IR 05000277/2004009
| ML042190370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2004 |
| From: | Doerflein L NRC/RGN-I/DRS/SB |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-04-009 | |
| Download: ML042190370 (14) | |
Text
August 6, 2004
SUBJECT:
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000277/2004009, 05000278/2004009
Dear Mr. Crane:
On July 2, 2004, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an engineering team inspection at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. The enclosed report documents the results of that inspection which were discussed with Mr. Eilola, and other members of your staff, on July 2, 2004.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted of a review of selected procedures and records, examination of components and systems, observation of activities, and interviews with site personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Systems Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-277, 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44, DPR-56
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000277/2004009 and 05000278/2004009
Mr. John L. Skolds
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket Nos:
50-277, 50-278 License Nos:
05000277/2004009, 05000278/2004009 Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location:
1848 Lay Road Delta, Pennsylvania Dates:
06/14-06/18/2004 and 06/28-07/02/2004 Inspectors:
Michael Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Team Leader Christopher Cahill, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS Aniello Della Greca, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS Brice Bickett, Reactor Inspector, DRS Carey Colantoni, Reactor Inspector, DRS Thomas Sicola, Reactor Inspector, DRS Dante Johnson, Reactor Engineer (Trainee)
Approved by:
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Systems Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure ii SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000277/2004009, 05000278/2004009; on 06/14-18/2004 and 06/28-07/02/2004; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Engineering Team Inspection Report.
The inspection was conducted by six regional based reactor inspectors. This inspection identified no significant findings. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html A.
Inspector Identified Findings None B.
Licensee Identified Violations None
Enclosure Report Details 1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (IP 71111.21)
a.
Inspection Scope The plant response of containment heat removal equipment followed by containment venting to a transient without power conversion system initiating event sequence formed the basis for this inspection. Specifically, the team evaluated the residual heat removal system in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation followed by containment venting. The inspectors also reviewed systems that interface with the residual heat removal system in response to the initiating event, such as the high pressure service water system. The inspectors reviewed the design basis documents, Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and design output documents associated with residual heat removal, high pressure service water, and containment venting. The design output documents reviewed included system calculations, piping and instrumentation drawings, and one-line diagrams. This review was performed to determine whether the system and component functional requirements during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions were met and to ensure consistency with various design documents, design specifications, and control diagrams.
The inspectors specifically reviewed the design capability of major risk significant components of the systems including the residual heat removal pumps, the heat exchangers, the heat exchanger bypass valves, and the high pressure service water pumps. Inquiry into the capability of the high pressure SW pumps led to a review of the importance of the Conowingo Pond and its back-up, the emergency cooling tower.
Electrical, control, and instrument systems that support these major components were reviewed. These reviews were performed to determine if the design basis was in conformance with the licensing commitments, regulatory requirements, and design output documents.
Selected mechanical, heat transfer, hydraulic, and electrical calculations and analyses were reviewed to verify the appropriate input assumptions were used and that the assumptions applied to the current system and plant configuration. The inspectors verified that adequate engineering methods were utilized and the technical bases supported the conclusions. The inspectors selected some design and electrical calculations and performed independent calculations to evaluate their adequacy. The inspectors also verified that recent plant modifications would not adversely affect the systems. The inspectors reviewed the effect of degraded voltage, voltage drop, and emergency diesel loading on the electrical system to verify that adequate protection existed.
Enclosure The inspectors reviewed some of the procedures used to operate the residual heat removal, high pressure service water, and containment venting systems to verify that procedure actions matched the design analysis assumptions. The types of procedures reviewed included: system operating procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, alarm responses, and surveillance tests. Surveillance test acceptance criteria and component performance data were compared with design analysis limits to determine if the design margin of the system was maintained and properly monitored.
The inspectors reviewed the operator training lesson materials to ensure that these materials appropriately describe the design limits, functions and design features of the systems.
Several walkdowns of accessible portions of the residual heat removal and high pressure service water systems were performed to verify the physical installation of the system and to verify consistency with design documents, calculations, assumptions, and installation specifications. During these walkdowns, the inspectors examined the material condition, and the physical line-up of major components, including pumps, valves, piping, supports, heat exchangers, instrumentation, and breakers. The inspectors used walkdowns to verify that selected station procedures were adequate to accomplish the intended tasks and that the appropriate equipment was staged at the specified locations to assist operators in performing the appropriate manual actions when required by station procedures. The inspectors also interviewed site personnel, including licensed and non-licensed operators, system engineers, and maintenance personnel, regarding the operation and performance of the systems.
