT-1459 failure
RC0801, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = -1, trigger = 1
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
3) "A" SG feed flow channel
FW1201, delay time = 5, Ramp = 45, severity value = -1,
III failure
trigger = 2
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
NOTE: Predictive analysis contacts control room concerning
higher than usual vibrations on the "C" main condensate
pump. They request that "B" pump be started and "C"
stopped.
NOTE: When directed to throttle closed "B" condensate pump
discharge valve 1-CN-22, use PNID screen and setup event
trigger to throttle the valve to 3% open over a two-minute
period.
NOTE: When directed to open "B" condensate pump
discharge valve 1-CN-22, use PNID screen and setup event
trigger to open the valve over a one minute period.
NOTE: When directed to close 1-CN-486, wait one minute,
then inform the crew that 1-CN-486 is closed (not modeled.)
NOTE: When directed to throttle closed "C" condensate pump
discharge valve 1-CN-34, use PNID screen and setup event
trigger to throttle the valve to 3% open over a two-minute
period.
NOTE: When directed to open "C" condensate pump
discharge valve 1-CN-34, use PNID screen and setup event
trigger to open the valve over a one minute period.
NOTE: When directed to open 1-CN-487, wait one minute,
then inform the crew that 1-CN-487 is open (not modeled.)
NOTE: The next event may occur once condensate pumps are
swapped, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
Page 1
NEVENT
MAL
TION/OVERDECOMMUNICATIONS
4)1-CH-P-1B trip
CH1602, delay time = 5, trigger = 3
NOTE: If an operator is sent to check the "B" pump breaker
he/she will report the breaker tripped on overcurrent.
NOTE: The next event will commence after the US reviews
Tech Specs, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
5)PT-1455 failure and RCS
RC0703, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = +1, trigger = 4
leak
RC04, delay time = 5, ramp = 300, severity value = 10, trigger = 4.
NOTE: If the US does not direct the crew to ramp unit off
line, then call as the OMOC and direct the US to remove the
unit from service.
NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing unit power
for the required reactivity change.
6) Unit rampdown
NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from reactor
engineer, verified by STA.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator is
satisfied with the amount of reactivity change.
7)EHC pump trip
TU1101, delay time = 5, trigger = 5
NOTE: If the crew dispatches an operator to look at EHC
pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually
hot, and 1-TM-P4 appears normal.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup EHC
pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
8)SBLOCA
Update MRC04 to 45% (200 gpm), ramp = 5, delay = 0, trigger =
none.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew transitions
out of 1-E-0, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
9)LOOP
ELOI, delay time = 5 see, trigger = 6
Note: Scenario can be terminated after the crew transitions to
1-ES-1.2, or at the direction of the lead evaluator
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
ATTACHMENT 3
SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with
Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,
and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.
GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
A.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,
especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink
availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by
prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative
procedures.
C.
During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves
conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary
information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.
D.
During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and
based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and predictive analysis reports high
vibrations on a running main condensate pump, the crew will swap pumps
in accordance with 1-OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R403
Shift the main condensate pumps
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR level channel has failed, the
crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R633 Respond to a failure of the controlling pressurizer level channel
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
CT Statement:
Crew takes manual control of PRZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown.
Safety Significance:
Failure to take manual control of PRZR level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew
performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on high PRZR level.
Cues:
The controlling PRZR level channel is failed low, letdown is isolated.
Performance Indicator:
RO places controller for l-CH-FCV- 1122 in manual and controls PRZR level.
RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel.
RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US.
Feedback:
PRZR level does not exceed trip setpoint.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and the controlling SG feed flow channel
has failed, the crew will be expected to respond lAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of
Vital Instrumentation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.
Safety Significance:
Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew
performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.
Cues:
The controlling SG feed flow channel has failed low.
Main feed reg valve is going open.
Actual SG level is increasing.
Performance Indicator:
BOP places controller for 1-FW-FCV-1478 in manual and controls "A" SG level.
Feedback:
SG level does not increase to P-14 setpoint.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to turbine trip/feedwater isolation on high SG level.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped
with no auto start of another pump, the crew will start a charging pump in
accordance with annunciator response for C-A6 "CH PP 1B 15J6
LOCKOUT."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and PT-1455 fails, causing an RCS leak,
the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation" and 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that there is an RCS leak that exceeds tech spec limits, the crew will
ramp the unit off line in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation
From Mode 1 to Mode 2."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
None
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Pagel1
EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that an EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not
auto-started, the crew will start the backup pump and attempt to stabilize
conditions, or trip the unit.
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power, and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will
be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant
Leakage," l-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-l, "Loss of
Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R185
R186
Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
Determine the appropriate recovery procedure following the actuation of a reactor trip with
a safety injection.
S69
Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications.
S85
Notify the appropriate personnel of emergency events.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew starts a second charging pump during safety injection.
Safety Significance:
Failure to start the second available charging pump constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect
crew performance" which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."
Cues:
SI signal present
Only one charging pump is running with two available.
Performance Indicator:
RO manually starts second available charging pump.
Feedback:
Increase in HHSI flow.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Before exiting E-0.
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 9 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is tripped, and a loss of off-site power has occurred, the
crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 0-AP-10, "Loss of
Electrical Power."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
S27
Direct the restoration of the electrical distribution system following the performance of the
loss of electrical power diagnostic
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 2
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
0
N02-0293
Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,
12002
4.
__________________ .1
I
I.
I .
II
I
i
I
4-
4.
- 1
+
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
I
Page I
Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 2
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
I-
4
__________________ +/- __________________________________________________
Page I
DOMINION
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
INITIAL LICENSE CLASS
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO 2
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
EVENT
DESCRIPTION
1.
Sync main generator to grid
2.
Main steam pressure transmitter PT-1464 fails high
3.
Continue ramping to 30%
4.
Loss of Bearing Cooling
5.
Letdown PCV fails closed
6.
"C" SG level channel III failure
7.
PT- 1444 fails high, PORV sticks open and block valve thermals
8.
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions after EOP entry
Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events
Major Transients
EOPs Entered
EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks
3 (Single train SI, failure of BIT inlet valves, SGTR on "C" SG)
8 (PT-1464 failure, Loss of Bearing Cooling, PCV- 1145 failure,
"C" SG level channel III failure, PT-1444 failure/stuck
PORV/block valve failure, single train SI, failure of BIT inlet
5 (PT-1464 failure, Loss of Bearing Cooling, PCV- 1145 failure,
"C" SG level channel III failure, PT-1444 failure)
3 (I-E-0, 1-E-l, l-E-3)
1 (1-ECA-3.1)
2 (Establish HHSI flow; isolate AFW to "C" SG)
SCENARIO DURATION
120 Minutes
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY
SCENARIO NRC 2
The first event will be a normal evolution to synchronize and load the main generator. The
unit is at 12% power with l-OP-15.2 and I-OP-2.1 completed through adjusting the setter ramp
rate to two percent per minute. Prior to entering the simulator, the crew will receive turnover and
conduct a pre-job brief for placing the unit on-line. Immediately after assuming the watch, the crew
will synchronize and load the main generator, then continue to increase turbine load. When the
condenser steam dumps are fully closed, the next event will occur.
Main steam header pressure transmitter PT-1464 will fail high over a 60-second period
causing the steam dumps to open. The crew will respond by entering 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load
Increase," which directs them to turn the steam dumps OFF. After the crew completes 1-AP-38,
they will continue ramping. If they are reluctant to do so because of steam dumps being
unavailable, the Operations Manager on Call will direct them to continue increasing power.
The third event will be a reactivity manipulation to continue the ramp to 30%. As soon as
the Lead Examiner observes the required ramp he will signal for the next event to occur.
The running BC pump will trip. The crew should identify annunciators associated with the
loss of BC and the US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."
The crew will identify the failure of the standby BC pump to auto-start and manually start the
pump. After the crew stabilizes the unit, the next event will occur.
Letdown pressure controller will fail causing letdown PCV- 1145 to fully close and
actuating annunciator C-B2, LOW PRESS LETDWN LINE HI PRESS. The crew will refer to the
annunciator response, place PCV-1 145 in MANUAL and restore letdown parameters to normal.
After the crew has stabilized letdown, the next event will occur.
The "C" steam generator level channel III will fail high, causing the "C" main feed
regulating valve to go full closed. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation,"
and the BOP will take manual control of the FRV and restore level prior to reaching the SG low
low level reactor trip setpoint. After the US refers to technical specifications and the crew has
identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.
PRZR PT-1444 will fail high causing the PORV and spray valves to fully open. The crew
will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure." The PORV will not close manually and the block
MOV will thermal out before it closes fully. RCS pressure will continue to decrease. The crew
will enter 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." After tripping the unit, RCS pressure will
continue to decrease and SI will occur. One train of SI and phase A will fail to actuate
automatically, requiring the crew to manually align equipment. After HHSI flow is established, the
last event will occur.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Pagel1
A 300-gpm tube rupture will develop in C S/G. The crew will identify increasing water
level in "C" SG coincident with decreasing RCS pressure. The crew will transition to 1-E-l,
"Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," then to 1-ECA-3.1, "SGTR with Loss of Reactor
Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired." The scenario may be terminated after the crew
transitions to 1 -ECA-3.1 or at the direction of the lead examiner.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET
Read the following to the crew:
This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks associated with
the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with
approved operations standards.
3. You are on a day shift during the week.
4. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.
Unit Status:
Unit 1 is at 12% power. The main generator is ready to be synchronized and loaded. RCS boron is
266 ppm and core age is 17,000 MWD/MTU. The amount of RCS dilution required to raise
temperature one degree is 569 gallons and the boration required to lower temperature one degree is
11 gallons. Aux steam is on unit 2. The Mrule window is green for all planned maintenance.
Unit 2 is at 100% power.
The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.
Equipment Status:
The main generator automatic synchronizing circuit is not functioning properly. A 10 gpd tube
leak exists in "A" SG. 1 H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance.
Shift Orders:
Prior to entering the simulator, perform a pre-job brief for placing the unit on-line. After
assuming the watch, place the unit on-line without delay.
Place the unit on line by manually synchronizing and loading the main generator, then ramp to
30% power. Hold for chemistry cleanup. Continue to monitor "A" SG tube leakage.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
EVENTI1 Gie thtt
4t>stt~4kAAhh
ain geert'
d'a
ihne the crew wll
ltlz
oad the min generator be pacoranced
`0
ffi
2
genrMfrehordfc
..
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
}TIME
EXPECTED A*CTIO1
II*STRUCTORREMARKS,
NOTE: The following steps are from 1-OP-15.2.
BOP manually closes main generator output
breaker.
BOP verifies generator assumes some load or raises
setter to assume load.
BOP places synch key in OFF.
BOP zeroes balance volts as necessary.
BOP adjusts setter to .3 percent per minute.
BOP adjusts generator voltage as necessary.
US directs crew to release ERF computer point from
OFF SCAN.
US directs crew to return to l-OP-2.1 to continue
increasing power.
NOTE: The next event will occur after condenser
steam dumps are fully closed or at the direction
of the lead examiner.
Page 1
EVENT 2: Given that the unit is a&ow&er' th c..w. i1g
-resp ond to P
64 failing high and an
6 eected power increasei
Inacrdncewih
A-38,AP Excessive Load Increase"
TIME",
EXPECTED ACTION
- ?. INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO identifies steam dumps open and informs US.
US directs crew to enter l-AP-38.
Crew st ops Rower increase.
BOP checks turbine load normal.
RO checks reactor power stable.
BOP identifies PT-464 failed high and informs US.
BOP checks turbine load control.
Crew checks plant status - stable.
Crew checks plant steam systems.
Crew verifies cause of load increase corrected.
US references VPAP-1410 and makes required
notifications.
US directs crew to continue increasing power.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
EVEY
NT,2*,: di
neiithat theuni i 'a p x
rh ew ~ill respondIto
T-464 failing ihada
nexitete power ie
accr
~~
wih -P3"xessivet 1d'InraeX
- TIME
EXPECTED ACTIO....
...
i.
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: If crew is reluctant to continue power
increase due to unavailability of steam dumps,
the Operations Manager on Call will direct them
to continue increasing power and transfer steam
dumps to Tavg mode when directed by
procedure.
NOTE: The next event will be the crew
increasing unit power for the required reactivity
manipulation.
Page I
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
EVENT 3: Given that t
t;iha j
"as
placed on-line, the c re w w iell continue increasing
Iepoxro 30a/&in acc6#d~ne
i iw4i1
Kjnit Operation -fom Mode2 to Mode:
TIME
EXPECTED ACTIO
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations
from reactor engineer, verified by STA.
RO commences raising Tave using dilution/control
rods.
BOP commences increasing main turbine
load
"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min
"* Raises reference setter.
"* Pushes GO button.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead
examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change.
Page I
EVENT 4: Given that the jilit isat
"
w
and teM uning BCE pump has tripped, tihe &crew' wilVl,
respond AW
I 1-AP-I9
Bfeng, C
- ,ooling Water."
TIME 1,
EXPECTED ACTION ..
INSTRUCTORREMARKS
BOP identifies annunciators F-E4, "BC WTR
DISCH HDR LO PRESS," and F-F4, "BC WTR PP
1A-lB AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED," and
informs US.
US directs the crew to enter 1-AP-19.
BOP identifies "A" BC pump tripped and informs
US.
BOP verifies BC pump running with normal
indications.
