IR 05000336/2003003
| ML032100006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/2003 |
| From: | Brian Mcdermott NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Christian D Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Dominion Resources |
| References | |
| IR-03-003 | |
| Download: ML032100006 (41) | |
Text
July 28, 2003
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 AND UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS 05000336/2003003 AND 05000423/2003003
Dear Mr. Christian:
On June 28, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed inspections at your Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed integrated inspection reports document the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 18, 2003 with Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of your staff.
These inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, NRC has issued five Orders and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance controls over access authorization. In addition to applicable baseline inspections, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148, "Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures," and its subsequent revision to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures required by order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial power nuclear power plants during calendar year 2002 and the remaining inspection activities for Millstone Power Station are scheduled for completion in calendar year 2003. The NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls at Millstone Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
Mr. David NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Brian J. McDermott, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-336, 50-423 License Nos.: DPR-65, NPF-49
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000336/2003003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information Inspection Report 05000423/2003003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Mr. David
REGION I==
Docket No.:
050000336 License No.:
DPR-65 Report No.:
05000336/2003003 Licensee:
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Facility:
Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 Location:
P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Dates:
March 30, 2003 - June 28, 2003 Inspectors:
S. M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector S. R. Kennedy, Resident Inspector P. C. Cataldo, Resident Inspector K. A. Mangan, Resident Inspector L. L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
Approved by:
Brian J. McDermott, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure ii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000336/2003-003; 03/30/2003 - 06/28/2003; Millstone Power Station, Unit 2; Routine
Integrated Report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a regional inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Unit 2 Plant Status The Unit operated at essentially 100% power for the duration of the inspection period with the exception of the period between June 9, 2003 and June 15, 2003. On June 9, 2003, the unit conducted an unplanned power decrease to 77% due to loss of the "A" circulating water pump while the "D" circulating water pump was out of service for maintenance. After completion of repairs to the "D" circulating water pump, the unit was returned to 100% power on June 15, 2003 and operated at essentially 100% power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns.==
The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The following systems were reviewed:
- Reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system partial alignment, Facility 1 on April 23 following an RBCCW valve stroke and timing IST
- Partial alignment of "C" high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system on May 22 during "A" & "B" HPSI system operational tests, in-service tests, and safety injection tank fill
- Partial alignment of "B" motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump on May 1 while "A" MDAFW pump was unavailable for maintenance
- Partial alignment of turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump on April 24 following identification of tin and ferrous material in the "A" MDAFW pump oil sample The inspectors evaluated system and component alignment to identify any discrepancies that would impact system operability. The inspectors reviewed selected valve positions, electrical power availability and the general condition of major system components.
Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors used the licensee procedures and other documents listed below to verify proper system alignment:
- Drawing No. 25203-26005, Condensate Storage and Auxiliary Feed
- OPS 2322, Rev 025-01, Auxiliary Feedwater System
- OPS Form 2610C-002, Revision 019-05, Auxiliary Feedwater System Lineup Verification The inspectors also verified electrical power requirements, labeling, hangers and support installation, and associated support system status. Operating pumps were examined to ensure that any pump leakoff was not excessive and the pumps were properly vented. The walkdowns also included evaluation of system piping and supports against the following considerations:
- Piping and pipe supports did not show evidence of water hammer.
- Oil reservoir levels appeared normal.
- Hangers were within the setpoints.
- Component foundations were not degraded.
A review of outstanding maintenance work orders was performed to verify that the deficiencies did not significantly affect the auxiliary feedwater system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report database to verify that auxiliary feedwater system equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors performed nine walkdowns of fire protection areas during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fire protection program to determine the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures.