The inspectors observed the normal system environmental conditions to verify plant conditions were bounded by the equipment qualification assumptions and considered the accident condition environment that may be incurred in these locations. Inspectors reviewed the administrative controls on temporary modifications to assure physical system protection is maintained for earthquake, fire and flooding as described in design documents.
A sample of preventive maintenance activities were reviewed to verify that maintenance was performed as scheduled using controlled procedures and that individual components and the overall system met its design basis function during the maintenance evolution. The inspectors evaluated a sample of surveillance and post-maintenance test results to verify system capability.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with the residual heat removal, high pressure service water, and containment venting systems, as identified in the attachment, to verify the licensee was identifying issues at an appropriate threshold, entering them in the corrective action program, and taking appropriate corrective actions.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Eilola and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 2, 2004.
The inspectors reviewed some proprietary documents during this inspection. These were either destroyed or returned to the licensee. The inspectors verified that the inspection report does not contain proprietary information.
A-1 Attachment ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel E. Eilola, Director - Operations S. Allen, Regulatory Assurance Analyst J. Jordan, Manager - Mechanical Design Engineering A. Knoll, Risk Management C. Behrend, Sr. Manager Plant Engineering T. Wasong, Training Director M. Newcomber, Sr. Manager Design Engineering C. Wiederbam, Operations Support Manager D. Mohre, Nuclear Oversight J. Heyne, Maintenance Director NRC Personnel C. Smith, Sr Resident Inspector D. Schroeder, Resident Inspector LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Opened and Closed None
A-2 Attachment LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Administrative Procedures MAG-CG-406, Flow Assisted Corrosion Program, Rev. 5 MAG-CG-409, Raw Water Corrosion Program, Rev. 3 Calculations ME-500, Determine the Adequacy of the Proposed ESW System Lineup with all ESW Flow over One Cell Instead of Two, Rev. 1 PM-0525, Set Pressure for the Torus Hardened Vent Rupture Disc, Rev. 3 PM-546, Torus Hardened Vent-Flow Calculation, Rev. 3 PM-575, Verify Emergency Heat Sink has Sufficient Capacity for Removing Heat from the Plants Systems in the Event the Normal Heat Sink is Unavailable, Rev. 1 ME-3, RHR Heat Exchanger Inlet Pressures for All Modes of RHR/HPSW Operation ME-171, RHR Pump Discharge Pressure ME-0530, Determination of Primary Containment Pressure Limit A, B, and C, Rev. 0 PEAM-0003, Evaluation of Pump Structure Ventilation System Design PM-0589, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Rev. 4 PM-1010, RHR Pump NPSH Design Baseline Documents P-S-27, Emergency Cooling Water System, Rev. 9 P-S-09, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 14 PM-546, Torus Hardened Vent, Rev. 2 PM-924, Hardened Vent Rupture Disk Evaluation for Post-LOCA Conditions Based on Re-rate Power, Rev. 0 P-S-25A, Primary Containment Pressure Suppression System, Rev. 10 P-S-25B, Primary Containment Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 9 P-S-26, Primary Containment Isolation System, Rev. 4 SE-3 Bases, Loss of Conowingo Pond, Rev. 10 P-S-04, High Pressure Service Water System, Rev. 10 P-T-12, Design Basis Accidents, Transients, and Events, Rev. 5 P-T-15, Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 4 Trip/Samp Curves, Tables, and Limits - Bases, Rev. 7 T-102, Primary Containment Control - Bases, Rev. 17 Modifications 05236, Torus Hardened Vent ECR PB 02-00049-000, TS Change to Increase Maximum Allowable River Water Temperature ECR PB 02-00563-001, PCV-3-36B-3502A ECR PB 03-00517-000, PCV-3-36B-3502A Needs Safety Related/Dedicated Regulator ECR PB-01-00400, 3/4" RHR Pump Discharge Instrument Line, Rev. 3, June 2002