BOP verifies BC system operating normally in
tower mode.
Crew monitors main generator temperatures.
Crew dispatches an operator to locally check
equipment.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
has started the standby BC pump and stabilized
the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
EVENTS: -,,Given that the unit is; ~t~vr
n
-EP-45,
Letdown Low4Pressureconrle
Output, has failed idw theewil rspond lA W aann
atbr 1 C-B2,_ LW PRSS
L..
ETDWNLDINE HI PkSSt
.
...
....
TIME'
J
XETDATO
NSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO identifies annunciator C-B2, "LOW PRESS
LETDWN LINE HI PRESS".
RO identifies 1-CH-PC- 1145 failed low and informs
US.
Crew refers to annunciator response procedure.
RO takes manual control of l-CH-PCV- 1145 and
opens it to reestablish 300 psig.
US notifies instrument department to investigate.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the RO
has stabilized letdown, or at the direction of the
lead evaluator.
Page I
EVENT 6: OGitn:that the unit, isat'ppe *th
con6tolling SG, evel channel hga failed'high,
thew
l
o
in
-o
a
i
?fo
ital In struimenttation'
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
TJIME,
,:EXPECTED ACTIOISItK 9>
NSTRUCTOR REMARKS,,
BOP identifies "C" SG level channel III failing high
and informs US.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.
BOP verifies redundant channels normal.
BOP identifies "C" SG level channel III has failed
high.
Crew manually controls steam generator
level.
RO verifies first stage pressure indications normal.
RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels
normal.
RO verifies both first stage pressure channels
normal.
BOP verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an
operable channel. (NO)
BOP verifies that "C" SG level channel III is the
only failed channel.
US directs crew to enter 1-MOP-55.76.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2, and determines
that the channel must be placed in TRIP within 72
hours.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the
direction of the lead evaluator.
Page 1
ýEVENT 7:' Given that PT- 1444 hasi failed hih wIth a stW cWkopnPR
and blck MOVthe',
crew will respond ig
Pccordaiie
wi
-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure, and 1E-O,
" "'Reactoi Trip Or Safpt
Inie*b,
el
e4
TIME
EXPECTED ATION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO identifies alarms associated with PT-1444
failing high and PRZR PORV open, and informs
US.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.
RO attempts to close PRZR PORV and identifies
valve stuck open.
RO attempts to close PORV block MOV and
identifies valve closed partially, then thermalled out.
RO closes PRZR spray valves and identifies RCS
pressure continuing to decrease.
US directs crew to enter 1 -E-0.
RO/BOP trip the reactor.
BOP trips the turbine.
RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
RO/BOP check if SI has actuated or is required.
RO identifies RCS pressure continuing to decrease,
requiring manual initiation of SI.
US directs crew to manually initiate SI.
RO/BOP manually initiate SI.
Crew identifies that train "A" SI did not actuate.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 7: Given that PT-I444has failed high with a stuck open PQRV and block MOV, the
creiwill respond i~coch~W6t64AP4,ts
fRSPesr,
n
"R 'aci6rt'1 1rip, drS
ýIk'
TIME.-
EXPETEDATIO
I STRCTOR REMARKS'
BOP verifies feedwater isolation (NO).
BOP closes main feed MOVs, stops 1-FW-P-1A1
and 1C 1, and places standby feed pump in PTL.
RO/BOP manually initiate phase A.
US initiates phase A attachment.
BOP verifies AFW pumps are running.
RO/BOP verifies SI pumps are running (NO).
Crew starts SI u
s.
BOP verifies SW pumps running (NO.)
- BOP starts 1-SW-P-lA.
Crew checks if MS lines should be isolated. (NO)
Crew verifies cold leg SI flow (NO).
US directs BOP to perform l-E-0 attachment to
verify SI flow path.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 7: Gien that PT-1444 hasftafiled ighwit
l
a stuck'l
-oe
PORV and bloc MO
t
ScreWwillrespond i, aýord&w
!it-AP-44,
"oss of RCS Pressure, and 1-EO
"Reactor Tfip or Safety'mjct4
JIME
..
EXP..T.D......ON.
INSTRUCTOR REMARKSý
NOTE: Crew may have previously identified
lack of SI flow and established SI flow lAW the
CAP.
Crew establishes HHSI flow.
CRITICAL TASK: Open
"* BOP checks charging pump alignment.
BIT inlet valve 1867A.
"* BOP checks BIT recircs closed.
"* BOP checks BIT outlet valves open.
"* BOP checks BIT inlet valves open (NO.)
RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.
US directs transition to 1-E-1.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
establishes HHSI flow, or at the direction of the
lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENt 8: Giye4 that a SGTh ha
R
Pk
en an cannot be,.
is~f" wil rej~oid jwith
I E3 SeamrGnertrTb
Rup'e
I
nd !jECA:3,
fSGT
swiflEoss5f ReactorCoolant
Subcooled..
R~qeitDesird
,,>
,
g
TIME
EXPECTED>ACT
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc
criteria.
BOP checks intact SG levels and identifies "C" SG
level continuing to increase after isolating AFW.
BOP checks secondary radiation and identifies "C"
SG MS line radiation monitor increasing.
US directs transition to 1 -E-3.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc
criteria.
Crew identifies ruptured generator.
Crew isolates flow from ruptured SG.
0
0
RO checks decay heat release valve closed
- BOP verifies "C" blowdown trip valves closed
0
0
BOP closes "C" MSTV
US initiates attachment 2 for local turbine building
operations.
RO checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves.
CRITICAL TASK:
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 8: GiVr that a SGER has b6eR'd a
a aZR PORV is stfk open and cannot be
isdlated theew will responhd ~a4cprc with 1 E=3j:teamGenetatorTube
ui'k;pe"'n
I
-EA3:jGR7~~~so
eco
olrtSub
obled
Desired
ýp
N
0"::
TIME
EXPECTED ACTI
....
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
US directs crew to enter 1 -ECA-3.1.
RO resets both trains of phase A.
BOP establish instrument air to containment.
Crew verifies all AC busses energized by offsite.
RO places all pressurizer heaters in PTL.
Crew checks if CDA reset is required. (NO)
Crew checks if QS is required. (NO)
BOP checks QS pump status.
Crew checks if low heads should be stopped (YES).
BOP places low-heads in AUTO.
BOP checks auxiliary building status.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
i>
- sohatd;tlie 4re wil &espq*d i aeccqrdance with 1 -ES; "Steam Generator Tube
R ~it,
n
ECA, 3tA BTtk*Niht5S of Reactor :Coh~nt -Subcoobed::
R
P*
t~
i5 d."
?
t;
7
r
TIME.
P
SXPECTED ACTION
,
,
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
US asks station emergency manager to request
chemistry samples.
Crew evaluates plant recovery equipment.
BOP places hydrogen analyzer in service.
Crew initiates RCS cooldown.
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after the
crew transitions to 1-ECA-3.1 or at the direction
of the lead examiner.
NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and
classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief.
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the
Lead Evaluator.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
REFERENCES
PROCDUR>
&REV.'
Operation Procedure l-OP-15.2, "Main Generator Operation."
35
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."
11
Operation Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."
68
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."
17
Abnormal Procedure 1-AP- 19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling."
13
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure."
14
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
28
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
16
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."
19
Emergency Contingency Action 1-ECA-3.1, "SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant
15
- Subcooled Recovery Desired."
Station Annunciator Response Procedures.
N/A
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.
2
INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,
Jan. 1988
INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines
Nov. 1990
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*
ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **
ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *
ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **
Located on N:\\N"LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\
- *
Located in the Instructor Booth.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
1.
SOER 83-2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
2.
NRC IE Bulletin N90-49 Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam Generator Tubes.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 2
Initial conditions
8. Recall IC for 12% power (IC163).
9. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
10. Tagout lH diesel per MOP.
11. Ensure "B" charging pump and both unit-2 SW pumps running.
12. Show 10 gpd leak on "A" SG (8E-4).
13. Provide copy of 1-OP-2.1 signed off through step 5.2.20.
14. Provide copy of l-OP-15.2 signed off through step 5.1.20.
15. Recall monitor screen: scenario2.
PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START
CONDITIONM
FUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.
BIT inlet valves fail to open SIMOV867B RACKIN = RACKOUT, delay time =0, event
on SI
trigger = S12: safetyinj on
MOV867 GREEN, override = ON
Failure of SI train A and S10701, delay time = 0, event trigger = none
phase A train A
S11303, delay time = 0, event trigger
none
sticks
in
open Remote function - reactor coolant: RC1901, delay time = 0, event
position
trigger = none
Trigger 11 = RCMOV536_CLOSE
MOV control: RCMOV536_Rackin = rackout, delay time = 0,
trigger = 11
Failure of BC pump auto-
BCPAUTODEFEAT = true
start
Failure of reactor trip switch
Switch overrides:
on benchboard 1
- RXTRIPTRIP, override = OFF, delay time = 0, trigger
none
- RXTRIPATRIP, override = OFF, delay time = 0, trigger
= none
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
SCENARIO EVENTS
EVENT
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
1) Sync
main
generator, NOTE: The next event will occur after condenser steam
ramp
dumps are fully closed or at the direction of the lead
examiner.
2) PT-1464 failure
MS16, delay time = 5, ramp = 240, severity value = .5, trigger = 1
NOTE: If crew is reluctant to continue power increase due to
unavailability of steam dumps, the Operations Manager on
Call will direct them to continue increasing power and
transfer steam dumps to Tavg mode when directed by
procedure.
NOTE: The next event will be the crew increasing unit power
for the required reactivity manipulation.
3) Ramp continues
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead examiner is
satisfied with the reactivity change.
4) Loss of Bearing Cooling
BCP1_PROTECT(1) = true
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has started the
standby BC pump and stabilized the plant, or as directed by
the lead evaluator.
5) PCV-1 145 fails closed
CHI8, delay time = 5 see, ramp = 5 see, severity value = +1,
trigger = 3
NOTE:
If contacted to visually observe 1-CH-PCV-1145,
report that you see nothing abnormal.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the RO has stabilized
letdown, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
6) "C" SG level channel
FW0109, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = +1, trigger = 4
failure
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
7) PT-1444 failure
RC0701, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 1, trigger = 5
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew establishes
HHSI flow, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
PagelI
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
EVENT
,ýMALFUNCTION/OVERRJDE/COMMUNICATIONS.
RC2403, delay time = 5, ramp = 60, severity value = 35, trigger = 6
NOTE: When called, pick up attachment(s) for local operations
to isolate "C" SG.
NOTE: If contacted to check breaker for block valve report
that breaker is tripped and the thermal cannot be reset.
NOTE: If contacted to close PORV using Appendix R switch
report that you took the switch to the ISOLATE position, but
it felt "loose" and you don't believe it actually operated.
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after the crew transitions
to 1-ECA-3.1 or at the direction of the lead examiner.
Page I
ATTACHMENT 3
SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with
Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,
and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.
GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
A.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,
especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink
availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by
prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative
procedures.
C.
During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves
conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary
information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.
D.
During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and
based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at 12% power with the main generator ready to be
placed on line, the crew will manually synchronize and load the main
generator in accordance with 1-OP-15.2, "Main Generator Operation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R379 Synchronize the main generator
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power, the crew will respond to an unexpected
power increase in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase".
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.
S69
Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew stops power increase
Safety Significance:
Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average
coolant temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality, and the following
can not be assured : 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature
range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P-12 interlock is
above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.
Cues:
Indication of power increase:
"* Several annunciators. (i.e. Pzr Hi/Lo Press, Pzr Lo Level)
"* Reactor power increasing.
"* Steam flow increasing.
Performance Indicator:
RO place both steam dump interlock switches to OFF/RESET.
Feedback:
"* Reactor power increase stopped
"* Steam dumps indicate closed
"* Steam flow decreased
WOG Reference:
N/A
Conditions:
Prior to receiving an automatic Rx trip on over power
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit has just been placed on-line, the crew will continue
increasing power to 30% in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation
from Mode 2 to Mode 1."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
N/A
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
PagelI
EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and the running BC pump has tripped, the
crew will respond IAW l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R522
Stabilize the unit following a loss of Bearing Cooling Water
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power, and 1-CH-PC- 1145, Letdown Low Pressure
controller output, has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with
annunciator 1C-B2, "LOW PRESS LETDWN LINE HI PRESS".
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a controlling SG level channel has
failed, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
PagelI
CT Statement:
Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.
Safety Significance:
Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew
performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.
Cues:
The controlling SG level channel has failed high.
Main feed reg valve is going closed.
Actual SG level is decreasing.
Performance Indicator:
BOP places controller for I-FW-FCV-1498 in manual and controls "C" SG level.
Feedback:
SG level does not decrease to SG low-low level reactor trip setpoint.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to reactor trip on low-low SG level.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
PagelI
EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that a SGTR has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with
1-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R185
Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
PagelI
EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that a SGTR has occurred and a PRZR PORV is stuck open and
cannot be isolated, the crew will respond in accordance with t-ECA-3.1,
"SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R634 Respond to a loss of reactor coolant system pressure.
R730
Verify safety injection flow
R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator.
R211
Depressurize the reactor coolant system using a subcooled recovery following a steam
generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of reactor coolant.
R469 Place a containment hydrogen analyzer in operation
CRITICAL TASK:
See Following Pages
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew isolates flow to/from ruptured S/G.