The inspectors also reviewed completed surveillances of fire damper operability for selected areas. The fire areas reviewed included:
- East DC Switchgear Room - Auxiliary Building, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-20)
- West DC Switchgear Room - Auxiliary Building, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-21)
"A" Battery Room - Auxiliary Building, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-22)
- Intake Structure Pump Room, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area I-1, Zone A)
- West Cable Vault - Turbine Building, 45'-0" Elevation (Fire Area T-8)
- East Cable Vault - Turbine Building, 45'-0" Elevation (Fire Area T-9)
- RBCCW Pump and Heat Exchanger Area - Auxiliary Building, -25'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-1, Zone B)
- Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Room - Auxiliary Building, -45'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-3)
- Containment Spray and HPSI/LPSI Pump Room - Auxiliary Building, -45'-6" Elevation (Fire Area A-8, Zone A)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) room in the auxiliary building to evaluate the licensees protection of this safety-related system from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report, as well as various licensing and design basis documents, including flooding calculations, to ensure the flooding mitigation plans and as-found conditions in the EDG room remain consistent with assumptions presented in the design basis documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the results of the "B" RBCCW==
heat exchanger inspection, performed in accordance with Maintenance Procedure (MP) 2701J-096, Revision 007, "Service Water Cooled Heat Exchanger Subject to GL 89-13." The inspectors reviewed the inspection results against the preestablished acceptance criteria contained within the procedure, and verified that all acceptance criteria had been satisfied. The inspector also reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report to ensure that heat exchanger inspection results were consistent with the design basis. The inspectors verified that adverse conditions identified by the licensee were appropriately entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors observed the conduct of licensed operator simulator training on April 22, 2003. The inspectors observed licensed operator performance relative to the following activities: training on high-risk licensed operator actions, operators' activities associated with the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and plant experiences. In addition, the inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to verify similarity between the simulator and the Unit 2 control room. The inspectors verified that the training evaluators adequately addressed operator performance issues that were identified during the exercise, and that applicable training objectives had been achieved.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed five maintenance risk assessments during the inspection period. The inspectors verified the conduct and adequacy of scheduled maintenance risk assessments for plant conditions affected by the conduct of the following scheduled maintenance and testing activities:
- Unit 2 Work Schedule for the week of 4/20/03 - maintenance and testing on the "A" and "B" reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system in-service testing (IST) and check valve testing, "B" turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchanger (HX) and valve maintenance with Unit 3 "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) out of service
- Unit 2 Work Schedule for the week of 4/27/03 - maintenance and testing on the refueling water storage tank (RWST) Facility 1 containment sump and shutdown cooling (SDC) system HX valve, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW)pump valve stroke and operational test and one charging pump unavailable
- Unit 2 Work Schedule for the week of 5/19/03 - maintenance and testing on the station blackout diesel, west 480V load center room fan, and lower 4160 switchgear room fan
- Unit 2 Work Schedule for the week of 5/26/03 - maintenance and testing on the TDAFW pump, Facility 1 RWST and SDC HX valve, "B" service water pump outage, and "C" TBCCW HX outage
- Unit 2 emergent work during the week of 6/09/03 - PRA risk review of Temporary Modification to service water supply piping to the "A" EDG The inspectors utilized the Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) quantitative risk assessment tool to evaluate the risk of the above plant configurations and compared the result to the licensee's stated risk. The inspectors also verified that the licensee entered appropriate risk categories and implemented risk management actions as necessary.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
==
On April 3, 2003, the inspectors reviewed personnel performance in response to a failure of a control element assembly (CEA) to insert upon demand. Specifically, during a down power to support scheduled maintenance, a Group 7 CEA failed to insert with the rest of the group when a demand signal was sent. Operations personnel responded to the event by entering the abnormal operating procedure for CEA malfunctions. The CEA was declared inoperable and TS 3.1.3.1, Moveable Control Assemblies, was entered; however, TS 3.1.1.1, Shutdown Margin, was also applicable. The inspectors reviewed operator logs and response procedures. The inspectors also interviewed operators responding to the event and held discussions with senior licensee management regarding the applicability of TS 3.1.1.1. The licensee has since determined that a CEA that remains tripable will remain operable and that TS 3.1.3.1 and TS 3.1.1.1 will only be entered for an inoperable CEA or other required entry conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
==1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations associated with degraded or non-conforming conditions to ensure that operability was justified and that mitigating systems or those affecting barrier integrity remained available and no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory measures to ensure that the compensatory measures were in place and were appropriately controlled. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance to ensure all related technical specification (TS) and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) requirements were met.