A-3 Attachment ECR PB-00-001681, Error in GE Containment Analysis for Power Rerate, Rev. 0, Feb 2001 ECR-PB-01-00096, RO-3789D Down Stream Piping Wall Thinning, January 2002 ECR-PB-01-00047, Through Wall Leak on U3 HPSW Piping, January 2001 Self-Assessments PB NRC SSDI Readiness FASA, May 24 -28, 2004 PB Maintenance Standards & Practices FASA, February 2003 PB Human Error Prevention FASA, March 2003 PB Use of OPEX by Maintenance FASA, May 2004 Specifications 6280-M-78, Emergency Cooling Tower, Addendum No. 1, Rev. 5 NE-164, Specification for Environmental Service Conditions, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3, Rev. 4 P&IDs 6280-M-367, Containment Atmospheric Control System, Rev. 83 6280-M-315, P & I Diagram Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, SH 1, Rev. 65 6280-M-315, P & I Diagram Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, SH 3, Rev. 51 6280-M-361, P & I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System, SH 3, Rev. 65 6280-M-361, P & I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System, SH 4, Rev. 67 6280-M-367, P & I Diagram Containment Atmosphere Control System, SH 1, Rev. 83 Drawings T-100, Scram, SH1, Rev. 10 T-101, RPV Control, SH 1, Rev. 17 T-102, Primary Containment Control, SH 1, Rev. 15 T-102, Primary Containment Control, SH 2, Rev. 14 T-102, Primary Containment Control, SH 3, Rev. 1 T-103, Secondary Containment Control SH, Rev.14 T-104, Radioactive Release, SH 1, Rev. 8 T-111, Level Restoration, SH 1, Rev. 11 T-112, Emergency Blowdown, SH 1, Rev. 14 T-116, RPV Flooding, SH 1, Rev. 12 T-116, RPV Flooding, SH 2, Rev. 1 T-117, Level/Power Control, SH 1, Rev 13 Operability Evaluations
A-4 Attachment LSA #03-48, Failure AO-3-07B-3514 04-008, 2DE024, RHR Heat Exchanger D 03-045, MO-3-10-025A Pressure Seal Leak 03-017, 3C RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Isolation Valves Procedures RT-M-07B-950-2, Torus Hardened Vent Rupture Disc Integrity Test, Rev. 2 SE-3, Loss of Conowingo Pond, Rev. 16 SE-4, Flood, Rev. 20 SO 48.1.B, Emergency Cooling Water System Startup, Rev. 11 T-200-2, Primary Containment Venting, Rev. 9 T-200A-2, Containment Venting via the 2 in Torus Vent to SBGTS, Rev. 3 T-200B-2, Primary Containment Venting via the 2 in. Drywell Vent to SBGTS, Rev. 3 T-200C-2, Containment Venting via the 6 in. ILRT Line from the Torus, Rev. 7 T-200D-2, Containment Venting via the Torus 18 in. Vent to SBGTS, Rev. 3 T-200E-2, Containment Venting via the Torus Purge Supply Line, Rev. 3 T-200F-2, Containment Venting via the 6 in. ILRT Line from the Drywell, Rev. 3 T-200G-2, Containment Venting via the Drywell 18 in. Vent to SBGTS, Rev. 2 T-200H-2, Containment Venting via the Drywell Purge Supply Line, Rev. 3 T-200J-2, Containment Venting via the Torus Hardened Vent, Rev. 1 Surveillance & Completed Surveillance Test Procedures RT-O-40C-530-2, Drywell Temperature Monitoring, Rev.5, completed March 12, 2004 ST-O-033-310-2, ESW Booster and ECW Pump and Valve Functional Inservice Test, Rev. 6 ST-O-098-02N-2, Daily Surveillance Log, Rev. 18 RT-X-010-661-3, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Calculation Test, Rev. 3, completed March 4 & 9, 2004 RT-X-010-661-3, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Calculation Test, Rev. 3, completed March 9, 2004 ST-M-07C-450-3, CAD Injection and Vent Valves In-Service Test, Rev. 14, completed March 23, 2004 ST-M-07C-450-3, CAD Injection and Vent Valves In-Service Test, Rev. 14, completed June 2, 2004 ST-O-010-301-2, A RHR Loop Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and Inservice Test, Rev. 20, completed February 20, 2004 ST-O-010-306-2, B RHR Loop Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and Inservice Test, Rev. 22, completed March 3, 2004 ST-O-010-350-2, RHR Loop A and Cross Tie Valve Position and Filled and Vented Verification, Rev. 6, completed April 21, 2004 ST-O-010-350-2, RHR Loop A and Cross Tie Valve Position and Filled and Vented Verification, Rev. 6, completed May 19, 2004 ST-O-010-355-2, RHR Loop B Valve Position and Filled and Vented Verification, Rev. 3, completed April 21, 2004 ST-O-010-355-2, RHR Loop B Valve Position and Filled and Vented Verification, Rev. 3,