Safety Significance:
Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and
the intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency
procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking
compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy..."
Cues:
Indication of unexpected increasing SG water level
Performance Indicator:
BOP adjusts ruptured SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG.
RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close 1-MS-95, Steam to the Terry Turbine from
"C" SG.
BOP closes 1-FW-HCV-100C.
Feedback:
Indication of:
"* stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG.
"* decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.
WOG Reference:
E-3 Background
Conditions:
Isolate before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew manually aligns the BIT.
Safety Sianificance:
Failure to establish HHSI flow constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance
which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."
Cues:
Indication/annunciation of:
"* reactor trip and safety injection
"* no SI flow
"* BIT inlet and outlet valves closed
Performance Indicator:
BOP opens 1 -SI-MOV- I 867A.
Feedback:
BIT inlet and outlet valves indicate open and BIT flow indicated.
WOG Reference:
E-0 Background
Conditions:
Prior to exiting E-0.
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 3
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
0
N02-0293
Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,
2002
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
Page 1
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 3
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
I
REASON
Scenario NRC 3 -DRR
I
PagelI
DOMINION
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
INITIAL LICENSE CLASS
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO NRC 3
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
DESCRIPTION
EVENT
1.
Containment air inleakage
2.
Swap charging pumps
3.
VCT level channel failure
4.
First stage pressure failure
5.
Steam leak on MS safety valve
6.
Unit rampdown for steam leak
7.
Loss of 1-I vital bus
8.
Inadvertent SI
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfinctions after EOP entry
Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events
Major Transients
EOPs Entered
EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks
1 (Failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open from control room)
6 (Containment air inleakage, VCT level channel failure, first
stage pressure failure, steam leak on "A" safety, loss of 1-I vital
bus, failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open)
6 (Containment air inleakage, VCT level channel failure, first
stage pressure failure, steam leak on "A" safety, loss of 1-I vital
bus, failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open)
1 (Inadvertent SI due to loss of vital bus 1-I)
1 (E-0)
0
2 (Prevent loss of charging pump suction; isolate AFW to "A"
SG)
SCENARIO DURATION
105 minutes
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY
SCENARIO NRC 3
The scenario begins with unit I at 100% power with a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG,
lH diesel is tagged for maintenance, and 1-RC-PT-1457 in test. Shift orders are to monitor "A"
SG tube leakage, support maintenance in repair of PT-1457, and return lH EDG to service when
released by maintenance
Once the crew assumes the watch, a leak will occur on a containment purge line, resulting
in excessive air in-leakage to the containment. The crew should identify this in-leakage by
annunciators and increasing containment partial pressure, and manually start the containment
vacuum pumps in order to reduce containment pressure. The crew should identify that the
containment vacuum pumps are unable to maintain vacuum and refer to 1 -AP- 18, "Increasing
Containment Pressure", and ITS 3.6.4 for allowable containment pressure. There will be a report
from the field that a loud whistling sound is coming from the containment vacuum breaker, and if
requested can be isolated by hand torquing. Once the crew has isolated and stopped the leak, the
next event will occur.
Maintenance will request operations to swap to "B" charging pump per the shift orders.
The crew will swap pumps using 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." After the
charging pump swap is complete, the next event will occur.
VCT Level transmitter 115 will fail high. The crew will respond in accordance with the AR
for VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-1 15, by opening the breaker to stop 11 15A from diverting to the
stripper and starting a manual makeup to restore VCT level. The crew should discuss the loss of
the RWST swapover on low level, and the loss of auto makeup capability. Once the designated
breaker has been opened the next event will occur.
The selected first stage pressure channel will fail low. The crew will respond in accordance
with t-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." The RO will place rod control in manual. The BOP
will either take manual control of SG level, or allow SG level to control at 33% in automatic, as
directed by the US. The US should refer to technical specifications and determine that trips and
permissives must be checked within one hour and the channel must be placed in trip within 72
hours. After the crew has determined the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in trip, the next
event will occur.
"A" S/G safety valve will develop a steam leak. The crew should identify the increase in
reactor power and enter I -AP-3 8. The crew should reduce power to * 100% by ramping the
turbine. A call from a security officer will help the crew identify the leak location as a steam
generator safety valve. The US will consult ITS and determine that the safety is inoperable and the
units needs to be ramped to *52% within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Operations management will direct the crew to
ramp the unit down to a lower power level while attempts to repair the valve are planned.
The crew will start a ramp-down in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation
From Mode 1 to Mode 2," when the lead examiner signals that the reactivity change is sufficient
then the next event will occur.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
The vital bus inverter for vital bus 1-I will fail, this will de-energize channel I
instrumentation and, along with PT-457 being failed, will initiate a SI. The crew will enter l-E-0
and stabilize the unit. The US will then direct the BOP to enter 0-AP-10 and make preparations to
reenergize the bus from the SOLA. When the crew gets to the point of securing SI flow, the normal
charging valve will not open (breaker will trip when the switch is taken to open). The crew will
direct the valve be opened locally. The scenario will end once team transitions to 1-ES-I. 1, or at
the discretion of the lead evaluator.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET
Read the following to the crew:
This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks associated with
the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with
approved operations standards.
5. You are on a day shift during the week.
6. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.
Unit Status:
Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 864 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. The amount of
RCS dilution required to raise temperature one degree is 235 gallons and the boration required to
lower temperature one degree is 15 gallons. Aux steam is on unit 1. The Mrule window is green for
all planned maintenance.
Unit 2 is at 100% power.
The system operator has reported thunderstorms reported in the area.
Equipment Status:
There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. 1H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for
maintenance. I-RC-PT-1457 has failed and has been placed in TRIP.
Shift Orders:
Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Support maintenance in repair of PT-1457. Place "B" charging
pump in service for maintenance to observe seal leakage. After "B" charging pump is verified
normal, stop "A" charging pump and leave in AUTO. Note that "B" charging pump was last run
last week when boron concentration was 872 ppm, so boron adjustment/purge will not be
necessary.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 1: Given that the unit is, at powerand indications exist of exces
air
inleakage to, the
!
containment
lrespond
t
annunciato
rso
nsad
-AP-8"Increasinq
Cotainment Pesr.
TiME
EXPECTED ACTIO'N
I:*iNSTRUCTOR REMARS;
BOP identifies annunciators J-F2,
CONTAINMENT PARTIAL PRESS+O.1 PSI CH
1-I1.
BOP identifies increasing containment partial
pressure.
BOP starts a containment vacuum pump.
BOP identifies containment partial pressure
continues to increase.
US directs crew to enter 1 -AP- 18.
US refers to ITS-3.6.4 to determine
containment partial pressure limit.
BOP checks containment vacuum pump flow.
BOP checks condenser air ejector radiation monitor
and discharge lineup.
BOP identifies containment partial pressure
continues to increase.
BOP starts another containment vacuum
pump.
Crew dispatches watchstanders to locate leakage
source.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 1:' Given that the unit istpwer an
atios exist: f excessive air
inleakag to the..
cnimetherwwllespond lAW the applicable,
annunciator respoOse, and1 AP 8asin
ontainment Pressure.!'
S.............K........
EXPE.CTEDIA*CTION
iU:*!
NOTE: APPROXIMATELY 3 MINUTES
AFTER BEING DISPATCHED, AN
OPERATOR WILL REPORT THAT
CONTAINMENT VACUUM BREAKER 1
HV-MOV-102 IS MAKING A LOUD
WHISTLING SOUND.
US refers to TRM-5.1 and ITS-3.6.3 to
determine containment isolation valve
operability, and ITS-3.6.1 to determine
containment integirity requirements.
Crew directs operator to hand torque the MOV
to stop the leak.
-4
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
stabilizes containment partial pressure, or as
directed by the lead evaluator.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
TIME
Page I
SIN STIRUCT£ :O RRMARKS"
%ii!iii!i*i!*iii!!i
'EVENT 2: Given'that~the unit is'uat7 powernd c haggpu
s are td be swappedthe cre'w"wifl
swap
hargng pmps AW 17 -P1-S.9,
'Transfein Runnin Chargingj Pumps.",
TIME
EXPECTED ACTION A>
]
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: The SS will call the US and request the
crew to place "B" charging pump in service
without delay for maintenance to observe seal
leakage per the shift orders.
US/RO reviews precautions and limitations, and
verifies that pump was recently in service.
RO places P-250 trend block on a short interval
trend for "B" CHP bearing temperatures.
US determines that boron concentration will not be
adversely affected by pump start.
RO requests auxiliary building operator to verify
that the auxiliary oil pump for "B" CHP is in auto
and running.
NOTE: Auxiliary building operator will report
that the auxiliary oil pump for "B" charging
pump is running in AUTO.
RO starts 1-CH-P-lB.
Crew identifies annunciator C-A8, "CH PP 1 C 15J7
LOCKOUT," as expected alarm due to both "A"
and "B" charging pumps running.
RO resets "C" charging pump lockout by placing
control switch in PTL then to AUTO.
Crew verifies charging pump lube oil temperature is
<1280F.
NOTE: After "B" charging pump is started, the
auxiliary building operator will report that the
pump looks fine and there is no seal leakage.
RO stops 1-CH-P-lA.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
EVE T
.2..Gventha.
th.u.t.i.at.......chrgig.pmpsaretobe swapped, the crew will:
s
chargng pumps IAW
W-frOP9'8
Transfenng R
g Chrn Pmp"
XPECTED ACTIOA
N
[INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: If requested, the auxiliary building
operator will report that seal leakage is zero on
"A" charging pump.
RO monitors trend block until temperatures stable.
NOTE: The next event will occur after charging
pumps have been swapped, or at the direction of
the lead evaluator.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
EVENT 3 Givefrthdt the unit is at, power acV
ieye transmitter 115 has failed 'hig th crew
w*ill r~espqndin adcordance&wt
Wi
a*~~~ ~uleao *pne
'Wi ll
24lth
4 ,tphe
p 1i c t annunci at or regp9le,
- .7
TIME
EXPECTED "<TO
INSTRUCTOR REMARIS
RO identifies annunciator C-Al, "VCT HI-LO
LEVEL L- 115."
RO identifies LT-l 115 is failed high and VCT is
diverting to stripper.
NOTE: Depending on VCT level the RO may
start a manual makeup.
US reads note in AR about 1-CH-LT- 1115 failing
high - loss of auto swapover capability, full divert to
stripper, loss of auto makeup capability.
CREW TAKES ACTION TO
CRITICAL TASK:
PREVENT LOSS OF CHARGING
Direct an operator to
PUMP SUCTION.
open the breaker to de
energize 1-CH-LCV
1115A, or makeup to
We
.VCT
to prevent loss of
charging pump suction.
US makes notifications about LT- 1115 failure and
requests instrument shop assistance.
NOTE: The next event may occur once the
letdown divert valve has been de-energized, or at
the discretion of the lead evaluator.
Page I
EVENT
Ge
at the unit is atowier, and th*P' oolling first st
presse channel has failed
ive,
rolin-frs sage prese h
the crew wi! respwnilAl
1ZA 3*"Lps
Vital Jnstr ment.tion..
TIME T,
EXPECTED ACTfON
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
BOP identifies SG level error alarms and high
steam flow alarms.
RO identifies annunciator B-A7, "MEDIAN/HI
TAVG < > TREF DEVIATION."
BOP identifies first stage pressure channel III
failing low.
US directs entry into 1 -AP-3.
BOP verifies redundant instrument channel
indication normal.
BOP verifies SG level control parameters normal.
NOTE: US may instruct BOP to place MFRVs in
manual and control OR allows SG levels to
control at 33%.
BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indication
normal (NO).
CREW TAKES ACTION TO
PREVENT EXCESSIVE CONTROL
ROD INSERTION.
RO verifies PRZR level indications normal.
BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure
channels normal (NO).
RO transfers condenser steam dumps to steam
pressure mode.
BOP verifies operable channels selected for
SGWLC (NO).
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
EVE 4:Giv~~ta
th uni isat ower an th conrolingfiirst stage pressure channeihas failed
lowthecre
wil~rs~oxdtki+44
ss fV
Vital nstrum entation.
_v**?
i
l:*<
- ***
! **
? i!*{* *[ *!5 !3
i
i ! i,¸
- !!; *
'
%
o~ ~
~~r
vV w
On
!)
- a
??:
r?
- )
TIME
EXPECTED ACTIONV
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO/BOP swap SGWLC channels as directed by the
US.
BOP verifies SG levels on program and returns
MFRVs to automatic.
RO verifies Tave and Tref matched and returns rod
control to automatic.
Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.81 for placing the failed
channel in trip.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 (condition R) and 3.3.2
(condition D) and determines that trips/permissives
must be checked within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and the failed channel
must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
identifies the applicable MOP, and rods have
been restored to fully withdrawn and placed back
I in AUTO, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
Page 1
EVENTV 5 Given that te unit is atpowei and&steam leak has developed on the A"SGthe
,:crew, wil respond iti ii- Acrdai e with -AP-,
ieLa Increase.',
!
NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing
unit power for the required reactivity
manipulation.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
TIMEEXPECTED
ACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO notices a decrease in Tave and an increase in
reactor power.
US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1
AP-38.
RO verifies steam dumps closed.
Crew determines that turbine must be ramped down
to reduce power below 100%.
CREW STOPS POWER INCREASE.
NOTE: A security officer will inform the crew
that steam can be seen coming from the roof of
the unit 1 MSVH.