The inspectors reviewed the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
- CEA-59 Momentary Trouble Alarm (CR-03-03390)
- Building Filtration System Operability (OD-MP2-046-03)
"A" Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Oil Sample Results Abnormal (ferrous material in oil) (OD MP2-048-03)
- Charging Pump Discharge Check Valves Not Fully Open As Expected (OD MP2-045-03)
- West 480 Volt alternating current (AC) Switchgear Room Temporary Ventilation Installation (CR-03-05497)
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified that Millstone failed to take measures to assure that the design bases were correctly translated into procedures and instructions for the installation of temporary cooling to a 480 volt AC (vital power) switchgear room. This is an issue about which more information is required to determine if it is acceptable, if it is a finding, or if it constitutes a deviation or a violation. This is an unresolved item (URI)pending the licensees evaluation of the potential impact of operability of equipment in the switchgear room and NRC review.
Description.
On June 4, 2003, the licensee identified a service water (SW) leak on the cooling supply line to the safety-related cooler in the West 480 volt AC switchgear room.
The licensee isolated the cooler to affect repairs and entered Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Limiting Condition of Operation(LCO) 3/4.8.2.1B.b, Electrical Switchgear Room Ventilation. The compensatory measures required by the TRM, included the installation of temporary cooling to the switchgear room per Operating Procedure (OP)2315D - "Vital Electric Switchgear Room Cooling." The temporary cooling system consisted of two Appendix R air blowers and several 20' sections of flexible air ducting.
Subsequent to the installation of the equipment, operators determined that the switchgear room temperature could not be maintained below the licensees maximum normal operating temperature limit of 104 degrees. Additional measures were taken to lower the room temperature that included installing additional suction and discharge ducting, and lowering the temperature of a non-vital air-conditioning system that serviced the hallway from which the blowers were drawing air. The switchgear room temperature was stabilized as a result of these efforts.
In February 1999 and October 2000, the licensee developed design calculations and a technical evaluation to specify compensatory measures for a loss of cooling to the West 480 Volt AC switchgear room, including temporary equipment installation, location, and specific flow path designation. The inspectors reviewed the licensees design calculations and technical evaluation to verify that the design bases for the compensatory measures were sufficient to ensure operability of the vital switchgear during all design basis events. The inspectors determined that the flow path developed in the design basis calculations had not been translated to the procedure (OP 2315D, Revision 11) which was used to install the compensatory measures to the switchgear rooms on June 4, 2003. The inspectors further found that a subsequent revision to the procedure (Revision 12), issued while the compensatory measures were in place, they had not been fully implemented nor was sufficient guidance provided for installation of the blowers and ducting. This is an unresolved item (URI) pending the licensees evaluation of the potential impact of operability of equipment in the switchgear room and NRC review. URI 05000336/2003003-01, West 480 Volt AC Switchgear Ventilation Lineup.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds
Refer to NRC Inspection Report 0500423/2003003, Section 1R16, for specific details.
==1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
A plant modification that provides cooling water to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump motor bearings was reviewed by the inspectors to ensure that the modification did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or functional capability of any safety-related structures, systems or components. The design bases of the motor driven AFW pumps were evaluated to ensure that the installed modification did not introduce the potential for common cause failures or unanalyzed conditions that could affect plant risk. The inspection also included a review of seismic qualifications to verify that the structural integrity of the modified cooling water supply piping, to the motor driven AFW pump bearings, remained acceptable for all accident conditions. The inspectors verified that the modified flow path did not adversely impact AFW design flow.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance test (PMT) activities during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test activities to determine whether the tests were performed in accordance with the approved procedures. The inspectors assessed the tests adequacy by comparing the test methodology to the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the test acceptance criteria to verify whether the test criteria demonstrated that the tested components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. In addition, the inspectors verified that any identified deficiencies were entered into the licensees corrective action program. The following maintenance activities and specified post-maintenance tests were evaluated:
- A" Charging System Discharge Check Valve Replacement (AWO M2-03-03343)
"B" Containment Spray Pump Assembly (AWO M2-00-6514)
- Replacement of Service Water Spool Piece and Modification ("B" RBCCW HX, Service Water Side)(AWO M2-02-12725)
"C" RBCCW Heat Exchanger Relief Valve Repair (AWO M2-03-06952)