A-5 Attachment completed May 27, 2004 ST-O-010-401-2, RHR Manual Isolation Valves Remote Position Indication Verification, Rev. 0, completed September 24, 2002 ST-O-010-420-2, RHR Loop X-Tie Valve Position Functional Test, Rev. 3, completed September 26, 2002 ST-O-010-490-2, RHR A Loop Stayfull Supply Check Valve Functional Test, Rev. 8, completed September 13, 2002 ST-O-010-495-2, RHR B Loop Stayfull Supply Check Valve Functional Test, Rev. 5, completed September 20, 2002 ST-O-010-501-2, RHR Loop A Valves Remote Position Indication Verification, Rev. 3, completed November 20, 2002 ST-O-010-506-2, RHR Loop B Valves Remote Position Indication Verification, Rev. 3, completed March 2, 2004 ST-O-032-301-2, HPSW Pump, Valve, and Flow Functional and Inservice Test, Rev. 18, completed April 4, 2004 ST-O-032-350-2, HPSW Valve Alignment Verification, Rev. 0, completed May 10, 2004 ST-O-032-350-2, HPSW Valve Alignment Verification, Rev. 0, completed April 12, 2004 ST-O-032-501-2, HPSW Valves Remote Position Indication Verification, Rev. 3, completed July 17, 2002 ST-O-007-510-2, PCIS Valves Remote Position Indication Verification, Rev. 4 Safety Evaluation and 50.59 Screens Safety Evaluation for Modification #622, Torus Vent Debris Screens Review for Modification No. 5236, Torus Hardened Vent Peach Bottom Corrective Action Documents A0949485 A1410657 A1059721 A1445708 A1059722 A1470688 A1127102 AR229285229285AR229355 AR229332229332C0207728 C0207897 C0207769 R0474948 R0474943 AR 224369224369A1399310 A1447010 A1447013 A1439515 A1452632 A1470340 CR229332 A1406907 CR181364 A1349541 CR204981 A1446999 A1301534 A1450013 A1453490 A1450051 CR169758 A139534 A1419741 A1431201 A1454398 I0012155 Miscellaneous Documents P-S-27-001, Telephone Memorandum, PBAPS - Emergency Cooling Tower Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Direct Torus Vent Rupture Disc Design Data Sheet
A-6 Attachment Quarterly Ship System Report, PEA -02, CAD/CAC, March 01, 2004 SU# 95, Demonstration Test Report, Emergency Cooling Tower System, April 2, 1973 PLOT-5007, Initial Licensed Operator Training Module - Primary Containment, Rev. 1 PLOT-5010, Initial Licensed Operator Training Module - Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 4 PLOT-5032, Initial Licensed Operator Training Module - High Pressure Service Water, Rev. 1 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment 2002 Update, March 2003 High Pressure Service Water System Health Overview Report, March 2004 RHR and RHR Sample System Health Overview Report, March 2004 2D RHR Heat Exchanger Maintenance History, June 14, 2004 Peach Bottom Unit 2 RHR and Containment Vent Component Importances Unit 2 HPSW Pump Vibration Data, April 2003-April 2004 Unit 2 RHR Pump Vibration Data, May 2003-May 2004 Unit 3 HPSW Pump Vibration Data, April 2003-March 2004 Unit 3 RHR Pump Vibration Data, May 2003-May 2004 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specifications Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report RHR Heat Exchanger Matrix - Number of Tubes Plugged, May 28, 2004 NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment NRC Information Notice 96-60, Potential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers NRC Information Notice 97-90, Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests Maintenance Work History: MO-2-10-034B, MO-2-10-089B, MO-2-10-039B Analysts, Inc.: HPSW Upper/Lower Bearing Oil Analysis, March-May 2004 Exelon Power labs Report, Failure Analysis of Cooling Coil Loop from 3B HPSW Motor Oil Cooler, December 3, 2003 System Health Overview Report - HPSW (system 32) - March 2004 PB Maintenance Rule Bases: Containment Atmospheric Control (system 7B), June 2004 PB Maintenance Rule Bases: Containment Atmospheric Dilution (system 7C), June 2004 PB Maintenance Rule Bases: RHR SDC (system 10), June 2004 PB Maintenance Rule Bases: HPSW (system 32), June 2004 WO-C0196207, UT Measurement of HPSW Piping Elbow, downstream RO-3789D, January 2001 ASME B&PV Code Case, N-513