Crew sends an operator to investigate steam leak.
NOTE: The operator sent to the MSVH will
report that a safety valve on "A" SG appears to
be leaking by the seat.
US requests maintenance help to repair/gag the
leaking SG safety valve.
US refers to ITS 3.7.1 and determines need to ramp
unit to 52% within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
NOTE: The Operations Manager on Call will
request that the unit be ramped to 50% power.
Page I
EVENT 6: Given that there is a 'stamfge
,,raorf
s
v(*ale leak jng by, the crew will reduce
tn,
ower inaccordaiictwit'lO1
2,2ti Powe Oprti
From Mode 1 to,
M6&I
2."...1K
S;
}2[ 2 :
? ? 2 ?
- i
- ! ) )
- ;)
}: iM
,:
S
TIME,
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
US briefs crew on ramp.
NOTE: When the US directs the RO to
determine the reactivity required to ramp the
unit, lead examiner will provide the crew with
reactivity calculations from the reactor engineer,
verified by the STA.
RO commences lowering Tave using
boration/control rods.
BOP commences lowering main turbine load.
"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.
"* Lowers reference setter.
"* Pushes GO button.
BOP takes turbine to IMP-IN when power is <98%.
"* Pushes HOLD button
"* Matches reference and setter
"* Pulses VPL down until red light lit
"* Pulses VPL up until red light not lit
"* Verifies governor tracking meter reads 0
"* Pushes IMP-IN button
"* Resumes ramp.
BOP directs turbine building watchstander to place
LP heater drain pumps on recirc and shutdown
when power is approximately 90%.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead
evaluator is satisfied with the reactivity change.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
I
EVENT 7: Given that the uInfitis a1 40wer ad4d. fia bus 1A has 6c6urredýJ
-the
H
respdid n 1-aeddace' >#tI)+0
4 L6,ý! df Electrical
9
Wwil
7-AP-,werI.P
'
TIMEe
EXPECTED ACION
INSTRUCTOR RE MARKS
NOTE: The loss of vital bus 1-I will cause a
safety injection on PRZR low-low pressure. The
crew will proceed to 1-E-0 (event 8) until the
plant is stable.
NOTE: The following steps refer to 0-AP-10
actions. 1-E-0 actions begin with event 8.
US directs BOP to initiate 0-AP-10.
BOP performs 0-AP-10 diagnostics.
BOP reports results of diagnostics to US.
US directs BOP to initiate 1-MOP-26.60 for loss of
vital bus 1-I.
Crew directs safeguards operator to investigate loss
of vital bus 1-I.
NOTE: Operator sent to check inverter 1-I will
report that the inverter cabinet is charred on the
outside and a strong odor of burnt insulation is
apparent in the area near the inverter.
US directs electrical department to investigate 1-I
vital bus and inverter.
NOTE: Electricians sent to check inverter 1-I will
report that the inverter is apparently damaged
and cannot be re-energized.
NOTE: Electricians sent to check vital bus 1-I will
report that the bus has been checked and that
there is no evidence of damage.
US directs backboards to perform 1-MOP-26.60 and
re-energize the vital bus via the SOLA transformer.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
EVENT 7Give, that the uint is atj oWer and ajlosdsof vtal bus, I has occurred, the crew will
respond in accordance wlth' O-APJO 'dsspof Electrical Power."..
r
<>6
EXPECTEDACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
Crew monitors RCP stator/bearing temperatures due
to loss of CC flow and stops any RCPs that exceed
limits.
Crew refers to l-AP-3, l-AP-4.3 and 1-AP-6.
US refers to ITS 3.8.7 and 3.8.9 declares the vital bus
and inverter inoperable.
Crew energizes the vital bus via the SOLA
transformer.
NOTE: Event 8 will occur concurrently with this
event.
Page I
,EVENT 8: GiveI 'hat the unit 1atp
rndwf!ioss of vital bus 17 has caused a inadvertent
S1
chrew will rspdh
Trip or Safetv
SInet.on .
.. ..
TIME
EXPECTED *CTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
US directs crew to enter l-E-0.
RO verifies reactor tripped.
BOP verifies turbine tripped.
RO verifies AC emergency buses energized.
Crew checks if safety injection has actuated. (YES)
RO/BOP manually initiate safety injection.
NOTE: At this point, the US may choose to
direct the BOP to perform 0-AP-10.
BOP verifies feediwater isolation.
RO/BOP manually initiate phase A isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps running.
RO/BOP verify SI pumps running.
BOP verifies SW pumps running.
Crew checks if MS lines should be isolated (NO).
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 8: Gi'enhat the umnt is atii*t
4oe
'n
t
of oitalbusjlK has caused an iadv*etent
S.....
SI* he&
ceWw ll epo~ *a o l*
th -1
E-ho 0
eaqtor Tflp or Safety.....
..
Injection".
.
..
i
III* r-*
.....
o.......e-
f
TXAC
TION..INSTRUCTORREMARKS
Crew checks if CDA is required (NO).
Crew checks if QS is required (NO).
RO/BOP verify SI flow.
RO/BOP verifies AFW flow.
RO checks RCS average temperature.
RO checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc
criteria.
BOP checks SG not faulted (NO)
US directs transition to 1 -E-2.
BOP verifies MSTVs and MSTV bypass valves
closed (NO).
BOP closes MSTVs.
BOP checks pressures in all SGs.
BOP identifies that only "A" SG is faulted.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 8: Giveh
Ihat the unit is at4powiSer-ad :
tss f vitalb Iu 1I has caused an inadvertent
<SI~~~t~',
coe wil-soaht9teWhi9,
"RcttTrip) or Sfet
eci
i*>
>
TIME
EX PEC TED: AdQT ION"
!,
INSTRUCTORREMARKS
Crew isolates the faulted SG.
CRITICAL TASK: Isolate
- BOP verifies 1-FW-HCV-100A closed.
BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip valves
closed.
- Crew dispatches an operator to locally close 1
MS-18.
- Crew dispatches an operator to verify closed 1
MS-19.
BOP checks ECST level.
BOP establishes IA to containment.
BOP checks secondary radiation.
Crew checks if SI can be terminated (YES).
US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-1.1.
RO stops one charging pump and places it in auto.
RO checks RCS pressure stable or increasing
(YES).
BOP isolates the BIT.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
'EVENT 8: Giyen. that te'unit is8-44*ierp andh
ý :s fvital lbpus <14 -ha& caused a4n inadvertent~i1
crew wll respin4 i accordacev wth IE-O, *teactor Trip or Safty
"".jeS tiofi.
1
.
..
7 ..
a
I
...... ....
..
¢,
<
- C
C
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
TIME
EXPECTED ACTiON
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
RO puts FCV-l 122 in manual and closes.
RO verifies HCV-1 311 closed.
RO attempts to open normal charging valves.
RO reports that breaker for 1-CH-MOV-1289B
appears to have tripped.
Crew dispatches operator/electrician to investigate.
NOTE: Operator/electrician sent to breaker will
report that it can not be re-closed.
US will request an operator to hand-crank the MOV
open.
NOTE: MOV-1289B will be handcranked open
when requested.
RO will establish 25 gpm charging.
RO will control charging flow to maintain
pressurizer level.
US will announce transition to 1-ES-1.1, step 7.
NOTE: The scenario may be terminated when
the crew transitions to 1-ES-1.1, or at the
discretion of the lead evaluator.
Page I
REFERENCES
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
PROCEDR
REV.
Operating Procedure 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps."
6
Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-18, "Increasing Containment Pressure."
6
Abnormal Procedure I -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."
17
Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."
11
Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."
30
Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."
47
Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
28
Station Annunciator Response Procedures.
N/A
Administrative Procedure VPAP- 1407, Verbal Communications.
2
INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,
Jan.,1988
INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines
Nov. 1990
Page I
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*
ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**
ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **
ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *
ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **
Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\
- *
Located in the Instructor Booth.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
1.
San Onofre 1, Westinghouse PWR.
Automatic Reactor Trip Upon Transfer of Vital Bus #1 With Pre-Existing Failure of High
Startup Rate Block Relay. At 1:14 p.m. on October 17, 1991, during the performance of
corrective maintenance on an alarm module powered from vital bus #1, and with pre-existing
failure of the high startup rate (SUR) block relay, unit 1 automatically tripped from 91 percent
power on a spurious high SUR signal. The spurious SUR signal was generated when a
momentary power interruption occurred during an automatic transfer of vital bus # 1 to its
alternate power source, which was initiated due to a momentary ground fault on the bus. As a
taped alarm module power lead was being routed through a grooming hole in the module chassis,
the lead arced apparently through the tape to the module chassis, causing the ground. Plant
response to the scram was normal. Laboratory analysis of the taped lead revealed that the
insulating capability of the tape had apparently been degraded during handling. This is
postulated to have occurred when the taped lead contacted a sharp edge of the grooming hole on
the alarm module chassis when the lead was inserted through the hole. The methodology used to
route insulated live leads will be reviewed. Any methodology enhancements identified by this
review will be implemented as appropriate. There is no safety significance to this event since all
RPS and AFW components actuated in accordance with design.
2.
Commonwealth Edison ZION 2 Westinghouse
With unit 2 at full power, operating personnel reported excessive steam leak around the bonnet
of the main steam safety valve, 2ms0026. Aged, worn, and deteriorated body to bonnet gaskets
and possible steam cuts on gasket surfaces caused the bonnet steam leak on the mainsteam safety
valve 2ms0026. Mechanical maintenance personnel made a temporary repair by injecting
furmanite sealing compound into existing injection plugs on the main steam safety valve.
Another work request has been written for a permanent repair later.
3.
Florida Power & Light Company TURKEY POINT 4 Westinghouse
Operations personnel noted during rounds that the main steam line '4c' steam safety valve inlet
flange had a steam leak. The external leakage presented a personnel safety hazard, unacceptable
loss of secondary steam and degradation of the valve's fluid containment function. The main steam
system and unit 4, at full power, were not affected. A related '4c' steam line safety, rv-4-1413 , was
also found leaking concurrently and was reported separately. Gasket wearout or material defect /
flaw or loose inlet flange bolting are possible causes of the steam leakage; root cause was not
determined. Leakage was stopped by sealing compound injection / temporary on-line leak repair.
Post maintenance testing was satisfactory noting no further leakage.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 3
Initial conditions
16. Recall 100% power middle-of-life IC.
17. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
18. Tagout lH diesel per MOP.
19. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 8E-4) and
SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.
allow to run until "A"
20. Place PT-1457 in trip per MOP-55.73.
21. Ensure VCT level is 40%.
22. Ensure "A" charging pump running.
PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START
S CQNDITION
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC*
PT-1457 failure
RC0705, delay time = 0, ramp = 0, severity level = -1, trigger =
N/A
Failure oflI115B and 1115D
MOVl15B MP=OFF
to auto-open
MOV115D MP = OFF
CH-MOV-1289B failure to
Using PNID, setup event trigger to take CHMOV289B_RACKIN
re-open
= F when control switch is taken to OPEN.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO EVENTS
EVENT
MALFUNCTION/OVERRDE/C:OMMUiCATiONS
1)
Containment
air CVO 1, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 20, trigger = 1
inleakage
NOTE: APPROXIMATELY 3 MINUTES AFTER
BEING DISPATCHED, AN OPERATORWILL
REPORT THAT CONTAINMENT VACUUM
BREAKER 1-HV-MOV-102 IS MAKING A
LOUD WHISTLING SOUND.
NOTE: If told to attempt to hand-torque the MOV:
Delete CV01 malfunction, then inform the MCR crew that the
valve has been closed and that the whistling noise has stopped.
NOTE: If asked why the valve was open, report that there are
some painters in the area, however, they said that they did
nothing to the valve.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes
containment partial pressure, or as directed by the lead
evaluator.
2) VCT level transmitter
CH1202, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 1, trigger = 2.
1115 failure
NOTE: When requested to open breaker 7 in 1-EP-CB-26B,
activate event trigger 6 on a one-minute timer with the following
overrides:
"* Lamp override LCV115A_LTR, override OFF
"* Lamp override LCV1L5A_RT R, override OFF
"* Switch override LCV115AAUTO, override OFF
"* Switch override LCV115ADIVERT, override OFF
"* Switch override LCV1l5ANORM, override ON
NOTE: IF crew does not request breaker 7 opened, and has
NOT manually opened charging pump suction valves from
RWST, observe VCT level. If VCT is allowed to empty, take
PNID variable CHMOV115ERACKIN = F and CHMOV115E
= 0, then set CH1201_DEG and CH1202 both = -1. If crew does
NOT restore a suction source within 30 seconds after VCT
empties, trip running charging pumps.
NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert
valve has been de-energized, or at the discretion of the lead
evaluator.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
"EVENT
MAFNTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNMIC ATIONS,
3) Swap charging pumps
NOTE: As the SS, call the US and request the crew to place
"B" charging pump in service without delay for maintenance
to observe seal leakage per the shift orders.
NOTE: Auxiliary building operator will report that the
auxiliary oil pump for "B" charging pump is running in
AUTO.
NOTE: After "B" charging pump is started, report to RO that
pump looks fine and there is no seal leakage.
NOTE: If requested, the auxiliary building operator will
report that seal leakage is zero on "A" charging pump.
NOTE: The next event may occur once charging pumps have
been swapped, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
4)
First
stage
pressure
MS0201, delay time = 5, ramp = 45, severity value = -1, trigger = 3
failure
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
applicable MOP, and rods have been restored to fully
withdrawn and placed back in AUTO, or as directed by the lead
evaluator.