- 2-SW-231A "A" EDG Heat Exchanger Service Water Bypass Valve Repair (AWO M2-02-09172)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
The inspectors reviewed six surveillance activities, including two in-service testing (IST)activities during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance of surveillance testing of structures, systems, and components to ensure these systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions and to ensure related technical specifications (TS) and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) requirements were met. The inspectors reviewed surveillance testing activities associated with the following:
"B" Containment Spray (CS) Pump Operability Test (SP-2606B)
"B" Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Operability Test (SP-2604D)
"A" Charging System Discharge Check Valve Test (SP 2601I)
"C" RBCCW Pump Discharge Check Valve IST (SP-2611F)
"A" MDAFW Pump Operability Test, Facility (SP-2610A)
The inspectors attended test briefs, verified selected prerequisites and precautions, and verified the tests were performed in accordance with the procedural steps. The inspectors also reviewed completed data sheets and verified that TS requirements were met.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification (TM-2-03-004) for service water supply piping to the "A" emergency diesel generator to verify that the temporary modification did not affect the safety function of important safety systems. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications to ensure the modification did not affect system operability or availability.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period from the 3rd quarter of 2002 through the 1st quarter of 2003. PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
Reactor Safety Cornerstone
- Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours
- Scrams with loss of normal heat removal
- Unplanned power changes per 7000 hours0.081 days <br />1.944 hours <br />0.0116 weeks <br />0.00266 months <br />
- Safety System Unavailability - Emergency AC Power System The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports, monthly operating reports, plant process computer power history information, condition reports (CRs) and NRC inspection reports to identify significant plant power changes and plant trips that occurred from the 3rd quarter of 2002 through the 1st quarter of 2003. The inspectors also reviewed system engineering tracking data to verify the accuracy of the EDG system unavailability data. The inspectors compared this information with the licensees data reported to the NRC for the time period listed above.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of condition report (CR) 02-07452, which was associated with the potential for emergency diesel generator (EDG) operability to be impacted by specific electrical alignments of the service water (SW) or reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) pumps. The specific conditions that were reviewed involved either pump pair being aligned to the same electrical facility and being started simultaneously. This review was conducted to ensure that the full extent of condition was identified, the issue was properly evaluated and appropriate corrective actions were identified and implemented. Additional CRs and other documents associated with this review are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup 71152
(Closed) LER 05000336/2003002-00, Reactor Trip While Performing RPS Matrix Testing On March 7, 2003 with the unit in Mode 1 at 100% power, an automatic reactor trip occurred during normal monthly Reactor Protection System (RPS) matrix testing due to a fault in the test circuitry. An extent of condition review determined that the strain failure of the wiring was limited to matrix relay trip select switches in the RSP test modules requiring adapter plates, and additional suspect switches were replaced during troubleshooting. The inspectors determined that the licensee entered the issues into the corrective action program and had taken actions to fix the problems. No additional findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented this event in CR-03-02300 which was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 05000336/2003006. This LER is closed.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
Integrated Report Exit Meeting Summary On July 18, 2003, the resident inspectors presented the overall inspection results to Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- A. Price, Site Vice President - Millstone
- A. Jordan, Director, Nuclear Engineering
- S. Sarver, Director, Nuclear Station Operations & Maintenance
- S. Scace, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
- R. Burnham, Design Engineering
- D. Fredericks, Licensing
- D. Dodson, Licensing
- M. Kai, Safety Analysis
- J. Bergin, Nuclear Training
- N. Sacco, Piping and Engineering Mechanical
- M. Marino, Engineering, Mechanical Projects
- M. Doucette, Engineering, Mechanical Projects
- W. Bellows, IST Group
- H. Thompson, Engineering, Secondary
- R. Schreiner, Engineering, Electrical/I&C Projects
- W. Saputo, Engineering, Nuclear Steam Supply Systems
- T. Moore, Engineering, Water Systems
- C. Maxson, Engineering, Nuclear
NRC personnel
- S. M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. R. Kennedy, Resident Inspector
- P. C. Cataldo, Resident Inspector
- K. A. Mangan, Resident Inspector
- L. L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000336/2003003-01 URI West 480 Volt AC Switchgear Ventilation Lineup (Section 1R15)
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
- 05000336/2003002-00 LER Reactor Trip While Performing RPS Matrix Testing (Section 4OA3)
Discussed
None