5) Small steam leak
MS1401, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 75, trigger = 4
NOTE: After MS1401 is fully implemented, setup event trigger
from either RTB open to ramp severity value from 75% to
50% over a 5 second period.
NOTE: A security officer will inform crew that steam can be
seen coming from the roof of the unit I MSVH.
The operator sent to the MSVH will report that a safety valve
on "A" SG appears to be leaking by the seat.
NOTE: If the crew does not begin a ramp, then have the OMOC
request the crew begin a controlled ramp to 50% power.
NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing unit power for the
required reactivity manipulation.
6) Ramp down
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator
considers the reactivity change to be sufficient.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
SEVENT
,
MALFUCO
OVERRIDECOMMUNICATIONS
7) Loss of VB 1-I
EL1301, delay time = 5, event trigger= 5.
NOTE: Operator sent to check inverter 1-I will report that the
inverter cabinet is charred on the outside and a strong odor of
burnt insulation is apparent in the area near the inverter.
NOTE: Electricians sent to check inverter 1-I will report that
the inverter is apparently damaged and cannot be re-energized.
NOTE: Electricians sent to check vital bus 1-I will report that
the bus has been checked and that there is no evidence of
damage.
NOTE: When crew requests SOLA transformer supply breaker
closed, wait 2 minutes and then call back and tell them the
breaker is closed.
8) Inadvertent SI
NOTE: Operator sent to breaker for 1-CH-MOV-1289B will
report that it cannot be re-closed.
NOTE: When the crew requests MOV-1289B be handcranked
open, use PNID to open valve.
NOTE: The scenario may be terminated when the crew
transitions to 1-ES-1.1, or at the discretion of the lead
evaluator.
Page I
ATTACHMENT 3
SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with
Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,
and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.
GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
A.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,
especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink
availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by
prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative
procedures.
C.
During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves
conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary
information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.
D.
During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and
based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of excessive
air inleakage to the containment, the crew will respond IAW the
applicable annunciator response, and 1 -AP- 18, "Increasing
Containment Pressure."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R521 Respond to increasing containment pressure.
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter 1115 is failed,
the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator
response.
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew takes action to prevent loss of charging pump suction.
Safety Significance:
With VCT level transmitter LT- 115 failed high the auto swapover to the RWST is lost,
letdown is on full divert to the gas stripper, and makeup capability is lost. If the level
decrease is not stopped the charging pumps will lose suction. Failure to stop the level
decrease constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads
to degraded ECCS capacity."
Cues:
VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-1 15 annunciator
Letdown on full divert to gas stripper
Performance Indicator:
Operator is instructed to open breaker 7 in 1 -EP-CB-26B.
Manual makeup is started to restore VCT level.
Feedback:
VCT level stable or increasing.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Before charging pumps lose suction from the VCT.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and charging pumps are to be swapped, the
crew will swap charging pumps IAW 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running
Charging Pumps."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R593 Transfer the running charging pump
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power, and the controlling first stage pressure
channel has failed, the crew will respond IAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R719 Respond to a failure of the controlling first-stage pressure channel.
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
RO places rods in manual to stop rod insertion.
Safety Significance:
A rod insertion caused by a failed first stage pressure transmitter causes an unnecessary
transient and could allow rods to insert below the low-low insertion limit.
Cues:
Control rods stepping in.
Failed first stage pressure transmitter.
Performance Indicator:
Crew identifies first stage pressure failure.
RO places rod control to MANUAL.
Feedback:
Rods stop stepping.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Before rod low-low insertion limit alarm.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a steam leak has developed on the "A"
SG, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load
Increase."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew stops power increase.
Safety Significance:
Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average coolant
temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality.
This would mean the
following could not be assured: 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed
temperature range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P-12
interlock is above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.
Cues:
Indication of power increase:
"* Several annunciators. (i.e. PRZR Hi/Lo Press, PRZR Lo Level)
"* Reactor power increasing.
"* Steam flow increasing.
Performance Indicator:
BOP ramps turbine back until reactor power < 100%.
Feedback:
Reactor power increase stopped
Steam flow decreased
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on over power.
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page 1
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that there is a steam generator safety valve leaking by, the crew will
reduce unit power in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation
From Mode 1 to Mode 2."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
N/A
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a loss of vital bus 1-I has occurred, the
crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical
Power."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
S27
Direct the restoration of the electrical distribution system following the performance of the
loss of electrical power diagnostic
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and the loss of vital bus 1-I has caused an
inadvertent SI, the crew will respond in accordance with l-E-0, "Reactor
Trip or Safety Injection".
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R185
Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 4
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
0
N02-0293
Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,
2002
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
Page I
SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 4
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
Page I
DOMINION
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
INITIAL LICENSE CLASS
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO NRC 4
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
DESCRIPTION
Shutdown a MFW pump
Continue the unit shutdown for refueling
"B" SG selected steam flow channel fails
"B" SG PORV fails open due to failure of pressure transmitter
"A" charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails to close
PRZR spray valve PCV-1455A fails open (able to manually close)
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions after EOP entry
Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events
Major Transients
EOPs Entered
EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks
1 (ATWS)
6 ("B" SG steam flow channel failure, "B" SG PORV failure, "A"
charging pump trip w/failure of discharge check valve, PRZR
spray valve failure, SBLOCA, ATWS)
4 ("B" SG steam flow channel failure, "B" SG PORV failure, "A"
charging pump trip w/failure of discharge check valve, PRZR
spray valve failure)
1 (SBLOCA)
2 (1-E-O, 1-E-1)
1 (1-FR-S.1)
1 (Bring reactor subcritical)
SCENARIO DURATION
120 Minutes
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
EVENT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Pagel1
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY
SCENARIO NRC 4
The scenario will begin with unit 1 at 50% power in the process of shutting down for
refueling. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" SG and 1 H diesel is tagged for
maintenance. Shift orders are to shutdown "C" main feedwater pump and continue with the unit
shutdown, monitor "A" SG leakage, and return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is
complete.
The first event will be a normal evolution. The crew will shutdown "C" main feedwater
pump in accordance with 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater System," prior to continuing with the unit
shutdown. After the pump is shutdown, the next event will occur.
The next event will be the required reactivity manipulation. The crew will continue with
the unit shutdown for refueling in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation from Mode 1
to Mode 2." When the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, the next event will
occur.
The selected steam flow transmitter for "B" steam generator will fail low, causing the "B"
main feed regulating valve to go full closed. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation," and the BOP will take manual cdntrol of the FRV and control level prior to
reaching the low-low level reactor trip setpoint. The crew will swap to an operable channel and
return SG level control to automatic. After technical specifications have been reviewed and the
crew has identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.
The "B" SG PORV will fail open due to a failure of its pressure transmitter. The
crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and manually
close the valve. After the crew stabilizes the unit, the next event will occur.
The "A" charging pump will trip and its discharge check valve will fail to close following
the automatic start of "B" charging pump. The crew will respond in accordance with I -AP-49,
"Loss of Normal Charging," and restore normal charging flow. The US will declare "A" charging
pump inoperable IAW technical specifications. After the crew has stabilized the unit and the US
has reviewed technical specifications, the next event will occur.
Pressurizer spray valve PCV-1455A will fail open causing RCS pressure to decrease.
The crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure," and manually close
the valve. After the crew has stabilized the unit, the next event will occur.
The PRZR spray line piping fails causing a RCS leak, which eventually degrades to
a small-break LOCA. The crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage," and determine that a reactor trip is required. The next event will
occur when the crew attempts to manually trip the reactor.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
The reactor will not trip manually or automatically and the crew will respond in
accordance with 1-FR-S. 1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." The reactor
trip breakers will be locally opened and the crew will eventually transition back to I-E-0,
"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." After completing the diagnostic steps, the crew will
transition to 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and determine that a post
LOCA cooldown and depressurization is required. The scenario can be terminated when
the team enters 1-ES- 1.2, "Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization," or when the lead
examiner is satisfied.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET
Read the following to the crew:
Purpose:
This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks
associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be
completed in accordance with approved operations standards.
7. You are on a day shift during the week.
8. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.
Unit Status:
Unit 1 is at 50% power in the process of shutting down for refueling. The unit ramp is being held
for turnover. There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. All applicable actions of 1-AP-5
have been completed. RCS boron concentration is 120 ppm and core age is 17,000 MWD/MTU.
The amount of RCS dilution required to raise temperature one degree is 2097 gallons and the
boration required to lower temperature one degree is 17.7 gallons. Xenon is increasing. Aux steam
is on unit 2. The maintenance rule window is green for all planned maintenance.
Unit 2 is at 100% power.
The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.
Equipment Status:
1 H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance.
Shift Orders:
Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Shutdown "C" main feedwater pump, then continue with the unit
shutdown.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT* 1 Given that a unit shutdo(jwn fo refI
'.n:'is9Jin progress th erew w i ll sutd
"C"
maifn eedwaterrpump, lAW
OP73 1jiMain Feedwaer System,"before contining
wilt the unit
sliddown.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
TIME
E
E
I
K
.
.
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
BOP reviews initial conditions, and precautions and
limitations.
BOP places control switches for "B" MFW pump in
PULL-TO-LOCK.
BOP closes discharge MOV for "B" MFW pump.
BOP verifies either "A" or "C" MFW pump
recirculation valve is open.
BOP closes discharge MOV for "C" MFW pump.
BOP verifies "C" MFW pump motor amps and
discharge pressure decrease.
BOP places control switches for "C" MFW pump in
PULL-TO-LOCK.
BOP requests turbine building operator to place the
"C" MFW pump auxiliary oil pump in HAND.
BOP places MFW pump recirculation valve in
AUTO.
BOP requests turbine building operator to observe
local MFW pump flow indication.
NOTE: Turbine building operator will report
"A" MFW pump flow indication is
approximately 8,000 gpm.
BOP places control switches for "C" MFW pump in
AUTO and verifies discharge MOV opens.
BOP requests turbine building operator to verify
alignment of warm-up lines.
NOTE: The next event will occur after feedwater
pump has been shutdown, or at the direction of
the lead evaluator.
Page I
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
EVENT2for
fefthelig
is nproggess,' the&crew will continue Withe
- , jin,
s ,
o}',
......
r
ce-
h: 1:
'
OP.,-22'ý, '
}g
niiP6
'
ftmd
ft
i-ViL2
Oqperatidnl
nmtstt~on jA
~
2Uit
fom Mde
t
~e2."
'TIME
..
EXPECTEDACTION
..
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations
from reactor engineer, verified by STA, to be
provided prior entering the simulator.
US briefs crew on ramp prior to entering the
simulator.
RO commences lowering Tave using
boration/control rods.
BOP commences lowering main turbine load.
"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.
"* Lowers reference setter.
"* Pushes GO button.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead
evaluator is satisfied with the amount of
reactivity change.
Page I
'EV IENT 3:,Given ,ithat the: unit is at powet anid a5 controlling SG: steam iflow 'channel Msfailfed!:
Ao~ "the crew,
"ilisdi
44AP-; tos bf"iq antrmnti
TIME
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR RMAR
S
BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III
failing low.
US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1
AP-3.
BOP verifies redundant channels normal.
BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III has
failed low.
Crew manually controls steam generator
level.
RO verifies first stage pressure indications normal.
RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels
normal.
RO verifies both first stage pressure channels
normal.
RO selects all SGWLC channels to an operable
channel.
BOP verifies that "B" SG steam flow channel III is
the only failed channel.
US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.77.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and determines the
channel must be placed in TRIP within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the
direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 4 Giventhatithe uit is at6ower and a SOGPRV has failedopen, the crew will respond
' <A-38, Excesi eo, a<I aicrse
- ,'TIME-,
EA4N
j
- INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS
BOP identifies loss of MW and RO identifies
increase in reactor power.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.
RO verifies all steam dumps closed.
BOP identifies "B" SG PORV open.
CREW STOPS POWER INCREASE.
NOTE: Security will report a loud noise and
steam coming from the top of the unit-1 main
steam valve house.
BOP verifies turbine load normal.
RO verifies reactor power is less than or equal to
100% power.
Crew dispatches an operator to check for the source
of steam.
Crew checks plant stable.
BOP checks all steam flow indications normal.
BOP checks turbine control in operator auto.
NOTE: The operator will report that the "B"
steam generator PORV is open.
Crew directs the operator to isolate the "B" SG
PORV by closing l-MS-59.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
has stabilized the unit, or at the direction of the
lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT5: G iven, that the unit i:atp 4poe ,,.x tda flssof the runnin cagin:g pup
concrren
-ýw'ith &~faile'l open d'is'h~rge cf&k4 h:ý
as,v woccutid
rvwl epnj
accptdanceith I-AP,49, 'tops Of-ormal Chargiinig ?
TIME
EXPECTED ACT.IO.
..
INSTUCTOR.REMARKS
RO identifies loss of"A" charging pump.
US directs crew to enter I -AP-49.
RO checks "B" charging pump for gas binding.
RO identifies that a charging pump manipulation
has taken place.
BOP closes discharge MOVs for "A" charging
pump.
RO verifies charging flow returns to normal.
RO restores letdown as directed by the US.
NOTE: Operator/electricians will report "A"
charging pump breaker has an instantaneous
overcurrent drop.
US reviews ITS 3.5.2 for having only one operable
HHSI pump.
NOTE: During the time that the "A" charging
pump is tripped with both discharge MOVs open
(and a failed-open check valve) ITS 3.5.2
condition C states that ITS 3.0.3 actions apply.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
stabilizes the unit, or at the direction of the lead
evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
,EVENT 6: Giypfrthat the
lt~6d~d
RRsry~ac~has faileap dp'nh6'ceWwiVl1.'ý
beexpeqte~d to respnhd i
l-X-4'"oss ofkactdr dS01nt SWste
"Ptset<
on+
11 '{
,
-
TIME
......
EXPECTED ACTION:
INSTRUCTORREMASRK
Crew identifies RCS pressure decreasing.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.
RO checks PRZR master controller normal.
RO identifies that one spray valve is open.
CREW STOPS RCS PRESSURE
DECREASE.
Crew verifies all PRZR heaters energized.
RO checks auxiliary spray valve closed.
Crew checks PRZR safety valves and PORVs
closed.
Crew verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.
Crew verifies RCS pressure returned to normal.
US requests I&C to investigate problem with spray
valve.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
stabilizes the unit, or at the direction of the lead
evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 7: Giyen 'that the unit, is-at powaýrind a:PRZR spray> line fails causing a sma1!-break
YJOCA,
the
-:ew
willresp6nd inP a4dodac wit
"PiA-lln
a
a nd Ldaio
rciio& tý
Ij
etin
indreasng
mary Pant
i
Legate, an
nj
&
l5o ~
eqv ion.,'*
4TIMEB
ýýEXPECTED ATONtz
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
Crew identifies that charging flow has increased
and/or containment sump pumping frequency has
increased.
US directs crew to enter 1-AP-16.
Crew verifies that the unit is in mode 1.
RO checks PRZR level, RCS subcooling, and VCT
level under control. (NO)
RO isolates letdown by closing HCV-1200B and
LCV-1460A and B.
RO manually opens FCV- 1122 to maximize
charging flow.
RO starts a manual makeup to the VCT from the
blender.
Crew determines that PRZR level cannot be
maintained and a reactor trip is required.
US directs the crew to enter 1 -E-0.
Crew attempts to manually trip the reactor. (NO)
NOTE: The next event will occur when the crew
identifies the failure of the reactor to trip.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
PagelI
EET 8:Given tat theuiisto
r and a:valid-ATWS qonditidn exists conicpx~e~yith aftýýý-ý
SBLOA, te creW, \\Wi1 ie~priil lAW
I"R,~,
'Respofis t5 Nuclea Powe
ReaetorrSecondr
Cooaht."
a
& 1
TIME
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
Crew identifies the reactor did not trip
CRITICAL TASK:
and takes action to bring the reactor
Ensure control rods insert
subcritical.
and initiate emergency
- US directs crew to enter l-FR-S.1.
boration, or dispatch
operator to trip reactor
- BOP manually trips the turbine.
locally.
- RO verifies at least one char ing ump running.
"* Crew verifies adequate negative reactivity
insertion.
"* RO checks PRZR pressure.
RO checks if reactor trip has occurred (NO.)
NOTE: The following action satisfies the critical
task of bringing the reactor subcritical.
Crew identifies the reactor did not trip
and takes action to bring the reactor
subcritical.
BOP checks if turbine trip has occurred.
RO verifies all dilution paths isolated.
Crew checks for reactivity insertion from
uncontrolled RCS cooldown (NO).
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
'EVENT 8: Given that t
uie t is at oxvrand a yaldAW$ conditidh eist cnurnt with a
e ...
BLOCA.thecrew will respond lAW' 17FR- S~ "1*......Response
to .......
Pucea* Pdwer
...
...
........
ear
Pow*
Generation/ATWS,7 i-E-0ReactorTior Safet Inection,' and *-E-l1, Loss of
R..... tor o.. Seco dar$. C
a61afit:
TIME .EXPECTED
ATON
.INSTRUCTOR
REMARKS
RO verifies reactor subcritical.
US directs crew to return to l-E-0.
RO verifies reactor tripped.
BOP verifies turbine trip.
RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
Crew checks if safety injection has actuated. (YES)
US directs crew to manually initiate SI.
RO/BOP manually initiate SI.
US directs RO/BOP to manually initiate phase A
isolation.
RO/BOP manually initiate phase A isolation.
BOP verifies AFW pumps running.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 8: Givrenthat the unit is atP'f
r'
aalidATWS condtn
n exists c*neu*etithla
SBLOCA, the crew williespfid
JAW
1R- 1' ".Respdnseidl
xckle Pw..
Generation/ATWS," 1E£0
actot Trip or Safet Injecio* ,n*'d
IZEI, k 0ss of
Reactor or Seoai C~oo~",
TIME
EXPECTEP~~~A-T:~ISRUTRBAK
ROIPvrf
iSSTRUpTOmprMAuninS
RO/BOP verify SW pumps running.
BOP verifies SW pumps running.
Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).
RO checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to
5470F.
RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recite
criteria.
BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).
BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).
Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment
(NO).
US directs crew to transition to 1 -E- 1.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
PagelI
EVENTS: Given that the uit'is44Aqwet axndavaaidAýTWS66fnidfi6fr~exists cpnuet wi tha
SBLOCA,~spn
thes
cr
Pi1
-R.;n
Generation/ATWS*t1 'SO,'tý0ReactorTrip or Safety Injetj!,n,
i-S
, "Loss of
Si, Reactor orS S6d6nd:iy doo:
TIM
..
EXPECTEDACTION
.
,NSTRUCTOR
REMARKS
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc
criteria.
BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).
BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).
BOP checks secondary radiation.
RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.
RO checks if SI can be terminated (NO).
RO checks if QS is required. (NO)
RO checks QS pump status.
RO checks if low-head SI pumps can be stopped.
(YES)
RO resets SI and stops LHSI pumps.
Note: Scenario can be terminated once the crew
stops LHSI pumps, or at the direction of the lead
evaluator.
NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and
classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the
Lead Evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
REFERENCES
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
PROCEDURS
REV4
Operating Procedure 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater System."
6
Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."
47
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."
17
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."
12
Abnormal Procedure 0-AP- 10, "Loss of Electrical Power."
30
Abnormal Procedure l-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP- 16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."
18
Function Restoration Procedure 1-FR-S. 1, "Response to Nuclear Power
12
Generation/ATWS."
Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
28
Emergency Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
16
Station Annunciator Response Procedures.
N/A
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.
2
INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,
Jan. 1988
INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines
Nov. 1990
Page I
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*
5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**
6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**
7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**
8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **
9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *
10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **
Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\
Located in the Instructor Booth.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 1
LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
1. SEN 122, Recurring Event: Unisolable Reactor Coolant System Leak
Loviisa Units 1 & 2/VVER (May 16, 1994)
An unisolable reactor coolant system leak developed in the pressurizer shutdown spray valve due to
fatigue caused by thermal cycling and stratification.
Note: The VVER design includes two different pressurizer spray systems: normal pressurizer spray
and shutdown spray. The normal spray system consists of two spray valves with water for
sprays taken from the discharge side of two of the six reactor coolant pumps. The two
normal spray paths are identical, each consisting of four parallel spray lines and one warm
up line. The capacity of the normal spray system is sufficient to avoid high reactor pressure
during most anticipated transients. The shutdown spray system, which is supplied either
from the cold leg of one RCS loop or the normal volume control system, is used for primary
pressure decrease during normal reactor shutdowns and also in some transients.
On May 16, 1994, during a routine weekly operator walk-down, fluid leakage was noted from the
insulation near the Unit 2 pressurizer shutdown spray valve. The source was determined to be a
through-wall crack in the 2-inch diameter valve body, and the plant was shutdown for five days to
conduct repairs. Similar crack indications were found on the corresponding valve on Unit 1, and
Unit 1 was shutdown for repair on May 23, 1994.
The failed valve had been in service for about 15 years. Although the original design did not
provide a means to maintain the pipe warm when the spray valve was closed, in 1980 a small hole
was drilled in the valve disc to minimize cyclic thermal stresses. While investigating the cause of
the May 16, 1994 crack, temperature stratification was also detected on the outlet side of the valve
(a 720F gradient existed from the top to the bottom of the horizontal run of pipe). The valve is
made of forged, titanium-stabilized, austenitic stainless steel.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 4
Initial conditions
23. Recall 50% power end-of-life IC (IC-166).
24. Sign off a copy of l-OP-2.2 to the appropriate step. Print a copy of 1-OP-31.1 with the
applicable sections removed.
25. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
26. Tagout 1H diesel per MOP.
27. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 8E-4) and allow to run until "A"
SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.
28. Ensure "A" and "C" MFW pumps are running, and "A" charging pump is running.
PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START
CONDITION
.ALFNCTION/OVERRlDEET.
Reactor trip failure.
Remote function - rod control: RD32 and RD38, delay time = 0,
trigger = none.
Remote function - SSPS: AMSACDEFEAT = T, delay time =0,
trigger = none.
"A" charging pump
CH2101, delay time = 0, trigger = none.
discharge check valve
failure.
SCENARIO EVENTS
EVENT
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS
1) Shutdown
"C"
MFW NOTE: Turbine building operator will report "A" MFW
pump
pump flow indication is approximately 8,000 gpm.
NOTE: Approximately five minutes after crew directs an
operator to align MFW pump warmup lines, report that the
warmup lines are aligned.
NOTE: The next event will occur after feedwater pump has
been shutdown, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
EVENT:
MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEXOMMUIATIONS
2)
Unit
shutdown
for NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from reactor
refueling
engineer, verified by STA, to be provided prior to entering
the simulator.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator is
satisfied with the amount of reactivity change.
3) "B" SG steam flow
MS0103, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity value = -1,
channel III failure
trigger = 1
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Remote function - main steam: MSPCV101B_K, delay time = 5,
ramp = 5, remote value = 100, trigger = 2
NOTE: Security will report a loud noise and steam coming
from the top of the unit-1 main steam valve house.
NOTE: Approximately two minutes after crew dispatches an
operator to the MSVH, report that the "B" steam generator
PORV is open.
NOTE: When the crew directs the operator to close 1-MS-59,
use the PNID screen to ramp the valve shut over 20 seconds.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized
the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
5) "A" charging pump trip
CH1601, delay time = 5, trigger = 3
and check valve failure
NOTE: Operator/electricians will report "A" charging pump
breaker has an instantaneous overcurrent drop.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes the
unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
6) PRZR spray valve failure
RC4601, delay time = 5, ramp = 150, severity value = 2, trigger = 4
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes the
unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
EVENT
~MALFUNTION/OVERRIDE/COMMU$JICtIN
7) SBLOCA
RC04, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 100, trigger = 5
NOTE: The next event will occur when the crew identifies the
failure of the reactor to trip.
8) ATWS
NOTE: Reactor trip will be initiated approximately 2 minutes
after an operator is dispatched to locally open the reactor trip
breakers. Use PNID to open the breakers.
NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once the crew stops LHSI
pumps, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Page I
ATTACHMENT 3
SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with
Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,
and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.
GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
A.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,
especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink
availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated
with plant evolutions.
B.
During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by
prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative
procedures.
C.
During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves
conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary
information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.
D.
During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and
based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation
strategy.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that aunit shutdown for refueling is in progress, the crew will
shutdown "C" main feedwater pump IAW 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater
System," before continuing with the unit shutdown.
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R407
Remove a main feedwater pump from operation
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that a unit shutdown for refueling is in progress, the crew will
continue with the unit shutdown in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power
Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
None
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
PagelI
EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a controlling SG steam flow channel
has failed, the crew will respond JAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital
Instrumentation."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure
S70
Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.
Safety Significance:
Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew
performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.
Cues:
The controlling SG steam flow channel has failed low.
Main feed reg valve is going closed.
Actual SG level is decreasing.
Performance Indicator:
BOP places controller for 1-FW-FCV-1478 in manual and controls "A" SG level.
Feedback:
SG level does not decrease to reactor trip setpoint.
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to reactor trip on low SG level.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew
will respond IAW l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase".
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew stops power increase.
Safety Significance:
Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average coolant
temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality. This would mean the
following could not be assured: 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed
temperature range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P- 12
interlock is above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.
Cues:
Indication of power increase:
"* Several annunciators. (i.e. PRZR Hi/Lo Press, PRZR Lo Level)
"* Reactor power increasing.
"* Steam flow increasing.
Performance Indicator:
BOP reduces turbine load until power is < pre-event value.
Feedback:
Reactor power increase stopped
Steam flow decreased
WOG Reference:
None
Conditions:
Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on over power.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a loss of the running charging pump
concurrent with a failed open discharge check valve has occurred, the crew
will respond in accordance with l-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R572 Restore charging flow following a loss of normal charging
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open,
the crew will be expected to respond LAW 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor
Coolant System."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System pressure
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page 1
CT Statement:
Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.
Safety Significance:
Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes
"mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to
fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the
spray valve represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or
combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."
Cues:
Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication
of RCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed
by 1-AP-44.
Performance Indicator:
RO places controller for 1-RC-PCV-1455A in MANUAL
RO closes 1-RC-PCV-1455A.
Feedback:
RCS pressure decrease stopped.
WOG Reference:
N/A
Conditions:
Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray line fails causing a
small-break LOCA, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-16,
"Increasing Primary Plant Leakage," and l-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R520
R185
R186
Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage
Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.
Determine the appropriate recovery procedure following the actuation of a reactor trip with
a safety injection.
S69
Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications.
CRITICAL TASK:
N/A
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
EVENT GOAL:
Given that the unit is at power, and a valid ATWS condition exists
concurrent with a SBLOCA, the crew will respond IAW 1-FR-S. 1,
"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or
Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:
R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS
S94
Classify an emergency event
S85
Notify the appropriate personnel of emergency events.
CRITICAL TASK:
See next page.
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
CT Statement:
Crew take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.
Safety Significance:
Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an
unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative
reactivity constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect
reactivity control."
Cues:
Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a
failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.
Performance Indicator:
RO manually insert control rods if rod speed decreases to < 72 spin.
RO place in-service boric acid transfer pump in fast speed.
RO open emergency borate valve 1-CH-MOV-1350
- OR
Crew dispatch operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment #3, Remote
Feedback:
"* Control rods moving in or fully inserted.
"* Emergency boration flow indicated.
"* Neutron flux decreasing.
"* Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.
"* Rod bottom lights on.
"* IRPIs indicating zero.
"* Neutron flux < 5%.
WOG Reference:
FR-S. 1 - Background Document
Conditions:
Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 5
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 5
REV
TIR NUMBER
REASON
1
N02-0293
Revised old scenario for use as a "spare."
Scenario NRC 5-DRR
Page I
DOMINION
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
INITIAL LICENSE CLASS
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION
SCENARIO NRC 5
NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO
EVENT
DESCRIPTION
1.
Shift Service Water pumps
2.
Loss of "H" emergency bus
3.
Ramp unit for waterbox repairs
4.
Letdown PT-145 fails low
5.
"B" SW pump trips/loss of SW header flow
6.
"B" SG steam flow channel fails high
7.
Scenario Recapitulation:
Malfunctions after EOP entry
Total Malfunctions
Abnormal Events
Major Transients
EOPs Entered
EOP Contingencies
Critical Tasks
2 (LOCA outside containment, failure of charging pump suction
to swap to RWST.)
6 (Loss of 1 H emergency bus, LOCA outside containment,
Letdown pressure transmitter failure, Service Water pumps trip,
SG steam flow transmitter failure, failure of charging pump
suction to swap to RWST.)
4 (Loss of 1 H emergency bus, Service Water pumps trip, SG
steam flow transmitter failure, failure of charging pump suction to
swap to RWST.)
1 (LOCA outside containment)
1 (E-O)
1 (ECA- 1.2)
2 (Manually align charging pump suction to RWST, isolate LOCA
outside containment)
SCENARIO DURATION
90 Minutes
Scenario NRC
P
Revision 0
Page 2
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY
SCENARIO NRC 5
The scenario begins with both units at 100% power. Unit 1 has just returned to full power
following a load reduction for seal repairs to 1-FW-P-1B.
C MFW pump had been tagged for
coupling repairs, which were completed while the unit was at reduced power.
1H EDG was
tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the
area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G. Shift orders are to place both unit-l service water
pumps in service and secure both unit-2 service water pumps in preparation for maintenance on 2
SW-P-1B.
When requested, reduce power as determined by Engineering in preparation for
removing the "C" waterbox from service for tube plugging.
The first event will be for the BOP to shift Service Water pumps as directed by the
turnover. After the BOP has shifted Service Water pumps, the next event will occur.
The "H" emergency bus normal feeder breaker will trip due to a breaker relay failure. 1H
emergency diesel will auto-start but will fail to load. The resulting secondary transient will cause
reactor power to increase, and the crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-38, "EXCESSIVE
LOAD INCREASE," and reduce reactor power to less than 100%. Once the crew has stabilized the
unit, the crew will be expected to respond IAW 0-AP-10, "LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER,"
and restore power to the 1H 4160-volt bus. After power has been restored, the next event will
occur.
The crew will receive a request to reduce unit power for waterbox repairs and will
commence reducing unit power. Once the crew has ramped the unit a sufficient amount, the next
event will occur.
Letdown PT-145 will fail low causing PCV-145 to close fully. The RO will be expected to
determine that the transmitter has failed and respond IAW annunciator C-B11, "LO PRESS
LETDWN REL LINE HI TEMP," and isolate letdown. Once the RO has isolated letdown and
placed excess letdown in service, the next event will occur.
1-SW-P-1B will trip, resulting in a loss of"B" SW header flow. The crew will be expected
to respond JAW 0-AP-12, "LOSS OF SERVICE WATER," and direct the unit-2 operator to start 2
SW-P-lA. The pump will trip on restart and the crew must direct unit-2 operator to start 2-SW-P
1B and align to "B" header. After flow has been restored and the SW system verified stable, the
next event will occur.
B SG steam flow channel fails high causing "B" SG MFRV to open. The BOP will be
expected to respond IAW 1-AP-3, "LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION," and take manual
control of SG level. After the crew has referred to the MOP to place the channel in trip, the next
event will occur.
The check valves from the RCS Cold Legs to the LHSI Pumps will begin to experience
backleakage. The LHSI pump discharge check valves will hold causing relief valves 1-SI
RV-1 845A, B, & C to lift. This will result in a "SFGDS AREA SUMP HI/HI-HI LEVEL"
annunciator A-CI and a high and high-high alarm on I -RM-VG-1 12/113. The crew should
determine that based on increased charging, the increased pumping of the safeguards sump,
Scenario NRC I
Page 3
Revision 0
and the alarm on the "B" vent stack that there is an RCS leak outside the containment. The
crew will be expected to respond IAW l-AP-16, "INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT
LEAKAGE," and isolate letdown, maximize charging, and start a VCT makeup. The leak
will degrade until PRZR level cannot be maintained, and the crew will manually trip the
reactor and enter l-E-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION." After verifying
the immediate actions, the crew will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually
initiate SI. Train B Sl will fail to actuate. VCT level will decrease and the charging pump
suction will not auto-swap to the RWST. The crew will manually open the charging pump
suctions from the RWST. The crew will continue in l-E-0 until directed to transition to I
ECA-1.2, "LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT". The scenario may be terminated after
the LOCA is isolated IAW l-ECA-1.2, or as directed by the Chief Examiner.
Scenario NRC 1
Page 4
Revision 0
SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET
Read the following to the crew:
Purpose:
This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks
associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be
completed in accordance with approved operations standards.
9. You are on a day shift during the week.
10. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.
Unit Status:
Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1442 and core age is 2000. The amount of RCS dilution
required to raise temperature one degree is
gallons and the boration required to lower temperature
one degree is
gallons. Aux steam is on unit 1. The unit has just returned to full power following a
load reduction for seal repairs on B MFW pump. C MFW pump, which had been tagged for
coupling repairs, was returned to service while the unit was at reduced power.
Unit 2 is at 100% power.
Equipment Status:
1H EDG was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator has reported
thunderstorms in the area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G.
Shift Orders:
Place unit 1 service water pumps in service and secure unit 2 service water pumps
in preparation for maintenance on 2-SW-P-1B. When requested, reduce power as
determined by Engineering in preparation for removing the C waterbox from service
for tube plugging.
Scenario NRC 1
Page 5
Revision 0
EVENT 1: Ginen ashi 6rdersrequir& serqie water pumps to be swapped to uht inj seve
thec*r6*il! st*t *nd sto pupJ
I
O
- P-44
Shifhng Servce
rat
r Comp nens'.
..
TIMEEXPECTEAC
INSTRUCTORREMARKS
BOP dispatches watchstander to locally verify that 1
SW-P-lA and 1-SW-P-1B are ready to start.
BOP verifies service water spray valves and bypass
valves aligned.
BOP starts 1-SW-P-lA.
BOP directs unit-2 operator to stop 2-SW-P-lB
BOP verifies service water parameters normal.
BOP starts 1-SW-P-1B.
BOP directs unit-2 operator to stop 2-SW-P-IA.
BOP verifies service water parameters normal.
BOP informs US that PT-62.2.1 must be performed on
both units.
NOTE: The next event may occur once unit 1 SW
pumps are running, or at the direction of the lead
evaluator.
Scenario NRC 1
Page 6
Revision 0
>>the buisn m codnewt
,10,
"tLss>>6:f Eie~ctiaiPowver ."
..
..
~TIME
K
EkPCTE AGJN:4>K
K7
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS",'
Crew identifies numerous control board annunciators
and the loss of various "H" bus equipment.
Crew notes reactor power increasing above 100%.
US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-38,
"EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE."
RO verifies steam dumps closed.
BOP reduces reactor power by reducing turbine load.
Crew stabilizes power at less than or equal to 100%.
US directs crew to perform actions of 0-AP- 10,
"LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER."
BOP checks unit- 1 emergency buses.
BOP gives attachment 24 to RO.
BOP checks radioactive releases from both units
secured.
BOP checks unit-2 emergency buses.
BOP gives attachment 23 to unit-2 RO.
BOP checks status of all buses.
Revision 0
Scenario NRC I
Page 7
EF-VENT 2: GOiveu that power to l14iýi
e
6rge'c, bu~ has been lost, tlicr#iwill'resp4
"
td'"othe
resulting powerlncrease in accordance with l -ANP3 8, Excessive Lo'a6 Ierease1 tdie
loss of
the bus i adcordance w'ith 0-AbPg
4
tt&&EiStEl~ial Power."
TIME
EPECTED ACTION .
INSTRUC TOR REMARKS ......
BOP verifies EDGs not the sole source of power to
emergency buses.
BOP notifies US of results of electrical system
diagnosis.
US directs BOP to initiate l-MOP-6.70 for 1H
emergency bus.
Crew directs watchstander/electricians to check the
bus.
US reviews ITS 3.8.1 for more restrictive LCO time
requirements and actions.
NOTE: The watchstander/electricians will report
that the bus has no apparent problems and an
electrician doing routine breaker inspections
accidentally tripped the feeder breaker. There are
no drops in on the bus.
The US will direct that the bus be re-energized from
the "F" transfer bus.
The crew will place various equipment in PTL to
prepare for bus restoration.
The BOP will verify power available to the bus
breakers.
The BOP will dispatch two operators to the rack room
to defeat the UV trip of the feeder breakers OR
dispatch an operator to the SBO building to place the
interlock defeat for 43-15F3 in the SBO position.
The BOP will close 15F3.
The BOP will turn on the sync key for 15H1 1 and
close 15H 11.
switch above he must hold the
C/S in close for 15 seconds.
Scenario NRC 1
Page 8
Revision 0
Scenario NRC 1
EVIENT 2: Givenith'at power ýto' IH 6m&gqicy' ~W~
eri lost, th6ecrew #11i~ 4t
d
the,
~~~~~a
e,
8
.
..
..
...
<<-
,
ess
ivql
>
resulting power incredsein accorda'~
wit l'N8
"Ecsiet'~c
"m
telos
'thf busji accordafc wit &A
,
,Ls:f~lir~
Pow~er.
- K'
~
~
~
TIME
,EXPECTED ACTiON
INSTRUCTORREMARKS
The BOP will check bus parameters and turn of the
sync key.
The BOP will tell the rack room operators that the
defeat switch may be released OR tell the operator in
the SBO room to return the switch to NORM.
If necessary, the BOP will direct an operator to close
the stub bus breaker.
The BOP will direct an operator to re-energize the
480-volt busses.
The crew will direct an operator to shutdown the
diesel fire pump and return it to Auto.
The crew will return equipment switches to their
initial positions.
NOTE: The crew will restore CC flow to the RCPs
and reset rad monitors.
NOTE: The next event will occur once equipment
has been returned to normal, or as directed by the
lead evaluator.
Page 9
Revision 0
Page 10
EVENT 3: G6ivp thatthe uniitsis required tq ke iarnp& dont allow awaterbpx.to be'removed
rom service , q crew wil: idwet p6wer i acbordanee with-
21
i
e
flm Mode
24 tMod& 1...
'TIME
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR RMARKS
US briefs crew on ramp.
NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from
reactor engineer, verified by STA.
RO commences lowering Tave using boration/control
rods.
BOP places turbine control in IMP-IN.
BOP commences decreasing main turbine load
"* Verifies load rate at .3%/rmin
"* Lowers reference setter.
"* Pushes GO button.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead
examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change.
Revision 0
Scenario NRC I
,EVENT 4: Giejni that letdown pr&ssure transmitter) 1
has faid l
thcr
wi
pond in
accordance* wilithe annuinciMto responseV C'or
"LOW PRESS LTtX
tB
L1NE WI
T E I
. .. ...... . .. . .. .. . . .
.. .... .. . . .. . ... . . . . ..
P.
. . . . .. ... . .. .. .... . ..
... . .. .. . .. ..
TIME
EXPECTED.
INSTRUTORREMARKCS
RO identifies letdown flow decreasing/fluctuating and
indicated pressure decreasing to zero.
RO identifies annunciator C-B1
, "LOW PRESS
LETDWN REL LINE HI TEMP."
RO determines letdown relief valve is lifting
RO isolates letdown by closing letdown orifices
isolation valves and letdown isolation valves.
RO places excess letdown in service:
"* Closes 1-CH-HCV-1137
"* Has operator energize loop drains
"* Places 1-CH-HCV-1389 in VCT position
"* Places 1 -CH-FCV- 1122 in manual and closes
"* Opens a loop drain valve
"* Opens I-CH-HCV-1201
"* Slowly opens 1-CH-HCV- 1137
"* Maintains parameters
US informs Instrument Department of failure
NOTE: The next event may occur once excess
letdown has been placed in service, or at the
discretion of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 1
Page Ill
Revision 0
EVENT 5: Giyen1
that th6 unitlis4 powetand a service wate
ha 'trippd the crew wil l 1
r6efrona iha&ordance wlih0-APl, "Loss f
S :W9
te
.TIME,
.... EXPECTED ACTION
....
INS
UOTORRMARKS
BOP identifies annunciators J-H3, "SW PP 1-PiB, 2
PIB AUTO TRIP" and J-B3, "SERV WTR RETURN
BOP identifies 1-SW-P-1B tripped and low flow on
"B" service water header.
US directs crew to enter O-AP-12, "Loss of Service
Water."
BOP checks service water reservoir level normal.
Crew checks for indications of flooding.
Crew verifies service water supply headers intact.
BOP verifies at least one service water pump running
on each supply header. (NO)
Crew performs RNO step and directs unit-2 operator
to start 2-SW-P-lA.
NOTE: The unit 2 operator will report that
2-SW-P-IA started, then tripped.
Crew directs unit-2 operator to start 2-SW-P-1B.
Crew directs watchstander to throttle open 2-SW-Il
and then throttle closed 2-SW-13 to align 2-SW-P-lB
to "B" service water header.
Crew dispatches watchstanders/electricians to
determine reason for pump trips.
BOP verifies service water return header flow normal.
BOP verifies service water system stable.
Revision 0
Scenario NRC I
Page 12
Page 13
EVENT, 5;: Givthat theuit is ~ipe
dsrk
ater pum hras rpete
rWl
tiespond inu accorane w"ith 0-API 23, "Los bfS
'cb Watr.
.3/4
3/4 3/4
..
.
..
TIME
'EXPECTED A,
!kCTI
CTRUCTORREMARKS ;
i
US refers to ITS-3.7.8 and enters action "b" due to two
service water pumps inoperable.
NOTE: The next event may occur once SW flow is
restored, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
Revision 0
Scenario NRC 1
,EVENT 6:. Give ii that, fth u InIit Iis at pow~er adfida sdkcted steam I flo I6 chanh ,el hias failed high, thez
crew Will res6nd in accordance with-ARPA
',LOSS OF ,VITALJ NSTRUMENTATION
4
+
- .
.
.
.
.
..
,:
'
4
- {..
.
TIME
<EXPECTEDQ
ACTION
K
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III failing
high.
US directs crew to perform immediate actions of I
AP-3.
BOP verifies redundant channels normal.
Crew manually controls steam generator level.
"* BOP places "B" MFRV in MANUAL.
"* BOP restores level in "B" SG to normal.
BOP verifies turbine 1st stage pressure channels
normal.
RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels
normal.
RO verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.
RO selects all SGWLC channels to an operable
channel.
BOP verifies that "B" SG steam flow channel III is the
only failed channel.
US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.77.
US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and determines the
channel must be placed in TRIP within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew
identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the direction
of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 1
Revision 0
Page 14
i
cVEN c
7e Gie tat there are
cdiIaions of a LOCA outside containment;ýthe crW-wili respo*d,
mracordancewh1-AP-1 6; "IncreasinhgPrimdry Plant ,Leaage," ! -EýýO "Reat6o tTi or Safety
Inpettion,4 'anOd 1 ECA-f.2 "LOCA Outside Contaiment,'
S[J
- 5
,
rE
TIME',
EXPECTED CIN-
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
Crew identifies annunciator A-C l, "SFGDS AREA
SUMP HI/HI-HI LEVEL".
RO identifies PRZR level decreasing.
US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-16,
"INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE."
RO identifies PRZR level decreasing, isolates
letdown, maximizes charging, and starts a VCT
makeup.
Crew identifies Vent Stack "B" high radiation alarm.
RO identifies PRZR level continuing to decrease.
US directs crew to perform actions of I-E-0,
"REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION."
Crew trips reactor.
BOP trips turbine.
RO verifies AC buses energized.
Crew manually initiates Safety Injection.
Crew identifies that train "A" SI did not actuate.
BOP verifies feedwater isolation (NO).
Scenario NRC 1
Revision 0
Page 15
EVNT'7 Gve
tatthr 4 iflat~h d aLOAoutside, cotizn
te,, re
v'll-respond
,in accordance" with 1"-'AP-,16,; jlntreasirigPrim'ary Plant"Le~akage," lT-EtO "R~~tp
aet
Injectionan
1-ECA-l .2,"LOCA Optside Cntinznen"
TIME
7
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTUCTORRRMARKS
BOP closes main feed MOVs, stops 1-FW-P-lA1 and
1 C1, and places standby feed pump in PTL.
RO/BOP manually initiate phase A.
US initiates phase A attachment.
BOP verifies AFW pumps are running.
RO/BOP verifies SI pumps are running (NO).
Crew starts SI u
s.
BOP verifies available SW pumps running
Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).
NOTE: CREW SHOULD IDENTIFY
CRITICAL TASK
DECREASING VCT LEVEL AS LEAK SIZE IS
INCREASED TO 280 GPM AND
MANUALLY SWAP CHARGING PUMP
SUCTION TO RWST.
Scenario NRC 1
Revision 0
Page 16
EVEN
7:Gi'eh hafthere arefifdicatii~t
O~~tieh~htt~ddcc~i~e~td
an eeodan
e-*
- I AP*6*
ncrasing, Primary Plant eakage, tB E-;
ReactotT ip> o Safet
'in accordance-w~ith Kp~ %A'luraide
imrPLLk
prafety
Inectionand t-C7-*1.2,"OCA, Outside
iontaimnment."
- P
<
TIME
EXPECTED ACTION
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS
NOTE: THE CREW MAY CHOOSE
TO BREAK OFF THE BOP TO
ISOLATE THE LEAK USING 1-ECA
1.2 AS GUIDANCE. THESE STEPS
ARE LISTED LATER
RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.
Crew checks RCS is intact inside containment.
Crew checks if SI should be reduced (NO).
(IS directs (U-2 OATC to initiate O-AP-47
Crew checks RCS conditions normal outside
containment (NO)
US directs transition to 1-ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside
Containment."
NOTE: The crew may have chosen to perform
these actions ahead of time.
Scenario NRC 1
Page 17
Revision 0
EVENT ~7
itnthafttier&ae Thdi6Af6h~taLC
usd
otinxt
Si
Ir~~i
r
fdso
,in accordanhc&with, 1
ary6,lan Leakage',". 1
ý-S- eRaci
or:n f
JulJ etiofl"t' aid -`ECM 2,LOQA> Outsid Continmet.
TIME
EXPECTED ACTI*N
INSTRUCTOR REMARKS ' .
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS
ARE FROM 1-ECA-1.2.
BOP verifies LHSI pump Hot Leg Injection valves
closed.
BOP verifies SI accumulator sample valves closed.
Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.
CRITICAL TASK
BOP closes LHSI pump Cold Leg Injection valves.
"* I-SI-MOV-1890C
"* I-SI-MOV-1890D
BOP closes LHSI pump discharge valves I-SI-MOV
1864A/B.
RO checks RCS pressure increasing. (YES)
US directs transition to 1-E-1, "Loss Of Reactor Or
Secondary Coolant".
NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once crew
acknowl'edges transition to 1-E-d, or at the
discretion of the lead evaluator.
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING STEPS
ARE FROM 1-E-1.
RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.
Scenario NRC
P
Revision 0
Page 18
- EVENT 7 Giveli that thb are
aiiidic*as ofa LO" Aout~side containmen the crev wi1l resjon4
ij accordne
thd !EAP-
16; fi&nrasing Pme y1ant Leaage,"
"Reactor TnporSafety
TIME
& EC
EXPE
L CTE ACTO
NTUCO
SAK
J ~ 6...
.
Oft....
SEXPECTEDORAREMARK
Crew checks secondary radiation.
RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.
Check if SI can be terminated (YES).
US directs transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."
NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the
Lead Evaluator.
Scenario NRC I
Page 19
Revision 0
REFERENCES
Scenario NRC 1
PROQ EDA
HJ.
REV.
3 z
Operating Procedure 0-OP-49.4, "Shifting Service Water Components."
12
Operating Procedure l-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."
68
Operating Procedure 1-OP-8.5, "Operation of Excess Letdown."
14
Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-6.70, "1-EE-SW- 1H, 4160-Volt
25
Emergency Bus."
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."
17
Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."
32
Abnormal Procedure 0-AP- 12, "Loss of Service Water."
25
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP- 16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."
18
Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."
12
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
28
Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
16
Emergency Contingency Procedure l-ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment."
4
Station Annunciator Response Procedures.
N/A
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.
2
INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,
Jan. 1988
INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines
Nov. 1990
Page 20
Revision 0
ATTACHMENTS
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT
I - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS
2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*
5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**
6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**
7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**
8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **
9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *
10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **
Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\
Located in the Instructor Booth.
Scenario NRC I
Revision 0
Page 21
ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 1
Page 22
Revision 0
SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM
Scenario NRC 5
Initial conditions
29. Recall 100% power beginning-of-life IC (IC 173).
30. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.
31. Tag-out 1H EDG per MOP.
32. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 1.1E-3) and allow to
run until "A" SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.
PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START
CONDITION
M........
............
E..
.
Failure of train B SI
SI10702, delay time = 0, trigger = none.
Failure of ll15B and ll15D MOV115B MP=OFF
to auto open
MOV115D MP= OFF
SCENARIO EVENTS
.EVENT
.AL
..
F.UN.TION/OVERRIDS/COM
!UNIýATIONS
1) Shift SW pumps
NOTE: If directed to verify unit 1 SW pumps ready to start,
report that both pumps are ready to start.
NOTE: May need to call and inform BOP as each pump
started that they look fine.
NOTE: If directed to do PT-62.2.1 on both units, reply that you
will print the PTs and perform them at the designated times.
NOTE: The next event may occur once unit 1 SW pumps are
running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 1
Revision 0
Page 23
EVEN!
I
MTTALFU NCTIJON/OVERRIDE/COMM.NICA.
2) Loss of"H" bus
EL0301, delay time = 5, trigger = 2.
NOTE: The watchstander/electricians will report that the bus
has no apparent problems and an electrician doing routine
breaker inspections accidentally tripped the feeder breaker.
There are no drops in on the bus.
NOTE: Report back as necessary from the SBO or rack room
on necessary switch positions.
NOTE: When directed to stop the diesel fire pump and place
it in Auto - wait several minutes and then use trigger 12.
NOTE: The next event will occur once equipment has been
returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.
3) Reduce power for
NOTE: AFTER CREW RESTORES RCP THERMAL
waterbox repairs
BARRIER FLOW AND RESETS R/M HI-HI
ALARMS, CALL IN AS SHIFT SUPERVISORAND
DIRECT CREW TO REDUCE POWER (5% LESS
THAN THE CURRENT POWER) FOR WATERBOX
REPAIRS.
NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead examiner is
satisfied with the reactivity change.
4) Letdown pressure
CH04, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity value = -1, trigger = 4
transmitter fails low
NOTE: When contacted to energize loop drains, wait 1 minute
then use trigger 13.
NOTE: The next event may occur once excess letdown has
been placed in service, or at the discretion of the lead
evaluator.
Scenario NRC
P
Revision 0
Page 24
VzENt
I*
- LFUNCTION/OVERRIDE!COMMUtC ATIONS
5) Unit I"B" SW pump trip,
Unit 2 "A" SW pump trip
Unit 1 "B" pump SWO 102, delay time = 5, trigger = 5
NOTE: When crew directs unit 2 to start 2-SW-P-lA,
implement the following malfunction:
Unit 2 "A" pump SWO104, delay time = 5, trigger 6
NOTE: WHEN DIRECTED TO CHECK SW
PUMP BREAKER(S), REPORT
OVERCURRENT TRIPS.
NOTE: When directed to align 2-SW-P-1B to B header, after 2
minutes use PNID to ramp 2-SW-l1 open and 2-SW-13 closed.
NOTE: The next event may occur once SW flow is restored,
or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
6) CH.111 "B" steam flow
MS0103, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity level = +1, trigger 7
fails high
NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the
appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Scenario NRC 1
Revision 0
Page25
EVENT
I. <MALFUNCTION/OV**
!*i
LFF NVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS.
Scenario NRC 1
7)
outside (109 gpm leak) SI16 = 10, ramp = 5
containment
NOTE: IF DIRECTED TO CHECK
SAFEGUARDS BUILDING, REPORT STEAM
ISSUING FROM UNDER THE DOOR
(280 gpm leak) update S116 to 30, ramp =
NOTE: IF PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND
PRESSURE STABILIZE OR RECOVERTOO
SOON, THEN DO THE FOLLOWING:
(490 gpm leak) update S116 to 55%.
NOTE: IF crew has NOT manually opened charging pump
suction valves from RWST, observe VCT level if VCT is
allowed to empty, take PNID variable CHMOV115E_RACKIN
= F and CHMOV115E = 0, then set CH1201_DEG and
CH1202 both = -1. If crew does NOT restore a suction source
within 30 seconds after VCT empties, trip running charging
pumps.
NOTE: THE SCENARIO MAY BE
TERMINATED ONCE CREW
ACKNOWLEDGES TRANSITION TO 1-E-1,
ORAT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD
EVALUATORt
Page 26
Revision 0